Quality Control in Criminal Investigation by Agirre, X. et al.
Edited by Viviane E. Dittrich, Kerstin von Lingen, Philipp Osten and Jolana Makraiová
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation
Xabier Agirre, Morten Bergsmo, Simon De Smet and Carsten Stahn (editors)

  
Quality Control in 
Criminal Investigation 
Xabier Agirre, Morten Bergsmo, 
Simon De Smet and Carsten Stahn  
(editors) 
2020 
Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 
Brussels 
  
Front cover: Master carpenter Lorenzo Corti fine-tuning a piece of European cher-
rywood in the CILRAP Bottega (office) in Florence. Recognized for the high quality 
of his work, he has restored churches and monasteries in Tuscany for many years. 
The books in CILRAP’s Quality Control Project display contemporary Florentine 
artisans as symbols of the mindset of quality control which they seek to inspire. Pho-
tograph: © CILRAP 2020. 
Back cover: Segment of the steps at the entrance of the San Miniato al Monte Basili-
ca, a Romanesque church (from 1013 AD) on a hill-top in southern Florence. The 
surface of each stone is carefully carved by a mason's hand for water to run off and 
for better grip. Photograph: © CILRAP 2020. 
 
 
This and other publications in TOAEP’s Publication Series may be openly accessed 
and downloaded through the web site http://www.toaep.org/, which uses Persistent 
URLs for all publications it makes available (such PURLs will not be changed). This 
publication was first published on 9 November 2020. 
© Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2020 
All rights are reserved. You may read, print or download this publication or any part 
of it from http://www.toaep.org/ for personal use, but you may not in any way charge 
for its use by others, directly or by reproducing it, storing it in a retrieval system, 
transmitting it, or utilising it in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, in whole or in part, without the prior permis-
sion in writing of the copyright holder. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the 
scope of the above should be sent to the copyright holder. You must not circulate this 
publication in any other cover and you must impose the same condition on any ac-
quirer. You must not make this publication or any part of it available on the Internet 
by any other URL than that on http://www.toaep.org/, without permission of the 
publisher. 
ISBNs: 978-82-8348-129-7 (print) and 978-82-8348-130-3 (e-book). 
  
 
Dedicated to those in criminal justice for core international crimes 




PREFACE BY THE CO-EDITORS 
This volume contains a wealth of ideas, sources and information on how 
the investigation and preparation of fact-rich cases can be improved. Cas-
es concerning core international crimes are often fact-rich. The book fo-
cuses on such crimes, but it is also relevant for those who work on certain 
forms of serious fraud, organized crime, and human trafficking. Fact-rich 
cases require time and teams of investigators, analysts and lawyers to 
prepare for trial. They consume resources, sometimes millions of euros. 
There is an immediate public interest in their efficiency and fairness. And 
they can always be improved – the challenge of professionalization is 
common to all criminal investigation and case-preparation. The theme of 
‘quality control’ reflects this fact. It is a general theme; it does not point 
fingers at specific institutions or individuals. The theme invites mobiliza-
tion around the question ‘how can we do better in this investigation or 
case-preparation?’. 
This simple question – how can we do better? – underpins the entire 
Quality Control Project which the Centre for International Law Research 
and Policy (CILRAP) and partners around the world have conducted in 
the period 2012-2020, with support from the Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. During the project, the term ‘quality control’ has started to 
take on prominence in the field of international criminal justice, most 
recently in the final report of the Independent Expert Review of the As-
sembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court. The term 
should be further mainstreamed, to the extent that it becomes a common 
term of workplace discussions. This is one of the motives behind the pro-
ject. To this end, the present book is dedicated to “those in criminal justice 
for core international crimes who never stop questioning the quality of 
their work”. Empowering the working level and line managers in relevant 
criminal justice organizations has been at the forefront of the minds that 
have designed the Quality Control Project. Enabling existing staff in crim-
inal justice agencies to work more critically – and by doing so triggering 
virtuous cycles of better performance – is not only a necessary supple-
ment to recommendations on managerial or normative reform; it may in 
the longer term prove more important to sustainable change. 
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The Quality Control Project has had three legs, focusing on three 
distinct phases of fact-work prior to the criminal trial. The first leg con-
centrated on fact-finding and documentation outside (or prior to) criminal 
justice of violations that may amount to core international crimes, typical-
ly fact-finding by non-governmental organizations or United Nations hu-
man rights bodies. The anthology Quality Control in Fact-Finding was 
first published in November 2013, with a second, expanded edition in July 
2020. The second leg focused on the stage of preliminary examination 
prior to the formal opening of a criminal investigation, leading to the pub-
lication of Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volumes 1 and 2 
in September 2018. 
The present volume is the main outcome of the third leg of the pro-
ject, focusing on the investigative and case-preparatory phase prior to the 
opening of trial. This first edition contains 24 chapters by some of the 
leading experts in the field, as well as forewords by Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda (International Criminal Court), Professor Manoj Kumar Sinha 
(Indian Law Institute), and Professor Gregory S. Gordon (Chinese Uni-
versity of Hong Kong). It is organized in five parts: Part I: The Context, 
Part II: Evidence and Analysis, Part III: Systemic Challenges in Case-
Preparatory Work-Processes, Part IV: Investigation Plans as Instruments 
of Quality Control, and Part V: Judicial and Prosecutorial Participation in 
Investigation and Case Preparation. 
We have sought to include a broad diversity of views in the book. 
We deliberately invited experts who hold very different views on, for ex-
ample, the role of the judiciary in case-preparation or the extent to which 
information technology should be used in the presentation and analysis of 
potential evidence pre-trial. As co-editors we do not necessarily agree 
with all views in the chapters below – nor do the institutions we work for 
share all views. The clash of opinions – which was on display during the 
project conference held at the Indian Law Institute in New Delhi on 22-23 
February 2019 – is important to avoid hegemonic or other imbalances in 
the discourse on these questions, whether by stealth or overt assertion. 
You can make use of the conference presentations through the films and 
podcasts that are available on the conference web page.1 Each film has a 
persistent URL so it can be linked to in your own writing, as several au-
thors in this book have done. 
                                                   
1 See https://www.cilrap.org/events/190222-23-delhi/. 
iii 
The concept paper for this third leg of the Quality Control Pro-
ject2 – as elaborated in the introductory chapter below – outlines seven 
‘bottlenecks’ to effective and fair investigation and preparation of fact-
rich cases. These ‘bottlenecks’ have informed the authors and co-editors 
of the present volume. Most of the subsequent chapters make reference to 
one or more of these ‘bottlenecks’. It may therefore be useful to introduce 
this conceptual taxonomy already here, at the outset of the book:3 (1) 
“The loss or fragmentation of overview of information and potential evi-
dence in the possession of the team during investigation or case-
preparation”; (2) “Inadequate analysis of factual propositions relevant to 
the prosecution’s burden in the case and corresponding evidence”; (3) 
“Irregularity in the team’s daily routine of assessing relevancy and possi-
ble weight of information or potential evidence”; (4) “Vague or non-
substantial formulation of criminal responsibility within the team after it 
has in its possession enough potential evidence”; (5) “Broad use of cumu-
lative charging of crimes and modes of liability – often pursuant to a pre-
cautionary fear of acquittals caused by failure to include a classification, 
not only a desire to ensure accountability for the full range of criminal 
conduct engaged in”; (6) “Excessively long exhibit- and witness-lists in 
the prosecution’s part of the case”; and (7) “Prosecution disclosure to the 
defence of voluminous materials not clearly related to a central hypothesis 
of criminal responsibility”. 
These and other common challenges in the preparation of fact-rich 
cases are being discussed in considerable detail in this book. It is not for 
this foreword to highlight any particular contribution. But we see some 
trends of thought. Firstly, a number of contributors are concerned with 
investigation plans as a tool of continuous quality control from the start of 
a criminal justice agency’s factual analysis of a situation or incident. Part 
IV of the book contains four chapters that discuss investigation plans. 
Secondly, several authors discuss the importance of proper evidence re-
view, especially during the quality control of draft indictments. Chapter 3 
provides a comprehensive overview of key methods. Thirdly, there is an 
emphasis on the importance of understanding the context in which the 
alleged crimes were committed, and on the necessity of using and devel-
oping proper methodologies for factual analysis. Fourthly, avoiding over-
                                                   
2 See Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). 
3 Quoted from the above-mentioned concept paper (footnotes omitted). 
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collection of information and finding new, more rational ways of organiz-
ing disclosure are topics that are thoroughly analyzed, notably in Chapter 
14. Fifthly, there are also detailed chapters on the interviewing of children 
and age determination of possible child soldiers. And sixthly, the quality 
of the legal guidance provided to fact-finders is a further recurring theme 
in the book. If prosecutors blame their investigators for why a case did not 
go well, there is usually cause to look more closely at the work of the 
prosecutors as well. 
Recognizing that criminal justice is an ever-evolving field of prac-
tice, the book does not offer a casuistic or defined catalogue of proposals. 
Rather, the authors develop myriad suggestions and advice which, we are 
confident, will germinate among colleagues both in international and na-
tional criminal justice agencies over the coming years, a sprouting that 
will lead to further refinement and development of approaches. The book 
makes it clear that – although the International Criminal Court has much 
to offer other jurisdictions in this area, as detailed by several chapters – 
the exchange of thoughts and experience should be a two-way stream 
between international and national actors. 
At the end of the day, the strongest assets of a criminal justice agen-
cy are the abilities, efforts and precision of its working-level analysts, 
investigators and prosecutors. More often than not, the leaders of the 
agency represent its greatest risk, as they select the staff, the cases and the 
charges. Perhaps the most important take-away from the book for leaders 
of investigations and case-preparation is their responsibility to build a 
culture of quality control within their agency, division, section or team. At 
a minimum, this means creating an office atmosphere where staff do not 
fear the consequences of raising concerns about quality. But managers 
should do more. They should devise incentive structures to actively en-
courage challenges by staff to the quality of work product. Individual ana-
lysts, investigators and prosecutors, on the other hand, should see it as 
their professional obligation to develop a mindset of quality control. This 
may require more courage to speak up, and a stronger preparedness to let 
institutional loyalties override inter-personal relations, even if this can be 
unpleasant. 
The co-editors and the publisher are committed to releasing new, 
expanded editions of this anthology in the coming years, with a view to 
enhancing its usefulness and quality. We would like the volume to become 
a standard reference book in the field for many years to come. We see 
already now that topics that should be addressed through additional con-
v 
tributions in the second edition include digital evidence, more national 
perspectives on investigation planning, and possible IT-enabling of key 
work-processes in case-preparation.4 
We would like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for its financial support to the Quality Control Project, and the Indian Law 
Institute in New Delhi for co-organising and hosting the project confer-
ence on which the book is based. We are also grateful to CILRAP’s many 
friends in New Delhi, in particular Professor Manoj Kumar Sinha (Direc-
tor, Indian Law Institute), Justice Madan B. Lokur (former Judge, Su-
preme Court of India), Ambassador Narinder Singh (former Legal Adviser, 
Ministry of External Affairs of India), and Professor Usha Tandon (Delhi 
University) as well as the Indian co-operating partners for the New Delhi 
conference: the Campus Law Centre of University of Delhi, Maharishi 
Law School, Jindal Global University, and the Indian Society of Interna-
tional Law. Finally, we thank Mr. LEE Wai Chun, Mr. Subham Jain and 
Mr. Antonio Angotti of the Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher for me-
ticulous and patient copy-editing. 
Xabier Agirre Aranburu 
Morten Bergsmo 
Simon De Smet 
Carsten Stahn 
Co-Editors 
                                                   
4 See Morten Bergsmo, “Decomposition Works in Our Favour”, Policy Brief Series No. 114 
(2020), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2020 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-




FOREWORD BY FATOU BENSOUDA 
I was pleased to accept the co-editors’ invitation to write a foreword for 
this volume – Quality Control in Criminal Investigation – as ensuring 
effective and efficient investigations have been a central focus of our ef-
forts since I assumed my mandate as Prosecutor of the International Crim-
inal Court (‘ICC’) in 2012. This volume is an impressive anthology of 
contributions by leading experts. I recognise in its pages the efforts to 
reach the highest quality and fairness in investigations. This is the same 
vision that has guided the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) at the ICC 
under my tenure. 
To begin with, several chapters highlight the importance of having 
clear selection criteria, so that investigations follow from fair and con-
sistent strategic choices. I am glad to see our OTP Policy Paper on Case 
Selection and Prioritisation (2016) repeatedly acknowledged throughout 
this volume, as I expected it to give clear direction in this area. It will 
hopefully also serve as a source of inspiration for practice in other juris-
dictions.1 My decisions on selection of situations and cases have always 
been guided by the legal criteria required by the ICC Statute, as is my duty. 
On occasion, I have been told that my decisions may not be well received 
by certain parties, particularly by those associated with the suspected con-
duct. I was never impressed with such suggestions. I have always acted on 
the basis of my legal duties – independently, objectively and consistently 
applied – and by the harm suffered by victims. This is what should influ-
ence the decisions of a responsible prosecutor.  
The first OTP Strategic Plan that I issued in 2012 set the path for 
improvement in our investigations.2 I directed the Office to move from a 
perspective of shorter-term impact, to the serious in-depth investigations 
that a court such as the ICC should undertake. Strengthening the investi-
gations was necessary to meet the evidentiary standards under the ICC 
                                                   
1 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013  (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/acb906/) and ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 
September 2016 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/182205). 
2  ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 11 October 2013 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ 
954beb/).  
viii 
Statute, to address the concerns expressed by judges and through our own 
self-assessment, and, more fundamentally, to make sure that we can deliv-
er as effectively as possible in the discharge of our mandate and to bring a 
measure of justice to the victims of atrocity crimes and their communities.  
This approach has led to important developments in our investiga-
tive model: I upgraded the areas of analysis and forensics with additional 
resources and responsibilities, and the newly established Investigative 
Analysis Section (‘IAS’) and Forensic Scientific Section (‘FSS’); we im-
plemented a planning cycle based on standard investigation plans and 
reviews (as explained by our Team Leader Markus Eikel in his Chapter 15 
below); the investigation teams adopted the Fact Analysis Database, an 
all-source integrated database managed by our analysts; we invested in 
digital evidence and big data, including projects in relation to telephone 
data and Internet-based open sources, hiring experts, specific monitoring 
projects, advanced software, drafting technical guidelines, and developing 
co-operation with service providers; we adopted the ‘PEACE model’ for 
investigative interviewing (the same as explained in Chapter 5 below) and 
had our investigators trained by experts of the International Investigative 
Interviewing Research Group (‘IIIRG’); we established Situation-Specific 
Investigations Assistants to help the teams bridging the distance with the 
situation countries; we implemented the Source Evaluation Guidelines, 
with corresponding templates and training (as explained in Chapter 3 by 
Xabier Agirre Aranburu, Head of IAS); and I obtained from the ICC As-
sembly of States Parties an important increase in the training budget for 
investigators and analysts, though pressures on resources are ever increas-
ing and we are consistently obliged to reallocate and prioritise our limited 
resources. Mismatch between demands and resources is certainly part of 
the equation when one is genuinely concerned with the question of inves-
tigative and prosecutorial impact and performance.  
I agree with the suggestions in this volume on the importance on in-
ternal review mechanisms. I have encouraged critical and open discussion 
in all important decisions under my responsibility. My staff know that 
they can express themselves with full freedom in any meeting or in direct 
communication with me. Analysts at the IAS are mandated to develop 
‘critical thinking’ techniques by their Operational Guidelines. The investi-
gation teams hold regular reviews in which all team members are invited 
to discuss and challenge the cases as much as necessary. The Director of 
the Investigations Division regularly convenes meetings with his manag-
ers to review the investigation plans proposed by every team, which facili-
tates peer-review among Team Leaders and identification of best practices. 
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The database of lessons-learned developed by the Legal Advisory Section, 
under the guidance of the Office’s Executive Committee, captures our 
institutional memory based on critical review of our investigative and 
legal practices. The Prosecutions Division also calls mandatory evidence 
reviews with independent boards at key points of the process, as instruct-
ed since the OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015. We have also instituted work-
ing groups to devise and map out how we are implementing specific Of-
fice policies, to assess our performance and to fill gaps where required. 
We initiated and engaged in ad hoc review processes with the assistance 
of independent external experts. Other examples include full engagement 
with evaluations carried out by the Court’s Independent Oversight Mech-
anism on certain aspects of our work. In short, as an Office, we have es-
poused a culture of continuous self-assessment and improvement, and 
with this as our guide, we are looking actively to see what other mecha-
nisms we can devise to assist us. 
The emphasis in this volume on appropriate legal direction for in-
vestigations is not new to me. All our teams, including investigation and 
trial phases, are led by Senior Trial Lawyers who make the strategic deci-
sions and supervise the progress of the investigations. The Investigations 
Division is not independently responsible for the conduct of investigations; 
they support them with the requisite expertise and resources, while legal 
direction and control is guaranteed by the Senior Trial Lawyers of the 
Prosecutions Division.  
I announced my priority to investigate efficiently gender-based 
crimes in my very first intervention when I was appointed Prosecutor, as a 
form of thematic prosecution. My commitment shows in the OTP Policy 
Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes adopted in 2014, including 
specific instructions to my staff to engage with civil society and special-
ised training.3 The Investigations Division followed up with training by 
leading experts, the development of focal points in the teams, and 
strengthening the Gender and Children Unit with a newly created legal 
officer position. In 2016, I issued our internal Gender Analysis Guidelines, 
expanding the focus from sexual crimes to all aspects of our work that 
require gender awareness. I engaged UN Women to benefit from special-
ised advice, and they generously seconded a number of highly qualified 
analysts and investigators – I am grateful for their support. The results of 
                                                   
3  ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014 (https://www. 
legal-tools.org/doc/7ede6c/). 
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these efforts show, among others, in Ntaganda, after his conviction in 
2019 on all charges of sexual crimes, as the Trial judges endorsed our 
arguments to close any legal loophole and protect intra-ranks victims of 
rape and sexual slavery.4 I look forward to the judicial findings in other 
cases in which I have sought proactively the best possible protection for 
victims of gender crimes under the law, including forced pregnancy and 
gender persecution, such as Ongwen and Al Hassan. The situation in Af-
ghanistan also requires serious investigation of gender-based crimes,5 as 
we identified in our Preliminary Examination credible allegations of gen-
der persecution, including attacks against schools for girls and murder of 
female leaders.  
Several contributors to this volume have highlighted the uneven re-
sults in court, including some high-profile acquittals. These concerns are 
understandable and I am grateful for expert feedback, even when critical. 
Firstly, observers should strive to be objective, and bear in mind that even 
in difficult circumstances my Office has succeeded in a number of convic-
tions of leading perpetrators. Limitations in the results are the conse-
quence of several factors that may confront any prosecutor, such as an 
initial prosecutorial strategy that had to be transformed; co-operation chal-
lenges; security conditions; resource limitations; and lack of consistent 
judicial judgments, practice or clarity, in addition to the need for the Of-
fice to improve its own performance. As this volume rightly recognises, 
all criminal justice agencies can improve. The Court, notwithstanding the 
unique challenges it faces, is no exception. 
Threats against witnesses are sadly common in our cases and have 
often obliged our Investigations Division to take specific protective 
measures for both witnesses and staff. I have also been obliged under Ar-
ticle 70 of the ICC Statute to develop additional investigative efforts and 
to file cases for “Offences under the administration of justice” for such 
conduct. This has been an important challenge in our investigations, much 
as national prosecutors find in cases of organised crime or terrorism.  
Lately, threats and sanctions of a different kind have been publicly 
issued against me and one of my senior managers by the government of a 
non-State Party. I have taken strength from the strong support that I have 
                                                   
4  The Ntagantda case is currently under appeal. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 
Appeals Chamber, Defence Appeal Brief, 11 November 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-2443 (Part 
I: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dstrmv/).  
5  At the time of writing, the investigation in Afghanistan situation is subject to a pending 
article 18 deferral request. 
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received from the ICC States Parties, from the world-wide civil society, as 
well as from my own staff.6 By statutory definition, you can rest assured 
that such threats will have no impact on the conduct of our duties and the 
fulfilment of our mandate under the Rome Statute.  
Most recently, I have also encouraged my staff to communicate 
without restrictions with the Independent Expert Review (‘IER’) mandat-
ed by the ICC Assembly of States Parties, including critical observations 
as much as they find necessary. As a result of this openness, many staff 
members of the OTP, as well as other ICC organs, spoke freely to the IER 
and gave them their best advice. The Investigations Division is develop-
ing the project ‘Investigations 3.0’ to guide the future of OTP investiga-
tions, and I am glad to see that the IER report has acknowledged and en-
dorsed this project.7 As I stated at a recent session of the Hague and New 
York Working Group convened on the 7 October 2020 to discuss the IER 
final report, we will be looking to the report of the Independent Experts 
for inspiration and fact-based actionable recommendations which we can 
then carry forward. 
As with all things, there is always room for improvement, and that 
should come both from internal self-reflection and external feedback. I am 
grateful to the co-editors of this volume for the opportunity to reflect on 
the topic of Quality Control in Criminal Investigation, a much-needed 
process which I am confident will receive broad attention. 
Fatou Bensouda 
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court 
                                                   
6  See ICC, “ASP President, O-Gon Kwon, rejects US measures against ICC”, Press Release, 
2 September 2020 (available on the ICC’s web site). See, for example, European External 
Action Service (‘EEAS’), “International Criminal Court: Statement by the High Repre-
sentative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on US sanctions”,  Press Release, Brussels, 3 Sep-
tember 2020 (available on the EEAS’ web site); ICC, “ICC Prosecutor briefs annual minis-
terial meeting, at the UN General Assembly High-Level Week, expresses gratitude for 
strong show of support”, Press Release, 24 September 2020, ICC-OTP- 20200924-PR1538 
(available on the ICC’s web site). 
7  Independent Expert Review, “Review of the International Criminal Court and the Rome 





FOREWORD BY MANOJ KUMAR SINHA 
On 15 January 2019, Laurent Gbagbo was acquitted by the International 
Criminal Court (‘ICC’) of charges of crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed in the context of post-electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire be-
tween 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011 as the Prosecutor failed to 
submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate Gbagbo’s responsibility. The 
acquittal raises important concerns of quality control in the international 
criminal justice system, as such cases are factually complex, fact-rich, and 
often span several years. 
In the wake of this event, the Centre for International Law Research 
and Policy (CILRAP) and the Indian Law Institute organized a two-day 
conference on ‘Quality Control in Criminal Investigation’ (‘QCCI’) in 
New Delhi on 22 and 23 February 2019. This is the third leg of CILRAP’s 
Quality Control Project, which was conceived in 2012. The present QCCI 
Project is led by Morten Bergsmo, together with Xabier Agirre, Simon De 
Smet, Carsten Stahn and myself. 
The conference, from which this volume originates, registered an 
international gathering of Professors, ICC officials as well as international 
law practitioners, advocates and students from Indian and foreign univer-
sities. In his inaugural address, the Honourable Justice Madan B. Lokur, 
former judge of the Supreme Court of India, highlighted how topical the 
issue of quality control in criminal investigation is, and drew our attention 
towards the ineluctable fact that both national and international criminal 
justice systems are in need of quality control. 
The contributors to the project offered practical solutions and a host 
of new ideas on how to address the bottlenecks of, and impart quality in, 
the process from the opening of a criminal investigation to the start of the 
trial. The presentations drew on anthropology, demography, history, psy-
chology, linguistics and philosophy, making the conference a truly multi-
disciplinary event, as this volume demonstrates. 
Like the conference, this anthology is divided into five parts, ad-
dressing (i) the context of quality control in investigations and case prepa-
ration; (ii) evidence and analysis; (iii) systemic challenges in case-
preparatory work-processes; (iv) investigation plans as instruments of 
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quality control; and (v) prosecutorial and judicial participation in investi-
gations and case preparation. 
In his opening chapter, Carsten Stahn urges international law practi-
tioners to adopt a critical look towards the very foundation on which the 
existing system is built, and emphasises how the QCCI Project attempts to 
do so. His contribution sets the theme for future debate on four broad 
points: (i) the structural difference between preliminary examinations and 
investigations; (ii) macro problems such as cognitive biases; (iii) different 
structures and steps of criminal investigations; and, lastly, (iv) the way 
forward. What follows from there is a critical engagement with the vari-
ous aspects of criminal investigations, ranging from the efficacy of proce-
dural norms and practical problems of collecting evidence, to more sub-
stantive issues like cognitive biases within criminal investigations. 
Since most of the contributors are legal practitioners, they can draw 
on their personal experience as actors within the criminal justice system in 
demonstrating the hurdles an investigator encounters in the field: for ex-
ample, how investigators must take into account and understand the cul-
ture that an informant belongs to during an interview, in order to put the 
information in the right perspective. In this context, Simon De Smet ad-
dresses the aspect of minimizing cognitive bias in investigations and judi-
cial fact-finding. His chapter on “Controlling the Quality of Reasoning 
about the Link between Evidence and Factual Propositions” could be reti-
tled “Quality Control of One’s Own Thinking”, as he candidly admitted at 
the conference. The basic premise of his chapter is that judicial fact-
finding should be a rational process that is not based on what one believes, 
but rather on what is rationally acceptable. De Smet argues that the 
‘standard of proof’ should be based on a rational approach to evidence: 
the judge who makes a certain finding after appreciating the evidence 
should be able to rationally explain his finding. 
The contributors discuss the various ‘bottlenecks’ and offer sugges-
tions as to the possible ways to overcome them. For example, issues of 
inadequate factual analysis and evidence-review by the prosecution lead 
to weaknesses in the formulation of charges and in the trial stage. In order 
to overcome them, contributors such as Olympia Bekou and Xabier Agirre 
suggest devising a structured approach to data and information collection 
from the very beginning of case preparation to avoid the fragmentation 
and the over-collection of evidence. Particularly, Bekou emphasises the 
importance of understanding the legal requirements from the earlier stages 
of case preparation. Agirre provides insights into various analytical tools 
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like source evaluation and diagnostic techniques, which can help the pros-
ecution during the investigation. Highlighting the importance of struc-
tured investigation and high-quality case development, Christian Axboe 
Nielsen points out that analysis not only enhances the quality of investiga-
tion, but can also help the prosecution in countering the narrative of the 
defence whenever it is argued that the preparation of a case has been cha-
otic, and hence full of loopholes. 
Gregory S. Gordon, while synthesizing the chapters and the deliber-
ations, offers an important insight: the problems that constitute the topics 
of the discussion are a product of the regime of the ICC’s first Prosecutor. 
He expresses that broader participation in the QCCI Project and similar 
ones is the need of the day in order to facilitate course correction. 
Indeed, the ICC has recently found itself mired in events such as 
States threatening to leave – with Burundi even formally withdrawing 
from the Rome Statute in October 2017 – and the Office of the Prosecutor 
under attack from the serious accusations against both the former and the 
current Prosecutors. Therefore, the importance of efforts such as the 
QCCI Project cannot be overemphasised. In fact, contributions like these 
are the epicentre where many brilliant minds of the field congregate to 
generate a ripple of ideas that will eventually help the institutions and the 
system to perform better. 
Professor Manoj Kumar Sinha 




PROLOGUE BY GREGORY S. GORDON 
I have had the pleasure to participate in the second and third legs of the 
incredible Quality Control Project undertaken by the Centre for Interna-
tional Law Research and Policy (‘CILRAP’) and partners from around the 
world since its first conference in May 2013, held at the European Uni-
versity Institute in Florence, on ‘Quality Control in International Fact-
Finding Outside Criminal Justice for Core International Crimes’. The se-
cond was on ‘Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Reviewing 
Impact, Policies and Practices’ (The Hague, June 2017), and the third fo-
cused on ‘Quality Control in Criminal Investigation’ (New Delhi, Febru-
ary 2019), on which this volume is based. I was honoured to deliver clos-
ing remarks at this last gathering. As I pointed out in delivering those re-
marks, alongside this three-prong Quality Control Project, CILRAP has 
undertaken other research projects of a distinct theoretical flavour, such as 
‘Philosophical Foundations of International Criminal Law: Its Intellectual 
Roots, Related Limits and Potential’ (New Delhi, August 2017) and 
‘Power in International Criminal Justice: Towards a Sociology of Interna-
tional Justice’ (Florence, October 2017). 
In his policy paper1 underpinning the ‘Quality Control in Criminal 
Investigation’ project, Morten Bergsmo made reference to ‘seven bottle-
necks’ in investigation and case preparation of cases involving core inter-
national crimes. He invited us to think more deeply in respect of criminal 
investigation practices, and to get out of our comfort zones. I quote here 
various snippets of his policy paper, quite revealing in this regard, where 
he referred to the more abstract notions of “‘fact-rich’ cases” and “a cul-
ture of quality control” (both footnote 10), “the freedom […] to challenge 
the quality of work” (footnote 11), “‘micro-prioritization’” (footnote 16), 
“confirmation biases” (Section 3.2.), “‘meta-evidence’” (Section 3.1.), 
“nuanced […] narratives” (footnote 21), “subsumption-analysis capacity” 
(footnote 22), “[e]vidence-review should be multi-disciplinary” (footnote 
33), and “social anthropology” (footnote 35). In that paper, he explicitly 
                                                   
1 Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019, Section 3 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). 
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encouraged us “to develop new ideas for what can be done differently and 
how. Honest problem-descriptions”, he reminded us, “are vital but not 
enough. To generate new ideas, minds from outside established criminal 
justice practice should also contribute: In hora venit [or ‘the hour has 
come’]” (Section 5) – his use of Latin there certainly enhanced the call for 
us to go on a more cerebral journey. 
I think it is evident from this comprehensive volume that many of 
the project participants have answered the challenge and risen to the occa-
sion. At the New Delhi conference, rather than merely focusing on the 
‘nuts and bolts’ aspects of criminal investigation, we were treated to a 
whole host of new ideas and deeper thinking that one might well consider 
to be of the philosophical stripe of research in our field. I jotted down 
notes throughout the conference and, at various points, typed in references 
to reliance on different disciplines, such as anthropology, demography, 
history, psychology, linguistics, and, of course, philosophy itself. We have 
heard reference to persons such as Plato and Aristotle and terms such as 
‘epistemology’, ‘natural language theory’, ‘cognitive load’, ‘cognitive 
bias’, ‘confirmation bias’, ‘bounded rationality’, ‘virtual reality’, ‘taxon-
omies’, ‘group think’, ‘victim-perpetrator dichotomies’, ‘Zeno’s paradox’, 
‘quantum physics’, the ‘observer effect’, and ‘dialectical processes’. 
Let me return to the project policy paper’s ‘seven bottlenecks’ and, 
within that framework, ask, what is the outlook going forward? Clearly, 
the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé case casts a large shadow over discussions on 
the quality of international criminal investigations. Are ICC investigations 
doomed to follow the same pattern in the future? I remain optimistic in 
thinking about the longer trajectory of the field for several reasons. 
First, many of the problems discussed in this volume are arguably 
the product of the regime of the ICC’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo. There is currently a different prosecutor in place, Fatou Bensou-
da, and she will soon be replaced by another. Course corrections are tak-
ing place, as we see from some of the chapters in this book, and it is rea-
sonable to assume that more are in the offing. 
Second, the ideas presented in this volume, which, as noted above, 
are the fruit of deep thinking by some of the key experts and practitioners 
in our field, will help us course-correct. And this will be an integral part of 
building a foundation for future success. After all, this is merely the latest 
in a series of quality control projects that has already dealt with fact-
finding and preliminary examinations. And this volume has only added to 
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that growing body of knowledge. From this most recent project in the 
series, we can glean certain common themes and tensions: 
• Tension 1: establishing truth that yields real justice versus promot-
ing efficiency and results; 
• Tension 2: the use of in-house vs. outside experts; and 
• Tension 3: focusing on big-picture or holistic answers vs. keeping 
track of the important small pieces of evidence. 
And I would propose two new areas of inquiry implicit in this vol-
ume’s materials but not addressed explicitly: (1) What quality control is 
needed on the defence side? (2) How might we modify the investigative 
phase so as to better promote due process and victim’s rights? For overall 
success in this endeavour, I believe it is paramount that we eschew too 
much of a prosecutor-centric approach. 
At the same time, from the perspective of all participants in the pro-
cess, I submit that other avenues of research should be considered. The 
materials herein consider effective evidence-gathering procedures and 
different legal traditions. But it is recommended that we also study human 
and inter-cultural dynamics in investigative and prosecution teams. In this 
regard, certain facets of organisational behaviour theory could be quite 
enriching: (a) considering individuals in organisations (micro-level analy-
sis); (b) examining work groups (meso-level analysis); and (c) studying 
how organisations themselves behave (macro-level analysis). There could 
be much value as well in considering the anthropological side of organisa-
tional behaviour by dissecting organisational culture, organisational ritu-
als, and symbolic acts within investigative and prosecutorial units. 
Another potential important area of study in this field is its interna-
tional dimension. International criminal investigation on behalf of interna-
tional institutions will nearly always involve international work teams. 
Thus, it would behove us to examine and incorporate social psychologist 
Geert Hofstede’s ‘cultural dimensions theory’, which describes national 
cultures along six dimensions: power distance, individualism, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence vs. restraint. 
These inter-personal or cultural human dynamics may also factor into 
better understanding quality control in criminal investigations. Indeed, 
this is true for examining all phases of the international criminal law spec-
trum. And, of course, it is possible that CILRAP will undertake future 
quality control projects on the trial phase itself, as well as perhaps post-
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trial proceedings. So, the Quality Control Project itself should give us 
great grounds for optimism. 
Finally, the other key reason for optimism derives from historical 
reflection. In his Chapter 13 on “Challenges in Charge Selection: Consid-
erations Informing the Number of Charges and Cumulative Charging 
Practices”, Cale Davis refers to the wise charging decisions taken in the 
Karadžić case. I have heard my good friend and colleague Serge Bram-
mertz (former International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(‘ICTY’) chief Prosecutor and currently chief Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (‘MICT’)) describe the 
thought-process that went into the charge prioritisation in that case. He 
has observed that, notwithstanding the public’s focus on the siege of Sara-
jevo and the Srebrenica genocide, Karadžić had been tied to many other 
ethnic-cleansing offences. He has described the challenges of the prosecu-
tor’s charging strategy when there are so many different crime scenes over 
so many years and limited resources. It would be too unwieldy to charge 
them all and doing so creates a risk of the ‘Slobodan Milošević scenario’, 
that is, a trial with a tremendous number of counts that drags on for so 
long that the defendant dies before a verdict can be rendered. But, with 
such a wide range of horrific war crimes traceable to Karadžić, deciding 
exactly which charges to exclude was an agonising process. 
In the end, Brammertz and his team chose to trim the potential uni-
verse of counts by about half. They then spoke with survivors whose 
loved ones were not victims of the offences featured in the indictment. 
The prosecutors were prepared for bitter complaints. Instead, much to 
their relief, the survivors were extremely supportive when learning that 
the charging strategy was motivated by assuring the most effective and 
winnable case could be brought against Karadžić. More than anything, 
they wanted justice for the representative crimes. And, in the end, they got 
justice. We can learn a lot from this. And it resonates with many of the 
recommendations made in this volume for enhancing quality control in 
international criminal investigations. 
The other historical point that ought to make us feel sanguine about 
the prospects for international criminal law in this realm going forward is 
the work of the last living Nuremberg prosecutor, Benjamin Ferencz, who 
was a master of efficiency when prosecuting the Einsatzgruppen case. 
Judge David Re in his New Delhi presentation “Rethinking Disclosure in 
Core International Crimes Cases” talked about the document-intensive 
approach in Nuremberg (see Chapter 14 below). Dr. William H. Wiley 
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spoke about the potential benefit of having a specific end-date in mind 
when one starts a case (see Chapter 8 below, co-authored by Dr. Wiley 
and Ewan Brown). The Associated Press (‘AP’) described the 
Einsatzgruppen case as the “biggest murder trial in history”. 
But after discovering secret files that documented the deliberate 
massacre of over a million innocent Jews, Gypsies, and other civilian ‘en-
emies’ of the Third Reich by these special Schutzstaffel (‘SS’) extermina-
tion squads, Ferencz concluded the investigation within a matter of 
months. He presented his case in chief against 22 Einsatzgruppen leaders 
in less than a week (22 defendants were indicted, but one committed sui-
cide pre-trial and another was removed from the trial on medical grounds 
pre-verdict). In the words of Ferencz himself: 
I did not intend to call a single witness. I knew that every 
survivor of a concentration camp would be eager to testify 
that any one of the defendants was responsible for the mur-
der of his or her family. But I also knew that witness testi-
mony can be fallible, and I did not have to risk it. I would re-
ly upon the captured official German documents to prove the 
guilt of each defendant. A typical EG Report, for example, 
said, “In the city of Minsk, about 10,000 Jews were liquidat-
ed on 28 and 29 July (1941), 6,500 of whom were Russian 
Jews – mainly old people, women, and children – the re-
mainder consisted of Jews unfit for work […]”. We knew 
which unit made the report and who was in command. And 
we had hundreds of such statements, including totals for 
each unit that added up to more than a million executions. 
[…] [T]he Prosecution submitted its evidence and rested its 
case after two days.2 
Not all cases are the same. It is unlikely in modern times that we 
would be able to successfully implement such an efficient strategy. But it 
provides a good rough model. Using the various reforms and techniques 
that have been suggested in this volume – such as in-depth evidence anal-
ysis tools, the equivalent of Rule 73 hearings, time limits, better use of 
local resources, evidence disclosure suites, and external peer review – we 
can aspire to achieve those kinds of results. 
In concluding remarks at the December 2018 CILRAP conference 
on “Integrity in International Justice”, I called on the participants to look 
back to our Nuremberg pioneers for best practices. As part of this project, 
                                                   
2 Benferencz.org, “Benny Stories”, Story 33 (available on its web site). 
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Xabier Agirre has pointed out that, in later years, Telford Taylor observed 
that “nobody anticipated how complex the task would be to investigate 
international crimes”. Perhaps that was true. But at Nuremberg, in spite of 
it all, they still managed to do it efficiently and effectively. Based on the 
wise insights in this volume, we can certainly achieve similar results on a 
consistent basis, as we work to develop model international criminal law 
investigative practices in the years to come. 
Gregory S. Gordon 
Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law 
Research Fellow, CILRAP 
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Investigative Bottlenecks and the 
Mindset of Quality Control 
Xabier Agirre Aranburu and Morten Bergsmo* 
1. Investigation and Preparation of Fact-Rich Cases: The Quality 
Control Framework 
1.1. Some Words on the Context of the Discourse on Quality  
Control 
On 15 January 2019, the case against Laurent Gbagbo, former President 
of Côte d’Ivoire, collapsed before the International Criminal Court. This 
has caused a flurry of comments. In a tempered text, Richard J. Goldstone 
                                                   
* Xabier Agirre Aranburu is currently the Head of the Investigative Analysis Section at the 
Investigations Division (‘ID’), Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’), International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’), where he has served since 2004. Previously he was Analyst and Strategic 
Analyst at the OTP of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(‘ICTY’) (1997–2003). He has contributed to multiple investigative and training projects 
with different international and national authorities, universities and NGOs. He is a mem-
ber of the TOAEP Editorial Board and the Advisory Boards of the Master on International 
Crimes, Conflict and Criminology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and the Berg Hu-
man Rights Institute (Madrid). He has co-authored Sections 2.-4. of this chapter in his per-
sonal capacity, and his views do not represent any of the above-mentioned institutions. 
Morten Bergsmo is Director of the Centre for International Law Research and Policy 
(CILRAP). He was formerly Legal Adviser, ICTY-OTP (1994-2002), Senior Legal Adviser, 
ICC-OTP (2002-2005), before serving as an academic. Relevant to the Quality Control in 
Criminal Investigation (‘QCCI’) Project, he worked on numerous ICTY cases by writing 
the applicable law section of pre-trial briefs and other motions. He also played a critical 
role in raising the importance given by the ICTY-OTP to documentary evidence (linked in-
itially to the use of the archive of the UN Commission of Experts for the Former Yugosla-
via (UNSC 780 (1992)), the Kotor Varoš municipal documents, municipal archives secured 
after the lifting of the siege of Bihać, and the archive of the International Conference for 
the Former Yugoslavia); in securing the co-operation of key insider-witnesses; and in con-
ceptualising the non-military analysis function within the ICTY-OTP. Section 1. of this 
chapter is authored by Morten Bergsmo based on the concept paper of the conference held 
in New Delhi on 22-23 February 2019, whose papers are published in this anthology (see 
Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/)). 
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observed that it “cannot be doubted [that] mistakes have been made by 
organs of the ICC”, and that the “challenge to the Office of the Prosecutor 
is to expend greater effort in ensuring that cases brought to trial are fully 
investigated and supported by sufficient evidence”.1 Referring to the ac-
quittal of Gbagbo as “a stinging rebuke of OTP’s modus operandi”, 
Patryk Labuda opined that the response of the ICC Office of the Prosecu-
tor (‘OTP’) to “the challenges of conducting effective investigations in the 
coming years will define the Court’s future”.2 Highlighting the implica-
tions for the prosecution’s “investigation methods and strategies”, he 
called for a “thorough evaluation of the Prosecutor’s performance”.3 The 
ICC Prosecutor has in turn indicated her disagreement with the decision.4 
As an article in Le Monde pointed out,5 the concern for quality con-
trol in international criminal justice more generally goes several years 
back to the 1990s. It is this long observation period – not any specific case 
or jurisdiction – that gave birth in 2012 to the ‘Quality Control Project’, a 
research project led by the Centre for International Law Research and 
Policy (CILRAP) with partners. As described in the foreword above by 
the four co-editors of this anthology, the project has already produced 
three volumes on quality control in documentation as well as preliminary 
examination.6 
                                                   
1   Richard J. Goldstone, “Acquittals by the International Criminal Court”, EJIL: Talk!, 18 
January 2019.  
2  Patryk Labuda, “The ICC’s ‘Evidence Problem’: The Future of International Criminal 
Investigations After the Gbagbo Acquittal”, Völkerrechtsblog, 18 January 2019. Borrowing 
from a 2013-article by Christian M. De Vos, Labuda observed that the ICC “has an ‘evi-
dence problem’”, see Christian M. De Vos, “Investigating from Afar: The ICC’s Evidence 
Problem”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 1009–1024. Labuda 
traces the ‘evidence problem’ “directly to certain policies put in place by the first Prosecu-
tor, Luis Moreno Ocampo”. 
3   Ibid. 
4   ICC Press Release, “Statement of the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, following today’s 
decision by Trial Chamber I in the case of Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé”, 15 
January 2019 (available on the Court’s web site). 
5   See Morten Bergsmo, “La CPI, l’affaire Gbagbo et le rôle de la France”, Le Monde, 18 
January 2019 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d499f6/ (French) and http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/693bee/ (English)).   
6   See Morten Bergsmo (ed.): Quality Control in Fact-Finding, Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher (‘TOAEP’), Florence, 2013, 500 pp. (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-bergsmo); 
a second, expanded edition was published in July 2020 (Morten Bergsmo and Carsten 
Stahn (eds.): Quality Control in Fact-Finding, TOAEP, Brussels, 2020, 650 pp. (http://
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The third leg – the ‘Quality Control in Criminal Investigation Pro-
ject’ (‘QCCI’) – was launched in the autumn of 2018, with a conference 
held in New Delhi on 22-23 February 2019. The conference presentations 
can be openly accessed as films or podcasts on the project web page.7 It 
concerns the phase that encompasses criminal investigation and case 
preparation.8 This is the period from the opening of criminal investigation 
until the start of the trial. As with the two previous legs of the Quality 
Control Project, the focus is on core international crimes,9 but it also in-
cludes perspectives from other fact-rich criminal cases10 such as serious 
fraud and organised crime (for example, human trafficking). 
1.2. The Need to Enhance Quality Control is Not Sensitive 
The QCCI Project is premised on the assumption that there is room for 
improvement in the quality control of all investigation or preparation of 
fact-rich criminal cases. This is a common challenge both in international 
and national jurisdictions in cases that involve many alleged incidents, 
                                                                                                                        
www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-bergsmo-stahn-second); and Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn 
(eds.): Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volumes 1 and 2, TOAEP, Brussels, 
2018, 1,470 pp. (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/32-bergsmo-stahn and http://www.toaep.org/
ps-pdf/33-bergsmo-stahn). For films and podcasts on the latter, see https://www.cilrap.org/
events/170613-14-the-hague/. 
7   The QCCI Project has been led by the authors of this chapter in co-operation with Dr. 
Simon De Smet (Legal Officer, Chambers, ICC), Professor Carsten Stahn (Leiden Univer-
sity), and Professor Manoj Kumar Sinha (Director of the Indian Law Institute, New Delhi). 
The team is grateful for the financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and for the kind co-operation on the project by the ICC Prosecutor. You find more in-
formation on the project web site (https://www.cilrap.org/events/190222-23-delhi/).  
8   There is not a clear line between ‘investigation’ and ‘case preparation’. Jurisdictions use 
different regulatory frameworks and terminology. The QCCI Project does not define the 
two terms, to avoid narrowing the discourse it convenes. Generally speaking, ‘case prepa-
ration’ includes ‘investigation’ in addition to the legal and other preparation of a case-file 
for trial. This chapter refers several times to both ‘investigation’ and ‘case preparation’, not 
to limit the analysis to ‘investigation’. Moreover, the decision to open an investigation is 
prepared during the earlier phase which we often refer to as ‘preliminary examination’. 
Ideally, the first investigation plan should be drawn up late in preliminary examination. 
Such preparatory steps that become investigatory tools or instruments do also fall within 
the scope of the QCCI Project. 
9   For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘core international crimes’ denotes war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression. 
10   Examples of ‘fact-rich’ cases include core international crimes, serious fraud and organised 
crime. Violent crime cases in peace-time national jurisdictions – such as isolated murders 
or sexual violations – normally lack the factual complexity to be considered ‘fact-rich’.  
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acts, transactions, victims, perpetrators, witnesses and other potential evi-
dence. “Prosecutorial professionalization – as other forms of professional-
ization in the public sector – requires awareness on the part of prosecuto-
rial leaders of the importance of self-questioning and -improvement. This 
is a precondition for such professionalization to take proper hold in the 
practice of criminal justice teams.” 11  Discussing quality control does 
therefore not imply criticism of specific jurisdictions or actors. Such dis-
cussions are important as the available literature for practitioners has up 
until now been limited.12 
Inherent in criminal justice systems around the world are two fun-
damental mechanisms of quality control: the work of the defence and the 
assessment and decisions of the judges. Both should correct errors and 
expose weaknesses in the prosecution’s investigation and case-preparation. 
Both are fundamental ‘quality-control mechanisms’ in criminal justice, for 
the outcome of the case as a whole. This is a part of the architecture of 
                                                   
11   See Carsten Stahn, Morten Bergsmo and CHAN Icarus, “On the Magic, Mystery and 
Mayhem of Preliminary Examinations”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.): 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 1, supra note 6, p. 3, which contin-
ues: “It is this awareness and culture of quality control, including the freedom and motiva-
tion to challenge the quality of work, that this project seeks to advance”. This applies 
equally to the QCCI Project. See also: “This quality control approach recognises the im-
portance of leadership in fact-finding mandates, the responsibility of individual fact-
finders to continuously professionalise, and the need for fact-finders to be mandate-centred, 
as discussed above. It is an approach that invites consideration of how the quality of every 
functional aspect of fact-finding can be improved, including work processes to identify, lo-
cate, obtain, verify, analyse, corroborate, summarise, synthesise, structure, organise, pre-
sent, and disseminate facts. It is a state of mind characterised by a will to professionalise, 
and not just by the ad hoc development and adoption of standard procedures or universal 
methodologies that come so easily to lawyers”, Morten Bergsmo, “Foreword by the Edi-
tor”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Quality Control in Fact-Finding, supra note 6, p. viii.  
12   Further to the references in note 6 above, the following publications are among the rele-
vant contributions: Martin Witteveen, “5. Dealing with Old Evidence in Core International 
Crimes Cases: The Dutch Experience as a Case Study”, in Morten Bergsmo and CHEAH 
Wui Ling (eds.): Old Evidence and Core International Crimes, TOAEP, Beijing, 2012, pp. 
65–108 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/16-bergsmo-cheah); Morten Bergsmo, “1. Institu-
tional History, Behaviour and Development” (pp. 1–31) and Xabier Agirre, “2. The Role of 
Analysis Capacity”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.): His-
torical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, TOAEP, Brussels, 2017 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song); and Helge Brunborg, “12. The 
Introduction of Demographic Analysis to Prove Core International Crimes”, in Morten 
Bergsmo, CHEAH Wui Ling, SONG Tianying and YI Ping (eds.): Historical Origins of In-
ternational Criminal Law: Volume 4, TOAEP, Brussels, 2015, pp. 477–512 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/23-bergsmo-cheah-song-yi).  
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criminal justice. In order to focus more in-depth, the QCCI Project is pri-
marily concerned with quality control in the prosecution’s investigation 
and case-preparation, not in the work of the defence or during the trial, 
both of which deserve a separate, subsequent project. We have, however, 
included a Part V in this anthology that looks at what may be useful roles 
for prosecutors, investigating judges, judges and specialised military law-
yers in investigation and preparation of cases.  
The project zooms in on some systemic ‘bottlenecks’ or problems 
that give rise to the long duration and high cost of the majority of investi-
gations of core international crimes – undermining the quality of work-
processes in cases – and it asks whether we can improve the way we work, 
as stated in the co-editors’ foreword at the outset of this volume. The main 
focus is not on the habitual reform of rules of procedure or evidence, but 
on the less visible work-processes that constitute the day-to-day reality of 
investigation and preparation of core international crimes.13 They are neg-
atively affected by several bottlenecks of varying degrees of seriousness. 
The expression of these challenges differs between jurisdictions, depend-
ing on factors such as whether lawyers lead the investigations or not.14 
1.3. Seven Bottlenecks 
Based on continuous observation and analysis of work-process problems 
in international and national war crimes jurisdictions since July 1994, the 
QCCI Project team has identified the following bottlenecks as particularly 
problematic in core international crimes cases. The list is obviously not 
exhaustive, and there might be significant variations between jurisdictions 
and teams. The nature of a team’s challenges may also change over time 
                                                   
13   This important distinction has escaped some of the colleagues who have considered the 
problem of length of proceedings in international criminal justice since the expert report 
prepared under the auspices of the preparatory team of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor in 
2003, see Morten Bergsmo and Vladimir Tochilovsky, “Measures Available to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court to Reduce the Length of Proceedings”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus 
Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.): Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: 
Volume 5, op. cit., pp. 651–693. Pages 660–661 discuss subsequent reports, with references. 
Most of the bottlenecks can be resolved by improving work-processes without changing 
rules of procedure or evidence. 
14   In international(ised) criminal jurisdictions, the investigators and prosecutors tend to be 
organised in one ‘office of the prosecutor’. In many Civil Law jurisdictions, lawyers lead 
the investigations (despite a two-fold chain of authority), whereas in many Common Law 
jurisdictions there is more of a separation between investigators and lawyers.  
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as progress is made and staff rotate. The abilites of staff are at the centre 
of all seven bottlenecks.  
The list of bottlenecks was compiled following consultation among 
a number of practitioners and experts in the field, with long accumulated 
experience from practice. We thank the colleagues who have contributed 
to this process. We mention here in particular Gilbert Bitti, Eleni 
Chaitidou, Cale Davis, Richard J. Goldstone, Teresa McHenry, Matthias 
Neuner, David Re, Bård Thorsen and William H. Wiley, as well as the co-
editors of this volume, Simon De Smet and Carsten Stahn. 
1.3.1. Loss of the Overview of Information 
The first bottleneck concerns the problem of loss or fragmentation of 
overview of information and potential evidence15 in the possession of the 
team during investigation or case-preparation (a problem closely related 
to point 3.3. below). This problem can cause delays in the investigation or 
case-preparation, lack of awareness of gaps in the available potential evi-
dence (including missing ‘meta-evidence’ demonstrating authenticity and 
reliability), and the problems described in 1.3.4.–1.3.7. below. It can also 
perpetuate weak evidence-overview at the stages of confirmation of 
charges and trial.16  
It was detailed observations of problems related to loss of overview 
in teams at the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor between 1994 and 2002 that 
led to the development of the ICC Case Matrix application as an IT-
enabled prototype of a more structured cognitive approach. Its methodol-
                                                   
15   The distinction between ‘information’ and ‘potential evidence’ is not strict. But much of 
the materials that have come into the possession of the prosecution in several core interna-
tional crimes jurisdictions have had limited potential to become evidence. Search and sei-
zure operations or requests for information may have been too wide; state actors may have 
dumped large amounts of information of dubious relevancy on the prosecution; non-
governmental organisations may not have been selective in what they have submitted; or 
the prosecution may have accessed a large amount of open source information, including 
audio-visual material, without a clear understanding of the limits of such material. The 
volume of materials directly impacts on translation and disclosure requirements. 
16   Although war crimes cases do not exceed the largest serious fraud cases, the QCCI Project 
has considered how cases can be narrowed where it is doubtful that the investigation team 
has the capacity to proceed with proper overview (and in other situations), including the 
rationale for narrowing and how it can be implemented. Such narrowing entails a form of 
‘micro-prioritization’ and needs careful reflection to avoid perceptions of confirmation-
bias or target-driven investigation.     
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ogy has influenced experiments with in-depth analysis charts in different 
jurisdictions and more advanced software developments such as I-DOC. 
1.3.2. Inadequate Factual Analysis 
The second bottleneck concerns inadequate analysis of factual proposi-
tions relevant to the prosecution’s burden in the case17 and corresponding 
evidence. This problem can lead to blind alleys, misleading confirmation 
biases, poor evaluation of source credibility and reliability,18 factual er-
rors, 19  wasteful over-collection of potential evidence, unawareness of 
possible counter-arguments,20 unwitting reliance on unsustainable infer-
ences or impeachable evidence, delayed exploration of alternative factual 
narratives, or lack of modesty in the assessment of the work done by the 
team and the quality of the evidence collected.21  
1.3.3. Uneven Evidence-Review 
The third bottleneck included here concerns irregularity in the team’s dai-
ly routine of assessing relevancy and possible weight of information or 
potential evidence. Such irregularity can undermine the quality of the 
evidence-review. The irregularity can have a variety of causes, such as 
unavailability of the skill-sets required for effective and reliable subsump-
tion-analysis;22 stationary evidence-review may be seen by team members 
                                                   
17   That is, the factual propositions that must be proven to the requisite level of proof in order 
to satisfy the applicable legal requirements under the legal classification or charges. These 
are the factual propositions that are material to, or necessary to sustain, the charges.  
18   This can be a particular problem if reports by non-governmental organisations based in 
part on hearsay are relied upon. 
19   In international(ised) criminal jurisdictions and in the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
states, materials relevant to the prosecution may be in foreign language(s) and witnesses or 
crime scenes situated within locations and cultures with which team members are not fa-
miliar.  
20   The manner in which the investigation team collects and analyses exculpatory evidence 
can significantly impact on this analytical work. 
21   It is relevant whether the prosecution is investigating all sides to the conflict. Multi-front 
investigations may generate a more nuanced understanding and narrative. One-sided inves-
tigations may make it harder to get relevant information on the other side. 
22   By ‘subsumption-analysis’ is meant analysis that subsumes (or sorts and assesses) potential 
evidence or related factual propositions under applicable legal standards in the jurisdiction 
in question, primarily subject-matter provisions. This form of analysis is vital to the suc-
cess of fact-rich investigations. Teams should have adequate subsumption-analysis capaci-
ty at all times during case-preparation.  
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as a less attractive task delegated to inadequately qualified junior staff or 
even interns; relevant senior team members go on too many missions 
causing interruptions in the evidence-review; the team fails to avail itself 
of evidence-review mechanisms which may exist; or lack of senior over-
sight from levels above the investigation team and senior prosecutor as-
signed to the case.  
This problem can weaken the efforts to build the case steadily, un-
dermine a sense of dynamic progress in the team, and prevent that indi-
vidual team members develop a proper overview of the case (1.3.1.), with 
subsequent delays and demotivation.23 
1.3.4. Formulation of Responsibility 
A fourth bottleneck is vague or non-substantial formulation of criminal 
responsibility within the team after24 it has in its possession enough po-
tential evidence. The problem is the formulation is not properly informed 
by existing potential evidence. Several reasons can cause this problem, 
including a lack of overview of information (1.3.1.) or inadequate man-
agement of evidence-review (1.3.3.). This bottleneck can prevent proper 
prioritisation of team resources to focus on weak links; slow down work-
processes for lack of clarity; prolong the fact-gathering period; and inun-
date the team’s systems with information of limited value.25 
1.3.5. Charging Without Proper Focus in the Case 
A fifth bottleneck is the broad use of cumulative or other forms of charg-
ing of crimes and modes of liability that have the effect of blunting the 
focus of the case.26 Cumulative charging is often used pursuant to a pre-
                                                   
23   Point 1.3.3. essentially concerns the role lawyers should play in the investigation, includ-
ing in overall co-ordination. 
24   This bottleneck scenario does not presuppose the problems of target-driven investigations 
or factual confirmation-bias: that is, the described bottleneck may be there even when the-
se additional problems are absent.  
25   There is obviously a difference (especially early in the investigation) between having 
specific investigative targets (which can facilitate a more efficient investigation, but may 
not be in keeping with the facts as they emerge during the investigation) or a more open-
ended investigation (perhaps ultimately fairer, but possibly less efficient). But the chal-
lenge of vague formulation of criminal responsibility described in 1.3.4. needs to be ad-
dressed in both scenarios.  
26   In some instances, there may even be an unwillingness to undertake an internal prosecu-
tion assessment of what the best-suited principal and subsidiary charges would be, as an 
exercise to better understand the core of the case under preparation. Jurisdictions that do 
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cautionary fear of acquittals caused by failure to include a classification,27 
not only a desire to ensure accountability for the full range of criminal 
conduct engaged in. Diffusing the focus of the case can swell both the 
prosecution and defence cases, and reduce the impact of the judgment. 
1.3.6. Too Much Evidence 
The sixth bottleneck included is made up of excessively long exhibit- and 
witness-lists in the prosecution’s part of the case. 28 This can again be 
caused by a variety of reasons, including lack of focus in the framing of 
the case (1.3.4.); fear of not having enough evidence; misconstrued faith 
in the effect of voluminous evidence; and weak quality control in select-
ing the best-suited evidence. This practice can obviously delay proceed-
ings significantly and make them costlier.  
1.3.7. Voluminous Disclosure 
The seventh and final bottleneck included here concerns prosecution29 
disclosure to the defence of voluminous materials not clearly related to a 
central hypothesis of criminal responsibility. The reasons may be those 
described in 1.3.1.–1.3.6. above; a perceived pressure to start the trial; 
fear of being accused of hiding materials; or the prosecution having re-
ceived a large amount of materials collected by others. This problem can 
delay the case and raise questions of de facto fairness.  
1.4. Further Challenges 
Fact-rich war crimes investigations are of course confronted by other 
challenges than these seven, for example, a) context-specific difficulties 
in obtaining evidence in the first place because of factors such as ongoing 
                                                                                                                        
not have the principle of iura novit curia may sometimes be more constrained in their abil-
ity to avoid cumulative charging. There is, however, a difference between narrow and 
broad use of cumulative charges even then.  
27   Frequently referred to as ‘technical acquittals’. 
28   Which is then often replicated by the defence. 
29   It should be considered how appropriate it is that the prosecution – as opposed to the regis-
try or judicial administration – is the central repository of materials that may only poten-
tially be disclosable and is not its work-product (such as documents from archives in the 
country where the alleged crimes occurred). This does not refer to witness-related materi-
als generated by the prosecution. The rapid increase in open source materials is also rele-
vant in this connection. Chapter 14 below by Judge David Re discusses this bottleneck in 
detail. 
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conflict or time-consuming mutual legal assistance procedures; b) that the 
available personnel lack the experience or ability to effectively undertake 
these types of investigations, especially where lawyers are not involved at 
the earliest stages and do not oversee or supervise the investigation, or 
where the personnel is not so familiar with applicable core international 
crimes (which can contribute to, for example, vague formulation of crimi-
nal responsibility or evidence overload); c) co-ordination deficiencies 
between investigation teams that pursue different crimes in the same con-
flict; and d) personnel may be assigned to several inquiries at the same 
time (especially in domestic agencies), affecting their drive to bring the 
investigation forward.30 These challenges should be kept in mind when 
analysing the core bottlenecks identified in Section 1.3., in order not to 
take a simplified or schematic view.  
1.5. Structuring an Open Inquiry 
The QCCI Project has asked whether work-processes can be enhanced so 
as to reduce the negative impact of the seven bottlenecks described in 
Sections 1.3.1. to 1.3.7. above. Such inquiry requires open-minded analy-
sis and new ideas on how we can work better, in manners that are not 
boxed in by the particulars of any one jurisdiction or by biases related to 
the familiar distinctions between Common and Civil Law procedure 
which too often become a distraction to innovative thinking.  
The project has not been constrained by the traditional discourse-
delimitation between procedural and evidentiary questions (for the law-
yers) and police methods (for the police). Rather, it has sought to carve 
out and focus on a third discourse domain which we have called key work-
processes in investigation and case preparation, with a pragmatic focus 
on high-quality results, cost-efficiency, and best project-management 
techniques, for critical and innovative input by lawyers, analysts, investi-
gators and others. It is particularly important that lawyers participate in 
the discussion on the seven bottlenecks in Section 1.3., rather than retreat-
ing into comfortable shells of legalese.  
The project has been structured into five main parts that are reflect-
ed in the New Delhi conference programme as well as this anthology: Part 
I: The Context of Quality Control in Investigations and Case Preparation, 
                                                   
30   A case law with judgments running into hundreds of pages, and a proliferation of separate 
and dissenting opinions, may increase the consequences of a less settled law. 
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Part II: Evidence and Analysis, Part III: Systemic Challenges in Case-
Preparatory Work-Processes, Part IV: Investigation Plans as Instruments 
of Quality Control, and Part V: Judicial and Prosecutorial Participation in 
Investigation and Case Preparation.  
The project has sought to promote attention to  
• whether our use of existing quality-control instruments31 such 
as a) investigation plans,32 b) evidence-review panels,33 c) draft 
indictments, d) indictments, and e) pre-trial briefs can be fur-
ther developed;  
• how newer tools such as f) analysis techniques34 can be used 
more intuitively and consistently;  
• whether a) to f) should be supplemented by additional instru-
ments to avert the bottlenecks described in Section 1.3. or re-
duce their negative impact; and 
• whether there are areas of expertise that could meaningfully be 
tapped into more actively during investigation.35 
The Centre for International Law Research and Policy (CILRAP) 
and partner institutions have invited as broad participation as possible in 
the QCCI Project. Authors were asked to not only describe the best avail-
able practice as seen by him or her, but to develop new ideas for what 
could be done differently and how. Honest problem-descriptions are vital, 
                                                   
31   These tools have the capacity to be used to enhance quality control. We are not suggesting 
that they are actually being used to that end, or that they have been designed to serve that 
purpose only. 
32   Due consideration should be given to the added importance of such plans when a team is 
composed of professionals from different national jurisdictions and cultures, and the com-
mon glue that binds them is not yet strong. 
33   By this is meant panels with senior officers, external to the team, to assess the strength of 
the case and its evidence. This entails ‘stress-testing’ of the evidence, including of crime-
base incidents and linkage to persons higher in chains of authority. In some entrenched sit-
uations, experts from outside the organisation are used (persons who are not part of the 
chains of authority and who have no loyalty or other conflicts of interest). Proper evi-
dence-review is multi-disciplinary when required, while led by competent lawyers. 
34   Such as statistics, mapping, analysis of organisational structures and telecommunications, 
and source evaluation. 
35   One example is social anthropology, which could be employed to shed light on what actu-
ally happened on a factual level, and develop case hypotheses and supplement evidence 
reviews.  
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but not enough. To generate new ideas, minds from outside established 
war crimes justice practice have been encouraged to contribute. 
The QCCI Project never sought to produce a mere catalogue of pro-
posals. Rather, its ambition has been to have a longer-term impact on our 
thinking about the appropriate mindset and culture of quality control in 
different jurisdictions. The project has already had some impact prior to 
the publication of this anthology. The Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court welcomed the debates in our conference in February 2019 
and took into account some of the resulting advice when issuing her OTP 
Strategic Plan 2019-2021 in July 2019.  
Further to her presentation and the lively discussions at the New 
Delhi conference, Moa Lidén was invited by the Investigative Analysis 
Section (‘IAS’) of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor to conduct two train-
ing sessions on confirmation bias (see Chapter 7 below), proposing spe-
cific methods to control such biases and build greater objectivity in inves-
tigations. The training was positively received, and subsequently the In-
vestigations Division has decided to consolidate some of the relevant con-
siderations into standard practice.  
Inspired by the QCCI Project, two of the co-editors of this volume – 
Simon de Smet and Xabier Agirre Aranburu, with the assistance of re-
searchers from Amsterdam Free University – organised on ICC premises a 
“Forum on witness assessments” in November 2019 with participation of 
staff from all ICC organs and the defence. Three experts on forensic psy-
chology from the Universities of Maastricht and Amsterdam gave lectures, 
and the ensuing debate has assisted in raising awareness among organs 
and parties.36 Given the positive feedback from participants, this ‘forum’ 
may well continue to explore issues of evidence and investigations related 
to the QCCI Project, seen in light of emerging ICC practice. 
In September 2020, the Independent Expert Review (‘IER’) man-
dated by the ICC Assembly of States Parties made public its findings in a 
detailed report with 384 recommendations for improvement across the 
Court organs. The IER report included a number of references to ‘quality 
control’, including a section on “OTP Internal Quality Control Mecha-
nisms”, and references to relevant publications released by the Torkel 
Opsahl Academic Epublisher. Some of their recommendations are con-
                                                   
36  The event was possible thanks to the assistance of Barbora Hola and Gabrielle Chlevikaite 
from Vrije Univeristeit Amsterdam.  
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sistent with views expressed in this volume, as explained in the following 
pages. We are pleased to see that the emphasis on ‘quality control’ pro-
moted by the QCCI Project – and CILRAP’s wider Quality Control Pro-
ject – is being increasingly endorsed by practitioners and experts in inter-
national justice. 
2. Main Themes of the Anthology 
Five main themes emerge from the subsequent 23 chapters of this volume, 
all of them relevant to quality control in investigation and case-
preparation (‘QCCI’) in any criminal justice juridiction:  
• rigorous internal review mechanisms;  
• analysis techniques and professionals; 
• contextual embedding;  
• cognitive psychology and sound reasoning; and 
• planning tools and processes.  
Firstly, investigations need rigorous internal review mechanisms, 
within the investigation and prosecution agencies, to ensure their quality, 
and to adjust direction whenever necessary. We identified these reviews 
from the outset as one of the key bottlenecks (see Section 1.3.3. above), 
and several chapters have underlined their importance, whether in the 
form of ‘evidence review boards’ like those known since the late 1990s at 
the ICTY, or through adversarial tests like ‘devil’s advocates’ or ‘red 
teaming’. This emerges as a ‘lesson learned’ in chapters written by senior 
practitioners (including Chapter 3 below as well as the chapters by Chris-
tian A. Nielsen, William H. Wiley and Ewan Brown, and Markus Eikel), 
and it is also reinforced by the advice offered by legal and psychological 
experts (see Chapters 1 by Carsten Stahn and Chapter 7 by Moa Lidén). 
The above-mentioned Independent Expert Review on the ICC (‘IER’) has 
likewise emphasised this issue in its report of September 2020, inviting 
the OTP to strengthen its current practice.37 Effective implementation of 
these mechanisms in any jurisdiction will require support and commit-
                                                   
37  See Independent Expert Review, “Review of the International Criminal Court and the 
Rome Status System, Final Report”, 30 September 2020, section on “Evidence Reviews: 
Internal and Peer Review”, and recommendations 305, 308, 309 and 310 (‘IER Report’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cv19d5/). See footnote 44 below. 
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ment from senior officers, including chief prosecutors themselves, and 
adequate analytical techniques.  
Secondly, investigations need to use analysis strategically to find 
their way through masses of complex and often conflicting information, 
as identified in the bottlenecks defined as loss of overview of information 
(Section 1.3.1. above) and inadequate factual analysis (Section 1.3.2. 
above). Cognisant of the importance of analysis, the co-editors invited 
several former or current professional analysts and researchers as contrib-
utors to this volume (Bouwknegt, Nielsen, Wiley, Brown and Eikel, in 
addition to co-editor Xabier Agirre Araburu himself). The reader may 
appreciate the value of their methods, including elements of political 
analysis, organisational structures, critical evaluation of sources, and mul-
tiple structured techniques. The more talented lawyers have always valued 
the work of analysts, as we know from Telford Taylor’s compliments for 
the analysts at Nuremberg, to Leila Bourghiba’s similar praise in her 
Chapter 21, through the continuing support for analysis by CILRAP.38  
The investigations of core international crimes need to embrace the 
‘intelligence-led model’, which has been recommended as best practice 
among others by the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (‘OSCE’), based on “close co-operation between the analysts and 
the law enforcement decision-makers”.39 This is also consistent with the 
notion of “evidence-based decision making”, which the International Or-
ganisation for Standardization (‘ISO’) identifies a one of the key ‘quality 
management principles’, since “[f]acts, evidence and data analysis lead to 
greater objectivity and confidence in decision making”. 40 Furthermore, 
the IER in September 2020 issued several recommendations to strengthen 
analysis in the ICC-OTP investigations, including higher recognition for 
analysts, trusting analysts for collection planing and evidence reviews, 
engaging “analysts with specialised skills”, and that the OTP “should 
                                                   
38  See Telford Taylor, USA Brigadier General and Chief Counsel for War Crimes, “Final 
Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials under Control 
Council Law No. 10”, Washington, D.C., 15 August 1949, including acknowledgements of 
analysts on pp. 14, 18, 43, 44 and 345.  
39  See OSCE, “Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing”, 3 July 2017 (available on its web 
site).  
40  See ISO, “Quality Management Principles”, 2015, p. 12 (available on its web site).     
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make additional resources available for the IAS” [Investigative Analysis 
Section].41 
The mass proliferation of digital data only emphasises the role of 
professional analysts. They are in the best position to lead the investiga-
tion, navigating in parallel the analogue and digital worlds, because of 
their comprehensive factual knowledge, critical thinking, and advance 
software skills. As has been observed by technology experts in reference 
to the ICC investigations: “Empowering analysts, in particular, by creat-
ing opportunities for learning, experimentation, and creativity, may be the 
best way to adapt to the new challenges”.42  
Thirdly, any crime emerges from a social context, and understand-
ing that context is indispensable to investigate the crime effectively. If the 
investigators are foreign to the context, they will need to make a serious 
effort to educate themselves on the relevant cultural and societal issues 
prior to contact with potential witnesses. They will also need to engage 
local actors genuinely and respectfully, and hire area-experts on an ongo-
ing basis. The importance of this knowledge and embedding cannot be 
over-emphasised. The investigation must breathe with the local society, 
and be guided by emotional intelligence towards its victims and perpetra-
tors alike. It is necessary to understand the blend of factors that shape 
uniquely every situation (in a way similar to how inter-sectional feminism 
calls for a joint consideration of gender along with class, ethnicity, post-
colonial legacy and other features).43  
                                                   
41  IER Report, section on “Evidence Assessment and Analysis” and recommendations 299-
304, see supra note 37. 
42  Jay D. Aronson and Enrique Piracés, contribution to the ICC Forum hosted by the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles (‘UCLA’), School of Law, on the question “To what extent 
can cyber evidence repositories, and digital and open-source evidence, facilitate the work 
of the OTP, and the ICC more generally?”, 2020 (available on the web site of the UCLA 
ICC Forum).  
43  For an early formulation of this concept, see Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class, Vin-
tage Books, New York, 1983. For a more recent analysis, see Ana Martin Beringola “Inter-
sectionality: A Tool for the Gender Analysis of Sexual Violence at the ICC”, in Amsterdam 
Law Forum, 2017, vol. 9, No. 2. For a feminist critical discussion on the focus on sexual 
violence, see Karen Engle, The Grip of Sexual Violence in Conflict, Stanford University 
Press, 2020.    
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The IER Report has also highlighted this issue in the context of the 
ICC.44 In the absence of proper contextual and inter-sectional knowledge, 
the serious consequences highlighted by several contributors to this vol-
ume (Bouwknegt, Wiley and Brown, Bourguiba, as well as Agirre 
Aranburu) may repeat again and again with every new international inves-
tigation. 
Fourthly, investigations and prosecutions are highly conditioned by 
the psychology of the officers in charge. They are conducted by human 
beings, not by super-human robots; by people who think and feel essen-
tially like any person in the street, including projections of their personal 
backgrounds, desire to be accepted by colleagues and superiors, and per-
sonal or institutional self-interest. International investigations need the 
scientific knowledge on cognitive psychology developed over decades in 
national systems, as Moa Lidén, Trond Myklebust, Gavin Oxburgh and 
William Webster, as well as Xabier Agirre Aranburu explain in their chap-
ters, and Stahn and De Smet also endorse from a legal perspective. Practi-
tioners need humble acknowledgment of their psychological frailties – 
modesty helps learning, and investigations are nothing else than learning 
processes.  
Finally, it is clear that major investigations, like any major scientific 
or engineering project, need serious planning. This is firmly established in 
the chapters by Eikel, Angotti, Tandon and Lalit, and Butenschøn Skre on 
the basis of both national and international experience. There is not only a 
need to have clarity on the objectives, timelines and resources. Planning 
of a higher order will also be required to secure the appropriate budget 
and personnel, and to make the right decisions when selecting situations 
and cases, a point thoroughly addressed by Devasheesh Bais and Cale 
Davis in their chapters. 
                                                   
44  The experts argue that there is “a substantial problem” with regard to sufficient expertise in 
the ICC-OTP on situation countries. See IER Report, para. 170 and recommendations 293-
298, see supra note 37. At the time of writing, the ICC-OTP is carefully considering the 
IER report and its recommendations. For an earlier commentary on this subject, see Xabier 
Agirre Aranburu, “Measuring Distances – A Response to the Book ‘Distant Justice’ by Phil 
Clark”, in Opinio Juris, 2 October 2019.   
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3. Overview of Subsequent Chapters of the Anthology 
In Chapter 1 below, Carsten Stahn builds a bridge between the previous 
work on preliminary examination in the Quality Control Project45 and this 
volume on investigations, based, inter alia, on his expert knowledge of 
ICC jurisprudence. His chapter outlines the commonalities and differ-
ences between these different stages, and proposes important points for 
further development, some of which are subsequently addressed in detail 
by other contributors to this volume, such as cognitive biases, the need of 
proper planning, and the crucial importance of peer-review systems. 
Thijs B. Bouwknegt follows in Chapter 2 with a critique of the in-
vestigations by different international tribunals in Africa, including 
Rwanda (ICTR), Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Democratic Republic of Con-
go, Northern Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire (ICC). From his viewpoint as a 
historian and researcher, Bouwknegt finds that too often the arguments by 
the prosecution are simplistic and biased for the sake of incrimination. He 
suggests that investigations would be more reliable if trusted to some 
agency independent from the prosecution.  
Part II: Evidence and Analysis contains six chapters. In Chapter 3, 
Xabier Agirre Aranburu explains the role of professional analysts and 
their QCCI tecniques. Most of this chapter is devoted to source evaluation, 
including a model with standard criteria to assess credibility and reliabiliy, 
and a critique of the reasoning adopted for this matter by some ICC 
chambers. He further recommends a number of diagnostic and adversarial 
techniques, such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, overview tem-
plates, ‘devil’s advocates’ and Evidence Review Boards.      
The reader may find some common ground between the second and 
the fourth chapter, both written by historians. In Chapter 4, Christian A. 
Nielsen, formerly an analyst at the ICTY and the ICC and currently a pro-
fessor of history, deals with the key question of organisational structures. 
His insight is critical for leadership cases, beginning with his warning that 
organisations are never monolithical, no matter what legal theories may 
have been used to aggregate multiple suspects and incidents. Like 
Bouwknegt, Nielsen doubts the impartiality of investigations designed for 
                                                   
45 See Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examina-
tion: Volumes 1 and 2, TOAEP, Brussels, 2018 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/32-bergsmo-
stahn and http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/33-bergsmo-stahn). 
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prosecution. Both recommend greater organisational independence, par-
ticularly for analysts.    
In Chapter 5, Trond Myklebust, Gavin Oxburgh and William Web-
ster focus on investigative interviews, a fundamental issue as international 
criminal investigations continue to rely largely on witness testimony. 
They outline the best practices according to scientific research, the 
‘PEACE model’ and the standards of the International Investigative Inter-
viewing Research Group (‘IIIRG’). These operational and training stand-
ards for witness interviewing have been adopted, among others, by the 
Investigations Division of the ICC-OTP and it is safe to recommend them 
to any investigative agency dealing with witnesses.    
In Chapter 6, Moa Lidén brings a forensic perspective to the book 
with her assessment of the methods used to estimate age in cases of al-
leged child soldiers. Her review of eight cases from the SCSL and ICC 
identifies challenges and opportunities for every kind of evidence so far 
utilised, including forensics, testimony, images and documents. Those 
familiar with the difficulties in the first trial of the ICC, the Lubanga case, 
will appreciate the importance of the subject, and investigations on al-
leged child soldiers should consider Lidén’s pioneering research for guid-
ance and ‘lessons learned’.  
In a second comprehensive contribution to this anthology, Chapter 7, 
Moa Lidén takes the psychological research on confirmation bias, con-
ducted in multiple national systems, to the international arena for the first 
time. Practitioners will recognise many of the cognitive problems de-
scribed in this chapter, as the tendency to confirm incriminating allega-
tions to the detriment of impartial assessments is a frequent problem in 
criminal investigations. The chapter identifies the main ‘risk factors’ and 
proposes ‘debiasing techniques’ for each of them, in ways that can be 
readily implemented by investigation and prosecution services.  
William H. Wiley and Ewan Brown develop a sobering analysis of 
the current state of international investigations in Chapter 8. Both authors 
worked as analysts at the ICTY-OTP before joining the ICC-OTP in its 
early days, just like other contributors to this volume (Nielsen, Eikel and 
Agirre Aranburu), and they write with sound technical knowledge as well 
as a sense of disappointment with international tribunals. They make the 
case for privatisation of international investigations, which comes as no 
surprise after their work with the Commission for International Justice 
and Accountability, as well as different defence cases. Based on their in-
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telligence background, they propose appointing ‘collection managers’. 
They also advise internal review procedures, such as ‘evidence reviews’ 
and ‘devil’s advocates’, in line with the recommendations in other chap-
ters (Stahn, Agirre Aranburu, Lidén and others).    
Part III: Systemic Challenges in Case-Preparatory Work-Processes 
also includes six chapters. Devasheesh Bais addresses in Chapter 9, case 
selection and prioritisation, which is the strategic issue par excellence in 
international investigations. The chapter builds on the experience of dif-
ferent jurisdictions, as well as pioneering work undertaken by CILRAP in 
this area since prior to 2008, leading, inter alia, to a 2009 TOAEP volume 
on this subject.46 Bais shares an overview of some fourteen projects and 
reports on case selection and prioritisation in the period 1995-2019, from 
the ICTY, ICC, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. As he concludes, 
the ICC-OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (2016) 
and its Strategic Plan 2019-2021 may be of some assistance to inform 
strategic decision-making on this matter, but more work needs to be done 
on prioritisation criteria.  
With her Chapter 10, Olympia Bekou inaugurates a series of chap-
ters dedicated to pre-trial techniques, exploring whether their earlier im-
plementation could help investigation and case-preparation. Bekou chron-
icles the implementation of the ‘in-depth analysis charts’ at the ICC, a 
classification scheme designed to tabulate legal requirements with factual 
allegations and means of evidence. At the ICC this tool was adopted by 
some judges and dismissed by others, while the prosecution never fa-
voured it in the specific manner that it was introduced by judges. Bekou 
highlights the potential benefits of the ‘in-depth analysis chart’ for disclo-
sure and for investigations, and she suggests that the charts should be giv-
en due consideration, perhaps in an evolved form.   
Simon De Smet is one of the three legal officers at ICC Chambers 
contributing to this volume, along with Gilbert Bitti and Eleni Chaitidou. 
In Chapter 11 he presents a prototype for an ‘argumentation map’ to plot 
the logical flows that could lead to judicial findings ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’. De Smet also discusses the trustworthiness of the sources of evi-
dence, in terms that are comparable to the analytical methodology for 
                                                   
46  Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes 
Case, TOAEP, Oslo, 2nd edition, 2010 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f5abed). 
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source evaluation proposed in Chapter 3, only from the viewpoint of the 
judges. The chapter makes important contributions to the theory of legal 
reasoning, inviting the reader to join in further exploration.   
Matthias Neuner reviews in Chapter 12 the practice of the ICC re-
garding modes of responsibility.47 He suggests that the cases filed by the 
prosecution should be clearer about the alleged responsibilities, avoiding 
to charge multiple modes in ways that could swell the case unnecessarily 
or otherwise be unfair, and that have been discouraged by the judges. In 
view of the judicial record so far, Neuner advises caution for the prosecu-
tion, holding back the filing of draft charges until the modes of responsi-
bility can be clearly identified. Following detailed analysis, he discour-
ages the use of cumulative charges. Neuner concurs with Agirre Aranburu 
in recommending a policy of ‘over-delivering’ by operating with evidence 
standards higher than what is formally required in the early stages, which 
would be also consistent with the practice in Norway, as we will learn in 
the chapter by Butenschøn Skre.  
Chapter 13 by Cale Davis discusses the selection of charges. He ap-
proaches this issue empirically, after interviewing a selection of senior 
prosecution lawyers in several international tribunals, and mastering sta-
tistically a large series of cases. He identifies ample variations across cas-
es, as well as underlying factors that lead to more expansive or economic 
choices. Practitioners will recognise those factors from their experience, 
while this chapter may assist to acknowledge and manage them with 
greater fairness and efficiency.  
The anthology would not be complete without the advice of a judge, 
and we were fortunate to have Judge David Re (of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon) address the issue of disclosure in Chapter 14. In his own 
words, “disclosure is a swamp, like a mire of quicksand that can rapidly 
swallow the unsuspecting”. Judge Re offers a way out of this ‘swamp’, 
based on a detailed review of the experience of several international tri-
bunals. He proposes specific methods and responsibilities for the parties 
and the judges as well as an important role for the court’s neutral admin-
                                                   
47  While many authors and practitioners refer to ‘modes of liability’ in the context of the ICC, 
the term ‘liability’ is never mentioned in the ICC Statute, which refers instead consistently 
to ‘responsibility’, including in Article 25 on “Individual criminal responsibility”, Article 
28 on “Responsibility of commanders and other superiors”, and Article 31 on “Grounds for 
excluding criminal responsibility”, see Rome Statute of the ICC, 17 July 1998 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/).  
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istration, with appropriate electronic tools and protocols. Beyond investi-
gations, this chapter will be of great technical interest for litigation law-
yers and judges. It is an example of the kind of well-informed, critical and 
innovative thinking that the QCCI Project has invited.  
Markus Eikel is one of the two contributors to this volume who 
work for the Investigations Division of the ICC-OTP, along with Agirre 
Aranburu. In Chapter 15 – the first of four chapters in Part IV: Investiga-
tion Plans as Instruments of Quality Control – he explains the importance 
of investigative planning based on the experience of the ICC-OTP, includ-
ing his own as Investigations Team Leader. Having proper investigation 
plans, with standard templates and processes, is fundamental for the suc-
cess of any complex investigation, as well as for cost-efficient manage-
ment of resources. The bottlenecks of ‘overview of information’ (Section 
1.3.1.), ‘evidence review’ (Section 1.3.3.) and ‘too much evidence’ (Sec-
tion 1.3.6.) cannot be addressed without serious design and control of 
investigation plans. In this chapter the reader will find detailed guidance 
for this purpose, including specific reference to the ICC-OTP Regulations 
and practice.  
Additional guidance for investigation planning follows in Chapter 
16 by Antonio Angotti, who compares the original concept of investiga-
tion plans in the ICC-OTP Draft Regulations (2003) and some tools avail-
able in the Italian legal system. Interesting examples of prosecutorial 
planning, co-ordination and prioritisation have surfaced in Italy in recent 
years in areas such as environmental and gender-based crimes, with ele-
ments that partly resemble the tools designed for the ICC and may pro-
vide inspiration for any jurisdiction. He also highlights the detailed provi-
sions on the Draft Regulations on investigation plans, including the re-
quired participation by the highest level of management in their discus-
sion and adoption (which is echoed in the 2020 IER Report), and that an 
investigation should not be opened unless there is a draft investigation 
plan prepared. The Draft Regulations required that professional investiga-
tors and prosecutors should be responsible for its preparation.  
More national references enrich the discussion on investigation 
plans in Chapter 17, as Usha Tandon and Shreeyash Uday Lalit share the 
experience in India with human trafficking crimes. A comparative consid-
eration of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code and the ICC model shows 
both similarities and differences. While in India investigations are con-
ducted independently by the police, in the ICC-OTP they are subordinated 
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to trial attorneys. The Standard Operating Procedures (‘SOPs’) to investi-
gate human trafficking crimes adopted by the Government of India in 
2007 with the assistance of UNODC, and by the National Human Rights 
Commission of India in 2017, show tools and techniques that may be rel-
evant for crimes in different jurisdictions. The authors argue that the ICC-
OTP planning model could be “too onerous” for Indian practice, which 
needs more flexibility under broader SOPs. Perhaps every system needs to 
find the planning model that best suits its needs, combining appropriately 
efficiency, accountability and flexibility.  
Alf Butenschøn Skre is the author of Chapter 18, the last one of Part 
IV dedicated to investigation plans. He explains in detail the planning 
process for criminal investigations in Norway, based on relevant docu-
ments and his experience as a Public Prosecutor. In the Norwegian system, 
the adoption of investigation plans is a standard practice based on clear 
instructions and requirements. The plans are used as ‘living documents’ 
handled through web-based electronic templates to facilitate sharing and 
updating as necessary. Instructions by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
outline the specific purposes of the investigation plans, including to im-
plement national prosecutorial priorities, manage efficiently resources, 
guarantee legal compliance, keep investigative objectivity, and facilitate 
due diligence vis-à-vis victims. Factual hypotheses and legal considera-
tions must also be captured in these plans. Butenschøn Skre explains me-
thodically these processes and suggests rightly that this approach should 
assist in adressing bottlenecks identified by the QCCI Project. 
Part V: Judicial and Prosecutorial Participation in Investigation 
and Case Preparation offers the last five chapters of the book. They con-
sider the role judges, investigating judges, prosecutors and specialised 
military lawyers can and should play during investigation and preparation 
of core international crimes cases. This is an area where comparative per-
spectives can be particularly important.   
In Chapter 19, Gilbert Bitti draws on his long experience at the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chambers that review the cases resulting from the OTP investi-
gative and legal work. The author favours greater involvement of ICC 
judges in the investigations, a theory rooted in French national law, as 
Leila Bourguiba explains in her Chapter 21 about the French model. Bitti 
draws on his expert knowledge of the law of the ICC, having played a key 
role in the drafting of the ICC Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
and Regulations. The chapter contains many propositions for the ICC-
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OTP, some of them essential to its investigative duties, and others reflec-
tive of disagreements between Pre-Trial Chambers and the OTP.   
Eleni Chaitidou adds, in Chapter 20, more advice for the ICC Pros-
ecutor from the viewpoint of a lawyer who has several years of experience 
from the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers. She focuses on cases in which Pre-
Trial Chambers decided to amend the charges proposed by the ICC Prose-
cutor. The comparison between the legal assessments of the OTP attor-
neys and the judges are helpful for the legal discourse, as well as for the 
OTP’s general case-preparation. Based on the cases she discusses, the 
author emphasises the role of the Pre-Trial Chambers in case-preparation, 
especially as regards legal characterisations (where she offers some guid-
ance also for the ICC-OTP).  
Whereas Part IV offers some national perspectives on investigation 
planning (drawing on Italy, India and Norway), Chapter 21 by Leila 
Bourguiba analyses the role of investigating judges and judges in French 
investigations and case-preparation, supplementing the two preceding 
chapters which considered the role of the judiciary in case-preparation 
before the ICC. Bourguiba provides a thorough overview of the French 
experience, writing from her unique experience from both the ICC Pre-
Trial Chambers and the French War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
Unit. Among the many valuable points in her chapter, we learn about the 
proactive efforts of the French judges to study the social context of the 
crimes, engaging experts ex officio, in ways that resemble the recommen-
dations in earlier chapters by Bouwknegt and Nielsen to ensure contextual 
awareness and independent analysis. Bourguiba describes a solid system, 
as it operates in French law. There are obviously many aspects of the 
French and other well-functioning national systems from which criminal 
justice for core international crimes can learn. As stated in the co-editors’ 
foreword to this book, there needs to be a two-way stream of ideas and 
approaches between national and international jurisdictions.    
We are privileged to have Tor-Geir Myhrer (Norway Police Univer-
sity College) addressing, in Chapter 22, one of the most sensitive issues in 
the real world of criminal investigations: the role of prosecutors in inves-
tigation and case-preparation as well as the rapport between investigative 
and legal officers. Myhrer speaks with the wisdom of a senior prosecutor 
and doctor of law with some 40 years of professional experience, commit-
ted to building the best possible understanding between lawyers and in-
vestigators. In the Norwegian system, importantly, the initial prosecutorial 
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work is done by lawyers embedded in the police force. The high level of 
education of Norwegian police officers allows them to interact most effec-
tively with both the embedded lawyers as well as the more senior prosecu-
tors. As Myhrer explains with multiple examples, legal direction and audit 
of the investigation are necessary for a number of activities that impact on 
due process, privacy rights, and overall legal relevance. Both investigative 
and legal staff can make good use of Myher’s advice to build their co-
operation on the basis of loyalty and respect.  
Finally, in Chapter 23, Gilad Noam presents some reflections on the 
role of military lawyers in case-preparation based on the experience of 
Israel, which has a military justice system, as do countries like Nigeria, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Noam reviews some of the 
recommendations by the ‘Turkel Commission’ established by the Gov-
ernment of Israel to examine the attack by Israeli forces on the humanitar-
ian flotilla bound for Gaza.48 The chapter highlights the question whether 
specialised criminal justice personnel should be used more in criminal 
justice for core international crimes, while respecting the integrity of the 
criminal justice process. For some elements of crime, it can obviously be 
an advantage to have detailed familiarity with and understanding of tech-
nical and operational military practice. 
4. Some Thoughts on the Way Forward 
We hope that this volume will help set the foundation for better quality 
control in the investigation of core international crimes, and foster dia-
logue among practitioners across jurisdictions and professional fields. 
There is certainly much more to say. Additional research and critical dis-
cussion are much needed. Different views among experts are not only 
understandable; they are prerequisites to progress through the contrast of 
                                                   
48  In 2010, the Israeli Navy attacked a flotilla en route to Gaza, resulting in the death of ten 
flotilla members. In 2013, the Union of the Comoros referred to the ICC-OTP the situation 
concerning “the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for [the] 
Gaza strip”, and requested the OTP to initiate an investigation, see, ICC-OTP, “ICC Prose-
cutor receives referral by the authorities of the Union of the Comoros in relation to the 
events of May 2010 on the vessel ‘MAVI MARMARA’”, Statement, 14 May 2013 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3434fe/). For the latest decision on this situation, see ICC, 
Decision on the ‘Application for Judicial Review by the Government of the Comoros’, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 September. 2020, ICC-01/13-111 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/mqu8bo/).  
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opinions. Even on highly specialised investigative issues, experts are fre-
quently known to differ.49   
Management issues have been addressed to some extent in our vol-
ume, but may deserve further attention in subsequent editions. A deliber-
ate quality-control culture requires not only thoughtful planning, but also 
knowledge-management (as building knowledge is the core business of an 
investigation), recruitment, human resources, financial management, 
training, security (for information, premises, witnesses and staff), pro-
curement, logistics, language skills, and co-operation with external part-
ners. It is not an easy set of tasks. Good criminal justice practitioners do 
not necessarily make good managers, just like in any other business. It 
remains a key issue for discussion how to manage the workflow and inter-
face between investigators and lawyers, a complex question that, as our 
volume shows, finds different answers in, for example, France, Norway, 
India, Italy or the ICC. 
In some criminal justice agencies, it may be helpful to detail the 
‘quality control’ notion with an articulation of pre-conditions for the de-
sired high quality. Paramount among them will be the right choice of 
skills and personnel. This issue was the subject of much discussion in the 
initial stages of the ICC, leading to the conclusion that investigations re-
quire staff with higher levels of education and diverse backgrounds.50 The 
large volumes of information, along with complex responsibilities, call for 
personnel that are not afraid to study hundreds of pages, and will be able 
to synthesise the main points while considering alternative hypotheses and 
                                                   
49  See, for example, the diverging views between experts testifying about statistical crime-
pattern analysis in the ICTY judgments of Milutinović, and about trauma and credibility in  
Furundžija, see ICTY, Milutinović et al., Trial Chamber, 26 February 2009, IT-05-87-T 
(vol. 1:  https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9eb7c3/, vol. 2: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
f0666a/, vol. 3: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d79e85/, vol. 4: https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/3b31aa/); ICTY, Furundžija, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, IT-95-17/1-
T (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e6081b/). For an advanced discussion from a forensic 
viewpoint, see Moa Lidén and Itiel E. Dror, “Expert Reliability in Legal Proceedings: 
“Eeny, Meeny, Miny, Moe, With Which Expert Should We Go?””, in Science and Justice, 
1 October 2020.  
50  See Morten Bergsmo, “Institutional History, Behaviour and Development”, in Morten 
Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International 
Criminal Law: Volume 5, TOAEP, Brussels, 2017, pp. 10-11 (https://www.toaep.org/ps-
pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song); see also in the same volume, Morten Bergsmo and Klaus 
Rackwitz, “The First Budget of the Office of the Prosecutor”, pp. 1009 ff.  
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perspectives. These are research skills typically acquired through univer-
sity education.  
To assume that investigations of this kind must rely exclusively on 
police officers, may well be perceived as regression to models that have 
been tried in the ICTY in 1990s, prior to management reforms made there. 
It may be correct that the first ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
distrusted police and military, but this will come as no surprise if you 
come from a country in which historically the military and the police have 
been notorious perpetrators of human rights violations and corruption.51 It 
is noteworthy that the first two investigators hired in 2003 by the first ICC 
Prosecutor – at the recommendation of a panel led by Morten Bergsmo – 
had law enforcement backgrounds. One of them, William H. Wiley, is a 
contributor to the present volume. Several police officers were subse-
quently hired by the first Prosecutor (including those who led the Luban-
ga investigation and most of the team leaders). A number of lawyers and 
other professionals with experience in criminal and human rights investi-
gations were also hired as investigators, whenever they succeeded in 
competitive recruitment with candidates of different backgrounds.52 Per-
sons from NGOs were rarely recruited as investigators.      
The staffing dilemma may be overcome in those systems where po-
lice investigations already include professionals with high levels of educa-
tion, such as in Norway, or in specialised investigation agencies in differ-
ent countries that also include analytical and scientific profiles. Another 
element of proactive ‘quality assurance’ is the strategic use of analysis 
following an ‘intelligence-led model’, which entails use of qualified 
methods and professionals with the support of higher management and 
decision-makers.  
To determine whether an investigation meets the required quality 
standards can be seen as an auditing challenge. The assessment requires 
thorough knowledge of the context of the investigative decision-making, 
                                                   
51  For an account of human rights violations in Argentina and the trial of the Juntas by the 
first ICC Prosecutor, see Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Cuando el poder perdió el juicio, Planeta, 
Buenos Aires, 1996, and Julio C. Strassera and Luis G. Moreno-Ocampo, Será Justicia. 
Entrevistas, Editorial Distal, Buenos Aires, 1986. 
52  For a volume edited by three former junior investigators with a legal background, 
see Adejoke Babington-Ashaye, Aimee Comrie and Akingbolahan Adeniran (eds.), Inter-
national Criminal Investigations: Law and Practice, International Publishing, The Hague, 
2018. 
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made possible through painstaking study of the relevant records and evi-
dence, and through consultation with the officers involved. Absent such 
knowledge, caution is advisable, although this volume and the QCCI Pro-
ject have welcomed highly critical approaches and questions. For example, 
ascertaining whether the investigation collected too much or too little 
evidence is not always straightforward, as the cases evolve and what to-
day seems excessive evidence may offer the basis for additional cases 
beyond the original plan; or what appeared to be sufficient ended up not 
meeting unexpected requirements, defence challenges, or witness with-
drawals due to personal or security issues. The German investigation of 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 interrogated 210 of its less than 500 mem-
bers:53 was that over-collecting? To answer this question would require 
analysis of the investigation in its original context. Modesty is advisable 
for any learning process, including both the actual investigation and any 
subsequent evaluation.   
Assessing the cases made at trial is not enough to evaluate the 
quality of the underlying investigation. One thing is how the investigation 
was conducted. It is quite another what the prosecutors subsequently 
chose to present as the legal case. If the evidence ends up lacking, it is the 
responsibility of the prosecution lawyers to frame their charges according-
ly – or not to file them at all, as several contributors to this volume have 
explained (mainly Bitti, Chaitidou, De Smet, Neuner and Agirre Aranbu-
ru). The advice offered by lawyers does not always penetrate the underly-
ing investigative work. The true histories of investigations rest on larger 
and more intricate scopes of evidentiary and operational information, pro-
tected by layers of confidentiality. Progress may follow from deep case-
studies more so than from sweeping assessments (much like ‘thick de-
scriptions’ are increasingly appreciated in social sciences after a discredit-
ing of ‘big theories’).54   
A certain ‘international exoticisation’ may be another source of con-
fusion. One sometimes gets the impression that observers consider that 
problems encountered in international investigations belong to a field that 
                                                   
53  See Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland, Harper Perennial, New York, 1993, p. xvii.  
54  For example, the independent expert review commissioned by the ICC Prosecutor on the 
Kenya investigation, see ICC-OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on ex-
ternal expert review and lessons drawn from the Kenya situation”, 26 November 2019 
(available on the ICC’s web site).   
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is vastly different and far-removed from the home turf. Fact-rich criminal 
investigations are complex, fragile and prone to human error in any 
known system, including in the countries that are reputed to have among 
the best criminal justice systems in the world.55 For example, it took 34 
years for the Swedish police to conclude the investigation of the murder 
of Prime Minister Olof Palme – which happened on a busy street right in 
the centre of the capital Stockholm – although the investigation was a top 
State priority involving hundreds of officers and millions of euros.56 In 
Spain it is estimated that some 40% of the murders committed by the ter-
rorist group ETA have not been solved, although again this issue was a top 
State priority with heavy resource investment over decades.57 In England 
miscarriages of justice are known in cases of various kinds, from terror-
ism to mothers wrongly convicted for the accidental deaths of their infants, 
due to investigative or forensic malpractice. 58  Similar examples are 
known in many other countries.59  
                                                   
55  For an early comment on the frailties of criminal justice, see André Gide, Ne jugez pas, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1930. Gide expresses candidly his doubts about the reliability of criminal 
procedure for fact-finding after his experience with several trials in France.   
56  See “Decision in the investigation into the murder of former Swedish Prime Minister Olof 
Palme”, announced by the Swedish Prosecution Authority on 10 June 2020 (available on 
their web site). Palme was murdered on 28 February 1986. For an overview in English of 
the crime and multiple failed lines of enquiry, see Jan Bondeson, Blood on the Snow: The 
Killing of Olof Palme, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2005. For a detailed journalistic 
work on the person who was identified as the perpetrator by the Swedish police in 2020, 
see Thomas Pettersson, Den osannolika mördaren: Skandiamannen och mordet på Olof 
Palme, Offside Press, Stockholm, 2018.  
57  See Juanfer F. Calderín, Agujeros del Sistema. Más de 300 asesinatos de ETA sin resolver, 
Ikusager, 2014, Vitoria-Gasteiz (research based on investigative and judicial records). The 
author claims that the gap is due to “serious mistakes” by State authorities, including in-
vestigative malpractice and procedural neglect. For an account from the viewpoint of the 
Spanish Guardia Civil, see Manuel Sánchez (colonel of the Guardia Civil), Lorenzo Silva 
and Gonzalo Araluce, Sangre, Sudor y Paz. La Guardia Civil Contra ETA, Ediciones Pen-
ínsula, Barcelona, 2017. In June 2018, the Prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional estab-
lished a special unit to address these unsolved crimes in response to the demands from vic-
tims’ associations.  
58  See “The Case of Sally Clark: Motherhood Under Attack”, Chapter 1 in Leila Schneps and 
Coralie Colmez, Math on Trial. How Numbers Get Used and Abused in the Courtroom, 
Basic Books, New York, 2013. For terrorism cases, see “Miscarriages of Justice and False 
Confessions”, Chapter 7 in Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and 
Confessions: A Handbook, Wiley, Chichester, 2003.  
59  For France, see Laurent Dibos et al., Grandes erreurs judiciaires, Prat Éditions, Issy-les-
Moulineaux, 2006. For the US see, among others, Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the In-
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As Tor-Geir Myhrer explains in Chapter 22, reflecting on national 
practice: “Most prosecutors have experienced that even indictments based 
on the most thorough investigation fall apart during court hearings. The 
reason is often that witnesses change their statements, do not any more 
remember, do not show up, or use their right”.  
The problems facing criminal investigations are, in other words, not 
confined to the international level. They can be found in any investigation 
because of inherent operational, cognitive and political challenges. Pro-
fessionals know these difficulties, and understand that they can only in-
crease exponentially in contexts of high threat and low resources. There is 
no excuse for incompetence, especially when public trust in, and the will 
to, justice is high. But setting the right standards requires a realistic un-
derstanding of how investigations actually work, starting from their foun-
dation in the national domain.  
Contextual embedding in close dialogue with local communities is 
one of the themes emerging from this volume. In view of the patent dis-
parities and disproportionate influence of some States in the international 
society, we could paraphrase Anthea Roberts and ask the question: ‘Are 
international investigations really international?’.60 Closeness to the vic-
timised communities should not just be a tool for the international investi-
gation. It is essential for the legitimacy of the entire exercise, in order for 
the judicial outcome to be accepted and owned by victims and respected 
by the world at large. Feedback from victims and the victimised commu-
nities should also be considered a quality-control measure. Addressing 
their rights is what justifies the investigation in the first place. Organisa-
tions that call themselves ‘international’ should benefit from a truly inter-
national composition of the leadership, if they seek broad credibility in the 
eyes of the world. Genuine cross-cultural empathy, including post-
                                                                                                                        
nocent. Where Criminal Prosecutions go Wrong, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
2011, and Mark Godsey, Blind Justice. A Former Prosecutor Exposes the Psychology and 
Politics of Wrongful Convictions, University of California Press, Oakland, 2017. 
60  Anthea Roberts (with a foreword by Martti Koskenniemi), Is International Law Interna-
tional?, Oxford University Press, 2017. See also Wolgang Kaleck, Double Standards: In-
ternational Criminal Law and the West, TOAEP, Brussels, 2015 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-
pdf/26-kaleck).  
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colonial reckoning and specific research, will be required to facilitate this 
dialogue.61   
Moreover, international investigations need to benefit from gender 
analysis to address the current disproportionate male share among investi-
gators and witnesses and apply due diligence on all crimes regardless of 
their gender context. To the extent that prosecutorial excesses correlate 
with what may be perceived as male over-confidence, a measure of gen-
der analysis may help for greater objectivity and efficiency. Inter-sectional 
analysis needs further development, as it responds to world-wide common 
sense, and the interplay of diverse factors among victims, perpetrators and 
investigating officers alike.62    
Another area that may require further development concerns the in-
vestigation of the crime of aggression.63 At the domestic level, violent 
crime is usually associated with poorer neighbourhoods and complex cor-
ruption with the richer ones. This imbalance led criminologists to develop 
the concept of ‘white collar crime’ in order to address corporate crimes, 
and to correct class biases in criminal justice.64 Similar disparities show at 
the international level. The crime of aggression could be regarded as a 
kind of ‘white collar crime’ under international criminal law, committed 
by powerful State actors, at arm’s length from actual physical violence. 
The widely perceived class and post-colonial imbalances in international 
                                                   
61  For emerging research in this area, see Julie Fraser and Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Inter-
sections of Law and Culture at the International Criminal Court, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd, Cheltenham, 2020. See also Morten Bergsmo, Wolfgang Kaleck and Kyaw Yin Hlaing 
(eds.), Colonial Wrongs and Access to International Law, TOAEP, Brussels, 2020 (forth-
coming). 
62  See ICC-OTP, “Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes”, 5 June 2014 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ede6c/) for a definition of gender analysis (p. 4) and in-
ter-sectionality (p. 16 and footnote 25). In this Policy Paper the OTP made a commitment 
to “integrating a gender perspective and analysis into all of its work” (p. 10), and to “un-
derstand” the intersection of multiple factors in line with some recommendations from the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’) and some 
ICC jurisprudence (footnote 25).   
63  On the crime of aggression under the ICC Statute, see, among others, Deborah Ruiz Ver-
duzco, “Fragmentation of the Rome Statute through and Incoherent Jurisdictional Regime 
for the Crime of Aggression: A Silent Operation”, in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten 
Stahn (eds.), The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 389-428. 
64  For the seminal work in this area, see Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime. The Uncut 
Version, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983 (originally published in 1949).  
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criminal law are unlikely to be addressed appropriately by seeking to es-
tablish responsibility for mass violence in the rich countries, but rather by 
understanding and investigating correctly crimes that are characteristic of 
their power, including the crime of aggression and crimes related to mili-
tary occupation. That may require investigative methods akin to those 
used in serious fraud investigations, with meticulous study of internal 
records and decision-making processes. ‘How to investigate the crime of 
aggression’ could be a useful subject to address in future editions of this 
anthology. 
It is only natural that several authors in this volume and many ob-
servers in the field are concerned with the outcome of ICC cases, includ-
ing the underlying investigations. This is understandable in view of the 
high expectations and the acquittals in several early cases before the Court. 
Critical interest mounted after the acquittal in Gbagbo and Blé Goudé in 
January 2019, shortly before the New Delhi conference on which this 
anthology draws, as discussed in Section 1. above.65 Assessing the overall 
results of ICC cases falls outside the scope of this volume and the QCCI 
Project, which is not jurisdiction-specific and which considers both the 
international and national levels.66  
Witness protection difficulties are a pervasive factor across cases 
and situations before the ICC. This topic was addressed at the New Delhi 
conference, but it is not covered by this first edition of the anthology. The 
leak of internal files and witness information at the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers in September 2020 is a stark reminder of such difficulties in 
                                                   
65  See, among others, Richard J. Goldstone, “Acquittals by the International Criminal Court”, 
in EJIL: Talk!, 18 January 2019.  
66   Such assessments would have to look critically at the preparation and presentation of 
specific cases, as well as in some instances also analyse the reasoning of the judges, as the 
IER has indicated particularly in relation to the acquittal in Bemba by ICC appeal judges, 
see IER Report, see supra note 37, sections on “Standards of Review in Appeals” and 
“Departure from Established Practice and Jurisprudence”, including para. 611:  
 Until the Bemba case, however, the Court had followed the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
Tribunals, and had been applying ‘a standard of reasonableness in reviewing’ a Trial 
Chamber’s factual findings, according to them a margin of deference. The decision to de-
part from that standard was unexpected. There is no clear explanation why that occurred. 
The decision has created a void of uncertainty about the applicable standard of review for 
error of fact. Uncertainty as to the applicable standard is undesirable.  
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different national and international jurisdictions.67 Issues of prioritisation, 
selection and exercise of other forms of discretion during case-preparation 
merit further analysis, including presumptions about ‘most responsible 
persons’, ‘representativity’ in incident- and conduct-prioritisation,68 and 
impartiality between parties to the conflict.69 Government co-operation is 
a further area of research for a second edition of the volume, including the 
imposition of formal sanctions by States against individuals serving at war 
crimes courts, or similar informal measures.70  
Part IV of the anthology invites further research on the use of inves-
tigation plans, in particular the arguments in favour of early preparation of 
such plans. It is suggested in the book that a decision to open a large in-
vestigation should not be made before a draft investigation plan has been 
prepared. This would seem rather obvious in some national jurisdictions, 
such as Norway. Further analysis should also be given to the involvement 
of the leadership in the preparation and adoption of such draft investiga-
tion plans, as well as the extent of continuity of operational staff involve-
ment in their creation and maintenance. The Norwegian model of a dy-
namic investigation plan, implemented digitally, whereby the elements of 
the plan are continuously updated as the work advances – rather than a 
printed document frozen in time which is common in many agencies – is 
                                                   
67  Hysni Gucati is accused of “intimidation” through public disclosure of witness identities, 
“violating the secrecy of proceedings”, see KSC, Arrest Warrant for Hysni Gucati (public 
redacted version), 24 September 2020. For an early overview and commentary, see Dean B. 
Pineles, “Kosovo War Crimes File Leaks Deliver a Blow to Justice”, Balkan Insight, 1 Oc-
tober 2020.  
68   See “Chapter 5: Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria”, in Morten Bergsmo, Kjetil 
Helvig, Ilia Utmelidze and Gorana Žagovec, The Backlog of Core International Crimes 
Case Files in Bosnia and Herzegovina, TOAEP, Oslo, 2010, 2nd edition, pp. 79-127 
(https://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/3-bergsmo-helvig-utmelidze-zagovec-second).  
69  See, for example, the IER Report, section on “The Criteria for Case Selection and Prioriti-
sation”, see supra note 37. 
70  See United States, Executive Order on Blocking Property Of Certain Persons Associated 
With the International Criminal Court, 11 June 2020, No. 13928, signed by President 
Donald J. Trump (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dfkvpn/). On 2 September 2020, the US 
government in furtherance of this Executive Order designated sanctions against ICC Pros-
ecutor Fatou Bensouda and her Head of the Jurisdiction Complementarity and Cooperation 
Division, Phakiso Mochochoko. For a legal analysis of this Executive Order under US law, 
note the law suit filed on 1 October 2020 by Open Society Justice Initiative (‘OSJI’) and 
four US law professors, see OSJI, “Open Society Justice Initiative Sues Trump Admin-
istration over International Criminal Court Executive Order”, Statement, 1 October 2020 
(available on its web site).  
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something that should be further elaborated in the second edition of this 
anthology.  
Skills can at all times be improved in criminal justice agencies, and 
such institutions should always welcome constructive feedback and criti-
cism, and use that as an opportunity to accelerate the work to enhance the 
internal culture of quality control. Contributing to the strengthening of 
such institutional cultures is a main objective of the QCCI Project. As the 
Foreword of the Co-Editors states: 
Perhaps the most important take-away from the book for 
leaders of investigations and case-preparation is their re-
sponsibility to build a culture of quality control within their 
agency, division, section or team. At a minimum, this means 
creating an office atmosphere where staff do not fear the 
consequences of raising concerns about quality. But manag-
ers should do more. They should devise incentive structures 
to actively encourage challenges by staff to the quality of 
work product. Individual analysts, investigators and prosecu-
tors, on the other hand, should see it as their professional ob-
ligation to develop a mindset of quality control. This may re-
quire more courage to speak up, and a stronger preparedness 
to let institutional loyalties override inter-personal relations, 
even if this can be unpleasant.   
This goes to the heart of this volume. We invite further submissions 
for the second edition specifically on these notions of culture and mindset 
of quality control, and how managers and staff members of relevant crim-
inal justice agencies should act to give effect to this passage by the co-
editors. This continuous query will benefit from contributions from differ-
ent fields of expertise, including business management, psychology, an-
thropology and ethics.   
This is not to diminish the importance of resource limitations, as the 
personnel available sometimes pales in comparison to the scale of fact-
rich cases.71 As the IER Report has found in the context of the ICC: “The 
ID [Investigations Division] is the most severely under-resourced Divi-
sion, having 87 less full time staff than estimated to provide the basic 
                                                   
71  For resource data and estimates, see ICC Assembly of the State Parties, “Report of the 
Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor”, 17 September 2015, ICC-
ASP/14/21, including section VII, “Resource comparison” with data from different nation-
al and international systems (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b27d2a/). 
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needs of the Division”.72 Conversely, some have contended that there may 
be an issue of over-reach, caused by the selection of an exceedingly large 
scope of work against finite resources.73  
A second edition of this anthology could include more analysis of 
the technical forensic sciences, an area that merits detailed attention. The 
same applies to digital evidence, as a parallel reality of electronic data is 
growing in our lives.74 The digital future has already arrived. Its investiga-
tion requires expertise on computer science, telecommunications, system-
atic monitoring and exploitation of Internet open sources, collection of 
satellite imagery and remote sensing data, and other evolving sources and 
techniques. 75  Continuing research on digital investigations is needed, 
along with efforts to educate practitioners and judges in this area.76 This is 
an area where the ICC may be well-placed to engage confidently with IT-
developers, building on the useful legal information services that the 
Court has made available to the public commons since many years.77 
                                                   
72  IER Report, para. 178, see supra note 37.  
73  This is the view adopted by the IER Report which invites the OTP to apply a higher 
threshold of gravity for admissibility, and to focus on fewer situations; see ibid., section 
“Narrower Standards for Admissibility” (paras. 646-650) and recommendation 227. 
74  See, for example, Council of Europe, “Electronic Evidence Guide. A Basic Guide for 
Police Officers, Prosecutors and Judges”, version 2.1, March 2020, published with the 
support of the European Union, including the chapters on the collection, analysis and legal 
procedure for digital evidence (available on the cyber-crime page of the Coucil of Europe’s 
web site).  
75  For some techniques of online investigations see, for example, Craig Silverman (ed.), 
“Verification Handbook”, endorsed by different UN agencies and specialised organisations 
(available on the Verification Handbook’s web site). For a meticulous discussion on evi-
dence from call data records, see Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Ayyash et al., Trial Cham-
ber I, Judgment, 18 August 2020, STL-11-01/T/TC (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/gcoqu8/). The Trial Chamber was presided over by Judge David Re, one of the con-
tributors to the present volume. 
76  For ongoing research see, for example, Formobile Project, “From Mobile Phones to Court”, 
an EU project funded under the Horizon 2020 programme (available on the Project’s web 
site). For a strategic outline, including considerations of workforce, skills and governance, 
see United Kingdom, “Digital Forensic Science Strategy”, July 2020, published by the Na-
tional Police Chiefs’ Council and other UK agencies.  
77   See Morten Bergsmo, “Decomposition Works in Our Favour”, Policy Brief Series No. 114 
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1.From Preliminary Examination to Investigation: 




International criminal justice has grown significantly as a field over the 
past decades. As Frédéric Mégret has noted, international criminal justice 
is not only “simply a set of laws or even an ideological project”, but a 
social field constructed by agents and professional communities. 1 It is 
marked by investment in institutions and practices. The development of 
this field requires critical scrutiny.2 Some methodologies of international 
criminal justice are in need of refinement. 
The work on quality control is an attempt to provoke critical self-
reflection and offer approaches to rethink existing practices. 3 This re-
quires critical analysis of practices, questioning of existing hypotheses, 
openness for dialogue and formulation of recommendations that may un-
pack or remedy existing problems. 
                                                   
* Carsten Stahn is Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice, Leiden 
University, Programme Director, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies and Pro-
fessor of Public International Law and International Criminal Justice, Queen’s University 
Belfast. This chapter is based on a presentation at the Indian Law Institute, see Carsten 
Stahn, “From Preliminary Examination to Criminal Investigation”, CILRAP Film, New 
Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-stahn/). 
1 See Frédéric Mégret, “International Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field”, in Penal Field, 
2016, vol. 13, p. 9 (“One might say: it is international criminal lawyers who create 
international criminal justice, not the other way around”). 
2 See Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2019. 
3 See Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Quality Control in Fact-Finding, Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, Florence, 2013 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-bergsmo). 
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Our previous two volumes on preliminary examinations have left 
footprints in enhancing the work in the pre-investigative stage,4 some of 
which are beginning to be reflected in OTP strategies.5 The project on 
investigations is a natural continuation of this line of work. This contribu-
tion argues that the nexus between preliminary examinations and investi-
gations deserves fresh attention in the practice of the International Crimi-
nal Court (‘ICC’). 
In the existing policies, preliminary examinations and investigations 
have been treated as if they are separate normative universes. They are 
associated with distinct goals and methodologies, and have their own 
unique institutional infrastructure. 6  For instance, preliminary examina-
tions are conducted by the Situation Analysis Section, which belongs to 
the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division, while inves-
tigations are run largely independently by the Investigation Division. This 
separation may be explained by certain structural differences between 
preliminary examinations and investigations. However, there should not 
be a ‘Great Wall’ between them. The different phases of proceedings are 
inherently connected. Preliminary examinations and investigations share 
numerous synergies and forms of interaction, which merit attention from 
the perspective of quality control and improvement of investigative struc-
tures. For instance, a preliminary examination provides an important 
knowledge base for investigations and might gradually shape investiga-
tion plans.7 Preliminary examinations rely heavily on external information 
                                                   
4 See Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examina-
tion: Volumes 1 and 2, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018 (http://www.
toaep.org/ps-pdf/32-bergsmo-stahn and http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/33-bergsmo-stahn). 
5 The Draft Strategic Plan 2019–2021 expressly recognizes the importance of on-going 
quality control and recommends steps to ‘optimize’ preliminary examinations. See OTP, 
Strategic Plan 2019–21, 14 May 2019, para. 13. See also Alex Whiting “ICC Prosecutor 
Signals Important Strategy Shift in New Policy Document”, in Just Security, 17 May 2019 
(available on its web site). 
6 See Carsten Stahn, “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques 
of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
2017, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 413–34. 
7 Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2019, 
pp. 3–4 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). Morten Bergsmo, “Rethinking In-
struments of Quality Control in the Investigation and Preparation of Core International 
Crimes Cases”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/
cilrap-film/190222-bergsmo/). 
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providers. Investigations require a pre-investigative plan in order to set 
out operational details or secure the preservation of evidence even before 
the formal initiation of the investigations. Preliminary examinations may 
contribute important elements to the formulation of investigative plans.8 
Trial strategy benefits from the continued input of investigative teams. 
These lessons are gradually recognized in the Draft Strategic Plan 2019–
2021, which expresses a commitment to: (1) “adapt the analytical prod-
ucts and information databases used during preliminary examinations to 
better reflect and anticipate investigative needs”, (2) to “consider means 
and opportunities for preserving evidence at the earliest stage” (for exam-
ple, through “interaction with first responders, preservation requests, 
statement-taking at the seat of the Court”), and to (3) increase the “inte-
gration between teams conducting preliminary examinations and investi-
gations”.9 
This chapter analyses synergies and differences between prelimi-
nary examinations and investigations. It highlights two macro problems 
arising in practice (‘cognitive bias’ and ‘bottlenecks’). It then discusses 
the structure of international criminal investigations and some ideas to 
improve the status quo, including means to address some of the ICC’s 
evidentiary problems. 
1.2. Structural Differences Between Preliminary Examinations and 
Investigations 
Preliminary examinations differ from investigations in at least five ways: 
purpose, formalization, investigative power (coercive powers, co-
operation duties), standard of proof and analytical methods. 
To begin with, a preliminary examination is “a form of pre-
investigation that precedes the actual formal investigation of a situation 
and subsequently a case”.10 It serves essentially as an analytical tool to 
determine whether there are sufficient grounds to commence an investiga-
tion. At the ICC, preliminary examinations have become a quasi-
independent stage of the proceedings. It is governed by a four-stage ana-
                                                   
8 See Markus Eikel, “Nature and Use of Investigation Plans at the International Criminal 
Court”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/
190223-eikel/). 
9 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–21, see above note 5, para. 24. 
10 See Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume III: International Crimi-
nal Procedure, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 335–36. 
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lytical process and a high degree of transparency. These four phases are: 
(1)“initial assessment of all information on alleged crimes received”, 
which filters out information on crimes that are outside the jurisdiction of 
the Court; (2) analysis of jurisdiction, which leads to a report on crimes 
(‘Article 5 report’); (3) analysis of the “admissibility of potential cases”, 
including complementarity and gravity, which leads to a report on Article 
17); and (4) examination of the interests of justice.11 This implies that not 
all preliminary examinations may culminate in investigations. 
In practice, the OTP has actively used preliminary examinations as 
a space to shape accountability policies, namely to foster deterrence and 
incentivize domestic investigations and prosecution.12 A preliminary ex-
amination involves uncertainty as to whether or not a situation shall be 
dealt with internationally or domestically. From a policy perspective, the 
lack of predictability as to whether or not a preliminary examination will 
lead to an investigation may be an asset: it may increase the political lev-
erage of the ICC to steer domestic justice approaches.13 
The assessment is made on the basis of material submitted to the 
Prosecution or open-source material.14 The OTP does not enjoy proper 
investigative power at this stage. It may invite other entities to co-operate; 
however, formal co-operation under Part 9 of the ICC Statute is not yet 
available. This makes the OTP comparable to a fact-finding body.15 The 
                                                   
11 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, paras. 77–83 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
12 Carsten Stahn, Morten Bergsmo, and CHAN Icarus, “On the Magic, Mystery and Mayhem 
of Preliminary Examinations”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Con-
trol in Preliminary Examination: Volume 1, pp. 1–32, see above note 4; Elizabeth Evenson, 
“ICC Preliminary Examinations and National Justice: Opportunities and Challenges for 
Catalysing Domestic Prosecutions”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality 
Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2, , pp. 713–29, see above note 4. 
13 See Mark Kersten, “Casting a Larger Shadow: Premeditated Madness, the International 
Criminal Court, and Preliminary Examinations”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn 
(eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2, pp. 655, 665, see above 
note 4. 
14 On open-source material, see Lindsay Freeman, “Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prose-
cutions: The Impact of Digital Technologies on International Criminal Investigations and 
Trials”, in Fordham International Law Journal, 2018, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 283; Alexa Koenig, 
Felim McMahon, Nikita Mehandru, and Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee, “Open Source 
Fact-Finding in Preliminary Examinations”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2, pp. 681–710, see above note 4. 
15 Ambos, 2016, p. 341, see above note 10. 
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initiation of preliminary examination requires an initial suspicion that 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed.16 The 
aim is to determine whether there is a “reasonable basis to proceed”.17 
Typically, no particular case hypothesis is developed. The focus is rather 
on the analysis of the situation and on the formulation of initial hypothe-
ses that are developed based on “relatively untested information”.18 
Investigations are different. Transforming material into a criminal 
case is a more complex undertaking. It requires several steps: the collec-
tion and analysis of material, investigation and the formation of a case 
theory. It involves document collection and analysis, the collection of 
crime-base and linkage-witness statements, as well as the identification of 
individual suspects.19 The purpose is to decide whether there is a suffi-
cient basis for prosecution. The main difference from preliminary exami-
nations is that the information and material is tested, for instance, through 
interrogatory processes, the taking of statements and witness interviews.20 
Further, investigations are more formal. They may involve coercive 
action against suspects. While criminal investigators are tasked with es-
tablishing facts, they are also subject to formalized requirements. They are 
bound by professional duties, are required to disclose evidence, may be 
called to testify about investigative methods, and must balance their man-
date against the rights of the Defence, as well as victims and witnesses. 
The legal framework serves as a basis to ‘frame’ investigations.21 
                                                   
16 Ibid., p. 336. 
17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 53(1) (‘ICC Stat-
ute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
18 See Paul Seils, “Putting Complementarity in its Place”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law 
and Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, 
pp. 305, 319. According to Article 15(2) and Rule 47, the OTP may “receive written or oral 
testimony at the seat of the Court”. 
19 Morten Bergsmo and William Wiley, “Human Rights Professionals and the Criminal In-
vestigation and Prosecution of Core International Crimes”, in Siri Skåre, Ingvild Burkey, 
and Hege Mørk (eds.), Manual on Human Rights Monitoring: An Introduction for Human 
Rights Field Officers, Norwegian Center for Human Rights, Oslo, 2010, pp. 1–27 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/8362d5/). 
20 See Seils, 2015, p. 319, see above note 18. 
21 On framing theories, see Fujiwara Hiroto and Stephan Parmentier, “Investigations”, in Luc 
Reydams,  Jan Wouters,  and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), International Prosecutors, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 572, 585. 
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Moreover, investigations are primarily aimed at identifying evi-
dence to hold individuals accountable before a court of law. This implies 
that they are subject to different safeguards and standards of proof.22 The 
aim of the investigation is to reduce uncertainties. This requires more 
concrete case hypotheses and different plans: investigation plans, evi-
dence collection plans and co-operation plans. 
Lastly, analytical methods differ and might change in the course of 
the investigation. Investigations rely on a combination of inductive and 
deductive methods. For instance, crime-base evidence is often induced 
from facts and information. Linkage evidence is more commonly deduced 
from organizational structures and contexts. Investigators navigate be-
tween these two techniques. 
Throughout the investigation, the collection of evidence is closely 
interrelated with analysis. Prosecutors must collect enough evidence to 
build a reliable case. However, the necessary scope, form and type of evi-
dence depend on the formulation of a charging theory, and involve the 
identification of suspects, the formulation of specific charges and the 
identification of modes of liability. This theory is gradually refined 
throughout the investigation. Methodologies need to be adjusted in light 
of newly available evidence. As Alex Whiting has noted: 
with a limited budget and uncertain and changing investiga-
tive needs, the Prosecutor must constantly react to shifting 
priorities and opportunities.23 
Ultimately, hastily investigated cases carry high chances of failure. 
1.3. Two Macro Problems 
Although preliminary examination and investigation differ in relation to 
aims and methods, they pose similar macro problems. 
The first one relates to risks of cognitive bias.24 Like all human be-
ings, analysts and investigators are vulnerable to inherent biases that may 
shape their processing of information, consciously or unconsciously. 
                                                   
22 Ibid., pp. 572, 580–81. 
23 Alex Whiting, “Dynamic Investigative Practices”, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 
2016, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 163, 179. 
24 See Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns, and Peter Juslin, “From devil’s advocate to crime fighter: 
confirmation bias and debiasing techniques in prosecutorial decision-making”, in Psychol-
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1.3.1. Cognitive Bias 
Due to their limited investigative resources, distance to crime sites, securi-
ty constraints and lack of enforcement powers, international criminal in-
stitutions are highly dependent on third parties in relation to access to 
information and material. External entities have their own vested interests 
in sharing information and follow their own methodologies. The infor-
mation and material that they supply is often heavily pre-selected or fil-
tered. Time pressures, external expectations and the sheer stigma associat-
ed with atrocity crimes may provide a natural temptation to take certain 
context elements, causalities or crime patterns for granted. Investigations 
may focus too easily on individuals, rather than crimes. It is thus essential 
for analysts and investigators to 
remain aware of the interests and perspectives of the various 
agencies and to counter their influence by cultivating multi-
ple information sources and always seek to corroborate all 
available information.25 
Investigators require sufficient knowledge of the historical context 
of conflicts and the culture of societies in order to counter such potential 
biases and understand the broader causes of violence and dynamics be-
tween different agents in conflict. In situations such as Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, cultural factors affected the evidence of witnesses. For instance, 
the Akayesu Trial Judgment noted that “cultural constraints” prompted 
different understandings as to “dates, times, distances and locations”.26 
A second potential bias relates to the relationship between the scale 
and seriousness of crimes and their probability of proof. International 
criminal justice relates to system criminality and collective crime. As Fu-
jiwara Hiroto and Stephan Parmentier have argued, it is misguided that 
international crimes are ‘easy to prove’, because of their magnitude: 
While the crime base may be evident because of the large 
number of victims, perpetrators and resources involved, this 
is not necessarily the case when it comes to the issue of […] 
responsibility, whose proof […] requires more complex con-
                                                                                                                        
ogy, Crime & Law, 2019, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 494–526. See also Moa Lidén, “Prevention of 
Factual Confirmation-Bias During Offence-Driven Investigations”, CILRAP Film, New 
Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-liden/). 
25 See Fujiwara and Parmentier, 2012, pp. 572, 582, see above note 21. 
26 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judg-
ment, 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 156 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b8d7bd/). 
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ceptual thinking and an elaborate strategy of evidence collec-
tion.27 
1.3.2. Addressing Bottlenecks 
Another macro problem is the risk of ‘bottlenecks’ referred to in the Poli-
cy Brief “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investiga-
tions”. 28  In practice, both preliminary examinations and investigations 
have suffered from bottleneck problems. 
A bottleneck is “a narrow place through which people must pass in 
order to reach many opportunities”,29 “a place where a road becomes nar-
row, or a place where there is often a lot of traffic, causing the traffic to 
slow down or stop”.30 In institutional terms, it is associated with the idea 
of delay, paralysis, or getting stuck in bureaucracy. This problem has be-
come evident in relation to ICC preliminary examinations. 
1.3.2.1. Bottlenecks in Preliminary Examinations 
Preliminary examinations have suffered from different types of bottle-
necks: indecision in relation to investigation, pitfalls of a phase-based 
approach, a mismatch between ends and means and the lack of a comple-
tion strategy. 
The relationship between preliminary examinations and investiga-
tion has caused concern. There are more and more voices expressing fear 
that the OTP has made more of preliminary examinations than they are or 
ought to be. Situations like Colombia, Palestine, Afghanistan or Myanmar 
have shown that preliminary examinations can easily get stuck over years 
or decades in complicated analysis. The lack of a decision one way or the 
other is criticized by those who want see situations move to investigation 
as much as by States who want to see their situations ‘delisted’ from pre-
liminary examination. Some voices argue that preliminary examinations 
have taken the space that investigations should occupy.31 Long prelimi-
                                                   
27 Fujiwara and Parmentier, 2012, p. 582, see above note 21. 
28 Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, see above 
note 7. 
29 Joseph Fishkin, “The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law”, in 
Washington University Law Review, 2014, vol. 91, no. 6, pp. 1429, 1472. 
30 See definition on Cambridge English Dictionary’s web site. 
31 On the paradoxes, see Stahn, 2017, see above note 6. For a critique, see Ana Cristina Ro-
driguez Pineda, “Deterrence or Withdrawals? Consequences of Publicising Preliminary 
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nary examinations may also extend the periods during which potential 
witnesses are at risk. 
In our volumes on preliminary examinations, we have identified 
several strategies to improve the status quo. One way to get out of such 
paralysis is to seek early guidance by the Pre-Trial Chamber in an inclu-
sive process, in order to seek clarity on jurisdiction. This option has been 
used in the Myanmar  context.32 It requires further procedural clarification 
in the future. There are two different potential legal bases: Article 19(3) 
and inherent powers. Pre-Trial judges have remained divided on this point. 
Procedural aspects, such as potential prejudicial effect, right to appeal or 
impact on later challenges need to be addressed, if this avenue is used 
more systemically to unlock stalemate. 
Another way out is to move ahead to investigation in relation to a 
particular segment of a situation, while keeping a broader focus under 
preliminary examination. For instance, if a preliminary examination is 
prolonged, such as in the situation in Afghanistan, it may be appropriate 
to consider strategies in relation to a partial opening of an investigation, in 
order to keep the ‘golden hour’ of evidence collection. Alternatively, indi-
vidual situations may be defined more narrowly. 
Another critique is that the OTP has created an overly restrictive 
framework for consideration of preliminary examinations, which deprives 
it of the flexibility needed to manage preliminary examinations more ef-
fectively. The phase-based approach introduces the same temporal se-
quence for all situations. It considers jurisdiction first, then admissibility 
and gravity and finally the interests of justice. This approach is grounded 
in the logic of Article 53, but it might be applied with more flexibility. 
These four criteria do not always have to be considered in a strictly se-
quenced fashion, but are often interrelated.33 Overall, the OTP may have 
                                                                                                                        
Examination Activities”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in 
Preliminary Examination: Volume 2, pp. 321–91, see above note 4. 
32 See ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 
19(3) of the Statute”, Pre-Trial Chamber, 6 September 2018, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/73aeb4/). 
33 On Gantt charts as alternative model, see Asaf Luban, “Politics, Power Dynamics, and the 
Limits of Existing Self-Regulation and Oversight in ICC Preliminary Examinations”, in 
Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: 
Volume 2, pp. 143–45, see above note 4. 
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created too much bureaucracy at this early stage, in an attempt to manage 
preliminary examinations. 
In its highly controversial decision not to authorize the investigation 
in relation to Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber II has proposed to use the 
“interest of justice” criterion to deal with bottleneck problems.34 It has 
argued that 
an investigation would only be in the interests of justice if 
prospectively it appears suitable to result in the effective in-
vestigation and subsequent prosecution of cases within a rea-
sonable time frame.35 
Deviating from earlier jurisprudence, the Chamber has relied on 
three criteria to deny the request for authorization: (1) the time elapsed 
between the commission of crimes and the authorization, (2) the scope of 
co-operation obtained by the Prosecutor “even for the limited purposes of 
a preliminary examination”, and (3) the “likelihood that both relevant 
evidence and potential relevant suspects might still be available and with-
in reach of the Prosecution's investigative efforts and activities”.36 
This reading misconstrued the relationship between preliminary ex-
aminations and investigations and infringed on prosecutorial power. It 
turned the “interests of justice” into an ‘interest of politics’ test. The pur-
pose of an investigation is to establish whether there is a sufficient basis 
to act in the first place. The level of co-operation cannot be reliably de-
termined at the preliminary examination stage, since States lack a duty to 
co-operate under Part 9. Most fundamentally, making authorization de-
pendent on alleged prospects of success, as determined by the Chamber, 
conflates the authorization to act with enforcement. It deprives the Prose-
cutor of the possibility to gather a case and seek co-operation from non-
compliant States. The decision provides an incentive for States to obstruct 
preliminary examinations and refuse to co-operate, in order to successful-
ly avoid proprio motu investigations. This result squarely contradicts the 
                                                   
34 On the OTP understanding, see Maria Varaki, “Revisiting the ‘Interests of Justice’ Policy 
Paper”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 455–70. 
35 ICC, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursu-
ant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situ-
ation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 12 April 2019, ICC-02/17-33, para. 89 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2fb1f4/). 
36 Ibid., para. 91. 
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purposes of the ICC and the interests of victims, which ought to be taken 
into account in the interpretation of the ‘interests of justice’ test.37 
Getting rid of bottlenecks requires more investment in structures, 
including consultation, verification and monitoring of domestic action and, 
possibly, even more interaction with other human rights or accountability 
mechanisms. Currently, the OTP lacks the means to achieve the goals that 
it aspires to reach.38 It is questionable whether the existing institutional 
structures allow OTP analysts and staff to gain sufficient context and ex-
pertise in relation to the uniqueness of each situation, in order to under-
stand the factors and interests driving the conflict, or the potential ramifi-
cations of ICC action. As Paul Seils, former Head of Situation Analysis at 
the OTP, has argued: 
A longer presence on the ground should allow analysts to 
improve their understanding of the institutions that are of in-
terest, both in terms of those providing information and those 
conducting national proceedings. Developing relationships in 
relation to both may help to create a sense of urgency at a na-
tional level that proceedings have to advance if ICC action is 
not to occur. 39 
Problems are likely to amplify in the future. The rise of new tech-
nologies and the availability of open-source material may create risks of 
overload of information. 
Finally, the ICC requires a completion strategy for preliminary ex-
aminations. Many existing ICC situations are based on open-ended refer-
rals and do not simply go away. It is key to develop strategies to end long-
standing preliminary examinations successfully. Several preliminary ex-
aminations have been on the docket for years. Investigations have been 
‘open-ended’. Conceptual thinking in relation to completion strategies has 
                                                   
37 For a critique, see Kevin Heller, “One Word for the PTC on the Interests of Justice: Tali-
ban”, in Opinio Juris, 13 April 2019 (available on its web site); Dapo Akande and Talita de 
Souza Dias, “The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the Situation in Afghanistan: A Few 
Thoughts on the Interests of Justice”, in EJIL: Talk!, 18 April 2019 (available on its web 
site). 
38 For a critique, see Human Rights Watch, Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National 
Justice: Lessons from Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, and the United Kingdom, 10 May 2018 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/442f1c/). 
39 Paul Seils, “Making Complementarity Work”, in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 989, 1000. 
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started more than a decade ago, in the context of work on ‘positive com-
plementarity’. The Statute provides indicators that can be used for ‘clo-
sure’. The Draft Strategy Plan 2019–2021 entails a commitment to “seek a 
suitable ‘closure ratio’ by completing, over each three year period, as 
many as preliminary examinations as it opens”.40 However, completion is 
more than an arithmetic exercise. It requires a case-by-case strategy that is 
driven by situational context rather than a (budget-driven) equivalence of 
open and closed situations. In complex situations where the OTP has 
started to collect useful information and material, completion should not 
be a mere ‘exit’, but should be guided by the goals set by the Statute, in-
cluding the prevention of crimes, complementarity strategies that facilitate 
knowledge-sharing, the strengthening of domestic accountability efforts 
and reverse co-operation under Article 93(10).41 
1.3.2.2. Bottlenecks in Investigations 
Investigations pose their own types of bottleneck problems. One of the 
main difficulties is to translate the large amount of material and evidence 
collected during investigations into successful cases. The record of the 
Court is mixed in this regard. Many cases have remained stuck in the ‘bot-
tle’, rather than making it through the ‘neck’ at pre-trial or trial. Problems 
relate, among other things, to the timing of investigations, the organiza-
tion of evidence, the amount of evidence and investigative strategy. 
1.3.2.2.1. Timing of Investigations 
The ICC has experimented with a number of approaches to enhance case 
preparation.42 At the ad hoc tribunals, the Prosecution had the possibility 
to continue investigations beyond pre-trial. The ICC sets a stricter regime 
relating to the timing of investigations, due to the presence of the confir-
mation of charges procedure. It is deemed to make cases more focused 
and to protect the Defence against changing Prosecution narratives at trial. 
In Mbarushimana, the Appeals Chamber held that 
                                                   
40 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–2021, see above note 5, para. 24. 
41 See in relation to investigations, Ibid., para. 26. 
42 On the ICTY experience, see Morten Bergsmo and Michael J. Keegan, “Case Preparation 
for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, in Hege Araldsen and 
Øyvind W. Thiis (eds.), Manual on Human Rights Monitoring: An Introduction for Human 
Rights Field Officers, see above note 19. 
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the investigation should largely be completed at the stage of 
the confirmation of charges hearing. Most of the evidence 
should therefore be available, and it is up to the prosecutor to 
submit this evidence to the Pre-Trial Chamber.43 
The key argument is that it is not in the interests of justice to allow 
the cases to go forward at pre-trial in the hope that sufficient evidence will 
materialize at trial. This ruling has been interpreted differently by differ-
ent Chambers. Some Chambers have favoured a strict approach, requiring 
completion of the investigation at the confirmation hearing, whilst others 
have allowed greater flexibility.44 
In the post-Ocampo era, the OTP expressed a commitment that, as a 
matter of policy, cases should be as trial-ready as possible by the confir-
mation of charges stage. The Draft Strategic Plan 2019–2021 rightly notes 
that “having cases trial-ready at the arrest warrant or confirmation stage” 
minimizes the “possibility of delays in order for the Office to complete its 
investigative activity, to secure witnesses and evidence, or otherwise to 
prepare for confirmation or trial proceedings”.45 This approach reflects 
recommendations found in the ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, 
which states: 
Ideally a case should be ready for trial before an indictment 
is issued and it should be the object of the Prosecutor's inves-
tigation to gather all necessary evidence before any charges 
are brought.46 
However, in actual practice, this principle has caused problems. For 
instance, in Kenyatta, the Trial Chamber found that the OTP interviewed 
“at least 24 out of the Prosecution’s 31 fact witnesses” for “the first time 
after the Confirmation Hearing”.47 The Prosecution has on several occa-
                                                   
43 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges”, 
30 May 2012, ICC-01/04-01/10-514, para. 44 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6ead30/). 
44 For a survey, see Whiting, 2016, pp. 168–73, see above note 23. 
45 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–2021, see above note 5, para. 28. 
46 See ICTY and UNICRI, ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, UNICRI Publisher, Turin, 
2009, p. 35 (‘ICTY Manual on Developed Practices’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
0cc55d/). 
47 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Trial Chamber, 
Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests’, 26 April 
2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-728, para. 122 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/da5089/). 
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sions failed to meet the threshold of Article 61. There is an assumption 
that the OTP “has simply moved too quickly in bringing some cases be-
fore the judges”. 48 This raises questions as to the extent to which the 
“stated policy of completing as much of its investigation as possible prior 
to confirmation is being implemented as a practical matter”.49 
The main issue is whether a time-limit to complete the bulk of in-
vestigations before the confirmation hearing has a didactic effect on the 
Prosecution, namely to increase quality control of the case. 
Such an approach places greater demands at the investigative stage, 
that is, to conduct more thorough investigations. It requires the Prosecu-
tion not to proceed until thorough investigations have been conducted. 
But it also has trade-offs. It might prolong the pre-trial phase, since the 
Prosecution might “wait until a case is trial ready or almost trial-ready 
before any charges are ever presented to a judge”.50 It also makes the con-
firmation hearing more central in the procedure as such since it may be 
understood as an implicit incentive for the Prosecutor to 
submit as much evidence as possible, including live witness-
es, in order to secure confirmation, this in turn compelling 
the Defence to do the same.51 
1.3.2.2.2. Organization of Evidence 
Another issue relates to the better organization of evidence gathered dur-
ing the investigation.52 The ICC has taken new avenues in this regard. 
In Bemba, the Pre-Trial Chamber introduced the idea of the “in-
depth analysis chart” (‘IDAC’) in order to “streamline the disclosure of 
evidence, to ensure that the Defence be prepared under satisfactory condi-
                                                   
48 War Crimes Research Office, Investigative management, Strategies, and Techniques of the 
International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor, 2012, p. 10. 
49 Susana Sácouto and Katherine Cleary Thompson, “Investigative Management, Strategies 
and Techniques of the ICC’s OTP”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, pp. 328, 347, see above note 18. 
50 War Crimes Research Office, 2012, p. 10, see above note 48. 
51 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Dissenting opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, 3 June 2013, ICC-
02/11-01/11-432-Anx-Corr, para. 27 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9a3b94/). 
52 On evidence and reasoning, see Simon De Smet, “Enhancing the Quality of Reasoning 
about the Link Between Evidence and Factual Propositions”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 
22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-smet/). 
 
1. From Preliminary Examination to Investigation: Rethinking the Connection 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 51 
tions, to expedite proceedings and to prepare properly for the confirma-
tion hearing”.53 The chart is designed to increase the certainty and con-
sistency of the disclosure process.54 It is one of the innovations of ICC 
practice, which is considered for replication in other contexts (for exam-
ple, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers). It requires the OTP to link each 
piece of evidence to each element of the charged crimes. It is designed to 
make proceedings more focused and transparent, and to highlight eviden-
tiary weaknesses early on. 
The introduction of the IDAC has caused an ideological divide. 
Much of the dispute is over the role of the pre-trial judge, rather than the 
IDAC’s utility as a tool to facilitate proceedings. The OTP has remained 
opposed to the idea that such a chart should be required. It fears that such 
a chart may lock-in the evidence too firmly at pre-trial55 and force the 
Chamber to look at the link between crimes and fact rather than the “rele-
vance of the evidence in its totality”.56 In Al-Hassan, the OTP gave at 
least six substantial reasons why it rejects the IDAC: 
1. it “is premature at this stage of the proceedings and would provide 
only a truncated, incomplete and inaccurate view of the charges as 
they will be presented during the confirmation of charges hearing, 
rendering the production of tables useless”; 
2. it “would necessarily and unduly delay the proceedings and, as a re-
sult, have a negative impact on the parties’ right to the fair and ex-
peditious conduct of proceedings”; 
                                                   
53 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable 
for Disclosure between the Parties, 31 July 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-55, para. 72 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/15c802/). 
54 Olympia Bekou, “Loss of Overview and In-Depth Analysis of Evidence During the Prepa-
ration of Fact-Rich Cases”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.
cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-bekou/). 
55 See also Alex Whiting, “Disclosure Challenges at the ICC”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The 
Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, p. 1027, see above note 18: 
Evidence in a criminal case does not come in neat, little packets that can be simply 
linked to individual elements. Rather the evidence supporting the elements of crimes 
charged is usually based on lots of pieces put together or inferences drawn from long 
transcripts or documents […]. 
56 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the In-Depth Analysis Chart of Disclosed Evidence, 29 June 2018, ICC-01/12-
01/18-61-tENG, para. 14 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d35cef/). 
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3. it “would unfairly burden and intrude into the Prosecution’s ability 
to undertake its core work before the confirmation of charges hear-
ing”; 
4. it “is not a substitute for the [D]efence’s deontological obligation to 
assess each and every item of evidence”; 
5. it “does not facilitate the Defence’s or the Chamber’s understanding 
of the Prosecution’s case, especially as the IDAC envisaged is law-
driven rather than fact-driven, which inverts the logic of the three-
stage process of evidence assessment, which – according to the 
Prosecution – is to be followed by the Pre-Trial Chamber”; and 
6. it “departs from the practice of other international tribunals”.57 
The OTP insisted that the “most appropriate tool available to the 
Chamber to analyze the evidence is a document containing a detailed de-
scription of the charges and other documents provided in support of it”.58 
The Defence countered that many of these justifications lack merit. 
It stated that 
the disclosure of voluminous evidence with no indication of 
its relevance to the constituent elements of crime and modes 
of liability is, in fact, what could truly affect the expeditious-
ness of the proceedings.59 
The ICC Chambers’ Practice Manual rejected imposing the IDAC 
on the parties. It noted: 
there is no basis for the Chamber to impose on the parties a 
particular modality/format to argue their case and present 
their evidence. For example, no submission of any “in-depth 
analysis chart”, or similia, of the evidence relied upon for the 
purposes of the confirmation hearing can be imposed on ei-
ther of the parties.60 
Currently, judges have preferred increasing the specificity of the 
document containing the charges, rather than insisting on the IDAC. Crit-
ics observe that the IDAC may fail to meet its purported objectives 
(namely to enhance transparency or provide necessary structural guid-
                                                   
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., para. 15. 
59 Ibid., para. 20. 
60 ICC, Chambers’ Practice Manual, 12 May 2017, p. 14 (‘ICC Chambers’ Practice Manual’) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0ee26/). 
 
1. From Preliminary Examination to Investigation: Rethinking the Connection 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 53 
ance), in cases where the underlying OTP narratives and legal categoriza-
tions remain vague.61 However, the jury is still out on the future of this 
approach. 
The bigger point from the perspective of quality control is that a 
clear and well-structured case at pre-trial is ultimately in the interests of 
the Prosecution itself.62 For instance, identifying the links between facts 
and elements on the one hand and the law (that is, crime labels and modes 
of liability) on the other early on allows the OTP to focus on the essence 
of the case and avoid identify evidentiary weaknesses and gaps.63 This 
rationale can be realized without requiring the OTP to “present all of its 
evidence at the early stages of proceedings against a suspect”. 64  As 
Morten Bergsmo and Olympia Bekou have argued: 
By requiring the Prosecution to structure the case according 
to a clear format, designed to enhance the understanding of 
the parties who have not been privy to the detailed investiga-
tions (for example, other teams within the OTP or other 
members of the same team), such charts will help them 
maintain an overview of the case, which will also assist, 
when presenting the case, in arguing it in a clear and logical 
fashion, thus improving its strength. When filled in, the 
charts highlight and help the Prosecution to identify the 
weak links in its case. They assist all members of a case 
preparation team to share a common understanding of the 
evidentiary state of the case. The charts also compel Prose-
cution team members to undertake fact-related work with the 
(draft) legal classification of the case in the forefront of their 
minds.65 
                                                   
61 On alternative re-thinking of disclosure, see David Re, “Rethinking Disclosure in Core 
International Crimes Cases”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.
cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-re/). 
62 Gilbert Bitti, “Quality Control in Case Preparation and the Role of the Judiciary of the 
International Criminal Court”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.
cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190223-bitti/). 
63 See also Guénaël Mettraux et al., Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 2 December 2014, p. 13 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3dae90/). 
64 See Sácouto and Thompson, 2015, pp. 345–46, see above note 49. 
65 See Morten Bergsmo and Olympia Bekou, “The In-depth Evidence Analysis Charts at the 
International Criminal Court”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Active Complementarity: Legal 
Information Transfer, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2011, pp. 313, 324 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/8-bergsmo). 
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The form and modalities of the IDAC remain subject to debate and 
potential improvement. However, the idea behind it, that is, a better or-
ganizing of evidence at pre-trial, is essential in three respects: to filter 
charges, prepare trials and avoid bottlenecks. 
1.3.2.2.3. Amount of Evidence 
A further concern relates to the management of the amount of evidence 
gathered during investigations. Defence lawyers typically complain that 
they are drowning in material because of the amount of files and evidence 
disclosed. Overloaded charges may render cases unmanageable. 
As the ICTY Manual stated, 
one the most important lessons to be learned from the ICTY 
experience is that, given the complex nature of war crime 
trials, there is a tendency for indictments to become over-
loaded with charges, thus making it difficult for the criminal 
process to cope with the extent of issues to be proved.66 
It is thus essential to develop hypotheses, at the time of the investi-
gation, on “how long it is likely to take to try the case”.67  
One strategy is to enhance evidence review within the OTP and to 
focus cases on the strongest charges since the outset. This possibility is 
foreseen in the Draft Strategic Plan 2019–2021, which openly recognizes 
that pursuing “narrower but stronger cases” may increase the “speed, effi-
ciency and effectiveness of investigations and prosecution”.68 It marks a 
departure from previous practices, including the experiences in the Ken-
yan cases and Gbagbo, which showed the risks of evidentiary weaknesses 
at trial. It needs to be reconciled with the premise to reflect “key aspects 
of victimization” in the charges.69 
Another strategy is to strengthen judicial oversight over prosecuto-
rial action. One may contemplate the extent to which ICC judges should 
use their managerial powers to avoid that cases become unmanageable, as 
                                                   
66 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, p. 36, see above note 46. 
67 Ibid. 
68 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–2021, see above note 5, para. 27. 
69 Ibid. 
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ICTY judges have done, after the experience of the Milosević trial, under 
Rule 73bis.70 
In particular, the practice of alternative charging requires careful 
scrutiny. The ICC Chambers Practice Manual has allowed alternative 
charges at pre-trial, in an attempt to “limit the improper use of regulation 
55 immediately after the issuance of the confirmation decision”.71 It states 
that 
the Prosecutor may plead alternative legal characterisations, 
both in terms of the crime(s) and the person’s mode(s) of lia-
bility. In this case, the Pre-Trial Chamber will confirm alter-
native charges (including alternative modes of liability) 
when the evidence is sufficient to sustain each alternative. It 
would then be the Trial Chamber, on the basis of a full trial, 
to determine which one, if any, of the confirmed alternative 
is applicable to each case.72 
However, the permission of alternative charges has caused confu-
sion in relation to case theories at trial. Where alternative charging is al-
lowed, 
                                                   
70 See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 July 2015, Rule 73bis (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/30df50/), which gives judges broad managerial powers: 
(B) In the light of the file submitted to the Trial Chamber by the pre-trial Judge pur-
suant to Rule 65 ter (L)(i), the Trial Chamber may call upon the Prosecutor to 
shorten the estimated length of the examination-in-chief for some witnesses. 
(C) In the light of the file submitted to the Trial Chamber by the pre-trial Judge pur-
suant to Rule 65 ter (L)(i), the Trial Chamber, after having heard the Prosecutor, 
shall determine 
(i) the number of witnesses the Prosecutor may call; and 
(ii) the time available to the Prosecutor for presenting evidence. 
(D) After having heard the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber, in the interest of a fair and 
expeditious trial, may invite the Prosecutor to reduce the number of counts 
charged in the indictment and may fix a number of crime sites or incidents com-
prised in one or more of the charges in respect of which evidence may be pre-
sented by the Prosecutor which, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, 
including the crimes charged in the indictment, their classification and nature, 
the places where they are alleged to have been committed, their scale and the 
victims of the crimes, are reasonably. 
71 ICC, Chambers’ Practice Manual, p. 19, see above note 60. For a discussion, see Eleni 
Chaitidou, “The Judiciary and Enhancement of the Classification of Alleged Conduct”, 
CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190223-
chaitidou/). 
72 ICC, Chambers’ Practice Manual, p. 19, see above note 60. 
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care should be taken to avoid listing multiple theories of re-
sponsibility in a way that obscures the main theory of the 
Prosecution.73 
1.3.2.2.4. Investigative Strategy 
It is clear from past experiences that some of the existing methodologies 
require a substantive makeover. OTP investigative practices have been 
under critique since Lubanga. Judges have taken issue with different as-
pects of investigations, including (1) the outsourcing of investigations, (2) 
reliance on intermediaries, and (3) heavy use of indirect evidence and 
witness testimony. Judge Van den Wyngaert has openly the criticized OTP 
for 
grave problems in the Prosecution's system of evidence re-
view, as well as a serious lack of proper oversight by senior 
Prosecution staff.74 
After the acquittals in Bemba and Gbagbo, one may openly speak 
of an “evidence problem”,75 which can be traced to investigative strate-
gies.76 
Initially, the OTP has followed a strategy of carrying out “short, fo-
cused investigations”,77 with reliance on a limited number of witnesses. 
This has resulted in “heavy reliance on indirect evidence gathered through 
secondary sources”.78 This approach was partially corrected in the Strate-
gic Plan 2012–2015, which shifted its attention “from its previous ‘fo-
                                                   
73 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, p. 36, see above note 46. On charging practices, see 
Cale Davis, “Cumulative Charging and Challenges in Charge Selection”, CILRAP Film, 
New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-davis/). 
74 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 26 April 2013, ICC-
01/09-02/11-728-Anx2, para. 4 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/917ec7/). 
75 See Patryk Labuda, “The ICC’s ‘Evidence Problem’: The Future of International Criminal 
Investigations After the Gbagbo Acquittal”, in Völkerrechtsblog, 18 January 2019 (availa-
ble on its web site). 
76 See also Morten Bergsmo, “The Gbagbo case and the role of France”, in Le Monde, 18 
January 2019 (“The Gbagbo acquittal tells us there is a problem of quality control at the 
Court. This is not a new problem. As a matter of fact, the investigative capacity of the 
Court was downgraded from the start”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/693bee/). 
77 War Crimes Research Office, 2012, p. 12, see above note 48. 
78 Ibid. 
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cused’ investigative approach to ‘open-ended, in-depth investigations’”.79 
The OTP acknowledged that it would, where appropriate, apply a “build-
ing upwards” strategy. 80 But this turn in strategy has not translated into 
reality. 
The ICC has witnessed a significant increase in Article 70 cases. 
However, the main trial record has been disappointing.81 In the Kenyatta 
case, the OTP had to withdraw charges due to witness interference. At 
trial, four of the seven cases have failed due to evidence deficits: 
Ngudjolo, Bemba, Ruto and Sang and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé. In two 
cases, the judges found that there was no ‘case to answer’ for the Defence. 
This motion is not even contemplated in ICC proceedings. It was permit-
ted as to tool to enhance the expeditiousness and fairness of proceedings. 
The fact that there is not even a case to answer at trial after the filter of the 
confirmation hearing illustrates severe evidentiary shortcomings in the 
Prosecution’s case, including insufficient linkage evidence and prepara-
tion for the fallout of witnesses at trial. 
In reality, the ICC is thus mainly becoming a criminal court for 
members of non-State armed groups. The trials against Lubanga, Katanga 
and Al Mahdi have succeeded, because their prosecution matched State 
interests. However, all cases against acting State officials or former State 
leaders have failed. This raises serious legitimacy concerns. It exposes the 
ICC to critiques of one-sided justice. Victor Peskin has called this “new 
victor’s justice”,82 namely the risk that the ICC becomes an instrument for 
States to get of their enemies or political opponents. 
These findings have implications for investigative strategy. The les-
son from Bemba and Gbagbo is that investigations and evidence collec-
tion require more in-depth engagement with individual situations and 
                                                   
79 OTP, Strategic Plan 2016–2018, 16 November 2015, para. 13 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/2dbc2d/). 
80 Ibid. 
81 See also “The Gbagbo case and the role of France”, 18 January 2019, see above note 76: 
[T]he record of the International Criminal Court is unprecedented in international 
criminal justice: cases against 12 persons have collapsed, compared to three convic-
tions of international crimes. Four suspects were acquitted, and charges were dismissed 
against four and withdrawn against four others. 
82 Victor Peskin, “Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda”, in Journal of 
Human Rights, 2005, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 213–31. 
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careful case-building. As scholars like Phil Clark83 and Patryk Labuda 
have emphasized, the ICC has remained at the surface in these contexts. 
One of the critiques is that the Court has assumed too easily 
that evidence against high-ranking officials can or will even-
tually be found, rather than basing arrest warrants on action-
able evidence developed over time against a larger group of 
suspects.84 
The experience of the ad hoc tribunals has shown that it is difficult 
to immediately go after leaders, without gradually building a sequence of 
interrelated cases. The Bemba and Gbagbo cases have made it clear that it 
may be necessary to engage more fully and in depth with individual situa-
tions, before passing on to leadership responsibility. Such hypotheses 
should be factored in during the planning of investigations. This lesson is 
more prominently reflected in the Draft Strategic Plan 2019–2021. It ex-
pressly acknowledges the need to bring “cases against notorious or mid-
level perpetrators who are directly involved in the commission of crimes’, 
in order to “provide deeper and broader accountability” and also to “ulti-
mately have a better prospect of conviction in potential subsequent cases 
against higher-level accused.85 
Such an approach has drawbacks, since it may limit the overall 
number of situations where the ICC is investigating. But ultimately ‘less 
may be more’, as in the context of preliminary examinations. 
1.4. The Structure of International Criminal Investigations 
Planning investigation of international crimes requires different mindsets 
and multidisciplinary input. Success depends on the co-operation between 
legal experts and non-lawyers. Experiences from the ICTY suggest 
that in addition to investigators with a traditional police 
background, teams require the services of military, criminal 
and political analysts, historians, demographers, forensic 
specialists and linguists. All groups of investigators can learn 
from each other, and it is essential that all understand the le-
                                                   
83 See Phil Clark, Distant Justice: The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African 
Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018. 
84 Labuda, 18 January 2019, see above note 75. 
85 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–2021, see above note 5, para. 27. 
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gal structure of the cases and the legal requirements for gath-
ering evidence.86 
Emphases and needs shift at different stages of an investigation. In-
vestigations cover context, structures and individuals. Dermot Groome 
has developed a model that divides investigations into roughly four phas-
es: “casting the net”, “discovering the case”, “exploring the case” and 
“building the case”.87 
 
Figure 1: Four phases of investigation. 
At the ICC, these four phases are connected to preliminary exami-
nation. At the very least, the first two phases may benefit from work done 
during preliminary examination. 
The first step is to provide a ‘fact-base’, that is, to establish what ac-
tually happened. In this first phase, investigators often cast the net widely, 
                                                   
86 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, p. 12, see above note 46. 
87 Dermot Groome, “Evidence in cases of mass criminality”, in Ilias Bantekas and Em-
manouela Mylonaki (eds.), Criminological Approaches to International Criminal Law, 
2014, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 117, 121–22. 
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by trying to capture as much evidence as possible about events. This 
serves to limit cognitive biases, and requires a broad investigation plan.88 
At the ICC, this phase may be supported by the work done during prelim-
inary examinations that involves fact-finding. 
The second phase relates to ‘discovering the case’. Investigators an-
alyse the evidence in order to develop theories of events and to identify 
potential suspects.89 This assessment may lead to early tentative conclu-
sions or a theory of events. As Paul Seils has argued, this phase may also 
benefit from insights gathered during preliminary examination: 
If from the outset, the process of preliminary examination 
was seen as the development of potential cases through for-
mulating initial hypotheses, once an investigation was 
opened the OTP would be potentially in a stronger position 
to allocate resources and identify areas of particular inter-
est.90 
The third phase is about ‘exploring the case’. Investigators deepen 
the collection of evidence to pursue concrete lines of inquiry, eliminate 
doubt in relation to hypotheses and meet relevant standards of proof.91 
This requires close co-ordination between investigators and prosecutors, 
who need to rely on evidence at trial. It may require changes in the inves-
tigation plan. 
The ‘building of the case’ is the last phase. It includes more detailed 
identification of the crime-base and modes of liability. It also serves to 
identify or remedy evidentiary gaps. 
This sequence implies that investigative teams have to rely on ‘legal 
direction’ throughout the entire phase of the investigation, and not only 
during the ‘case-building’ stage. 92 
                                                   
88 Ibid., p. 121. 
89 Ibid., p. 122. 
90 Seils, 2015, p. 319, see above note 18. 
91 Groome, 2014, p. 122, see above note 87. See generally Simon de Smet, “The Internation-
al Criminal Standard of Proof at the ICC – Beyond Reasonable Doubt or Beyond Reason?”, 
in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, pp. 
861–89, see above note 18. 
92 See also ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, p. 12, see above note 46 (“Experience has 
also shown that it is essential for investigative teams to have strong legal direction from 
the outset”). 
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1.5. Some Thoughts on the Way Ahead 
There are several ways in which existing practices can be improved. They 
relate to planning, the role and structure of investigative teams, investiga-
tive strategies and review. 
1.5.1. Planning 
Firstly, the ICTY Manual on Developed Practices has defended the use of 
investigation plans in order to “clarify the investigative objectives and 
evidence collection methods”.93 It has identified certain key elements that 
should be “developed, discussed and approved by senior management” 
prior to the start of any substantive investigative activity. They include 
• fundamental questions, that is, questions that the “investigation will 
hopefully be able to answer through the collection of credible and 
reliable evidence”; 
• the legal framework, including theories of responsibility and “pos-
sible crimes that were committed and their legal elements”; 
• primary investigative avenues, including summaries of “what is 
presently known”, “people whose activities will be examined”, po-
tential witnesses, physical evidence and potential documentary evi-
dence; 
• a summary of “investigative tasks to be undertaken”; and 
• the “resources to be deployed to conduct” the investigative activi-
ties.94 
These plans require periodic review in light of the different phases 
of the investigation, changing hypotheses and evolving “collective 
knowledge of a particular event”.95 
Careful planning is even more essential at the ICC, where situation-
al analysis encompasses additional elements and where case selection and 
access to evidence have remained problematic. Successful investigations 
require not only different types of investigative plans, but also pre-
                                                   
93 Ibid., p. 30. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., p. 32: 
For example the class of people to be investigated should over time narrow as recent 
evidence inculpates some and exculpates others. Theories of how crimes were commit-
ted will similarly evolve and entire investigative avenues can be safely terminated and 
newer more precise avenues commenced. 
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investigative plans, which should be informed by preliminary examina-
tions. In some situations, the formulation of investigative plans may be a 
desired outcome of preliminary examinations.96 This requires close col-
laborative links between preliminary examination analysts and investiga-
tive experts not only after, but also during the preliminary examination.97 
1.5.2. Role and Structure of Investigative Teams 
Secondly, it has become evident that there should be limits and adequate 
control structures relating to the outsourcing of investigations.98 At the 
ICC, the role of intermediaries went beyond establishing contact with 
potential witnesses. In the Lubanga case, the Trial Chamber reprimanded 
the Prosecution for its unchecked use of intermediaries and its “negli-
gence in failing to verify and scrutinize” the work of intermediaries, 
which led to “inaccurate or dishonest” testimonies.99 It found that “the 
prosecution should not have delegated its investigative responsibilities to 
the intermediaries in the way set out, despite the security difficulties it 
faced”. 100  The Chamber suggested that some intermediaries exercised 
improper influence over witnesses, warranting contempt of court proceed-
ings.101 
One of the weaknesses of the ‘contracting of intermediaries’ is that 
it may introduce a filter between the locals and the ‘internationals’. It may 
be more helpful to embed ICC investigators more deeply in local contexts 
or to consider mixed investigation teams, composed of domestic and in-
ternational investigators. Such teams operate successfully in the context of 
regional systems, as seen in the ICTY’s completion strategy.102 
                                                   
96 See also Bergsmo, 2019, see above note 7. 
97 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–21, see above note 5. 
98 Elena A. Baylis, “Outsourcing Investigations”, in UCLA Journal of International Law and 
Foreign Affairs, 2009, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 121. 
99 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial 
Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, para. 482 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/677866/). 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., para. 483 (“there is a risk that P-0143 persuaded, encouraged, or assisted witnesses 
to give false evidence; there are strong reasons to believe that P-0316 persuaded witnesses 
to lie as to their involvement as child soldiers within the UPC”). 
102 See War Crimes Research Office, 2012, p. 5, see above note 48: 
Another option relating to the composition of investigation teams that may improve 
investigations is to hire nationals of the country being investigated and/or persons will-
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Throughout the proceedings, it is essential to maintain a close link 
between investigative teams and trial teams. Investigators have unique 
insights into the situational context and may continue to provide useful 
input at pre-trial or trial. However, after the formal end of the investiga-
tion, investigators easily fall off the radar screen or may lack voice, since 
they operate under the leadership of trial team leaders. Institutionally, it 
might be helpful to re-introduce a Deputy Prosecutor for Investigations at 
the ICC (as in early OTP practice), in order to reinforce the importance of 
investigative work and to ensure that investigative knowledge and exper-
tise is effectively and continuously present throughout the proceedings. 
1.5.3. Place-based Approach 
Thirdly, the ‘evidence problem’ of the ICC suggests that investigations 
require not only a “phase-based”, but also a “place-based approach to 
evidence gathering”.103 The success of investigations depends on fostering 
meaningful relations with ground-level institutions and persons. The ini-
tial strategy to conduct investigations from abroad without a more devel-
oped field-based presence has had significant drawbacks. As Xabier 
Agirre has noted: 
Local expertise is indispensable to interpret the relevant in-
formation in its authentic social context, including aspects of 
culture, politics, economy and linguistics.104 
Investigations require more investment in establishing long-term re-
lationships with local agents and communities. They may benefit from 
greater field presence during preliminary examination.105 
                                                                                                                        
ing to be permanently located in the situation country for the duration of the investiga-
tion. Of course, this may not always be possible due to security concerns and will have 
to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the Office will need to be cautious 
about potential bias, be it real or perceived, when engaging local actors as part of its 
investigation team. 
103 Christian M. De Vos, “Investigating from Afar: The ICC’s Evidence Problem”, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2013, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 1009, 1011. 
104 Xabier Agirre, “Methodology for the Criminal Investigation of International Crimes”, in 
Alette Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdis-
ciplinary Approach, Intersentia, 2010, pp. 353, 359. 
105 See War Crimes Research Office, 2012, p. 6, see above note 48: 
[W]e recommend that, in most cases, the OTP send analysts to the country under ex-
amination for an extended period of time prior to the formal opening of an investiga-
tion, which may improve the OTP’s understanding of the context in which the crimes 
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1.5.4. In-depth Investigation and Bottom-up Strategy 
Fourthly, the strategy of targeted investigations needs to be complemented 
by more in-depth investigations in cases where investigative strategies 
aim at reaching the most responsible political leaders or State agents. In 
such contexts, it may be necessary to pursue a broad investigation strategy 
within a single situation that extends beyond a handful of cases. This 
means that the OTP must devote greater time and resources to investiga-
tions from the start. As now reflected in the Draft OTP Strategic Plan 
2019–21, which is based on academic critique and work on quality control 
as well,106 cases may need to be gradually and carefully built up, as was 
done in the context of the ad hoc tribunals. 107 The investigative fabric 
must be thick enough to succeed despite the risk of loss of witnesses or 
other evidence. 
1.5.5. Peer Review System 
Finally, it is key to ensure a rigorous ‘peer review’ process within the OTP 
to ensure quality control.108 Internal reviews, involving other teams and 
lawyers, are required early on, in order to refresh minds and detect weak-
nesses.109 They may guide analytical processes and the review of potential 
material and evidence. 
During investigations, the OTP is mandated to investigate exculpa-
tory evidence as well.110 This is an important element of facilitating re-
view. But peer review structures are needed much earlier. It is important 
to frame and question key assumptions already at the preliminary exami-
nation stage. For instance, the preparation of a pre-investigative plan re-
                                                                                                                        
took place and its ability to gain the trust of those who may be in a position to provide 
useful information. 
106 See Bergsmo, 2013, see above note 3; Bergsmo and Stahn, 2018, see above note 4; Carsten 
Stahn, “The Times They Are A-Changin’: Why the ICC Should Re-Visit Strategies on Pre-
liminary Examination”, in Justice in Conflict (available on its website). 
107 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–21, see above note 5, para. 27. 
108 Such an approach was adopted at the ICTY. See Bergsmo and Keegan, 1997, p. 11, see 
above note 42. 
109 See War Crimes Research Office, 2012, p. 70, see above note 48: 
Another measure that may help to expose potential weaknesses in the Prosecution’s 
case and ensure that all necessary investigative steps have been undertaken before the 
OTP seeks an arrest warrant or summons to appear would be to implement a rigorous 
and formal “peer review” process within the OTP similar to that used at the ICTY. 
110 ICC Statute, Article 54, see above note 17. 
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quires effective anticipation of Defence challenges and development and 
consideration of alternative hypotheses. Structures, like ‘devil’s advocate’ 
models or ‘red team’ approaches, may help to strengthen peer review dur-
ing preliminary examinations and investigations.111 
In addition, it is essential to nurture a ‘culture of critical thinking’ 
inside the OTP which allows dissident voices to be freely expressed and 
considered in working practices, without fear of marginalization or re-
pression. It needs to be reflected not only in internal working structures 
and daily practice112, but also applied in relation to critical voices from 
outside.113 Such a culture requires careful and open-minded listening to 
outside voices, openness towards quality control, constructive engage-
ment with critiques of OTP practices and policies, and their potential use 
as springboard for review and reform.  
1.6. To be Continued 
In criminal procedure, it is often said that time spent at pre-trial may be 
time gained at trial. In ICC practice, this promise has not yet come to frui-
tion. There are numerous initiatives to promote the fairness and expedi-
tiousness of judicial proceedings. However, the foundations must be laid 
much earlier, namely in prosecutorial practice. Saving time at pre-trial 
requires more investment into effective preliminary examinations and 
investigations by the OTP itself and ICC members and supporters. Quality 
control during preliminary examinations and investigation is essential for 
the Court as a whole. It has a double function. It serves as a filter at pre-
trial and has preparatory function for trial. As the following chapters in 
this volume indicate, this aim requires critical engagement with existing 
practices and new pathways that go beyond classical procedural divides 
(that is, adversarial vs. inquisitorial), institutional standpoints or discipli-
nary silos. 
                                                   
111 On OTP approaches, see Xabier Agirre, “On How Analysis Can Enhance the Quality of 
Investigation and Case Preparation”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://
www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-agirre/). 
112 OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–21, see above 5, para. 17. 
113 See for instance Morten Bergsmo, Wolfgang Kaleck, Sam Muller and William H. Wiley, 
“A Prosecutor Falls, Time for the Court to Rise”, Policy Brief Series No. 86 (2017), Torkel 
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2016 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/86-four-
directors/). 
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The Draft OTP Strategic Plan 2019–21 recognizes that it is im-
portant for the OTP to engage with quality control and adjust institutional 
structures, where necessary. Some of the proposed changes reflect rec-
ommendations voiced in the course of this project. The main test is to 
what extent they will be implemented in practice. This requires ongoing 
dialogue and an institutional culture which is open to listen and engage. 
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2.Investigating International Crimes: 
Pitfalls, Problems and Promises 
Thijs B. Bouwknegt* 
 
2.1. Introduction 
International criminal justice for violent mass atrocity crimes has devel-
oped into a belief system, a political project, a scholarly field as well as a 
vibrant industry at an astonishing pace since 1993. In the last years, how-
ever, it is in relapse. Progressively, as Mark Drumbl reasons, there is a 
realisation that basically “law cannot solve the biggest problems we 
face”.1 Among myriad tribulations is the collection and ascertainment of 
facts about mass atrocity violence through preliminary examinations and 
criminal investigations. Investigative inhibitions and biases have explicit-
ly come to light at the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). Its manifold 
investigations in a dozen African (post-)conflict situations have therefore 
led to only miniature truth(s), a few completed trials, and to hardly any 
convincing convictions. 
Much criticism of the ICC has focused on the way it has conducted 
its investigations in Africa. This critique does not only come from human 
rights organisations, academics and Court observers. Judges too have 
raised serious concerns about the coalesced investigative and prosecutori-
                                                   
* Thijs B. Bouwknegt is a Researcher at NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies (part of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, ‘KNAW’) and As-
sistant Professor at the University of Amsterdam (‘UvA’). This chapter is an extended ver-
sion of: Thijs B. Bouwknegt, “Gbagbo – An Acquittal Foretold”, JusticeInfo, 31 January 
2019 (available on its web site); Thijs B. Bouwknegt, “The International Criminal Trial 
Record as Historical Source”, Nanci Adler (ed.), Understanding the Age of Transitional 
Justice: Crimes, Courts, Commissions, and Chronicling, Rutgers University Press, New 
Brunswick, 2018, pp. 118–46. 
1 Thierry Cruvellier (conducting a justiceinfo.net in-depth interview), “Mark Drumbl: ‘Law 
Cannot Solve the Biggest Problems We Face’”, JusticeInfo, 16 July 2019 (available on its 
web site). 
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al status quo of the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’). In 2011, for 
example, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the prosecution did not make 
it through the basic evidentiary test of the confirmation of charges versus 
Callixte Mbarushimana. As the OTP’s case was largely built on non-
governmental organisation (‘NGO’) and United Nations (‘UN’) reports, 
the Chamber found that the case was riddled with “inconsistencies”, “lack 
of any corroborating evidence” and “assumptions” from third parties.2 In 
2012, Judge Adrian Fulford, while reading a summary of the judgment in 
the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, lamented the prosecution’s negligence 
in parts of its investigation: 
A series of witnesses have been called during this trial whose 
evidence, as a result of the essentially unsupervised actions 
of three of the principal intermediaries, cannot safely be re-
lied on.3 
As a result, the ICC’s first judgment was also an indictment of the 
Prosecutor’s investigation. Somewhat literally, the Chamber commanded 
better quality. A year later, however, the Pre-Trial Chamber adjourned the 
confirmation of charges hearing in the case against Laurent Gbagbo. 
Judges held that “the Prosecutor relied heavily on NGO reports and press 
articles with regard to key elements of the case, including the contextual 
elements of crimes against humanity”, and that “[s]uch pieces of evidence 
cannot in any way be presented as the fruits of a full and proper investiga-
tion”.4 Seven years later, the collapse of the Prosecution’s case was hardly 
surprising. Judge Cuno Tarfusser, in a ranting opinion, said: 
It is or should be obvious that the investigation constitutes 
the bedrock of any criminal case; as a consequence, flaws 
and shortcomings at the investigative stage are not suitable 
                                                   
2 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 16 December 
2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, paras. 120, 136 (‘Decision on the confirmation of charg-
es of Mbarushimana’s case’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/63028f). 
3 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, 
Trial Chamber, Transcript, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-359-ENG, p. 5 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/4f82d2). 
4 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of 
charges pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3 June 2013, ICC-02/11-01/11-
432, para. 35 (‘Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges of Gbag-
bo’s Case’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8). 
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to be remedied in the courtroom and will inevitably com-
promise the chances of success of any resulting case.5 
Judge Tarfusser’s colleague, Judge Henderson, proposed institu-
tional and strategic lessons to be learned: 
[T]he Prosecutor cannot be expected to bring cases of this 
level of complexity and scope within a reasonable time 
frame with the limited resources that are currently available 
to her. While it is important for the Prosecutor to be ambi-
tious in the way that she approaches her mandate, she ought 
also to be realistic about what is feasible.6 
Indeed, Prosecutors and ICC protagonists have generally lacked 
modesty by promising more than what they could realistically achieve. 
Carsten Stahn fairly writes that the field of international criminal justice 
“requires critical scrutiny” and proposes that “[s]ome [of its] methodolo-
gies […] are in need of refinement”.7 Any such fine-tuning, however, can 
only be achieved if one understands the intrinsic pitfalls and practical 
obstacles of investigating international crimes, and if one determines the 
ICC’s investigative culture and modus operandi. In other words, only 
through an investigation of investigations would it become possible to 
conclude whether there is need for ‘refinement’, as Stahn suggests, or for 
revolution, restructuring and reorganisation. 
Morten Bergsmo points to an important precondition for interna-
tional criminal justice to improve its investigation or preparation of fact-
rich criminal cases: 
Prosecutorial professionalization […] requires awareness on 
the part of prosecutorial leaders of the importance of self-
questioning and -improvement.8 
                                                   
5 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 16 July 2019, ICC-
02/11-01/15-1263-AnxA, para. 95 (‘Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser’) (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/f6c6f3). 
6 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Reasons of Judge Geoffrey Henderson, 16 July 2019, 
ICC-02/11-01/15-1263-AnxB-Red, para. 10 (‘Reasons of Judge Geoffrey Henderson’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/j0v5qx). 
7 Carsten Stahn, “From Preliminary Examination to Investigation: Rethinking the Connec-
tion”, Chap. 1 above. 
8 See Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
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As the OTP is not only tasked with prosecutions but also investiga-
tions, this practical repair approach to ‘quality control on investigations’ is 
fair. However, it omits questioning whether the OTP, as adversarial party 
to criminal proceedings, should be empowered, or burdened, with investi-
gations in the first place. Arguably, a focus solely directed at improvement, 
or curing, existing practice may not necessarily lead to sustainable solu-
tions, or more crucially to better investigations. Gauging a wider pallet of 
options for changing existing investigative practice is therefore warranted. 
Why not, amongst others, think about the creation of an investigative 
chamber, an autonomous investigative organ, or an independent perma-
nent international investigative ‘mechanism’? Considering an evidence-
based rather than prosecution-based system of international criminal in-
vestigations may in itself be a form of quality control. 
If one desires a “culture of quality control in criminal investiga-
tions”9 one ought to start with an assessment of the existing culture of 
international criminal investigations, and understand its rationale, practice 
and outcomes. This requires a critical and empirical analysis. First, it 
makes sense to establish what international criminal investigations, by 
whom, seek to achieve, when, why, how and for whom? Ergo: what are the 
biases? Secondly, one should consider whether the existing approaches, 
methodologies and available (re)sources allow for standardised investiga-
tions. Thirdly, what have investigations resulted in? Truth, convictions, 
acquittals or something else? 
This chapter analyses the pitfalls of the specific rationale and prac-
tice of international criminal justice on criminal investigations of interna-
tional crimes. It does so by discussing a variety of investigative problems 
in Africa and analysing investigations in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire. It concludes by 
discussing several promises for the way forward. 
                                                                                                                        
2019, p. 2 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). This publication has served as the 
concept paper for the research project that led to this anthology. 
9 See ibid. 
 
2. Investigating International Crimes: Pitfalls, Problems and Promises 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 71 
2.2. Pitfalls and Problems 
Historian Uğur Üngör finds that the study of mass violence must princi-
pally be shielded from moral, legal, political, and emotional constraints.10 
He classifies fundamental biases that may distort objective, neutral and 
meticulous investigation of mass atrocity violence. First, people find mass 
violence repulsive. They react with strong condemnatory emotions and 
pleas for righteousness. Involvement, attachment or empathy for victims 
are logical human traits, but they can also bias the forensic eye of a truth-
seeker. A second logjam is moralisation (a sense of good versus evil), 
which can easily percolate into investigations and affect its core neutrality. 
‘Doing good’ does not equal rigour, value-free inquisition and thus quality 
inquiry. A third pitfall is politics. Frequently, the lexicon of atrocity crimes 
is weaponised (by, inter alia, lobbyists, advocacy groups, critics, opposi-
tion groups and States) in service of political rhetoric, litigation, moral 
outcry, diplomatic interests and identity-politics. The wanton allegation of 
political atrocity violence does not always mean that there is unpolluted or 
unmanipulated evidence of crime.11 A fourth pitfall in the study of mass 
violence is a strict legal approach. In international legal practice – a field 
that is the product of politics – the aim is to name and shame, accuse, 
condemn and punish individuals. Law’s orientation is only determining 
individual criminal responsibility in the context of mass violence (within 
a clearly set legal, procedural and evidentiary straitjacket) which by itself 
is a heuristic bottleneck. 
Reflecting soberly on the quality of criminal investigation of atroci-
ties, we could consider that excellence is best secured if they are carried 
out in a dispassionate, amoral, apolitical and non-juridical way.12 Howev-
er, international criminal justice – in particular its epitome, the ICC – is 
performed by passionate agents, based on a particular moral worldview, 
stirred towards achieving liberal political goals, and curtailed by laws and 
regulations. Because of its inborn biases, international criminal justice 
seems to have become its own enemy. 
                                                   
10 Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Studying Mass Violence: Pitfalls, Problems, and Promises”, in Geno-
cide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, 2012, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 68–80. 
11 Also see Alex de Waal, “Writing Human Rights and Getting it Wrong”, in Boston Review, 
6 June 2016 (available on its web site). 
12 Üngör, p. 73, see above note 10. 
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International criminal justice is a system of belief grounded in the 
human rights positivism of the 1990s. It was premised on liberal notions 
that it was finally possible to speak law to power, and that truth would 
prevail. On the macro-level, it is premised on a liberal bias, which fa-
vours democratic values and rule-of-law type political systems. However, 
its expressed goals of contributing to world peace, ending impunity, forg-
ing reconciliation, uncovering truth and repairing victims are not so much 
“assumptions of epistemology”.13 Rather, achieving universal ‘justice’ is 
an ‘article of faith’, rooted in the idea there is one justice, and that law 
would liberate humanity from repression and evil. This ideological bias, 
together with the idea that justice is globally applicable (universalist bias), 
trickles through generalised transitional justice ambitions into internation-
al criminal justice. Ultimately, these fields are rooted in a human rights 
bias. Not only do they address topical human rights issues, they are also 
informed by leads and information provided by human rights lobby 
groups (NGO bias).14 Ultimately, international criminal justice is driven 
by a nearly religious zeal that the ICC would “heal the world”.15 Yet, if 
one recalls the realism of Hannah Arendt, one is reminded about the law’s 
limited role: 
The purpose of a trial is to render justice and nothing else; 
even the noblest of ulterior purposes […] can only detract 
from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought 
against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due 
punishment. 16  […] Justice demands that the accused be 
prosecuted, defended, and judged, and that all the other ques-
tions, though they may seem to be of greater import […] be 
left in abeyance.17 
When justice is overpromised, it risks ending up underdelivered. A 
fundamental bottleneck is the perception that law – and lawyers – could 
also fulfil non-judicial goals. 
                                                   
13 Michael Ignatieff, “Articles of Faith”, in Index on Censorship, 1996, vol. 25, no. 5, p. 111. 
14 Cf. Luc Reydams, “NGO Justice: African Rights as Pseudo-Prosecutor of the Rwandan 
Genocide”, in Human Rights Quarterly, 2016, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 547–88. 
15 Author’s Observation, see below note 143, and accompanying text. 
16 Hannah Arendt, “A Reporter at Large: Eichmann in Jerusalem – V”, The New Yorker, 16 
March 1963, p. 101. 
17 Ibid., p. 40. 
 
2. Investigating International Crimes: Pitfalls, Problems and Promises 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 73 
As lawmakers appointed Prosecutors as drivers of international 
criminal justice, other bottlenecks came to light, including accountability, 
punitive and responsibility biases. OTP investigations are oriented to-
wards prosecution, punishment and winning cases; they are not per se 
about establishing truth. Moreover, because their mandate may be limited 
to or focused on going after those ‘most responsible’, a particular category 
of public persons may become suspects by default. According to common 
knowledge and public opinion, they ‘must be guilty’. This form of cogni-
tive bias can lead to a presumption of guilt, until proven otherwise. In 
such a reversed situation, investigations may serve to corroborate assump-
tions of guilt, not to seek, find and ascertain facts. Because of this prose-
cutorial bias in the inquiry, the system chases targets by seeking evidence 
against them (top-down), rather than finding suspects by following the 
evidence (ground-up). Christian Nielsen has called this practice case per-
petration.18 This confirmation bias does not only pollute inquisitorial in-
vestigations, broadly understood. It also creates prosecutorial tunnel vi-
sion, and Manichean and unprovable case theories. Lastly, as a result of 
limited existence or availability of documentary evidence in certain situa-
tions (for example, in some countries in Africa), the chief evidentiary base 
for international criminal prosecutions is witness evidence. Apart from 
basic questions as to reliability and credibility, a bottleneck may be wit-
ness bias; the assumption that victims and survivors of the most horrible 
atrocities do not lie. 
2.3. Investigating Atrocity 
Besides prosecution, the ICC-OTP is also tasked with ‘preliminary exam-
ination’ and ‘investigation’. However, the drafters of the Rome Statute 
and the Elements of Crimes document defined only sketchily what these 
words actually mean, and which actions and methodologies they require. 
The practice to date may differ fundamentally from other forms of in-
quisitorial, forensic fact-seeking, fact-finding and fact-ascertainment 
about mass violence. 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary an ‘examination’ is the “act 
of looking at or considering something carefully in order to discover 
                                                   
18 Christian Axboe Nielsen, “Analysis of Organisational Structures and Quality Control of 
Case Development”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-
film/190222-nielsen/). 
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something”, while an ‘investigation’ means “the act or process of examin-
ing a crime, problem, statement, etc. carefully, especially to discover the 
truth”.19 At is its core, examinations (which in practice is a form of open 
source desk research) and investigations (in the field) are about discovery 
of facts and truth. Ideally, such an exercise would be done holistically, 
inquisitorially and without constraints. So far, however, the political au-
thors of the Rome Statute judiciously straitjacketed the scope of the 
OTP’s examinations and investigations. Although the Prosecutor shall 
“establish the truth”, she is regulated to assess “whether there is criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminat-
ing and exonerating circumstances equally”.20 The margins as to what the 
OTP is allowed to investigate are thus plenty. 
First, as a judicial organisation, the ICC is not purposed – and argu-
ably incapable – to establish forensic, historical ‘(Rankean) truth’ (as it 
happened) about mass violence in each particular and unique situation. 
Rather, the ICC pursues judicial truth – a legal, argumentative, narration 
that is made compatible with its given mandate, procedures and eviden-
tiary standards. Second, the ICC is after the judicial truth about a specific 
kind of micro agency (individual criminal responsibility) within a macro-
reality (structure) of acts and events that fit complex definitions of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or aggression. Third, in doing 
so, the OTP is perhaps paradoxically constrained: besides looking for 
evidence to support its charges (which is its core business), it must also 
look for evidence that potentially undermines its charges. Prior to filing 
charges, it has the duty during the investigations to explore doubt about 
evidence that should prove charges beyond any reasonable doubt. Essen-
tially, the OTP is tasked to undermine its own cases. Fourth, the OTP does 
not possess the investigative means and powers that are typically required 
for criminal investigations. Unlike professional police, the OTP cannot 
investigate and secure immediate crime scenes, hear witnesses on the spot, 
conduct search and seize operations, wiretap suspects or conduct under-
cover operations. Its examinations and investigations may therefore re-
semble a form of secondary research, often depending largely on second-
ary sources, while its success depends on tertiary factors and agents (State 
                                                   
19 Cambridge Dictionary, “Examination”, “Investigation” (available on its web site). 
20 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 54 (‘ICC Statute’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9). 
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co-operation, assistance from national police and military forces, peace-
keepers, NGO lobby groups and local ‘intermediaries’). 
Overall, one could consider that international criminal investiga-
tions present a particular, yet limited, way of fact-seeking, fact-finding 
and fact-ascertainment of atrocity crimes. Moreover, critique has been 
levelled against the manner in which, as well as by whom, such investiga-
tions are being carried out. Particularly in the early days of the ICC, in-
vestigative teams would hardly include of investigators with police back-
ground, skills or experience. Quite infamously, the first Prosecutor, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, distrusted police, almost as much as he distrusted staff 
who would express disagreement with him. This led to a situation in 
which investigators were recruited from a pool of NGO researchers, aca-
demics and human rights lawyers; people with remarkable skills in their 
own fields, but they were not necessarily professional crime investigators. 
Senior investigators lamented this reality in the beginning, saying it seri-
ously impacted the quality of investigations. Moreover, some critiques 
have argued that the OTP’s investigative units were too heavily controlled 
by prosecuting lawyers, who obviously had a specific interest in finding a 
particular kind of facts and evidence that would support their indictments 
and case scenarios against readily identified targets. Moreover, and quite 
crucially, OTP’s investigations were often hampered by security concerns. 
By nature, police work in volatile contexts – and particularly in the con-
text of war crimes and organised crime –is dangerous and risky. Investi-
gating atrocity crimes requires risk taking, but so far, however, there has 
been a notable tilt towards safeguarding investigators over pursuing fact-
finding opportunities. Other tribunals, like the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), also investigated during armed 
conflicts, but in comparison the ICC has been more risk averse to date. 
Overall, due to its limitations and rationale, the ICC’s Investigation Divi-
sion can hardly be compared to criminal investigative units in national 
police forces.21 
Further to these rather basic observations about international atroci-
ty crime investigations, there are certain challenges that are particular to 
                                                   
21 See Thijs B. Bouwknegt, Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of International 
Crimes in the Netherlands (Opsporing, Vervolging en Berechting van Internationale Mis-
drijven in Nederland), NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Amster-
dam, 2019. 
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the ICC. First, there is an issue with temporality. Legal responses, includ-
ing investigations, often start a long time after crimes have occurred, 
sometimes even decades. Recently, in the ICC’s decision not to allow the 
OTP to investigate atrocity crimes in Afghanistan (and in sub-text in Po-
land, Lithuania and Romania), judges expressed concerns about the tim-
ing of criminal investigations and especially the investigative risks related 
the expiration of evidence about old crimes.22 In fact, international crimi-
nal investigations mostly deal with cold cases and old evidence. Such a 
cold-case situation poses epistemological, empirical and thus evidentiary 
challenges and requires a particular kind of expertise. It is hardly surpris-
ing that the investigative units at the ad hoc tribunals, but also in various 
national war crimes units, include(d) historians and social scientists with 
particular methodological and contextual expertise. At the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, for instance, the Leadership 
Research Team, headed by an historian, was such an entity that assisted 
investigators and prosecutors in dealing with fact-finding, source-
interpretation and contextualisation. At the ICC, no such specialised unit 
was set up, leaving key questions about the nature and context of crimes 
unanswered by professionals and left to lawyers. As seen in the prosecu-
tion of former history professor and President Gbagbo, ignoring the warn-
ings of specialists and analysts (because, based on the evidence, they 
could advise against prosecution, charges or case narrative) contributed to 
a prosecution based on an unrealistic Manichean case scenario. Greater 
and genuine involvement of independent and unbiased experts, at both the 
examination and investigation stages, could arguably better inform the 
OTP on evidentiary and feasibility matters as well as the quality of evi-
dence and the presentation of realistic case scenarios in charges and pros-
ecutions. 
2.4. Investigations in Africa 
Q: [Mr. Biju-Duval] […] Can you tell us precisely on the ba-
sis of which document or what other source you can make 
such a claim? 
                                                   
22 ICC, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pur-
suant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 12 April 2019, ICC-02/17-33 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/2fb1f4). 
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A: [Gérard Prunier] Well, sir, we’re dealing with Africa. Pity, 
please, a little common sense. This isn’t how things work 
there.23 
2.4.1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
What lessons are learned from past investigations? Justice for internation-
al crimes tends to arrive belatedly, particularly if it is generated through 
international bureaucracies.24 At the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (‘ICTR’), it took a year after the end of the civil war and geno-
cide in Rwanda (1990-1994), before an investigative unit was set up in 
Kigali. Prosecutor Richard J. Goldstone reported in April 1995 that he 
was already processing about 400 cases.25 His investigative team, howev-
er, faced tremendous administrative, leadership and operational prob-
lems.26 One year after its establishment, the OTP had 52 staff members 
from 15 different countries, 28 of them on secondment.27 Next to lawyers, 
intelligence analysts, advisers, a scientific director, experts in forensic 
medicine, statisticians, demographers, interpreters and support staff, the 
team comprised only a dozen investigators.28 Experience and qualification 
was, however, lacking. Senior prosecutors came from academia or human 
                                                   
23 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 26 March 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-156-ENG, 
pp. 94–95 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/4bf97a). 
24 Megan M. Westberg, “Rwanda’s Use of Transitional Justice After Genocide: The Gacaca 
Courts and the ICTR”, in Kansas Law Review, 2011, vol. 59, no. 2, p. 343. 
25 Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1995/297, 9 April 1995, para. 18 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/7tpba7). 
26 Financing of the ICTR: Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc. A/51/789, 6 February 1997, Annex, para. 19–25 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/59dqh2); Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), UN Doc. S/1995/533, 30 June 
1995, para. 4 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/573b94). 
27 Netherlands House of Representatives, “Rwanda; Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse 
Zaken en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking”, 8 October 1996, kst-23727-25, p. 2; Frank 
Vermeulen, “Negen Miljoen voor Rwanda”, NRC Handelsblad, 20 May 1995; “Neder-
landers naar Rwanda”, Het Parool, 26 September 1995; Hans Marijnissen, “Nederlandse 
politie brengt zaak voor Rwanda-tribunaal”, Trouw, 24 October 1995; Hanneke de Wit, 
“Onderzoek in Rwanda traag”, Het Parool, 2 November 1995. 
28 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Review of the Office of the 
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugosla-
via, in Review of the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/58/677, 
7 January 2004, para. 6 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/nkowtt). 
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rights organisations and had neither criminal trial proficiency nor experi-
ence. Legal advisors had no experience in criminal investigations. And the 
investigators, drawn largely from police forces in the Netherlands, Canada, 
Norway and Sweden, hardly had experience in investigating genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Many were in Africa for the first 
time 29  and were foreign to Rwandan society, culture and language. 30 
Working conditions were hard and some staff left “in complete frustra-
tion” after being threatened or assaulted.31 They also lacked vehicles – 
essential to visit crime scenes and witnesses – computers, phones, faxes 
and stationery, leaving some investigators to bring their own laptops to the 
field. Overall, the OTP was in disarray and had no strategy at all.32 
As a result, self-organised teams set their own plans and strategies. 
But they made little effort to gather documentary and forensic evidence.33 
In the field, investigators were escorted by Rwandan officials, clergy, po-
licemen or translators. They often worked on the basis of UN or human 
rights reports focussed on Rwandans who were captured already. 34 They 
further relied on witnesses identified and delivered to them by NGOs and 
survivor organisations. 35  The investigative strategy was suspect-based 
with a geographical focus on Butare, Kibuye, Cyangugu and Kigali. 36 
Three investigators gathered the first survivor testimonies in May 1995.37 
They testified that it was not complicated to collect evidence. “In Rwanda, 
everyone knows everything, and everybody knows everybody”, one of 
them explained in court.38 However, sometimes, in the case no witnesses 
                                                   
29 Also see Nick Louvel and Michele Mitchell, “The Uncondemned”, Film at Eleven, 2015. 
30 Alison Des Forges, “Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda”, in Eric Stover and Harvey 
M. Weinstein (eds.), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of 
Mass Atrocity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 53. 
31 Financing of the ICTR: Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services, 1997, para. 38, see above note 26. 
32 Ibid., para. 56. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Nicholas A. Jones, The Courts of Genocide, Politics and the Rule of Law in Genocide and 
Arusha, Routledge, Abingdon, 2010, pp. 112–15. 
35 Des Forges, 2004, pp. 49–68, see above note 30. 
36 Larissa van den Herik, The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of 
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005, p. 65. 
37 Thierry Cruvellier, Court of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Chari Voss trans., University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2010, p. 81. 
38 Ibid., p. 96. 
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could be found, professional witnesses would offer their fairly priced “tes-
timonial services”.39 From early on there were rumours of denunciation 
syndicates, groups of opportunistic people, who allegedly organised tes-
timony against rich persons.40 This investigatory modus operandi would 
sow the seeds, in part, for the troublesome process of truth-ascertainment 
at the ICTR. It was only late in the ICTR’s history that these investigative 
impediments came to light and were addressed by judges.41 
2.4.2. Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Some of the lessons learned at the ICTR were taken aboard at the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’), which was to: 
[I]nitiate the research on the history of the conflict (“map the 
conflict”), take into possession existing evidence from the 
Sierra Leone Police, UNAMSIL [United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone] and NGOs, and establish an evidentiary basis 
from which investigations could be launched […].42 
Soon, however, the missions’ interim prosecutor and investigators 
found that the available evidentiary material was of “limited utility”.43 
They found that the only reliable material available was held by the Sierra 
Leonean police but was collected only after 1999. With few exceptions, 
there was “virtually no evidentiary material for the bulk of the crimes 
committed against the people of Sierra Leone in the decade-long con-
flict”.44 Thus, the paucity of detailed, reliable evidentiary material would 
place a significant burden on the investigative functions of the Prosecu-
tor.45 When Prosecutor David Crane arrived in Freetown46 he recruited 
                                                   
39 André Sirois, “Les mauvais débuts du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda”, Mondialisa-
tion.ca, 13 November 2014 (available on its web site). 
40 See “The trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, former mayor of Taba commune”, Hirondelle News 
Agency, 1 September 1998. 
41 Doris Buss, “Expert Witnesses and International War Crimes Trials: Making Sense of 
Large-Scale Violence in Rwanda”, in Dubravka Zarkov and Marlies Glasius (eds.), Narra-
tives of Justice in and Out of the Courtroom: Former Yugoslavia and Beyond, Springer, 
Cham, 2014, pp. 23–44. 
42 Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/246, 8 March 2002, Annex, para. 60(b)(ii) (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/usgtwc). 
43 Ibid., para. 26. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., para. 27. 
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among his personal connections, former ICTR and ICTY staff members, 
Sierra Leonean expatriates47 and Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’) activ-
ists.48 Four Sierra Leonean police officers joined the investigations team 
within the first two weeks of operations to provide local insights and fol-
low-up leads throughout the process.49 Like at the ICTR, chief investiga-
tor Alan White assumed that “[p]eople are the best source of information 
and your best source of evidence”, and in “this case, our best evidence is 
going to be good, credible witness testimony”.50 His methodology was 
“getting out and talking to people, letting them know what our mission is 
and soliciting their support”.51 
In the following months, the investigation team increased to some 
20 investigators, including interns, alongside almost 50 analysts and law-
yers. The team carried out one forensic examination52 and focused mainly 
on finding witnesses.53 In chasing its predetermined suspects, soon the old 
prosecutorial trick of flipping potential suspects to testify against their 
superiors became the standard.54 On that testimonial basis, the first round 
of investigations that lasted about six months, the first indictments were 
drawn up, approved and (partially) executed during two targeted mis-
                                                                                                                        
46 David M. Crane, “Dancing with the Devil – Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords: Building 
Initial Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed Con-
flicts”, in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 2005, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 3. 
47 Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First 
Eighteen Months, International Center for Transitional Justice, March 2004, p. 4. 
48 For instance, West Africa Researcher Corrine Dufka of Human Rights Watch. See her 
testimony: SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 
21 January 2008, pp. 1749–50 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/541e5b). 
49 Tom Perriello and Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, 
International Centre for Transitional Justice, 5 March 2006, p. 21. 
50 Charles Cobb Jr., “Sierra Leone’s Special Court: Will it Hinder or Help?”, AllAfrica, 21 
November 2002 (available on its web site). 
51 Ibid. 
52 SCSL, First Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for the 
Period 2 December 2002 - 1 December 2003, pp. 14–15 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
5c5175). 
53 Author’s interview with Corrine Dufka, 15 March 2015. 
54 Eric Stover, Victor Peskin and Alexa Koenig, Hiding in Plain Sight: The Pursuit of War 
Criminals from Nuremberg to the War on Terror, University of California Press, Oakland, 
2017, p. 261. 
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sions.55 Like pursuing the mafia, the investigators went on undercover 
operations, posing as diamond dealers, in refugee camps to track inform-
ants whom they would offer a deal: “[t]estify and you’ll be safe. In return, 
we’ll take care of you and your family”.56 This mode of investigations 
resembled practice at other hybrid constructions, such as the Special Pan-
els in East Timor, but has not resurfaced after the SCSL experience. Par-
ticularly the ICC departed from police-style investigations. 
2.4.3. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Pandora’s Box 
On the fact that humanitarian groups are lousy investigators, 
I will not go that far. However, one must concede that the 
procedure of investigation of humanitarian groups, in my 
opinion, is more a sort of a general journalism rather than le-
gal-type activities of investigators. 
Bernard Lavigne, Investigator57 
In all respects, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) 
seemed to be the perfect case file for the ICC. But it turned out to become 
the ICC’s Pandora’s Box. In the year before the set-up of the OTP, 6 out 
of 499 ‘communications’ related to Ituri.58 In March 2004, Joseph Kabila 
outsourced the well-reported atrocities to Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo who then announced the start of a criminal inquiry.59 The trou-
bled Congolese province had been on his radar from the very beginning.60 
                                                   
55 David M. Crane, “The Take Down: Case Studies Regarding ‘Lawfare’ in International 
Criminal Justice: The West African Experience”, in Case Western Reserve Journal of In-
ternational Law, 2010, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 201–14. 
56 Stover, Peskin and Koenig, 2017, p. 261, see above note 54. 
57 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 17 November 2010, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-T-2-Red2-ENG, p. 47 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/318f82). 
58 ICC Assembly of States Parties (‘ASP’), Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, 8 September 2003 (‘Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC 2003’) (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/8873bd). OTP, “Communications Received by the Office of the Prose-
cutor of the ICC”, 16 July 2003, pids.009.2003-EN, sect. III.a. (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
df602e). 
59 OTP, “The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens Its First 
Investigation”, 23 June 2004, ICC-OTP-20040623-59 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/b68535). 
60 Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC 2003, see above note 58; OTP, Statement of the Prose-
cutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps, 12 February 2004 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/6dvm3d). 
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Congo appeared to be a politically convenient and feasible pick.61 But it 
was also challenging. Former Deputy Prosecutor Serge Brammertz told 
the United States embassy in Kinshasa that his probe ought not to “derail” 
Congo’s delicate peace process.62 It would hence only “focus on abuses 
committed by actors outside the transition, such as the Ituri armed 
groups”.63 Brammertz also raised concerns about the working terrain: the 
DRC was “difficult and complex […] for logistical and political rea-
sons”.64 And indeed, throughout their first field mission to Bunia in Sep-
tember 2004, investigators heard gunshots in the regional capital. Bunians 
greeted them with suspicion, unsure what and who these foreigners were 
after. Roadblocks prevented them from leaving the city to visit crime 
scenes and potential witnesses.65 Amidst these security concerns and start-
up issues,66 the first witness in the investigation was not heard before 
2005 or mid-2005.67 Around this time, the Congolese army arrested eight 
Iturian warlords, including Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga, 
who were charged with serious charges including genocide and crimes 
against humanity.68 
Meanwhile, Bosco Ntaganda – who since April 2005 also faced a 
Congolese arrest warrant69 – fled to his home country Rwanda.70 Ntagan-
                                                   
61 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Presidency, Decision assigning 
the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2004, 
ICC-01/04-1 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/218294). 
62 USA Embassy in Kinshasa, “ICC Gearing up to Start Ituri Investigation”, WikiLeaks, 4 
August 2004, para. 6. 
63 Ibid., para. 3. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 16 November 2010, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-T-1-Red2-ENG, p. 35 (‘Lubanga Rule 68 Deposition Transcript – Ses-
sion 1’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2f1389). 
66 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 
2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 151–68 (‘Lubanga Trial Judgment’) (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/677866). 
67 Lubanga Rule 68 Deposition Transcript – Session 1, p. 43, see above note 65. 
68 Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Criminal 
Court Hearing to Confirm the Charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Questions and 
Answers, November 2006 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/vfs22n). 
69 Since 12 April 2005, Bosco Ntaganda was under a DRC arrest warrant, issued by the 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Bunia. The arrest warrant details charges 
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da was featured as the ‘terminator’ in many HRW reports and ICC inves-
tigators spent most of their time tracking down ‘Bosco’ and lobbying for 
his arrest with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (‘MONUC’). But without results, Moreno-
Ocampo’s mood swung and: 
[S]uddenly, because of a political decision by Louis or his 
political committee, we were obliged to change our planning 
and our investigative work and concentrate on a new target. 
It was completely crazy. […] We put in danger a lot of peo-
ple.71 
As a result, the cases “barely scratched the surface of the con-
flict”.72 But it was exactly that very conflict that also brought along sub-
stantial hurdles for the investigators; continuing violence, no permanent 
office. Besides, the United States restricted MONUC’s assistance to a 
minimum. While security concerns dragged down investigations, the lack 
of police experience arguably affected its quality. Only two out of the 
twelve investigators had a police background. The Congo team included 
former NGO researchers, who were instructed to refrain from local con-
tact with chiefs, priests or school teachers. It was to protect the identities 
of witnesses and informants, but it barred them from gaining useful ‘field 
knowledge’.73 
The team’s immobility obstructed their core business: collecting in-
formation and impartially verifying prospective evidence. Instead, the 
Ituri investigation was outsourced. Intelligence was borrowed from the 
notes of MONUC police officers and NGO researchers. The very first 
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witness was heard in The Hague “through an NGO, which acted as an 
intermediary”,74 a modus operandi that was soon exported to Bunia. On 
the advice of the human rights researchers, the OTP commissioned locals 
to liaise between investigators and potential witnesses. These ‘intermedi-
aries’ carried out the ICC’s essential fact-finding mandate: selecting wit-
nesses, recording their statements and corroborating the information. A 
Congolese lawyer summarised that “investigating cases of child soldiers 
in Ituri is like picking a ripe mango that fell at your feet. It could not be 
any easier”.75 This methodology was soon criticised by observers as being 
“amateurish” and “mediocre”.76 
Based on its delegated enquiry, Moreno-Ocampo requested the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber to issue arrest warrants for Lubanga and Ntaganda for 
child soldering.77 But pre-trial judges were hardly impressed by the evi-
dence and found that Ntaganda was not a key actor or most responsible in 
the DRC situation and only approved the indictment against Lubanga,78 
who was already in prison.79 His case, however, was riddled by eviden-
tiary hurdles. Just before the Lubanga trial was to start, in July 2008, the 
Chamber ordered his release. Moreno-Ocampo refused to – and argued he 
could not – disclose to them and the defence more than 200 documents he 
had obtained under confidentiality agreements, including from the UN. As 
some of the material was believed to contain exculpatory evidence, the 
Chamber believed in these circumstances a fair trial was impossible with-
out the judges seeing it.  By use of first-aid solutions and legal gymnastics 
by the Appeals Chamber, the trial went forward. 
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“Lubanga’s armed group recruited, trained and used hundreds of 
young children to kill, pillage, and rape”,80 said Moreno-Ocampo. “They 
cannot forget what they suffered”.81 But the OTP narrative was soon shat-
tered, when he called a former child soldier as his first witness. The timid 
boy, who could not remember his date of birth, testified that: 
I would like to say what actually happened myself, not say 
what some other person intended me to say. […] At the time 
there was an NGO which was helping children. My friends 
went there. I also went there, and they took our addresses 
and told us that they could help us. […] They told me things 
which did not help me to remember what happened, but now 
that I’m here I will tell you exactly what happened.82 
With such a shaky evidentiary start, the trial forged on and only in 
the ninth week did the Prosecution turn to historian Gérard Prunier. He 
was to go through the details of the origins of the ethnic conflicts in Ituri. 
But he constantly reminded the court of the difficulties of investigations 
in Africa: 
I cannot be more reliable than the UN for the simple reason 
that there are a lot of things in the history of that region that 
you cannot elucidate […] sometimes you have to resign 
yourself to the fact that it’s difficult to elucidate these things 
and you may not know everything.83 
The same precision was lacking in the testimony in the evidence by 
forensic expert witnesses. Discussing x-ray images taken from 9 former 
child soldiers, who were witnesses in the trial, radiologist Catherine Ad-
amsbaum said that age determination “is not a totally exact science”.84 
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Her colleague, Caroline Rey-Salmon, a paediatrician and forensic doctor, 
testified that the x-ray images she had to analyse were of relatively bad 
quality, only showed hard-to-interpret jawbones and that their methodolo-
gy could not always produce the exact age of a person.85 
In July 2010 judges again stayed the proceedings.86 This time it was 
because Moreno-Ocampo refused to reveal the name of an intermediary. 
The Appeals Chamber reversed the release order, but rebuked Moreno-
Ocampo for flouting court orders.87 On that notice the trial resumed with 
the testimony of Barnard Lavigne, two investigators and several interme-
diaries, who shed light on the investigations. The trial continued and final-
ly, at its closure in August 2011, Fatou Bensouda insisted that Lubanga’s 
guilt was “beyond any possible doubt”.88 But Defence lawyer Catherine 
Mabille alleged that the Chamber must have seen a product of organised 
manipulation of witnesses. “[T]he intermediaries knew exactly what story 
needed to be told”,89 she said, accusing them of going to Congolese towns 
“recruiting children, and they would tell the children what they had to 
say”.90 
Lubanga heard his judgment in March 2012. But to some extent, it 
was also levelled against the OTP. Judge Fulford lamented the prosecu-
tion’s negligence in parts of its investigation, which ultimately led the 
Chamber to find the nine ‘child soldiers’ who had testified for the prose-
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cution “unreliable”.91 Lubanga’s conviction and sentence were upheld by 
the Appals Chamber. However, Judge Anita Ušacka, found that Lubanga 
should not have been convicted at all. In her view, the evidence relied 
upon by the Trial Chamber to convict Lubanga was not sufficient to reach 
the threshold of beyond any reasonable doubt. In practice they have ap-
plied a lower standard.92 
Ušacka expressed her hope that “future prosecutions […] will ad-
duce direct and more convincing evidence”.93 Her dissent was a sharp 
indictment against the court’s fact-ascertainment dilemmas. She found the 
OTP levelled insufficiently detailed charges – which did not contain refer-
ence to identified victims, while “dates and locations were framed in un-
acceptably broad terms”,94 and had relied too much on the testimony of 
nine former child soldiers. Even “the factual conclusions of the Trial 
Chamber suffered from the same level of imprecision”,95 she said. More-
over, Ušacka, considered “that the evidence in this case was, in particular, 
not sufficient to establish that at least some of the children in the UPC 
[Union of Congolese Patriots]/FPLC [Patriotic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo] were under the age of fifteen”.96 Ušacka reminded the court of 
the testimony of two alleged child soldier, who featured in a video excerpt 
heavily relied on by the Trial Chamber, who testified they were aged be-
tween 17 and 20 years at time that the video was filmed.97 
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2.4.3.1. Bogoro 
[D]eclaring that an accused person is not guilty does not 
necessarily mean that the Chamber has been convinced of 
the person’s innocence.98 
Judge Bruno Cotte elucidated that “[s]uch a decision merely shows that 
the evidence adduced is insufficient to convince the Chamber beyond all 
reasonable doubt”.99 His carefully chosen words were the pretext of the 
acquittal of Ngudjolo. The prosecution had alleged he had intended and 
planned to “wipe out Bogoro” during an attack that killed around 200 
civilians.100 Out of a total of 54, the OTP relied heavily on three “key” 
witnesses who had themselves been taking part in the attack. The prosecu-
tor ensured they had “testified as best they could and in light of their own 
personal situations”.101 But for the Chamber “their remarks were too con-
tradictory or too hazy, too imprecise […] to base itself on”.102 
With the uncertain start of Lubanga’s trial in mind, the judges in 
this case selected the first witness, the head of the team that had investi-
gated the Bogoro case since May 2006, themselves. The Chamber ques-
tioned her about their methodologies: “Could you tell us how you assess 
the objectivity and credibility of these intermediaries?”.103 It was a query 
that poured salt in an open wound. Ngudjolo, since his acquittal was up-
held,104 was sent back to Kinshasa.105 
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Meanwhile, his former co-accused Germain Katanga was found 
guilty based on the same evidence.106 But the outcome in his case was 
controversial. In his case, the judges – with Christine van den Wyngaert 
dissenting “in the strongest possible terms”107 – experimented with Regu-
lation 55.108 In its final considerations, the bench changed the contours of 
the jigsaw puzzle, in order to fit in the pieces at hand.109 In effect Katanga 
was only officially informed about the exact nature of the charges on the 
day he was found guilty. Had the balance of power shifted from the Pros-
ecution to the Judges and did the judges take over the role of the prosecu-
tor?110 On the surface, it appears so. At least to the point where some 
judges have favoured a more inquisitorial approach.111 This was the case 
for Trial Chamber II. Like in Lubanga, the Ngudjolo and Katanga case 
was based on “witness statements and reports by MONUC investigators 
or representatives of various NGOs”,112 while OTP investigators had nev-
er travelled to the home-villages of the accused or places where prepara-
tions for the very attack allegedly took place. A forensic investigation in 
Bogoro was only concluded in late March 2009, six years after the massa-
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cre.113 But its findings were filed too late and lacked “probative value”.114 
The Chamber acknowledged that the OTP: 
would have encountered difficulties in locating witnesses 
with sufficiently accurate recollections of the facts and able 
to testify without fear, as well as in the collection of reliable 
documentary evidence necessary for determining the truth in 
the absence of infrastructure, archives and publicly available 
information.115 
[…] 
In all probability, the Prosecution’s [case] would have 
benefitted from a more thorough investigation of these issues, 
which would have resulted in a more nuanced interpretation 
of certain facts, a more accurate interpretation of some of the 
testimonies taken and, again, an amelioration of the criteria 
used by the Chamber to assess the credibility of various wit-
nesses.116 
It was against this background that the Trial Chamber travelled to 
the Iturian towns of Bogoro, Aveba, Zumbe and Kambutso.117 The Cham-
ber found it essential to “make its own findings and verify various witness 
accounts”.118 They did not want to judge the case file from an armchair in 
The Hague.119 To see is to believe seemed to be their adage.120 Katanga 
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did not appeal his conviction – and was brought before the Congolese 
judiciary for a range of other crimes against humanity121 – and therefore 
the ‘Bogoro dossier’ came to a close.122 But it did not put a lid on the 
Pandora’s Box in Ituri altogether. 
2.4.3.2. Ntaganda 
Bosco was someone who would kill people easily; he was a 
nasty man. […] He would kill people very easily. For exam-
ple, if a soldier killed another soldier, he would be killed. 
‘Dieumerci’, Witness123 
The first witness in the Lubanga trial already talked about one of the 
ICC’s key suspects: Bosco Ntaganda. Many other witnesses followed, and 
in the videos shown during the Lubanga trial he was seen several times. 
After chasing Ntaganda since 2004, his case file had effectively been 
dormant for many years.124 But amidst the pandemonium of the Congo 
proceedings, Ntaganda’s unexpected surrender was more an inconven-
ience than a present. Investigators had to go back to Ituri to track down 
the old case-witnesses and find new ones to support additional charges.125 
While the OTP has had time to rethink its investigative methodologies and 
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“unfinished business”,126 ‘intermediaries’ were again looking for witness-
es in the field.127 
After these renewed investigations, which delayed most of the pro-
ceedings, Ntaganda went on trial in 2015. His case was riddled with con-
troversies and allegations against him of witness tampering.128 From its 
advent, it was likely to be poisoned by the investigations and strategies in 
the other Congo trials. 129 The evidentiary foundations in Ntaganda are 
again embedded mostly in witness testimony.130 In seeking to add meat to 
the case, the prosecution also tendered tangible evidence, including Nta-
ganda’s radio communications logbook; internal reports, requests, orders, 
letters, decrees and statutes; photographs; and video. Introducing this 
documentary evidence seemed promising. However, from the beginning 
of the trial the OTP mainly called witnesses in closed session. Like in 
another cases, the Trial Chamber also raised concerns about the use of 
NGO sources, including the testimony of HRW researcher Anneke van 
Woudenberg. Judge Robert Fremr had reservations about admitting her 
report into evidence. The Chamber would 
exercise really high caution in relation to this document be-
cause in fact it’s mainly based on anonymous sources. And 
as we already expressed in I would say similar case concern-
ing the previous similar witness, we really see very low rele-
vance on this kind of information coming from that kind of 
sources.131 
Fremr’s reasoning was informed by the ICC’s Kivu-probe. In 2011 
the Court released Callixte Mbarushimana132 as the OTP did not make it 
through the test of the confirmation of charges hearings. Their case was 
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built largely on NGO and UN reports,  barely on its own investigations on 
the ground. In his case, the Chamber issued a damning decision citing 
“inconsistency”, “lack of any corroborating evidence” and “assumptions” 
from third parties. 133 Ntaganda was convicted on 18 counts of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. 
2.4.4. Uganda 
While the Ituri investigations were problematic, the situation in Uganda 
was slightly different. Although the investigation was announced at a very 
early stage of the ICC’s life, considerable time passed by as Moreno-
Ocampo was still hiring lawyers, analysts and investigators. A so-called 
‘Uganda joint team’ – including a dozen investigators, analysts and trial 
lawyers – was recruited in early 2004.134 There was no scarcity of sources. 
Uganda was a key investigating partner and shipped piles of reports and 
evidence of Lord’s Resistance Army (‘LRA’) activities to The Hague, 
including intercepted radio and satellite phone communications. With a 
strong appetite to start trials, OTP lawyers went into overdrive. Tight 
deadlines left no time for thorough collection and broad analysis of exist-
ing information. Moreno-Ocampo’s hand-picked case-leader, Christine 
Chung, opined: “many think for too long – [and] at some point you need 
to go to the field”.135 
In the event that the LRA militants suddenly came out of the bush, 
Moreno-Ocampo wanted indictments ‘ready-to-go’. Rushing to produce 
arrest warrants, the OTP lawyers selected six crimes scenes, handpicked 
six specific crime types, and identified several targets. Under that blue-
printed directive, a small team was sent into the field. However, none of 
the seven on-ground investigators had police background. As the six 
crime scenes were already deemed too old, forensic evidence was not 
trailed. Instead, during over 50 missions in little more than half a year, the 
investigators identified, heard and collected testimonies from victims in 
refugee camps, LRA defectors within the Ugandan Army, and former 
child soldiers. Amongst other things, the investigation recorded at least 
2,200 and 3,200 abductions in over 850 attacks between July 2002 and 
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June 2004.136 In contrast to the Ituri-probe, witnesses were directly acces-
sible, and recourse to ‘intermediaries’ was unnecessary. In Uganda, the 
biggest challenge was to keep the number of witnesses small but of 
‘smoking gun’ quality, something that, according to former investigators, 
worked out rather well.137 
Ten months after the start of the investigation, the Court’s first-ever 
arrest warrants were issued on 8 July 2005, against five senior command-
ers of the LRA.138 However, only Dominic Ongwen made it to trial. Both 
a victim and (alleged) perpetrator of LRA atrocities,139 and facing no few-
er than 70 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity,140 Ong-
wen’s trial, which is ongoing at the time of writing, has seen substantial 
introduction of documentary evidence.141 
2.4.5. Côte d’Ivoire 
First, let me be clear: I have not yet opened an investigation. 
But, if serious crimes under my jurisdiction are committed, I 
will do so. For instance, if as a consequence of Mr. Charles 
                                                   
136 OTP, “The Investigation in Northern Uganda”, 14 October 2005 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/zlp4tr). 
137 Author’s interview with ICC investigator, 14 January 2015. 
138 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58, 8 July 2005, 
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seph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 September 2005, 27 September 2005, 
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Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Vin-
cent Otti, 8 July 2005, ICC-02/04-01/05-54 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f7c78c); ICC, Situ-
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Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen, 
8 July 2005, ICC-02/04-01/05-57 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/7a2f0f). 
139 Thijs B. Bouwknegt, “Dominic Ongwen: born at the time of the white ant, tried by the 
ICC”, African Arguments, 20 January 2015 (available on its web site). 
140 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 23 March 2016, ICC-02/04-
01/15-422-Red (https://legal-tools.org/doc/74fc6e). 
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Blé Goudé’s speeches, there is massive violence, he could be 
prosecuted. […] [V]iolence is not an option. Those leaders 
who are planning violence will end up in the Hague. 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor142 
When the ICC’s new building was officially inaugurated by Dutch King 
Willem-Alexander in April 2016, the celebratory ceremony ended with a 
performance of children singing Michael Jackson’s Heal the World in one 
of the courtrooms.143 Three months earlier, there was a totally different 
atmosphere. In front of the building a crowd was chanting “Libérez 
Gbagbo!” (“Free Gbagbo!”). 144 Outside the guarded entrance, Ivorians 
from the diaspora community had assembled to demand the release of 
Laurent Gbagbo. Inside, while the Court clerk read out the charges at the 
opening of the trial, some spectators on the Public Gallery uttered praises 
when Gbagbo and his companion in the dock, former youth leader Charles 
Blé Goudé, did “not recognize [the] charges” and pleaded not-guilty to 
crimes against humanity charges.145 Absent from the hearings were vic-
tims of the post-electoral crisis that shocked the West African nation be-
tween late 2010 and early 2011.146 Inside the courtroom, the atmosphere 
was tense. One could hear a pin drop. 
Conscious of the highly politicised public discourse, controversies 
and conspiracy theories concerning, the trial Judge Tarfusser explained: 
“This is a criminal trial. […] This is not a game in which one side wants 
to win and the other side shall be defeated. Côte d’Ivoire is not on trial 
either here. The people of Côte d’Ivoire are not on trial”.147 Instead, he 
articulated, “[t]he task of this bench is to determine on the basis of the 
                                                   
142 OTP, “Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire”, 21 December 2010, ICC-OTP-20101221-PR617 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
3ffcf8). 
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evidence adduced by the parties and participants for our assessment 
whether the charges are, indeed, well-established or not”.148 
Like Ituri, the ICC had its eyes on Côte d’Ivoire from 2003. Alt-
hough not yet a Rome Statute subscriber,149 the country had been under 
preliminary examination since 2003. It was sparked because of an invita-
tion from Gbagbo’s government to identify, investigate and try “the perpe-
trators and accomplices of acts committed on Ivorian territory since the 
events of 19 September 2002”.150 It took until 2010 for the ICC to move 
into action. It was a response to the violent aftermath of the contested 
presidential elections on 28 November 2010. Soon after the final round of 
elections, perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara, who had claimed 
victory, were attacked.151 By February 2011, the country had descended 
into an intra-State conflict between forces loyal to Gbagbo and Ouattara. 
An estimated 3,000 civilians were killed and more than 150 women were 
raped in a conflict waged along political, ethnic, and religious lines. With 
French and United Nations military assistance, Gbagbo was defeated and 
arrested on 11 April 2011.152 Amidst the turmoil, the OTP responded to 
Ouattara’s 2010 invitation to initiate a proprio motu investigation.153 
The ICC’s move into Côte d’Ivoire was supported by human rights 
lobbyists and international political figureheads. Experts, however, raised 
serious concerns about the way the OTP operated. The late historian and 
West-Africa expert Stephen Ellis said they “sometimes run ahead of their 
ambitions”. He and other experts on mass violence in Côte d’Ivoire 
warned that a criminal case against Gbagbo for the political violence be-
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tween December 2010 and April 2011 would not fly. 154 But the OTP fol-
lowed suit nonetheless. In May 2011, Fatou Bensouda, the Deputy Prose-
cutor at that time, said the ICC was “poised to receive” the file from Abid-
jan. 155 For then Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, Gbagbo was the obvious 
target: he was in prison, he featured as a bad guy in the press, and the new 
regime provided access to presidential records and insider witnesses. 
In Paris on 24 November 2011, President Ouattara and Prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo orchestrated Gbagbo’s prompt transfer to The Hague, 
based on a sealed indictment.156 Crucially, the field investigations would 
follow only after Gbagbo’s arrest and transfer to The Hague. For a case 
against a president, the inquiry was marginal.157 By February 2012, the 
OTP had only eight investigators on the ground. Working with Côte 
d’Ivoire’s main human rights groups to record witness testimonies, they 
were focusing on preparing for Gbagbo’s confirmation of charges hear-
ing.158 Fatou Bensouda wanted to “send out a strong message to those 
who intend to attempt to get to power, or to remain in power, by use of 
force and brutality, to tell them that they shall henceforth be answerable 
for their actions”.159 Like in Kenya, the OTP sought to only deal with 
contemporary messy political violence in the chaotic, blurry wake of con-
tested elections. And indeed, at first sight, the charges against Gbagbo 
seemed clear-cut: four violent attacks against unarmed civilians in Abid-
jan. It could have worked if the underlying case theory was not the OTP’s 
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Manichean narrative on Gbagbo’s decade-long presidency and his virtual-
ly despotic determination to cling on to power by criminal means.160 
Madam President, my entire life, and this is a known fact not 
only back in Côte d’Ivoire but throughout Africa, and 
throughout France, throughout political France notably, I 
have been fighting for democracy. I asked my counsel only 
last week, and I said that I wanted to bring you all the books 
that I’ve written, and they said that it was too late to intro-
duce these books, but once we have finished, whatever the 
result may be, whatever you decide, I will send a batch of 
books written by Gbagbo to the Office of the Prosecution, 
and I will send you also a batch of my books, because, well, 
that is the man that I am.161 
On 28 February 2013, at the end of the ICC’s confirmation of 
charges hearings, Gbagbo told the Pre-Trial Chamber he would share a 
batch of his history books with the Prosecutor’s office. He reinforced his 
position as the all-knowing leader and central agent in recent Ivoirian 
history as well as his supreme expertise as a history professor.162 In his 
opinion, Bensouda had distorted the facts and “constructed a mere carica-
ture of the history of Côte d’Ivoire, which made it impossible for them to 
fully grasp the issues at stake or to understand the reality of the crisis in 
this country”.163 Nearly six years later, after finishing writing two addi-
tional books in The Hague’s Scheveningen prison,164 he may want to keep 
his promise to send the OTP his books. 
On 15 January 2019, Gbagbo and his former Youth Minister Blé 
Goudé were acquitted by the Trial Chamber. They did not even have to 
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present their case.  It was a bitter start of the year for the ICC. It was its 
first hearing in 2019 and the only people revelling in The Hague were 
Ivorians. On the Court’s crisp doorsteps, they were drinking champagne 
and singing, rejoicing the acquittal.165 For the international justice com-
munity, and for victims back in Côte d’Ivoire too, it was a moment of 
tremor, defeat, disillusion, and despair. Once again – following an acquit-
tal of Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo – the world’s court of last resort that is to 
speak justice to power had ordered the release of government officials 
suspected of mass atrocity crimes. Since its beginning, the trial was politi-
cised, theatrical, emotional, controversial and uneasy. However, its abrupt 
ending midway – after two years of prosecution evidence and one year for 
the judges to make an evaluation of it – was barely surprising. Overall, the 
trial suffered from an implausible case theory, lack of evidence, and para-
doxical testimonies. 
Should it have gone to trial at all? If it was for Christine van den 
Wyngaert to answer, it would have been a decisive ‘no’. The former ICC 
judge echoed how profoundly feeble she found the evidence in the case, 
which she called “a fiasco”.166 She said she had seen the acquittal looming 
in the air, like a dark cloud, for more than five years. From the beginning, 
the Prosecution had built its crimes against humanity case on anonymous 
hearsay evidence from NGO reports and press articles.  Such pieces of 
evidence may serve as first drafts of history, sketch context and provide 
leads, but they cannot, wrote the Pre-Trial Chamber in June 2013, “in any 
way be presented as the fruits of a full and proper investigation”.167 In a 
somewhat unexpected move of judicial lenience, the same Pre-Trial 
Chamber – of which van den Wyngaert was a member – gave the OTP 
five extra months to collect evidence that would withstand the lowest 
threshold of legal scrutiny required to confirm the charges. But the writing 
on the wall was clear of what was going to happen if the Prosecutor could 
not deliver. The rest is history. 
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While the charges against Gbagbo were confirmed, by majority,168 
Abidjan chose to transfer Charles Blé Goudé to The Hague on 22 March 
2014. The former sports and youth minister was charged with the same – 
and one additional count – crimes as the Gbagbo.169 Laurent Gbagbo’s 
wife, Simone, who was charged as well,170 was never transferred to The 
Hague as she has faced national investigations and proceedings.171 She, 
alongside with 82 other defendants including her son, was convicted to 20 
years imprisonment in early 2015 for undermining State security. 172 A 
year later, in January 2016, Gbagbo and Blé Goudé were tried in a joint 
trial. 173  Getting presidents and ministers convicted of mass atrocities 
might have felt easy to the OTP.174 But practice, so far, has demonstrated 
the opposite. Proving that political responsibility also amounts to criminal 
responsibility may require sound expertise on the political history of a 
‘situation’, systematic inquisitorial investigations, and bringing realistic 
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charges. This is not what we saw in the Gbagbo-Blé Goudé case – as well 
as in previous ICC cases from Africa. 
In reality, the prosecution’s case theory relied on such a simplistic 
understanding of Côte d’Ivoire’s political history that it was bound to fail. 
No reasonable judge, or first year history student, could be convinced of 
the following propositions about Gbagbo, his wife Simone and his protégé 
Blé Goudé: 
Upon assuming the Presidency of Côte d’Ivoire in October 
2000, G[bagbo] harboured the objective of retaining power 
by, inter alia, repressing or violently attacking those who 
challenged his authority. 
In the following years, knowing that a freely-contested 
presidential election was inevitable, G[bagbo] and the Inner 
Circle jointly conceived and implemented a common plan to 
keep him in power by all means, including by committing 
the crimes charged (“Common Plan”). By 27 November 
2010, the implementation of the Common Plan had devel-
oped to include a State or organisational policy aimed at a 
widespread and systematic attack against perceived Ouattara 
supporters.175 
Particularly informed by a pile of reports from activist group 
HRW – which summarise anonymised witness testimony, media reports 
and selected interviews176 – and “a rather unsophisticated general hypoth-
esis on the workings of the African state”,177 which even commences two 
years before the start of the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction from 1 July 2002, 
the allegations culminate in the core charge that from November 2010: 
G[bagbo] and members of the Inner Circle jointly planned, 
organised, coordinated, ordered, induced, authorised and al-
lowed various measures to implement the Common Plan and 
the crimes charged. In pursuance of the Common Plan, pro-
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G[bagbo] forces attacked, killed, injured, raped and perse-
cuted hundreds of civilians.178 
The criminal incidents alleged179 were committed in the past, but 
not in historical isolation.180 They took place in the immediate aftermath 
of the first presidential elections in a decade of rising nationalism (‘Ivoir-
ité’ or ‘Ivorianness’) ,181 a preceding civil war, prior political and ethnic 
animosity, and anti-Western – particularly French – sentiments.182 This 
broader historical context – arrested by these real social, political and 
historical dimensions in which Gbagbo had acted – actually appear to 
matter more than Prosecutor Bensouda would have liked. In linking 
Gbagbo to widespread and systematic crimes against humanity, she elect-
ed to show the Trial Chamber that Gbagbo (and his wife Simone, also a 
trained historian183) had always been driven by an insatiable appetite for 
power. Once they were served the main dish (the Presidency), the couple 
was not about breaking bread, up to the point that they became criminal 
minded. Moreover, Gbagbo’s intent to commit crimes, writes Bensouda, is 
partly demonstrated by “his historical repression of his political opposi-
tion”. 184 That is the red thread in the case against him: from the day 
Gbagbo was elected President in October 2000, he “intended to stay in 
power at any cost”.185 First he used the defence forces to quell demonstra-
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tions. But after a failed coup attempt in 2002, he employed militias, for-
eign mercenaries and “pro-Gbagbo youth”.186 Indeed, the civil war that 
plagued and divided Ivory Coast in the early 2000s was extremely violent, 
included massacres and some observers said even bordered on geno-
cide,187 but that episode was not a part of the ICC charges. 
One day before the Gbagbo trial started in January 2016, Bensouda 
told journalists “that the purpose of the trial […] is to uncover the truth 
through purely a legal process […], for the sake of doing justice for the 
victims; and to prevent mass atrocities recurring in the future”.188 Howev-
er, during the entire trial, the judges signalled that they found the Prosecu-
tion narrative – which went beyond the scope of the charges – implausible, 
unclear, and unsubstantiated. Halfway through trial, the Chamber even 
asked the Prosecution to file a trial brief 
containing a detailed narrative of her case in light of the tes-
timonies heard and the documentary evidence submitted at 
trial. More specifically, she should indicate to the Chamber 
in which way she thinks the evidence supports each of the 
elements of the different crimes and forms of responsibility 
charged.189 
During trial, the OTP presented 2,679 documents, including the 
presidential palace logbooks, police records, UN reports, medical reports 
and Simone Gbagbo’s diary. None of these documents contained a single 
Nazi-style meticulously kept record of crimes against humanity, let alone 
presidential orders to commit such acts. In the absence of a documentary 
trail of primary sources, the OTP resorted to secondary sources: human 
rights reports, a documentary, press footage, and erratic testimonies. 
At trial, hardly anyone corroborated the case theory or linked the 
charges to Gbagbo. From day one, in January 2016, witness testimonies 
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were laborious, non-sensical, and at times even absurd. The trial faced 
hurdles and promised to take a long breath. Already when the Chamber 
heard the first prosecution witness on 8 February 2016, Tarfusser could 
not hide his annoyance with lawyers asking the same questions “three, 
four, five, ten times”,190 or the witness being unable to estimate a distance, 
only to jokingly observe that “at this pace we finish this trial in 2050”.191 
While hearing only the sixth prosecution witness three months later, al-
most half an hour was spent on questioning whether he was washing a 
kettle or if he was washing himself with water at 09:00 on a Friday morn-
ing in February 2011, more than five years previously.192 Then Tarfusser 
became increasingly impatient.193 After the trial he concluded: 
For almost two years, I assisted [sic] to the Prosecutor’s case 
unravelling before my eyes in the courtroom, where witness 
after witness, from the humblest of victims up to the highest 
echelons of the Ivorian Army, systematically weakened, 
when not outright undermined, the case they were ‘expected’, 
and had been called, by the Prosecutor to support.194 
The Chamber had heard testimony from a variety of witnesses. 
Among the crime base witnesses, there were victims, a fishmonger, the 
owner of two pubs, an electrician, a truck driver, a seamstress and an edu-
cator. Among the insider witnesses were several members of the Rassem-
blement des Républicains  (‘RDR’) and senior officers from the military, 
special units and the gendarmerie. Their testimony was contextualised by 
a HRW researcher, two documentary producers, a forensic expert, and a 
former UN volunteer. However, the OTP did not produce experts to testify 
about Côte d’Ivoire’s political history, culture and language – evidence 
that could potentially support the OTP case narrative. If getting as close to 
truth as possible on even the most basic facts about peripheral events in 
2011 was not attempted, and already seemed impossible, how then to ass-
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es witness testimony that turns the trial into somewhat of a carnival-like 
operetta? After hearing harrowing detailed testimony from four Ivoirian 
victims, the OTP called to the stand their fifth witness, Mohammed Sam 
Jichi, better known in Côte d’Ivoire as ‘Sam the African’. As a former 
‘insider’ he was to testify against Gbagbo and corroborate the prosecu-
tion’s case theory. On the stand, however, the witness turned ‘hostile’, 
changed the incriminating story he had told ICC investigators a year be-
fore, and started to apologetically exonerate Gbagbo: 
He is a professor. He knows the history of Africa. […] [H]e 
was a great head of state […]. That’s my personal analysis. 
And in the investigations and in many documents, you will 
read that this is the truth what I say to you.195 
Nodding in agreement, for Gbagbo, the historian, it was a narrative 
he would subscribe to. But moments later, the witness drifted on to say: 
When I see the history of President Gbagbo it reminds me a 
little of that of Jesus and Barnabas […]. It’s history repeating 
itself […]. This is my analysis. This is what’s happening to 
Gbagbo, Jesus and Barnabas.196 
Playing along the game, Gbagbo’s lawyer then staunchly asked, 
“and who is Jesus?”. Only to wait for the presiding judge to interrupt, “I 
think we’re going a little bit too far with this questioning on the Holy Bi-
ble. We should come back a bit to the facts. Please”.197 In trying to do so, 
the OTP called their prime witness, former HRW researcher Matt Wells, 
an American who was to testify on the investigations he had carried out 
immediately after the crisis and published in a report relied upon by the 
Prosecution. 198 Yet, the precise contents of his reports, which formed the 
core of the OTP’s case, were hardly discussed at the hearings, which were 
dominated by belligerent cross-examination by the defence on the investi-
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gative methodology and alleged bias of his organisation.199 This line of 
questioning continued when the Trial Chamber heard from Nigel Walker 
(and later his translator), a British-American documentary producer who 
made a film, Shadow Work, about the rise of Goudé’s youth movement in 
2006,200 events from four years before the alleged crimes occurred.201 
Increasingly irritated by the trial’s endless dwelling on the past, 
Judge Tarfusser, while hearing the twelfth witness, former Cabinet Minis-
ter for Human Rights Joël Kouadio N’Guessan,202 could no longer hide 
his impatience. On 28 June 2016, after 05:43 hours of questioning, he 
urged the prosecution to finally move forward with its examination to the 
post-electoral violence, exclaiming: 
And I really, and it’s not the first time that I said that I would 
urge you to move towards what are – towards the period of 
the charges, otherwise, I mean, we’re really making history. 
And I understand the context, we have to know the context, 
but we have enough context I think. Please go ahead.203 
Thus, five months into the trial, the proceedings had been riddled 
with historical questions outside of the scope of the indictment, but had 
                                                   
199 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 17 May 2016, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-40-Red-
ENG (https://legal-tools.org/doc/9e4d05); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 
The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 18 
May 2016, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-41-Red2-ENG (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f55d69); ICC, 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles 
Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 19 May 2016, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-42-ENG (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/c36cf4). 
200 Nigel Walker, “Shadow Work”, Walkerfilm, 2008. 
201 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 24 May 2016, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-43-
Red2-ENG (https://legal-tools.org/doc/b3r3ds); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Tran-
script, 25 May 2016, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-44-Red2-ENG (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
o88nvt). 
202 At the time he was testifying, he was “a management consultant”, the assistant secretary 
general of RDR and “responsible for communications and public relations”; ICC, Situation 
in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Gou-
dé, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 27 June 2016, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-53-ENG, p. 2 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/0ef0c7). 
203 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 28 June 2016, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-54-ENG, 
p. 41 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c8e44a). 
 
2. Investigating International Crimes: Pitfalls, Problems and Promises 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 107 
not touched upon the heart of the matter: the individual criminal responsi-
bility of Gbagbo and Blé Goudé for the specific incidents charged. All this 
window-dressing on broader questions of history may have been interest-
ing for the judges, but the process failed to address whether or not Gbagbo 
committed the crimes as charged. Besides the HRW researcher, the docu-
mentary producer, and a UN investigator, no real independent expert was 
called to outline what exactly had happened in Côte d’Ivoire, who had 
actually been involved in violence, and how.204 Thus, after hearing 82 
witnesses, it remained forensically unclear who did what to whom. 
Who killed 150 people, raped 17 women, and injured 111 others, as 
listed in the indictment, during the attacks on the national Radio and Tele-
vision headquarters, Abobo’s women march, and the shelling of Abobo’s 
market? Nobody questioned that this violence had taken place, including 
the trial judges. But insider witnesses, including a score of police officials, 
generals and politicians, could not provide a beyond-reasonable doubt 
picture of who was ultimately responsible. Their testimonies were gener-
ally unspecific, ambiguous, evasive or even exonerative, particularly con-
cerning Gbagbo’s role – and of course their own – in the events. Other 
witnesses, including ‘Sam the African’, took the stand for opportunistic 
reasons. 
After 231 hearing days, many of which behind closed doors (thus 
disallowing public scrutiny of the trial evidence), the OTP closed its case 
in January 2018. The prosecutors involved must have felt confident, as 
they cancelled 44 witnesses initially announced to testify in The Hague. 
The Trial Chamber, however, was not. It soon requested the OTP to file a 
trial brief in which it was to summarise, organise and clarify how the evi-
dence presented related to the charges and the theory of criminal respon-
sibility. This was an uncommon request. And it was obviously telling of 
the Trial Chamber’s confusion over the relevance of what they had heard 
during the course of two years. But the OTP’s mid-trial brief offered the 
Chamber no remedy.205 
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It took the Chamber a mere 15 minutes to render an oral decision to 
acquit, and order the release of Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, saying that there 
was no need for the Defence to submit further evidence “as the Prosecutor 
has not satisfied the burden of proof in relation to several core constitutive 
elements of the crimes as charged”.206 
It took six months from the oral acquittal decision until each of the 
judges published their reasons. 207  Particularly Tarfusser’s opinion was 
uncompromising, even personal. It reads like an indictment of interna-
tional criminal justice, the ICC, ICC judges, the OTP and the Defence. 
The Italian Judge generally found the case scenario “Manichean and sim-
plistic”208 and the evidence in the case to support it of “exceptional weak-
ness”.209 He aims his arrows at the OTP’s investigation, which he found 
“far from being completed”,210 lamenting that “much of the evidence was 
essentially provided by the current [Ivorian] government, which is headed 
by political opponents of the accused”.211 Moreover, he critiqued the OTP 
for only photocopying – at times illegible – original items, continuing: 
“Even more troubling, it seems that staff with limited mastery of French 
was selected as responsible for carrying out interviews of critical im-
portance for the case”.212 
While agreeing in substance with Tarfusser, Judge Henderson’s 
opinion is more structured, elaborate and substantive, carefully combing 
through the evidence. At the core, however, he also found that the OTP’s 
case failed because the way “the Prosecutor depicted their [Gbagbo and 
Blé Goudé’s] actions and omissions from a legal point of view could not 
be sustained by the evidence”.213 Crucially, judge Henderson observed: 
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The main concern is that the Prosecutor seems to have pre-
sented a rather one-sided version of the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire. There is a reason why we ask witnesses to under-
take to tell the ‘whole truth’. This is because withholding 
part of the relevant information may be highly misleading. 
Although it would be unfair to suggest that the Prosecutor 
deliberately withheld important information, her narrative – 
wittingly or unwittingly – systematically omits or downplays 
significant elements of the political and military situation. 
This has resulted in a somewhat skewed version of events 
that may be inspired by reality but does not fully reflect it.214 
Henderson’s opinion, which is not directed against the OTP per se, 
uncovers the consequences of simultaneously tasking prosecutors with 
investigations and with prosecutions, while they are also being part of the 
proceedings. In this case, this issue became readily apparent, as the prose-
cutor “seems to have started from the premise that her case theory is cor-
rect and that this theory provides the necessary coherence to link the dis-
parate evidentiary elements she relies upon”.215 In the Gbagbo case, the 
OTP put “the cart in front of the horse”,216 and has “on occasion, been 
selective in the evidence she collected”.217 In fact, the Prosecutor was led 
by proving a theory, not by following evidence: 
While it is recognised that the Prosecutor does not have lim-
itless resources, it is important to stress that the Prosecutor 
should not cherry-pick those (parts of) exhibits that support 
her narrative and ignore the rest.218 
Moreover, while the OTP retains the burden of proof, Henderson 
found that “the Prosecutor sometimes seems to want to shift the burden of 
proof onto the Defence for missing evidence”.219 Henderson concludes, 
that “because of the Prosecutor’s ‘everything-proves-everything’ approach, 
it has proved impossible to conduct a linear analysis of the evidence”.220 
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The OTP appealed the majority’s decision to acquit on one proce-
dural matter and on the Chamber’s application of its standard of proof and 
approach to assessing the sufficiency of the evidence.221 But it does not 
raise any substantive matter. They may want to rely on the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Olga Herrera-Carbuccia. Contrary to her colleagues, she 
found: “In the case at bar I find that there is sufficient evidence, if accept-
ed, on which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict the accused”.222 
Her human rights approach to the facts, evidence and purpose of interna-
tional criminal justice differs from the majority’s approach. She under-
scores the rights of participating victims who’s “interest in the proper and 
transparent administration of justice and the establishment of the truth” 
should not be ignored.223 She opined: 
Establishing the truth behind events and preventing all forms 
of revisionism have always been the underlying objectives of 
all international criminal justice systems. If we allow a pres-
ident in a democratic society who refuses to step down in the 
aftermath of a contested election to target citizens of that so-
ciety and commit crimes against humanity with impunity, we 
fail to comply with the values and purposes enshrined in the 
Rome Statute (“Statute”) and espoused by the international 
community.224 
For Herrera-Carbuccia, the purpose of the trial goes beyond Hannah 
Arendt’s adage that is must focus solely on the criminal responsibility of 
the accused. Instead, she focused on the State’s responsibility by default. 
“The State has a duty to protect its citizens, and the principle of propor-
tionality applies in every case where civilians are harmed”, she writes, 
adding that “[w]hen the State apparatus targets citizens of the State with-
out fear of sanction, it acts against the fundamental values of a democratic 
society, and the individuals at the head of the State apparatus must be held 
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accountable”.225 In Côte d’Ivoire, according to her, there was evidence 
that unjustifiable violence was committed and that State institutions – led 
by Gbagbo – failed to protect civilians and took no action to punish those 
responsible for perpetrating the crimes. Herrera-Carbuccia implies that 
Gbagbo and Blé Goudé bear some criminal responsibility, and finds that 
“[o]n the basis of the evidence submitted into the record, the seriousness 
of the charges and the interests of the victims participating in these pro-
ceedings, the trial should have continued with the presentation of the De-
fence case”.226 
At the time of writing, it is impossible to gauge what the Appeals 
Chamber may do. However, it is safe to conclude that during the com-
bative trial proceedings, virulent cross-examinations in front of a public 
gallery filled with Gbagbo supporters, the OTP fought the case as if it 
were the underdog. In so doing, it held on to its bone for too long, blindly 
believing in its case theory. 
More fundamentally, the Gbagbo case is eventually emblematic of 
the OTP’s inability to forensically investigate atrocity crimes in Africa. 
The problem is widespread and systematic as evidenced by the ICC’s fee-
ble conviction record. Should we fault the OTP for it? Yes, to some extent. 
The OTP needs to consider whether it should continue to act as the execu-
tive, prosecutorial, arm of major international human rights NGOs, or 
work in a more inquisitorial, independent manner. That includes deciding 
not to push cases if there is insufficient evidence. On the other hand, and 
in fairness, the OTP is hamstrung by its mandate to simultaneously act as 
truth-finder, prosecutor and litigator. Enhanced quality control in interna-
tional criminal investigations may therefore require a balanced division of 
labour, which unburdens, in the first place, the OTP from carrying out the 
investigations. 
At the same time, as Judge Henderson remarks, we must be aware 
of financial constraints. States supporting the Court have maintained it on 
a shoestring budget. By 2018, the ICC only had 61 investigators, 23 ana-
lysts, and 9 staff in its forensic science section.227 That is modest for a 
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court that deals with no less than 21 situations across the globe. By com-
parison, the ICC says that the ICTY deployed between 20 and 30 investi-
gators per case – excluding lawyers and other support functions.228 One 
could argue that the financial and political backers of the Court have been 
very successful at maintaining a court that is imperfect when it comes to 
holding to account government officials. The Gbagbo trial reassured them 
that they have little to worry from the ICC. As to Gbagbo, while he may 
have to wait for the appellate proceedings, he now stands among an illus-
trious group of powerful figures who have benefitted from the shoestring 
investigations at the ICC. 
2.5. Conclusion: Promises 
Much criticism from the quarters of observers, activists, lawyers, academ-
ics and ICC judges of the ICC has focused on the way in has conducted its 
investigations in Africa. As regards investigations, it is clear that the sys-
tem of international criminal justice has created an enemy from within. It 
suffers from ingrained pitfalls, inherent problems and inborn biases, each 
of which are impediments to its objectives, in particular in truth-finding 
abilities. 
Essentially, international criminal justice is heavily restrained by its 
limited investigatory mandate, power and resources – more so than, for 
example, truth commissions. In thinking about quality control, the ques-
tion is thus whether the field requires refinement or revolution in order to 
come to sustainable solutions, or more crucially to better investigations. If 
we analyse the quality of judicial investigations of atrocity crimes in light 
of how historical sciences approach mass violence, we may consider that 
its excellence is best secured if carried out in a dispassionate, amoral, 
apolitical and non-juridical manner. 
Arguably, while looking at the past modus operandi of international 
criminal investigations, one could make a case that investigations ought to 
be done independently and not by an adversarial party to the proceedings 
with a specific orientation, the OTP. Considering an evidence-based rather 
than prosecution-based system of international criminal investigations 
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may in itself represent a form of quality control. This requires a separation 
of powers in international criminal justice. 
In this sense it may be worthwhile to think about the creation of an 
investigative chamber – like in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia and Extraordinary African Chambers – that carries out the 
investigation, including site visits. In national jurisdictions too, like in the 
Netherlands, there is a clear division between war crimes prosecutors, war 
crimes police, specialised war crimes investigative magistrates, the de-
fence, and trial judges. In the entire process, each party plays a role in the 
truth-finding exercise. This may not always lead to prosecutions and con-
victions, but that too is a realistic outcome of an inquiry. Checks and bal-
ances safeguard the quality of the investigation at different stages, and 
ultimately the prosecutions. 
Alternatively, States Parties could consider establishing an inde-
pendent inquisitorial investigative organ within the ICC. This could not 
only solve external perceptions that investigations are biased, but also 
allow the OTP to carefully consider charges in the case if it finds that 
there is enough evidence to commence prosecutions. In both scenarios 
(neither of which would obviate the need for the parties to conduct their 
own additional investigations), the ICC would have the benefit of an in-
dependent expert unit, along lines similar to the ICTY, which could advise 
on historical, sociological, linguistic, cultural, and political contexts. The 
past has shown that these areas are insufficiently and unprofessionally 
covered by trial lawyers, who are not professionally trained in these fields. 
If international criminal justice is to improve its investigation or 
preparation of fact-rich criminal cases, perhaps the solution is not “prose-
cutorial professionalization”, 229  but rather investigative professionalisa-
tion: a move towards an inquisitorial investigative process, independent 
from the OTP. 
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3.The Contribution of Analysis to the 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Xabier Agirre Aranburu* 
 
3.1. Introduction: The Role of Analysts 
This chapter will explain different analysis techniques that are instrumen-
tal for quality control in criminal investigations (‘QCCI’) and the contri-
butions that analysts should make for that matter as part of their profes-
sional duties within the investigations. The proposed methods are based 
on the experience of different national and international tribunals over the 
last 25 years as well as research in the fields of criminology and other 
social sciences, intelligence studies, and cognitive psychology. 
Jerome Frank, judge and law professor, observed by 1949 based in 
his own extensive legal experience that “fact-finding is the toughest part 
of the judicial function. It is there that court-house government is least 
satisfactory. […] but the legal profession has done next to nothing about 
the problem of fact-finding”.1 He suggested that “law-suits are misnamed: 
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They should rather be called ‘fact suits’”.2 In more recent times, Sarah 
M.H. Nouwen followed in Frank’s footsteps and highlighted the “empiri-
cal weakness” of research on academic literature about international crim-
inal law and “transitional justice”, a remarkable gap since “after all, the 
job of international criminal tribunals itself is, or should be, largely empir-
ical”.3 Most analysts working in investigations will share the concerns 
expressed by Frank and Nouwen, they also struggle to call everybody’s 
attention to the facts in a world dominated by legal rhetoric, as they do 
their best to bring empirical rigour to the procedures. 
The primary role of analysts in investigations is to make sense of 
the factual information, processing large volumes of data, most often in-
complete and conflicting, to give strategic direction to the investigation, 
and to present valid factual findings relevant to the legal case. Contribu-
tions to the Quality Control (‘QC’) of the investigative findings are inher-
ent to the duties of the analysts, to avoid situations in which “criminal 
investigations lack a quality control supervisor on the job. There is no 
process for collecting and analysing information about errors” and “[t]he 
farther a case moves down the assembly line […] the harder it is to undo 
an error”.4 
Already in Nuremberg, professional analysts made significant con-
tributions to the investigations and prosecutions under the direction of 
Franz Neumann, Chief of Analysis with the United States (‘US’) prosecu-
tion.5 In the 1980s, the Office of Special Investigations (‘OSI’) of the US 
                                                   
2 Ibid., p. 32. 
3 Sarah M.H. Nouwen, “‘As You Set out for Ithaka’: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and 
Existential Questions about Socio-Legal Empirical Research in Conflict”, in Leiden Jour-
nal of International Law, 2014, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 228. 
4 Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 270. 
5 See Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer, in Raffaele Laudani (ed.), 
Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2013. Compilation of reports produced by Franz 
Neumann, Herbert Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer while working of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) and supporting the US prosecution in Nuremberg. For an overview of their 
experience, including their conflict with the US Chief Prosecutor Jackson, see ibid., “In-
troduction”, pp. 1–23. See also David Kettler and Thomas Wheatland, Learning from 
Franz L. Neumann: Law, Theory and the Brute Facts of Political Life, Anthem Press, Lon-
don, 2019, and Petra Marquardt-Bigman, “Behemoth revisited: The research and analysis 
branch of the office of strategic services in the debate of us policies towards Germany, 
1943–46”, in Intelligence and National Security, 1997, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 91–100. 
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Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) hired historians to work as analysts in their 
investigations on World War II crimes.6 Soon afterwards the role of pro-
fessional analysts was included in the work of the ICTY-OTP (1993–
2017), thanks to the support from Morten Bergsmo and other experts in 
international criminal law. 
The Investigations Division at the ICTY-OTP included analysts 
with different profiles and functions. From the outset in 1994, it had an 
Special Advisory Section with experts on “military matters including 
chains of command and order of battle; and the cultural, historical and 
political background relating to the Balkans” whose function was de-
scribed as “providing the Prosecution and Investigations Sections with the 
necessary background knowledge and information”.7 The Special Adviso-
ry Section operated independently, along with the Investigations Section 
and the Prosecutions Section. In 1995 the OTP reported that this section, 
now referred to as Strategy Team, grew from 3 to 15 staff because of “the 
tremendous amount of extant and potentially critical information relating 
to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the importance of providing 
strategic guidance to the investigative teams”.8 The Strategy Team includ-
ed the Intelligence Analysis Unit, “responsible for disseminating infor-
mation to other units within the Office of the Prosecutor and analysing 
information, intelligence and other material received by the Office”, and 
the Special Projects Unit “analysing the power and legal structures within 
the former Yugoslavia and providing a chronology of events pertaining to 
the former Yugoslavia”.9 
                                                   
6 See Lawrence Douglas, The Right Wrong Man: John Demjanjuk and the Last Great Nazi 
War Crimes Trial, Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 50. For an account by a former OSI 
researcher, who later became the head of the LRT at ICTY-OTP (1997–2009), see Patrick J. 
Treanor, “Old Documents and Archives in Core International Crimes Cases”, in Morten 
Bergsmo and CHEAH Wui Ling (eds.), Old Evidence and Core International Crimes, Tor-
kel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Beijing, 2012, pp. 141–53 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/
16-bergsmo-cheah). Treanor served in the DOJ OSI as Historian (1980–89) and Senior 
Historian (1989–94), he joined ICTY-OTP from the outset in 1994, and became the head of 
its Leadership Research Team (‘LRT’) throughout its existence from 1997 to 2009. 
7 ICTY, First Annual Report of the ICTY, 29 August 1994, p. 40 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/cacdb7/). 
8 ICTY, Second Annual Report of the ICTY, 23 August 1995, p. 14 (‘Second Annual Report 
of the ICTY’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9a66a1/). 
9 Ibid., p. 15. 
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As the OTP grew, more analysts were recruited and two specialized 
analysis units were established in 1997, the Leadership Research Team 
(‘LRT’) and the Military Analysis Team (‘MAT’). The LRT was: 
responsible for the identification of persons from the civilian 
and military leadership structures of the relevant Yugoslav 
entities believed to be responsible for crimes committed dur-
ing the conflict. […] Within its area of expertise, the Section 
makes recommendations to the Chief of investigations on the 
selection of appropriate cases for investigation.10 
The LRT was led by a former Senior Historian at the US DOJ OSI 
and it comprised mainly historians and social scientists with advanced 
knowledge of the former Yugoslavia, and fluent in the local languages.11 
The investigation teams had Crime Analysts and Strategic Analysts oper-
ating under the supervision of a Team Leader, usually a senior police of-
ficer, or a Senior Trial Attorney when the teams moved to the prosecution 
phase. The MAT comprised analysts with a background of military intelli-
gence mainly, “to provide specialized analysis of military aspects”.12 The 
Demographics Unit employed researchers focused on demographic and 
crime pattern analysis. 
A few analysts were assigned to support the tracking of fugitives at 
the Fugitive Intelligence and Sensitive Sources Team (FISST, focused on 
operational intelligence, initially created in 1996 as FIST or Fugitive In-
telligence Support Team). Continuing this precedent, as recently as May 
2020 the work of professional analysts was decisive for the arrest of the 
ICTR fugitive Félicien Kabuga, on the basis on phone, financial and sur-
veillance data.13 Some analysis resource was also assigned to support the 
                                                   
10 ICTY, Statement of Functions and Organization, undated, circa 1997, p. 5 (‘ICTY State-
ment of Functions and Organization’). 
11 On the experience of the LRT and related analysis issues, see Christian Axboe Nielsen, 
“Leadership Analysis in International Criminal Justice”, in Adejoke Babington-Ashaye, 
Aimee Comrie and Akingbolahan Adeniran (eds.), International Criminal Investigations: 
Law and Practice, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2018, pp. 207–30. 
12 ICTY Statement of Functions and Organization, p. 5, see above note 10. See also the chap-
ter by Peter Nicholson, who led the MAT from 1997 to 2004, “The Function of Analysis 
and Analysts”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical 
Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
Brussels, 2017, pp. 121–35 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). 
13 See Adam Ciralsky, “How a High-Tech Dragnet Nabbed the Alleged Financier of the 
Rwandan Genocide – After He’d Spent 26 Years on the Lam”, Vanity Fair, 22 May 2020, 
including an interview with Serge Brammertz, where he explains the role of analysis in 
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Appeals Section, since some factual issues became unavoidable event at 
the appeals stage.14 
By 1995, the ICTY-OTP had 20 “researchers and analysts” along 
with 35 investigators and 29 lawyers, which is a significant share for 
analysis in the overall composition of the office.15 As the ICTY annual 
reports indicate, OTP senior management chose an investigative model 
with a fairly large analytical component because of the need to process 
large volumes of complex information, as well as regional and military 
expertise. The number of analysts grew in the period 1997–2000 upon 
request from the investigation and prosecution teams. At the highest point 
of staffing around the year 2000 the Investigations Division (‘ID’) at the 
ICTY-OTP employed some 50 professional analysts across the above-
mentioned categories. In the final completion stage the workload of the 
ICTY-OTP shifted from investigations to trials, the ID was disbanded, and 
its staff transferred to the Prosecutions Division including all analysts and 
the LRT and MAT in full. 
Many of the ICTY-OTP analysts joined other international tribunals 
and investigation bodies and carried with them the ICTY experience in the 
analysis of sources, crime patterns and organisational structures. Among 
them are five contributors to this volume: Christian Nielsen (formerly 
with the LRT, and then ICC analyst), William H. Wiley and Ewan Brown 
(formerly MAT, and later ICC investigators), Markus Eikel (formerly 
Crime Analyst with ICTY, and later investigations Team Leader in the 
ICC), and myself. 
Most of the contributions by analysts at the ICTY are not public, 
they are part of confidential investigations, but some of it has become 
public through a number of trial exhibits and testimonies. Among others, 
the Head of LRT Patrick Treanor contributed to the Perišić trial and LRT 
researchers Christian Nielsen (co-author of this volume), William Tomlja-
                                                                                                                        
this operation (available on its web site). Brammertz is the Chief Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals since 2016 and previously, among oth-
ers, ICTY Prosecutor (2008–17) and ICC Deputy Prosecutor for Investigations (2003–06). 
14 For public research conducted by a former analyst assigned to the ICTY-OTP Appeals 
Section, see Uwe Ewald, “Large-Scale Victimisation and the Jurisprudence of the ICTY. 
Victimological Research Issues”, in Uwe Ewald and Ksenija Turković (eds.), Large-Scale 
Victimisation as a Potential Source of Terrorist Activities: Importance of Regaining Securi-
ty in Post-Conflict Societies, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006, pp. 171–96. 
15 Second Annual Report of the ICTY, p. 13, see above note 8. 
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novich and Dorothea Hanson to Krajišnik, Karadžić, Stanišić and 
Župljanin, Prlić et al. and Mladić.16 Examples of testimony by MAT ana-
lysts include the co-author of this volume Ewan Brown in Brđjanin, and 
Stanišić and Župljanin, Richard Philipps in Galić, and Reynaud Theunens 
in Gotovina and Šešelj.17 Contributions on analysis of demographics and 
crime patterns became public mainly through the reports and testimonies 
by Helge Brunborg and Ewa Tabeau in Blagojević and Jokić,  Krstić, 
Mladić, in Milutinović, Galić and Prlić et al.18 By 2003 one of the most 
experienced ICTY Senior Trial Attorneys assessed based in his experience 
                                                   
16 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Perišić, Trial Chamber, Decision on Admissibility of Expert Report of 
Patrick Treanor, 27 November 2008, IT-04-81-T (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d317dd/); 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Trial Chamber, Decision on Two Expert Witnesses (Nielsen 
and Riedelmayer), 31 March 2004, IT-00-39-T (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2d5562/); 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Prosecution, Prosecution’s Notice of Disclosure of Expert 
Reports by Christian Nielsen and His Curriculum Vitae, 12 March 2009, IT-95-5/18-PT 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/11h9vl/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Trial Chamber, 
Judgement, 29 May 2013, IT-04-74-T, para. 528 (‘Prlić et al. Trial Judgment’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/2daa33/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladić, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 
29 October 2012, IT-09-92-T, p. 4137 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cw1f5l/). 
17 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Trial Chamber, Decision on Prosecution’s Submission of 
Statement of Expert Witness Ewan Brown, 3 June 2003, IT-99-36-T (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8e3882/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Župljanin, Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion pursuant to Rule 94bis accepting Ewan Brown and Affirming Ewa Tabeau as Prosecu-
tion Expert Witnesses, and Written Reasons for the Oral Ruling accepting Andras 
Riedlmayer as an Expert Witness, 29 September 2010, IT-08-91-T, para. 18 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/ab4f2c/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, Trial Chamber, Decision concern-
ing the Expert Witnesses Ewa Tabeau and Richard Philipps, 3 July 2002, IT-98-29-T 
(‘Galić Trial Decision concerning the Expert Witnesses Ewa Tabeau and Richard Philipps’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3937e8/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Trial 
Chamber, Decision and Guidance with regard to the Expert Report, Addendum, and Testi-
mony of Reynaud Theunens, 17 November 2008, IT-06-90-T, para. 25 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/5d595a/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Trial Chamber, Decision on Expert Sta-
tus of Reynaud Theunens, 12 February 2008, IT-03-67-T, para. 36 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/42881c/). 
18 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 17 January 2005, IT-
02-60-T, para. 291 (‘Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/7483f2/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 2 August 2001, IT-
98-33-T, para. 82 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/440d3a/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladić, 
Trial Chamber, Decision pursuant to Rule 94bis in relation to proposed expert Helge Brun-
borg, 19 July 2013, IT-09-92-T (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d83f80/); ICTY, Prosecu-
tor v. Milutinović et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement: Volume 2 of 4, 26 February 2009, IT-
05-87-T, para. 565 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0666a/); Galić Trial Decision con-
cerning the Expert Witnesses Ewa Tabeau and Richard Philipps, see above note 17; Prlić et 
al. Trial Judgment, paras. 296–355, see above note 16. 
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that “it is the analyst, in my view, who has the most important job of as-
sisting the prosecutor in building a case against high-ranking superiors”.19 
At the ICC analysts so far have testified twice, also on the basis of 
their reports, first in relation to telephone data analysis in Bemba et al., 
and for issues of military telecommunications in Ongwen. 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’) also hired a number of 
professional analysts for its investigations, including several from ICTY-
OTP, particularly for the analysis of large volumes of telephone data. Oth-
er agencies investigating international crimes that have employed former 
ICTY analysts, include multiple UN commissions of inquiry, the ECCC, 
the IIIM for Syria, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW), The Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Commission for Interna-
tional Justice and Accountability (CIJA), and the International Crisis 
Group (ICG). 
By 2012, the International Best Practices Project acknowledged the 
role of analysts based on the experience of five international or hybrid 
tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECCC and STL): “Analysts who have spe-
cialized knowledge and expertise may be vitally important to a successful 
investigation and prosecution and their analytical output must be accessi-
ble and usable throughout the process”.20 A recommended best practice, 
essential for their role in QCCI, was that “[a]nalysts must adopt an objec-
tive approach, highlighting both information that supports and undermines 
the prosecution case”, since “an analyst should always be objective and 
should formulate his or her views and opinions on the basis of all the 
available source materials”.21 To further strengthen the role of analysts the 
International Best Practices Project mentioned the options to have a dedi-
cated analysis section to manage analysts deployed across teams, and spe-
cialized analysis units (military, political or other specialized domains), 
and having in each team along with a lead prosecutor and a lead investiga-
                                                   
19 Peter McCloskey, “Leadership and Control of Investigations”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus 
Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: 
Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, p. 209 (http://www.toaep.
org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). 
20 Robert Petit, David Akerson and Maria Warren (eds.), Prosecuting Mass Atrocities: Les-
sons from the International Tribunals: A Compendium of Lessons Learned and Suggested 
Practices from the Offices of the Prosecutors, 2012, sect. “Evidence Analysis”, p. 144. See 
also ibid., sect. “Ongoing Analysis of Collected Material”, p. 62. 
21 Ibid., p. 146. 
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tor, and at the same level, “a lead analyst in charge of the analysis of the 
material and the identification of what the prosecution does not have and 
should collect”.22 The stronger the mandate and institutional safeguards 
for the analysts, the better they will be able to contribute to QCCI. 
Among the national investigations on international crimes, the Fis-
calía General de la Nación in Colombia has been probably most advanced 
in the use of analysts, since the late 1990s, as well as with the Unidad de 
Análisis y Contextos established in 2012.23 Multiple national units for the 
investigation of international crimes in third countries have also employed 
analysts, including those in Canada and the Netherlands.24 
The ICC-OTP was given since its first budget in 2003 an Analysis 
Section in the Investigations Division. This section today, the Investiga-
tive Analysis Section (‘IAS’), comprises 21 professional analysts and 11 
junior Analysis Assistants, deployed to support multiple investigation and 
prosecution teams across 13 situations. Analysts design and sustain all-
source collation databases and they contribute regularly to the identifica-
tion of investigative leads, strategic decision-making, Source Evalua-
tion,25 analysis of crime patterns and organisational structures (including 
elements of statistics, Geographic Information Systems, military and net-
work analysis), and systematic monitoring and exploitation of internet 
open sources and social media. The Investigations Division benefits from 
the experience of other international and national investigations and con-
ducts highly competitive recruitment processes which, along with con-
tinuing training and standardisation programs, has led to a high level of 
technical skill among analysts, as assessed by feedback from the investi-
gation teams as well as external peer-review. IAS also has engaged the co-
                                                   
22 Ibid., p. 14. 
23 See their official web site “Unidad de Análisis y Contextos”, Fiscalía General de la 
Nación. 
24 For publications by Canadian analysts in this area (historians), see Norman G. Finkelstein 
and Ruth Bettina Birn, A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth, Owl 
Books, New York, 1998 (Birn was the Chief Historian in the War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity Section of the Department of Justice); and Ralf Ogorreck, Les 
Einsatzgruppen: Les groupes d’intervention et la “genèse de la solution finale”, Olivier 
Mannoni trans., Calman-Lévy, Paris, 2007 (translation of the original in German of 1996, 
Ogorreck was a historian in the same Section). 
25 See below Section 3.2. 
 
3. The Contribution of Analysis to the Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 125 
operation of UN Women, and thanks to their generous support has re-
ceived in secondment several analysts specialised on gender issues. 
3.1.1. The Cycle 
Analysts look at their work as part of an iterative cycle, anticipating the 
need to review multiple times the findings as a process of development, 
verification and QC. A merely linear model, which is how usually crimi-
nal procedure is conceived, would be too simplistic and positivistic, be-
cause investigations are creative processes in which cases morph con-
stantly until they reach a stage of evidential maturity. This cyclical ap-
proach is common among scientist, engineers or software designers, com-
bining inductive and deductive techniques, and planning ahead for multi-
ple tests and iterations.26 Sherman Kent, considered ‘the founding father 
of intelligence analysis’, proposed similarly in 1949 the adoption for intel-
ligence research of a cyclical framework borrowed from social sciences, 
for “the development of new concepts from observations and that the new 
concepts in turn indicate and lead to new observations”.27 In the words of 
Catrien Bijleveld, an expert in criminology, “[t]he empirical cycle is 
therefore not a cycle, but a spiral, with each answer generating new re-
search ideas”.28 
The essence of the investigation needs to be the implementation of 
the well-known principles of scientific methodology to the matter of the 
crimes and the relevant evidence.29 As the Italian prosecutor Gherardo 
Colombo explained based on his experience with large-scale corruption 
cases: “Investigation must be carried out in a scientific manner. […] Fact-
finding in an investigation must be carried out using the same methods as 
                                                   
26 For software engineering, see the classic work by Frederick P. Brooks Jr., The Mythical 
Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering, anniversary edition, Addison-Wesley, Bos-
ton, 1995 (originally published in 1975). 
27 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1949, pp. 156–57. 
28 Catrien Bijleveld, Conflicts and International Crimes: An Introduction to Research Meth-
ods, Eleven International Publishing, Amsterdam, 2017, sect. 2.2. “Empirical Cycle”, p. 15. 
Bijleveld is professor of Research Methods in Criminology at the Vrije Universiteit Am-
sterdam and director of the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law En-
forcement. 
29 For general reference on scientific methodology, see Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, Routledge, London, 2005 (originally in German, 1935). 
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in an experiment carried out in any sector of science”.30 In the context of 
criminal procedure, unlike other domains, the ‘spiral’ of the scientific 
cycle will not roll endlessly, it has discrete purpose and it shall stop when 
the investigation is completed. The subsequent litigation can be also un-
derstood as a new round or iteration in the cycle, only then integrating 
evidence delivered by the opposing party. 
Such cycles have gained currency in police and intelligence agen-
cies around the world.31 Agencies have adopted different versions, more 
or less elaborate depending on their needs and their organisational culture. 
The following cycle may be appropriate for the needs of investigating 










Figure 1. Cycle of investigating complex or international crimes. 
The first step is identifying the relevant hypotheses to guide the in-
vestigation, to be critically tested and verified, much like any scientific 
process. Pretending instead to start from some blank slate or tabula rasa 
would be a fallacy, because any action is always based on some 
knowledge, which is best stated and treated properly rather than letting it 
govern the investigation implicitly and free of audit. In the words of Karl 
                                                   
30 Gherardo Colombo, “Investigating and Prosecuting Large-scale Corruption: The Italian 
Experience”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2006, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 516. 
31 See Don McDowell, Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers and 
Users, Istana Enterprises, Pambula, 1998, p. 18; Europol, Analytical Guidelines, The 
Hague, 1999, insert 2; Howard Atkin, “Criminal Intelligence Analysis: A Scientific Per-
spective”, in Journal of Intelligence and Analysis, 2000, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1–15; and Mark 
Pythian (ed.), Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, Routledge, London, 2013. 
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Popper: “it is not only impossible to avoid a selective point of view, but 
also wholly undesirable to do so; for if we could do so, we should get not 
a more ‘objective’ description, but only a mere heap of entirely uncon-
nected statements”.32 Hypotheses need to be formulated impartially and 
objectively, assuming these criteria as fundamental requirements of the 
investigation from the outset.33 
The second step refers to the collection of relevant evidence, which 
shall follow in accordance to proper investigation plans.34 This is primari-
ly the duty of professional investigators, trained in the relevant techniques 
for interviewing witnesses among other means, as well as the required 
standards for operational and information security. 
Thirdly, ‘registration’ shows as a specific step because of the needs 
of ‘chain of custody’ for the evidence, as a reminder for this fundamental 
investigative duty, as also because good registration meta-data are very 
useful for investigative analysis. 
Fourthly, ‘collation’ is the step of summarising and integrating data 
from multiple sources, a necessary foundation for the actual analysis. The 
use of all-source databases is considered best practice, to integrate infor-
mation from any kind of source (statements, reports, videos, phone data, 
and so on) around factual entities (mainly persons, events, organisations 
and locations), with and Entity-Attribute-Value data model, and links be-
tween related entities. The implementation of such databases may grow 
into a major project, with specific protocols and dedicated inputters and 
database managers. 
The fifth step is the analysis as such, assigned to professional ana-
lysts for key factual issues of the investigation. The most common areas 
of analysis include the following: crime pattern analysis about the com-
mon features among large series of incidents and victims; analysis of or-
ganisational structures and networks with the systems of command and 
communications; and Source Evaluation (see Section 3.2. below). The 
relevant techniques include both quantitative and qualitative methods, as 
                                                   
32 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy: 
Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 261. 
33 For a more detailed discussion on investigative hypotheses, see below Section 3.3.2. 
“Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (‘ACH’)”. 
34 See Markus Eikel, “Investigation Plans in International Criminal Investigations: The Ex-
ample of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor”, Chap. 14 below. 
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well as Geographic Information Systems (GIS), applied both for tactical 
support in operations, and for strategic advice when selecting situations, 
cases, suspects and charges. 
The sixth and last step is ‘dissemination’, fundamental to make sure 
that the analytical findings are properly communicated and understood by 
the end-users, typically investigators, prosecutors and management for 
operational, legal and strategic decisions. Proper standards for archival 
storage, report drafting, visual aids and briefings are required for effective 
dissemination. 
The model above shows a ‘cycle within the cycle’ for Source Eval-
uation because of the importance of this aspect across investigative steps, 
as Section 3.2. below explains. References to multiple judgments are in-
cluded in relation to Source Evaluation to illustrate the expectation of the 
judges, not necessarily to endorse those findings. 
Concerning specifically the role of analysis for QCCI, Sections 3.3. 
and 3.4. below propose two sets of techniques known as ‘diagnostic’, 
focused on the descriptive evaluation of a given case or hypothesis, and 
‘adversarial’, designed to test critically hypotheses and findings. Diagnos-
tic techniques are reminiscent of scientific methodology, while adversarial 
techniques anticipate the dialectics of litigation.35 
Finally, Section 3.5. will propose Evidence Review Boards as a 
fundamental tool for QC, with the input of the analysts and their tech-
niques, in close co-operation with legal officers, investigators and investi-
gation managers. 
3.2. Source Evaluation 
One quarter of [the guilt of] an unjust [decision] falls on him 
who committed [the crime], one quarter on the [false] wit-
ness, one quarter on all the judges, one quarter on the king. 
Manusmriti, verses 8.18. 
We learn what happened by ruling out unreliable testimony; 
and we know what testimony to rule out as unreliable by 
learning what happened. 
M.C. Otto, “Testimony and human nature” (1918) 
                                                   
35 For a catalogue of analytical techniques and their classification, see Richards J. Heuer Jr. 
and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, SAGE, 
Los Angeles, 2015. 
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La pratique judiciaire devra désormais choisir entre deux at-
titudes possibles vis-à-vis des témoignages: ou bien conti-
nuer à les apprécier routinièrement, intuitu personnœ, sans 
méthode, au risque d’erreurs grossières; ou bien mettre à 
profit les nouvelles données de la science du témoignage 
s’édifiant par le labeur accumulé de tant de savants (psycho-
logues, médecins, psychiatres, juristes, etc.), pour tenter de 
soumettre les témoignages à une critique psycho-judiciaire 
méthodique et d’en tirer le maximum de vérité avec le mini-
mum d’erreur. 
François Gorphe, La critique du Témoignage (1924) 
3.2.1. The Concept 
Source Evaluation (‘SE’) is the domain of investigative analysis dedicated 
to assess the quality of the evidence, with standard criteria related to its 
providers and its content. The equivalent terms of ‘source assessment’, 
‘source criticism’ (Qellenkritike in German historiography), ‘verifica-
tion’ 36, ‘evidence about the evidence’, ‘probative efficiency’ or ‘infor-
mation quality’ are known in various technical and legal domains.37 Con-
cerning witnesses the key question is “how do you know if the witness is 
speaking the truth?”. Concerning other means of evidence (documents, 
objects, forensics, and so on) SE will address questions of documentary or 
physical authenticity and integrity. The SE criteria and methods com-
prised in this section refer mainly to witnesses, but they may be relevant 
also for any type of evidence, and their authors. 
Mistakes in the evaluation of witnesses and other sources may oc-
cur due to multiple conflict-related biases, the dramatic nature of the 
crimes and various operational limitations. Anybody growing up in a 
                                                   
36 For ‘verification’ in historiography, see Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, “Verification”, 
in The Modern Researcher, 5th edition, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1992, p. 99. 
For ‘verification’ of internet sources, see Craig Silverman (ed.), Verification Handbook: A 
Definitive Guide to Verifying Digital Content for Emergency Coverage, European Journal-
ism Centre, Maastricht, 2014 (available on Verification Handbook’s web site), including 
reference to multiple examples, techniques and tools. 
37 For ‘evidence about the evidence’, see Fernando Gascón Inchausti, El control de fiabilidad 
probatoria: “Prueba sobre la prueba” en el proceso penal, Ediciones Revista General del 
Derecho, Valencia, 1999. On ‘information quality’, see Craig Fisher, Eitel Lauria, Shobha 
Chengalur-Smith and WANG Richard, Introduction to Information Quality, AuthorHouse, 
London, 2006; and Global Privacy and Information Quality Working Group (GPIQWG), 
Information Quality: The Foundation for Justice Decision Making, US DOJ, 2010. 
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country affected by violent conflict, as I did, is used to hear regularly dif-
ferent versions of the same event from different media, friends or relatives: 
the so-called ‘Rashomon effect’ is part of your daily life.38 I further dealt 
with SE issues through my research and field work in the former Yugosla-
via (1992–95), and I became acutely aware of such problems in criminal 
investigations through my work as an analyst at the ICTY-OTP (1997–
2003). Section 3.2.2. below summarising the “most frequent biases and 
limitations” is inspired largely, but not exclusively, by my experience with 
ICTY investigations. It appeared to me that those investigations did not 
have a proper system to evaluate the quality of witness evidence, which is 
also noticeable in the lack of any reference to the subject in the ICTY 
Manual on Developed Practices.39 
I decided to develop a methodology for Source Evaluation upon 
joining the ICC-OTP investigations in 2004. This was in line with the 
vision of Morten Bergsmo and other ICTY veterans who joined the ICC 
determined to carry ‘lessons learned’ and improve previous practice. In 
any event, problems with the evaluation of the evidence are well-known 
in domestic practice, where “[t]he objectivity of the evaluation is key to 
the integrity of any investigation. Yet the most ubiquitous form of biased 
reasoning occurs through a distorted evaluation of evidence”.40 
Difficulties in SE may arise under the pressure of operational or lit-
igation deadlines. Hans Gross already observed in relation to the evalua-
tion of witnesses the ‘rapidity’ affecting the quality of the interviews, and 
advised “for the Officer to carefully prepare his interrogatory, not to be 
afraid to remind the witness at length that he must speak the truth, and to 
                                                   
38 Rashōmon is the story of four conflicting witness accounts of the same alleged crimes of 
killing and rape, as told by different witnesses to the same judge, as shown in Kurosawa’s 
famous film Rashōmon (1950), based on the story by AKUTAGAWA Ryūnosuke, In a 
grove (1922). See Wendy D. Roth and Jal D. Mehta, “The Rashomon Effect Combining 
Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches in the Analysis of Contested Events”, in Sociologi-
cal Methods and Research, 2002, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 131–73; and Robert Anderson, “The 
Rashomon Effect and Communication”, in Canadian Journal of Communication, 2016, 
vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 249–69. For context, see Peter Wild, Akira Kurosawa, Reaktion Books, 
London, 2014, particularly pp. 64–73. 
39 ICTY and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (‘UNICRI’), 
ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, UNICRI Publisher, Turin, 2009 (‘ICTY Manual on 
Developed Practices’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0cc55d/). 
40 Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process, Harvard Universi-
ty Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 38. 
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probe him to the bottom, especially if he has the slightest suspicion that 
his statement is false”.41 Rushed evaluations are unlikely to save time, 
they may instead lead to waste and mistakes in the longer run. Insufficient 
professional experience may also lead to errors in SE, which should be 
trusted as much as possible to experienced officers, and those who have 
the most advanced knowledge of the case and the context. Definition of 
standard criteria, specific training and mentoring should help to shorten 
the learning curve. 
Criteria for SE are known historically in every major culture around 
the world, including the Indian civilisation. The classic canon Manusmriti 
dictated detailed rules for the qualifications of witnesses. 42 The Nyāya 
Sūtra, the treaty on logics and epistemology, included rules for ‘verbal 
testimony’, defined as the “instructive assertion of a reliable person”.43 By 
the second century CE, the Arthashastra also referred to criteria for the 
admissibility and evaluation of witnesses, including issues of ‘honesty’, 
independence and corroboration.44 More recently in December 2018, the 
High Court of Delhi in Sajjan Kumar et al., a case related to mass vio-
lence against Sikhs in the 1980s, issued a conviction only after evaluating 
thoroughly the key witnesses and their testimonies.45 
                                                   
41 Hans Gross, Criminal Investigation: A Practical Handbook for Magistrates, Police Offic-
ers, and Lawyers: Translated and Adapted to Indian and Colonial Practice from the 
SYSTEM DER KRIMINALISTIK, John Adam and J. Collyer Adam eds. and trans., A. 
Krishnamachari, Chennai (Madras), 1906 (original in German from 1893), p. 97. 
42 See Manusmriti in Sanskrit with English Translation, verses 8.61.–8.78., 8.95. and 8.254. 
(available on Internet Archive’s web site). 
43 The Sacred Books of the Hindus: Translated by Various Sanskrit Scholars: Vol. VIII: The 
Nyaya Sutras of Gotama, B.D. Basu ed., Mahamahopadhyaya Satla Chandra Vidyabhusa-
na trans., The Panini Office, Allahabad, 1913, sutra 7, p. 4. In other versions translated as 
“testimony is instruction by a trustworthy authority”. The Nyāya Sūtra is the foundational 
canon of the Nyāya school of philosophy, focused on methodology, logics and epistemolo-
gy, written at some point between sixth century BCE and second century CE. For an anno-
tated version, see Matthew Dasti and S. Phillips, The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early 
Commentaries, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 2017. 
44 See Kautilya, The Arthashastra, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 1992, sect. “Law of 
Evidence”, pp. 356–58 and sect. “Guidelines to Judges”, pp. 358–59. It is estimated that 
Kautilya, also known as Chanakya or Vishnugupta, authored the Arthashastra treatise at 
some point between the second century BCE and third century CE. 
45 Delhi High Court, State Through CBI v. Sajjan Kumar and Others, Judgment, 17 Decem-
ber 2018, Criminal Appeal No. 1099/2013 (‘Delhi High Court Sajjan Kumar and Others 
Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b08482/). See in particular sect. “Analysis of 
the Evidence of PW-1”, paras. 178–220. 
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Methods for SE have been developed in a range of fields, from psy-
chology to intelligence, as explained in Section 3.2.3. below, and their 
multi-disciplinary consideration offers the best foundation to define ap-
propriate standards for international criminal law. This is the approach 
that I took when I drafted the SE guidelines for the ID of the ICC-OTP, 
proposing the method presented and discussed in Section 3.2.4. below. 
The Director of the ID issued these guidelines to assist the work of ana-
lysts and investigators, and this chapter benefits from the experience of 
this implementation since 2006. 
Abundant national and international jurisprudence underscores the 
importance of critical Source Evaluation. For example, in the very first 
case before the ICTY, it became apparent that a witness for the prosecu-
tion had given false testimony.46 The issue was reported in the ICTY an-
nual report of 1997 as follows: 
The Defence, having researched the witness’s family situa-
tion, found discrepancies in his testimony and confronted 
him with relatives who he had claimed in Court were dead. 
After a conversation with his family, witness L, who had tes-
tified for the Prosecution on 14 and 15 August 1996, stated 
that he had lied when testifying before the Trial Chamber 
and that he had not witnessed Duško Tadić committing any 
of the acts with which the latter was charged. The Trial 
Chamber instructed the Prosecutor to conduct an investiga-
tion into the circumstances surrounding this testimony. On 8 
May 1997, the Prosecutor informed the Judges that it did not 
consider the case of witness L – whose name was now dis-
closed as Dragan Opacić – to be an appropriate one for pros-
ecution for false testimony under rule 91.47 
This incident in Tadić, the first ICTY trial, is remarkably similar 
with the problems in Lubanga, the first ICC trial, about 15 years later, 
with some intermediaries engaged by the prosecutor: the judges also de-
cided to dismiss the evidence facilitated by these intermediaries and asked 
the prosecutor to investigate them for their falsehood, and the prosecutor 
                                                   
46 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgement, 7 May 1997, IT-
94-1-T, paras. 33, 553 and 554 (‘Tadić Trial Opinion and Judgement’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/0a90ae/). 
47 ICTY, Fourth Annual Report of the ICTY, 18 September 1997, p. 13 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/6bc14e/). 
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equally declined to prosecute them because of insufficient evidence, in 
spite of the judicial record of their wrongdoing.48 
Also in Tadić, the defence questioned “the reliability as witnesses” 
of victims on grounds of eventual subjectivity and resentment; the Judges 
dismissed this claim, indicating that “the reliability of witnesses, includ-
ing any motive they may have to give false testimony, is an estimation 
that must be made in the case of each individual witness”.49 
For the ICC Source Evaluation is required within the following le-
gal framework: 
• Article 54(1)(a) ICC Statute – the Prosecutor has the duty to inves-
tigate with impartiality “in order to establish the truth”, “consider-
ing equally incriminating and exonerating circumstances”, which 
requires necessarily objective evaluation of the merits and limita-
tions of the different means of evidence. 
• Article 74(2) ICC Statute – “[t]he Trial Chamber’s decision shall be 
based on its evaluation of the evidence and the entire proceedings”. 
In the context of a trial judgment issued at the end of the trial, the 
ICC judges have indicated that this provision implies the need for 
evaluating the credibility and reliability of the evidence. 
• Rule 140(2)(b) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’) 
– “[t]he prosecution and the defence have the right to question that 
witness about relevant matters related to the witness’s testimony 
and its reliability, the credibility of the witness and other relevant 
matters”. 
• OTP Regulation 24: 
In the analysis of information and evidence regarding alleged 
crimes, the Office shall develop and apply a consistent and 
objective method for the evaluation of sources, information 
and evidence. In this context, the Office shall take into ac-
count inter alia the credibility and reliability of sources, in-
formation and evidence, and shall examine information and 
evidence from multiple sources as a means of bias control. 
                                                   
48 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial 
Chamber, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, para. 291 (‘Lubanga Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
677866/). 
49 Tadić Trial Opinion and Judgement, para. 541, see above note 46. 
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3.2.1.1. Note on Terminology: ‘Credibility’ and ‘Reliability’ 
As explained below, to follow a dual approach distinguishing between 
provider and content is a commonly accepted approach in jurisprudence 
and investigations, but the terminology for those two parameters has not 
always been used consistently. In ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence the 
meaning attributed to the terms ‘reliability’ and ‘credibility’ varied across 
cases. For example, the Trial Chamber in Kunarac held that “credibility 
depends upon whether the witness should be believed. Reliability assumes 
that the witness is speaking the truth, but depends upon whether the evi-
dence, if accepted, proves the fact to which it is directed”.50 The Appeals 
Chamber (AC) in Aleksovski adopted the opposite view. It held that it is 
for the Trial Chamber “to consider whether a witness is reliable and 
whether evidence presented is credible”.51 The same definition was uti-
lized by the Appeals Chamber in Delalić et al.52 In other cases, including 
Tadić, the ICTY judges used ‘reliability’ and ‘credibility’ interchangeably 
or referring both to the witnesses and to their evidence.53 
The ICTR Chambers used ‘credibility’ for witness and ‘reliability’ 
for testimony in some but not all cases. For example, the Trial Chamber in 
Rwamakuba stated that “[w]hen a witness is found to be credible, a 
Chamber must also determine whether his or her evidence is reliable”.54 
The Appeals Chamber in Ntagerura, and the Trial Chambers in Kay-
ishema et al. and Ndindabahizi used the same terminology.55 However, in 
                                                   
50 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, 3 
July 2000, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, para. 7 (‘Kunarac et al. Trial Decision on Motion 
for Acquittal’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/70edc1/). 
51 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 24 March 2000, IT-95-14/1-
A, para. 63 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/176f05/). 
52 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 20 February 2001, IT-96-
21-A, para. 491 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/051554/). 
53 Tadić Trial Opinion and Judgement, paras. 232, 253, 255, 259, 268, 275, 536, and so on, 
see above note 46. 
54 ICTR, Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 20 September 2006, 
ICTR-98-44C-T, para. 35 (‘Rwamakuba Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/b6ffa6/). 
55 ICTR, Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki, and Samuel Imanishimwe, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 7 July 2006, ICTR-99-46-A, para. 174 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/816b44/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement, 
21 May 1999, ICTR-95-1-T, para. 397 (‘Kayishema et al. Trial Judgment’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/0811c9/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Trial Chamber, Judge-
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Bagilishema the Appeals Chamber changed the meaning of the terms, to 
determine whether “the witness was reliable and his evidence credible”56. 
In Akayesu the Trial Chamber used the term ‘credibility’ both for witness 
and for testimony.57 The Appeals Chamber in the same case referred to 
“the credibility and reliability of the relevant witness, the same usage as 
the Trial Chamber did in Semanza”.58 
ICC RPE Rule 140(2)(b) establishes the use of ‘credibility’ for wit-
ness and ‘reliability’ for testimonies, while the drafting history of this rule 
does not provide any precise definition or factor for these two parameters. 
The ICC judges have followed subsequently this terminology to a large 
extent. In Lubanga trial judgment and in Ngudjolo trial judgment, the 
judges used both terms interchangeably, or jointly for witnesses. By 2014 
the Appeals Chamber operated in line with Rule 140(2)(b): 
Thus, although a witness may be honest, and therefore credi-
ble, the evidence he or she gives may nonetheless be unreli-
able because, inter alia, it relates to facts that occurred a 
long time ago or due to the “vagaries of human percep-
tion”.59 
Most recently, Ntaganda follows this guidance and confirms: 
Credibility relates to whether a witness is testifying truthfully, 
while the reliability of the facts testified to by the witness 
may be confirmed or put in doubt by other evidence or the 
surrounding circumstances. Therefore, although a witness 
                                                                                                                        
ment and Sentence, 15 July 2004, ICTR-01-71-T, para. 23 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/272b55/). 
56 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (Reasons), 3 July 2002, 
ICTR-95-1A-A, para. 78 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e4786a/). 
57 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 2 September 1998, 
ICTR-96-4-T, para. 47 (‘Akayesu Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
b8d7bd/). 
58 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001, ICTR-
96-4-A, para. 292 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c62d06/); and ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Laurent Semanza, Trial Chamber, Judgement and Sentence, 15 May 2003, ICTR-97-20-T, 
paras. 119, and so on (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7e668a/). 
59 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against His Conviction, 
1 December 2014, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, para. 239 (‘Lubanga Appeals Judgment’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/585c75/). 
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may be credible, the evidence he or she gives may nonethe-
less be unreliable.60 
This convention seems contrary to the practice of most national 
models for SE, when ‘reliability’ is used most often for the source, and 
‘credibility’ for the evidence.61 It may be also contrary to common seman-
tics, since ‘reliability’ (fiabilité, fiabilidad, Glaubwürdigkeit) is usually 
understood in relation to ‘trustworthiness’ for a method, a tool or a person 
and the expected or actual behavior over time, while ‘credibility’ (credi-
bilité, credibilidad, Glaubhaftigkeit) is most commonly used to refer to a 
single item of information or allegation at a given point of time.62 In any 
event, the usage of these two terms might be of lesser importance as long 
as the specific underlying indicators are properly addressed.63 
3.2.2. Most Frequent Biases and Limitations 
For the purpose of Source Evaluation ‘bias’ is commonly understood as a 
systematic conditioning of the information, because of the sources’ back-
ground, purpose, or methodology. Biases can be deliberate and conscious 
or not.64 For example, deliberate biases are common in propaganda, while 
unconscious biases may show in rumours resulting from fear, anxiety or 
                                                   
60 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 8 July 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, para. 53 (‘Ntaganda Trial 
Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/80578a/). 
61 See, for example, judgment on the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2003, when 
referring to the “fiabilidad de la fuente” and “contraste de la informacion” as the two main 
parameters for source evaluation used by the Spanish Guardia Civil. Spain National High 
Court (Audiencia Nacional), Criminal Chamber (Sala de lo Penal), Sección Segunda, The 
Prosecutor v. Jamal Zougam et al., Sentencia no. 65/2007, 31 October 2007, 
ECLI:ES:AN:2007:4398, p. 332 (‘Spain National High Court Zougam Sentencia’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/b6mvfl/). 
62 For common usage, see definition in the dictionaries by Oxford, Cambridge, Merriam-
Webster, Larousse (French), Real Academia Española (Spanish), and so on. All of them re-
fer to ‘reliability’ and the equivalent terms as related to the ability of the source, rather than 
a description of the outcome. For example, the Trésor de la Langue Française informatisé 
defines ‘fiabilité’ as “qualité d’un appareil, d’un équipement fiable” and ‘crédibilité’ as 
“caractère, qualité rendant quelque chose susceptible d’être cru ou digne de confiance”. 
63 See below Sections 3.2.4. and 3.2.5. 
64 For a viewpoint from cognitive psychology, see among others Rüdiger F. Pohl (ed.), Cog-
nitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, 
Psychology Press, New York, 2004. For an authoritative reference from social science re-
search, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Appendix A: Data Sources”, in The Logic of Violence in 
Civil War, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 393–411; and sect. “Bias”, pp. 405–07. 
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different assumptions. A biased source is not necessarily lying, in a con-
scious deliberate sense, the source may be just conveying what seems 
truthful from its viewpoint.65 
The investigation should operate on the assumption that there are no 
‘bias-free sources’, they all carry biases of one type or another. Instead the 
purpose of Source Evaluation is to identify the relevant biases, and to 
control them through systematic analysis and triangulation with other 
sources.66 
The following pages outline the most frequent biases and difficul-
ties related to SE in order to raise awareness and readiness among profes-
sionals. The issues highlighted below are not theoretical, they follow from 
real investigative experience, while some historical or domestic examples 
are used as proxies for more current realities in international investiga-
tions. Different biases67 may affect both the sources and the evaluating 
officers, hence the corresponding paragraphs on ‘advice’ propose 
measures at different substantive and operational levels. For example, 
cultural biases are likely to show both in witnesses, as well as among in-
vestigators, analysts and judges evaluating their statements. Evaluating 
officers should be wary of their own personal and institutional biases, as 
well as those of those from the source. 
Sections 3.2.2.4. and 3.2.2.5. refer to some operational difficulties 
related to the perception by the investigating officers, which would re-
quire from them specific awareness, training and careful implementation 
of the proposed Source Evaluation model. 
3.2.2.1. Partisan Biases 
Biases related to the parties in the conflict are frequent, because of parti-
san links, kinship or shared ideology. They may take different degrees, 
from the most obvious forms of propaganda, to more subtle forms of un-
der-rep orting or emphasizing different crimes. The information may con-
tain exaggerations or inflammatory language and images constituting 
                                                   
65 For some recent research on actual lies, as well as data biases, in the context of internet, 
see Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Everybody Lies: What the Internet Can Tell Us About Who 
We Really Are, Bloomsbury, London, 2017. The author is a former data scientist at Google 
and an expert on ‘big data’. 
66 Paulette M. Rothbauer, “Triangulation”, in Lisa M. Given (ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia 
of Qualitative Research Methods, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, 2008, pp. 892–94. 
67 Below Sections 3.2.2.1. to 3.2.2.3. 
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‘atrocity propaganda’.68 Information conveyed by a partisan or sensation-
alist source may still be truthful to some extent, once the exaggerated or 
dramatic elements are identified and neutralized. Consider the following 
examples: 
• Nazi reports on war crimes: Nazi sources were keen on reporting 
thoroughly about German victims, while ignoring the victims of 
their own crimes. For example, in 1940 the German Foreign Office 
published an elaborate volume in English on “the Polish atrocities 
against the German minority in Poland”, “based on documentary 
evidence” from the Military Commission “for the investigation of 
breaches of International Law”, and including detailed information 
and pictures of a number of alleged civilian victims.69 It may be that 
some of that evidence was truthful, but the notorious suppression 
from the record of the Nazi invasion of Poland and their subsequent 
crimes would call for some additional verification. The Nazi regime 
had already started using such selective reporting of war crimes by 
1937 in relation to the Spanish Civil War, emphasizing crimes 
committed by government forces while ignoring those committed 
by the fascist uprising and the Luftwaffe.70 
• Rigoberta Menchú Tum: In 1983 the authors of a widely distributed 
documentary about the genocide committed by the Guatemalan 
Army featured the Maya K’iche’ indigenous activist Rigoberta 
Menchú Tum stating: “I am going to tell you my story, which is the 
                                                   
68 For a classic study on the subject, see Arthur Ponsoby, Falsehood in Wart-Time: Contain-
ing an Assortment of Lies Circulated Throughout the Nations During the Great War, 
George Allen and Unwin, London, 1928. See also Paul Morrow, “A Theory of Atrocity 
Propaganda”, in Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, 
and Development, 2018, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 45–62, and the article by Jo Fox, “Atrocity prop-
aganda”, British Library, 29 January 2014 (available on its web site). 
69 Hans Schadewaldt (ed.), The Polish Atrocities Against the German Minority in Poland: 
Edited and Published by Order of the German Foreign Office and Based upon Documen-
tary Evidence: Second Revised Edition, Volk und Reich Verlag, Berlin, 1940. For method-
ology, see ibid., chap. II “Sources of information and explanations”. 
70 See Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “Goebbels en el pais de San Ignacio: Reflexiones sobre Es-
pana, fascismo y propaganda”, Joseph Paul Goebbels, in Xabier Agirre Aranburu (ed.), La 
verdad sobre España [The Truth About Spain], Iralka, Irun, 1998. “The Truth About 
Spain” is a speech delivered by Joseph Paul Goebbels in the annual congress of the Nazi 
Party in Nuremberg on 9 September 1937, originally published by M. Muller & Sohn in 
Berlin, 1937. 
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story of all the Guatemalan people”.71 In 1984 Menchú Tum be-
came widely known after the publication of her biography, which 
included an array of episodes of marginalization and violence.72 In 
1992, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded her the Peace No-
bel Prize. Subsequent research revealed by 1994 that in her biog-
raphy Menchú Tum had fabricated or appropriated a number of 
facts to craft a narrative supportive of the guerrillas, of which she 
had been an associate.73 She responded explaining that she acted as 
a collective spokeswoman, and whether her individual account was 
accurate is not important as long as it is valid to tell the experience 
of her community. Anthropologists and others have debated exten-
sively about the ethics, the politics and the credibility of her account. 
The prevailing view is that her narrative makes useful advocacy, but 
poor evidence.74 
                                                   
71 Peter Kinoy (Prod.), Pamela Yates and Thomas Newton Sigel (Dirs.), “When the Moun-
tains Tremble” [motion picture], 1983, United States, Skylight Pictures. The documentary 
was designed to expose the crimes committed by the Guatemalan Army, while in one in-
stance it attributed mistakenly to it a massacre committed by the guerrillas, as the Com-
mission for Historical Clarification (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico) estab-
lished in 1999, and the authors were compelled to acknowledge in 2014; see their state-
ment: Pamela Yates, “Preliminary investigation results by Pamela Yates and Skylight Pic-
tures”, Skylight Pictures, 6 July 2014 (available on its web site). For context, see the report 
of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio: Conclu-
siones y Recomendaciones, United Nations Office for Project Services, 1999 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c0c4af/); and the judgement and conviction of José Efraín Ríos Montt 
and José Mauricio Rodríguez Sánchez by the Guatemalan Tribunal Primero de Sentencia 
Penal, 10 May 2013, C-1076-2011-00015, finding the accused guilty of genocide and 
crimes against humanity (‘Ríos Montt and Rodríguez Sánchez Tribunal Primero de Sen-
tencia Penal Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/riztst/). 
72 Elisabeth Burgos, Me llamo Rigoberta Menchu y asi me nacio la conciencia, Casa de las 
Americas, Havana, 1984. For context, see Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999, 
see above note 71; and Ríos Montt and Rodríguez Sánchez Tribunal Primero de Sentencia 
Penal Judgment, see above note 71. 
73 See David Stoll, Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans: Expanded 
Edition, Routledge, New York, 2008. Including a foreword by Elisabeth Burgos in which 
she explains how she and other activists linked to the guerrillas chose Menchú Tum as she 
“would make and ideal witness” for their advocacy campaign. 
74 For an overview of the controversy, see Mario Roberto Morales (ed.), Stoll-Menchú: la 
invención de la memoria, Consucultura, Guatemala, 2001, including chapters by David 
Stoll, Elisabeth Burgos, Jennifer Schirmer and others. For a view supportive of Menchú, 
see Leigh Gilmore, “Jurisdictions and Testimonial Networks: Rigoberta Menchú”, in 
Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say About Their Lives, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2017, pp. 59–84. 
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• UN Security Council (‘UNSC’): On 11 March 2004 a bomb attack 
killed 191 people in Madrid. The Spanish government immediately 
attributed the attack to the Basque terrorist group ETA, led appar-
ently by two considerations. Firstly, because indeed ETA and no 
other group had carried out a number of murderous bomb attacks in 
Madrid in previous years. 75  Secondly, because of partisan bias, 
since this hypothesis was more convenient for the government than 
the alternative of blaming the attack on Jihadi militants, in the given 
political context and three days before the general elections.76 The 
position of the Spanish government led the UNSC to adopt unani-
mously Resolution 1530 (2004) stating erroneously that it 
“[c]ondemns in the strongest terms the bomb attacks in Madrid, 
Spain, perpetrated by the terrorist group ETA”.77 Police investiga-
tions indicated soon that the authors were associated to Al Qaeda, 
which was confirmed by the judgment and conviction issued by the 
Audiencia Nacional in Madrid in 2007.78 The UNSC resolution and 
public statement containing this factual mistake is still today availa-
ble in their official site (as of October 2020). 
A source should not be discarded just because of an alleged or real 
association to a party in the conflict, as different judges have indicated. In 
1997, the ICTY judges indicated in their very first judgment: 
                                                   
75 Among several other bomb attacks in Madrid, on 29 July 1979, ETA exploded a bomb in 
the Atocha train station, the same station attacked by the Jihadi group on 11 March 2004, 
killing three persons. For an account based on police and judicial investigative records, see 
Juanfer F. Calderín, Agujeros del Sistema: Más de 300 asesinatos de ETA sin resolver, 
Ikusager Ediciones, Vitoria, 2014, pp. 79–91. 
76 For context, see the conclusions of the Commission of Investigation of the Spanish Cortes 
Generales (Comisión de Investigación sobre el 11 de marzo de 2004), 22 June 2005, ses-
sion no. 50 (available on Cortes Generales’ web site). Also, Fernando Reinares, Al Qaeda’s 
Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 
D.C., 2016. See Bruce Riedel, “Foreword”, in ibid., p. xiii for UNSC Resolution 1530 
(2004). 
77 UNSC, “Security Council Condemns Madrid Terrorist Bombings, Urges All States to Join 
Search for Perpetrators”, 11 March 2004, SC/8022 (available on UN Meetings Coverage 
and Press Releases’ web site). 
78 Spain National High Court Zougam Sentencia, see above note 61. The alternative hypothe-
sis of commission by ETA was raised by the defence, and dismissed by the judges after 
considering multiple means of evidence, including testimony of senior police officers (see 
ibid., p. 346, and so on). For an explanation by the presiding judge, see Javier Gómez 
Bermúdez, No destruirán nuestra libertad, Planeta, Madrid, 2010. 
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It is neither appropriate, nor correct, to conclude that a wit-
ness is deemed to be inherently unreliable solely because he 
was the victim of a crime committed by a person of the same 
creed, ethnic group, armed force or any other characteristic 
of the accused. That is not to say that ethnic hatred, even 
without the exacerbating influences of violent conflict be-
tween ethnic groups, can never be a ground for doubting the 
reliability of any particular witness. Such a conclusion can 
only be made, however, in the light of the circumstances of 
each individual witness, his individual testimony, and such 
concerns as the Defence may substantiate either in cross-
examination or through its own evidence-in-chief.79 
In 2019, an ICC judge found in similar terms: 
[…] the fact that victims and witnesses were ethnically or 
politically related to Mr Ouattara is not per se sufficient to 
raise doubts concerning their credibility. It would thus be un-
reasonable to exclude their testimony solely on that basis.80 
3.2.2.2. Cultural Biases 
Culture is likely to affect both the production of information by the wit-
ness, and its interpretation by the investigating and judicial officers. Diffi-
culties of cross-cultural understanding are common in international inves-
tigations, when investigating officers are foreign to the relevant communi-
ties.81 Research in the fields of anthropology, linguistics, ‘cross-cultural 
communication’, and international management should help for the evi-
dence not going ‘lost in translation’, as the pages below shall illustrate.82 
                                                   
79 Tadić Trial Opinion and Judgement, p. 186, para. 541, see above note 46. 
80 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of Dissenting Opinion by 
Judge Herrera Carbuccia, 16 July 2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263-AnxC-Red, para. 33 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6ak9rf/). 
81 For a compilation of relevant cases studies, see Richard A. Wilson (ed.), Human Rights, 
Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives, Pluto Press, London, 1997. 
82 For the view from management studies, see among others David C. Thomas, Cross-
Cultural Management: Essential Concepts, 2nd edition, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, 
2008; and Erin Meyer, The Culture Map: Decoding How People Think, Lead, and Get 
Things Done Across Cultures, Public Affairs, New York, 2014. For a view from law and 
linguistics, see “The Discourses of Law in Cross-Cultural Perspective”, in John M. Conley, 
William M. O’Barr and Robin Conley Riner, Just Words: Law, Language and Power, 3rd 
edition, Chicago University Press, 2019, pp. 101–20. Among the many references in an-
thropological studies that are highly relevant for international investigations, note Nigel 
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Insufficient contextual knowledge is very likely to lead to investiga-
tive mistakes. For example, Justice Jackson, the Chief US Prosecutor in 
Nuremberg, when interrogating Joachim Ribbentrop, the former Nazi 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, accused him of denying passports to Jews 
who wanted to flee Germany, and refused angrily to believe Ribbentrop’s 
denial on this point: Jackson’s interpreter, a native German, had to tell 
him discreetly that Ribbentrop was being truthful since in Germany, un-
like in the US, passports are issued by the police and not by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and Ribbentrop may have committed many crimes but 
not that particular one.83 
Officers dealing with asylum applications face similar problems, as 
explained in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(‘UNHCR’) and EU guidelines for their ‘credibility assessments’: 
Multi-lingual and cross-cultural communication in the asy-
lum procedure increases scope for misunderstandings and er-
rors. Though interpreters may help to overcome the linguistic 
barriers, decision makers’ lack of familiarity with the cultural 
backgrounds of applicants as well as the social mores and 
gender norms of their societies of origin, and the linguistic 
barriers may remain a challenge.84 
Among many other cultural dimensions, cross-cultural communica-
tion may be affected by the different perceptions of individuality and hier-
archy. World-wide variations about these two dimensions are known at 
                                                                                                                        
Barley, The Innocent Anthropologist: Notes from a Mud Hut, London, Penguin, 1983. For 
some pioneering anthropological work by African researchers, see Jomo Kenyatta, Facing 
Mount Kenya, Heinemann Educational Books, Nairobi, 1982 (first published in 1938). 
Kenyatta’s book describes the culture of his own community, the Kenyan Kikuyu, and has 
an introduction by Branislaw Malinowski, who had mentored him in the London School of 
Economics. Jomo Kenyatta was the first President of independent Kenya, and the ICC 
Prosecutor indicted his son Uhuru in 2011 and withdrew the charges in 2014, see “Kenyat-
ta Case”, ICC (available on its web site). See also Susan Thomson, An Ansoms and Jude 
Murison (eds.), Emotional and Ethical Challenges for Field Research in Africa: The Story 
Behind the Findings, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013. 
83 See the memoirs by Richard W. Sonnefeldt, Witness to Nuremberg: The Chief American 
Interpreter at the War Crimes Trials, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2002, p. 24. 
84 UNHCR, Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems, Brussels, May 
2013, p. 30 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/i4racg/). This report is based on extensive re-
search, including practice in different national systems, relevant asylum jurisprudence, ac-
ademic research, as well as ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence on the assessment of witness 
testimony. 
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least since Geert Hofstede published his influential book Cultures and 
Organisations.85 Hofstede’s data show a certain correlation between these 
two dimensions, that is, the more hierarchical cultures tend to be also 
more collectivistic, as the scatter plot below from his book illustrates, 
with his data for hierarchy (defined as ‘power distance’) and ‘individual-
ism’(Figure 2 below).86 
Furthermore, according to these data the countries that have suf-
fered mass violence in recent decades appear to belong in the cluster with 
high values for both hierarchy and collectivism (upper right quarter in the 
scatter plot below).87 People from such victimized countries are likely to 
offer relatively hierarchical and collectivistic narratives. Conversely, per-
sons from the minority of countries at the other end of the spectrum (low-
er left quarter), some of which are often over-represented in international 
institutions, are likely to be biased towards high individualism and low-
hierarchy, which could impair their understanding of the rest of the world. 
‘WEIRD people’ is how some researchers call the people from “Western 
Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic” societies, who are “a truly 
                                                   
85 Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind: 
Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival, 2nd edition, McGraw Hill, New 
York, 2005 (1st edition published in 1991). For a discussion on Hofstede’s research and 
comparison with other global surveys, see: Thomas, 2008, chap. 3 “Comparing Cultures: 
Systematically Describing Cultural Differences”, pp. 47–69, see above note 82; Peter B. 
Smith, Ronald Fischer, Vivian L. Vignoles and Michael H. Bond, Understanding Social 
Psychology Across Cultures: Engaging with Others in a Changing World, SAGE, Los An-
geles, 2013, chap. 2, sect. “The Hofstede Project”, pp. 26–31; and Daphna Oyserman, 
Heather M. Coon and Markus Kemmelmeier, “Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: 
Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses”, in Psychological Bulletin, 
2002, vol. 128, no. 1, pp. 3–72. Hofstede’s model is part of the induction program for ICC 
staff delivered by the Registry as they join the institution, to raise their multi-cultural 
awareness. For Hofstede on gender, see Geert Hofsted et al., Masculinity and Femininity: 
The Taboo Dimension of National Cultures, SAGE, London, 1998. For the latest research 
in the field, see the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. For a review of research trends 
and limitations in this field, see Jüri Allik, Koorosh Massoudi, Anu Realo and Jérôme Ros-
sier, “Personality and Culture: Cross-Cultural Psychology at the Next Crossroads”, in 
Swiss Journal of Psychology, 2012, vol. 71, no. 1, p. 5–12. 
86 Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, p. 83, see above note 85. The level of aggregation is one of 
the main limitations of this research: variations between persons and regions within the 
same State are under-represented, while data from Africa and Arab countries are aggregat-
ed at an even larger level (“Arab ctrs”, “W Africa” and “E Africa”). 
87 On the implications of different perceptions of hierarchy around the world, see Meyer, 
2014, chap. 4 “How Much Respect Do You Want? Leadership, Hierarchy, and Power”, pp. 
115–42, partly based on Hofstede’s research, see above note 82. 
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unusual group” within the overall world population, hence their perspec-
tive may not be suitable to understand many societies around the world.88 
 
Figure 2. Correlation between power distance and individualism. 
                                                   
88 Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People in the 
World?”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010, vol. 33, nos. 2–3, p. 61. In the view of 
these authors, “[t]he findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young 
children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing 
about humans”. 
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Remembering is a form of thinking, and people that think collec-
tively are likely to remember the same way.89 This is a very common cul-
tural choice around the world, but it may conflict with the production of 
individualized knowledge expected by criminal procedure, particularly in 
Western criminal law. As mentioned above, this issue surfaced with the 
biography of Rigoberta Menchú Tum and the ensuing controversy, while 
she justified certain inaccuracies in her account because she intended to 
speak collectively. The ICTR addressed similar issues in its first judgment, 
Akayesu, under a brief section on “cultural factors affecting the evidence 
of witnesses”. The judges observed, based on expert testimony, “that most 
Rwandans live in an oral tradition in which facts are reported as they are 
perceived by the witness, often irrespective of whether the facts were per-
sonally witnessed or recounted by someone else”. Still the chamber found 
that Rwandan witnesses were capable of differentiating direct from indi-
rect knowledge in the courtroom context, and they made a “consistent 
effort to ensure that this distinction was drawn throughout the trial pro-
ceedings”.90 In ICTR Musema, the judges echoed and cited Akayesu and 
noted: 
While there appears, as the Defence argued, to be in Rwan-
dan culture a “tradition that the perceived knowledge of one 
becomes the knowledge of all”, the Chamber notes that, as in 
other cultures, Rwandan individuals are clearly able to dis-
tinguish between what they have heard and what they have 
seen.91 
The concerns with cross-cultural understanding in international pro-
cedures are legitimate, but some authors appear to emphasize differences 
in ways that are not loyal to the judicial record, nor consistent with the 
ability to truly communicate across cultures. Nancy A. Combs in particu-
lar misquotes the above lines from Musema in her book when discussing 
‘cultural divergences’. She attributes to the Trial Chamber the sentence 
“tradition that the perceived knowledge of one becomes the knowledge of 
                                                   
89 See Joël Candau, Anthropologie de la mémoire, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 
1996, particularly chap. V “Mémoires et amnésie(s) collectives”; and David Middleton and 
Derek Edwards (eds.), Collective Remembering, SAGE Publications, London, 1990. 
90 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 155, see above note 57. 
91 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Trial Chamber, Judgement and Sentence, 27 January 
2000, ICTR-96-13-T, para. 103 (‘Musema Trial Judgment and Sentence’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/1fc6ed/). 
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all”, while that was not the finding of the judges, it was only the allega-
tion of the defence that the judges actually dismissed, as quoted above 
from the judgment.92 This author also fails to mention the solution that the 
judges adopted on this issue, which shows in the last sentence of the para-
graph above; that Rwandans “are clearly able” to overcome that tradition 
and to distinguish between direct and indirect knowledge in the context of 
the proceedings. 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor (‘SPSC’) en-
countered similar difficulties, with some witnesses failing to differentiate 
individual from collective knowledge in their testimonies. It appears that 
most SPSC judgments “largely ignore or only deal cursorily with matters 
impacting credibility”, while a more detail evaluation can be found in 
Florencio Tacaqui, including indications of “the court’s frustration at try-
ing to sort out what witnesses actually saw and what they later decided 
had occurred”.93 In that case a key point was eyewitness identification of 
the alleged perpetrator, reported by a number of witnesses only after the 
suspect was arrested, which in the given context the judges attributed to 
“the power of collective suggestion”.94 David Cohen has explained this 
phenomenon as follows: 
this is a problem of traditional societies, especially in over-
whelmingly oral cultures like that of East Timor, where liter-
acy was low and Tetun, the most widely spoken indigenous 
language, was at the time for the most part not a written lan-
guage.95 
This observation could be seen as consistent with Hofstede’s data, 
while Indonesia features among the highest values for authority and col-
lectivism in his scheme.96 Nevertheless situations of ‘collective sugges-
                                                   
92 Nancy A. Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 94. 
93 See David Cohen, “The Passage of Time, the Vagaries of Memory, and Reaching Judgment 
in Mass Atrocity Cases”, in Morten Bergsmo and CHEAH Wui Ling (eds.), Old Evidence 
and Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Beijing, 2012, p. 18 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/16-bergsmo-cheah). Note within Cohen’s chapter, Section 
2.2. “Collective Memory and ‘Cultural Factors’”, pp. 13–22. 
94 Timor-Leste District Court of Dili, Prosecutor v. Florencio Tacaqui, Special Panel for the 
Trial of Serious Crimes, Judgement, 9 December 2004, Case No. 20/2000, p. 43 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/864bbe/). 
95 Cohen, 2012, p. 17, see above note 93. 
96 See Figure 2 above. 
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tion’ or contamination are known in any society, not only in ‘traditional’ 
ones, as for example, the research by Wagenaar and others shows in The 
Netherlands.97 Researchers should resist the temptation to exoticize be-
haviour that they find problematic. 
Another relevant cultural dimension is how explicitly people com-
municate or not. In the so-called ‘low-context cultures’ explicit and direct 
communication is the norm, which requires limited knowledge of the con-
text. In the ‘high-context cultures’, to the contrary, people avoid explicit 
communication and tend to use indirect or metaphorical expressions that 
are only understandable with proper contextual knowledge. 98  Western 
cultures are typically regarded as ‘low-context cultures’, while high-
context is common in the rest of the world. High-context communication 
style tends to correlate with collectivistic and hierarchical values, which 
in turn coincides with countries suffering mass violence. Furthermore, 
particularly sensitive issues may lead to high-context or euphemistic ex-
pressions in any culture, out of a sense of embarrassment, fear, or respect 
for other persons or superiors. 
ICTR judges dealt with this issue, among others, in Musema, when 
they decided not to draw “any adverse conclusions regarding the credibil-
ity of witnesses when cultural constraints appeared to induce them to an-
swer indirectly certain questions regarded as delicate”.99 This is a valid 
position, in order to avoid cultural biases in the procedure, but contextual 
communication tends to understate the information, and it requires recon-
structing the original context to be able to retrieve the message, which 
may be a sensitive and laborious exercise. ‘High-context’ communication 
is an opera aperta, as Umberto Eco would say for semiotics, a creative 
piece open to many interpretations.100 
Some recent research may help for greater understanding of the 
rapport between local culture and international evidence. Tim Kelsall has 
discussed extensively cultural issues affecting litigation at the SCSL, in-
                                                   
97 See Willem Albert Wagenaar and Hans Crombag, The Popular Policeman and Other 
Cases: Psychological Perspectives on Legal Evidence, Amsterdam University Press, 2005, 
chap. 10, sect. “Collaborative storytelling”, pp. 166–68. 
98 See Meyer, 2014, chap. 1 “Listening to the Air: Communicating Across Cultures”, pp. 29–
60, see above note 82. 
99 Musema Trial Judgment and Sentence, para. 103, see above note 91. 
100 See Umberto Eco, Opera aperta: Forma e indeterminazione nelle poetiche contempora- 
nee, Bompiani, Milano, 1962. 
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cluding command structures, magic beliefs and credibility challenges.101 
Mark Osiel has discussed some cultural factors in relation to what he calls 
“Non-western military organisation”. 102  Julien Seroussi, based on his 
unique ‘participant observation’ while working for the ICC Trial Chamber 
in Katanga and Ngudjolo, believes that ‘international lawyers’ suffer from 
‘structural ignorance’ when dealing with evidence from cultures foreign to 
them. 103  Leigh Swigart has identified a number of sensitive cultural-
linguistic issues after interviewing multiple ICC staff members and de-
fence teams.104 Perhaps languages with limited phonetic and verbal sys-
tems are ill-suited to convey the meaning of expressions in languages with 
richer repertoires. For example, English has an ‘ergativity problem’ in its 
inability to translate languages with ergative forms marking nouns and 
pronouns for transitive verbs, such as Georgian, Hindi and Basque.105 
On the other hand, while the above-mentioned authors and others 
seem interested on finding differences between cultures, common ele-
ments maybe equally real and relevant. For example, to assume that con-
ventional military hierarchies are characteristic of the global West would 
be misleading, actually a sign of lacking world-wide knowledge, since 
such systems are known in every major civilisation, at least since the 
times of the Arthashastra some twenty centuries ago.106 Joseph Campbell 
has identified universal values and archetypes in his research since the 
1950s.107 Attitudes towards truth also show both universal features and 
                                                   
101 Tim Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Presss, 2009. 
102 Mark Osiel, “Ascribing Individual Liability Within a Bureaucracy of Murder”, in Alette 
Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdiscipli-
nary Approach, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010, pp. 105–30. 
103 Julien Seroussi, “How Do International Lawyers Handle Facts? The Role of Folk Socio-
logical Theories at the International Criminal Court”, in British Journal of Sociology, 2018, 
vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 962–83. See also Franck Leibovici and Julien Seroussi, Bogoro, Ques-
tions théoriques, Paris, 2016. 
104 Leigh Swigart, “Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Culture at the International Criminal 
Court”, in Intersections of Law and Culture at the International Criminal Court, forthcom-
ing (available on ResearchGate’s web site). 
105 Conley, O’Barr and Conley Riner, 2019, chap. 6, sect. “Ergativity”, pp. 115–16, see above 
note 82. 
106 See Kautilya, 1992, sect. “Military Organisation”, pp. 640–62, including regulations for 
“Organisational Structure”, duties of commanders, and so on, see above note 44. 
107 See his classic work, Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 3rd edition, New 
World Library, Novato, 2008. 
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cross-cultural variations.108 A large body of research in psychology and 
anthropology has identified both commonalities and differences across 
cultures in relation to multiple individual and social aspects.109 
A certain emphasis on cultural differences leads some commenta-
tors to raise doubts referring typically to Western officers and non-
Western witnesses. Nancy A. Combs elaborated on issues of ‘cultural di-
vergences’ in relation to witnesses from Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Timor-
Leste, assuming that they would have “very different worldviews than the 
Western court personnel who hear their testimony. Those differences cre-
ate numerous barriers to understanding and assessing witness testimo-
ny”.110 The fact is that ICTR, SCSL and the Special Panels for Timor-
Leste had judges and personnel from all regions of the world, not just 
‘Western personnel’. Combs insists based in the precedent of Akayesu that 
Trial Chambers hear experts on the local cultures “so that they do not 
inappropriately assess the credibility of non-Western witnesses by West-
ern cultural norms”.111 It is not clear how this would be consistent with 
Akayesu, since the Trial Chamber was presided by a judge from Senegal, 
                                                   
108 For commonalities, see Charles F. Bond, Jr. and Sandhya R. Rao, “Lies Travel: Mendacity 
in a Mobile World”, in Pär Anders Granhag and Leif A. Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of 
Deception in Forensic Contexts, Cambridge University Press, 2004, sect. “Universality”, 
pp. 128–30. For differences, see Edward Westermarck, “The Regard for Truth and Good 
Faith”, in The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, 2nd edition, vol. 2, McMillan, 
London, 1917, pp. 72–108; and Edward Westermarck, “The Regard for Truth and Good 
Faith (Concluded)”, in ibid., pp. 109–36, including multiple examples from different cul-
tures showing apparently varying degrees of truthfulness in their social and historical con-
text. 
109 See, for example, regarding cross-cultural commonalities and differences about causality 
Sieghard Beller, Andrea Bender and Michael R. Waldmann (eds.), Diversity and Univer-
sality in Causal Cognition, Frontiers Media, Lausanne, 2017; on emotions, see SHAO Bo, 
Lorna Doucet and David R. Caruso, “Universality Versus Cultural Specificity of Three 
Emotion Domains: Some Evidence Based on the Cascading Model of Emotional Intelli-
gence”, in Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2015, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 229–51; and 
Hugo Mercier, “On the Universality of Argumentative Reasoning”, in Journal of Cognition 
and Culture, 2011, vol. 11, nos. 1–2, pp. 85–113. I am grateful to Moa Lidén for biblio-
graphic advice on this point. 
110 Combs, 2010, p. 81, among multiple references to Western standards in section 3.C. “Cul-
tural Divergences”, pp. 79–100, see above note 92. 
111 Ibid., p. 99. 
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with another one from South Africa, and only the third one from a West-
ern country (Sweden).112 
The cultural landscape of international tribunals is more complex 
indeed, with different combinations of officers and witnesses across re-
gions, multi-cultural teams within the institutions, and also often staff 
from anywhere in the world trained in Western universities. Besides, is-
sues that are regarded as ‘cultural differences’ may have quite universal 
roots, such as personality traits, security concerns, socio-economic class, 
peer-pressure, sexual taboos and economic incentives, hence proper inter-
sectional analysis should be more truthful, and a safeguard against stereo-
types. Additional research seems necessary to explore the potential impact 
of cross-cultural issues, controlling for the background of the different 
judges and officers, and considering other concurring factors. 
A related issue is suggestibility and acquiescence, because the im-
balance of power or expectations between international officers and wit-
nesses.113 Acquiescence is understood as “the tendency of an individual to 
answer questions in the affirmative irrespective of the content”.114 It is 
known that, depending of different personality and operational factors, 
some witnesses may be very sensible to suggestion or tending to say what 
they think the investigators want to hear. For example, one empirical 
study showed that regarding suggestibility “Afro-Caribbean police detain-
ees scored significantly higher than their Caucasian counterparts” after 
controlling for other factors.115 
Nancy A. Combs has raised the issue of acquiescence in relation to 
ICTR and SCSL witnesses, under the heading of “a cultural component to 
perjury?”, as follows: “Some interviewees contended only that Rwandan 
and Sierra Leonean witnesses were inclined to tailor their testimony to 
                                                   
112 Akayesu Trial Judgment, see above note 57. Trial Chamber presided by judge Laïty Kama 
(Senegal), with judges Navanethem Pillay (South Africa, ICTR judge 1995–2003 and its 
President 1999–2003, ICC judge 2003–08 and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2008–14) and Lennart Aspegren (Sweden). 
113 For a pioneering study, see Alfred Binet, La suggestibilité, Schleisher Frères, Paris, 1900; 
and for an influential, more recent handbook, see Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “Suggestibility: 
Historical and Theoretical Aspects”, in The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: 
A Handbook, Wiley, London, 2003, pp. 332–59; and Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “Interrogative 
Suggestibility: Empirical Findings”, in ibid., pp. 360–414. 
114 Ibid., p. 376. 
115 Ibid. 
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convey what they believed the Western investigator, lawyer or judge ques-
tioning them wished to hear”.116 This approach shows three main limita-
tions: the author ignores prior experience and research from national sys-
tems and presents the issue erroneously as characteristic of international 
tribunals and related to ‘cultural differences’, while allegedly “lying is 
more accepted in Rwandan and Sierra Leonean cultures”;117 the author 
refers to Western officers when those tribunals comprised officers from all 
regions of the world, including many Africans; and she relies mainly on 
the information from the defence teams, who have an interest on highlight 
any actual or hypothetical evidentiary weakness. Combs also quotes a 
senior ICTR-OTP officer stating that in Rwandan culture “lying is not 
only tolerated but sometimes encouraged”:118 this quotation is not correct, 
in the media article used by Combs these were not the words used by the 
OTP officer, they were only the words of the journalist who interviewed 
him.119 
It may be the case that evaluating officers carry ethno-centric biases, 
tending to give greater credibility to persons that are culturally closer to 
them. Some research on asylum procedures in the Netherlands indicates 
that “there seems to be a relation between ethnicity and credibility”, based 
on a comparison between the evaluation of asylum seekers from different 
countries, particularly Bosnia and DRC: 
Bosnians were often not asked about their flight motives ap-
parently because they were considered self-evident. When 
Bosnian applicants were interviewed, credibility was not 
raised. In Zairian cases, incredibility is routinely invoked 
against applicants; in 23 or the 37 Zairian cases in the sam-
ple, credibility was a central argument given for rejecting the 
claim.120 
                                                   
116 Combs, 2010, p. 131, see above note 92. 
117 Ibid., p. 131, quoting five interviewees (see fn. 576), four of them from the defence and 
one from the prosecution, including Howard Morrison (UK, formerly defence counsel in 
ICTR and ICTY, then judge at the ICC), Peter Robinson (USA, defence counsel at ICTR, 
ICTY, SCSL and ICC), and Michiel Pestman (The Netherlands, defence counsel at SCSL 
and ECCC). 
118 Ibid., p. 131, fn. 577; citing Karen Palmer, “It’s a Lying Shame”, South China Morning 
Post, 22 March 2006 (available on its web site). 
119 See ibid. 
120 Thomas Spijkerboer, “Stereotyping and Acceleration: Gender, Procedural Acceleration and 
Marginalised Judicial Review in the Dutch Asylum System”, in Gregor Noll (ed.), Proof, 
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The researchers found some indications of “generally negative atti-
tude towards Zairian applicants” and some “incredulous attitude” among 
interviewing officers, who considered Bosnians as most credible, Congo-
lese as the least credible, and others in between (from Turkey, Iran, China 
and Sri Lanka in the given sample).121 The same research found that the 
Dutch immigration officers tended to perceive the violence in the Bosnian 
accounts as systematic and the violence in the accounts from the DRC and 
other countries as random, a difference not necessarily granted by the 
available information. 122  This comparatively more restrictive standards 
for DRC people may have been related to multiple issues, from the avail-
ability of contextual information (the average Dutch person would have 
been much more exposed to information about Bosnia than about the 
DRC) to cultural distance, language issues or merely ‘sloppiness’.123 It 
appears however that credibility and the perception on alleged violence 
“are constructed in part by gendered and ethnic notions” in a way that 
may call for intersectional analysis: 
They [notions of gender and ethnicity in place] do not work 
per se against women. They work to the benefit of women 
who succeeded in fitting the mould, and to the detriment of 
women who don’t. It seems that for Zairian women it was 
particularly difficult (but not impossible) to do so, and for 
Bosnian women it was relatively easy. However, the use of 
(sometimes blatant) stereotypes turns out to be crucial in fact 
finding, credibility assessments and deciding what has been 
proven.124 
The above-mentioned research, including the comparison between 
the evaluation of accounts from Bosnia and the DRC, suggests a hypothe-
sis of ‘ethno-centric bias’ that may be worth exploring in relation to the 
                                                                                                                        
Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden, 2005, p. 82. Researcher based on the analysis of the relevant interview records and 
reports. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., p. 88. 
123 Ibid., p. 82. The author mentions particularly language and translation issues, and proce-
dural “sloppiness”, as main causal factors. 
124 Ibid., p. 88. 
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evaluation of DRC witnesses and alleged patterns by some ICC judges,125 
and in comparison with the ICTY. 
Issues like eventual suggestibility, acquiescence or perjury need to 
be assessed on an ad hoc basis, taking into account multiple concurring 
factors, and considering equally elements of resilience and incentives for 
veracity, otherwise the analysis may easily lead to stereotypes and unrea-
sonable discredit of any and all witnesses, from all parties.126 
3.2.2.2.1. Advice 
a) Training on implicit biases and cross-cultural communication, and 
use of tools to raise awareness about cultural biases;127 
b) serious background analysis and preparation on the given situation 
prior to the contact and collection of any source; 
c) hiring or consultation with area experts, local staff and translators; 
and 
d) multi-cultural team composition to combine different perspectives. 
3.2.2.3. Other Personal Biases 
The officer(s) in charge of the evaluation may carry personal biases due to 
various other issues, including gender, social extraction, professional 
background or ideology, as well as confirmation bias. 
Gender assumptions may condition the perception of the source and 
the information in relation to all relevant issues, from the substantive 
gravity of the crime, to various elements of credibility. For example, it 
                                                   
125 See below Section 3.2.5. 
126 For a more rigorous approach to the issue, see Bond Jr. and Rao, 2004, sects. “Cross-
Cultural Variation”, “Worldwide Beliefs About Deception”, and “Cross-Cultural Decep-
tions”, see above note 108. 
127 See, for example, the Implicit Association Test (‘IAT’), on the web site of Project Implicit, 
with different tests available in relation various race, religion and gender issues. Economic 
issues are not considered in the IAT, which is conceived from a US perspective. There are 
different views about the scientific validity of the IAT, but at least it may help to raise 
awareness on unconscious biases, which is why I have recommended it over the years to 
my staff and members of recruitment panels. For a discussion on the limited predictive va-
lidity of the IAT, significantly conditioned by social expectations just like any self-
reporting exercise, see Anthony G. Greenwald, T. Andrew Poehlman, Eric Luis Uhlmann 
and Mahzarin R. Banaji, “Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Me-
ta-Analysis of Predictive Validity”, in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2009, 
vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 17–41. 
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may happen that male sources dismiss crimes involving male perpetrators 
of sexual assault, because of some conscious or unconscious association 
with the perpetrator or a sense of embarrassment. Other combinations and 
factors may also be conducive to different kinds of gender biases. 
Prejudice against women’s testimony is known from a number of 
classic works. John Henry Wigmore, probably the single most influential 
authority on the law of evidence in the US, noted in his Principles of Ju-
dicial Proof that “woman does not reason and infer” and “objectivity is 
another property that women lack”.128 He also states, without any refer-
ence to scientific sources or reasoning, that “[d]ishonesty is, however, a 
especially feminine characteristic; in men it occurs only when they are 
effeminate”.129 F. Gorphe warned against female witnesses in La critique 
du Témoignage because women would lie more often and more effective-
ly than men: 
Les femmes, par des considérations de pudeur, ont davantage 
l’habitude de cacher, et, pour des raisons de faiblesse phy-
sique et de subordination sociale, elles ont davantage recours 
à la tromperie. Aussi est-il généralement plus difficile de dé-
couvrir leurs mensonges habilement et audacieusement pré-
sentés, sans souci de la vérité ni de la justice.130 
This prejudice against women is likely to persist in patriarchal soci-
eties, to the extent that credibility correlates with social status. From a 
viewpoint of socio-linguistics this problem has been fully exposed by 
Robin Lakoff in her influential study Language and Woman’s Place.131 
Other authors have brought this linguistic analysis to the legal field and 
found that for cultural reasons “women project deference and uncertainty” 
and their “language style did indeed influence the credibility of their tes-
timony”.132 The testing of Lakoff’s observations in experimental settings 
                                                   
128 John Henry Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof: As Given by Logic, Psychology, 
and General Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials, Little, Brown, and Company, 
Boston, 1913, p. 341. 
129 Ibid., p. 343. 
130 François Gorphe, La critique du Témoignage, Librairie Dalloz, Paris, 1924, p. 165. 
131 Robin Tolmach Lakoff, in Mary Bucholtz (ed.), Language and Woman’s Place: Text and 
Commentaries, revised and expanded edition, Oxford University Press, 2004 (original 
from 1975). See also Leigh Gilmore, Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say 
About Their Lives, Columbia University Press, New York, 2017. 
132 Conley, O’Barr and Conley Riner, 2019, chap. 4 “Speaking of Patriarchy”, p. 67, see above 
note 82. 
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has led to the conclusion that a kind of ‘powerless language’ is “associat-
ed primarily with the speaker’s status in society”, and in certain societies 
“most women, most of the time, were speaking in a style that the legal 
system devaluated; men, by and large, did not suffer this disadvantage”.133 
Such gender bias may have deeper implications in those societies in 
which the law carries “a preference for a characteristically male episte-
mology” favoring typically male assertiveness and ‘rule-oriented ac-
counts’, in detriment of more realistic ‘relational accounts’ usually ex-
pressed by women.134 Hence some experts have concluded that “the law 
displays a deep gender bias in the way it performs such basic tasks as 
judging credibility and defining narrative coherence”.135 
The record of the trial testimonies in different international tribunals 
shows a large majority of male witnesses, approximately some 80 per cent. 
This is likely to result from both underlying social factors (higher visibil-
ity, availability and trust on men in patriarchal societies) and operational 
factors related to the investigations and prosecutions (including reliance 
on insider and expert witnesses, most often male), all of which requires 
additional research.136 Among many efforts in this area around the world, 
for example, the Supreme Court of Mexico issued in 2013 comprehensive 
guidelines to include gender perspective in the evaluation of evidence and 
other procedural requirements.137 
Concerning political, religious or ethnic ideology, experience indi-
cates that the background of the investigating officers may easily influ-
ence the evaluation of sources. A number of examples could be mentioned 
                                                   
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid., p. 77. 
135 Ibid., p. 4. See also Deborah Epstein and Lisa A. Goodman, “Discounting Women: Doubt-
ing Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences”, in Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2019, vol. 167, no. 2, p. 399–461; and Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, “Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount”, in Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2017, vol. 166, no. 1, p. 1–58. 
136 Data and analysis produced by Investigative Analysis Section (IAS) as part of a Gender 
Analysis project supported by UN Women. Similarly, Nancy Amoury Combs found 74.5 
per cent of male witnesses in a sample of 342 witnesses from 19 ICTR cases, see See Nan-
cy A. Combs, “Grave Crimes and Weak Evidence: A Fact-Finding Evolution in Interna-
tional Criminal Law”, in Harvard International Law Journal, 2017, vol. 58, no. 1, p. 65. 
137 Mexico Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Protocolo para Juzgar con Perspectiva de 
Género: Haciendo Realidad el Derecho a la Igualdad, Mexico City, 2013, further to the 
work of the Unidad de Igualdad de Género established in 2008. 
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in relation to left-right political conflict in Latin America, as well as reli-
gious and ethnic cleavages in any region of the world. 
Concerning professional background (police, humanitarian, military, 
NGOs, legal, and so on), the evaluating officer may perceive more posi-
tively persons with similar backgrounds, which may contribute to over-
estimate their credibility. The opposite negative effect can equally take 
place, with under-estimation across different backgrounds. 
Confirmation bias arises if the officer(s) in charge of evaluating the 
source are driven, consciously or not, by an interest to corroborate allega-
tions, hypotheses or charges, which may lead to look for and accept cor-
roborating information and to exclude systematically conflicting infor-
mation. This is a rather frequent problem for all parties in the procedure, 
including particularly in suspect-driven investigations, and under the pres-
sure of adversarial litigation. I identified this problem from the outset of 
my work at the ICC-OTP, and I included specific references to it in differ-
ent analytical protocols. I remain concerned with this cognitive problem, 
which is why we invited Dr. Lidén to join the New Delhi conference on 
which this book is initially based, and I defer to her expertise for this mat-
ter.138 
3.2.2.3.1. Advice 
Officers involved in investigations and Source Evaluation must conduct 
some ‘self-evaluation’, on their own or preferably with the advice of oth-
ers, to anticipate which aspects of their background may carry relevant 
biases and affect the evaluation of the source. As it has been observed by 
experienced officers, in the same way that psychoanalysts need to be psy-
choanalyzed themselves as a requirement to start practicing, in criminal 
investigations officers need to subject themselves to analysis in relation to 
their potential biases.139 
                                                   
138 Moa Lidén, “Confirmation Bias in Investigations of Core International Crimes: Risk Fac-
tors and Quality Control Techniques”, Chap. 7 below. 
139 See Richards J. Heuer, Jr., The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1999. For advice regarding confirmation bias, see Moa Lidén, “Confirmation 
Bias in Investigations of Core International Crimes: Risk Factors and Quality Control 
Techniques”, Chap. 7 below. 
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3.2.2.4. Insider Witness Issues 
Witnesses with internal knowledge of the criminal groups are usually re-
ferred to in investigative practice as ‘insider witnesses’, including most 
often active members of the group and perpetrators, but also possibly per-
sons that happened to gain such knowledge by virtue of their work or per-
sistent victimisation. Insiders have always been important in the investi-
gation of crimes involving multiple perpetrators, examples abound from 
cases of organized crime, terrorism and surely core international crimes. 
The ICTY-OTP identified from an early stage the need to foster co-
operation with insiders, which shows in its Regulation no. 1 on the “Pros-
ecutor’s Policy on Nolle Prosequi of Accomplices”. By 2006, ICTY Pros-
ecutor Carla del Ponte advised: “Insiders can and must be used in com-
plex criminal cases because proof of a complex criminal enterprise and its 
leadership can otherwise be extremely difficult and time/resource con-
suming”.140 
Insiders and suspects may cause a certain fascination because of the 
high value of their evidence. Hans Gross already warned about the diffi-
culties with insiders and suspects in his handbook, referring to persons 
who perhaps “are afraid of being suspected of being themselves the perpe-
trators, or that they are conscious of negligence which may have facilitat-
ed the perpetration, or that they may be considered as abettors or accesso-
ries of the accused, & c.”.141 His advice for this kind of witness remains 
relevant today: 
the witnesses will, despite their best intention to speak the 
truth, fashion it the way apparently most useful to them-
selves. They will rely on certain details, they will slur over 
others, they will arrange the various incidents in a new man-
ner, and if the Investigating Officer examines attentively all 
the depositions he will recognize the existence of a group of 
persons deposing inaccurately; the group of frightened peo-
ple, always imagining themselves suspected and constantly 
shuffling.142 
                                                   
140 Carla Del Ponte, “Investigation and Prosecution of Large-scale Crimes at the International 
Level: The Experience of the ICTY”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2006, 
vol. 4, no. 3, p. 546. 
141 Gross, 1906, p. 89, see above note 41. 
142 Ibid. 
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The officer(s) in charge of collecting the evidence may involve 
themselves personally in the process in ways that affect their objectivity. 
Some research indicates that when comparing evaluations conducted by 
interviewers and observers, “the observers were more accurate in their 
assessment of the target than were those who engaged in the conversa-
tion”.143 Operational experience also suggests that trusting the evaluation 
only to the same officer that carried out the interview or collection may 
cause over-rating. This can be explained as cognitive dissonance, that is, 
an interpretation of the reality biased towards justifying our prior actions 
and decisions.144 
3.2.2.4.1. Example: Rudolf Höss, SS Auschwitz Commander 
The officers that conducted the first interrogation of Rudolf Höss, a psy-
chologist and a lawyer, praised his ‘frank answers’ and evaluated that “his 
statements were generally true”.145 They spent very long time with him 
and took upon themselves to learn about his whole life, including happy 
childhood memories, and to record not only his statement about the al-
leged crimes, but also his whole biography. Subsequent research proved 
that Höss had been fairly truthful about the crime as such, but he had lied 
about his own role. Among other issues, Höss never mentioned Eleonore 
Hodys, the prisoner with whom he had sex, and once she got pregnant 
was put in an isolation cell to die of starvation.146 It appears that the inter-
viewers failed to distance themselves sufficiently from the interviewee, 
                                                   
143 Saul Kassin, “True or False: ‘I’d Know a False Confession If I Saw One’”, in Pär Anders 
Granhag and Leif A. Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 176. 
144 On cognitive dissonance associated to confirmation bias, see Moa Lidén, Confirmation 
Bias in Criminal Cases, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2018, pp. 189 and 191; and Carol 
Travis and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish 
Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts, Harvest, Orlando, 2007, particularly chap. 1 
“Cognitive Dissonance: The Engine of Self-Justification” and chap. 5 “Law and Disorder”. 
145 Jerzy Rawicz, “Foreword”, in Rudolf Höss, Pery Broad and Johann Paul Kremer, KL 
Auschwitz Seen by the SS, Publications of Państwowe Muzeum Oświęcimiu, Auschwitz, 
1978, p. 16. 
146 On Eleonore Hodys, see the book by Herlinde Pauer-Studer and J. David Velleman, “Ru-
dolf Höss and Eleonore Hodys”, in Konrad Morgen: The Conscience of a Nazi Judge, Pal-
grave Macmillan, London, 2015. 
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and that they “did not manage to avoid a certain overestimation of the 
allegedly absolute credibility of his reminiscences”.147 
3.2.2.4.2. Example: Mafia Insiders 
Italian investigators and judges have interviewed hundreds of insiders, 
commonly known as pentiti, over the last forty years, after the legal and 
investigative measures adopted in the 1980s for cases of terrorism and 
organized crime.148 In any given year around 1,000 pentiti from different 
groups may be under the national witness protection programme.149 
Tommaso Buscetta is perhaps the single most influential one among 
them. The late judge Giovanni Falcone, who interviewed him extensively, 
explained how Buscetta provided with multiple details on the Sicilian 
mafia, “[b]ut above everything he gave a global vision, ample, far-
reaching of the phenomenon [the mafia]. He gave an essential key for 
reading, a language, a code”, so that Buscetta allowed Falcone to see “il 
carattere unitario de la Cosa Nostra”, as a unified hierarchy.150 This ‘uni-
                                                   
147 Jerzy Rawicz, 1978, p. 17, see above note 145. 
148 See Italy, Misure per la difesa dell’ordinamento costituzionale, 29 May 1982, Law no. 304, 
conceived originally for terrorism cases, then used extensively also for organised crime, 
including Article 3 granting attenuation for accused “in case of co-operation” (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/xzzva7/). For an analysis of the history and investigative practice with 
the pentiti, see Gruppo Abele, Dalla mafia allo Stato: I pentiti: analisi e storie, EGA Edi-
tore, Torino, 2005. For a compilation of Italian authors (mainly Sicilian, University of 
Palermo professors), see Alessandra Dino (ed.), Pentiti: I collaboratori di giustizia, le 
istituzioni, l’opinione pubblica, Donzelli Editore, Rome, 2006. For analysis techniques in 
Italy, see Tiziana Montefusco, L’analisi di contesto per la lotta al crimine, Laurus Robuffo, 
Rome, 2007; and Ultimo (pseudonym), La lotta anticrimine: Intelligence e azione, Laurus 
Robuffo, Rome, 2006. For the legal framework, see Salvatore Aleo, Sistema penale e 
criminalità organizzata: Le figure delittuose associative, Giuffrè Editore, Milan, 2005. 
149 See figures for the period 1994–2002 in Abele, 2005, p. 134, Graph “Grafico 1. Numero 
totale de pentiti (1994-2002)”, in a range from 899 (1994) to 1214 (1996), see above note 
148. In 2016, the Italian Ministry of Interior (Ministero dell’Interno) reported to the 
parliament having 1277 “justice collaborators” under the protection programme: see 
Michele Ciervo, “Protezione testimoni e collaboratori di giustizia, Minniti: “I minori sono 
la priorità da tutelare””, Ministero dell’Interno, 11 December 2018 (available on its web 
site). 
150 Giovanni Falcone, Cose di Cosa Nostra, RCS Libri, Milano, 1998, p. 41. First published in 
1991, based on interviews with the journalist Marcelle Padovani conducted in 1987. The 
mafia killed Falcone on 23 May 1992. For Buscetta’s account, see Saverio Lodato, La 
Mafia ha vinto: Intervista con Tommaso Buscetta, Mondadori, Milano, 2017. For the 
memoirs of one of the judges that ruled over related cases, see Pietro Grasso, Storie di 
sangue, amici e fantasmi: Ricordo di mafia, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2017, including his hom-
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tarian theory’, referred by some observers critically as ‘il teorema Buscet-
ta’, was confirmed in the judgment of the Maxi Trial in 1987 and further 
by the Italian Supreme Court in 1992.151 As one of the judges of the Maxi 
Trial would say, thanks to Falcone “[f]rom that point on, for the other 
judges everything became easier because it was enough to prove the be-
longing in the mafia association”, and it was accepted that “the full use of 
the justice collaborators, equated with trial witnesses, unlike in the past, 
when they were simple police informants inefficient for the purpose of 
evidence, and the myth of the impunity for Mafiosi is definitely bro-
ken”.152 
Nevertheless, there are different views among researchers and judg-
es about this unified vision of the mafia, as well as the credibility of the 
insiders who supported it. By the late nineteenth century, a senior police 
officer assessed based on his investigative experience that considering the 
Sicilian mafia as a unified group would be a “gravissimo errore”.153 A 
                                                                                                                        
age to Falcone (chap. 1 “Caro Giovanni”, pp. 8–14) and chap. 7 on the pentiti (pp. 68–84). 
For an anthropological assessment, see Deborah Puccio-Den, “L’ethnologue et le juge: 
L’enquête de Giovanni Falcone sur la mafia en Sicile”, in Ethnologie française, 2001, vol. 
37, no. 1, pp. 15–27. For his methodological approach, with an emphasis on financial 
investigations, see Giovanni Falcone and Giuliano Turone, “Tecniche di indagine in 
materia di mafia”, in Rivista di Studi e Ricerche Sulla Criminalità Organizzata, 2015, vol. 
1, no. 1, pp. 116–53 (paper delivered in June 1982). The co-author Giuliano Turone, inves-
tigating judge from Milano known for his role in high-profile corruption cases, and col-
league of Gherado Colombo, would become later Senior Trial Lawyer in the ICTY-OTP, 
acting particularly in Delalic et al. For Turone on the ICC, see Giuliano Turone, “Powers 
and Duties of the Prosecutor”, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002. For a highly qualified and comprehensive study of contemporary legal 
history, see Giuliano Turone, Italia occulta: Dal delitto Moro alla strage di Bologna: Il 
triennio maledetto che sconvolse la Repubblica (1978-1980), Chiarelettere, Milano, 2019, 
including chaps. 5 and 6 about the alleged links of Giulio Andreotti with the mafia and 
chap. 11 on Falcone’s investigations. 
151 The so-called Maxi Trial (maxiprocesso) included 475 accused, with Buscetta as the main 
witness for the prosecution, starting in 1986 and concluding after appeals in last instance 
with the judgment of the Supreme Court of 30 January 1992. See Salvatore Lupo, 1986: Il 
maxiprocesso, Editori Laterza, Rome, 2008, and Sarah Mazzenzana, “Il maxiprocesso di 
Palermo”, in Rivista di Studi e Ricerche Sulla Criminalità Organizzata, 2016, vol. 2, no. 1, 
pp.117–69. 
152 Grasso, 2017, p. 35, see above note 150. 
153 Antonino Cutrera, La mafia e i mafiosi: Origini e manifestazioni, Alberto Reber, Palermo, 
1900, p. 127: 
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number of researchers have reached similar conclusions, considering the 
mafia merely a series of autonomous local gangs with a common culture 
and methods.154 Charles Tilly noted in 1974: “Sicily has never had any 
single organization one could properly call The Mafia. The Mafia super-
gang is a simplifying fiction”.155 Henner Hess warns that “Mafia is neither 
an organisation nor a secret society, but a method” and “[t]here are organ-
isations, but not ‘the organisation’”.156 Maurizio Catino proposes a more 
complex interpretation, with different degrees of centralization depending 
on periods, activities and regions. 157  In 1984 the expert on organized 
crime Pino Arlacchi discussed the issue with Falcone, advised him that 
“the scientific literature on the issue, in Italy and the US, is virtually unan-
imous in excluding the existence of the ‘mafia’ intense in these terms”, 
and warned him “to be alert with his ‘sources’, who were perhaps more 
cunning than what he thought”.158 By 1991 Arlacchi changed his views 
after the revelations by Buscetta and other insiders and acknowledged 
                                                                                                                        
Trattandose adunque di associazione di malfatori autonome, indipendenti, non legate 
da vincoli di commune responsabilità o complicità, esse non possono costiture 
un’unica e grande associazione. Se questa fosse vera, con conseguenza ne sarebbe che 
la mafia di tutta l’isola altro non sarebbe che un’inmmensa associazione a delinquere; 
allora avrebbero pienamente ragione coloro che nella mafia hanno vista una vasta as-
sociazione segreta: e il ritener questo sarebbe un gravissimo errore. 
154 Among others, see Judith Chubb, The Mafia and Politics: The Italian State Under Siege, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989; Henner Hess, Mafia and Mafiosi: Origin, Power 
and Myth, C. Hurst & Co., London, 1998; Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized 
Crime, Italian Style, Oxford University Press, 2008; and Maurizio Catino, Mafia Organi-
zations: The Visible Hand of Criminal Enterprise, Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
155 Charles Tilly, “Foreword”, in Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A 
Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, 1974, p. xiv. 
156 Hess, 1998, pp. 132 and 191, see above note 154. Pietro Grasso, one of the judges of the 
Maxi Trial, refers to Hess and his theories and claims that Falcone proved him wrong 
through the Maxi Trial: 
[I]t should not be overlooked that, until then, the most widespread book on the mafia 
theme had been that of the sociologist Henner Hess, according to which the mafia was 
a subculture inherent in the soul of the Sicilians, while for others it was a set of crimi-
nal gangs not connected to each other, or the result of a romantic reality borrowed from 
the film The Godfather. 
See Grasso, 2017, p. 35, original in Italian, see above note 150. 
157 Catino, 2019, sect. 3.1.1 “The Sicilian Cosa Nostra”, pp. 153–60, see above note 154. 
158 Pino Arlacchi, Addio Cosa Nostra: I segreti della mafia nella confessione di Tommaso 
Buscetta, Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, Milan, 1994, p. vii. Arlacchi advised Falcone and 
the Italian government on related issues, and in 1997 was appointed Executive Director of 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (‘UNODC’). 
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Falcone’s findings.159 The issue has been indeed extensively discussed in 
Italy at all levels of social research, litigation and legal doctrine. 
Some observers refer to ‘il innamoramento del pentito’ to question 
the reliance on such insider witnesses by prosecutors, a critique favoured 
often by the accused and their counsel.160 The prosecutors would respond 
that there is no alternative to the insider evidence, or as an Italian prosecu-
tor would explain: 
You have to understand that the so-called pentiti represent a 
strategy for us that is irreplaceable. […] Hearing them is like 
a little load of explosives in a wall of stone, or marble. It 
creates an opening for us to excavate inside. This is why the 
judges are enamored of them.161 
In any event, Falcone did emphasize that their testimony was “only 
one of many means”, to be subject to “critical examination”, “rigorously” 
with “wisdom and caution”. 162  Even Buscetta himself advised that he 
needed to be corroborated: “The word of a pentito is never cast gold. In-
vestigators must verify whether the facts told are the truth. This is the 
correct way to use pentiti and not to destroy their statements”.163 
A different aspect of the debate concerns the links to higher political 
levels. The testimony of Buscetta and other pentiti led to numerous con-
                                                   
159 Ibid., p. ix. 
160 See Fernando Díaz Cantón, “Breves notas críticas sobre la figura del ‘arrepentido’”, in 
Pensar en Derecho, 2018, no. 13, sect. V “El peligro de la sobrevaloración probatoria de 
las manifestaciones del arrepentido”, p. 26 (available on Facultad de Derecho, Universidad 
de Buenos Aires’ web site). 
161 Jance C. Schneider and Peter T. Schneider, Reversible Destiny: Mafia, Antimafia and the 
Struggle for Palermo, University of California Press, Oakland, 2003, sect. “The Justice 
Collaborators as Flash Points”, p. 135. 
162 Falcone as quoted in Abele, 2005, p. 75, see above note 148: 
Falcone sosteneva l’importanza del ‘vaglio critico’ delle dichiarazione dei pentiti che 
doveva essere particolarmente ‘rigoroso’, condotto con ‘saggeza e oculatezza’, senza 
mai trascurare la ricerca di riscontri obiettivi […] La dichiarazione del pentito ‘è solo 
uno dei tanti mezzi’ di cui dispone il magistrato inquirente. 
163 Interview with Tommaso Buscetta by Liana Milella, “Di Andreotti non parlerei più”, La 
Repubblica, 24 October 1999 (available on its web site). Buscetta was interviewed in the 
US, where he was in a witness protection program, shortly after Andreotti’s first acquittal 
for alleged complicity in the murder of journalist Mino (Carmine) Pecorelli. 
 
3. The Contribution of Analysis to the Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 163 
victions of gangsters, but when they implicated former prime minister 
Giulio Andreotti the cases resulted in acquittal.164 
The Italian authorities faced similar difficulties with the investiga-
tions and trials about the Neapolitan camorra. It appears that in the initial 
stages of proceeding and trials in 1983–86 the judges “relied excessively 
on the pentiti’s testimony and allowed them great latitude, frequently un-
critically accepting their claims”, while by 1986: 
The appellate judges’ careful and more antagonistic scrutiny 
revealed many distortions and lies in the pentiti’s previous 
testimonies, with the result that the verdicts of the first set of 
trials were almost completely overturned.165 
The appellate judges, “followed three fundamental factors in decid-
ing the credibility of the pentiti: consistency, good knowledge of details, 
and ability to provide contextual embedding for their testimony”, while 
“hard evidence [riscontri oggettivi] became to be seen as the only possible 
way to determine the pentito’s credibility”. 166 Some cases of terrorism 
from the 1970s had also showed difficulties with the pentiti evidence, 
such as the case against some leaders of Lotta Continua, convicted and 
acquitted in different instances based on the testimony of a single penti-
to.167 
The perception of the pentiti evolved over time. In the 1980s they 
were increasingly valued, as there was a sense of urgency to confront the 
escalation in mafia violence and Falcone and other judges showed im-
                                                   
164 Buscetta and other pentiti alleged that Andreotti was knowingly associated with local 
Sicilian politicians of his party who were part of the mafia. These allegations led to two 
trials, one with charges of mafia association and the second one about the murder of the 
journalist Mino Pecorelli. In both cases Andreotti was acquitted in 1999, as the defence 
counsel succeeded to discredit the pentiti evidence. For the murder of Pecorelli, Andreotti 
was first acquitted (1999), then convicted (2002) and finally acquitted in last instance 
(2003). See the records of judgements and hearings for both cases at the web site of Ar-
chivio Antimafia. For an analysis of the Andreotti cases, see Salvatore Lupo, Storia della 
maffia: dalle originia ai giorni nostri, Donzelli, Rome, 1993, pp. 302–11. 
165 See Marco Jacquemet, Credibility in Court: Communicative Practices in the Camorra 
Trials, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 6. See also Felia Allum, “Pentiti di camorra”, 
in Alessandra Dino (ed.), Pentiti: I collaboratori di giustizia, le istituzioni, l’opinione 
pubblica, Donzelli Editore, Rome, 2006, pp. 185–205. 
166 Jacquemet, 1996, p. 184, see above note 165. 
167 For a detailed critical review of the case against the leaders of Lotta Continua, see Carlo 
Ginzburg, The Judge and the Historian: Marginal Notes on a Late-Twentieth-Century Mis-
carriage of Justice, Verso, London, 1999 (original in Italian 1991). 
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portant results. This trend led to the approval in 1991 of a law establishing 
a new system for witness protection, which facilitated crucially insider co-
operation. 168  Towards the late 1990s the climate grew more sceptical, 
when the level of violence decreased and the problems with insider evi-
dence showed in different procedures, including the two acquittals of An-
dreotti in 1999. The Italian parliament reacted modifying the Law 
82/1991 and approving, after four years of intense debate, a new law in 
2001 to impose more restrictive regulations in the acceptance and protec-
tion of pentiti.169 The new restrictions included a time limit of 180 days 
after the expression of the intention to co-operate, for the pentito to state 
the relevant evidence, in order to avoid the so-called ‘instalment declara-
tions’ used in some cases by the witnesses to bargain or to manipulate the 
investigation. 170  Many judges and prosecutors were disappointed with 
these restrictions or, as the former Maxi Trial judge Pietro Grasso stated, 
                                                   
168 Italy, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 15 gennaio 1991, n. 8, 
recante nuove misure in materia di sequestri di persona a scopo di estorsione e per la 
protezione di coloro che collaborano con la giustizia (based on the law decree no. 8 of 15 
January 1991, new rules on kidnappings for the purpose of extortion and for the protection 
of witnesses of justice, as well as for the protection and sanctioning of those who collabo-
rate with justice), 15 March 1991, Law no. 82 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/vj77ee/). 
169 Italy, Modifica della disciplina della protezione e del trattamento sanzionatorio di coloro 
che collaborano con la giustizia nonche’ disposizioni a favore delle persone che prestano 
testimonianza [Modification of the discipline of protection and sanctioning of those who 
collaborate with justice as well as provisions in favor of people who testify], 13 February 
2001, Law no. 45 (‘Law no. 45 of 2001’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/631z2v/). On 
this evolution from 1991 to 2001, see the interview with the Director of the Division of 
Justice Collaborators in the Central Protection Office, Colonel R. Scuzzarello conducted in 
2002, “Aspetti evolutivi del servizio centrale de protezione: dalla lege del 1991 a quella 
riforma del 2001”, in Abele, 2005, pp. 535–37, see above note 148. 
170 Law no. 45 of 2001, Article 14-1, see above note 169: 
[L]a persona che ha manifestato la volonta’ di collaborare rende al procuratore della 
Repubblica, entro il termine di centottanta giorni dalla suddetta manifestazione di 
volonta’, tutte le notizie in suo possesso utili alla ricostruzione dei fatti e delle 
circostanze sui quali e’ interrogato nonche’ degli altri fatti di maggiore gravita’ ed 
allarme sociale di cui e’ a conoscenza oltre che alla individuazione e alla cattura dei 
loro autori ed altresi’ le informazioni necessarie perche’ possa procedersi alla 
individuazione, al sequestro e alla confisca del denaro, dei beni e di ogni altra utilita’ 
dei quali essa stessa o, con riferimento ai dati a sua conoscenza, altri appartenenti a 
gruppi criminali dispongono direttamente o indirettamente. 
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the new law was not conducive to generate insider witnesses, and “[i]f I 
were a Mafioso, I would not co-operate”.171 
Much like in the abovementioned Italian cases, insider evidence 
was a major difficulty in the ICC investigations in Kenya. The cases relied 
on a limited number of insiders that had inspired the investigations 
through their ‘theorems’, and once those insiders were not available any-
more as the result of serious threats and attacks, the cases were not sus-
tainable.172 Insiders are often high-maintenance witnesses, like some pen-
titi regarded as ‘collaborante in evoluzione’ or ‘pentito in osservazione’ as 
their commitment and truthfulness may evolve over time depending on 
various factors, including security.173 In Ruto and Sang,  for example, 
after serious threats upon them and their relatives, key insider witnesses 
for the prosecution recanted the evidence given during the investigation 
and “testified that they had deliberately implicated the Accused falsely, 
partly motivated by material gains, including relocation abroad”.174 
The scenario in the Kenyan cases resembles the experience in mafia 
cases, since “[t]he typical end of any trial of a mafioso, acquittal for lack 
of evidence” follows among other factor from the fact that “incriminating 
testimony is sometimes given in the preliminary investigation, but this as 
a rule is later retracted”.175 The same problems are common in cases of 
terrorism, also due to pressure and threats on insider and co-accused wit-
                                                   
171 Felice Cavallaro, interview with Pietro Grasso, “Allarme del magistrato sulla lotta a Cosa 
Nostra: con le nuove regole, a parità di condizioni, è meglio fare l’imputato: “Se fossi un 
mafioso non mi pentirei”: Il procuratore di Palermo Grasso: legge cambiata, ora non 
conviene più collaborare con lo Stato”, Corriere della Sera, 18 March 2001. 
172 See ICC-OTP, “Annex 1: ICC OTP Kenya Cases: Review and Recommendations: Execu-
tive Summary of the Report of the External Independent Experts”, in “Full Statement of 
the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on external expert review and lessons drawn from the 
Kenya situation”, 26 November 2019, paras. E.19 and E.20 (‘Kenya Cases: Review and 
Recommendations: Executive Summary of the Report of the External Independent Ex-
perts’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/32p2hy/). 
173 Abele, 2005, p. 90, see above note 148. 
174 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber, Lesser Public Redacted Version of Decision on Joint 
Defence Application for Further Prosecution Investigation Concerning the Asylum Appli-
cation Records of Certain Prosecution Witnesses, 11 December 2017, ICC-01/09-01/11-
1655-Red2, para. 2 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b843a/). 
175 Hess, 1998, p. 142, see above note 154. 
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nesses.176 In the Kenyan cases the prosecution found those ‘insider theo-
rems’ credible and consistent with other evidence, whether they were true 
should have been determined through the trials and due process. The ex-
tent of the witness tampering and threats against Kenyan insider witnesses 
shows in the investigations conducted by the OTP under Article 70 and 
the corresponding warrants of arrest issued by the ICC judges in 2013 and 
2015.177 
3.2.2.4.3. Advice 
Thorough handling and evaluation of insider witnesses is fundamental for 
international investigations, including: 
a) extensive preparation and background analysis prior to the inter-
views; 
b) emphasis on verification with other sources, including communica-
tions and financial records whenever possible; 
c) including an analyst with advanced knowledge of the case in the in-
terviewing team; 
d) equipping the interviewing team with analytical tools, such as chro-
nologies, maps, indexes of key individuals, and so on; or support 
them during the interview with relevant databases; 
e) building some distance in the time, space and personnel, between 
interviewing and evaluation; 
f) sharing the evaluation with officers that have not had personally in-
volvement with the witness; 
g) keeping in mind the actual crime while carrying out the interview, 
and confronting the witness with details of the crime and the suffer-
ing of the victims, as a means to control the ‘fascination effect’; 
h) planning ahead the need to have multiple interviews; and 
                                                   
176 See, for example, Gómez Bermúdez, 2010, pp. 138–46, see above note 78. Ibid., pp. 139–
40: “[…] este problema de la valoración de la prueba de los coimputados […] es muy 
frecuente en terrorismo, incluido el yihadista”; and ibid., p. 145: “[…] hubo imputados que 
se retractaron de sus anteriores declaraciones”. 
177 See ICC, “Barasa Case” and ICC, “Gicheru and Bett Case” (available on ICC’s web site), 
with arrest warrants issued in 2013 and 2015, the relevant individuals remain at large. 
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i) other specific de-biasing techniques.178 
3.2.2.5. Victim Witness Issues 
The officer(s) in charge of collecting the evidence may experience a feel-
ing of compassion because of the human suffering caused by the crimes, 
which may affect the objectivity of the evaluation. 
This issue is most common when interviewing victims. Investiga-
tors will often interview persons with appalling experiences of suffering, 
including grave physical pain, sexual violence, mutilations, extreme cruel-
ty, miserable conditions of life, death of close relatives, destruction of the 
entire family or social environment with long-standing consequences, and 
so on. A reaction of empathy and compassion by the interviewer is under-
standable, but it is also necessary to keep a certain distance for the sake of 
objectivity and greater investigative quality. On a related legal note, 
Cesare Beccaria warned against lowering the standards of evidence for 
atrocious crimes, and he considered “a cruel imbecility” the classic dic-
tum in atrocissimis leviores conjecturae sufficient, et licet iudice iura 
trasgredi.179 
It may happen that victims are truthful and accurate regarding the 
personal experience of victimization (what they suffered directly), but not 
necessarily so accurate when reporting on the perpetrators regarding their 
identification, methods and organization.180 Regarding the perpetrators, a 
victim may tend to express greater certitude than granted by his or her 
knowledge and experience, because such rationalization is psychological-
ly comforting, or possibly out of resentment. It may happen that a victim 
                                                   
178 See Moa Lidén, “Confirmation Bias in Investigations of Core International Crimes: Risk 
Factors and Quality Control Techniques”, Chap. 7 below. 
179 Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene: Edizione Rivista, corretta e disposta secondo 
l’ordine della Traduzione francese, Presso la Società dei Filosofi, Londra, 1774 (corrected 
and rearranged version of the original book of 1764), p. 20: “In the very atrocious crimes 
the lightest conjectures suffice, and it is legitimate for the judge to breach the law”. 
180 On the difficulties of eyewitness identification in domestic investigation, see Simon, 2012, 
chap. 3 ““Officer, That’s Him!”: Eyewitness Identification of Perpetrators”, pp. 50–89, and 
chap. 6 ““We Find the Defendant Guilty”: Fact-Finding at Trial”, section on “Eyewitness 
Identification Testimony”, pp. 150–57, see above note 40. For the international context, 
see Andrew Smith, Roderick Lindsay and Brian Cutler, “Eyewitness Psychology in the 
Context of International Criminal Law”, in Ilias Bantekas and Emmanouela Mylonaki 
(eds.), Criminological Approaches to International Criminal Law, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014, pp. 159–91, including sections on “Distance and Lighting”, “Emotions and 
Stress” and “Post-event Information”. 
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does not have knowledge of the internal functioning of the structure of the 
perpetrators, and in his or her account tends to exaggerate the coherence 
of such structure and the role of a given suspect. 
3.2.2.5.1. Example 
In an ICTY case the Trial Chamber based the conviction of an accused 
largely on the testimony of a witness who was deemed reliable by the 
Prosecutor and the judges, but the Appeals Chamber made a different 
evaluation of the same witness, considered her not reliable and acquitted 
the accused. The witness was a victim that apparently had made a strong 
impression on the investigators because of her personal experience of 
suffering and her very assertive expression. In spite of defence objections 
and objective difficulties at the time of the events (low visibility, limited 
length of observation), the investigators as well as the Trial Chamber 
evaluated positively the witness impressed by her “confident and force-
ful” demeanour. The Appeals Chamber found that, “very often, a confi-
dent demeanour is a personality trait and not necessarily a reliable indica-
tor of truthfulness or accuracy”, and actually the witness had not been in a 
position to know the facts that she reported, concerning in particular eye-
witness identification.181 The Appeals Chamber concluded that 
the Trial Chamber erred in relying so heavily upon Witness 
H’s confident demeanour. There are several strong indica-
tions on the trial record that her absolute conviction in her 
identification evidence was very much a reflection of her 
personality and not necessarily an indicator of her reliabil-
ity.182 
The expert testimony of a cognitive psychologist, as well as contra-
dictions with earlier statements by the same witness, was considered to 
this effect. 
Conversely, it may also happen that the interviewer or any other op-
erator evaluating a victim may develop a tendency of disbelief as a coping 
mechanism, to protect him or herself from the psychological impact of the 
narrative. As the UNHCR research has observed in relation to asylum 
procedures: 
                                                   
181 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Appeals Chamber, Appeal Judgement, 23 October 
2001, IT-95-16-A, para. 138 (‘Kupreškić et al. Appeals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/c6a5d1/). 
182 Ibid., para. 154. 
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If interviewers and decision-makers suffer psychological dis-
tress from their exposure to such evidence – so-called vicari-
ous trauma – they risk employing natural coping strategies 
that involuntarily compromise their fact-finding and impar-
tiality. […] Examiners may find the content of the evidence 
so horrific that they are tempted to reject it as unimaginable, 
fabricated and therefore not credible. […] Disbelief is a very 
human coping strategy that undermines objectivity and im-
partiality.183 
Continuing exposure to victims may cause a “compassion fade ef-
fect”, if officers grow dismissive over time due to their fatigue, regardless 
of the quality of the information.184 
3.2.2.5.2. Advice 
To differentiate aspects of the victimization as such (the suffering caused 
by the victims), and aspects of related to the perpetrators (identification, 
modus operanda, organizational structures), and be particularly rigorous 
in the evaluation of the latter. 
3.2.3. Multi-Disciplinary Overview of Methods 
Different domains of investigation and research have developed diverse 
approaches to Source Evaluation. Structured methods focused on alpha-
numeric codes are common in some police and intelligence agencies. The 
models known as ‘4 x 4’, ‘5 x 5’, ‘6 x 6’, or Admiral, consist on a matrix 
to rank the sources by two scales related to the source and the information. 
See below an example of a ‘4 x 4’ matrix.185 
                                                   
183 UNHCR, 2013, p. 40, see above note 84. 
184 See Philip Pärnamets, Alexander Tagesson and Annika Wallim, “Inconsistencies in Re-
peated Refugee Status Decisions”, in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2020 (forth-
coming), pp. 1–10. 
185 Image from Pierre Aepli, Olivier Ribaux and Everett Summerfied, Decision Making in 
Policing: Operations and Management, EPFL Press, Lausanne, 2011, p. 31. 
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Figure 3. An example of a ‘4 x 4’ matrix for Source Evaluation. 
The Criminal Intelligence Manual for Analysts published by the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (‘UNODC’) in 2011 includes the ‘4 x 4’ mod-
el, and a ‘6 x 6’ variant, based on the following fundamental principles for 
the “evaluation of sources and information”: 
1. It must not be influenced by personal feelings but be based on pro-
fessional judgment. 
2. Evaluation of the source must be made separately to the information. 
3. It must be carried out as close to the source as possible.186 
This UNODC manual illustrates the second principle and “the evaluation 
process” with the graphic below.187 
                                                   
186 UNODC, Criminal Intelligence Manual for Analysts, Vienna, 2011, p. 25. 
187 Ibid. 
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Figure 4. The evaluation process. 
The ‘4 x 4’ model is also part of the methodology for the 
EUROPOL Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (‘SOCTA’) 
adopted in 2012, described as follows: 
In general, information will be evaluated using the “four by 
four (4x4)” system, in which both the source and the infor-
mation are independently assessed, and every combination of 
a source and its information is assigned a value ranging from 
A1 to X4.188 
The same document defines as an assumption that all source from 
EUROPOL, the contributing agencies from EU member States and EU 
institutions (Eurojust, Frontex, and so on) shall be rated A1 and that “[t]he 
information that can be used for the SOCTA should have an evaluation of 
B3 or higher (A1, A2, A3, B1, B2)”.189 In the version of the ‘4 x 4’ model 
adopted by INTERPOL the sources codes are: A – Always reliable; B – 
Sometimes reliable; C – Unreliable; X – Untested. The information codes 
                                                   
188 Council of the European Union, “Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(SOCTA) – Methodology”, 4 July 2012, ST 12159 2012 INIT, p. 19 (available on the Open 












Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 172 
define the top value 1 as ‘known to be true’, and lower values are similar 
to Figure 3 above.190 
A main merit of this model is evaluating separately source and in-
formation, which contemplates the possibility that a ‘bad source’ can pro-
vide ‘good information’ and vice versa. As indicated from historiography, 
“[t]he most honest witness may misstate; the worst may tell the truth”.191 
This distinction departs from classic jurisprudence that conditioned entire-
ly the validity of the evidence on the honesty of the witness. The principle 
testibus se, no testimoniis creditor (believe the witness, not the testimony), 
known in Roman and other ancient traditions, was characteristic of sys-
tems with limited means of evidence that relied exclusively on witness 
testimony.192 A certain emphasis on witness traits could also lead to an 
argumentum ad hominem, that is, disqualifying an argument by attacking 
its proponent, which is considered as a classic fallacy. 
The analytical distinction between the two parameters source–
information was already acknowledged by Jeremy Bentham in his An 
Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence when he referred to two 
aspects relevant to the “increase or diminution of probative force” for the 
evidence: 
1. The source from which the evidence – the information – sprints, and 
is delivered; and 
2. The shape in which it is delivered.193 
Hans Gross would also indicate that, for different reasons, “[w]e 
must not imagine that an honest witness will at all hazard stick to the 
                                                   
190 See INTERPOL, Practical Guidelines: Sharing Information with Law Enforcement, sect. 3 
“Providing High Quality Information” and template in sect. 6 (available on INTERPOL’s 
web site). See also Agreement between Interpol and Europol, 5 November 2001, Article 9, 
adopting the 4 x 4 model. 
191 Thomas Spencer Jerome, “The Case of the Eyewitnesses: ‘A Lie Is a Lie Even in Latin’”, 
in Robin W. Winks (ed.), The Historian as Detective: Essays on Evidence, Harper Colo-
phon Books, New York, 1968, p. 187. 
192 See János Jany, Judging in the Islamic, Jewish and Zoroastrian Legal Traditions: A Com-
parison of Theory and Practice, Routledge, New York, 2012, pp. 96–97. 
193 Jeremy Bentham, in John Bowring (ed.), An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evi-
dence; for the Use of Non-lawyers as well as Lawyers, vol. VI, William Tait, Edinburgh, 
1843, p. 14. For a commentary on Bentham, see William Twining, Theories of Evidence: 
Bentham and Wigmore, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1985 and William Twining and 
Terence Anderson, Analysis of Evidence, Butterworths, London, 1991. 
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truth”.194 ICTY jurisprudence concurs, particularly for eyewitness identi-
fication of perpetrators, when referring to “the possibility that even com-
pletely honest witnesses may have been mistaken in their identifica-
tion”.195 As it has been observed from national practice: “[h]ence testimo-
ny should not be understood as a mere dictum, but rather as an act made 
of two elements: the testis and the dictum”.196 This broad acceptance in 
contemporary investigative and judicial practice led to incorporate the 
dual approach in the method adopted by OTP ID in 2006.197 
The method of the structured matrix also helps developing aware-
ness and standard practice for agencies comprising large numbers of of-
ficers and sources. The officer is forced to adopt a scale in the quality of 
the sources and to carry out the evaluation accordingly. This model has 
two main limitations for the needs of a criminal investigation. Firstly, the 
source codes are based on the experience with the source, assuming a 
series of previous or ongoing engagements. This is consistent with the 
practice of handling informants by police and intelligence officers, for 
continuing monitoring of criminal or hostile activities, but it may not ap-
ply the same way for a criminal investigation when the witness is assessed 
in relation to a single event. 
Secondly, merely assigning a code is insufficient to address the 
complexity of the relevant issues, usually requiring more detailed assess-
ment. For example, in the judgment on the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 
March 2003, the judges considered as a relevant indicator the classifica-
tion of some information as A1, according to the handling of an informant 
by the police, but they further discussed extensively credibility and relia-
bility issues in the context of the alleged crime.198 
Furthermore, assumptions of highest validity merely because of the 
formal status of the provider, like in the above-mentioned EUROPOL 
                                                   
194 Gross, 1906, p. 90, see above note 41. 
195 Kunarac et al. Trial Decision on Motion for Acquittal, para. 8, see above note 50. 
196 Alejandro Solís Espinoza, “Psicología del testigo y del testimonio”, in Derecho PUCP: 
Revista de la Facultad de Derecho, 2000, vol. 53, p. 1015. The author elaborates on the 
procedure of Perú, with references from Spanish-speaking countries. 
197 See below Section 3.2.4. 
198 Spain National High Court Zougam Sentencia, pp. 331–32, based on the testimony of the 
guardia civiles who had handled the informant and produced relevant reports rated A1, see 
above note 61. 
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model, are certainly not appropriate for a criminal investigation, let alone 
one that may have to confront State actors. 
At the other end of the methodological spectrum is the un-
structured approach, consisting on some free commentary and assessment 
according to broadly defined criteria, or trusted to the experience of a 
seasoned professional. This is typical of researchers and lawyers acting 
individually, as opposed to teams that need common standards, and claim-
ing a degree of authority or expertise on the relevant subjects and proce-
dures. 
Historians have a solid tradition of Source Evaluation, including 
exegesis and hermeneutics in Biblical studies, and the school of 
Quellenkritik (source criticism) in German historiography. Their approach 
is often sophisticated, but not necessarily with a uniform methodology. 
For example, Raul Hilberg, leading authority in the history of the holo-
caust, explained his very elaborate practice for Source Evaluation in his 
book Sources of Holocaust Research based on a multitude of ad hoc ex-
amples, rather than an overall standard system. 199 The historian Carlo 
Ginzburg has discussed thoroughly issues of Source Evaluation when 
reviewing the investigation and trial of some leaders of Lotta Continua in 
his book The Judge and the Historian. 200 Stathis N. Kalyvas, another 
leading researcher, explains thoroughly his experience handling multiple 
sources and their biases in his major work The Logic of Violence in Civil 
Wars, in a way that similarly is very sophisticated, but not easy to repli-
cate in standard team work.201 In the words of a classic study in this area, 
“[v]erification is required of the researcher in a multitude of points […] 
verification is accordingly conducted on many planes, and its technique is 
not fixed”.202 Taken to the field of philosophy, this would be similar to 
                                                   
199 Raul Hilberg, Sources of Holocaust Research: An Analysis, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2001. 
More on his experience, including exchanges with Franz Neumann and Hannah Arendt, in 
his memoirs, Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian, 
Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 1996. 
200 Ginzburg, 1999, see above note 167. 
201 See Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 393–411, including detailed methodological observations about 
archives, judicial records and witnesses and their biases, see above note 64. 
202 Barzun and Graff, 1992, p. 99, see above note 36. For historiographic methodology, see 
Robin W. Winks (ed.), The Historian as Detective: Essays on Evidence, Harper Colophon 
Books, New York, 1968; Louis R. Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Histor-
ical Method, 2nd edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1969; and Jerzy Topolsky, Metodo-
logia de la Historia, Cátedra, Madrid, 1992 (translation of the original in Polish, 1973), 
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Paul Feyerabend’s ‘epistemological anarchism’, a radical critique of uni-
versal scientific methodologies.203 Only that Feyerabend means to chal-
lenge rationalism, and criminal justice rests axiomatically on rationalist 
positivism, that is, the assumption that there is a positive factual reality 
that can be determined through universal rational methods. 
Legal practitioners are often reluctant to adopt clear methodologies 
for Source Evaluation. For example, John Henry Wigmore dedicated more 
than 400 pages to “testimonial evidence” in his massive work (1179 pages) 
The Principles of Judicial Proof, identifying multiple factors relevant 
from jurisprudence and scientific research, but he never produced a meth-
odology to assess them systematically.204 Another legal expert of this pe-
riod, Charles C. Moore quoted in his A Treatise on Facts or the Weight 
and Value of Evidence several judges and authors dismissing the idea of 
having any set methodology for the evaluation of witnesses.205 One judge 
found that when deciding to believe or not a witness, for each juror “this 
belief is personal, individual, and depends upon an infinite variety of cir-
cumstances; any attempt to regulate or control it by a fixed rule is imprac-
ticable, worse than useless, inconsistent and repugnant to the nature of a 
trial by jury […]”.206 Another judge noted: “[i]t is one of the difficulties 
attending all tribunals passing upon facts, that the reasons for believing 
particular witnesses or particular testimony in preference to others cannot 
be defined”.207 Jerome Frank, another influential judge and legal theorist 
would summarise: “the methods used by trial judges in determining 
whether or not to believe particular witnesses cannot be formulated in 
rules and rendered systematic”.208 
                                                                                                                        
particularly chap. XVIII “La autenticidad de las fuentes y la fiabilidad de los informants”, 
pp. 333–49. 
203 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, Verso, London, 1975. 
204 Wigmore, 1913, part II “Testimonial Evidence”, pp. 312–744, including title I “Generic 
Human Traits Affecting the Trustworthiness of Testimony”, title II “The Elements of the 
Testimonial Process Itself as Affecting the Trustworthiness of Testimony”, and so on, see 
above note 128. 
205 Charles C. Moore, “Introductory”, in A Treatise on Facts or the Weight and Value of Evi-
dence: Volume I, Edward Thompson Company, New York, 1908, sect. 3 “Judicial State-
ments Concerning Standards of Belief”, pp. 4–7. 
206 Ibid., p. 5. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Jerome Frank, ““Short of Sickness and Death”: A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal 
Criticism”, in New York University Law Journal, 1951, vol. 26, no. 4, p. 559. 
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This kind of holistic and intuitive free evaluation has the advantage 
of flexibility to address multiple factors and scenarios, but its validity 
seems to be subject to at least four premises. Firstly, the person conduct-
ing the evaluation should be a true expert on evidence, with advanced 
skills derived from serious training and investigative or judicial experi-
ence. Secondly, the evaluator would need to be free of confirmation bias 
and be able to evaluate source and information impartially, regardless of 
their consistency with the litigation arguments: this is very hard to achieve 
for the parties, whether defence or prosecution, in a polarized litigation 
context. Thirdly, the evaluator should be very knowledgeable about the 
personal and social context of the witness, which is not always the case 
with foreign investigating and judicial officers. Fourthly, for auditing pur-
poses, the evaluator would have to be ready to communicate and explain 
the assessment conducted every time, by the ad hoc reasoning developed 
for each source. 
Some semi-structured methods have emerged in forensic psycholo-
gy, asylum procedures and Internet research. By the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century a number of psychologists and lawyers developed 
in Europe what they called ‘the science of testimony’, beginning with the 
Austrian criminologist Hans Gross, as he explained in his handbook 
Criminal Investigations, the French lawyer and psychologist Alfred Binet 
and his seminal book La suggestibilité, and followed among others by 
Francois Gorphe with his influential handbook La critique du Témoign-
age.209 
Gross addressed in detail “the examination of witnesses and ac-
cused” based on investigative practice, jurisprudence and research on 
psychology. His original handbook in German was translated into English 
and published in Chennai in 1906 with some adaptation to the context of 
                                                   
209 Binet, 1900, see above note 113; and Alfred Binet, “La science du témoignage”, in 
L’Année psychologique, 1904, vol. 11, pp. 128–36. For a commentary on Binet’s historical 
importance, see Serge Nicolas, Yannick Gounden and Rasyid Bo Sanitioso, “Alfred Binet, 
Founder of the Science of Testimony and Psycho-legal Science”, in L’Année psy-
chologique, 2014, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 209–29. For that period, see also Hugo Münsterberg, 
On the witness stand: Essays on Psychology and Crime, Doubleday, Page & Co., New 
York, 1909. Münsterberg refers to Binet’s experiments, and further highlights problems 
with witness memory and suggestibility. Also very critical of witness testimony, M.C. Ot-
to, “Testimony and Human Nature”, in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1918, 
vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 98–104. 
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India.210 He identified many relevant factors and scenarios, but gave no 
clear guidance for operational implementation. His outline for Source 
Evaluation shows in the table of contents of his handbook as follows: 
Examination of Witnesses and Accused. 
i.—General considerations … 52 
ii.—Examination of witnesses … 56 
A. When the witness desires to speak the truth … 57 
1. Fundamental considerations … 58 
(a) Perception … 58 
(b) Memory … 72 
2. Special considerations … 78 
(a) Strong feeling as a cause of inaccuracy of ob-
servation … 78 
(b) Inaccurate observations following wounds on 
the head … 82 
(c) Differences in the observing powers, resulting 
from differences in the natural qualities and in-
tellectual culture of the observer … 87 
B. When the witness does not wish to speak the truth … 97 
C. Pathological lying … 108 
iii.—Examination of the accused … 109 
Table 1. Outline for Source Evaluation. 
Gorphe went one step beyond and proposed a tableau synoptique to 
assess testimonies from four points of view: moral, intellectual, emotional, 
and psychological, see below:211 
                                                   
210 Gross, 1906, see above note 41. The editors adapted this edition to “combine and include 
therewith a mass of information of peculiar interest in India” (“Preface”, in ibid., p. v). See 
ibid., chap. II “Examination of Witnesses and Accused”, pp. 52–122. 
211 Gorphe, 1924, p. 386, see above note 130. 
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Table 2. Tableau synoptique. 
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As forensic psychology evolved, more elaborate methods emerged, 
such as the Statement Validity Assessment (‘SVA’). This method is based 
on the so-called ‘Undeutsch hypothesis’, as formulated by the German 
psychologist Udo Undeutsch, according to which “a statement derived 
from memory of an actual experience differs in content and quality from a 
statement based on invention or fantasy”.212 
The German Supreme Court ruled first in 1954 that expert witness-
es, such as psychiatrists or psychologists, could be called to assess the 
credibility of statements by alleged child victims of sexual abuse, particu-
larly in the absence of any other evidence. Then in 1999 it declared SVA 
as the standard expert procedure for such cases.213 
The SVA was designed to assess statements given by children about 
alleged sexual abuse, which were considered particularly sensitive and 
prone to suggestion or false allegations, and in many cases the only avail-
able evidence.214 This origin is comparable to the context of international 
investigations, with various reliability issues and often allegations sus-
tained by a single witness, hence the need of some methodology of that 
kind is understandable in the international context. Some proponents of 
the SVA claim that it can be used also with adults and any crime.215 
The SVA considers multiple hypotheses about the factual validity of 
a statement, including ‘deliberate lie’ and ‘non-intentional mistakes’, and 
it includes the Criteria-Based Content Analysis (‘CBCA’) as a standard 
check-list for evaluating statements under the hypothesis of ‘deliberate 
                                                   
212 Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities, 2nd edition, Wiley, 
Chichester, 2008, p. 209. 
213 Valerie Hauch, Siegfried L. Sporer, Jaume Masip and Iris Blandon-Gitlin, “Can Credibility 
Criteria Be Assessed Reliably? A Meta-Analysis of Criteria-Based Content Analysis”, in 
Psychological Assessment, 2017, vol. 29, no. 6, p. 820. 
214 See Günter Köhnken, “Statement Validity Analysis and the ‘Detecion of Truth’”, in Pär 
Anders Granhag and Leif A. Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in Forensic 
Contexts, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 41–63; Josep Baqués Cardona, “Otras 
técnicas en psicología forense: detección de mentiras en la declaración de testigos”, in Mi-
guel Angel Soria Verde (coord.), Manual de psicología penal forense, Atelier, Barcelona, 
2002, pp. 335–60; and Eugenio Carlos Fernández-Ballesteros González, “Evaluación de la 
credibilidad y de la validez del testimonio de menores”, in Miguel Angel Soria Verde 
(coord.), Manual de psicología penal forense, Atelier, Barcelona, 2002, pp. 581–622. 
215 See Köhnken, 2004, p. 60, see above note 214. 
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lie’. See below outline of the main hypotheses, as presented by propo-
nents of this method.216 
 
Figure 5. Outline of the main hypotheses. 
See overview of the 19 CBCA criteria in Table 3 below.217 
General characteristics: 
1. Logical structure 
2. Unstructured production 
3. Quantity of details 
Specific contents: 
4. Contextual embedding 
5. Descriptions of interactions 
6. Reproduction of conversation 
7. Unexpected complications during the incident 
8. Unusual details 
9. Superfluous details 
                                                   
216 Günter Köhnken, Antonio L. Manzanero, and M. Teresa Scott, “Statement Validity As-
sessment: Myths and Limitations”, in Anuario de Psicología Jurídica, 2015, vol. 25, p. 17. 
217 From Pär Anders Granhag, Aldert Vrij and Bruno Verschuere, Detecting Deception: Cur-
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10. Accurately reported details misunderstood 
11. Related external associations 
12. Accounts of subjective mental state 
13. Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state 
Motivation-related contents: 
14. Spontaneous corrections 
15. Admitting lack of memory 
16. Raising doubts about one’s own testimony 
17. Self-deprecation 
18. Pardoning the perpetrator 
Offence-specific elements: 
19. Details characteristic of the offence  
Table 3. Overview of the 19 CBCA criteria. 
SVA and CBCA are meant to be applied by certified psychologists 
who have been trained specifically in the method. They are expected to 
rate each CBCA criterion in three-level or five-level scales (practice var-
ies), and to produce an overall score aggregating the ratings of all indica-
tors.218 In some countries, particularly Germany, the SVA and its CBCA 
have been admitted as evidence in court while, beyond formal admissibil-
ity, their actual probative value may vary across cases, practitioners, and 
jurisdictions.219 
This method appears to show several limitations: the underlying 
‘Undeutsch hypothesis’ is taken as an axiomatic premise rather than as a 
hypothesis; each indicator is fairly open to interpretation; some of the 
indicators have dubious scientific foundation, such as ‘quantity of details’ 
(see discussion in Section 3.2.4.8.2. below). Some research and laboratory 
tests suggest that the CBCA may be able to determine the truthfulness of a 
statement with about 70 per cent of success: this is slightly above the 50 
per cent of a random guess, which could be helpful but far from conclu-
                                                   
218 Vrij, 2008, p. 208, see above note 212. 
219 According to Köhnken, “SVA has now [2004] been widely accepted by many courts in 
continental Europe (Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden) as well as in 
the United Kingdom”, including a ruling to that effect by the German Supreme Court. See 
Köhnken, 2004, p. 60, see above note 214. Still, as Moa Lidén rightly observed in her re-
view of my draft, one thing is to be procedurally ‘accepted’ as evidence, another thing is 
the actual probative value, and yet a different thing is acceptance by the scientific commu-
nity. For an example and critical assessment of CBCA applied in a case in the Netherlands, 
see Wagenaar and Crombag, 2005, pp. 113–14, see above note 97. 
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sive.220 Hence the method may be useful tentatively at the investigation 
stage, but not as categorical evidence on its own right. The proponents of 
SVA-CBCA argue that it is preferable to the alternatives of merely im-
pressionistic assessments, reliance on non-verbal cues, or the polygraph, 
which is probably a fair point but it doesn’t say much about the validity of 
the method as such.221 
Following the SVA method, psychologists are expected to run the 
results of the CBCA with a Validity Checklist comprising another 11 indi-
cators related to the witness’ motives and psychological profile, the con-
duct of the interview, and consistency with other statement and evi-
dence. 222 This Validity Checklist then would take the assessment to a 
whole different area, including verification against other sources. 
Reality Monitoring is another model developed by experts in cogni-
tive psychology. It resembles SVA-CBCA in some respects, and some 
authors recommend to use both jointly.223 
Similar models have been proposed for evaluating asylum applica-
tions, including with the support of UNHCR and the European Union.224 
For example, the European Asylum Support Office proposed in 2018 a 
check-list with four ‘credibility indicators’: ‘internal consistency’, ‘exter-
nal consistency’, ‘sufficiency of detail’ and ‘plausibility’.225 
3.2.4. Recommended Method 
Based on a review of the abovementioned methods, the relevant jurispru-
dence, and consultation with colleagues, I concluded in the early years of 
the ICC-OTP that a semi-structured approach would be most suitable for 
                                                   
220 Vrij, 2008, p. 256, see above note 212. 
221 See Köhnken, 2004, p. 61, see above note 214. For a critical assessment of CBCA, see 
Wagenaar and Crombag, 2005, pp. 189–92, see above note 97. 
222 Vrij, 2008, chap. 8 “Statement Validity Assessment”, sect. “Stage 4: Evaluation of the 
CBCA Outcome: The Validity Checklist”, pp. 213–18, see above note 212; ibid., sect. “Va-
lidity Checklist: Reflections”, pp. 241–51. 
223 See Siegfried L. Sporer, “Reality Monitoring and Detection of Deception”, in Pär Anders 
Granhag and Leif A. Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 64–102. 
224 UNHCR, 2013, p. 30, see above note 84. 
225 European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Evidence and Credibility Assessment in the 
Context of the Common European Asylum System, 2018, p. 188; ibid., sect. 4.5 “Credibility 
Indicators”. 
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our investigations. I drafted accordingly the Source Evaluation Guidelines, 
based on a check-list of standard indicators to be addressed with a brief 
description of the relevant facts, and a rating for each indicator. This 
method was designed to assist the investigations both prospectively, to 
select the best sources for collection, and also for subsequent analysis and 
quality control. This section reflects largely the content of these guidelines, 
while departing on some issues for the purpose of academic discussion, 
and further critical review and improvement. 
The 15 proposed indicators (see Table 4 below) were meant to as-
sess jointly different dimensions. Some indicators relate to the likelihood 
of ‘the truth’ in a fundamental sense, trying to assess whether ‘the source 
is telling the truth’.226 Other indicators have the more modest purpose to 
contribute to ‘the judicial truth’, assessing whether the sources are suita-
ble for the communicative procedure of the investigations and trials. Cer-
tainly ‘the judicial truth’ is meant to correspond with ‘the truth’, but the 
judicial process is based on the principles of evidential ‘orality’, ‘immedi-
acy’ and reasonability in ways that call for specific communicative 
skills.227 First the witness is expected to be fundamentally able and will-
ing to convey the truth; additionally, a good witness is also expected to be 
convincing, which usually requires good oral communication and reason-
ing skills, in order to pass the test of cross-examination and the ‘immedi-
                                                   
226 For epistemological reference, see Jacobo Munoz and Julián Velarde (eds.), Compendio de 
Epistemología, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2000; Juan Antonio Nicolás and María José 
Frápolli (eds.), Teorías de la verdad en el siglo XX, Tecnos, Madrid, 1997; and Feyerabend, 
1975, see above note 203. 
227 For a discussion about ‘judicial truth’ and empirical truth, see Michele Taruffo, “Prueba y 
verdad en el proceso civil”, in La prueba de los hechos, Trotta, Madrid, 2002 (Spanish 
translation of the original in Italian of 1992), pp. 21–88; and HO Hock Lai, “Truth, Justice 
and Justification”, in A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search of Truth, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 51–84. For the Dutch system, see Marc S. Groenhuijsen and 
Hatice Selçuk, sect. III “The Concept of Truth in the Dutch Criminal Procedure”, in “The 
Principle of Immediacy in Dutch Criminal Procedure in the Perspective of European Hu-
man Rights Law”, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 2014, vol. 126, no. 
1, pp. 251–52. For communication requirements in common-law procedure, see Emily 
Henderson, Christopher Heffer and Mark Kebbell, “Courtroom Questioning and Dis-
course”, in Gavin Oxburgh, Trond Myklebust, Tim Grant and Rebecca Milne (eds.), Com-
munication in Investigative and Legal Contexts: Integrated Approaches from Forensic 
Psychology, Linguistics and Law Enforcement, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, 2016, pp. 
181–208. 
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ate’ perception by the judges.228 These different dimensions can be ex-
plained as follows:229 
A. Truthfulness: Whether the information is fundamentally true, it cor-
responds with tangible positive facts. To be addressed mainly 
through ‘internal consistency’, ‘external verification’, and ‘detail’, 
which are three of the four indicators relevant to the information. 
B. Competence: As a pre-condition for truthfulness, whether the source 
is capable to acquire truthful knowledge. This is equivalent to what 
historians may call ‘competence’, in relation to “degree of expert-
ness, state of mental and physical health, age, education, memory, 
narrative skill, etc.”.230 Also related to what Wigmore referred to as 
‘perception’, including sight, hearing and other sensory considera-
tions. 231  To be evaluated through ‘language’, ‘knowledge’ and 
‘medical condition’. 
C. Authenticity: Whether the knowledge is authentic, not determined 
by undue self-serving design or external influence. To be evaluated 
through ‘motivation’, ‘independence’, ‘contamination’ and ‘imme-
diacy’. These indicators are related to the perspective of the source 
vis-à-vis the reported facts, comparable partly to the concept of ‘po-
sitionality’ in gender studies or ‘personal equation’ in astronomy.232 
D. Pragmatic performance: As a practical consideration and subordi-
nate to the above substantive issues, whether the witness is able to 
communicate effectively, during the investigation, and also poten-
tially to the judges after adversarial cross-examination. Once the 
truthful and authentic sources are identified, the parties may want to 
prioritize for trial among them those who communicate best, partic-
ularly in common-law systems that rely heavily on oral perfor-
                                                   
228 On legal procedure as communication, see Frank, 1949, chap. XIII “A Trial as Communi-
cative Process”, pp. 186–89, see above note 1. 
229 For the specifics on each indicator, see below Sections 3.2.4.7. and 3.2.4.8. 
230 See Gottschalk, 1969, p. 151, see above note 202. 
231 See John Henry Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof, or the Process of Proof: As 
Given by Logic, Psychology and General Experience and Illustrated in Judicial Trials, 2nd 
edition, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1931, sect. “Perception”, pp. 335–93. 
232 See Gottschalk, 1969, p. 148, see above note 202. On positionality, see, for example, 
Frances A. Maher and Mary Kay Tetreault, “Frames of Positionality: Constructing Mean-
ingful Dialogues About Gender and Race”, in Anthropological Quarterly, 1993, vol. 66, no. 
3, pp. 118–26. 
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mance. This is similar to what Wigmore referred to as “narration or 
communication”, defined as “accurately reproducing and expressing 
the actual and sincere recollection” and “intelligibility to the tribu-
nal of the witness’s utterance”.233 To be evaluated possibly on the 
basis of ‘prior experience’, ‘communication’, ‘behaviour’, and 
‘criminal record’, as explained below. 
The model below aggregated requirements related to both the inves-
tigation and trial performance, which is consistent with the ‘integrated’ 
model adopted by the ICC-OTP, with early anticipation of trial require-
ments at the investigation stage. To an extent this reflects the US model 
since, in the words of a former US prosecutor, in the US “the line between 
investigation and trial is non-existent”, and “this adversarial mentality 
sees the investigation and trial as one undifferentiated process”.234 Since 
at least the times of Bentham and Wigmore “the central tradition of An-
glo-American evidence scholarship is closely connected to the discourse 
of lawyers and of the courts”, hence evidence tends to be evaluated in a 
utilitarian perspective, for prospect litigation effectiveness, rather than 
from an autonomous viewpoint of empirical validity and accuracy.235 The 
US influence on international prosecutorial practice is noticeable, dating 
back to the precedents of Nuremberg, Tokyo, ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, 
through the influence of a large number of senior officers and advisors. 
For example, by 2003 an experienced ICTY Senior Trial Attorney (‘STA’) 
from the US, previously a prosecutor in his country, advised ICC that an 
“experienced attorney should be in charge of the overall investigation and 
responsible for carrying it out” because: 
The experienced senior trial attorney is the person in the best 
position to understand what evidence he or she will need to 
charge and successfully prosecute an accused person. This is 
especially true in a new, developing system like the ICC.236 
                                                   
233 See Wigmore, 1931, sect. “Narration”, p. 455, see above note 231. 
234 William T. Pizzi, Trials Without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal Trials Has Become 
and Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It, New York University Press, 
1999, p. 60. 
235 Twining, 1985, p. 178, see above note 193. The author, an English law professor, com-
ments approvingly on Wigmore, and considers his method “solidly grounded in one intel-
lectually respectable tradition” and unmatched “in sophistication and clarity”. 
236 McCloskey, 2017, p. 207, see above note 19. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 186 
Another ICTY STA from the US also advised the ICC in the same 
direction, arguing that “[i]t is vital, therefore, that the prosecutors be ac-
tively involved in the investigation and oversee the manner in which evi-
dence is developed and collected”.237 A word of caution may be needed 
here because anticipating the argument for incrimination as the guiding 
principle for investigations may undermine their impartiality. As observed 
by a former US prosecutor, the US system tends to “permit and encourage 
extreme behaviour from lawyers” and such aggressive adversarial compe-
tition “ends up undervaluing truth”.238 A safer alternative could be to ad-
dress separately the investigative and trial needs when evaluating sources, 
in order to focus more accurately on empirical fact-finding, and discuss 
separately suitability for trial performance. 
Following the dual approach adopted in the practice by jurispru-
dence, police and intelligence, I arranged the indicators under two catego-
ries, as they are relevant to the provider of the evidence (under ‘source’ in 
Table 4 below) or to the substantive content (under ‘information’ in Table 
4 below). The check-list includes 11 indicators for ‘source’ and 4 for ‘in-
formation’. This does not mean that ‘information’ is less important. ‘Ex-
ternal verification’ in particular is often a crucial issue, requiring exten-
sive work for cross-checking against multiple sources. See below the 15 
indicators with their summary descriptions: 
 Summary Description 
1. Source 
1.1 Motivation Motives that lead the source to offer the information. 
1.2 Prior experience Prior experience of interaction, or earlier records. 
1.3 Independence Association with any actor relevant to the matter 
under investigation. 
                                                   
237 Clint Williamson, “On Charging Criteria and Other Policy Concerns”, in Morten Bergsmo, 
Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal 
Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, p. 413 (http://www.
toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). 
238 Pizzi, 1999, p. 3, see above note 234. More on the US prosecutorial system in Garrett, 
2011, see above note 4. 
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1.4 Contamination Influence by other sources or actors. 
1.5 Self-restraint Ability to restrain to areas of actual valid knowledge. 
1.6 Language Knowledge of languages material to the investigation. 
1.7 Communication Ability to communicate clearly. 
1.8 Knowledge Prior knowledge of the relevant context or areas of 
expertise. 
1.9 Behaviour Interaction and co-operation with the interviewers or 
the investigation. 
1.10 Criminal record Legitimate record of criminal behaviour, for crimes of 
any kind. 
1.11 Medical condition Physical or psychological issues relevant to cogni-
tion. 
2. Information  
2.1 Immediacy Distance to the reported facts, primary or secondary 
knowledge. 
2.2 Detail Specificity regarding names, dates, locations, figures, 
actions, and so on. 
2.3 Internal consistency Logical consistency of the information. 
2.4 External verification Verification with other sources relevant to the same 
facts. 
Table 4. The 15 indicators of the Source Evaluation Guidelines  
with their summary descriptions. 
3.2.4.1. Standard Template 
The evaluation should be completed through a ‘Source Evaluation Report’ 
(‘SER’) based on a standard template. That template would include a table 
comprising the indicators in the check-list above, along with two more 
columns: one for a concise description of the relevant facts, and another 
one for the rating of each indicator. The evaluator is expected to rate the 
indicators following a simple code as follows: ‘positive’ for a positive 
evaluation of the source or the information under that indicator; ‘negative’ 
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for the opposite; ‘intermediate’ in case of ambivalent data; ‘undetermined’ 
if the indicator cannot be assessed due to insufficient or conflicting data. 
In addition to the table described above, the standard template 
would have a section for free commentary, if the evaluator wishes to share 
some additional observation that does not fit under the check-list or ex-
plain some specifics, and for recommendations in order to address issues 
revealed by the evaluation through additional evidence collection or anal-
ysis. 
The resulting Source Evaluation Report shall contain an elaborate 
qualitative description, in which the ratings are meant to assist the de-
scription, rather than producing a quantitative measurement. The overall 
evaluation would not be quantified because the indicators are not homo-
geneous enough for mathematical aggregation. 
The evaluation should assist making the following decisions: 
• To believe or not the information; 
• to take additional actions to verify the information, such as a new 
interview of the witness, collection of other additional evidence, or 
specific analytical checks; 
• selection of witnesses for appearance before the trial chamber; and 
• protection measures, along with specific risk assessment procedures. 
These decisions would be made considering the specifics of the 
case and the source, and the available alternatives, after considering all 
indicators ‘in the round’ or holistically.239 
Beyond the standard Source Evaluation Report some sources may 
require a more elaborate and detailed report because they are particularly 
complex and important for the investigation. For example, a standard re-
port may require two pages, and it can be filled relatively quickly, while a 
more extensive report on a key insider may take several days of work and 
many more pages. 
The quality of a source may evolve over time, as new information 
emerges about the source or the subject-matter, or the behaviour of the 
source evolves. Hence the evaluation of a source may need to be run dy-
                                                   
239 On the concept of determination ‘in the round’, see Allan Mackey and John Barnes, As-
sessment of Credibility in Refugee and Subsidiary Protection Claims Under the EU Quali-
fication Directive: Judicial Criteria and Standards, International Association of Refugee 
Law Judges (‘IARLJ’), Haarlem, 2013, p. 41 (available on IARLJ’s web site). 
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namically, for example, if a witness is interviewed several times, after 
every new interview. 
3.2.4.2. Implementation 
The Director of the ID issued the Source Evaluation guidelines in 2006 
for mandatory reference of our Division, including analysts and investiga-
tors, and he asked me to reinforce the implementation in 2012 in response 
to the acquittal in Ngudjolo. The OTP Legal Advisory Section also con-
ducted research on the relevant jurisprudence by 2008 and the Situation 
Analysis Section followed-up with a version of the guidelines adapted to 
their duties at the Preliminary Examination stage. 
The ID SE Guidelines were marked as an internal confidential OTP 
document, only to assist at the investigation stage, not intended to bear 
probative value at the litigation stage. The evaluation, ratings and SERs 
are considered internal operational information, not subject to mandatory 
disclosure at the litigation stage. Some ‘facts’ (under the column ‘facts’ in 
the SER) identified through the evaluation and their underlying evidence 
may require disclosure at the litigation stage under certain circumstances. 
For example: under ‘medical condition’ the SER identifies some sight 
impairment that is relevant for an eyewitness selected for trial by the 
prosecution; this fact may need to be disclosed to the judges and the de-
fence, along with relevant medical diagnostic records, to the extent that it 
affects the evidence of that eyewitness, but not the SER as such, which is 
merely a document for internal investigative reference. The above would 
apply to ICC procedure, while rules of disclosure vary across legal sys-
tems and the practice would need to be adjusted to the legal system in 
question. 
3.2.4.3. Training 
I have conducted the mandatory training on SE over the years for analysts 
and investigators at the ID. This training lasts some four hours, starting 
with a briefing based on the ID guidelines and real examples from differ-
ent investigations and trials. Then participants are asked to evaluate a fic-
tional statement inspired on real experience with a key insider (11 pages, a 
summarised and simplified version of an original statement of 60 pages). 
The insider was not a perpetrator, he had been both a member and a vic-
tim of the perpetrating group. Participants are given a copy of this fiction-
al statement, along with a one-page summary of ‘available evidence’ to 
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check ‘external verification’, and information about the circumstances of 
the interview to assist evaluating ‘self-restraint’, ‘communication’ and 
‘behaviour’. Then participants are divided in small groups to fill the SE 
table and evaluate the witness following the guidelines. The training con-
cludes with a review of the evaluations, and further instructions for im-
plementation. The training is most often evaluated positively by the par-
ticipants, and a common feedback observation is that it should be longer 
to go into greater detail on the different examples, indicators and instruc-
tions. 
3.2.4.4. Inter-Rater Reliability 
I have recorded the ratings resulting from the practical exercises through 
multiple trainings to assess consistency among the raters, as a tentative 
inter-rater reliability test. The results of this test, as conducted by staff of 
the ID immediately after the training and based on the given scenario, 
showed consistency for most but not all indicators (see below specifics 
about the results of this testing for each indicator). Inter-rater reliability 
tests conducted for CBCA indicate similar variations across criteria, with 
higher consistency for “criteria that have more straightforward or intuitive 
operationalizations” and lower for “criteria with more complicated or less 
clearly defined operationalizations”.240 Low inter-rater consistency in any 
event may be due to a number of factors, related to the validity of the 
method, the available information or the skills of the evaluators. A proper 
inter-rater reliability test with valid statistical results could well be devel-
oped with additional research support. 
3.2.4.5. Additional Criteria 
There are more criteria that could be added to the check-list for further 
thoroughness. For example, in 2016 Chlevickaite and Hola identified 20 
criteria, including 9 for the ‘credibility of a witness’ and 11 for ‘the relia-
bility of information provided’, see Table 5 below.241 
                                                   
240 See Hauch, Sporer, Masip and Blandon-Gitlin, 2017, p. 820, see above note 213. 
241 Gabriele Chlevickaite and Barbora Hola, “Empirical Study of Insider Witnesses’ Assess-
ments at the International Criminal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2016, 
vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 687–88; ibid., Table “Testimony Assessment Factors in International 
Criminal Tribunals”, p. 688. 
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Table 5. The 20 criteria identified by Chlevickaite and Hola. 
Twelve of these 20 criteria had been already included in the pre-
existing ID Source Evaluation model.242 The procedural status of the wit-
ness could be a very relevant factor (suspect, accused, plea agreement, 
convict, and so on), which could be assessed specifically, as Chlevickaite 
and Barbora suggest, or be captured under ‘motivation’. Translation issues 
are certainly important, and they could be considered specifically or as a 
matter of ‘immediacy’ (a translation is strictly speaking a secondary 
source). The ‘time-lapse between the events and the testimony’ (SCSL 
jurisprudence, and Chlevickaite and Hola) could be considered, under the 
assumption that recency helps reliability. 
                                                   
242 While the article does not include definitions of the criteria, it appears that the following 
12 would be consistent with the ID Source Evaluation model: ‘Motivation’, ‘Potential Bias 
(Independence)’, ‘Contamination’, ‘Demeanour’, ‘Criminal Record’, ‘Medical Condition’, 
‘Ability to Understand the Language of the Events’, ‘Knowledge of the Facts’, ‘Detail’, 
‘Consistency (Internal and to Prior Statements’, ‘External Corroboration’ and ‘Proximity 
to or Involvement in the Events in Question’. 
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‘Impact of traumatic events’ (no. 10 under ‘reliability’ in Table 5 
above) is common in situations of violence, and the issue has been litigat-
ed in a number of cases (ICTY Kunarac, Furundžija, ICTR Akayesu, Kay-
ishema, SCSL Fofana and Kandewa, and so on). Nevertheless, there is no 
scientific consensus on the impact of trauma on memory. A review of sci-
entific literature would show that “there is no clear consensus as to 
whether stress improves or worsens memory” while the issue is condi-
tioned by “many individual psychosocial and biological factors”.243 The 
existing jurisprudence does not show any consensus either on the matter, 
as judges have tended to dismiss it as a relevant factor for specific find-
ings. 
Different authors (Gross 1893 and others) have proposed psycho-
logical criteria, including on individual memory and intellectual skills, 
some jurisprudence refers to the ‘personality’ of the witness, similar pos-
sibly to ‘character’ (no. 7 under ‘credibility’ in Table 5 above, proposed 
by Chlevickaite and Hola).244 The relevance of such psychological traits 
cannot be excluded, but its scientific foundation and practical implemen-
tation would need to be critically discussed. 
3.2.4.6. Fewer Criteria 
Alternatively, one could consider a more simple and robust model, with 
less criteria. An option could be to decide that “what matters is the infor-
mation and its corroboration” and reduce or eliminate the source indica-
tors. The problem is that in the context of international investigations cor-
roboration opportunities are often limited, because of the complexity of 
the facts and operational limitations, and with facts alleged by a single 
source the source-specific indicators become indispensable. This is pre-
cisely in the origins of the SVA-CBCA, which was invented to evaluate 
child testimony in cases when that was the only source of evidence, and 
the methods developed for asylum procedures, also often reliant only on 
the account of the applicant.245 
                                                   
243 Anya Topiwala and Seena Fazel, “Memory and Trauma”, in Morten Bergsmo and CHEAH 
Wui Ling (eds.), Old Evidence and Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, Beijing, 2012, p. 164 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/16-bergsmo-cheah). 
244 See for example, Rwamakuba Trial Judgment, paras. 102 and 135, dismissing a witness 
among other reasons because of “her particular personality”, see above note 54. 
245 See Gregor Noll (ed.), Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Proce-
dures, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005. 
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Still, for the sake of operational expediency, the source indicators 
could be limited to those that appear to be most relevant and reliable. As 
explained bellow, this could be ‘independence’, ‘contamination’, ‘lan-
guage’, ‘communication’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘medical condition’, which are 
related mainly to competence. This would reduce the source indicators 
from 11 to 6, and the total from 15 to 10. 
3.2.4.7. Source Indicators 
3.2.4.7.1. Motivation 
Often prosecutors, judges, or any observer for that matter, wonder about 
why a given witness decides to co-operate. Already in the times of the 
Maurya Empire the Arthashastra referred to “persons known for their 
honesty” as ‘trustworthy witnesses’.246 Cesare Beccaria proposed in his 
classic work Dei delitti e delle pene that for any witness “the true measure 
of his credibility is none other than the interest that he may have in telling 
the truth or not”.247 For Hans Gross, as he explained in his handbook 
Criminal Investigations, the first consideration in evaluating a witness 
was to assess his or her intentions, defining a method based on two main 
scenarios, A. “when the witness desires to speak the truth”, and B. when 
they do not.248 In some legal systems the trial testimony of a co-accused 
can be dismissed if the motives are related to revenge, ‘personal hatred’, 
blackmail or similar.249 For example, in the trial for the terrorist attack in 
Madrid on 11 March 2004, the judges evaluated positively the testimony 
of a key insider because “[i]t has been also confirmed the absence of spu-
rious motives, such as revenge, hatred, animosity or price”.250 In ICC-
OTP investigations, among many others, witnesses are regularly asked 
about their motives to speak in the beginning of interviews, and their an-
swer may show in their statements. This indicator would be similar to the 
point of “questionable motives to report” in the SVA Validity Checklist.251 
                                                   
246 See Kautilya, 1992, p. 356, see above note 44. 
247 Beccaria, 1774, sect. VIII “Dei testimoni”, p. 18, see above note 179. 
248 Gross, 1906, chap. II “Examination of Witnesses and Accused”, pp. 52–122, see above 
note 41. 
249 See Gascón Inchausti, 1999, pp. 125–26, referring to jurisprudence of the Spanish Tribunal 
Supremo (Supreme Court), see above note 37. 
250 Spain National High Court Zougam Sentencia, p. 334, see above note 61. 
251 Vrij, 2008, p. 217, see above note 212. 
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This emphasis on motivation is arguable for several reasons: mo-
tives are culturally conditioned, particularly by the weight given to the 
individual or the collective in each culture (see Section 3.2.2.2. above 
regarding cultural biases), and open to culturally-biased interpretation;252 
different motives, no matter how benign or pernicious, are not mutually 
exclusive, they may well coexist and evolve; establishing the motive re-
quires a degree of psychological speculation; sometimes the focus on mo-
tives brings inappropriately moral judgment into the technical assessment; 
and the record from jurisprudence is far from conclusive on the weight 
given to different motives. While I had my doubts about the validity of 
‘motivation’ as a reliable empirical parameter, I agreed to include it in the 
model because of the precedents in jurisprudence and suggestion by some 
legal officers. 
Table 6 below summarises motives to give a statement that are often 
self-reported by witnesses, or otherwise identified through investigation, 
in the context of international crimes. 
1. Contribution to justice and truth. 
2. Wish to put an end to impunity. 
3. Wish to prevent future crimes. 
4. Pre-existent personal conflict with the suspect or associates. 
5. Revenge, intention to damage the alleged suspect or associates. 
6. Political or war propaganda, discrediting opposing party or suspects. 
7. Personal profit or self-promotion, including penal benefits. 
8. Group loyalty or pressure. 
9. Asylum application for reasons related to the case. 
10. Advocacy agenda for victims or particular issues. 
11. Reparations because of relevant crimes. 
                                                   
252 See Thomas, 2008, chap. 4, section on “Motivation Across Cultures”, pp. 87–89, see above 
note 82. 
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12. Protection because of relevant procedures or other. 
13. Financial support because of relevant procedures or other. 
Table 6. Motives of witnesses to give a statement  
in the context of international crimes. 
The top three motives above are often self-reported by victims and 
other witnesses and they are consistent with the purpose of the procedure. 
They may express their genuine commitment to justice, which is often the 
case, or their wish to please the interviewer, or some combination of both. 
In a survey of ICTY witnesses conducted in 2001, 90 per cent of the re-
spondents indicated that their motivation to testify was a sense of ‘moral 
obligation’, including “to speak for those who were missing or dead” and 
to make sure that they “would never be forgotten”.253 A word of caution 
may be still be granted since, as indicated for interviewing methodology 
in anthropology, “[i]nterviews are social encounters […] [e]xpect people 
to over-report socially desirable behavior and to under-report socially 
undesirable behavior”.254 
Motives related to personal agendas, revenge or propaganda (4 to 8 
in Table 6 above) are rarely self-reported by witnesses, but they are not 
uncommon in view of the human suffering and polarization in situations 
of mass violence. For example, in ICTY Vasiljević the Trial Chamber 
dismissed the evidence from a witness because she appeared to have 
“considerable animus against the accused”.255 
Penal benefits as a motive is common in scenarios of plea bargain, 
or for convicts seeking reduction of terms or improvement of penitentiary 
conditions. Defence attorneys are likely to object to such witnesses, but 
often judges have dismissed such objections and accepted their evidence. 
In ICTY Simić the Trial Chamber did not consider a co-accused who 
pleaded guilty and who appeared as a witness for the Prosecution unrelia-
                                                   
253 Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (eds.), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Com-
munity in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 105. 
254 See H. Russel Bernard, “Interviewing: Unstructured and Semistructured”, in Research 
Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Altamira Press, Wal-
nut Creek, 2002, p. 237. 
255 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, IT-98-32-T, 
fn. 190 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8035f9/). The judgment does not explain the basis 
of this finding, nor its relevance in the given context. 
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ble, since the witness was sentenced prior to giving his oral testimony.256 
In Blagojević the Trial Chamber accepted evidence from a prosecution 
witness that had given his plea agreement, and the Appeals Chamber con-
firmed the validity of this decision in spite of objections from the de-
fence.257 In Kordić and Čerkez the defence challenged the credibility of a 
key insider and co-perpetrator, who had been convicted before for the 
same crimes by ICTY judges, because of his interest to get his sentence 
reduced, as well as established falsehood in his own previous trial: the 
Trial Chamber deemed his testimony reliable because of circumstantial 
corroboration and “his demeanour”.258 Similarly in ICTR Ntakirutimnana 
et al, the Appeals Chamber observed: “the mere fact that an incarcerated 
suspect had a possible incentive to perjure himself on the stand in order to 
gain leniency from the prosecutorial authorities is not sufficient, by itself, 
to establish that the suspect did in fact lie”.259 In Niytegeka, the Appeals 
Chamber also took into consideration that accomplice witnesses may have 
motives or incentives to implicate the accused person, but found that “ac-
complice testimony is not per se unreliable, especially where an accom-
plice may be thoroughly cross-examined”.260 
In some cases, the judges have presumed that insiders involved in 
the crimes have an interest in avoiding self-incrimination, which may 
disqualify their testimony. For example, in ICTR Bagambiki et al. the 
Chamber found certain Defence witnesses not to be “credible or reliable” 
because they were “biased and self-interested” after they had served under 
the command of the accused, and because acknowledging the crimes 
could incriminate them.261 The Trial Chamber in Muvunyi found the tes-
                                                   
256 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement, 17 October 2003, IT-95-9-T, 
para. 21 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa9b81/). 
257 Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, para. 117, see above note 18. 
258 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 26 February 2001, IT-
95-14/2-T, para. 630 (‘Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/d4fedd/). 
259 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Appeals Cham-
ber, Judgement, 13 December 2004, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, para. 181 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/af07be/). 
260 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 9 July 2004, ICTR-96-14-
A, para. 98 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/35cd4f/). 
261 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe, Trial Chamber, Judgement 
and Sentence, 25 February 2004, ICTR-99-46-T, para. 399 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/60036f/). 
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timony of one witness to be “unreliable” because he was a militiaman 
who “had reason to enhance the accused’s role in order to diminish his 
own role”, and “his evidence on the issue was not corroborated”.262 
There are other motives that are also frequent and they do not nec-
essarily have a positive or negative impact (9 to 13 in Table 6 above). 
They may be legitimate, but they need to be reported in order to determine 
whether they have influenced the resulting information. 
The prospect of reparations is legitimate for genuine victims under 
any regime, including the ICC Statute, but it may also prompt false vic-
tims or exaggerated allegations. For example, ICC Trial Chamber I found 
in the Lubanga judgment that “there is a real possibility” that some pre-
tended victims “stole the identities” of other actual victims “in order to 
obtain the benefits they expected to receive as victims participating in 
these proceedings”.263 
Financial allowances for witnesses related to the procedures are 
common, for example, to facilitate transportation, to compensate for the 
disruption of economic activities, or because of relocation out of the nor-
mal social and work environment. What seems a reasonable amount of 
money from the viewpoint of the administration of the procedures, may 
constitute a reward in the eyes of witnesses with limited means. In a num-
ber of cases defence counsel has raised this issue to challenge the credibil-
ity of witnesses and to allege that somehow the prosecution is ‘buying 
witnesses’. In SCSL Taylor, the judges addressed this issue as follows: 
they agreed with the defence that theoretically such allowances may im-
pact on the credibility of witnesses;264 they referred to the standard policy 
approved by the Court Registrar for such allowance;265 they assessed on a 
case by case basis, taking into account the records disclosed by the Wit-
ness and Victims Section (‘WVS’) and the prosecution for each witness, 
whether the allowances were justified in view of the specific needs of 
                                                   
262 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Trial Chamber, Judgement and Sentence, 12 September 
2006, ICTR-2000-55A-T, para. 156 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fa02aa/). 
263 Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 502, see above note 48. 
264 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 18 May 2012, SCSL-03-01-T, 
paras. 184–95 (‘Taylor Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8075e7/). 
265 Ibid., paras. 190–91, in reference to the Practice Direction on Allowances for Witnesses 
and Expert Witnesses, issued by the SCSL Registrar on 16 July 2004, valid for all parties 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/078448/). 
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each witness;266 ultimately they dismissed the defence objections for eve-
ry witness that they evaluated individually.267 
3.2.4.7.1.1. ICC Jurisprudence 
In their assessment published in 2016, focused on insider witnesses from 
both prosecution and defence, Chlevickaite and Hola found that the ICC 
judges had given low weight to “potential bias and motivations” when 
compared to previous practice “in both national proceedings and other 
ICTs”.268 
3.2.4.7.1.2. Training Test 
‘Motivation’ was the indicator that showed the lowest consistency among 
raters. Against the given information, the evaluators often disagreed in the 
identification of the motives, as well as their evaluation. This may be re-
lated to both limited information and differing understanding about the 
motives as such. In spite of the expectations about ‘motive’, it appears 
that assessing it may require a degree of speculation, in ways that may 
question its validity as an indicator. 
                                                   
266 Taylor Trial Judgment, para. 195, see above note 264. 
267 Ibid., for example, para. 240 for insider witness Foday Lansana, who received some USD 
300 from the prosecution “for expenses including medication, meals, communication, his 
children’s education and uniforms”, and some USD 6,000 from WVS “to cover rent, utility 
bills, subsistence, medical care, child care, transportation and other miscellaneous expens-
es”, and the judges found “that the promise of early release from prison for protective rea-
sons and the support he received for his and his family’s expenses did not influence his tes-
timony”; para. 250 similar for insider witness TF1-362, who had received some USD 
8,500 from the prosecution and WVS “for various items such as lost wages, accommoda-
tion and transportation. For a period of a few months it appears that the witness lived on 
Prosecution funds at a “Safe House” along with her three children and her sister. During 
that period, she received a mobile phone, expenses for child care and school fees for her 
children.”; para. 287 for Alimamy Bobson Sesay, an insider witness and perpetrator who 
also worked as an intermediary for the prosecution: “WVS provided him a weekly allow-
ance for meals and accommodation in addition to payments made by the OTP. The Trial 
Chamber does not find these payments to be unreasonable, nor did they appear to influence 
his testimony”; and para. 346 for insider witness Dauda Aruna Fornie, who received some 
USD 3,470 over two years from OTP and WVS for “transportation, medical expenses, rent 
payments and witness attendance allowances […] The Trial Chamber finds that these pay-
ments do not appear to be unreasonable, and did not influence his testimony”. 
268 Chlevickaite and Hola, 2016, p. 694, see above note 241. 
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3.2.4.7.2. Prior Experience 
In cases when there is prior experience with the witness, the question is 
whether that experience was positive regarding the needs of the investiga-
tion, and whether the information provided at the time is consistent with 
the information currently under evaluation. The Arthashastra already 
mentioned “contradiction between earlier or later statements” as one of 
the circumstances that “shall go against a party”.269 
That prior experience may refer to the same agency, or to other 
agencies that worked on the same or related allegations. For example, 
before testifying ICTR witnesses in some cases had been interviewed by 
the Rwandan authorities, the Gacaca proceedings, foreign agencies, the 
ICTR investigations, as well as previous ICTR trials.270 In the ICC Kenya 
investigations key witnesses had been interviewed, among others, by the 
national Commission on Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), the 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), and the na-
tional police. A word of caution is necessary in relation to prior experi-
ence with other actors, since there may be significant differences in the 
timing, evidentiary standards or methods. Often prior experiences and 
statements are less demanding than the full engagement in an international 
investigation and testimony, hence the predictive or validating value may 
be limited. 
At the investigation stage the interviewers need to identify and 
study prior statements as much as possible prior to interviewing a witness. 
The witnesses shall be given the opportunity to tell their accounts afresh, 
without being conditioned by earlier statements. Once the witness com-
pletes the account, the interviewer may want to review earlier statements 
with him or her, to authenticate them, and to ask about eventual contradic-
tions. At the trial stage the parties are expected to disclose all available 
statements from a given witness, whether they have been collected by the 
party or by others, and they may well raise questions about contradictions 
in adversarial cross-examination. This is common practice in many sys-
tems, international or national, for example, as provided by the Spanish 
Law of Criminal Procedure.271 
                                                   
269 See Kautilya, 1992, p. 358, see above note 44. 
270 See Combs, 2017, p. 80, see above note 136. 
271 Spain, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, 14 September 1882, Article 714 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/227b70/):  
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The jurisprudence of international tribunals indicates that some fac-
tual discrepancies between multiple statements may be acceptable if they 
do not affect the central elements of the case. Peripheral details might 
well drop out and new ones appear when a person truthfully retells an 
event. Arguably a lack of any discrepancy could be rather regarded with 
suspicion, possibly indicative of a fabricated story, because a degree of 
variation or evolution is perfectly normal in human cognition and memory. 
Still, what is ‘central’ and what ‘peripheral’ in a given account will require 
ad hoc consideration. 
3.2.4.7.2.1. Example: ICC Kenyatta 
A key insider gave a statement for asylum seeking purposes that was not 
consistent with his ICC statement is some key points: the issue affected 
seriously his reliability and had litigation consequences. Statements given 
by the witness for asylum applications or other purposes need to be thor-
oughly analysed and cross-checked as part of the source evaluation pro-
cess. 
3.2.4.7.2.2. Training Test 
The evaluators were highly consistent regarding this indicator, while the 
information given to them conveyed prior positive experience of the wit-
ness with a commission of enquiry. On the basis of the underlying real 
experience, a word of caution was advisable here for two reasons: firstly, 
that prior experience was relatively superficial compared to the deeper 
engagement required for proper criminal investigations; and secondly, the 
situation deteriorated over time with increased pressure and threats on the 
witness, in ways that made difficult to predict behaviour on the basis of a 
less stressful prior situation. 
3.2.4.7.3. Independence 
The question is whether the provider of the evidence is acting inde-
pendently or influenced by some specific association, formal or informal, 
to relevant parties in the conflict or the proceedings, through organiza-
tional, business, family or other links. The Arthashastra mentioned “his 
                                                                                                                        
Cuando la declaración del testigo en el juicio oral no sea conforme en lo sustancial con 
la prestada en el sumario, podrá pedirse la lectura de ésta por cualquiera de las partes. 
Después de leída, el presidente invitará al testigo a que explique la diferencia o contra-
dicción que entre sus declaraciones se observe. 
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[business] partner, a dependent, a creditor, a debtor” and “an enemy of 
his” among “those who shall not be cited as witnesses”.272 Cesare Becca-
ria indicated that “the credibility of a witness must diminish in proportion 
to the hatred, or friendship, or close relationships existing between him 
and the accused”.273 The relevance of eventual links shows in those legal 
systems that provide for las preguntas generales de la ley (the general 
questions of the law), to be asked to the witness at the outset of an inter-
view or testimony, about any personal links, friendship or animosity, or 
interest on the subject-matter.274 
If a witness is associated with a suspect or party to the conflict it is 
advisable to follow-up with specific questions on the circumstances (ex-
tent, period and duration of group membership or relevant link). For ex-
ample, the fact that a witness is a member of an armed group involved in 
the group may certainly be very relevant to the evaluation, and worth clar-
ifying in detail regarding the role or rank within the group, reasons for 
joining, chronology and other circumstances. 
The ideology of the source may be relevant to evaluate independ-
ence, including political and religious beliefs, feelings of group belonging 
(ethnic, national, tribal, and so on), gender, cultural or other. 
3.2.4.7.3.1. Training Test 
The results were somehow consistent, with most participants giving a 
negative rating. This was a valid assessment, since the scenario indicated 
that the witness was a member of a key group and had some specific links 
to relevant institutions. There was not a single positive rating, but some 
were ‘undetermined’ or ‘intermediate’. That hesitation among some re-
spondents seems surprising, because the information showed clearly the 
lack of independence, for more than one reason. It appears that some 
evaluators, a minority within this sample, may hesitate to give a negative 
rating when the reported links are related to the victimized group or legit-
                                                   
272 See Kautilya, 1992, p. 356, see above note 44. 
273 Beccaria, 1774, p. 20, see above note 179. 
274 See Gascón Inchausti, 1999, pp. 78–86, referring to the criminal procedure in Spain, Italy 
and Germany, see above note 37. For a discussion in the procedure of Paraguay, including 
also references for several Latin-American countries, see Juan Marcelino González Gar-
cete and Guzmán Esteban Orué Prieto, La Prueba Testimonial, Lexijuris, Asunción, 2017, 
particularly chap. VI “Tipos de testigos”, pp. 63–138, and fn. 68. 
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imate institutions, as if they would ‘feel sorry for the witness’, and they 
would not want to ‘punish the witness’ because of legitimate relationships. 
Experience shows that indeed sometimes evaluators over-estimate inde-
pendence out of respect for the witness or the interview, not to be dis-
missive about apparently legitimate witnesses and procedures. Evaluators 
need to be instructed clearly to avoid moral or instrumental considerations, 
and to focus on the narrow question on to what extent the source was in-
dependent or not as a matter of fact. 
3.2.4.7.4. Contamination 
Whether the source has been contaminated by other actors that influenced 
his or her information, to the point that is not possible to determine 
whether the information belongs genuinely with the source or it has been 
conveyed indirectly by others. Such contamination may be spontaneous or 
deliberate, and it may result from communication between witnesses, 
tampering designed to harm the case, or media influence. 
Communication between witnesses could contaminate the evidence 
only if they influence each other in a way that makes impossible to distin-
guish between direct and hearsay knowledge, or causes some significant 
distortion. Research in psychology has referred to this phenomenon vari-
ously as ‘collaborative narration’, ‘co-narration’, ‘joint remembering’ or 
‘conversational remembering’, while “through dialogue people actually 
pool their recollections”.275 An intensified form of contamination can be-
come ‘collaborative storytelling’, when witnesses reinforce gradually each 
other accounts towards a common goal, possibly aiming at a given claim 
or suspect.276 
For example, in Fedorenko, a key issue was the identification of the 
suspect by several eyewitnesses, which was dismissed by the judges be-
cause of contamination: 
The court was convinced the witnesses were discussing the 
trial among themselves, at least; and at worst someone was 
coaching them. […] because of the obvious discussion of the 
                                                   
275 Wagenaar and Crombag, 2005, p. 175, and experimental findings in chap. 8, sect. “Mis-
leading Post-event Information”, pp. 135–38, see above note 97. 
276 Ibid., chap. 10, sect. “Collaborative Storytelling”, pp. 166–68. 
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case by the witnesses in violation of the rule, the court re-
jects the in-court identification in toto.277 
Conversely, in Bemba the ICC Trial Chamber dismissed allegations 
of ‘collusion’ between two witnesses, although they had been in contact in 
circumstances related to the proceedings, because “the contact between 
P42 and P23 prior to and after their testimonies is, in itself, insufficient to 
cast doubt on their credibility or the reliability of the entirety of their evi-
dence”.278 
The review conducted by independent experts about the ICC Kenya 
investigations found that key insider witnesses “had been relocated to the 
same locations for extended periods of time, raising the possibility that 
they had talked among themselves and tainted each other’s evidence”.279 
This issue was indeed specifically investigated and analysed by the OTP 
at the time. Unfortunately, the cases did not proceed to completion, which 
otherwise could have shed some light on this and other related issues. 
Deliberate tampering is a different and more serious issue. It may 
require specific investigation and prosecution in many national systems, 
and also under Article 70(1)(c) of the ICC Statute (offences against the 
administration of justice) for “corruptly influencing a witness”. It also 
shows in the SVA Validity Checklist under “pressures to report falsely”, 
defined as: “whether there are indications that others suggested, coached, 
pressured, or coerced the witness to make a false report or to exaggerate 
certain elements in an otherwise truthful report”.280 Such undue influence 
originating from the accused or their associates is frequent in ICC cases, 
as found by the prosecutor and reported to the judges among other cases 
in Bemba, Ruto and Sang,  Ntaganda and Gbagbo and Ble-Goude. 
                                                   
277 US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, United States v. Fedorenko, Judg-
ment, 25 July 1978, 455 F. Supp. 893. Case on the denaturalisation of Feodor Fedorenko, a 
US citizen of Ukrainian origin suspected of having been involved in Nazi crimes, dis-
missed first in 1978, and granted on appeal by the US Supreme Court in 1981. Fedorenko 
was then extradited to USSR, sentenced to death, and executed in 1987. 
278 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Trial Chamber, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, para. 335 (‘Bemba Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/edb0cf/). 
279 See Kenya Cases: Review and Recommendations: Executive Summary of the Report of 
the External Independent Experts, paras. E.19 and E.20, see above note 172. 
280 Vrij, 2008, p. 217, see above note 212. 
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In Lubanga similar problems surfaced with an intermediary work-
ing for the prosecution, which led Trial Chamber I to dismiss the evidence 
from four alleged child soldiers. The judges found that the intermediary 
introduced a “pattern of unreliability” and “it is likely that as the common 
point of contact he [the intermediary] persuaded, encouraged or assisted 
some or all of them to give false testimony” particularly regarding their 
age.281 Subsequently the OTP reviewed this experience and introduced 
more strict standards for hiring, managing and auditing intermediaries. 
Witnesses may be also be influenced by media reports on the rele-
vant events. This is plausible with widely-reported reported incidents, but 
the mere exposure to media reports should not be tantamount to contami-
nation, while it may be difficult to determine to what extent the 
knowledge by the witness is authentic or suggested by media. 
In the very first case before the ICTY the defence argued that the 
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses was contami-
nated by the pictures of him published extensively in media. The defence 
also presented Professor Willem A. Wagenaar (Leiden University), a lead-
ing expert on cognitive psychology that had already testified for the de-
fence in Israel v. Demjanjuk,282 to challenge the methods utilized for the 
visual identification of the accused. The judges acknowledged that this 
was a relevant issue, they took it into account when raised by the defence 
in cross-examination, they granted that some of Wagenaar’s critique was 
legitimate, and yet they dismissed the defence allegations because in the 
given context the individual witnesses did not appear to have been influ-
enced by the images of the suspect published by different media.283 
3.2.4.7.4.1. Training Test 
The results were not consistent for this indicator. About half of the partic-
ipants rated ‘contamination’ as ‘undetermined’ because, in the given sce-
nario, it was clear that the witness interacted with other witnesses and 
relevant actors, but it was not established whether such interactions ‘con-
taminated’ his knowledge. The other half assessed that there was no con-
                                                   
281 Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 291, see above note 48. 
282 Israel, State of Israel v. Ivan (John) Demjanjuk, Criminal Case no. 373/86, Criminal Ap-
peal no. 347/88. 
283 Tadić Trial Opinion and Judgement, section on “Pre-trial Media Coverage and the Infec-
tion of Testimonial Evidence”, paras. 542–44, and para. 552, see above note 46. 
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tamination, since that was not specifically reported in the scenario. Not a 
single participant identified the existence of ‘contamination’, although 
this could have been inferred from the circumstances, and in the true un-
derlying case this was very plausible. These results seem indeed a reflec-
tion of the real difficulties with this indicator: contamination is a real risk, 
often witnesses will be exposed to communication with multiple actors 
about the relevant facts, but whether such interaction ‘contaminated’ or 
not their account may be difficult to determine. Notwithstanding the diffi-
culties with this indicator, it may still be worth keeping it because of the 
likelihood of such situations, and its potentially serious impact, as indicat-
ed among others by the ICC precedent in Lubanga. 
3.2.4.7.5. Self-Restraint 
Whether the source acknowledges the limitations of his or her own 
knowledge. The purpose of this indicator is to identify sources are most 
realistic and tempered with their information, as opposed to those that 
may be overly assertive, beyond their actual knowledge, for reasons of 
personality, acquiescence, fabrication or other. Having categorical an-
swers for all questions is usually not considered a good sign, on the as-
sumption that no witness ‘knows everything’. To control possibly for is-
sues of acquiescence the witness should be told before, and reassured 
throughout the interview that “it is ok to the say ‘I don’t know’”, or “we 
don’t expect you to have answers for all our questions”, or “it is ok to 
acknowledge ignorance or limitations”. 
When genuine, acknowledging the following limitations is general-
ly considered as positive signs: 
• Ignorance: Whether the sources acknowledge it when they do not 
know the answer, perhaps simply stating ‘I don’t know’.  
• Doubts: Whether the sources use ‘maybe’, ‘I am not sure’ and simi-
lar expressions when appropriate to qualify their account. 
• Spontaneous corrections: Whether the source corrects him or her-
self spontaneously. Defined in the CBCA model as “corrections are 
made or information is added to material previously provided in the 
statement without having been prompted by the interviewer”.284 
                                                   
284 Vrij, 2008, p. 212, see above note 212. 
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• Memory limitations: Whether the source acknowledges memory 
gaps or limitations when appropriate. Similar to “admitting lack of 
memory” in the CBCA model.285 
• Self-critique: Including details that are self-critical or self-
incriminating is usually considered as a positive sign because it 
suggests that the source is not driven merely by self-interest, and it 
is more likely to be objective. In some systems this is referred to as 
“declarations (or statements or utterances) contrary to self-interest”. 
Similar to “self-deprecation” in the CBCA model, defined as “the 
witness mentions personally unfavourable, self-incriminating de-
tails”.286 Historians may concur that “when a statement is prejudi-
cial to a witness, his dear ones, or his causes, it is likely to be truth-
ful”.287 
3.2.4.7.5.1. Training Test 
The results were consistent, most evaluators agreed on a negative rating, 
since the information given to them suggested that the witnesses spoke in 
an overly confident manner. This is probably consistent with real investi-
gative experience, where usually interviewers are able to evaluate fairly 
the degree of ‘self-restrain’ of the witness. After several hours of methodi-
cal conversation, it is often possible to spot a bragger. 
3.2.4.7.6. Language Skill 
The question is whether the source had the ability to gather the infor-
mation in its original language or not. The level of knowledge of a lan-
guage may be a relevant issue, as well as whether the source acquired the 
information through translation. A person that is fluent in the relevant 
language would be more reliable to convey information originated in that 
language, rather than someone who has only limited knowledge of the 
language or has obtained the information through translation. 
This may apply to victim accounts about statements made by perpe-
trators in a given language. For example, in ICC Ruto and Sang the al-
leged perpetrators communicated among themselves and made public 
statements in Kalenjin, while the level of knowledge of this language 
                                                   
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid., p. 209. 
287 Gottschalk, 1969, p. 161, see above note 202. 
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among victims was uneven, and sometimes an important issue to be eval-
uated. Similar linguistic issues arose in ICC Bemba in view of the differ-
ent languages spoken by victims and perpetrators. The linguistic gap can 
be even bigger with foreign witnesses or international observers. 
3.2.4.7.6.1. Training Test 
The results were fully consistent, while this was a very relevant issue, and 
clearly exposed in the given scenario. 
3.2.4.7.7. Communication 
The question is the ability of the witnesses to convey effectively their 
knowledge, and to respond clearly to the questions raised in the investiga-
tive interview. In linguistic studies, this would be a point of ‘pragmatics’, 
that is, about the impact of the language and its reception by the audience, 
which is different from ‘semantics’ as substantive meaning.288 The inves-
tigations need ‘pragmatic’ results from ‘good communicators’ that convey 
readily understandable information. Whether that information is true or 
not is a different question, closer to linguistic ‘semantics’, but it can only 
be addressed if the witness makes the information available properly in 
the first place. 
Giving clear answers, focused on the actual questions, is desirable, 
as opposed to confusing, evasive or ambiguous answers. On a related note, 
some judges consider spontaneity as a good sign. For example, in Bemba 
the ICC judges referred to ‘lack of spontaneity’ negatively when evaluat-
ing three witnesses: “the Chamber found D19’s demeanour and testimony 
to demonstrate evasion, and a lack of spontaneity and impartiality”; “[t]he 
Chamber finds that the nature of these notes casts significant doubt on the 
credibility of D45, in particular his spontaneity and impartiality”; “D21’s 
testimony – which was generally evasive, lacking spontaneity […]”.289 
This may merit some discussion, since spontaneity may be conditioned by 
various factors, including the courtroom adversarial setting, not necessari-
ly related to truthfulness. 
                                                   
288 See Gennaro Chierchia, “Linguistics and Language”, in Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. 
Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
1999, pp. xci–cix; ibid., entry “Pragmatics”, pp. 661–64. 
289 Bemba Trial Judgment, paras. 359, 363 and 435, see above note 277. 
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3.2.4.7.7.1. Training Test 
The evaluators were divided between ‘negative’, ‘undetermined’ and ‘in-
termediate’, while none of them gave a positive evaluation. This may be a 
valid set of observations, since the information provided to the evaluators 
did convey some negative elements, but it was not entirely conclusive, 
and assessing this point usually requires direct knowledge of the interac-
tion with the witness, hence it could well remain ‘undetermined’ for those 
who did not participate in the interview. Indicators of this kind, including 
‘communication skill’ and ‘behaviour’, would be better tested with a sim-
ulation of an interview, giving the evaluator the opportunity to observe the 
interaction. 
3.2.4.7.8. Knowledge 
On the source’s prior knowledge qualifications, how much did the source 
know beforehand about the relevant area, people, institutions, or issues. 
Consider, for example: 
• whether the source knew well the area and population under attack, 
including topology and society; 
• whether the source had a qualified knowledge of the group by virtue 
of his or her internal position or interaction; and 
• whether the source has any military expertise when reporting about 
military operations or weapons. 
3.2.4.7.8.1. Expert Witnesses 
Expert witnesses, whether scientific or area experts, require detailed eval-
uation of their knowledge credentials, experience, and so on; and they are 
subject to specific procedures before the judges. 
3.2.4.7.8.2. Training Test 
The results were largely consistent, with positive ratings. The available 
information indicated that the witness was a long-term local resident, so-
cially very active, and very knowledgeable about the relevant area and 
actors. 
3.2.4.7.9. Behaviour 
The question would be whether the witness behaved in a co-operative and 
reassuring way during the interview or other contacts. The views of psy-
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chologists and litigators tend to differ on this point: most psychologists 
will warn against considering behaviour as an indicator of credibility; 
most litigators will look at behaviour to predict witness performance be-
fore the judges. 
If accepted as a relevant consideration, the behaviour of a witness 
during the interview should be evaluated with caution. Methods that rely 
on behaviour or body language to determine truthfulness, such as the ‘Be-
havioral Analysis Interview’, lack scientific foundation and have been 
discredited.290 Witnesses may give a negative impression through their 
behaviour perhaps because of discomfort or insecurity when not telling 
the truth, or for many other reasons, including the following: personal 
circumstances unknown to the interviewer; cross-cultural issues; mistrust 
or rapport with the interviewer, the interpreter or the organisation; time 
pressure. 
However, at trial judges are expected to listen and observe directly 
the expressions and conduct of witnesses, and this direct appreciation is 
considered as an epistemic guarantee and part of the ‘principle of imme-
diacy’, particularly in common-law procedure. 291  By 1949 Jerome N. 
Frank warned that inevitably the witness’ demeanour and manners are 
always in evidence, the judge will never be able to ignore their human 
conduct when evaluating the testimony, consciously or unconsciously, and 
this is actually part of ‘the principle of immediacy’ in the procedure. For 
that matter judges “are themselves witnesses of what goes on in court-
rooms. They must determine the facts from what they see and hear, from 
the gestures and other conduct of the testifying witnesses as well as from 
their words”, and “as silent witnesses of the witnesses, the trial judges and 
juries suffer from the same human weaknesses as other witnesses”. 292 
Frank insisted that that for witnesses “their demeanor, while testifying, 
                                                   
290 See Simon, 2012, chap. 5 ““Just Admit It, You’re Guilty”: Interrogating Suspects”, section 
on “The Behavioral Analysis Interview”, pp. 127–32, see above note 40. This method is 
focused on the interrogation of suspects. 
291 See Richard Volger, “The Principle of Immediacy in English Criminal Procedural Law”, in 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 2014, vol. 126, no. 1, pp. 239–47. In 
Volger’s view, “[t]hese aspects of the English trial methodology have over many years of-
fended continental Positivist sensibilities as illogical, excessively theatrical and showing 
little respect for the serious pursuit of truth”. For the Dutch system, see Groenhuijsen and 
Selçuk, 2014, see above note 227. 
292 Frank, 1949, p. 22, see above note 1. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 210 
counts heavily in appraising their credibility – their observable demeanor, 
as ‘wordless language’, being an important part of the evidence”.293 
Among other international examples, in ICTY Strugar the Trial 
Chamber was critical about a witness because they “gained the clear im-
pression that he was very uneasy and uncomfortable about his testimo-
ny”.294 In ICTR Akayesu the Trial Chamber acknowledged among other 
factors “the witness’s demeanour”.295 In ICTR Kayishema et al. the Trial 
Chamber noted that: 
having observed the demeanour of the witnesses and listened 
closely to their oral testimony the Trial Chamber is satisfied 
that the eyewitnesses were credible and did not attempt to 
invent facts. This credibility was helpful in determining the 
reliability of the identification of the accused at the massacre 
site.296 
In ICC Ngudjolo Trial Chamber II assessed negatively that P-0250 
(key insider) “behaved oddly during his testimony”, including that “he 
threatened to interrupt his testimony and even, on one day, refused to ap-
pear in court”, while “none of the other witnesses considered to be vul-
nerable behaved in such a peculiar manner”.297 In the case of P-0250 the 
issue would not be just some subtle signs, his odd behaviour was very 
noticeable and impacting on the interaction with the court. 
Similar dilemmas surface in asylum procedures. The International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ) advices caution: 
using demeanour as a basis for credibility assessment should 
be avoided in virtually all situations. If demeanour is used as 
a negative factor the judge must give sustainable reasons as 
to why and how the demeanour and presentation of the 
claimant contributed to the credibility assessment, taking in-
                                                   
293 Frank, 1951, p. 559, see above note 208. 
294 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 31 January 2005, IT-01-42-T, 
para. 148 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/927ba5/). 
295 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 47, see above note 57. 
296 Kayishema et al. Trial Judgment, para. 397, see above note 55. 
297 See ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 18 Decem-
ber 2012, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, sect. VII “Analysis of the Credibility of Specific Wit-
nesses”, para. 141 (‘Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
2c2cde/). 
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to account relevant capacity, ethnicity, gender and age fac-
tors.298 
For example, “[i]n many cultures, it is a sign of respect not to make 
eye contact. In Western culture avoiding eye contact is a sign of shame”. 
And yet they acknowledge: “However, it must be recognised that in reali-
ty, demeanour can always have some impact in an oral hearing”, because 
of the principle of orality that informs hearings with the applicant.299 
3.2.4.7.9.1. Emotions 
Emotional reactions by the witness may be indicative of truthfulness, par-
ticularly if they appear to be a consequence of the alleged crimes. For 
example, a victim of the genocide in Guatemala started crying when tell-
ing how her eight-year-old daughter was killed, and the judges assessed as 
one of the reasons “to give probative value” the fact that “the witness’ 
crying was apparent when recalling what happened to his daughter”.300 
For several others witnesses the same judges considered positive for ‘pro-
bative value’ that they “could observe the witness’ pain when recalling 
what happened”.301 
This should not lead to a negative reading of the lack of emotional 
expression, because such behaviour may be conditioned by multiple fac-
tors unrelated to truthfulness. Concerning female victims of rape in par-
ticular, it seems that “distressed rape complainants are perceived to be 
more credible than complainants who present with controlled affect”, 
                                                   
298 Mackey and Barnes, 2013, p. 41, see above note 239. 
299 Ibid., p. 42. 
300 Ríos Montt and Rodríguez Sánchez Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal Judgment, part 
IV “Razonamientos que inducen al tribunal a condenar o absolver”, sect. B “Prueba 
testimonial”, para. 46, see above note 71: “Fue manifiesto el llanto del testigo al recordar 
lo ocurrido a su hija de ocho años”. 
301 Ibid., part IV, sect. B, para. 55: “El tribunal, pudo observar el dolor de la testigo al recordar 
lo ocurrido”; ibid., part IV, sect. B, para. 47: “Para los juzgadores ha sido visible el dolor 
experimentado por el testigo al recordar lo que le ocurrió”; ibid., part IV, sect. B, para. 57: 
“Es evidente el dolor de la testigo, al recordar los hechos”; ibid., part IV, sect. B, para. 63: 
“Los jueces observamos el grado de afectación del testigo, al recordar todo lo ocurrido”; 
ibid., part IV, sect. B, para. 65: “Bañada en llanto, indicó como mataron a su hermano e 
hijos”; ibid., part IV, sect. B, para. 68: “Los juzgadores observamos y escuchamos el llanto 
desgarrador de la testigo, al recordar las violaciones sexuales de las cuales fue objeto”; 
ibid., part IV, sect. B, para. 95: “Evidencia dolor y tristeza al relatar lo ocurrido”; and so on. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 212 
which could lead to discredit unfairly the less emotionally expressive vic-
tims.302 
3.2.4.7.9.2. Assertiveness 
Assertiveness is not necessarily indicative of accuracy. For example, in 
one ICTY case the Trial Chamber issued a conviction largely on the 
strength of a victim witness who showed a “confident and forceful” de-
meanour before investigators, prosecutors and judges. The Appeals 
Chamber reversed this evaluation and indicated that: 
very often, a confident demeanour is a personality trait and 
not necessarily a reliable indicator of truthfulness or accura-
cy […] an enormous amount of research has determined that 
the relationship between the certainty expressed by a witness 
and the correctness of the identification is very weak. […] 
Even witnesses who are very sincere, honest and convinced 
about their identification are very often wrong.303 
The finding referred particularly to eyewitness identification. Re-
search on national cases shows confident witnesses being particularly 
influential although “the observed confidence-accuracy relationship is 
close to zero”.304 And yet for litigation purposes “confident witnesses are 
likely to be overrepresented at trial because prosecutors are more likely to 
try cases when they have confident eyewitnesses”.305 
Chlevickaite and Hola found that “[e]ven though identified as one 
of the most fundamental factors in the judicial assessments of witness 
credibility in the literature, demeanour did not play a leading role at the 
ICC”.306 As these authors indicate, this “can be seen as a positive devel-
                                                   
302 See Faye T. Nitschke, Blake M. McKimmie and Eric J. Vanman, “A Meta-Analysis of the 
Emotional Victim Effect for Female Adult Rape Complainants: Does Complainant Distress 
Influence Credibility?”, in Psychological Bulletin, 2019, vol. 145, no. 10, pp. 953–79. On 
the credibility assessments of female victims of rape in India, see Ravinder Barn and Ved 
Kumari, “Understanding Complainant Credibility in Rape Appeals: A Case Study of High 
Court Judgments and Judges’ Perspectives in India”, in British Journal of Criminology, 
2015, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 435–53. 
303 Kupreškić et al. Appeals Judgment, para. 138, see above note 181. The expert testimony of 
a cognitive psychologist, as well as contradictions with earlier statements by the same wit-
ness, was considered to this effect. 
304 Simon, 2012, p. 167, see above note 40. 
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opment, since behaviour-related factors are particularly difficult to assess 
appropriately in judicial proceedings, and may be easily misinterpret-
ed”.307 It appears that the ICC judges focus instead on “on more tangible 
aspects of the testimonies, though not dismissing demeanour altogeth-
er”.308 This is similar to the approach taken by the ID SE guidelines, con-
sidering behaviour only as one among many factors, to be assessed with 
caution. 
This caution could consist on limiting any consideration of behav-
iour only to the most apparent and disruptive actions by the witness, while 
avoiding speculation on minor signs or ‘body language’. An alternative 
could be to train judges to ignore the behaviour of the witnesses when 
perceiving and assessing their testimony. Some authors do recommend in 
relation to rape “that effective methods of reducing reliance on emotional 
demeanor to make credibility judgments about rape complainants should 
be investigated to make credibility assessments fairer and more accu-
rate”.309 One author has recommended for asylum procedures “prohibiting 
entirely the use of nonverbal cues or demeanor in credibility assess-
ments”.310 
3.2.4.7.9.3. Training Test 
The results were not consistent, possibly reflecting the different behav-
ioural aspects reported in the scenario, which were not necessarily ame-
nable to a single overall conclusion. This result is probably a valid proxy 
of the true difficulties to assess behaviour in real life, as per the above-
mentioned caveats and differing judicial record. The reliance on behav-
ioural indicators by judges would merit some additional research. 
3.2.4.7.10. Criminal Record 
The question is whether the witness has been involved in the commission 
of crimes, whether related to the matter under investigation, or others. It is 
a common assumption that a criminal record is detrimental for the credi-
                                                   
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid., p. 695. 
309 See Nitschke, McKimmie and Vanman, 2019, see above note 302. 
310 Michael Kagan, “Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in 
Refugee Status Determination”, in Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 2003, vol. 17, 
no. 3, p. 380. 
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bility of a witness, but in reality, criminals may be as knowledgeable of 
many facts as anybody else, and there are many kinds of criminal conduct 
that may be more or less relevant to the quality of a witness for a particu-
lar case. The judicial record across international tribunals is not consistent 
when evaluating this factor. 
For example, in one ICTY case the judges considered that prior 
criminal record, criminal conduct and history of personal drug use, weighs 
“very negatively in an assessment of the trustworthiness” of a witness. 
Such a record, together with the witness’ association with the armed group 
of the accused, left the judges with an “extremely negative view of the 
credibility of this witness”.311 The judges required corroboration for any 
fact reported by this witness. In another ICTY case the defense challenged 
the credibility of an insider witness because of his criminal record, since 
the witness had confessed to robbing and then murdering two fellow sol-
diers, but the Trial Chamber considered the witness credible, with the 
subsequent endorsement by the Appeals Chamber.312 ICTY judges dis-
missed similar objections by the defence in another case, while the wit-
ness had contributed to the crimes, and the defence argued that blaming 
the accused was in the exculpatory self-interest of the witness.313 
Similar differences show across cases in ICTR. In Kajelijeli, the 
Trial Chamber found credible a witness who was a convicted co-
perpetrator, and furthermore accused by his brother acting as witness for 
the defence of being “a liar and a thief who had previously stolen things 
from his own family”.314 In Rwamakuba, after careful discussion the Trial 
Chamber relied on the testimony of two witnesses with a criminal record, 
while dismissing another witness who also had a criminal record but was 
considered dishonest and not trustworthy in relation to “her particular 
personality”.315 Some research on ICTR shows that the judges have found 
                                                   
311 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement, 30 November 2005, IT-03-66-
T, para. 28 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4e469a/). 
312 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 3 May 2006, 
IT-98-34-A, para. 174 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/94b2f8/). 
313 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement, 16 November 1998, IT-96-
21-T, paras. 759 and 762 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6b4a33/). 
314 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kajelijel, Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 1 December 2003, 
ICTR-98-44A-T, para. 467 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/afa827/). 
315 Rwamakuba Trial Judgment, paras. 102 and 135, see above note 54. 
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much more often that witnesses are credible when they were not involved 
in the genocide, or they were not co-accused, that when they were.316 
3.2.4.7.10.1. Insiders 
Persons with direct internal knowledge of the perpetrating group are 
commonly referred to as ‘insider witnesses’. Most often they are members 
of the group, eventually involved in the crimes or related operations, but 
victims or other persons may have also gained internal knowledge as the 
result of their confinement or work with the group. 
Some ICC judges have tended to see the criminal record of insiders 
as detrimental to their credibility, while others to the contrary appreciate 
their qualified knowledge of the criminal actions. For example in the con-
firmation procedure for Ruto and Sang the prosecution presented four 
insider witnesses and argued that “‘insiders’ commonly provide highly 
relevant information accessible only to individuals involved in the crime 
or close to the accused”, the defence responder that “they should not be 
considered by the Chamber as reliable or credible because they are self-
confessed criminals”. 317  The judges found these insiders reliable and 
based their decision to confirm the charges to a large extent on their evi-
dence.318 
3.2.4.7.10.2. Subsequent Criminal Conduct 
Crimes or lesser offences committed after the person became a witness 
may be relevant to the evaluation, they may need to be specifically rec-
orded, and in some cases communicated to the judges and the defence. 
For example, in one case a witness that was under a protection scheme 
attacked violently a protection officer, which constituted a criminal of-
fence, and the witness was arrested, prosecuted and convicted for this 
matter: this situation required specific evaluation and disclosure. 
                                                   
316 See Combs, 2017, p. 95, see above note 136. 
317 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, para. 91 (‘Ruto and Sang Pre-Trial Deci-
sion on the Confirmation of Charges’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/96c3c2/). 
318 Ibid., paras. 168 and 218. 
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3.2.4.7.10.3. Training Test 
The participants rated this indicator consistently as ‘undetermined’, which 
is fair since the scenario did not contain any relevant information. If judg-
es consider this a relevant indicator, as in the examples above, it is advis-
able for the investigation to address such issues specifically. 
3.2.4.7.11. Medical Condition 
Did the witness have, at the time of the events or at the time of the inter-
view, any medical condition that may affect his or her cognitive ability or 
memory (sight, hearing, psychological, psychiatric, or other)? 
For example, in one ICTY case the psychological diagnosis and 
treatment of a victim was seen by the judges as a relevant fact that should 
have been disclosed to the defence, as a matter of fairness for the accused, 
even if ultimately there is no scientific consensus on whether that condi-
tion affects the credibility of the witness or not. 319 Such diagnosis or 
treatment should show in the evaluation as a relevant fact, but it does not 
lead necessarily to a positive or negative assessment. 
If needed the investigation may seek medical (sight, hearing, physi-
cal), psychological or psychiatric assessments of witnesses on issues rele-
vant to their cognitive ability. 
3.2.4.7.11.1. Training Test 
The participants rated this indicator consistently as ‘undetermined’, since 
the scenario did not contain any relevant information. Whenever visual 
ability is essential for the evidence, or there are reasons for doubt, it is 
probably advisable to verify it specifically, so that the information would 
show in the statement and the evaluators would be able to make a valid 
assessment. 
3.2.4.8. Information Indicators 
3.2.4.8.1. Immediacy 
On the cognitive distance between the source and the reported facts. In 
principle direct knowledge is considered more credible than indirect or 
                                                   
319 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, IT-95-17/1-T, para. 92 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e6081b/). 
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hearsay knowledge. It is crucial to determine whether a source is direct or 
indirect, and who is the original source of the given information. 
‘Primary source’ is a term for direct witness, original records, or 
any other kind of source that conveys direct, immediate knowledge of the 
facts. Conversely ‘secondary sources’ are those that convey indirect 
knowledge, whether as hearsay witnesses, or copies of documents, or 
documents that are based on other primary sources. There is abundant 
case-law from ICC and other jurisdictions indicating that direct sources 
have higher probative value than indirect ones. 
3.2.4.8.1.1. Degrees and Modes of Hearsay 
There are different degrees and modes of hearsay or secondary infor-
mation. For example, some hearsay may be very credible, if the direct 
witness is reliable, he or she conveyed the information immediately after 
fact, in a very detailed way, and to several persons that corroborate each 
other in their hearsay accounts. On the other hand, ‘double hearsay’ refers 
to two or more degrees of separation from the direct source, which will 
require identifying the specifics of every step of separation, and it will be 
less credible. 
3.2.4.8.1.2. Secondary Reports 
Some ICC judges have considered NGO and human rights fact-finding 
reports as indirect evidence about the crimes of only limited probative 
value.  Detailed Source Evaluation is advisable for sources of this kind to 
determine their methods, degree of closeness to the primary sources, qual-
ifications of the authors, and so on. If such reports were conveyed to the 
suspects they might constitute direct evidence about their knowledge of 
the crime. 
3.2.4.8.1.3. Translations 
Translating the information may be seen as detrimental in terms of imme-
diacy: an original document is preferable than a translated version, when 
possible. 
3.2.4.8.1.4. Training Test 
The ratings were not consistent, possibly because the witness reported 
many different facts, based variously on direct and indirect knowledge. A 
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better evaluation would require to test ‘immediacy’ on specific facts, ra-
ther that the account as a whole. 
3.2.4.8.2. Detail 
Detailed information is usually perceived as more credible than generic 
information, including specific locations, time, persons and descriptions. 
This is commonly accepted in many systems, including, for example, in 
the Italian jurisprudence about the testimony of the pentiti, and also em-
phasized in the SVA-CBCA and Reality Monitoring models.320 
The focus on details is based on two assumptions: first, substantially, 
that a more detailed account is more likely to be true; second, methodo-
logically, that more details offer more factual points for verification. The 
first assumption is arguable; a very detailed account may well be false, for 
different reasons of cognitive mistake or deliberate deception. A common 
strategy among deliberate liars, known as ‘embedded lies’, is to take a 
true and detailed story, and to add or change only some detail, such as a 
name or a date, to achieve the desired deception. A different type of ‘em-
bedded lie’ could occur when a source appropriates a story known only to 
another source, hence presenting as direct knowledge what is only hearsay. 
Such ‘embedded lies’ are well-known from scientific research as well as 
investigative practice.321 
By 1900, Alfred Binet had observed that a recollection, even in 
good faith, can be “detailed and entirely false […] an unprepared observer 
could consider these details so clear, so specific, as evidence of the accu-
racy of the memory; we see now that the detail of the recall is not incom-
patible with its falsehood”.322 Still, some seventy years later CBCA in-
                                                   
320 See Giacomo Cavalli, La chiamata in correità, Giuffrè Editore, Milan, 2006, sect. 3.2.2.5. 
“Precisione o articolazione”, p. 106: “La chiamata in correità è tanto più credibile quanto 
più ricca di particolari, anche marginali, poiché il guidice ha maggiori possibilità di 
verificare la dichiarazione accusatorial”. 
321 I am grateful to Moa Lidén for calling my attention to ‘embedded lies’ in scientific litera-
ture, the phenomenon indeed is also known in international investigations. 
322 Binet, 1900, pp. 284–85, see above note 113: 
Les erreurs commises par les élèves ont ce caractère singulier: ils ont la précision de 
détails des souvenirs exact. Toutes nos observations montrent qu’un souvenir peut être 
précis quoique entièrement faux; […] Un esprit not prévenu pourrait considérer ces dé-
tails si nets, si circonstanciés comme un prévue de l’exactitude du souvenir. Nous 
voyons maintenant que la précision des souvenirs n’est pas incompatible avec leur 
fausseté. 
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cluded the criterion of “quantity of details”, defined as “the statement is 
rich in detail and includes specific descriptions of place, time, persons, 
objects and events”.323 Those experts that are critical with CBCA have 
observed that this criterion, which is one of the most decisive ones within 
CBCA, has no scientific validity because “[i]t has never been shown that 
a detailed testimony is more often true than one with fewer details”.324 It 
is a well-known technique in literary fiction to add detail to impress real-
ism, as Julio Cortazar observed about Edgar Allan Poe’s horror stories.325 
Conversely, a relatively vague account may be truthful, while the vague-
ness is related to the source’s methods or skills, or the circumstances of 
the communication. 
The second assumption seems valid as a matter of methodology, 
since more details means more information, and more opportunities for 
testing external verification and internal consistency. In other words, more 
detailed sources are preferable because they contain more information and 
they are more verifiable, not necessarily because they are more truthful. 
Evaluating this criterion should take into account the background of 
the source, which may be more or less inclined to give details because of 
their personality, rapport, and so on; and the circumstances when collect-
ing the information, including the available time and methods. 
3.2.4.8.2.1. Training Test 
The results were not consistent, apparently because the witnesses referred 
to many different issues, with varying degrees of detail, hence the infor-
mation was not necessarily suitable for a single overall conclusion. A bet-
ter evaluation would require to test ‘detail’ on specific issues of fact, ra-
ther that the account as a whole. Alternatively, in view of the abovemen-
tioned critical considerations, perhaps ‘details’ could be dropped entirely 
as an indicator, and the available details simply be utilized as relevant for 
the rest of the indicators about the information. 
                                                   
323 Vrij, 2008, p. 209, see above note 212. 
324 Wagenaar and Crombag, 2005, p. 190, see above note 97. 
325 Edgar Allan Poe, Cuentos/1: Prólogo, traducción y notas de Julio Cortazar, Alianza, 
Madrid, 1994. 
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3.2.4.8.3. Internal Consistency 
The question is whether the information is consistent, factually and logi-
cally, in its own terms. This would be equivalent to “logical structure” in 
the CBCA, defined as “the statement is coherent and does not contain 
logical inconsistencies or contradictions”. 326  Similarly multiple Italian 
cases related to pentiti refer to the “logicità o coerenza del racconto” as 
an element of credibility.327 
Consider the following examples: 
• A witness reported seeing the perpetrator at the crime scene, but this 
was not plausible giving the insufficient light, obstacles in the line 
sight, or distance; 
• An insider reported that he had participated in multiple attacks quite 
far away from each other within a short period of time. The account 
was not plausible because it would have been impossible to travel to 
those locations in the given conditions and timeframe. 
• ICC Trial Chamber II in Ngudjolo assessed negatively some ‘con-
tradictions’ within the testimony of P-0250 (key insider) in relation 
to the command status of the accused: 
Within a short time span in the course of his testimony, 
Witness P-250 stated that soldiers were not authorised 
to meet Mathieu Ngudjolo on an individual basis, only 
to claim in apparent contradiction or at the very least 
extemporaneously, that even an ordinary soldier could 
report to the Accused or provide him with information 
directly.328 
Internal consistency also needs to be evaluated with caution, only to 
exclude propositions that are factually implausible within a well-known or 
safely predictable material context, for example, for a specific chronolog-
                                                   
326 Vrij, 2008, p. 209, see above note 212. 
327 See Cavalli, 2006, sect. 3.2.2.4. “Logicità o coerenza del racconto”, p. 106, quoting 
multiple judgments from the Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of 
Cassation) from 1971 to 1999, see above note 320: “La chiamata en correità deve essere 
strutturata in modo tale da rispondere alle regole della commune esperienza, della logica e 
della fisica”. 
328 See Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment, sect. VII “Analysis of the Credibility of Specific Wit-
nesses”, para. 138, see above note 297. Note fns. 305 and 306 for the corresponding tran-
scripts quoted by the Chamber in support of this finding. 
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ical sequence, or some discrete physical action, or predictable functioning 
of different artefacts (vehicles, weaponry, and so on). Internal consistency 
will be more open to interpretation in relation to higher-level logical ar-
guments or complex factual scenarios. Plausibility is context and culture-
specific, as John Locke indicated already in his classic work An essay 
concerning human understanding with the story of the king of Siam and 
the Dutch Ambassador: 
As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining the 
king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he 
was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him that the 
water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so 
hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an ele-
phant, if he were there. To which the king replied, Hitherto I 
have believed the strange things you have told me, because I 
look upon you as a sober fair man, but now I am sure you 
lie.329 
A number of judgments and experts on asylum procedures have 
made this point, since “[a]sylum seekers’ claims may be rejected because 
the accounts of their experiences fail to satisfy decision-makers’ expecta-
tions as to how persecuted people ‘ought’ to behave or react”.330 In the 
words of one expert “[t]oo often officials assume that the way they think 
is also the way the asylum-seeker thinks”.331 
A different kind of consistency issues may appear with contradic-
tions, or additional allegations, among multiple statements by the same 
witness. Regarding rape in particular the international judges, including 
ICTR, SCSL and ICC, have stated in several cases that the fact that the 
allegation was not included in the first statement should not be a reason to 
doubt its veracity. A situation of this kind surfaced in ICC Ntaganda, with 
the statements of three victims who reported being raped only in their 
second statement given in 2013, not in their first one from 2005.332 The 
                                                   
329 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and a Treatise on the Conduct 
of the Understanding, Heys & Zell, Philadelphia, 1860 (original edition of 1690), p. 429. 
330 Douglas McDonald, “Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination”, in Na-
tional Law School of India Review, 2014, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 123. 
331 Ibid., citing Walter Kälin, “Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings 
in the Asylum Hearing”, in International Migration Review, 1986, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 234. 
332 Ntaganda Trial Judgment, para. 88 “Delayed reporting of rape”, including fns. 192 and 195 
referring to the testimony and reports by prosecution’s expert witness Ms. Maeve Lewis, 
see above note 60. 
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OTP team identified this issue and took the additional steps of conducting 
two expert assessments, one medical in order to assess some injuries re-
ported in the statement, and another one psychological to assess the credi-
bility of the witness. The psychologist who interviewed the witnesses and 
conducted the assessments concluded that “delayed reporting of their 
rapes is consistent with the ‘experience of raped women worldwide’”, and 
that the allegations were credible.333 This psychologist testified in court, 
the prosecution submitted her reports and three other witnesses corrobo-
rated her assessment on the difficulties to report rape by victims.334 The 
judges accepted this assessment, and further considered the rapes proved 
on the strength of the testimonies of these victims.335 
Nancy A. Combs takes a critical stand towards the acceptance of 
delayed rape reporting for two reasons. Firstly, she claims that “[a] West-
ern victim’s credibility would be in shreds if she failed to mention that she 
had been raped until a late stage of the investigation”.336 There are several 
problems with this statement. Combs does not present any source of aca-
demia nor jurisprudence to support this notion, this shows only as her 
opinion. Research indicates a more complex and evolving picture in 
Western national systems, including instances in which national judges 
are equally understanding towards delayed rape allegations. 337 Further-
more, even if the comment were true, it does not mean that it is fair, it 
could be related to prejudice prevailing in national systems, and the prac-
tice advanced by international judges could be more truthful and fair than 
many a national precedent.338 
                                                   
333 Ibid., fn. 195. 
334 Ibid., fn. 192. 
335 Ibid., para. 88 “Delayed reporting of rape” for the general conclusion, and paras. 599–601 
for the specific crimes. 
336 Combs, 2010, p. 87, see above note 92. Note that the author refers to victims of rape ex-
clusively as “she”. 
337 See among others Louise Ellison, “Closing the Credibility Gap: The Prosecutorial Use of 
Expert Witness Testimony in Sexual Assault Cases”, in The International Journal of Evi-
dence and Proof, 2005, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 239–68, including on “Delayed Reporting” pp. 
248–50, focused on England and Wales; and Melissa S. Morabito, Linda M. Williams and 
April Pattavina, Decision Making in Sexual Assault Cases: Replication Research on Sexual 
Violence Case Attrition in the U.S., US National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Feb-
ruary 2019. 
338 For the state of the issue in India, including on delayed reporting, see Barn and Kumari, 
2015, see above note 302. 
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Secondly Combs claims that although the acceptance of delayed 
rape allegations may be justified because of “widespread taboo”, in her 
view “it likewise could have the effect of encouraging witnesses to embel-
lish or to lie outright about their experiences”.339 Combs does not offer 
any justification, nor basis of research to support this statement. Hypo-
thetically witnesses may have incentives to “embellish or to lie” for any 
crime, just as they may have important incentives to speak the truth. 
Combs proposes a teleological interpretation of the argument anticipating 
some hypothetical negative consequences, but she does not consider the 
implications of the alternative argument, while the consequence of reject-
ing delayed reporting would be the impunity for many instances of true 
rape that are subject to reporting delays and difficulties for understandable 
reasons. 
The judgment by the High Court of Delhi in Sajjan Kumar et al. of-
fers another example of accepting the veracity of delayed allegations. The 
key witness referred to police officers as “killers and murderers” only 
during the trial testimony, and never in the previous investigative inter-
views. She acknowledged this contradiction under cross-examination and 
explained that it was due to lack of trust on the police officers.340 The 
judges accepted her testimony as truthful in the following terms: 
the investigation was completely botched-up. […] The at-
mosphere of distrust created as a result of these develop-
ments would have dissuaded the victims from coming for-
ward to speak about what they knew. In the context of these 
cases, the factum of delay cannot be used to the advantage of 
the accused […] Nothing in the deposition of PW-1 points to 
either untruthfulness or unreliability. Her evidence deserves 
acceptance.341 
3.2.4.8.3.1. Training Test 
The participants were divided between positive and ‘undetermined’ rat-
ings, with not a single negative rating. This seems understandable because 
in the given scenario some general features were consistent, particularly a 
good chronological flow, and plausible cause-effect accounts, while the 
information included some internal contradictions in relation to specific 
                                                   
339 Combs, 2010, p. 87, see above note 92. 
340 Delhi High Court Sajjan Kumar and Others Judgment, paras. 210–12, see above note 45. 
341 Ibid., paras. 219–20. 
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issues. That may well happen with complex narratives involving multiple 
facts. 
3.2.4.8.4. External Verification 
Verification is a test of consistency with the rest of the evidence that has 
been positively evaluated and originate from separate independent sources. 
This is a particularly important aspect, checking against multiple sources 
is a fundamental requirement for proper investigations. ‘Verification’ is a 
neutral term, literally aiming at a determination about the truth, hence 
preferable to define an impartial parameter, rather than ‘corroboration’ 
which means positive confirmation: the evaluation must aim at verifying 
impartially the validity of the evidence, with no prejudice towards con-
firming or dismissing it. The approach should not be driven by ‘confirma-
tion bias’ or ‘asymmetrical scepticism’, it needs to look impartially for 
points of either confirmation or contradiction.342 
Corroboration is not a legal requirement in most systems, and a sin-
gle good source may produce conclusive evidence. Even the classic rule 
testis unus testis nullus (one witness, no witness) accepted exceptions in 
its original context. As Mirjan Damaška has explained: “contrary to the 
widespread opinion on the mechanical nature of Roman-canon evidence 
[…] even under mainstream Roman-canon doctrine, two eyewitnesses 
were not always required for the imposition of sanguinary punish-
ments”.343 At the international level the SCSL trial judgment in Taylor 
stated, while quoting several ICTY precedents: “[a]s a matter of law, the 
testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not require corrobo-
ration”.344 
Corroboration is not a guarantee either, because several sources 
may be equally wrong about a point of fact. As explained in ICTY juris-
prudence: 
corroboration of testimonies, even by many witnesses, does 
not establish automatically the credibility, reliability or 
weight of those testimonies. Corroboration is neither a con-
                                                   
342 See Moa Lidén, “Confirmation Bias in Investigations of Core International Crimes: Risk 
Factors and Quality Control Techniques”, Chap. 7 below. 
343 Mirjan Damaška, Evaluation of Evidence: Pre-Modern and Modern Approaches, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2019, p. 85. 
344 Taylor Trial Judgment, para. 166, with reference in fn. 414 to ICTY Tadić, Aleksovski, and 
Kupreškić et al., see above note 264. 
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dition nor a guarantee of reliability of a single piece of evi-
dence. It is an element that a reasonable trier of fact may 
consider in assessing the evidence.345 
The ICC judges have explained in similar terms: 
Depending on the circumstances, a single piece of evidence, 
such as a video image of a person, may suffice to establish a 
specific fact. However, as recognised by the Trial Chamber, 
this does not mean that any piece of evidence provides a suf-
ficient evidentiary basis for a factual finding.346 
Evidence needs to be impartially checked against other sources by 
the principle of ‘follow the best source’, that is, take as a starting point the 
information that has been evaluated as most credible. The assessment of 
which one is the ‘best source’ may evolve along with the investigation. 
It is highly advisable, as recommended by the ICC judges, to check 
witness allegations against documentary or forensic records (personal 
records, pictures, communication data, and so on), which might be ‘the 
best source’ to be followed. Allegations of injuries or death should be 
checked as much as possible with existing medical or death records, or 
with medical examinations or exhumations conducted specifically for the 
purpose of the investigation. 
3.2.4.8.4.1. Corroboration of Co-Perpetrators 
Some national systems consider that the evidence by a co-perpetrator 
alone is insufficient to justify a conviction, which would be an exception 
to the general rule of validity of single-witness allegations.347 The Italian 
Code of Criminal Procedure suggests a requirement of corroboration for 
co-perpetrators as follows: “3. The statements made by the accused of the 
same crime or by a person accused in a connected procedure pursuant to 
                                                   
345 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 27 September 2007, IT-
03-66-A, para. 203 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6d43bf/). 
346 Lubanga Appeals Judgment, para. 218, see above note 59. 
347 See Cavalli, 2006, sect. 3.3. “La credibilità estrinseca della chiamata in correità”, p. 108, 
see above note 320: “Qualora si stato superato il controllo sulla attendibilità intrinseca 
della chiamata in correità, il giudice, data l’insufficiente forza probatoria della stessa, deve 
individuare ‘altri elementi di prova’, ossia i c.d. riscontri estrinseci, che siano idoenei a 
confermare l’attendibilità della dichiarazione acusatoria”; Gascón Inchausti, 1999, p. 126, 
referring to jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), 
ECLI:ES:TC:1997:153, ECLI:ES:TC:1998:49, and ECLI:ES:TC:1998:115, see above note 
37. 
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Article 12 are valued together with the other elements of proof that con-
firm their reliability”.348 Similarly, in the trial for the terrorist attack in 
Madrid on 11 March 2004, the judges evaluated the testimony of a key 
insider “as if it were the testimony of a co-accused, so that they are given 
the value of incriminating evidence after being corroborated by sources of 
evidence or objective external data, as required by jurisprudence”.349 
ICTY judges considered this issue in Kordić and Čerkez, and taking 
into account, among others, the Italian procedure and jurisprudence in 
relation to pentiti, they decided that the testimony of co-perpetrators does 
not require corroboration. 350  Nevertheless, in the case in question the 
judges did verify the testimony by a key co-perpetrator with some circum-
stantial indicia and found it reliable.351 The SCSL judges took the same 
position in Taylor, echoing several SCSL and ICTR precedents, and stat-
ing that the Trial Chamber “may convict on the basis of the evidence of a 
single witness, even an accomplice, provided such evidence has been 
viewed with caution”.352 
3.2.4.8.4.2. Circumstantial Corroboration 
The ICTY jurisprudence has admitted two types of corroboration, which 
can be defined as substantive and circumstantial. Substantive corrobora-
tion is the most common and compelling understanding of corroboration, 
when two independent sources report consistently the same fact. Circum-
stantial corroboration takes place when one source reports the substantive 
fact, and other sources report some accessory facts in a way that makes 
the primary account plausible. As mentioned above, Kordić and Čerkez is 
a remarkable example of circumstantial corroboration, as follows: a co-
perpetrator testifying for the prosecution reports, on the basis of hearsay, 
the crucial fact that a certain meeting took place to plan the massacre with 
                                                   
348 Italy, Codice di Procedura Penale (Code of Criminal Procedure), Article 192 “Valutazione 
della prova” (Evaluation of the Evidence), para. 3. Article 12 “Casi di connessione” (Con-
nected Cases) defines the criteria to connect cases with the same actions or perpetrators 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/513152/, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aee4e8/). 
349 Spain National High Court Zougam Sentencia, p. 334, see above note 61. 
350 Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment, para. 628, see above note 258. 
351 Ibid., para. 630. 
352 Taylor Trial Judgment, para. 183, with reference in fn. 445 to SCSL AFRC and RUF, and 
ICTR Nchamihigo and Muvunyi, see above note 264. 
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the participation of the accused;353 “the Trial Chamber must determine to 
what extent his evidence is confirmed by other evidence”;354 “there is no 
direct evidence supporting his account of the meeting”; 355 “[h]owever, 
there is circumstantial evidence which does so”, including three elements; 
that the events “followed the plan which he described”; that “no such plan 
could have been put into operation without prior meetings and without 
political approval”; and that given the power of the accused in the area no 
such meeting would have taken place without him.356 Hence the judges 
found that those circumstantial elements corroborated the core fact al-
leged by the witness. The defence challenged this evidence in appeal, 
arguing that the Trial Chamber erroneously relied on “the uncorroborated 
hearsay testimony of a convicted murderer and admitted liar” and that 
“alternative inferences favourable to the Accused ought to have been 
drawn”. 357  The Appeals Chamber discussed this issue thoroughly and 
endorsed the findings by the Trial Chamber because “[i]t is incorrect to 
suggest that circumstantial evidence cannot be regarded as corroborative” 
and otherwise the Trial Chamber did not err in its evaluation of the evi-
dence.358 
3.2.4.8.4.3. Circular Reporting 
Only sources that are different and independent among themselves can 
provide corroboration. For example, when a media or intelligence report 
and an insider witness are giving the same information, this may consti-
tute corroboration only if the insider was not the source of the media or 
intelligence report in the first place. If the source is anonymous it may not 
be possible to assess whether it provides with corroboration or it is merely 
a case of duplication, or circular reporting. 
                                                   
353 Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment, para. 610, see above note 258: “The witness was not 
present himself but was some of those who did attend […] He was told about it by Paško 




357 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 17 December 2004, 
IT-95-14/2-A, para. 247 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/738211/). 
358 Ibid., paras. 276–84. 
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3.2.4.8.4.4. Fabricated Corroboration 
Mechanically echoing known allegations may be a negative indicator; it 
may be that the providers of the information aims at corroborating the 
allegation and giving us ‘what they think we want to hear’ rather than his 
or her true knowledge. Including details that are counter-intuitive, and 
contrary to the expected or most popular version of the events, might be in 
some cases a positive indicator. 
3.2.4.8.4.5. Internal Tools 
Checking external corroboration requires specific and laborious checks 
with analytical products, evidence databases, and possibly open sources. 
3.2.4.8.4.6. Training Test 
The participants gave consistently negative ratings for external corrobora-
tion, which was a valid assessment in view of the information contained 
in the scenario. 
3.2.4.8.5. Evolution 
The evaluation often evolves over time, because of the behaviour of the 
source, or new information. Hence the evaluation needs to be dated and 
time-specific, and it may need to be updated. It is advisable to review 
periodically the evaluation and correct or adjust to the new information 
when appropriate.359 
3.2.5. The Practice of the ICC Chambers 
The sections above focus on the methodology to conduct Source Evalua-
tion at the investigation stage. At the litigation stage SE issues will surface 
in similar terms, with the benefit of the adversarial test, and judges will 
need to address them with criteria and methods of their choice. 
The ICC judges have paid attention extensively to SE in multiple 
decisions and judgments, which is a sign of high professional standards. 
They have discussed at length the relevant issues even at the pre-trial 
stage and Confirmation Hearings. In Ruto and Sang,  for example, the 
judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) discussed in detail the evaluation 
of insider witnesses and dismissed the prosecution’s argument that “for 
                                                   
359 See below Section 3.4. on the process. 
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purposes of confirmation, the Pre-Trial Chamber should accept as reliable 
the Prosecution’s evidence, so long as it is relevant”, and defer to the trial 
judges for “a careful weighing and evaluation of the credibility of the 
witnesses”.360 
Table 7 below illustrates the extensive consideration of SE issues in 
the five main judgments by different Trial Chambers (TC) from 2012 to 
2019: 
Year TC Case Source Evaluation Considerations 
2012 I Lubanga 130 pages on the issue of the intermediaries, which 
was relevant to the alleged “contamination” of some 
victims who testified for the prosecution; 35 pages to 
discuss specifically issues of “witness credibility” and 
age determination for 15 different witnesses. 
2012 II Ngudjolo 2 pages to outline their criteria for the “assessment of 
oral testimony” and 62 pages for the “analysis of cred-
ibility of specific witnesses”, including 32 pages for 
the prosecution’s main 2 insider witnesses. 
2014 II Katanga 13 pages on “the Chamber’s criteria for the evaluation 
of witnesses”, 99 pages on “analysis of credibility of 
specific witnesses”, including 22 pages for the prose-
cution’s main 2 insider witnesses. 
2016 III Bemba 12 pages on “the criteria for the weight to be accorded 
to the evidence”; 32 pages on “issues of witness credi-
bility”. 
2019 VI Ntaganda 12 pages on “evaluation of evidence”; 89 pages on 
“specific issues of witness credibility”, including indi-
vidual evaluation of 16 witnesses and 9 pages on al-
leged collusion.  
Table 7. Consideration of SE issues in the five main judgments  
by different TC from 2012 to 2019. 
In four of the above judgments the TCs outlined their evaluation 
criteria, with similar language, but some differences in the choice of crite-
ria. See below the list of the criteria identified by these TCs (with the 
judgments of Ngudjolo and Katanga by TC II sharing the same criteria), 
                                                   
360 Ruto and Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, paras. 55–58, see above 
note 317. 
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1 “indicia suggesting that witnesses may have been 
pressurised or influenced”. X   1.4 
2 “or whether there was a risk that they were collud-
ing with other witnesses”. X   1.4 
3 “the consistency and precision of the accounts”. X X X  
4 “whether the information provided was plausible”. X X X 2.3 
5 “whether the evidence conflicted with a witness’s 
prior statement”. X X X 1.2 
6 “any possible contradictions with the evidence of 
other witnesses”. X   2.4 
7 “conduct during their testimony, including their 
readiness, willingness, and manner of responding 
to questions”. 
X X X 1.9 
8 “the fact that the charges relate to events that oc-
curred in 2002 and 2003”. X X X  
9 “and that witnesses who suffered trauma may have 
had particular difficulty in providing a coherent, 
complete, and logical account”. 
X X X  
10 “relationship to the Accused”. X   1.3 
                                                   
361 Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment, paras. 49, 51 and 53, see above note 297; ICC, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber, Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, paras. 
83, 85 and 87 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f74b4f/); Bemba Trial Judgment, para. 230, 
see above note 278; Ntaganda Trial Judgment, paras. 78 and 79, see above note 60. In 
Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., TC VII indicated some of the same criteria, in the context of 
Article 70 offences, and citing the precedents of the abovementioned judgements and par-
agraphs, see ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., 
Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 
19 October 2016, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, paras. 202 and 203 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/fe0ce4/). 
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11 “sincerity”. X    
12 “possible bias towards or against the Accused”. X   1.1 
13 “motives for telling the truth or giving false testi-
mony”. X   1.1 
14 “other potential reasons why a witness’s evidence 
may have been flawed”. X X   
Table 8. List of the criteria identified by TCs and their correspondence with the 
criteria of the OTP ID Source Evaluation Guidelines. 
The criteria above are partly consistent with those adopted by the 
OTP ID independently in 2006.362 As Table 8 above shows, the judges 
identified explicitly 7 of the 15 criteria adopted previously by OTP ID. On 
the other hand, the judges adopted criteria that were not in the OTP ID 
model, such as trauma and passage of time (criteria 8 and 9 in Table 8 
above). I had decided not include them in the OTP ID model because they 
did not appear to be settled in scientific research nor in jurisprudence, 
hence they would not make reliable parameters. Another difference could 
be using “sincerity” as a criterion by TC II (criteria 11 in Table 8 above), 
which may be repetitive with “motives” (criteria 13 in Table 8 above) or 
otherwise rather speculative. 
Concerning consistency across chambers, TC II adopted a longer 
list of criteria (14 as opposed to 6 or 7), and defined them in more de-
manding terms. TC II defined several of their additional criteria by refer-
ence to potential rather than actual issues, as follows: “indicia suggesting” 
(criterion no. 1 in Table 8 above), “may have been” (criterion no. 1 in 
Table 8 above), “risk” (criterion no. 2 in Table 8 above), “possible contra-
dictions” (criterion no. 6 in Table 8 above), “possible bias” (criterion no. 
12 in Table 8 above), and “other potential reasons” (criterion no. 14 in 
Table 8 above). That hypothetical and suggestive language is not present 
in the criteria defined by TC III and TC VI, who use descriptive impartial 
language, as Table 8 above shows. 
The approach proposed by TC II presents two problems. Firstly, it 
does not seem in accordance to the required legal standard and practice 
for the prosecution’s evidence, since under the ICC Statute judges are 
bound to decide “beyond reasonable doubt” (Article 66(3)) based on the 
                                                   
362 See above Section 3.2.4. 
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actual evidence, as opposed to any potential doubt or mere “risk”.363 This 
issue was already addressed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić, the 
very first ICTY case, in 1999. The Trial Chamber had acquitted the ac-
cused of certain killings because they “may have been” committed by 
other perpetrators, as a “bare possibility” and other elements “could sug-
gest” different conclusions.364 The prosecutor appealed considering that 
“the proof must be such as to exclude not every hypothesis or possibility 
of innocence, but every fair or rational hypothesis which may be derived 
from the evidence, except that of guilt”.365 The Appeals Chamber agreed 
with the prosecutor, since the participation of the accused in the killings 
was the only reasonable inference from the available evidence and no 
witness had suggested an alternative hypothesis.366 Several ICTY cham-
bers endorsed this doctrine.367 
Secondly, the focus on “suggestion/risk/potential” may lead to an 
area of theoretical speculation that is not verifiable or, in terms of scien-
tific epistemology, the method is not valid because it is not falsifiable. As 
Karl Popper would say: “We cannot search the whole world in order to 
establish that something does not exist, has never existed, and will never 
exist”.368 In classic jurisprudence this kind of impossible proof is known 
as probatio diabolica and considered fallacious.369 
                                                   
363 For a discussion on the standard “beyond reasonable doubt” and scientific methodology, 
see Elena Maria Catalano, “Logica della prova, statistical evidence e applicazione della 
teoria delle probabilità nel processo penale”, in Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, 2013, vol. 
4, pp. 132–51. 
364 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, p. 77 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8efc3a/). 
365 Ibid., p. 76. 
366 Ibid., p. 79. 
367 See Mark Klamberg, “Fact-finding in International Criminal Procedure: How Collection of 
Evidence may Contribute to Testing of Alternative Hypotheses”, paper presented during 
lecture at the Amsterdam Center for International Law, 30 May 2011, pp. 10–11. 
368 Popper, 2005, p. 49, see above note 29. See also ibid., chap. 4 “Falsifiability”, pp. 57–73. 
369 See for example in ICJ, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France), 
Preliminary Objections of the French Republic, 5 July 2000, para. 25, about the Yugoslav 
claim for France to prove in the negative that the alleged facts would not fall under the 
Genocide Convention, and para. 33, denying the validity of such probatio diabolica 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/waseth/). See also Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, 
The Construction of a Humanized International Law: A Collection of Individual Opinions 
(1991-2013): Volume 1, Brill, Leiden, 2014, chap. 18, sect. IV “The Inadmissibility of the 
Probatio Diabolica”, pp. 771–72. 
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One of the speakers in our conference, a Legal Officer with the ICC 
Chambers, suggested an approach similar to the one adopted by TC II.370 
According to him the duty of the judges is “identifying all potential 
sources of doubt”.371 Then the speaker, outlined the different “potential 
sources of doubt” related to logical consistency, plausibility and evidence 
validity.372 Unfortunately the speaker did not quote any relevant source of 
law or jurisprudence, which would help to assess the legal validity of this 
argument. 
An earlier version of this theory addressed witness credibility em-
phasising all potential problems, rather than defining impartial parameters 
and tools. The author starts by elaborating on the different reasons why 
“witnesses may lack credibility”, warning the reader that “[w]itnesses 
may be mistaken about the facts they testify to for a wide variety of rea-
sons” and “many things can go wrong”.373 Then the author describes vari-
ous types of potential biases. We are warned, for example, that “[a]nother 
very powerful type of bias is the witness’s self-interest”, assuming that 
this may distort the evidence:374 the author ignores the equally plausible 
scenario in which speaking the truth may be in the ‘self-interest’ of the 
witness, particularly victims. The author carries on warning about all 
kinds of possible “deception” since apparently “research suggests that it 
may be equally difficult for international investigators to detect when wit-
nesses are trying to deceive them”.375 Again, this is a very theoretical ob-
servation, biased towards doubting the investigative skills, when an im-
partial empirical research most likely would show different results, in-
cluding many instances of successful identification of deception. More 
warnings follow about “mendacious witnesses” and all thinkable difficul-
                                                   
370 See presentation by Simon De Smet, Legal Officer at the ICC Chambers, “Enhancing the 
Quality of Reasoning about the Link Between Evidence and Factual Propositions”, 
CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-
smet/). 
371 Ibid., 05:51 and corresponding slide. 
372 Ibid., 05:58 and corresponding slide. 
373 Simon De Smet, “Justified Belief in the Unbelievable”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Quality 
Control in Fact-Finding, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Florence, 2013, p. 121 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-bergsmo). For the 2020 second, expanded edition, co-
edited by Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn, see http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-
bergsmo-stahn-second.  
374 Ibid., p. 122. 
375 Ibid., p. 123. 
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ties, to conclude with the rather obvious statement that “[e]ven after thor-
ough testing, testimony therefore remains essentially defeasible evi-
dence”.376 All evidence is defeasible by definition, this is why we have 
adversarial processes, with the parties dedicated to defeat each other’s 
evidence and argument, and the judicial officers hopefully presiding im-
partially. 
The same speaker from the ICC Chamber continued with his scepti-
cal discourse explaining that some “holistic assessment of the evidence” is 
not possible because of the sheer volume of the evidence or “cognitive 
load”, so that when dealing, for example, with “25000 data points” if 
someone is claiming to have assessed holistically the evidence this person 
would be “lying to me”. 377  This statement would run contrary to the 
longstanding experience in social sciences managing large volumes of 
information and producing holistic assessments based on multiple qualita-
tive and quantitative methods. Such complex cognitive tasks should be 
feasible, as long as they are trusted to properly trained professionals using 
the appropriate empirical methods.378 
Different authors refer to the distinction between ‘holistic’ and ‘at-
omistic’ approaches to the evaluation of evidence.379 From the viewpoint 
of scientific research this is a false dilemma: complex large phenomena 
always require a multi-level approach addressing both the whole at the 
macro level, the atoms at the micro level, and various intermediate levels. 
This is similar to the distinction between the macro, meso and micro lev-
els that is common in social sciences. International cases comprise most 
often both ‘big questions’ that require macro holistic methods and reason-
ing, as well as ‘smaller questions’ for specific victims or items of evi-
dence. That should be regarded as an ontological issue, inherent to the 
underlying reality, rather than a methodological choice. For large-scale 
                                                   
376 Ibid., p. 126. 
377 De Smet, 2019, 12:47, see above note 370. 
378 For an overview of empirical methods applied to international crimes, see Bijleveld, 2017, 
p. 15, see above note 28. 
379 See among others Taruffo, 2002, chap. IV, sect. 5. “Concepción holista y método analítico”, 
pp. 307–19, see above note 227; Twining, 1985, pp. 183–84, see above note 193; Mark 
Schweizer, “Comparing Holistic and Atomistic Evaluation of Evidence”, in Law, Probabil-
ity and Risk, 2014, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 65–89; and Yvonne McDermott, “Strengthening the 
Evaluation of Evidence in International Criminal Trials”, in International Criminal Law 
Review, 2017, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 682–702. 
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cases the equivalent of the macro level could be the pattern of crime as a 
whole, the meso level would correspond with the multiple incidents that 
constitute the alleged pattern, and the micro level would speak to the indi-
vidual victim or source. All the three levels would need to be specifically 
proved and tested through litigation with sources and methods appropriate 
to their scope. 
Besides the tools available from scientific methodology, other logi-
cal solutions for ‘complex facts’ are also known from jurisprudence and 
legal expertise, including certain forms of ‘evidence by sampling’, ‘evi-
dence by absence of evidence to the contrary’, and ‘reducing complexity’ 
by focusing selectively on key defining elements.380 
What some jurisprudence has accepted as ‘evidence by absence of 
evidence to the contrary’ is the equivalent of the classic reductio ad ab-
surdum, whereby the alternative explanations are identified and discarded 
if they are not logical, a well-known scientific principle since the times of 
Euclid and Archimedes.381 This is also similar to ‘differential diagnosis’ in 
medicine, a process of finding the right diagnosis by eliminating the alter-
natives, as well as the concept of ‘inference to the best explanation’ pro-
moted by some authors in logics and law, and the technique of Analysis of 
Competing Hypotheses.382 With this approach the holistic conclusion does 
not need to be perfect in every element to be valid ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’, it only needs to be the single reasonable answer left when other 
reasonable alternatives have been duly identified, fairly considered, and 
discarded if they are not plausible. 
The same speaker presented “bounded rationality” along with the 
notion that “human mind is prone to make reasoning errors (fallacies, 
heuristics)”.383 This proposition is misleading because, unlike fallacies, 
heuristics and ‘bounded rationality’ are not essentially erroneous, they are 
reasoning strategies that may be valid or not, depending among other fac-
                                                   
380 See among others Taruffo, 2002, chap. II, sect. 5.1. “El hecho complejo”, pp. 143–49, 
including references from Italy and other countries on prova per campione (‘evidence by 
sampling’) and prova per mancanza del contrario (‘evidence by absence to the contrary’), 
see above note 227. 
381 See John Losee, “The Ideal of Deductive Systematization”, in A Historical Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Science, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 23–26. 
382 See below Section 3.3.2. 
383 De Smet, 2019, 13:14, see above note 370. 
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tors on the expertise of the observer. 384 Even Daniel Kahneman, most 
vocal among experts in the critique of heuristics, does not consider them 
essentially wrong. In his view rather “[t]here is a heuristic alternative to 
careful reasoning, which sometimes works fairly well and sometimes 
leads to serious errors”.385 Other experts, and particularly Gerd Gigeren-
zer, question the premise that there must be a “careful reasoning” prefera-
ble to heuristics, since any reasoning, including legal reasoning, is con-
text-specific and it cannot be assessed by merely formal abstract stand-
ards.386 
As explained above a differential approach (‘evidence by absence 
of evidence to the contrary’, reductio ad absurdum, ‘differential diagno-
sis’, ‘inference to the best explanation’ or Analysis of Competing Hypoth-
esis) could be valid heuristics at the holistic level, which coupled with 
proper Source Evaluation at the atomistic level, would suffice to reach 
certainty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. An approach of abstract formal logic 
is not necessarily any more reasonable, it is only more grandiloquent, or 
perhaps a heuristic path to dismiss the cases, which would be a legitimate 
strategy for the defence counsel, but not for impartial judges. 
Dismissing certain forms of reasoning and suggesting the theoreti-
cal risk of logical mistakes contributes to raise ‘reasonable doubts’, which 
is the task of the defence counsel, rather than determining impartially 
whether such doubts are present or not, which is the task of the judge. 
During our conference a judge responded to the presentation by the 
abovementioned speaker indicating indeed that it seemed to reflect the 
                                                   
384 For a discussion on bounded rationality and heuristics in relation to prosecutions, see 
Barbara O’Brien, “Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institu-
tional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making”, in Missouri 
Law Review, 2009, vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 999–1050. For an overview on heuristics, history of 
the concept and related controversies, see Ulrich Hoffrage, Sebastian Hafenbrädl and Jul-
ian N. Marewski, “The Fast-and-Frugal Heuristics Program”, in Linden J. Ball and Valerie 
A. Thompson (eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, 
Routledge, London, 2018, pp. 325–45. For broader reference, see also Patrick Nerhot (ed.), 
Law, Interpretation and Reality: Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990. 
385 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Penguin, London, 2011, p. 98. 
386 On legal reasoning, see Gerd Gigerenzer and Christoph Engel (eds.), Heuristics and the 
Law, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006. For broader reference applicable to different fields, 
see Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd and the ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics that 
Make Us Smart, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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way of thinking of the defence, committed to dismantle the case for the 
prosecution, rather than that of judges with a duty to assess it impartially. 
Cultural preferences amount to another aspect that would need to be 
taken into account when discussing ‘holistic v. atomistic’. ‘Analytical 
thinking’, in the sense of dissecting the elements of an argument or an 
image is typical of Western culture, while the alternative of ‘holistic 
thinking’ is common in the rest of the world, along with more collective 
and contextual thinking.387 
Beyond the formal definition of criteria, the most difficult question 
is assessing their actual implementation in specific cases. This would re-
quire extensive analysis of the judicial decisions and their underlying evi-
dence, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. A comprehensive study 
would reveal variations among judges and chambers, which is otherwise 
noticeable in multiple dissenting options that refer to issues of evidence, 
as well as contradictions between Trial Chambers and the Appeals Cham-
bers. Just like in any fair national or international judicial system, clearly 
there is a broad scope of standards and practice among ICC judges, some 
being more conservative than others with the evidence. 
Let us consider the example of TC II with the Katanga and 
Ngudjolo judgments, which appears to be an outlier when compared with 
the criteria adopted by other chambers. Table 9 below summarises the 
information contained in these judgments comparing the OTP evidence 
and allegations, and the findings of the Source Evaluation conducted by 
the chamber in relation to the five key insider witnesses presented by the 
prosecution (the evaluation is the same in both judgments for all of them, 
except for P-28): 
                                                   
387 Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010, sect. 4.3 “Analytic Versus Holistic Thinking”, pp. 
71–73, see above note 88. 
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 OTP Evidence/Allegation TC II Source Evaluation 
P-28 Abducted, Katanga’s per-
sonal escort, witnessed 
preparations and participat-
ed in the Bogoro attack. 
Ngudjolo – Not credible on issues specific to 
the accused, dismissed. 
Katanga – Credible on some details of the 
Aveba militia and commanders. On key 
responsibility issues his testimony alone will 
not suffice and must be corroborated. 
P-219 Lived with a member of 
Katanga’s family, access to 
the camp and commanders. 
Not credible, contradictions with 5 defence 
witnesses. 
P-250 Member of a delegation that 
Ngudjolo dispatched to 
Katanga, when they decided 
to attack Bogoro. 
Not credible on his membership of the mili-
tia, lacking internal consistency. 
P-279 Abducted, witness of Ka-
tanga discussing Bogoro 
with Ngudjolo, order to 
attack Bogoro.  
Not credible, “trop imprécis et contradic-
toires”, denial of his precise age and his 
relationship, and contradictions with another 
witness. 
P-280 Abducted, Katanga one of 
the FRPI leaders. 
Not credible, “trop imprécis et contradic-
toires”, he may have transposed what he 
knew of Aveba to add value to his descrip-
tion of Zumbe, contradictions with other 
witnesses. 
Table 9. Comparison between the OTP evidence and allegations, and the find-
ings of the Source Evaluation conducted by the chamber in relation to the five 
key insider witnesses presented by the prosecution. 
The discrepancy is remarkable, with the chamber quashing all five 
of the prosecution’s key insider witnesses. The assessment by the chamber 
would suggests that the OTP had a very poor understanding of their wit-
nesses, while the view of the OTP was rather that the chamber was ex-
ceedingly dismissive with these witnesses. 
Some comparative pattern analysis may shed additional light. In 
2016 Chlevickaite and Hola published some initial findings about the 
evaluation of insider witnesses by ICC judges based on the three judg-
ments issued at the time (Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo) and the rele-
vant 21 insider witnesses (12 for the prosecution and 9 for the defence). 
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They assessed the value given to these witnesses regarding their ‘witness 
credibility’ and ‘information reliability’, as well as the ‘probative value’ 
















D-0007 High High High High with 
exceptions 
D-0011 Low Low Low Low 
D-0019 Low High Low High 
D-0037 High High High High 
P-0002 High High High High 
P-0012 High High High High 








P-0017 High High High High 







P-0041 High High High High 
P-0055 High High with 
exceptions 

















P-250 Low Low None None 
P-279 Low Low None None 
P-280 Low Low None None 
P-28 Low Medium Medium Low 
P-219 Low Low None None 
D03-88 Low High Low High 
D02-176 High High High High 
                                                   
388 Chlevickaite and Hola, 2016, Table 2 “Link Between Credibility/Reliability Assessments 
and Weight Given to Linkage/Crime-Base Evidence”, p. 696, see above note 241. The first 
column is added to facilitate identifying visually the witnesses of the two trials. Witnesses 
D02-176, D02-228, D02-236 and D02-350 were assessed only for Katanga. 
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D02-228 Medium High High High 
D02-236 Medium High Medium High 
D02-350 High High High High 
Table 10. Overview table of the value of insider witnesses based on the Lubanga, 
Katanga and Ngudjolo judgments issued. 
Concerning the association of the witnesses with the prosecution or 
the defence, this dataset shows a quite different distribution of values for 
the witnesses evaluated by TC I (witnesses D-0007 to P-0055), and those 
evaluated by TC II (witnesses P-250 to D02-350). TC I gave positive and 
negative values for both prosecution and defence witnesses, with a distri-
bution that does not correlate clearly with any of the two parties. TC II 
evaluated negatively every one of the prosecution witnesses (see above P-
250, P-279, P-280, P-28 and P-219), with remarkably more positive eval-
uations for defence witnesses (see above D03-88, D02-176, D02-228, 
D02-236 and D02-350). These results coincide with the different formula-
tion of the evaluation criteria by TC II, which are more demanding and 
leaning to side with the defence in their proactive exploration of potential 
doubts, as explained above. Furthermore, one of the judges in TC II was 
even more dismissive than the majority with the prosecution’s witnesses, 
as she indicated in her dissenting opinion and vote for acquittal.389 
Taking into account the unusually expansive criteria adopted by TC 
II, and the results in the judgments as explained above, the fact that the 
chamber was so dismissive selectively with the prosecution’s witnesses 
appears to be the result of applying some high standard akin to ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ at the atomistic level for each witness, instead that at 
the holistic level for the case as a whole. These two judgments give the 
impression that TC II projected the overall standards for the defence and 
prosecution cases on their individual witnesses: defence witnesses were 
evaluated more positively as if the standard for them was merely to raise 
doubts about the prosecution’s case, while prosecution witnesses were 
dismissed because they were evaluated individually with a higher stand-
                                                   
389 See ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, Trial Chamber, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, 7 March 
2014, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-AnxI, sect. III.A.3. “Unconvincing Credibility Analysis”, pp. 
87–98 (‘Katanga Trial Minority Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/9b0c61/). 
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ard equivalent to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. This would be a legal and 
logical mistake, because judges must be convinced ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ about the ultimate question of individual responsibility, after hav-
ing evaluated all the evidence holistically, they are not expected to apply 
the ultimate standard to the primary items of evidence individually. This 
approach of deconstruction and fragmentation would make impossible to 
understand complex phenomena, and it would set an impossible standard 
of a ‘perfect case’ for the prosecution, highly conducive to quash any and 
all possible cases. 
Concerning the validity and implementation of the two main pa-
rameters, for the witness and for the information, Table 10 above by 
Chlevickaite and Hola shows a remarkable correlation for most witnesses 
across the four columns, for both chambers, very often receiving the same 
value. Not a single witness given ‘high credibility’ is assessed with ‘low 
reliability’, and only two witnesses show the reverse combination. This 
pattern begs the question of to what extent there is a ‘halo effect’ in place, 
that is, once they get a good impression about the witness, the judges 
might be inclined to assess positively their evidence and give it good pro-
bative value for all purposes. Some ‘witness halo effect’ might have oper-
ated for the judges when trying to find their way through the mass of evi-
dence. This could be regarded as a hypothesis for further research, with a 
larger dataset from more cases. 
Chlevickaite and Hola found that the ICC judges had focused pri-
marily on the content of the testimony (“reliability of the information”), 
while issues related to the background of the witness (“credibility of the 
witness”) appeared to be secondary, only relevant in case of doubt about 
the evidence as such.390 These authors find that the judges may have un-
derestimated the importance of “witness credibility” issues since insiders 
often are conditioned by subjective or self-serving motives and biases. 
Chlevickaite and Hola found that judges had focused particularly on 
4 of the 11 criteria relevant to the “reliability of the information”: con-
sistency, corroboration, detail and knowledge.391 This focus is in my view 
appropriate, since these appear to be indeed the most relevant criteria for 
this matter. These four criteria coincide largely with the four criteria in the 
                                                   
390 Chlevickaite and Hola, 2016, p. 691, see above note 241. 
391 Ibid., p. 689. 
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ID model for ‘information’, which appears to validate the design adopted 
by ID in 2006. 
A more complete assessment of the judicial practice will require 
additional research of the kind that Chlevickaite and Hola have initiated, 
including both pattern analysis and statistics across cases, as well as quali-
tative case studies fully embedded in the factual and cultural context of 
the cases and the chambers. In addition to the context of justification, on 
how judges or prosecutors justify their decisions, research on the context 
of discovery may be equally important to explore how such decisions are 
truly developed in the first place. 
Another issue that would merit additional research is the impact of 
tampering and pressure on witnesses from the accused and their associates. 
Problems of this kind have surfaced in every ICC case brought to trial, 
including threats against witnesses, public defamation, coaching and brib-
ery. When the OTP has raised these issues before the judges, some of 
them have declined to consider their impact on the validity of evidence, 
and directed instead the prosecution to a different procedure. This policy 
adopted by some ICC judges may run contrary to the need to conduct 
proper Source Evaluation at the trial stage, because it may exclude from 
the scrutiny information relevant to, among others, ‘motivation’, ‘inde-
pendence’ and ‘contamination’ (as explained in Section 3.2.4. above under 
criteria 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 in the ID model). 
3.2.6. Conclusion 
The investigation of international crimes requires a proper methodology 
for Source Evaluation, with a set of standard criteria to be systematically 
tested against individual sources of evidence. The model adopted by the 
Investigations Division at the ICC-OTP may assist investigations by na-
tional and international agencies, with appropriate adjustments to the op-
erational and legal context as necessary. No model is perfect and the 
above-recommended model may also benefit from additional review and 
feedback from researchers and practitioners, as explained in reference to 
different indicators.392 Once a model is adopted, proper training, imple-
mentation and compliance control will be required. 
                                                   
392 See above Section 3.2.4. 
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3.3. Diagnostic Techniques 
Diagnostic techniques aim at dissecting the content of the tentative case or 
proposition, breaking it down into tangible elements that can be subject to 
individual examination. These techniques are most relevant to address the 
bottlenecks no. 1 “information overview”, no. 3 “evidence review” and no. 
4 “formulation of responsibility” identified in the QCCI project, see the 
introductory chapter above by Bergsmo and the present author. The term 
‘analysis’ is known in Western culture since Aristotle and his works Prior 
Analytics and Posterior Analytics, which are considered as foundations of 
Western epistemology. The original meaning and etymology of ‘analysis’ 
in this tradition is actually to dissect and break in smaller pieces a phe-
nomenon to better understand it.393 The four techniques in this section are 
known from analytical practice and they are largely consistent with prin-
ciples of scientific methodology, as well as the requirements of legal pro-
cedure. 
3.3.1. Key Assumptions Check 
This method requires: a) To identify the underlying factual assumptions of 
a given investigative hypothesis; b) To check specifically their factual and 
logical validity.394 
There are a number of factual assumptions that the investigation 
may have accepted axiomatically, because they were implicit in the 
sources, because of insufficient contextual knowledge, or for various op-
erational reasons. Because these assumptions operate as building blocks 
for the investigation, it is advisable to check them in the best interest of 
the whole construct, particularly for the first cases in a new situation. 
Questioning such assumption may be difficult if they follow from cultural 
consensus, precedent in other cases, policy orientation, or ‘groupthink’. 
Consider the following examples: 
• Group identity: In the context of an ‘ethnic conflict’ various reports 
refer to different ‘ethnic groups’ as well-defined entities. The inves-
tigation in based on the assumption of the existence and belonging 
in these ‘ethnic groups’. There may be a need to check this assump-
                                                   
393 See Losee, 1993, chap. 1 “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Science”, pp. 5–15, see above note 
381. 
394 See Heuer Jr. and Pherson, 2015, sect. 8.1 “Key Assumptions Check”, pp. 209–14, see 
above note 35. 
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tion in view of fuzzy belonging boundaries, mixed types, sub-
groups, and stereotypical reporting for propaganda of journalistic 
purposes. Perhaps the ‘ethnic’ image is an epiphenomenon and the 
true drives are other economic or political factor, which could ex-
plain some contradictions with the profiles of victims or other in-
vestigative issues. 
• Military organisation: The investigation may have assumed that a 
military group follows conventional schemes because of their ap-
pearance, denomination, ranks or uniforms. It is advisable to check 
this assumption against the real functioning of the group, key per-
sonalities, internal processes, and actual operations. It could be that 
a self-proclaimed military group is actually a cover for pre-existing 
structures, or a proxy for other actors. 
• Authority: Assumptions about the mandate of different government 
branches from the national background of the investigation team 
may conflict with the realities of other countries.395 
• Ideology: Major political and religious belief-systems are defined in 
binary terms, with negative assumptions about opposing creeds. As-
sumptions of ‘fundamentalism’ or ‘authoritarianism’ may follow 
implicitly, when the reality is that major political or religious creeds 
comprise many different trends and experiences. 
Best practice is to identify and check the key assumptions from the 
outset of the investigation, when defining investigative hypotheses, 
through specific brainstorming, consultation and analysis tasks. This 
check may lead to confirm, dismiss or adjust the assumptions, or it may 
trigger specific efforts of collection or analysis if the issue is particularly 
important. For example, checking assumptions about group identity typi-
cally requires context-specific research and group-specific victim data, 
while organisational assumptions most often require documentary or wit-
ness internal sources. 
Alternatively, if the team is not able to check certain assumptions, 
or they do not consider them critical for the case, at least those assump-
tions should be stated clearly for the record, so that it is understood that 
                                                   
395 Like in the example of the interrogation of a former Nazi Foreign Affairs Minister by a US 
prosecutor, see above Section 3.2.2.2. 
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the investigative findinsg are subject to the validity of those underlying 
premises. 
3.3.2. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (‘ACH’) 
Causality, as Hannah Arendt indicated, is one of the most difficult and 
elusive questions in science.396 It is also the ultimate question in criminal 
investigations, focused on causal attribution and individual responsibil-
ity.397 It is useful to identify causal hypotheses from the early stages of the 
investigation,398 to the extent supported by the available information. Hy-
potheses, in investigations as much as in science, are meant to be tested 
critically and compared with alternative or concurring factors. 399 They 
should be phrased in factual plain terms, as the most plausible factual 
explanation of the alleged crimes, and as a syllogism or chain of discrete 
propositions that lead logically to a conclusion of responsibility. By 2003 
Patrick J. Treanor, Head of the ICTY Leadership Research Team, advised 
the nascent ICC-OTP as follows: 
It is extremely important that investigations, especially of 
leadership figures on a higher level, begin and continue to 
                                                   
396 See her essay: Hannah Arendt, “Understanding and Politics (the Difficulties of Under-
standing)”, in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1994, p. 319: “Causality, however, is an altogether alien 
and falsifying category in the historical sciences”. On her scepticism about causal thinking, 
see Annette Vowinckel, “Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger: History and Metahistory”, 
in Steven E. Aschheim (ed.), Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 2001, pp. 338–46. See also entry “Causation”, in Robert. A. Wilson and Frank. C. 
Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
1999, pp. 108–10. 
397 See among others Carlo Brusco, Il rapporto di causalità: prassi e orientamenti, Giuffré 
Editore, Milan, 2006. For a case study of alternative hypotheses and argumentation theory, 
see E.T. Feteris, “An Argumentative Analysis and Evaluation of Complex Cases in Dutch 
Criminal Law”, in C.M. Breur, M.M. Kommer, J.F. Nijboer and J.M. Reijntjes (eds.), New 
Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence: Volume 2, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2000, 
pp. 225–38; the author focuses on the “ballpoint case”, in which a conviction was reversed 
by the appeals judges because they found that the judges in the first instance had not con-
sidered the alternative hypothesis presented by the defence. For more on this high-profile 
Dutch case, see Roland Bal, “How to Kill with a Ballpoint: Credibility in Dutch Forensic 
Science”, in Science, Technology, and Human Values, 2005, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 52–75. 
398 As indicated in the general cycle, see above Section 3.1. 
399 See Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker, “Causal Explanation”, in Critical Thinking, 
9th edition, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2009, pp. 385–413. For related issues of statistical evi-
dence, see Leila Schneps and Coralie Colmez, Math on Trial: How Numbers Get Used and 
Abused in the Courtroom, Basic Books, New York, 2013. 
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proceed on the basis of a substantive hypothesis (for exam-
ple, the party leader was in control) developed through the 
analysis of all information and evidence available on the 
given leadership structure. That is, all relevant knowledge 
must be integrated through analysis into a consistent hypoth-
esis or, if inconsistent with it, put aside but not forgotten for 
later re-evaluation and possible use. The hypothesis may, in-
deed most likely will, change over time, but the changes 
must reflect a deepening of knowledge and constant analysis. 
Analysis will in fact serve to point up gaps and other weak-
nesses in the hypothesis and the available knowledge and 
serve as a guide to the investigative process, that is, the turn-
ing of mere information into evidence and the gathering of 
fresh information and evidence.400 
The Regulations of the ICC-OTP direct the teams to identify an 
overall “case hypothesis (or hypotheses)” at an initial stage, as a tool to 
guide the investigation, and to “be reviewed and adjusted on a continuous 
basis taking into consideration the evidence collected”. 401 Similarly in 
Colombia, where the Fiscalía General de la Nación has decades of experi-
ence with complex investigations (numerous cases of organized crime, 
corruption, war crimes, and so on since its establishment in 1992), the 
“prosecutor in charge of co-ordinating the investigation” is required at the 
outset of the investigation to “determine the objectives of the investiga-
tion” on the basis of a “crime hypothesis” as part of a “methodological 
program”.402 
                                                   
400 Patrick J. Treanor, “Research and Analysis in the Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudica-
tion of Crimes”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Histori-
cal Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
Brussels, 2017, p. 138 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). 
401 ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09, Regu-
lations 24 and 35 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). 
402 Colombia, Código de Procedimiento Penal Colombiano (Law 906 of 2004), 31 August 
2004, Article 207 “Programa metodológico” (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/96af08/): 
el fiscal, con el apoyo de los integrantes de la policía judicial, se trazará un programa 
metodológico de la investigación, el cual deberá contener la determinación de los ob-
jetivos en relación con la naturaleza de la hipótesis delictiva; los criterios para evaluar 
la información; la delimitación functional de las tareas que se deban adelantar en pro-
cura de los objetivos trazados; los procedimientos de control en el desarrollo de las la-
bores los recursos de mejoramiento de los resultados obtenidos. 
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Hypotheses are necessary to guide investigations, but they are also 
dangerous if poorly designed or handled. What Chimamanda Ngozi 
Adichie calls “the danger of a single story”, harmful simplifications based 
on limited information and stereotypes, resembles the stories that some-
times the parties tell in adversarial litigation.403 This issue surfaced, for 
example, in ICTY Milutinović et al., when an expert for the prosecution 
presented statistical analysis about the mass displacement of Albanian 
population in Kosovo. 404  He argued that the displacement was “con-
sistent” with the hypothesis of an attack against civilians by the Serbian 
forces, but the defence challenged this finding because the expert never 
considered other alternative hypotheses that could have also been “con-
sistent” with the data. The judges agreed with the defence in that the pros-
ecution’s analysis “still leaves a number of potentially plausible options 
unexplored”, besides other methodological flaws, and they dismissed this 
expert evidence.405 Additionally the accused in a related case had ques-
tioned the same analysis because it had excluded the exodus of Serbian 
civilians from the population to be analysed, which could suggest some 
fundamental bias, or otherwise it should have been checked as a “key 
assumption”. The need to consider alternative factual hypotheses has also 
been indicated by ICC judges in different cases.406 
A way to counter ‘the danger of a single story’ is to consider simul-
taneously several investigative hypotheses. But this is not easy, psycho-
logically and operationally, or as F. Scott Fitzgerald would say, “[t]he test 
of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind 
at the same time and still retain the ability to function”.407 That challenge 
                                                   
403 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, “The Danger of a Single Story”, TED, July 2009 (available 
on TED’s web site). 
404 For the analytical report, see Patrick Ball, Wendy Betts, Fritz Scheuren, Jana Dudukovich 
and Jana Asher, Killings and Refugee Flow in Kosovo, March - June 1999: A Report to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) and American Bar Association Central and East Europe-
an Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), Washington, D.C., 2002. 
405 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement: Volume 3 of 4, 26 
February 2009, IT-05-87-T, pp. 13–17 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d79e85/). 
406 See, for example, in Katanga Trial Minority Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, 
sect. C. “Another Reasonable Reading of the Evidence Is Possible”, pp. 100–42, see above 
note 389. 
407 F Scott Fitzgerald, in Edmund Wilson (ed.), The Crack-UP, New Directions Books, New 
York, 1945, p. 69. 
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can be addressed with Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, a method de-
veloped for intelligence analysis that can be equally helpful in criminal 
investigations, applied for the case as a whole (case hypothesis) or for 
specific elements. 
ACH is essentially a table to check comparatively different hypoth-
eses against the relevant items of evidence.408 The logic is similar to the 
methods of differential diagnosis in medicine: a process of elimination, 
first identifying different potential diagnoses, and then checking them 
against the available medical evidence. The original public formulation by 
Richards J. Heuer indicated the following 8 steps:409 
 Step-By-Step Outline of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 
1 Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with 
different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities. 
2 Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis. 
3 Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side. 
Analyse the ‘diagnosticity’ of the evidence and arguments – that is, identify 
which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of the hypotheses. 
4 Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence and argu-
ments that have no diagnostic value. 
5 Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis. 
Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather than prove them. 
6 Analyse how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence. 
Consider the consequences for your analysis if that evidence were wrong, 
misleading, or subject to a different interpretation. 
7 Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of all the hypotheses, not 
just the most likely one. 
8 Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a 
different course than expected. 
Table 11. The original public formulation of ACH. 
                                                   
408 See Heuer Jr. and Pherson, 2015, sect. 7.3 “Analysis of Competing Hypotheses”, pp. 181–
92, see above note 35; and Morgan D. Jones, “Hypothesis Testing”, in The Thinker’s 
Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving, Three Rivers Press, New York, 1999, 
pp. 178–216. 
409 Heuer, Jr., 1999, p. 97, see above note 139. 
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The first step requires defining through analysis several plausible 
hypotheses, beyond merely echoing the allegations from victims and other 
actors. In the second step the key items of evidence, those most relevant 
and credible, need to be also identified systematically. These two initial 
steps need to be conducted impartially, regardless of eventual incriminat-
ing or exonerating implications. The exercise needs to integrate as much 
as possible the hypotheses and evidence proposed by or expected from the 
viewpoint of the alleged perpetrators. The team might consider at least 
three different hypotheses, two of them mutually exclusive representing 
the most likely scenarios for incrimination and exoneration (hypotheses A 
and B), and a third hypothesis C to anticipate variations partially compat-
ible with A and B. The hypotheses might be suspect-specific, if justified 
by the available information, in the understanding that this process should 
help to control for suspect-driven biases. ACH can also be used to test 
comparatively several suspect-specific hypotheses about different sus-
pects, if relevant. 
The third and fourth steps require to identify those items of evi-
dence and propositions that appear to carry the highest diagnosticity, that 
is, those who make a difference for the diagnosis, and to remove those of 
lesser value, in order to consolidate a robust model. Otherwise the model 
could become too cumbersome and not workable. 
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The fifth step can be covered by coding the cells in the matrix with 
a positive or negative assessment on whether each item of evidence sup-
ports each hypothesis or not. A simple coding scheme can be applied as 
follows (colour coding for the ease of visual synopsis, or with figures for 
tentative scores) in the tables, and similarly for ‘links’ in relational 
charts:410 
Finding Explanation Link 
(green) Conclusively positive, the item of evi-
dence supports clearly the hypothesis. 
Solid = Confirmed  
(amber) Undetermined. Ambivalent, the item of 
evidence is compatible with the hypothe-
sis, but also open to other interpretations 
or compatible with other hypotheses. 
Broken = Unconfirmed: compat-
ible with the evidence but not 
conclusive, because the evidence 
is incomplete or conflicting. 
Dotted = Tentative: mere hypoth-
esis proposed by the analyst, or 
unverified allegation. 
(red) Conclusively negative, the item of evi-
dence contradicts clearly the hypothesis. 
No link. 
 Irrelevant. Evidence not relevant to the 
hypothesis. 
No link. 
Table 12. Coding scheme for tables and relational charts. 
For a more elaborate version, this step can also be covered with dif-
ferent formulas in spread-sheets, adding possibly a scale for the Source 
Evaluation of each evidence item (that is, attributing them different 
weights), and aggregated scores for each hypothesis. 
Steps number 6 and 7 will allow to identify the most plausible hy-
pothesis. If more than one hypothesis is equally valid, this can mean that 
they are too vague, or that the evidence is not specific enough, which may 
help to refine the hypothesis or to search for additional and more specific 
evidence. The last step should contribute to the collection plan, by identi-
fying key points and facts and sources for further verification. 
                                                   
410 As for Case Evaluation Charts, see below Section 3.3.4. 
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The initial design of ACH has led to different versions and imple-
mentations, as well as software tools and video tutorials, all of which 
readily available online. Clearly identifying multiple hypotheses and 
comparing them systematically is a good idea for any complex investiga-
tion, and the ACH model may help for this purpose, while other models 
and combinations of methods should also be explored. For large cases it 
could be that an overall ‘case hypothesis’ is too complex to be subsumed 
under a table with a few rows, but still the method can be used for general 
orientation, or otherwise applied on discrete propositions within the case. 
Ultimately having a hypothesis or an explanation as ‘the best’ does not 
mean that it is factually correct, it only means that it is better than the 
alternatives under consideration, hence hypotheses are tools and not find-
ings, always in need of further inductive and deductive verification.411 
The preferred hypothesis still will be subject to the critical test of the in-
vestigation, and the resulting findings subject to Evidence Review.412 
Beyond and after the investigation, this comparative approach could 
help in the stage of litigation, towards a finding ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’, as a method to identify the ‘inference to the best explanation’. The 
judges could use the ACH method in their deliberations, but with a higher 
standard of certainty, so that a conviction would require not just that the 
alternative hypotheses are less compelling, but rather that they are not 
reasonable in view of the available evidence. 
3.3.3. Case Evaluation Table 
Once one or more hypotheses have been selected for investigation after 
the ACH or similar process, a subsequent step would be to apply a similar 
test to each element of the hypothesis. The Case Evaluation Table (‘CET’) 
is meant to test the premises of the case hypothesis against specific items 
of evidence and to produce a synopsis that should help to identify investi-
gative priorities, and ultimately to decide on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence for eventual charges. As the example below shows, the case hy-
pothesis is specified with one row for each of its premises, stated in pre-
                                                   
411 See Larry Laudan, “Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Crimi-
nal Standard of Proof”, in International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 2007, vol. 11, no. 
4, pp. 292–306. The author questions similarly the validity of ‘inference to the best expla-
nation’ based on history of the sciences, and considers it insufficient to warrant certainty 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. 
412 See below Section 3.5. 
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cise factual terms, while the columns show the different sources of evi-
dence that have been assessed positively as a matter of Source Evaluation. 



































1 2 3 4 5 
1 X was the Head of the Police in 
[period].           5  
2 Y was the Head of the Prison sys-
tem in [period].           5  
3 Z was the top leader above X and Y.           4  
4 X directed and controlled effective-
ly the police.           2  
5 Y directed and controlled effectively 
the prison system.           3  
6 Z issued orders to arrest opposition 
civilians.           4  
7 Police arrested some 5000 opposi-
tion civilians.           7  
8 Police and prison guards tortured 
some 300 prisoners.           7  
9 Police and guards tortured to death 
some 20 prisoners.           7  
10 Police and prison guards raped 
some 25 prisoners.           4  
11 X, Y and Z knew about the arrests, 
torture and rapes.           2  
12 X, Y and Z did not prevent nor 
punish their subordinates.           3  
 Total 8 1 4 4 8 8 6 9 2 2 5  
Table 12. Example of Case Evaluation Table. 
The CET can be read horizontally, to see which elements of the hy-
pothesis are confirmed with the available evidence or not. It can also be 
read vertically, to show the number of positive hits per item of evidence. 
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The ‘total’ figures per source (count in the lowest row) and per element of 
the hypothesis should help understanding the degree of confirmation of 
the hypothesis, and the relative weight of each source, but operational 
decisions cannot be based on quantitative thresholds because of the multi-
ple qualitative issues at stake. The colour-code for the ‘total’ column is 
based on a holistic assessment of all relevant evidence, not necessarily 
dictated by the count of positive hits because of variations in the value of 
different sources. The ‘comment’ column is open for analytical commen-
tary on the sources or other issues not captured by the coding. 
The example above, inspired in Cold-War situations of political 
conflict from the 1970s, illustrates some common scenarios in interna-
tional investigations, which the CET should help identifying and manag-
ing: 
• Wide discrepancies among insider witnesses, some highly incrimi-
nating (like insiders 1 and 5) and others highly exonerating (like in-
sider 2); 
• highest value of international witnesses (confirming 9 of the 12 
points of the hypothesis), which is not uncommon assuming differ-
ent types of international witnesses with significant access to the 
relevant area, actors and victims; 
• highest corroboration, including forensics, for the criminal acts 
(rows 7 to 10, except for rape), often the least contested part of the 
case; 
• lowest corroboration for individual responsibilities (rows 11 and 12), 
including mixed evidence from insiders; 
• more corroboration for formal authority (rows 1 to 3) than for effec-
tive control (rows 4 to 6). 
The example above pays particular attention to insider witnesses, 
with specific columns for each one of them, on the assumption that their 
evidence is critical to assess individual responsibilities. The evidence 
from all victim-witnesses is aggregated under a single column, assuming 
broadly that the victimisation as such is a less contested issue, and it is 
corroborated with forensic evidence. 
Table 12 above could suggest, among others, the following investi-
gative decisions: to interview more insiders, since they have only five and 
there are important contradictions among them; to conduct advanced 
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Source Evaluation on the items of evidence that may be most decisive 
(such insiders 1, 2 and 5, documents and international witnesses); to try to 
obtain more videos, if possible in the given context, since they are so far 
relevant to only two points; to investigate specifically issue of knowledge 
and means of reporting, since this point (row 11) is only corroborated by 
two sources. 
The CET will need to be kept and updated regularly by a designated 
analyst. It should be used as a reporting tool to be shared with the team, 
management, as well as in Evidence Reviews (see Section 3.5. below). 
Multiple versions over time should be kept to monitor progress. Best 
practice is to accompany the CET with a report justifying the assessment 
in detail. Similar tables can be developed for specific incidents, accused 
or offences, applying the method to smaller scopes of information and 
greater detail. 
3.3.4. Case Evaluation Chart 
The Case Evaluation Chart (‘CEC’) is a relational chart designed as a 
synopsis of the case linking suspects, alleged criminal actions, and all 
persons related to them as alleged perpetrators, victims or witnesses. The 
chart should help to diagnose the strength of the case hypothesis by using 
the existing diagramming conventions for actors, groups and links, includ-
ing the following: 
• Title indicating the subject, version no., and date of the evaluation, 
since the case will require multiple versions of the chart, and it will 
evolve over time; 
• sober style, avoiding visual manipulation, no pictures of persons, no 
red colour associated to persons, sober colour palette, no sensational 
language or icons; 
• only one icon per entity (mainly persons and incidents), no repeti-
tion; 
• attributes or shapes to show the profile of the persons, as relevant to 
the investigation, including possibly gender, ethnicity, and so on; 
• boxes to show organisational units, while persons within boxes in-
dicate organisational membership; 
• links witness-incident to visualize the number of relevant witness 
and to identify them easily; links between perpetrators and suspects 
to visualize their network or hierarchy; 
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• different strengths of links to show the strength of the information, 
typically a solid line for ‘confirmed’, broken for ‘unconfirmed’, and 
dotted ‘tentative’ (see explanations in Table 12 above). 
Relational charts of this kind are very valuable to produce a graphic 
synopsis that integrates aspects of hierarchy (the links between a senior 
suspect, multiple direct perpetrators, and intermediate levels), crime pat-
tern (visualising multiple incidents as entities, as well as relevant attrib-
utes of victims and perpetrators) and Source Evaluation (by the strength 
of the links). Their dissemination needs to be accompanied by a briefing 
with the analyst that produced the chart, at least for those officers who are 
not familiar with this kind of graphic language. Databases designed 
around entities and links (the Entity-Attribute-Value models or graph da-
tabases) may facilitate processing datasets about large numbers of persons, 
and they may be the foundation to plot relational charts of this kind. Con-
solidated versions could well be used as visual aids in trial, since the 
judges and the accused may equally benefit from a synoptic view of the 
alleged case. 
3.4. Adversarial Techniques 
Adversarial techniques are designed as a ‘stress test’, to challenge the 
investigative findings in order to control for ‘tunnel vision’ and ‘confirma-
tion bias’, and to anticipate the counter-arguments of adversarial litigation. 
They are similar to the ‘resistance test’ that the Italian investigating judge 
Gherardo Colombo proposes, based in his experience in large corruption 
cases: 
When no alternatives to the current outcome of the investiga-
tion emerge, and evidence seems therefore conclusive, the 
outcome should nonetheless be checked again against a ‘re-
sistance test’, so as to ascertain whether it can resist imagi-
nable contrary evidence that might contradict it.413 
The purpose of these techniques is not to challenge or weaken man-
agers and decision-makers, rather to the contrary the purpose is to em-
power them “to make better decisions by providing them with a more 
objective analysis” and “alternative options to consider”.414 
                                                   
413 Colombo, 2006, p. 517, see above note 30. 
414 Bryce G. Hoffman, Red Teaming: How Your Business Can Conquer the Competition by 
Challenging Everything, Crown Business, New York, 2017, p. 59. 
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The following conditions are necessary for the success of any ad-
versarial technique in QCCI: 
• Independence: The designated officers must operate with full inde-
pendence, and with the institutional guarantee that no adverse con-
sequences will follow, no matter how controversial the exchange. In 
other words, “you can’t red team in the Führerbunker”,415 and such 
groups must be “licensed to be troublesome”.416 If the officers are 
members of the investigation team, or otherwise closely related to 
its members, a sense of peer-pressure may prevent them from de-
veloping a full critique. Higher management must intervene com-
municating clear support for this kind of critical intervention, shel-
tering the designated officers, and acknowledging such contribu-
tions in their performance reviews as appropriate. 
• Choice of staff: Not all good officers are suitable for that contrarian 
task, the exercise requires those who are not afraid to contradict col-
leagues and popular assumptions, and can handle the stress in-
volved in the exercise. Professional analysts are often well prepared 
for this kind of work, but surely one can find good candidates also 
among lawyers and investigators. The following attributes should 
be taken into account when choosing the staff for an adversarial ex-
ercise:417 
a. ability to see things from alternative perspectives, imagination; 
b. familiarity with different cultural perspectives, cultural capabil-
ity and empathy; 
c. confidence and assertiveness to challenge conventional or estab-
lished thinking; 
d. ability to communicate effectively. 
• Preparation: The designated officers need to have sufficient time, 
tools and access to the evidence to prepare properly for the exercise. 
                                                   
415 Ibid., p. 95. 
416 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, 31 March 2005, p. 170. 
417 Adapted and summarised from Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre of the UK 
Ministry of Defence, A Guide to Red Teaming: DCDC Guidance Note, February 2010, pp. 
2-16 and 2-17. 
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The exercise should be anticipated and planed from an early stage; 
it should not be a mere afterthought. 
• Equality of arms: The designate officers should be offered the same 
opportunities to present the critique as others have to present the 
proposed case, taking into account allocated time and access to de-
cision-makers. Only officers with the required qualifications and 
seniority should be asked to act as Devil’s Advocate. 
• Focus: Adversarial techniques need to focus on the key elements of 
the case, a selective high-quality focus is likely to be more useful 
than a broad review of any and every element. 
• Receptiveness: The investigation team and management must be 
committed to actually listen to the Devil’s Advocate and take into 
account the resulting feedback. 
Absent the above-mentioned conditions, adversarial techniques may 
fail, or worse, they may reinforce ‘groupthink’ among those who may feel 
victorious without having been really challenged, and to comfort man-
agement after a merely cursory test. As indicated from military doctrine: 
“Poorly conducted red teaming is pointless, may be misleading and en-
gender false confidence”.418 
There are two main techniques of this kind, known from the prac-
tice of investigations and intelligence, among other fields: Devil’s Advo-
cate and Red Teams.419 
3.4.1. Devil’s Advocate 
Advocatus diaboli is a technique known in the Catholic procedures for 
beatification since centuries ago, with an officer tasked to challenge sys-
tematically the heavenly merits of the candidate. The Devil’s Advocate 
should play a role equivalent and anticipating that of a defence counsel, 
arguing ex parte anything that could help challenging the accusation.420 
Rather than an extraordinary procedure for problematic cases, this should 
                                                   
418 Ibid., p. 1-8. 
419 See Heuer Jr. and Pherson, 2015, chap. 9 “Challenge Analysis”, pp. 233–70, see above 
note 35. 
420 See ibid., sect. 9.5 “Devil’s Advocacy”, pp. 260–62; and Jones, 1999, chap. 12 “Devil’s 
Advocacy”, pp. 217–23, see above note 408. 
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be considered a standard QC test for every major investigation because of 
the serious budgetary and procedural consequences of eventual mistakes. 
The advantage of this technique is that the designated officer will 
deliberately depart from the accepted position and aim at questioning any 
point in the proposed facts or case. This should be a safeguard against 
‘groupthink’ and ‘confirmation bias’, with the help of an officer specifi-
cally tasked to ‘think against the group’ and carry a ‘contrarian bias’. Any 
officer in the investigation team may be asked to play this role, on an ad 
hoc basis, or within Evidence Reviews (see Section 3.5. below), while 
analysts may be particularly well equipped because of their overall 
knowledge of the case (if they are part of the team), and their training in 
‘critical thinking’ (including fallacies, Source Evaluation, and so on) 
which usually is part of their standard professional training. 
3.4.2. Red Teaming 
A Red Team is similar to a Devil’s Advocate but more demanding: beyond 
challenging the proposed argument, a Red Team is expected to build an 
alternative argument or scenario with the same information.421 Red Teams 
have grown from the field of military, intelligence, security as well as 
some private sector companies interested on testing their systems and 
achieving greater certainty and efficiency. They can be defined as follows: 
Red Teaming is the art of applying independent structured 
critical thinking and culturally sensitised alternative thinking 
from a variety of perspectives, to challenge assumptions and 
fully explore alternative outcomes, in order to reduce risks 
and increase opportunities.422 
Techniques used by Red Teams in different fields vary, from 
strengthened versions of Devil’s Advocate, to hiring external consultants 
or ‘tiger teams’, to full simulations designed to test security systems. In a 
broad sense Red Teams comprise techniques of simulation, vulnerability 
                                                   
421 See Hoffman, 2017, see above note 414; and Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by 
Thinking like the Enemy, Basic Books, New York, 2015. For a list of references, see Micah 
Zenko, “Red Team Reading List”, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 October 2015 (availa-
ble on its web site). For historical background and precedents in ‘war game’ simulations, 
see Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Swerve Editions, New York, 
1991. 
422 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre of the UK Ministry of Defence, 2010, p. 1-1, 
see above note 417. 
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tests and alternative analyses.423 While the Devil’s Advocate is usually 
associated with a single senior officer, by definition the Red Team refers 
to several officers, which in the context of criminal investigations could 
well comprise analysts, investigators and lawyers working for the same 
strategy. 
3.5. Evidence Review Boards 
An Evidence Review Board (‘ERB’) is a board of senior officers that shall 
review critically the case resulting from the investigation to advise on 
whether the available evidence is sufficient to file charges or not. This is 
similar to the concept of ‘testing team’ in software design and other indus-
tries, where it is accepted that “[t]he project manager’s best friend is his 
daily adversary, the independent product-testing organization”, and 
“[e]very development organization needs such an independent technical 
auditing group to keep it honest”.424 Their task is to “check machines and 
programs against specifications and serves as a devil’s advocate, pinpoint-
ing every conceivable defect and discrepancy”, and they act as “the surro-
gate customer, specialized for finding flaws”.425 In criminal procedure the 
ultimate ‘customer’ of the investigation would be the judge, and its ‘sur-
rogate’ the ERB. Methods of this kind are sometimes referred to as ‘mur-
der boards’, because of the merciless approach expected from the review-
ers, which have been defined as “a group charged with the responsibility 
to slam a candidate or proposer of an idea up against the wall with tough 
questioning”.426 
The ERB is a fundamental mechanism of QC for the investigation 
and the proposed legal case. Senior management would convene ERBs at 
key moments of the process, typically when the investigation is consid-
ered as completed and a legal case or indictment is proposed for submis-
sion before the judges. It is not uncommon that officers that have been 
involved in the investigation over-estimate the strength of the case, as 
they often work under internal and external pressure to ‘show results’ for 
                                                   
423 Zenko, 2015, p. xxi, see above note 421. 
424 Brooks Jr., 1995, p. 69, see above note 26. 
425 Ibid. 
426 See William Safire, “On Language; Murder Board at the Skunk Works”, The New York 
Times, 11 October 1987. For example, for the ‘murder boards’ adopted by NASA research-
ers in the 1970s, see Glenn E. Bugos, Atmosphere of Freedom: 75 Years at the NASA Ames 
Research Center, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C., 2014, p. 10-11. 
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incrimination. Prosecutions and investigations tend to attract assertive 
personalities, which may be necessary to lead complex projects and con-
front criminals, but it comes with a risk of insufficient self-reflection. As 
indicated by an experienced prosecutor “a tragic lack of humility” on the 
part of investigating and prosecuting officers is a key factor in cases of 
judicial miscarriage, the remedy for which may be simply to show “hu-
mility and the ability to accept our human limitations”.427 This internal 
self-reflection is crucial because of the consequences of prosecutorial 
decisions on the lives of indicted persons, as well as witnesses and victims, 
and their impact on the resources and the credibility of the institution. 
In national systems researchers and practitioners that have focused 
on prosecutorial decision-making have advised greater accountability and 
review procedures of different kinds.428 In Canada in 2005, the Working 
Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice included among its 
recommendations that “[s]econd opinions and case review should be 
available in all areas”.429 In 2008 the American Bar Association recom-
mended that “[g]enerally, the prosecutor engaged in an investigation 
should not be the sole decision-maker regarding the decision to prosecute 
matters arising out of that investigation”.430 
At the international level the ICTY-OTP adopted from its early 
years mandatory ‘Indictment Reviews’, defined by the ICTY-OTP Charg-
ing and Indictment Guidelines as “the formal, authorised OTP procedure 
for testing all proposed indictments”.431 These guidelines presented the 
reviews as mandatory and essential for the Office, and regulated them in 
detail: 
                                                   
427 Mark Godsey, “Seeing and Accepting Human Limitations”, in Blind Justice: A Former 
Prosecutor Exposes the Psychology and Politics of Wrongful Convictions, University of 
California Press, Oakland, 2017, p. 213. 
428 O’Brien, 2009, p. 1047, see above note 384. 
429 See FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee, “Tunnel Vision”, in The Path to Justice: Pre-
venting Wrongful Convictions: Report of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Heads of Pros-
ecutions Subcommittee on the Prevention of Wrongful Convictions, 2011, sect. II “2005 
Recommendations”, and sect. VI “Discussion of Recommendations”. This recommenda-
tion was included both in the 2005 report and the 2011 review. 
430 ABA, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecutorial Investigations, 3rd edition, 2014, 
p. 8. 
431 ICTY-OTP, Charging and Indictment Guidelines, internal document, undated, circa 1995, 
section 4 “Indictment Reviews”, p. 13. Copy on file with author. Every staff member re-
ceived a copy of these guidelines, I have kept mine. 
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Every proposed indictment must go through a review. If 
there are security concerns or exigencies, then the Deputy 
Prosecutor can convene a confidential or expedited review, 
but it is essential that the proposed indictment be reviewed 
by a group of attorneys who have not participated in the in-
vestigation. The OTP is committed to subjecting all of its 
charging proposals to an objective and critical internal re-
view in order to ensure fairness, accuracy and consistency 
with OTP policies and strategies.432 
See below an excerpt from the ICTY-OTP Charging and Indictment 
Guidelines:433 
 
Figure 6. Excerpt of ICTY-OTP Charging and Indictment Guidelines. 
The guidelines mandated the OTP ‘legal commander’ to call and 
chair the reviews, designate the reviewers, and to prepare “detailed, writ-




Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 262 
ten minutes and recommendations to the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecu-
tor”.434 The Legal Advisory Section would advise on legal issues, with its 
head or a representative participating as a reviewer. The Special Project 
Unit, with a focus on analysis, was requested to participate, to “provide 
special expertise concerning, among other things, historical, contextual, 
constitutional, political and hierarchical information”, and to “review the 
draft indictment to ensure that the allegations are accurate and are placed 
in proper context”.435 
Under the section on “team preparation for reviews” these guide-
lines indicated that “[t]he team leader and legal advisor are responsible for 
presenting the case to the indictment review committee”.436 The teams 
had to present a draft indictment and a memorandum including the fol-
lowing eight sections: “summary of the case”; “review of proposed ac-
cused” including issues of command and knowledge; “general proof of 
incidents and analysis of the charges” to “outline the evidence supporting 
each alleged incident and charge”; “factual difficulties”, the guidelines 
advising wisely to “[k]eep in mind, it is always preferable to get an objec-
tive and critical evaluation of the weaker aspects of your case in an OTP 
review, as opposed to a cross-examination at trial”; “legal problems and 
affirmative defences”; “additional investigation”; “special policy issues”; 
and “recommendations”.437 
The mandate for the reviewers was to accept, omit or add “targets 
and charges”, advise on the legal characterisation of the alleged crimes 
and responsibilities, and recommend additional investigative or legal 
work if necessary.438 The only issue for which the reviewers were given a 
specific threshold was suspect identification: “If the team has not com-
piled sufficient and reliable identification information on a proposed ac-
cused, the reviewers will not recommend proceeding with the indict-
ment”.439 
                                                   
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid. This unit hosted analysts prior to the establishment of the Leadership Research Team 
and the Military Analysis Team in 1997. 
436 Ibid., sect. 5 “Team Preparation for Reviews”, p. 15. 
437 Ibid., pp. 15–16. 
438 Ibid. 
439 Ibid., p. 15. 
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The standard of evidence for the ‘indictment reviews’ was defined 
as “trial ready”, as a matter of office-wide policy: 
When an investigation team proposes an indictment, the evi-
dence should be sufficient to proceed to trial immediately. 
The OTP has adopted a policy of requiring investigation 
teams to develop the case to a “trial ready” status before 
seeking the confirmation of an indictment.440 
Under the section on “post-review procedures” the guidelines in-
structed the team and the ‘legal commander’ to brief the Prosecutor and 
Deputy Prosecutor and plan subsequent investigative or procedural steps, 
including possibly operational issues and arrest opportunities. In case of 
disagreement the ‘legal commander’ was asked “to present all views to 
the Prosecutor and Deputy”. The ‘legal commander’ also had to com-
municate relevant policy decisions “to all legal advisors for application to 
future indictments and reviews”.441 
The ICTY-OTP implemented these ‘indictment reviews’ indeed. As 
Morten Bergsmo and Michael Keegan wrote in 1997: 
The OTP has developed an internal review procedure for 
draft indictments which aims at eliminating factually or le-
gally deficient charges. […] When the drafting and internal 
team review is concluded, the draft indictment with support-
ing material is evaluated by a general OTP review to which 
all lawyers working for the Office are invited to participate. 
As many as 20–25 lawyers, who have been provided with 
and reviewed the relevant material, can participate in such 
reviews, which tend to be very thorough and can sometimes 
last several days. In most cases a number of changes are 
made in the draft indictment following the review.442 
I attended myself several of these reviews as observer or participant. 
The reviewers used to be a number of senior lawyers, including often the 
Head of the Legal Advisory Section, Commander William J. Fenrick and 
Dr. Vladimir Tochilovsky, known for his expertise on procedure and evi-
                                                   
440 Ibid., “Introduction”, p. 4. 
441 Ibid., sect. 6 “Post-review Procedures”, p. 18. 
442 Morten Bergsmo and Michael J. Keegan, “Case Preparation for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”, in Hege Araldsen and Øyvind W. Thiis (eds.), Manual 
on Human Rights Monitoring: An Introduction for Human Rights Field Officers, Norwe-
gian Institute of Human Rights, 1997, p. 10 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bfbba0/). 
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dence.443 I drafted an indictment and presented it for review in 1998, and I 
still remember the very cold and incisive comments by some senior re-
viewers. I had been very involved in that investigation for some two years, 
including multiple missions and interactions with victims and insiders, 
which gave me both the best knowledge of the facts, and the highest risk 
of overstating them because of my personal biases and self-interest. 
Sometimes when discussing internally the strength of cases you hear that 
‘the team knows best’, which is true for the team that conducted the inves-
tigation and proposed the legal characterisation because of their extensive 
work with the evidence, but it is equally true that sometimes ‘the team 
knows worst’ because their personal involvement and the all-too-human 
confirmation biases and defensive reactions. The feedback from the re-
viewers was for me first irritating, and ultimately helpful. I believe it did 
help to improve the draft, and to develop higher professional standards. 
That indictment led to a successful arrest, prosecution and conviction of 
the accused. 
The evidence reviews in the ICTY-OTP had four main limitations, 
which are likely to surface similarly in any other institution: cognitive 
load, forecast uncertainty, suspect-driven biases, and weak implementa-
tion. Firstly, the cognitive load for the reviewers is very high, possibly 
beyond the ability of many of them, because it is very difficult for an ex-
ternal observer to command the evidence of a complex case in short no-
tice. 
Secondly, as explained when defining the standard of review, in ad-
dition to being certain about the facts, the reviewers need to conduct a 
prospective assessment on the likelihood of success of the case in the 
court. This is similar to the notion of ‘realistic prospect of conviction’ 
required for prosecutions in England and Wales, which calls for a forecast 
                                                   
443 Fenrick is a former military lawyer in the Canadian armed forces (1974–94), member of 
the UN Commission of Experts investigating war crimes allegations in the former Yugo-
slavia, and then Head of the Legal Advisory Section at the ICTY-OTP. Tochilovsky is a 
former Deputy Regional Attorney for judicial matters, and as District Attorney in the 
Ukraine (1976–94) and then investigation team leader and trial attorney in the ICTY-OTP 
(1994–2010), as well as official representative of the ICTY to the UN negotiations for the 
establishment of the ICC (1997–2001). Among Tochilovsky’s publications, note his books 
Indictment, Disclosure, Admissibility of Evidence: Jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, 
Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2004; and The Law and Jurisprudence of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals and Courts: Procedure and Human Rights Aspects, 2nd edition, 
Intersentia, Amsterdam, 2014. 
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on the cogency of the evidence by both prosecution and defence.444 This 
is not an easy task, even with the best intentions and skills. As judge Je-
rome Frank explained, and practitioners know well: 
Trials are often full of surprises. The adversary introduces 
unanticipated testimony. Witnesses, on whom the lawyer re-
lied, change their stories when they take the witness-stand. 
The facts as they appeared to the lawyer when, before a trial, 
he conferred with this client and his witnesses, frequently are 
not at all like the facts as they later show up in the court-
room.445 
The “surprises” that Frank found in national practice will only in-
crease in international cases because of multiple investigative and com-
municative difficulties. There is a real risk of erring on the side of over-
confidence with this kind of procedural forecast exercise, if the institution 
is under pressure to file charges, the teams carry their confirmation biases, 
and the reviewers do not want to be too harsh with their colleagues. Hence 
the forecast on the viability of the case will require some careful methods, 
including design of different scenarios, and using adversarial techniques 
within the review sessions.446 Methods developed in management studies 
to facilitate decision-making could be of assistance, including different 
kinds of diagrams and ‘decision-trees’.447 
Thirdly, the ICTY-OTP had a policy focused on ‘targets’ – for “re-
viewing the proposed targets and charges” – further to the official criteria 
for “selection of targets”, and such target-driven mind-set usually breeds 
confirmation bias.448 Target- or suspect-driven cases are common when 
arrests are difficult, hence the cases may focus on whoever is arrestable or 
already arrested instead of those who are truly the key perpetrators, in 
                                                   
444 Director of Public Prosecutions of the Crown Prosecution Service, “The Evidential Stage”, 
in The Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2018, sect. 4.6. 
445 Frank, 1949, p. 17, see above note 1. 
446 See above Section 3.4. 
447 See for example Peter Mcnamee and John Celona, Decision Analysis for the Professional, 
4th edition, SmartOrg, San Jose, 2008, particularly section on “Litigation Decision Analy-
sis”, pp. 190–92; and Philip Meissner, Olivier Sibony and Torsten Wulf, “Are You Ready 
to Decide?”, McKinsey Quarterly, 1 April 2015, including a decision-making checklist to 
consider “different points of view” and “downside risk”, and integrating the resulting 
scores in a screening matrix. 
448 See ICTY-OTP, circa 1995, sect. 3 “Selection of Targets”, and several references to ‘tar-
gets’ in sect. 4 “Indictment Reviews”, see above note 431. 
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order to make the trials possible (unless trial in absentia is accepted, 
which is usually not the case in international tribunals). The focus on 
‘most responsible’ senior suspects (which was the policy in the ICTY and 
ICTR and a statutory duty for the IMT, IMTFE, ECCC and SCSL) would 
also contribute to this suspect-driven pressure. 
Fourthly, the design of the review model was very thorough, but its 
implementation was uneven. Some ICTY Prosecutors supported these 
reviews, while others found them an unnecessary infringement on their 
discretion or burden on limited resources. In some instances, the teams 
disregarded the findings of the reviewers and succeeded to brief the Pros-
ecutor directly and get their proposals approved. The gap between the 
stated policy and the real practice was at times noticeable. 
Many former officers, including contributors to this volume,449 are 
critical about the efficiency of these reviews at the ICTY-OTP. They 
would not agree with the above-mentioned assessment that they “tend to 
be very thorough”. Overall, the quality of the ICTY indictments was not 
very impressive, in view of the multiple amendments that were often re-
quired, and frequent critical observations by ICTY judges on their quali-
ty.450 I believe these ‘indictment reviews’ proved to be useful as a QC 
mechanism to a certain extent, but the Office would have benefited from a 
more robust review system. This was also the assessment and advice of 
Mark B. Harmon, one of the most experienced ICTY-OTP Senior Trial 
Attorneys, when he recommend in 2003 the adoption of ‘indictment re-
views’ by the ICC-OTP.451 The reviews were popular among the junior 
staff, who were allowed to attend as observers, and they could learn from 
the discussions with senior officers about multiple issues of evidence and 
procedure. 
                                                   
449 See Ewan Brown and William H. Wiley, “International Criminal Investigative Collection 
Planning, Collection Management and Evidence Review”, Chap. 8 below. 
450 See some examples of judicial decisions criticising the quality of the prosecutor’s indict-
ments and cases in Xabier Agirre, “The Role of Analysis Capacity”, in Morten Bergsmo, 
Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal 
Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, p. 96 (http://www.
toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). 
451 Mark B. Harmon, “Preparation of Draft Indictments and Effective Indictment Review”, in 
Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of Inter-
national Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 
385–90 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). 
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Subsequent accounts have presented the ICTY-OTP evidence re-
views in a somehow idealized way, perhaps echoing the ‘official history’ 
of the institution, without a proper appraisal of the above-mentioned limi-
tations. The ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, published in 2009 by 
the ICTY and UNICRI, acknowledged the OTP ‘indictment reviews’ as 
follows: 
The Office of the Prosecutor eventually adopted its own in-
ternal procedures for reviewing indictments before they are 
finalised and presented to a Judge for confirmation. Using a 
peer-review process, the prosecution team presented a draft 
indictment to colleagues from other teams, and defended 
their product against the colleague’s questions. These inter-
nal indictment reviews helped produce a consistent approach, 
and often exposed problems with an indictment. The reviews 
also served to highlight the need for better evidence or fur-
ther investigation, and produced suggestions for improve-
ment.452 
By 2012, the International Best Practices Project, based on the ex-
perience of five international or hybrid tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, 
ECCC and STL) recommended categorically: “Every indictment should 
only be approved after review and recommendation to the chief prosecu-
tor by a review panel”.453 The aim should be to achieve “the highest quali-
ty” and: 
The panel will ensure that the indictment under review is tri-
al ready (although that standard may differ from one tribunal 
to another), supported by strong sufficient evidence, is con-
sistent with other indictments and is in line with the indict-
ment policy and charging directives.454 
The practice of the ICC-OTP has evolved over time. The Regula-
tions of the ICC-OTP issued by the first ICC Prosecutor in 2009 (six years 
after the beginning of his mandate) do not include any reference to evi-
dence review boards. During the mandate of the first Prosecutor such re-
views took place occasionally, without standard methodology and subject 
to the participation and evaluation by the Prosecutor himself. Strengthen-
                                                   
452 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, p. 39, see above note 39. 
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ing the review system was one of the priorities of the second Prosecutor, 
well aware of the need to improve the results after the feedback received 
from the judges, as well as OTP staff, in different cases. Hence, the ICC-
OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015 announced her decision “to organize an 
internal review committee that is independent of the joint team which will 
advise Excom on the strength of the presented case and on the desirability 
to proceed with it”.455 The ICC-OTP, particularly its Prosecution Division, 
started indeed to convey regularly ERBs, with a model similar to the prac-
tice of the ICTY-OTP, including senior lawyers and analysts as reviewers, 
prior to filing any Application for a Warrant of Arrest, or Document Con-
taining the Charges. The next ICC-OTP Strategic Plan (2016-2018) reiter-
ated the commitment to “[s]tandardising and enhancing the system of 
internal evidence review prior to a case being presented for prosecu-
tion”.456 
Taking into account the above-mentioned experiences and others, 
the best practice for ERBs in the investigation of international crimes, 
whether in national or international jurisdictions, can be summarised in 
the following points. 
3.5.1. Status 
The ERB must be considered as a mandatory procedure and a safeguard 
of quality control, particularly for the decisions whether or not to file an 
indictment. There should be no exceptions to this mandatory rule. No 
chief prosecutorial authority should issue or request an indictment or 
similar filing without having received the qualified opinion of an inde-
pendent evidence review board. The advice of the ERB is not necessarily 
binding for the decision-maker (chief prosecutor or other), but a departure 
from this advice should be regarded as exceptional, requiring specific 
justification. 
3.5.2. Scope 
The purpose of the review would be primarily to assess the strength of the 
proposed case and answer the basic question “do we have the evidence or 
not?”. Broader considerations of policy or opportunity should not distract 
                                                   
455 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 2013, p. 26 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954b
eb/). 
456 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 2015, p. 22 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2dbc
2d/). 
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the team and the reviewers from this technical assessment. They should be 
discussed separately. This is similar to the double test required by the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors in England and Wales to decide whether or 
not to file charges, including two stages to be discussed separately: ‘the 
evidential stage’, on whether the evidence suffices for a conviction; and 
‘the public interest stage’, on whether the prosecution is worth the effort 
in an utilitarian perspective, taking into account the limited resources, the 
priorities of the community, and the circumstances of the suspect.457 The 
question about the evidence needs to be discussed specifically for every 
proposed charge, incident and accused, a broad aggregated assessment 
would not be sufficient nor reliable. 
3.5.3. Standard of Evidence 
Given the seriousness of the decision at hand, the reviewers should aim at 
a high standard of certainty, based only on the actually available and ad-
missible evidence. The question for the reviewers is not only about their 
personal certainty (“are you certain about the alleged facts and responsi-
bilities?”). In addition to that, reviewers need to assess whether the prose-
cution is able to communicate that certainty to the chamber and prove 
successfully the case after adversarial challenge based on the actual evi-
dence, which is a complex prospective assessment. Hence the question for 
the reviewers becomes: “are you certain about the alleged facts and re-
sponsibilities, and is the office able to prove this case beyond reasonable 
doubt with the actually available and admissible evidence”? 
Effectively this calls for a standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in 
the eyes of the prosecution, assuming that only prosecutors who are fully 
convinced of their case will be able to lead the judges to the same conclu-
sion. This standard is not procedurally required, but it is operationally 
highly advisable, and it should apply to every person and charge included 
in the proposed indictment. It requires an approach of ‘inference to the 
best explanation’, so that the prosecution, after having considered impar-
tially multiple alternative hypotheses, will aim at the most cogent, logical 
and truthful causal explanation of the alleged crimes, not merely at the 
one that may seem most convenient for incrimination. 
                                                   
457 Director of Public Prosecutions of the Crown Prosecution Service, 2018, sect. 4 “The Full 
Code Test”, see above note 444. 
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This standard, in a sense ‘beyond the reasonable doubt of the prose-
cutor’, is similar to the ‘trial ready’ standard required by the ICTY-OTP 
Charging and Indictment Guidelines, as well as the International Best 
Practices Project, since the prosecution’s goal in trial is actually to achieve 
certainty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.458 This is also similar to the standard 
recommended by the American Bar Association (‘ABA’) for this purpose: 
“A prosecutor should not seek an indictment unless the prosecutor reason-
ably believes the charges are supported by probable cause and that there 
will be admissible evidence sufficient to support the charges beyond rea-
sonable doubt at trial”.459 
The excerpt below from the ICTY-OTP guidelines, from its very 
first page, contains the explanation of their ‘trial ready’ standard and its 
specific requirements:460 
 
Figure 7. Excerpt of the first page of the ICTY-OTP guidelines. 
                                                   
458 For the International Best Practices Project, see their report Petit, Akerson and Warren 
(eds.), 2012, p. 169, see above note 20. 
459 ABA, Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function, 4th edition, 2017, Stand-
ard 3-4.6 “Quality and Scope of Evidence Before a Grand Jury”. 
460 ICTY-OTP, circa 1995, p. 1, see above note 431. 
 
3. The Contribution of Analysis to the Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 271 
3.5.4. Team Preparation 
The team proposing the indictment must submit before the ERB a fully 
finalized and sourced draft indictment, ready to be submitted without fur-
ther elaboration, and meeting in their view the required standard of cer-
tainty. The draft indictment must be sourced in detail, for every significant 
factual proposition, against discrete items of evidence referenced after 
their registration in an evidence management system with guarantees of 
‘chain of custody’. The team must also submit analytical reports and other 
products (relational charts, maps, and so on) that justify the factual find-
ings in the draft indictment. Relevant key witnesses, such as insiders, 
must be subject to individual Source Evaluation, so that the reviewers can 
endorse a case only if these witnesses are considered sufficiently credible 
and reliable. The team must report candidly the limitations in the evidence, 
as well as the known or most predictable lines of defence, and the corre-
sponding responses. The analysts in the team must assist in the prepara-
tion and lead the production of reports and presentation on key analytical 
issues, such as crime patterns, organisational structures, the role of the 
accused, documentary evidence, and Source Evaluation. The analysts 
should also use diagnostic tools and tables to assist the review.461 The 
team must submit the relevant materials with sufficient time for the re-
viewers to study them properly, for example, no less than one week prior 
to the review. 
3.5.5. Reviewer Preparation 
The reviewers must allocate an adequate amount of time to study the pro-
posed case and the underlying evidence. A superficial review or merely 
legal commentary is of little assistance. This may oblige senior officers to 
block their agendas and postpone other duties, which may be well-
justified in view of the importance of the task. 
3.5.6. Composition 
The reviewers should be a few senior officers with extensive experience 
in investigations and litigation, including attorneys, analysts and investi-
gators. They should have not participated in the investigation, for the sake 
of objectivity and independence. Top managers responsible for the ulti-
mate decision, such as the chief prosecutor or the next senior management 
                                                   
461 See above Section 3.3. 
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level, may abstain from participating, or participate only as observers, 
since they will have their chance to review the case subsequently on their 
own, and they might influence the technical assessment with policy con-
siderations (suggesting the accused and charges that are more desirable, 
rather than those who are more truthful and viable in court). 
3.5.7. Independence 
The ERB must act with full independence from the team and from higher 
levels. Top managers should not influence the ERB directly or indirectly 
with suggestions about the desired outcome. Reviewers need to be reas-
sured that they will not suffer any adverse consequence from their fair 
assessment. Reviewers need to act with utter objectivity and technical 
focus on the evidence, free of any influence or pressure. 
3.5.8. Method 
The review as such could take a few hours or a whole day, including a 
presentation by the team, questions by reviewers and ensuing discussion. 
A designated officer should act as a facilitator, to help ensure focus on the 
core questions and manage time and participation. After the presentation 
and discussions, the reviewers should meet separately to reach their con-
clusions, much in the way a jury would do, and to prepare their evaluation 
report. The reviewers must state clearly in this report their opinion on 
whether the proposed case and its different elements meet the required 
standard, as well as possible legal and operational recommendations. The 
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4.Analysis of Organisational Structures 
and Quality Control of Case Development 
Christian Axboe Nielsen* 
 
Serious international crimes of the type investigated and prosecuted by 
international criminal courts and tribunals are by definition complex phe-
nomena that typically involve a multitude of actors, a broad geographical 
area and a wide chronology. Crimes against humanity, to take one major 
category of serious international crimes, are by statutory definition ‘wide-
spread and systematic’ and genocides typically involve thousands of ac-
tors and detailed planning and execution. War crimes can, unlike the other 
two categories of major international crimes against humanitarian law, be 
discrete, but they are by definition committed within the context of com-
plicated armed conflicts, many of which feature not just two opposing 
standing armies but a variety of regular and irregular forces. And while 
one of the major tenets of modern international criminal justice is individ-
ual criminal responsibility, it is to date unheard of that those individuals 
prosecuted are lone wolves. Rather, all accused perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes prosecuted by international courts and tribunals since the 
end of the Second World War have belonged to some type of regime or 
organisation through which criminal acts have been committed. The chal-
lenges posed to investigators, analysts and prosecutors by the scope of 
these crimes has been evident since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
which gave birth to modern international criminal justice. But as we slow-
ly approach the centenary of these trials, questions of how best to investi-
gate these crimes and their perpetrators remain important. 
Based on my own experience since 2002 – both as a full-time ana-
lyst and as an external consultant and expert witness – with investigations 
and prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
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Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), Special Tri-
bunal for Lebanon (‘STL’), as well as with domestic proceedings (in Can-
ada and Germany) focused on serious crimes and more general knowledge 
of other recent international judicial proceedings, I will in this paper ad-
dress key features and typical pitfalls occurring in the analysis of organi-
sational structures. Through this analysis, I hope to raise some relevant 
and practically useful points regarding quality control in international case 
development, though I believe that a number of the comments I will make 
here would also be relevant for complex domestic criminal investigations 
in cases involving terrorism or organised crime. I write this chapter in-
spired by – and, I hope, in the spirit of – Morten Bergsmo’s policy brief 
on quality control in criminal investigations.1 Needless to say, all thoughts 
and opinions expressed herein are attributable to me and not to any of the 
aforementioned instances or jurisdictions. 
As anyone who has ever worked with international criminal investi-
gations and prosecutions will know, any meaningful analysis of organisa-
tional structures presupposes an initial identification and categorisation of 
those organisations which are germane to the particular situation being 
investigated. Those familiar with more well-organised States tend to as-
sume that the civilian, military and police structures that are relevant for 
such investigations will be more or less universally recognisable. That is 
to say, there will be a state with a government, ministries, a standing army 
and security organisations with clear structures operating on the basis of 
relevant laws and regulations. Such a situation would be ideal from the 
point of view of analysis and investigation, but even when such clear 
structures exist, they are almost always adversely affected, modified and 
obfuscated by the processes that generate the malicious behaviour that 
also leads to criminal conduct.2 Moreover, to the degree that actors are 
cognisant of the risk of investigations and prosecutions because of their 
own criminal actions, these actors have a vested interest in obscuring their 
structures, whether through manufacturing ‘plausible deniability’ or other 
avenues. 
                                                   
1 Morten Bergsmo, “Towards Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/65157b). 
2 On the wide array of military organisations and structures, see John Keegan, A History of 
Warfare, Vintage, New York, 1994. 
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The case of the former Yugoslavia illustrates that even when a very 
well-organised modern army – the Yugoslav People’s Army (‘JNA’) – is 
one of the principal actors in the violent dissolution of a state, organisa-
tional analysis can be extremely difficult and time-consuming. For on the 
same side of the conflict a multitude of other actors quickly emerged 
whose roles and relationship to the JNA were far from clear. For example, 
a large number of volunteer forces appeared on the scene in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 and 1992. Although legislation existed 
regarding the incorporation of these forces into the JNA and their subse-
quent deployment in combat, investigation and analysis revealed that this 
process was to a considerable extent highly improvised and localised and 
was very contingent on the personalities of key officers in the JNA and 
the self-appointed leaders of these volunteer units.3 
Many conflicts feature a large number of paramilitary groups, most 
of which are self-proclaimed and very loosely organised and which may 
exist for relatively short periods of time. As seen in cases against both 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat perpetrators at the ICTY, these amor-
phous, ephemeral and highly contingent groups may or may not be coher-
ent. Their relationships with various official (even if self-proclaimed) 
government, military and police actors can vary greatly over time and 
may veer from complete co-operation to antagonism and even open con-
flict. Indeed, the very names of paramilitary groups and their colloquial 
usage in the affected area may or may not be indicative of their actual 
existence. In both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a particularly 
good example of this phenomenon was the ‘Red Berets’. Many witnesses 
reported that this group has perpetrated criminal acts in a considerable 
number of municipalities. The name obviously emerged as a result of their 
distinct headgear, but it remained for a long time fundamentally unclear 
whether all those actors wearing red berets actually belonged to the same 
unit. Additionally, many victims’ accounts exaggerated the consistency 
and uniformity of these groups. In the end, investigators and analysts were 
able to prove that a unit wearing red berets did actually exist – though it 
formally bore another name. However, it also became apparent that a 
number of the actors wearing red berets had no real affiliation with this 
                                                   
3 Reynaud Theunens, “Military Aspects of the Role of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović 
in the Conflict in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) (91-95)”, in Prosecution’s Sub-
mission of the Expert Report of Reynaud Theunens Pursuant to Rule 94bis With Annexes 
A and B, 2 July 2007, IT-03-69. 
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unit. Indeed, it seemed instead likely that some had adopted this headgear 
as a way of becoming ‘copycats’ and sponging off the notoriety of the 
actual unit. It is easy to see how mistakes could have been made in the 
investigation of the ‘Red Berets’ without careful analysis. 
The point here is that preconceived notions or assumptions regard-
ing the organisations involved can impact negatively upon the analysis 
that is essential to investigations of major international crimes.4 There is 
of course nothing at all wrong with assembling available information re-
garding orders of battle, established institutions, leadership structures, etc. 
However, doing so is the beginning and not the end of the analytical in-
vestigative process. The analysis of organisations is affected by whether 
they have existed prior to the alleged commission of crimes or whether 
they emerged only subsequent to the emergence of armed conflict or auto-
cratic rule. In other words, are these regimes or organisations inherently 
criminal or have they been transformed or perverted in such a way that 
previously ‘ordinary’ and legitimate organisations and institutions have 
now become vehicles for the perpetration of criminal acts? Again, in the 
case of the former Yugoslavia, a relatively stable and highly-bureaucratic 
federal State – though one also characterised by chronic human rights 
abuses typical of party-States – disintegrated into mutually warring States 
in which the army and the police were among the chief perpetrators of 
criminal acts. However, during that same process elements of these organ-
isations voluntarily outsourced policing and combat activities to newly-
established paramilitary organisations whose entire purpose was based on 
illicit economic gain and by extension violent criminal conduct. Analys-
ing these two types of organisational structures requires different modali-
ties, not least because the interrelationship between them was to a large 
extent deliberately obfuscated in order that the former type could achieve 
and maintain plausible deniability with respect to the activities of the lat-
ter type. 
Having established an approximate and initial understanding of the 
quantity and types of significant structures operating in the particular situ-
ation, the next obvious challenge is to begin the analysis of the interrela-
tionship of these organisations. This challenge is in turn interlinked with 
the analysis of the de jure and de facto operation of previously existing 
                                                   
4 See Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization, Updated Edition, Sage Publications, London, 
2006. 
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organisations. Essentially this entails comparing the way in which these 
organisations are supposed to function according to existing laws and 
regulations and comparing this with how they actually functioned. Here it 
should be noted that anyone who has ever worked in any kind of organisa-
tion or who has interacted with the authorities even in a stable and peace-
ful environment will recognise that the actual functioning of such organi-
sations and authorities differs from the official way in which they are sup-
posed to function. Inevitably, the events leading to the commission of 
crimes lead to much more considerable deviations from the de jure struc-
tures and manner of functioning, and it may well be that deputies, tempo-
rarily appointed or even completely official actors are more significant 
than the ones officially in charge. Struggles for power and resources also 
exacerbate the functioning, as does bureaucratic turf warfare. In some 
cases, the most powerful actors may be difficult to detect because they 
deliberately try to shield their power and activity from public view. 
For analyses of organisations to have a chance of succeeding and 
become useful in investigations and subsequent trials, the analysts per-
forming them must demonstrate that they are primarily interested in un-
derstanding the genesis, operations and internal structures and logics of 
these organisations. Here a delicate and difficult balance needs to be 
struck: if the analysts performing this work are exclusively focused on 
examining questions which pertain to the case theory being developed by 
investigators and prosecutors, then the analysis risks being tainted by 
prosecutorial agendas. Conversely, analysts must realise and accept that 
the main reason they are being asked to perform analysis is to assist not 
just the prosecutors and investigators but also the lawyers representing the 
accused and – not least – the trial chamber. Both the relevant document 
collection process and the subsequent analysis can therefore not be al-
lowed to exist in an intellectual vacuum. Document collection plans must 
of course exist, but these document collection plans must be focused pri-
marily on the relevant organisational structures rather than on specific 
investigative or prosecutorial theories. This requires a bit of a tightrope 
walk. Put differently, the goal should be able to provide the most objective 
analysis of the designated organisations and their structures while recog-
nising that the primary focus must be on the role and legal responsibility 
of these structures with respect to potential commission of serious interna-
tional crimes. That having been said, from the perspective of leadership 
analysis and organisational structures, overly narrow document collection 
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and evidence review based primarily on elements of crime can also create 
serious problems, particularly if the use of expert reports produced by 
analysts at trial is being contemplated. 
One of the mistakes routinely made in the investigation of major in-
ternational crimes is to assume that the organisations responsible for the 
commission of these crimes are monolithic, possessing at all times the 
same (criminal) intent and purpose. (Given the amount of personal and 
professional rivalries and bureaucratic infighting that characterise large 
organisations – and in this sense international criminal courts and tribu-
nals are certainly no exception – it is rather ironic that some employees of 
these courts and tribunals commit the fallacy of believing in monolithic 
criminal enterprises.) At the ICTY, the decision to espouse the doctrine of 
joint criminal enterprise (‘JCE’) probably to a significant extent exacer-
bated this fallacy and has led critics to claim that the doctrine possessed 
an inherent pro-conviction bias.5 Somewhat paradoxically, separate trials 
of various members of the alleged JCE also at times resulted in contradic-
tory prosecution theories in the sense that in each separate case prosecu-
tors had a vested interest in portraying the accused in the given case as 
primarily responsible for criminal acts. Hence, a regional governor might 
be prosecuted in one case and be portrayed as nearly omnipotent in his 
area of responsibility. Later, at the same judicial institution, the president 
or prime minister of the country in which the regional governor served 
might in turn be prosecuted, yet in this case the regional governor’s role is 
downplayed in order to increase the perception of culpability on the part 
of the president or prime minister. Such contradictory case theories and 
prosecutions should be thwarted by proper quality control in analysis. 
Absent this the prosecutions, even if successful, will be suboptimal and 
will moreover also lead to the emergence of problematic historical narra-
tives. Of course, similar mistakes can also be identified on the part of de-
fence teams representing the accused in international criminal cases, who 
also labour under the constant risk of succumbing to myopic understand-
ings of the overall context. 
                                                   
5 For a constructive criticism of JCE, see Kai Ambos, “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Com-
mand Responsibility”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2007, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 
159–83. On organisational liability and alleged pro-conviction bias, see Nancy A. Combs, 
Fact-Finding without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International 
Criminal Convictions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, chap. 8. 
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It may be argued that the presentation of seamless joint criminal en-
terprises may be a conscious choice made by prosecutors to streamline 
their cases and hence convince trial chambers of their overarching case 
theory. Yet international trial chambers are not juries composed of lay 
persons in a domestic court of law. Although it is true that a number of 
judges at international criminal courts and tribunals have lacked previous 
trial and criminal law experience, it is equally true that the prosecutors 
have in several cases at both the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC seen their 
cases collapse because they oversimplified analysis and tried in a sense to 
engage in incriminating heuristics. 
4.1. Strategic vs. Case-Based Analysis 
By strategic analysis I refer to the type of analysis that focuses on an en-
tire set of crimes in a geographical area over a certain span of time, or 
‘situation analysis’, as it is also called at the ICC. Conducting such analy-
sis also leads us to a better overview of the possible drawbacks of focus-
ing on certain crimes, organisations or perpetrators. This is important be-
cause all international criminal courts and tribunals must operate within 
the constraints of finite resources: personnel, time, and money. Even in 
the best-case scenario, only a small fraction of the crimes committed in 
any given situation will be investigated, and therefore only a small minor-
ity of the actual perpetrators will face prosecution. Strategic analysis can 
help ensure that those investigations and prosecutions that are carried out 
deliver ‘the best bang for the buck’. 
A particular risk when choosing to focus on certain organisations is 
whether those organisations are primarily responsible for the conflict or 
whether they are rather symptomatic of the conflict. With respect to para-
military, proxy and other irregular forces, special care is necessary in 
analysis and investigation. If too much emphasis is placed on these forces, 
a substantial risk exists that subsequent prosecutions will treat the symp-
toms rather than addressing the root cause of criminal conduct. We can 
see this danger both in domestic prosecutions that focus on low or mid-
level criminal conduct and at the ICC where certain State sponsors of re-
bel militias have for various reasons largely avoided prosecution. For ex-
ample, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) and more gen-
erally the Great Lakes Region of Africa, some of the groups committing 
crimes against humanity and war crimes were essentially established as 
proxy groups for States in the region, though some of them later broke 
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with their erstwhile sponsors and subsequently acted more independently 
or sought out other sponsors. While there is no doubt that the level of 
criminality perpetrated to proxy groups reached the threshold triggering 
investigation and possible prosecution, it is at least worth questioning the 
overall strategic value of such cases, regardless of their success or failure 
in court. These cases can of course have significant inherent value, not 
least from the perspective of the victims of these crimes. Yet in a world of 
finite resources, if such cases are pursued, then they should preferably 
yield increasing returns to scale for subsequent investigations of those 
States or regimes which have established the proxy groups. Otherwise, the 
entire international criminal justice process risks treating the symptoms 
while ignoring the underlying disease. 
The example of some of the early cases at the ICTY illustrate this 
point. The Tribunal’s very first case, against a lowly perpetrator named 
Duško Tadić, was in some senses a fluke. Compared to later cases against 
other accused, neither Tadić’s crimes nor his importance rose to anywhere 
near the level that the UN Security Council had in mind when talking 
about the Tribunal’s obligations to pursue the most serious cases. Indeed, 
had Tadić been found just a few years later, he almost certainly would not 
have been prosecuted at the ICTY. Yet at the particular time of his discov-
ery and arrest in Germany, he was a ‘godsend’ to a tribunal casting about 
for its first case. The same to some extent holds true for Jean Paul 
Akayesu at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’). 
Nonetheless, the Tadić case was put to great effect by the Office of 
the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) at the ICTY. The documentation gathered and the 
analysis and investigations carried out for the Tadić case were used to 
build the base of knowledge from which other cases could subsequently 
be constructed. Evidence – documentary, as well as witness statements, 
forensic and other material – could in effect be recycled and reused in 
cases that worked their way up the chain of responsibility. From the Tadić 
case, in which the focus was on a rather randomly selected guard at a 
Bosnian concentration camp, the evidence and the prosecutions wound 
their way up to the mayor and governor of the area in which this and simi-
lar camps were located, and from there up to the ‘national’ level of Repub-
lika Srpska and ultimately to the leadership in Serbia (at the time a part of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) which had instigated and supported 
the criminal activities perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs. 
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The first case which went to court at the ICC, the case of Thomas 
Lubanga, suffered from the same flaws as the Tadić case. Lubanga, who at 
the time of the investigation conducted against him was already languish-
ing in prison in Kinshasa, was the head of a paramilitary force called the 
Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais, ‘UPC’), one 
of many proxy forces present in the eastern provinces of the DRC. (Ad-
mittedly, the UPC had elements of both a proxy group and an independent 
group, having been founded by Uganda then subsequently switching to 
Rwandan patronage.) The mere fact that Lubanga had been neutralised 
did not necessarily invalidate his prosecution for some of the grave crimes 
the UPC had committed in the DRC’s Ituri province. 
However, unlike in the case of Tadić, there are few indications that 
significant returns to scale were obtained from the Lubanga case. In par-
ticular, even though the UPC and several other similar groups were at 
least during some periods acting as proxies for Uganda or Rwanda, the 
ICC did not prove capable or willing to pursue the leads provided by the 
investigations of proxy groups. Whether the failure to do so was rooted in 
politically influenced decisions or political pressure, or whether it was a 
strategic error or a decision informed by a narrow-minded cost-benefit 
calculation is immaterial here. The end result to date has been that the 
ICC has failed to achieve the types of increased returns to scale seen at the 
ICTY. Of course, to be fair to the ICC, that court has faced tremendous 
pressure to deal with situations in several countries, whereas the ICTY as 
a geographically defined ad hoc court enjoyed the relative luxury of being 
able to focus on crimes committed in one (former) country. And the ICTY 
has also been criticised for not succeeding sufficiently in prosecuting and 
convicting those leaders in Serbia and Croatia who were most responsible 
for funding, supplying and to some extent commanding Bosnian Serb, 
Croatian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces. Yet with a bit of poetic license, 
one can compare the above problem to applying lotion to cosmetic treat-
ment of skin moles while ignoring the underlying skin cancer. 
Successful investigations and prosecutions of paramilitary groups 
are not by definition bad, but if the ICC does not move beyond these, the 
results of its work will be very limited. The ICC has in the Darfur situa-
tion shown that it can pursue investigations and prosecutions which build 
on local or regional atrocities and then reach all the way to the top of a 
state, as evidenced by the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir. Yet as a truly international criminal court, the ICC also 
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labours under the structural problem of having to address numerous situa-
tions that may be completely detached from one another. Although there 
are certainly investigative, analytical and prosecutorial lessons learned 
which can be transferred from one situation to another, it can be argued 
that even in the best of circumstances, the ICC will not be able to generate 
the kinds of investigative and prosecutorial returns to scale which the two 
most productive ad hoc tribunals could achieve in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, another risk exists if we devote 
too much attention to the ultimate sponsors of proxy forces. By doing so, 
we risk not seeing the disagreements regarding means and goals, contra-
dictions and power struggles that may inform the relationship between 
them. There is a certain seductiveness that attaches to the simplicity of 
hegemonic control and monolithic actors. After all, if one actor is in near 
total control, both investigations and prosecutions should all things equal 
be easier. Yet here we skirt the danger of assuming the existence of a well-
formulated and implemented master plan and – by extension – the exist-
ence of a hegemonic mastermind. 6 By contrast, historical research in-
forms us that even those regimes most notoriously identified with one 
individual – Hitler in the case of Nazi Germany, Stalin in the case of the 
Soviet Union – were much more complicated and nuanced than they seem 
at first glance.7 
In this respect it may also be useful to entertain the competing ex-
planations that have informed much of Holocaust scholarship, intentional-
ism and functionalism.8 Briefly put, adherents of intentionalism believed 
                                                   
6 Patrick J. Treanor, “Old Documents and Archives in Core International Crimes Cases”, in 
Morten Bergsmo and CHEAH Wui Ling (eds.), Old Evidence and Core International 
Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Beijing, 2012 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
f130e1). 
7 Ian Kershaw’s biography of Hitler summarises much of the research on the Nazi regime, 
and the same is true of Stephen Kotkin’s biography of Stalin. Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889–
1936: Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1999 and Ina Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945: Neme-
sis, W.W. Norton, New York, 2000; Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878–
1928, Penguin Random House, 2014; and Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 
1929–1941, Penguin Random House, 2017. 
8 For an overview of the debate see Christopher R. Browning, “Beyond ‘Intentionalism’ and 
‘Functionalism’: The Decision for the Final Solution Reconsidered”, in Christopher R. 
Browning (ed.), The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 88–101. 
4. Analysis of Organisational Structures 
and Quality Control of Case Development 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 283 
that Hitler as the leader of Nazi Germany possessed a clear intent to de-
stroy European Jewry. All subsequent criminal actions committed fol-
lowed from his dictatorial role and this criminal intent. By contrast, while 
not denying the existence of Hitler’s intent, functionalists argued that a 
significant portion of subsequent actions could better be explained by the 
bureaucratic apparatus. Competition among bureaucrats and other Nazi 
officials inexorably contributed to a ratcheting up effect in which criminal 
actions resulted not so much out of intent as out of careerist and egotisti-
cal motivations. Of course, for victims of the regime, whether they were 
being persecuted and ultimately killed based on intentionalist or function-
alist reasons mattered little. But in terms of better understanding how such 
regimes work – and how they can be prevented and their crimes subse-
quently investigated and prosecuted – is of great import. 
This in turn leads us to the question of whether serious international 
crimes are committed in an environment of chaos or well-planned con-
spiracy. If one indulges a bit of generalisation based on cases tried at in-
ternational courts and tribunals since the mid-1990s, it could be said that 
whereas the defence in complex (international) cases argues that the situa-
tion – particularly where armed conflict was involved – was chaotic, the 
prosecution tends to argue that everything was entirely (too) well-
organised. As with so many things, quality control in analysis requires 
recognising that all situations reviewed by international courts include 
elements of both chaos and conspiracy. The entire point of analysis is not 
to succumb to either end of the chaos-conspiracy spectrum, but instead to 
break down the dichotomy and analyse what actually transpired.9 At a 
much more fundamental level, this also leads to questions regarding our 
understanding of the relationship between human nature and violence.10 
4.2. Remembering the Flip Side 
In the vast majority of situations which give rise to the commission of 
serious international crimes, the complexity and multitude of factors un-
derlying these crimes is augmented by the existence of misdeeds on ‘the 
other side’. It is exceedingly rare that conflicts are completely one-sided. 
                                                   
9 Xabier Agirre, “Methodology for the Criminal Investigation of International Crimes”, in 
Alette Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdis-
ciplinary Approach, Intersentia, Antwerp, p. 363. 
10 Siniša Malešević, The Sociology of War and Violence, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2010. 
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Even if one side’s forces commit the lion’s share of crimes during the 
actual conflict, it is entirely possible that the other side has previously 
committed crimes or does so later, particularly if the conflict is marked by 
a reversal of fortunes. From an analytical point of view, the challenge that 
must be grasped and confronted is to ensure that alleged criminal activity 
is investigated per se, and not because a particular side or set of actors 
have allegedly committed crimes. 
Analysis of organisational structures therefore also need to take into 
account the existence and performance of opposing organisations: flip-
side cases. At the same time, we must recognise that analysts will almost 
inevitably end up developing a particularly deep knowledge of one or 
several – but not all – parties to a conflict. The mere fact that a particular 
analyst has been assigned to work on a particular side of the conflict can-
not and must not serve to disqualify that analyst in the eyes of the court. 
Rather, such compartmentalised tasking is simply a recognition that no 
one analyst can reasonably be expected to cover all sides of the conflict 
equally. Those analysts must however be able to cover all sides of the 
conflict objectively, that is, they should apply precisely the same standards 
to their analysis and scrutiny of one side as they would to all others. 
By way of example, both the leadership research team (‘LRT’) and 
the military analysis team (‘MAT’) at the ICTY featured research subunits 
working on a particular side of the conflict. Within the LRT, the Bosnian 
Serb unit, composed of several analysts, worked on analysing the leader-
ship of the Bosnian Serbs. Importantly, these analysts co-operated not just 
within their subunit, where the analyst focusing on the Bosnian Serb As-
sembly exchanged knowledge and sources with the analysts concentrating 
on the Bosnian Serb’s primary political party or their self-proclaimed ‘cri-
sis staffs’. Upon encountering information that was prima facie relevant 
for an investigation of the Bosnian Croats’ leadership, the analysts would 
pass this on to their colleagues. And, of course, the analysts would work 
on producing products that conformed to the same standards and were 
quality-checked by the chief analyst. In principle, analysts could be reas-
signed to another subunit if there was no longer sufficient work for them 
on their present assignment. 
It is not unusual that one side commits more crimes than the other 
in a conflict, and the plea not to neglect flip side cases should not be con-
strued as a misguided call for equivocation or what-about-ism. Rather, 
analysis of both (or all sides) of a conflict should contribute to better qual-
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ity of investigations and prosecutions. Moreover, to the extent that inter-
national courts and tribunals are to have any chance at contributing to 
long-term reconciliation, it is essential that they treat allegations of crimi-
nal conduct on all sides of any given conflict. To not do so is to succumb 
to the reification of the victor-perpetrator dichotomy.11 And analysis that 
ignores flip side cases has real costs for the reputation of international 
judicial institutions in the long run, as the relative neglect at the ICTY of 
crimes perpetrated by Kosovo Albanians, at the ICTR of crimes perpetrat-
ed by Tutsis and at the ICC of crimes perpetrated by Ugandan government 
security forces show. We must be extremely wary of reifying and appro-
priating the analytical categories employed by parties to a conflict. 
4.3. Evidence-Based, Not Target-Based 
As pointed out in the concept note by Morten Bergsmo underpinning this 
volume, avoiding target-based investigations requires strategizing in order 
“to avoid perceptions of confirmation-bias or target-driven investiga-
tion”.12 Quality control in analysis in international criminal investigations 
is of cardinal importance. However, the best analysis in the world can end 
up being an exercise in futility if the wrong strategical decisions are taken. 
A notorious example of this in newer history is the analytical work carried 
out by American and British intelligence agencies regarding possible 
weapons of mass destruction possessed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Alt-
hough most reports indicate that the intelligence analysts carried out thor-
ough and effective analysis, the political leadership in both the US and the 
UK had arrived at their own preordained conclusions, thereby in effect 
neutralising the analysis performed.13 
Similar observations can be made at international criminal courts 
and tribunals. All of those judicial institutions established since the mid-
1990s have to some degree struggled with the problems created by inves-
tigations that were at least initially driven by a focus on particular indi-
                                                   
11 Margarida Hourmat, “Victim-Perpetrator Dichotomy in Transitional Justice: The Case of 
Post-Genocide Rwanda”, in Narrative and Conflict: Explorations of Theory and Practice, 
2016, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 43–67. 
12 Bergsmo, 2019, see above note 1. 
13 James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian (eds.), Intelligence and National Security Policymak-
ing on Iraq, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2018. For a contrarian view, see 
Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq”, in Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 2006, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 3–52. 
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viduals rather than on the evidence collected. Indeed, it is common 
knowledge that the Lubanga and Ntaganda cases at the ICC were a result 
of a target-driven investigation ordained by the Court’s first prosecutor 
and persist to some extent in later cases such as in the Mali situation. 
Target-driven investigations are notorious for creating situations of 
severe cognitive bias.14 Information and evidence collection are distorted 
because investigators, analysts and lawyers from a very early stage collect 
data that pertains to a particular target. Moreover, in practice the collec-
tion is further skewed so that it focuses predominantly on the culpability 
of the target in question. This makes it, often unconsciously and implicitly, 
much more difficult to comply with the (statutory) obligations to investi-
gate potentially exonerating leads equally. 
It is of course theoretically possible that target-driven investigations 
can point at individuals who are genuinely guilty of committing serious 
international crimes. Taking this possibility into consideration, analysis of 
these targets can still be useful and lead to better investigations and prose-
cutions. However, the risk of prosecutorial bias and blindness not only to 
the potential innocence of the targets but also the potentially greater cul-
pability of others not targeted should be enough to dissuade any interna-
tional judicial institution from pursuing target-driven investigations. 
Quality analysis, properly done, instead constitutes an essential part 
of evidence-based investigations. As Patrick J. Treanor, the head of the 
LRT has argued, investigations must: 
[B]egin and continue to proceed on the basis of a substantive 
hypothesis […] developed through the analysis of all infor-
mation and evidence available on the given leadership struc-
ture. That is, all relevant knowledge must be integrated 
through analysis into a consistent hypothesis or, if incon-
sistent with it, be put aside but not forgotten for later re-
evaluation and possible use.15 
                                                   
14 Moa Lidén, “Prevention of Factual Confirmation-Bias during Offence-Driven Investiga-
tions”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/
190222-liden/). 
15 Patrick J. Treanor, “Research and Analysis in the Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudica-
tion of Crimes”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Histori-
cal Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
Brussels, 2017, p. 138 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/ea5269). 
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Needless to say, the hypothesis can involve mention of the roles of 
various individuals, units, organisations, etc. However, the hypothesis 
should not be target-driven per se, rather targets should emerge organical-
ly based on the objective collection and rigorous analysis of information 
and evidence. Simply put, those who commit the error of conducting tar-
get-driven investigations ended up perpetrating cases instead of preparing 
cases. 
4.4. Breadth vs. Depth 
Quality in major criminal investigations requires energy, resources, objec-
tivity and time. Reprioritising scarce resources is a key aspect of sound 
investigative management, but all too often we see that resources are 
reprioritised in a manner that resources are spread too thin or that repriori-
tisation is done in a reactive rather than proactive and strategic manner, 
putting out fires instead of planning to prevent future fires. Quality con-
trol in analysis requires robust and decisive managers who are willing to 
shield analysts from menial tasks that are sloughed off on them because 
they are viewed by others as undesirable, as well as from tasks that threat-
en to derail or severely delay the production of in-depth analytical work 
product. This is not to say that analysts should somehow be isolated or be 
permitted to exist in a cocoon from which they emerge only when they 
finish their major analytical tasks. It is legitimate to expect analysts to be 
accessible to pressing relevant questions from investigators and lawyers, 
as long as those posing these questions do so in a manner that does not 
fundamentally distract analysts from fulfilling their primary tasks. 
Another challenge that undoubtedly exists at the ICC is that of ana-
lytical depth. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals who had a fixed mandate con-
cerning a particular region and timeframe, the ICC must cover a wide 
variety of countries and regions, none of which it will conceivably focus 
on permanently. There are undoubtedly analysts who have started their 
careers by becoming experts on a particular region, and who have subse-
quently become agile and competent analysts in situations that have little 
or nothing to do with their own original areas of expertise. The ICC at 
present employs quite a number of analysts who began their careers as 
experts on the former Yugoslavia, worked for the LRT at the ICTY and 
subsequently moved on to work on the DRC, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, etc. 
However, most if not all of these analysts and their colleagues in similar 
situations are acutely aware of the empirical and linguistic gap that they 
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must overcome when compared to their previous assignments. To give but 
one highly relevant example: in all international criminal investigations, 
the total quantity of available material in the relevant languages of the 
country or region being investigated is larger than the amount of this ma-
terial that has been translated into the working languages of the judicial 
institution. Moreover, notwithstanding the often very high quality of 
translation work done at these institutions, it is an absolute certainty that 
mistakes will be made, and that the best and most reliable analysis is per-
formed on the basis of the documentation in its original language.16 It is 
therefore absolutely essential that the institution employ analysts who do 
not have to rely on translations in order to perform their analytical work. 
Building up a roster of expert analytical knowledge is crucial but 
often difficult to justify if a court or tribunal must deal with a wide array 
of situations, as opposed to ICTR or ICTY, which had the opportunity to 
delve much deeper into a particular time and geographical area. If it is not 
possible to establish in-house analytical expert knowledge, then it will be 
necessary to retain relevant outside experts, which comes with its own 
disadvantages. Country or area experts who work in academia or other 
professions have their own hectic schedules, and experience with external 
experts at the ICTY shows that not all such experts are able to prioritise 
adequately the work they are retained to perform for international courts 
and tribunals. (Let it be noted that whereas publication deadlines are often 
highly relative and routinely ignored by many scholars, prosecutors and 
judges are much less likely to indulge external experts’ requests for ex-
tended deadlines.) Moreover, just as it is a truism in academia that not all 
excellent scholars make excellent teachers – and vice versa – so it is abso-
lutely the case that not all excellent scholars make excellent analysts. For 
this reason, there is often a considerable cost and risk attached to retaining 
outside experts on an ad hoc basis instead of relying on more permanently 
appointed analysts to produce analytical products and expert reports for 
judicial institutions. 
In terms of securing the best quality of analysis in investigations 
while simultaneously operating within the multiregional environment of 
the ICC, it might well therefore be necessary to craft a hybrid analytical 
unit, juxtaposing career analysts with country experts. Such a unit could 
                                                   
16 Ellen Elias-Bursać, Translating Evidence and Interpreting Testimony at a War Crimes 
Tribunal: Working in a Tug-of-War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
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employ a combination of permanent analysts who have seasoned experi-
ence performing analysis for international courts and tribunals. In addition, 
a less permanent category of analysts could be hired to ensure that the 
necessary linguistic and area expertise was available. Finally, if no other 
alternative existed, and if there was a higher likelihood of a particular case 
being a ‘one off’ in a given region, outside experts with relevant compe-
tencies could be retained for this case. 
4.5. Navigating Tensions During Verification Analysis 
A substantial portion of analysis involves checking the veracity of witness 
and suspect statements against relevant documentation. Doing so is part 
and parcel of the investigation or intelligence cycle, variations of which 
are widely used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.17 As I have 
explained elsewhere, there is very good reason to rely on documentation 
as a mechanism for checking whether witnesses are being honest or not. 
Simply put, although it is entirely plausible that documents contain false 
or mendacious assertions, the content of any given document should not 
change over time. By contrast, a witness may constantly alter his or her 
account. Moreover, to the degree that the documents in question are pro-
duced in what I call the halcyon days of a particular regime, such docu-
ments are likely to include evidence of criminal conduct. Simply put, 
many regimes are at their apex proud of their accomplishments, even 
when the acknowledgement of such accomplishments constitutes admis-
sion of criminal acts. Such documentation can later be used to considera-
ble effect when questioning members of these regimes who are suspected 
of having participated in the commission of these crimes. 
It is worth noting briefly that this can lead to certain tensions be-
tween those who gather information and those who verify it. This topic is 
tangentially related to the main subject at hand here, but it is enough of a 
problem that it deserves mention. There is, all things equal, at internation-
al judicial institutions a tendency to overvalue field missions, with labori-
ous analysis in headquarters being commonly perceived by many as a less 
prestigious or desirable activity. As Xabier Agirre has observed, these 
preferences can lead to what he calls ‘the paratrooper syndrome’, where 
                                                   
17 On the investigation cycle, see Xabier Agirre, “The Role of Analysis Capacity”, in Morten 
Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International 
Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 41–42 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/59ec97). 
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investigative staff deploy frequently to the field to engage in unfocused 
and often redundant collection of information. 18 Going on mission be-
comes a goal in and of itself and the material collected is not properly 
plugged into the intelligence cycle and analysed. 
It is also imperative that those persons engaged in collecting evi-
dence from witnesses must accept that the verification and cross-checking 
of this information, regardless how enamoured they become of a certain 
collection or source. This is particularly worth emphasising with respect 
to insider witnesses. Experience at the ad hoc tribunals teaches that there 
is a very real risk that those persons dealing with high-ranking and power-
ful insider witnesses romanticise these sources in a way that exaggerates 
their importance and underestimates the amount of criticism that the in-
formation they provide should be subjected to subsequently. Those han-
dling insider witnesses must be constantly reminded that no lower stand-
ards of analytical scrutiny and quality control apply to the information 
provided by these witnesses. 
4.6. For Whom is Analysis Produced? 
In writing a chapter such as this one, it is all too easy to summarise and 
repeat the wise words on the matter which knowledgeable colleagues have 
shared with the public in the past. In order to stir the pot and be a bit more 
provocative, I would like to submit that some problems linked to quality 
control of analysis in international criminal investigations are structural. 
By ‘structural’, I am not as above referring to questions related to the 
structure of the organisations or institutions under investigation but rather 
to the structure of analysis or rather analytical structures at international 
criminal courts and tribunals. 
In a memo written at the request of the Director of Common Ser-
vices at the nascent ICC, Xabier Agirre, who subsequently became a Sen-
ior Analyst at the Court, provided a detailed examination of the role of 
analysis in international criminal investigations and prosecutions.19 Ac-
cording to Agirre, experience from the International Military Tribunal and 
the ad hoc tribunals of the 1990s has shown that: 
                                                   
18 Ibid., p. 45. 
19 Ibid., p. 37. Morten Bergsmo led this expert-consultation process in the preparatory team 
establishing the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.  
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[A] better use of the analyst would be secured by grouping 
them in an analytical unit, and having them under the guid-
ance of legal officers rather than investigators, which seems 
to be the first choice of the ICC structure, as indicated by the 
first budgetary period.20 
Agirre went on to propose that the ICC’s OTP include an analysis 
section which should: 
[F]ulfil an advisory role on factual issues (as opposed to le-
gal issues), at the strategic level of planning and decision-
making, for the benefit of the prosecutor, deputy prosecutor 
and the chief of investigations.21 
[…] 
The analysis section should fulfil a support role to evi-
dence-gathering operations, trials and appeals, on an ad hoc 
basis, at a level of tactical analysis focused on the specific 
operation or procedure.22 
The analysis section would be led by a senior (chief) analyst who 
would be able to implement quality control of analytical products and to 
ensure that analysts were tasked in a rational manner commensurate with 
their skill sets and with the needs of the relevant cases. The analysis sec-
tion had to possess a clear mandate. 
Analysis needs to be central to ICC investigations in order to 
avoid dysfunctionality and waste in operations-led practice. 
The analysis section should cover three main functions: ad-
visory-strategic, support-tactical and source exploitation.23 
[…] 
In order to preserve its integrity, operate as a safeguard 
for objectivity and best perform its advisory-strategic func-
tion, the analysis section needs to maintain its organisational 
autonomy under the chief of investigations, but without be-
ing subordinated to any particular line of investigation or 
proceeding.24 
                                                   
20 Ibid., p. 95. 
21 Ibid., p. 103. 
22 Ibid., p. 106. 
23 Ibid., p. 117. 
24 Ibid., p. 118. 
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In February 2019, the investigative analysis section (‘IAS’) at the 
ICC produced as set of guidelines on structural analysis which summarise 
many state-of-the-art reflections and lessons learned.25 
Agirre was not alone in highlighting the need for analytical auton-
omy. Writing in the same volume as Agirre, Peter Nicholson, who served 
as the head of the MAT at the ICTY, agreed that the role of the analyst had 
often been misunderstood in the early days of the ad hoc tribunals, and 
that: 
[H]istorically the effective use of analysis had been from 
outside the investigative team environment, where the ana-
lyst nevertheless supported the team, but the tasks were iden-
tified, allocated and supervised by the analytical manage-
ment structure.26 
Nicholson therefore proposed that: 
[T]he analyst should have a separate management chain in 
terms of the execution of his or her professional obligations 
to the Office of the Prosecutor, namely objectivity, ethical 
analytical process, qualitative contribution and proper utili-
sation of the resource.27 
Similar thoughts about the use of analysis were shared by Patrick J. 
Treanor, who had headed the LRT, also at the OTP of the ICTY. 
Taking the thoughts of Agirre, Nicholson and Treanor a bit further, 
it is worth considering whether it would be desirable and beneficial to not 
only have a strong and dedicated analytical unit at international criminal 
courts and tribunals, but to actually have this unit exist independently of 
the OTP. This would conceivably involve placing the analytical unit so 
that it would be directly subordinate to the Chambers. 
Why place the analytical unit in Chambers? To begin with, doing so 
would to a significant extent counter the perception that analysts working 
for the OTP produce analytical products that are designed to prove prose-
                                                   
25 ICC OTP, “IAS Guidelines for the Analysis of Structures v1”, 1 February 2019 (on file 
with the author). 
26 Peter Nicholson, “The Function of Analysis and Analysts”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus 
Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: 
Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, p. 131 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/fe6c90). 
27 Ibid. 
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cution case theories. Many defence lawyers believe that analysts em-
ployed by the OTP are at the very least over time contaminated by a pros-
ecutorial mindset, and that the analysts therefore suffer from collection 
and confirmation bias leading to inferior and subjective analysis. Of 
course, lawyers working for the OTP often have a similar opinion of the 
analysts who have been retained by the defence. 
If analysts instead worked directly for judges, the analysts would 
have an increased chance of producing analysis for the court as opposed 
to producing analysis that would – explicitly or implicitly – speak to the 
interests of one party to a given case. 
In terms of recruitment, it could be made possible for the parties to 
a case to nominate experts in the field to fixed-term employment in the 
analytical unit for the duration of a particular case or situation. A panel of 
judges could then decide whether the academic and professional qualifica-
tions of the proposed expert warranted retaining him or her as a member 
of the analytical unit. 
Once retained, the analysts would interact with other, more experi-
enced analysts working for the analytical unit. Tasking of the analyst 
would occur through the relevant pre-trial or trial chambers. These cham-
bers would be responsible for collating all pertinent analytical questions 
posed by all parties to the case. At the ICC, this would mean that the 
judges, the prosecution, the defence and victims’ representatives would all 
have the ability to pose questions or propose analytical tasks that could be 
handled by the analysts. For example, in the case of expert reports, ana-
lysts could be tasked with answering the questions not just of the prosecu-
tor but of all parties to the case. Both the judges and the analytical unit’s 
chief would be able to vet the questions being posed, but the burden 
would be on the analysts in question to explain why they could not answer 
some of the questions posed. 
In German criminal courts a similar model exists. Both defence and 
prosecution can identify and propose expert witnesses to the trial chamber 
in a case. The appointment of experts takes place at the discretion of the 
trial chamber. Once appointed, the expert works on behalf of the trial 
chamber for all parties to the case. As just explained, the expert would 
then prepare his or her report based on questions posed by all parties, and 
would through the trial chamber have access to all information that the 
trial chamber deems relevant. In addition, the expert has the opportunity 
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for ex parte communication with the trial chamber if the need for this 
should arise. 
In my specific case I was initially retained by the German federal 
prosecutor who gave me an initial list of questions to which I was asked 
to respond. The questions were to some degree case-specific but quite a 
number of them were more general and structural in nature. Once the case 
proceeded to trial, I was presented by the prosecution to the court, where 
the judges in the trial chamber decided to retain me as an expert witness 
for the trial. At that point in time, I became the expert witness of the court 
rather than the prosecution. Effectively, I was transformed from being the 
instrument of one party of the court to being a resource for all parties to 
the court. Reflecting this situation, I now received questionnaires from all 
parties to the case: the judges, the prosecution, the defence and the repre-
sentatives of the victims. Compare this to the ICTY, where every appear-
ance of a prosecution expert witness in cases led to a ritualistic dance on 
cross-examination regarding whether the experts had merely sought to 
prove the prosecution’s case. 
Obviously, making the analysts into court witnesses requires a dif-
ferent statutory setting than the one which obtains in some jurisdictions. 
In terms of assuring proper quality control in international courts, howev-
er, it is worth considering the extent to which such a status could at the 
very least be emulated. A chief analyst could set the overall research 
agenda and ensure that the analysts produced analysis that was sufficient-
ly open-minded and broad to ensure proper quality and objectivity but 
conversely specific enough that it addressed the needs of the parties to the 
court. 
Expert analytical reports should be produced for the court – or in 
other words for all parties to the court case and should therefore be salient 
and useful for all. The point of a report on a given army and ministry of 
defence should therefore not be proving the prosecution’s or defence’s 
case theory but instead on providing as complete and objective as possible 
of the subject matter. If a prosecution analyst has succeeded in this en-
deavour, this will become visible when both the judges and defence coun-
sel use the opportunity of courtroom examination to elicit information that 
is pertinent to their case. Thinking back to the internal electronic file of 
analytical memos produced by the LRT at the ICTY, it seems to me that a 
very significant portion of these memos could have been disclosed to the 
defence and thereby assisted them as well as the prosecution. 
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In terms of document and source collection, analysts working in 
such an analytical unit would be able to draft document collection plans 
based on the analytical tasks that they were given by all parties to the 
court. This would in principle give them extra assurance that they were 
casting an objective net and collecting as much relevant information as 
possible. If relocating analysts or an analytical unit outside of the OTP is 
too radical, then at the very least analysts should be shown to be primarily 
interested in explaining the topic of analytical focus – which should be 
organisations, structures, etc. and not the (potential) criminal charges. It 
should also be examined to which degree analytical products can at as 
early a stage as possible be informed by and be exposed to outside input 
in order to encompass/envelope the questions of the chambers and – very 
importantly – also the defence. 
Placing an analytical unit in the jurisdiction of the judges at interna-
tional institutions is no panacea. Just as not all lawyers and investigators 
in the OTP have a proper understanding of the role of analysis, so it must 
be said that not all judges taking up appointments at international courts 
and tribunals understand this role, either.28 Indeed, those who have at-
tended workshops and conferences on international criminal justice will 
be familiar with the sotto voce sentiment that these fora address a wide 
arrange of challenges in international criminal justice but tend to shy 
away from addressing the shortcomings of chambers, particularly as re-
gards judges appointed to the international bench without little or no prac-
tical relevant experience. 
4.7. Conclusion 
I am quite well aware that a considerable number of the problems high-
lighted herein and related to quality control in analysis of serious interna-
tional crimes have been identified and discussed elsewhere by very 
knowledgeable authors. The fact that these challenges nonetheless persist 
in international criminal investigations indicates that we must continue to 
flag their existence and to discuss how to surmount them. By doing so we 
will help to increase the likelihood that the vast and ambitious experiment 
                                                   
28 For a criticism of lacking contextual knowledge by lawyers and judges at the ICC, see 
Julien Seroussi, “How Do International Lawyers Handle Facts? The Role of Folk Socio-
logical Theories at the International Criminal Court”, in The British Journal of Sociology, 
2018, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 962–83. 
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of international criminal justice will not just survive but also prove suc-
cessful. 
When speaking of quality control in international criminal investi-
gations, it is important that we ask what kind of quality is actually being 
controlled? From the perspective of analysts, it becomes problematic if 
quality control is linked too closely to issues of culpability, as these will 
impact upon the objectivity of the analysis. It might therefore also be con-
sidered whether quality control of analysis in international investigations 
should also involve some kind of internal peer review mechanism, where 
a panel of analysts, investigators and lawyers not working on particular 
case would have the ability to independently review the quality of the 
analysis produced. 
At the ICC, it was frequently said that the prosecution should be in-
vestigating cases as if it were simultaneously also pursuing exculpatory 
information and hence complying with its statutory obligations to investi-
gate potentially exculpatory avenues equally. The track record of the ICC 
raises questions as to whether that has been happening in practice or not. 
It will surprise no one who knows me and my professional record 
that I believe that strong analytical teams interacting closely with prosecu-
tors and investigators but also insulated from both prosecutorial and in-
vestigative pressures are a prerequisite for high-quality complex investi-
gations. An analytical team can, among other things, provide expert 
knowledge on several fronts and ensure standardisation of analytical out-
put, thereby militating against the loss or fragmentation of overview of 
information and potential evidence. From an analytical perspective, this 
also helps against having to reinvent the wheel. 
5 
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5.Interviewing Victims and Witnesses of Crime 
Trond Myklebust, Gavin Oxburgh and William Webster* 
 
Communication in investigative settings with vulnerable victims and wit-
nesses (and suspected offenders) is a vitally important area of practice and 
research. This chapter outlines a significant paradigm-shift in interview-
ing practices relating to victims and witnesses, highlighting that such in-
terviewing requires enhanced sensitivity and advanced training. There is 
strong, international consensus on which interviewing skills are currently 
deemed to be the most effective and appear to yield the most accurate 
accounts, some of which are presented and discussed in this chapter. Alt-
hough these skills can be learned, it has been continually found across 
scientific research that, for (as yet) unknown reasons, many interviewers 
do not appear to use these skills reliably during interviews. 
We discuss elements of current interview methods currently availa-
ble internationally and provide an overall consensus that the use of struc-
tured interview protocols appears to be the most effective. Several aspects 
of our approach to investigative interviewing that are now considered 
conventional wisdom, were once contested, challenged and debated. In 
this chapter we have examined and presented some of the debate sur-
rounding the complex nature of investigative interviewing of victims and 
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witnesses, specifically those who are deemed vulnerable, and the key as-
pects with which all interviewers should be familiar. 
5.1. Background to Investigative Interviewing 
In its ‘Quality Control in Criminal Investigation’ project (‘QCCI’), the 
Centre for International Law Research and Policy (CILRAP) has identi-
fied seven bottlenecks as particularly problematic in the investigation of 
core international crimes or war crimes (dating back to 1994).1 In the vo-
luminous case materials collected, analysed and presented in all crime 
cases, the investigative interview has a central role. This chapter outlines 
a significant paradigm-shift in interviewing practices relating to victims 
and witnesses. 
Knowledge about communication in investigative settings is of ma-
jor importance in the prevention of the first four of the seven bottlenecks 
presented by Bergsmo.2 In the areas of research and practice, there is a 
strong international consensus about interviewing skills that are currently 
deemed to be the most effective, some of which are presented and dis-
cussed in this chapter. 
Investigative interviewing requires great sensitivity. Investigative 
interviewing of victims and witnesses (and suspects in criminal cases) is 
cognitively demanding.3 Consequently, information elicited must be accu-
rate and reliable with the main objective of obtaining the best quality and 
quantity of information possible that will assist in determining what has 
happened, when, and by whom.4 In addition, interviewers are required to 
                                                   
1 See Morten Bergsmo, “Towards Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/65157b). Based on continuous observation and analysis of 
work-process problems in international and national war crimes jurisdictions since July 
1994, the QCCI project team has identified the following seven bottlenecks as particularly 
problematic: (i) overview of information, (ii) factual analysis, (iii) evidence-review, (iv) 
formulation of responsibility, (v) cumulative charging, (vi) too much evidence, and (vii) 
disclosure. 
2 Ibid.: (i) overview of information, (ii) factual analysis, (iii) evidence-review, and (iv) 
formulation of responsibility. 
3 Gavin Oxburgh and Ian Hynes, “Investigative Practice”, in Pamela Radcliffe, Gisli 
Gudjonsson, Anthony Heaton-Armstrong and David Wolchover (eds.), Witness Testimony 
in Sexual Cases: Evidential, Investigative and Scientific Perspectives, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 221. 
4 Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, “Interviewing Victims of Crime, Including Children and 
People with Intellectual Difficulties”, in Mark Kebbell and Graham Davies (eds.), Practi-
 
5. Interviewing Victims and Witnesses of Crime 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 299 
possess professional integrity, be appropriately trained in the use of effec-
tive models, and follow relevant policy and procedures.5 
5.2. Interview Models 
Interview models around the world differ in many ways, however, the 
principles are very similar.6 For example, in the United Kingdom there are 
two different models: in Scotland, the ‘PRICE’ model is utilised (Planning 
and preparation; Rapport building; Information gathering; Confirming the 
content; Evaluate and action); it has very similar principles to that of the 
‘PEACE’ model used in England and Wales.7 PEACE is the mnemonic 
acronym used for the five phases: 
• Planning and preparation: This should take place prior to the inter-
view itself and is a vital part of all investigative interviews. Inter-
viewers must first consider how the interview might contribute to 
the overall investigation and they should have a clear understanding 
of the purpose of the interview. They should also consider when and 
where it will take place. If there is more than one interviewer, they 
should be clear what each other’s roles are and have a clear 
knowledge of relevant legislation. Before commencing the inter-
view, he or she should make any necessary arrangements for the at-
tendance of other persons.8 
                                                                                                                        
cal Psychology for Forensic Investigations, Wiley, Chichester, 2006, pp. 7–24; Ole Thom-
as Bjerknes and Ivar A. Fahsing, Etterforskning: Prinsipper, metoder og praksis (Investiga-
tion: Principles, Methods and Practice), Vigmostad og Bjørke, Bergen, 2018; Gavin Ox-
burgh, James Ost and Julie Cherryman, “Police Interviews with Suspected Child Sex Of-
fenders: Does Use of Empathy and Question Type Influence the Amount of Investigation 
Relevant Information Obtained?”, in Psychology, Crime and Law, 2012, vol. 18, no. 3, p. 
259. 
5 Oxburgh and Hynes, 2016, see above note 3. 
6 Dave Walsh, Gavin E. Oxburgh, Allison D. Redlich and Trond Myklebust, International 
Developments and Practices in Investigative Interviewing and Interrogation, Volume 1: 
Victims and Witnesses, Routledge, London, 2016; Dave Walsh, Gavin E. Oxburgh, Allison 
D. Redlich and Trond Myklebust, International Developments and Practices in Investiga-
tive Interviewing and Interrogation, Volume 2: Suspects, Routledge, London, 2016. 
7 Central Police Training and Development Authority, Practical Guide to Investigative 
Interviewing, 2004; Central Planning and Training Unit, The Interviewer’s Rulebook, Har-
rogate, 1992; National Crime Faculty, A Practical Guide to Investigative Interviewing, Na-
tional Police Training College, Bramshill, 1996, 1998 and 2000. 
8 For example, an interpreter or intermediary, see below Section 5.5.5. 
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• Engage and explain: The first main phase of the actual interview is 
all about the opening stage of the interview and is crucial to its 
overall success. Interviewers should use appropriate language, be 
flexible in their approach, and try to create a relaxed atmosphere. 
The reason for the interview should be explained, together with the 
procedures that will be followed during the interview, including 
how long it will last, a basic outline of the interview, who will ask 
the most questions, and who will be taking notes etc. Rapport-
building and adopting an empathic approach in this stage are key to 
the overall success of the interview.9 
• Account, clarify and challenge: This is where the interviewer(s) ob-
tain the person’s version of events (or account) using one of two 
ways: (i) the cognitive approach,10 or (ii) the conversation manage-
ment approach. If the latter approach is used, he or she should ob-
tain an initial account from the interviewee and then sub-divide his 
or her account into a number of sub-sections in order to probe for 
further detail or clarify any details provided. 
• Closure: This phase involves the interviewers summarising what 
occurred during the interview to ensure there is a mutual under-
standing about what has taken place. This is an ideal opportunity to 
verify that all aspects have been sufficiently covered (with the wit-
ness and the second interviewer if appropriate). The interviewers 
should also explain what will happen after the interview is complet-
ed. 
• Evaluation: This is not just about an evaluation of the interview that 
has just taken place, or about how much information was obtained, 
rather, it includes an evaluation of the interviewer(s) own perfor-
mance during the interview. 
The PEACE model is depicted in Figure 1 as a linear model that in-
cludes the processes before the interview commences (for example, the 
planning and preparation phase) all the way through until after the inter-
view is completed (the evaluation phase). The actual interview itself in-
cludes: (i) engage and explain; (ii) account, and (iii) closure. Figure 1 
shows the links between the three main phases of the interview, indicated 
                                                   
9 See below Section 5.4. for an outline of these concepts. 
10 See below Section 5.5.1. 
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with solid lines, showing there is a natural forward movement from one 
phase to the next, whereas the dotted lines indicate that the interviewer 
can move backwards and forwards between any of the three main phases 
as required in order to remain as flexible as possible during the course of 
the interview. For example, if the interviewer reaches the closure stage 
and is provided with new information, he or she can move back to the 
engage and explain, and/or the account phase(s) as required. 
 
Figure 1. The PEACE model11 of interviewing. 
The PEACE model, which was introduced in 1992, was based on 
collaborative work with academic researchers, psychologists, police prac-
titioners, and lawyers, and was intended to take into account the vulnera-
bilities of some interviewees.12 The model also integrated two other inter-
view methods based on reputable psychological principles: (i) the cogni-
tive interview (‘CI’),13 and (ii) the conversation management (‘CM’) ap-
proach.14 The focus of the PEACE model is based on fairness, openness, 
workability, accountability, and fact (truth) finding rather than the obtain-
                                                   
11 Central Planning and Training Unit, 1992, see above note 7; National Crime Faculty, 2000, 
p. 27, see above note 7. 
12 Andrea Shawyer, Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, “Investigative Interviewing in the UK”, in 
Tom Williamson, Rebecca Milne and Stephen Savage (eds.), International Developments 
in Investigative Interviewing, Willan, Devon, 2009, p. 24. 
13 Ronald Fisher and Edward Geiselman, Memory-Enhancing Techniques for Investigative 
Interviewing: The Cognitive Interview, Charles Thomas, Springfield, 1992. 
14 Gisli Gudjonsson and John Pearse, “Suspect Interviews and False Confessions”, in Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 2011, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 33. 
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ing of a confession (involving suspects).15 The PEACE model is now a 
widely-resourced method of interviewing and is used throughout England 
and Wales in addition to many other countries including Australia, New 
Zealand, Norway (known as KREATIVE) and some parts of Canada. 
5.3. Interview Training 
Effective training in the various interview models is required and there is 
no doubt it has been enhanced considerably during the past two decades.16 
The investigative interviewing of vulnerable (and intimidated) witnesses 
requires additional, advanced training (over and above foundation level 
training) together with enhanced sensitivity to ensure the information ob-
tained is accurate, reliable and untainted in any way. This is equally im-
portant when it comes to interviewing reluctant and/or ‘insider’ witnesses. 
There are many methods of training used throughout the world. In 
England and Wales, the Initial Police Learning and Development Pro-
gramme (‘IPLDP’) was introduced in 2005, designed to ensure quality 
and to support student officers throughout their two-year probationary 
period, thereby meeting their individual development. In 2007, investiga-
tive interview training was enhanced and incorporated into the Profes-
sionalising the Investigation Programme (‘PIP’; see Table 1). This devel-
opment was intended to increase professionalism amongst all police in-
vestigators and to establish a structured, professional approach to investi-
gations and interviewing. The IPLDP provides all uniformed police offic-
ers and supervisors with the necessary accreditation at PIP level 1, with 
PIP level 2 designed for dedicated investigators (for example, detectives) 
who investigate serious and complex investigations, including victims, 
witnesses and suspected offenders. PIP level 3 was designed for Senior 
Investigating Officers (‘SIOs’) in cases of murder, stranger rape, kidnap, 
or crimes of similar complexity, with PIP level 4 designed for SIOs and 
Officers in Overall Command (‘OIOC’) who manage critical, complex or 
protracted and/or linked serious crime. 
                                                   
15 Ibid. 
16 Gavin Oxburgh and Coral Dando, “Psychology and interviewing: What Direction Now in 
Our Quest for Reliable Information?”, in The British Journal of Forensic Practice, 2011, 
vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 135–44. 
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Table 1. PIP levels. 
PIP level Example of role Investigative responsibility 
1 Uniformed constable or police 
staff or supervisors 
1. Conduct priority and volume crime 
investigations. 
2. Interview suspects, witnesses and vic-
tims for priority and volume crime in-
vestigations. 
2 Dedicated investigator (that is, 
Detective) 
1. Plan and conduct serious and complex 
investigations. 
2. Plan, conduct and evaluate interviews 
with witnesses and victims for serious 
and complex investigations. 
3. Plan, conduct and evaluate interviews 
with suspects for serious and complex 
investigations. 
   317 SIO 1. Lead investigator in cases of murder, 
stranger rape, kidnap or crimes of simi-
lar complexity. 
2. Manage major investigations. 
4 SIO or OIOC 1. Manage critical, complex, protracted 
and/or linked serious crime. 
2. Responsible for the review of investiga-
tions in other force areas (as appropri-
ate). 
It is important to note, that although such enhancements in training 
will doubtlessly continue, Powell, Fisher and Wright18 outlined the ele-
ments of training that have been found to be the most successful which 
include the use of: 
• structured interview protocols;19 
• multiple opportunities to practice over an extended period; 
                                                   
17 This PIP level is split into various core and specialist roles including the interviewing of 
vulnerable witnesses and the specialist interviewing of suspects, some of which would 
have been categorised at the old tier level 3. 
18 Martine B. Powell, M.B. Ronald, P. Fisher and Rebecca Wright, “Investigative Interview-
ing”, in Neil Brewer, and Kipling D. Williams (eds.), Psychology and Law. An Empirical 
Perspective, The Guilford Press, London, 2005, pp. 11–42. 
19 See below Section 5.5.2. 
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• expert feedback and ongoing supervision; and 
• internal motivation by the interviewer to enhance his or her individ-
ual performance. 
5.4. Recurring Themes Across Interview Research 
A plethora of research has been conducted by many academic researchers 
and practitioners in numerous countries across the world incorporating 
many different jurisdictions. The research to date has been overwhelming-
ly consistent with regards to best practice across all types of interviews 
(for example, victims, witnesses and suspected offenders) which include: 
(i) the use of a humane and non-coercive interview approach incorporat-
ing legal safeguards, procedural justice and international human rights; (ii) 
the use of rapport-building; (iii) the use of empathy; and (iv) the use of 
appropriate questions. 
5.4.1. Humane and Non-Coercive Interviewing Approach 
Previous research20 has highlighted how a humanitarian style of inter-
viewing, characterised by the use of supportive or humane interview tech-
niques (for example, rapport-building and the use of empathy), can facili-
tate communication and improve the quality of the interaction between 
interviewer and interviewee. Indeed, all interviewees, regardless of coun-
try or legal jurisdiction, must never be subjected to any form of physical 
or psychological abuse. Every individual regardless of the type of crime 
they are being interviewed about, have the fundamental right21 to be treat-
ed in accordance with international human rights, which by virtue, pro-
                                                   
20 Alison J. Laurence, Emily Alison, Geraldine Noone, Stamatis Elntib and Paul Christiansen, 
“Why Tough Tactics Fail and Rapport Gets Results: Observing Rapport-Based Interper-
sonal Techniques (ORBIT) to Generate Useful Information From Terrorists”, in Psycholo-
gy, Public Policy, and Law, 2013, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 411–31; Ulf Holmberg and Sven-Åke 
Christianson, “Murderers’ and Sexual Offenders Experiences of Police Interviews and 
Their Inclination to Admit or Deny Crimes”, in Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 2002, 
vol. 20, nos. 1–2, pp. 31–45; Miet Vanderhallen, Geert Vervaeke and Ulf Holmberg, “Wit-
ness and Suspect Perceptions of Working Alliance and Interviewing Style”, in Journal of 
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2011, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 110–30. 
21 See Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, in Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/71/298, 5 August 2016 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/luww5z). 
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vides22 procedural justice. To this end, in 2016, the former United Nations 
(‘UN’) Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan E. Mendez, presented a report 
to the UN General Assembly on the need for the development of a univer-
sal protocol (‘UP’) to provide practical guidance to police, law-
enforcement officials and other state authorities on the conduct of effec-
tive, ethical, and non-coercive interviews/interrogations, grounded in the 
absolute legal prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. 
The Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), together with 
Anti-Torture Initiative (ATI) and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights 
(NCHR) are (at time of writing this chapter) co-ordinating the develop-
ment of this UP which will embed the implementation of associated legal 
safeguards. The expert-driven, multi-disciplinary process for developing 
the protocol consists of a Steering Committee, Drafting Group and Advi-
sory Council, and involves the participation of legal, medical, psychologi-
cal, law enforcement and criminological professionals from dozens of 
countries around the world. 
5.4.1.1. Procedural Justice Theory (‘PJT’) 
PJT derives from social psychology and relates to the notion of fairness, 
dignity, respect, and due process in legal proceedings. With interviewees, 
it relates to their personal experiences of interacting with the police or law 
enforcement agency and how the behaviour of an officer could potentially 
influence their level of co-operation throughout the investigation – in oth-
er words, the fairness with which an interviewee is treated and whether 
this influences whether they co-operate or resist authority. The earliest 
studies regarding the psychology of procedural justice recognised that the 
opportunity to present information relevant to a decision enhances judge-
ments relating to the fairness of the decision-making procedures.23 Early 
theories regarding PJT attempted to explain procedural justice by refer-
ring to the assumptions made by the perceiver about the potential out-
                                                   
22 Allan E. Lind and Tom R. Tyler, “Procedural Justice in Organizations”, in Allan E. Lind 
and Tom R. Tyler (eds.), The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice, Plenum, New York, 
1992, pp. 173–202. 
23 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis, Erlbaum, 
New York, 1975; Laurens Walker, Stephen Latour, Allan E. Lind and John Thibaut, “Reac-
tions of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication”, in Journal of Applied So-
cial Psychology, 1974, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 295–310. 
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comes that could be the result of different procedures.24 Key components 
of PJT include:25 
• Participation (being allowed to speak) – which involves having the 
opportunity to present one’s own side of the dispute and be heard by 
the decision maker. 
• Dignity – which includes being treated with respect and politeness, 
having one’s rights acknowledged by the decision maker. 
• Trust – that the authority is concerned with one’s welfare. 
Lind and Tyler26 also suggest that people want to be treated fairly 
by authorities, independent of the outcome of the interaction. Fair treat-
ment by an authority, defined in terms of voice (by coming forward and 
disclosing the crime to the authorities), dignity and trust, directly shapes 
procedural justice judgements and signifies that the individual in question 
is a valued member of the group. Tyler and Blader27 argued that this, in 
turn, would then facilitate co-operation by strengthening a person’s tie to 
the social order. The strengthening of the tie promotes the value of mem-
bership within the group, which then increases the level of confidence in 
the authorities (that is, the interviewer), which subsequently provides en-
couragement to others. In other words, as a result of perceived fair treat-
ment, interviewees may be more willing to report crimes. 
Conversely, if officers show disrespectful behaviour, this will re-
duce the likelihood of citizen co-operation.28 These findings could also be 
                                                   
24 Gerald S. Leventhal, “What Should be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the 
Study of Fairness in Social Relationships”, in Kenneth Gergen, Martin S. Greenberg and 
Richard H. Willis (eds.), Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research, Plenum 
Press, New York, 1980, pp. 27–55; Thibaut and Walker, 1975, see above note 23; Walker, 
Latour, Lind and Thibaut, 1974, see above note 23. 
25 For a full review see Lind and Tyler, 1992, pp. 173–202, see above note 22. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Tom R. Tyler and Steven L. Blader, “The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, 
Social Identity and Cooperative Behaviour”, in Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
2003, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 349–61. 
28 Stephen D. Mastrofski, Jeffrey B. Snipes and Anne E. Supina, “Compliance on Demand: 
The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests”, in Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency, 1996, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 269–305; John D. McCluskey, Stephen D. 
Mastrofski and Roger B. Parks, “To Acquiesce or Rebel: Predicting Citizen Compliance 
with Police Requests”, in Police Quarterly, 1999, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 389–416. 
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associated with those of Bull and Cherryman29 who found that specific 
qualities, similar to those antecedents that make up the PJT (for example, 
voice, dignity and trust), were also present within ‘skilful’ police inter-
views. Similarly, in terms of interviews with suspects of crime, many au-
thors have highlighted the importance of being empathic, respectful and 
humane when interviewing suspects, again, comparable to the procedural 
justice framework antecedents.30 
5.4.2. The Use of Rapport 
Rapport building is an established part of the interaction during investiga-
tive interviews, regardless of whether it is with a victim, witness or sus-
pect.31 Scientific findings indicate that interviewers who utilise rapport-
building techniques elicit significantly more detailed and accurate 
memory reports from child and adult victims, witnesses and suspects.32 
                                                   
29 Ray Bull and Julie Cherryman, Identifying Skills Gaps in Specialist Investigative Inter-
viewing, Home Office, London, 1995; Julie Cherryman and Ray Bull, “Police Officers’ 
Perceptions of Specialist Investigative Interviewing Skills”, in International Journal of Po-
lice Science and Management, 2001, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 199–212. 
30 Holmberg and Christianson, 2002, pp. 31–45, see above note 20; Mark Kebbell, Laurence 
Alison, Emily Hurren and Paul Mazerolle, “How Do Sex Offenders Think the Police 
Should Interview to Elicit Confessions from Sex Offenders?”, in Psychology, Crime and 
Law, 2010, vol. 16, no. 7, pp. 567–84; Oxburgh, Ost, Cherryman, 2012, see above note 4; 
Eric Shepherd, “Ethical Interviewing”, in Policing, 1991, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 42–60. 
31 Ministry of Justice, Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on Inter-
viewing Victims and Witnesses and Using Special Measures, Her Majesty’s Stationery Of-
fice (‘HMSO’), London, 2011. 
32 Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib and Christiansen, 2013, pp. 411–31, see above note 20; 
Jehanne Almerigogna, James Ost, Lucy Akehurst and Mike Fluck, “How Interviewers’ 
Nonverbal Behaviors Can Affect Children’s Perceptions and Suggestibility”, in Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 2008, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 17–39; Ray Bull and Stavroula 
Soukara, “Four Studies of What Really Happens in Police Interviews”, in G. Daniel Lassit-
er and Christian A. Meissner (eds.), Police Interrogations and False Confessions: Current 
Research, Practice, and Policy Recommendations, American Psychological Association, 
Washington, 2010, pp. 81–95; Kimberly Collins and Nikki Carthy, “No Rapport, No 
Comment: The Relationship Between Rapport and Communication During Investigative 
Interviews with Suspects”, in Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 
2019, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 18–31; Roger Collins, Robyn Lincoln and Mark G. Frank, “The 
Effect of Rapport in Forensic Interviewing”, in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 2002, vol. 
9, no. 1, pp. 69–78; Ulf Holmberg, Police Interviews with Victims and Suspects of Violent 
and Sexual Crimes: Interviewee’s Experiences and Interview Outcomes, Doctoral Disserta-
tion, Department of Psychology, Stockholm University, 2004; Jenna Mitchell Kieckhaefer, 
Johathan Patrick Vallano and Nadja Schreiber Compo, “Examining the Positive Effects of 
Rapport Building: When and Why Does Rapport Building Benefit Adult Eyewitness 
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However, there appears to be no shared definition on the exact 
meaning of ‘rapport’, with the concept being traditionally referenced by 
therapists in a clinical setting, citing the importance of establishing a 
‘therapeutic alliance’. 33  It is, however, generally accepted that rapport 
does not exist solely with one individual, rather it is a relationship be-
tween two or more individuals.34 In addition, some definitions of ‘rapport’ 
appear to conflict, as in practitioner guidelines offered in England and 
Wales and the United States respectively: “a positive mood between inter-
viewer and interviewee”,35 and “the establishment of a relationship, which 
does not have to be friendly in nature”.36 Some academic researchers be-
lieve that ‘rapport’ involves a “harmonious, sympathetic connection to 
another”, 37  whereas other, more theoretically-driven conceptualisations 
identified and described attentiveness, positivity and co-ordination as the 
non-verbal components associated with the relationship between interact-
ing individuals.38 Although definitions of rapport are sometimes conflict-
ing, most indicate interconnecting components of openness and an ‘inter-
est’ in the other party (sometimes referred to as ‘mutual attentiveness’).39 
During the early stages of an interaction with two or more individu-
als, mutual attention is important for the purpose of building a relation-
ship as it is essential to show an interest in the other party (parties). It is 
argued that attentiveness facilitates the creation of focused and interacting 
                                                                                                                        
Memory?”, in Memory, 2014, vol. 22, no. 8, pp. 1010–23; Lina Leander, Pär Anders 
Granhaga and Sven-Åke Christianson, “Children’s Reports of Verbal Sexual Abuse: Ef-
fects of Police Officers’ Interviewing Style”, in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 2009, vol. 
16, no. 3, pp. 340–54. 
33 Robinder P. Bedi, Michael D. Davis and Meris Williams, “Critical Incidents in the For-
mation of the Therapeutic Alliance from the Client’s Perspective”, in Psychotherapy: The-
ory, Research, Practice, Training, 2005, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 311–23. 
34 Fiona Gabbert, Lorraine Hope, Kirk Luther, Gordon Wright, Magdalene NG and Gavin E. 
Oxburgh, “Exploring the Use of Rapport in Professional Information-Gathering Contexts 
by Systematically Mapping the Evidence-Base”, article accepted for publication in Applied 
Cognitive Psychology. 
35 Ministry of Justice, 2011, p. 70, see above note 31. 
36 US Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Washington, D.C., 
2006, sect. 8.3. 
37 James J. Newberry and Carol A. Stubbs, Advanced Interviewing Techniques, Bureau of 
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms National Academy, Glynco Georgia, 1990, p. 14. 
38 Linda Tickle-Degnen and Robert Rosenthal, “The Nature of Rapport and Its Nonverbal 
Correlates”, in Psychological Inquiry, 1990, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 285–93. 
39 Ibid.; Newberry and Stubbs, 1990, see above note 37. 
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engagement. 40  Paying attention is synonymous with active listening, 
whereby the listener, without interrupting, interprets what the other party 
is expressing, and through demonstrating active listening behaviour en-
courages the other party to talk and interact.41 In addition to active listen-
ing, another type of behaviour that helps facilitate the mutual attentive-
ness during an interaction and has been used as a measure to define ‘rap-
port’ is reflective listening.42 This is characterised by the listener being 
able to accurately reflect something that the other party has expressed to 
encourage further discussion or clarification.43 
Given that there is no agreed definition on the exact meaning of 
‘rapport’, and whether it is used mutually between parties, it comes as no 
surprise that difficulties are evident when attempting to define the concept 
within an operational setting (that is, an investigative interview). To this 
end, Gabbert et al.44 proposed that when describing rapport which is often 
present in a professional interaction, such as an investigative interview, 
the term ‘professional rapport’ could be used. This term can be understood 
as an intentional use of rapport behaviours to facilitate positive interac-
tions and build a relationship that is not necessarily mutual. It differs dis-
tinctly from the idea of ‘genuine mutual rapport’.45 As such, Gabbert et al. 
propose that the cultivation of rapport is a key skill within investigative 
interviews. 
5.4.3. The Use of Empathy 
Similar to rapport, there are various definitions that attempt to describe 
the multi-dimensional construct of empathy throughout counselling and 
                                                   
40 Ulf Holmberg and Kent Madsen, “Rapport Operationalized as a Humanitarian Interview in 
Investigative Interview Settings”, in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 2014, vol. 21, no. 4, 
pp. 591–610; Michel St-Yves, “The Psychology of Rapport: Five Basic Rules”, in Tom 
Williamson (ed.), Investigative Interviewing: Rights, Research, Regulation, Willan, Cul-
lompton, 2006, pp. 87–106. 
41 Michel St-Yves, 2006, pp. 87–106, see above note 40. 
42 Laurence Alison, Susan Giles and Grace McGuire, “Blood from a Stone: Why Rapport 
Works and Torture Doesn’t in ‘Enhanced’ Interrogations”, in Investigative Interviewing: 
Research and Practice, 2015, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 5–23. 
43 Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib and Christiansen, 2013, pp. 411–31, see above note 20. 
44 Gabbert, Hope, Luther, Wright, NG and Oxburgh, forthcoming, see above note 34. 
45 Bella M. DePaulo and Kathy L. Bell, “Rapport Is Not So Soft Anymore”, in Psychological 
Inquiry, 1990, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 305–08. 
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clinical psychology, in addition to medical writings.46 However, there is 
an absence of a clear operational explanation that professional interview-
ers can understand. Davis termed empathy as “a reaction of one individual 
to the observed experiences of another”.47 It is important to consider the 
various types of reactions that can range from simply understanding the 
other’s perspective, to a more intuitive or emotional reaction.48 Therefore, 
when used in an investigative interview, it is not just about the interviewer 
‘showing’ empathy to the interviewee, it is also about having the ability to 
understand their perspective appreciating their emotions and then com-
municating that directly, or indirectly.49 
To explain the multi-dimensional nature of empathy, Barrett-
Lennard50 developed an empathy cycle in 1981 that Oxburgh and Ost51 
amended in 2011 for use in relation to an investigative interview (see Fig-
ure 2). 
                                                   
46 See Simon Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty, 
Penguin Books, Milton Keynes, 2011, pp. 1–181; Godfrey T. Barrett-Lennard, “The Empa-
thy Cycle: Refinement of a Nuclear Concept”, in Journal of Counselling Psychology, 1981, 
vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 91–100; Mark H. Davis, “Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: 
Evidence for a Multidimensional Approach”, in Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 1983, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 113–26; Gerald A. Gladstein, “Understanding Empathy: 
Integrating Counselling, Developmental and Social Psychology Perspectives”, in Journal 
of Counselling Psychology, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 467–82; Stephanie D. Preston and Frans 
B.M. de Waal, “Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases”, in The Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 2002, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1–72. 
47 Davis, 1983, p. 114, see above note 46; See also Gavin E. Oxburgh and James Ost, “The 
Use and Efficacy of Empathy in Police Interviews with Suspects of Sexual Offences”, in 
Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2011, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 178–88. 
48 Davis, 1983, p. 114, see above note 46. 
49 Ibid.; Oxburgh and Ost, 2011, see above note 47. 
50 Barrett-Lennard, 1981, see above note 46. 
51 Oxburgh and Ost, 2011, p. 182, see above note 47. 
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Figure 2. Diagrammatical illustration of the empathy cycle. 
The ‘empathy’ demonstrated by an interviewer during an investiga-
tive interview differs considerably to that demonstrated by other individu-
als in less complex and cognitively demanding exchanges (that is, in clin-
ical settings). Oxburgh et al.52 developed a model for measuring empathic 
responses within such interviews that was based on the theoretical princi-
ples of the empathy cycle outlined by Barrett-Lennard53 in 1981. Their 
model focused on four key variables (empathic opportunities, empathic 
continuers, empathic terminators and spontaneous empathy) that were 
central to the interaction between interviewer and interviewee (see Figure 
3). During an investigative interview, the interviewee might provide in-
formation (consciously or otherwise) that could be deemed empathic (the 
‘opportunity’). The interviewer then has one of two options in how to deal 
with this information, either he or she can resonate some, or all aspects, of 
the information received (for example, “I understand, please don’t worry”) 
and ‘continue’ the opportunity presented. Alternatively, the interviewer 
could ignore the comments made or information received completely, or 
ask an unrelated question in response, thus ‘terminating’ the opportunity.54 
Finally, an interviewer may use empathy without any prompting (or ‘op-
portunities’) from the interviewee, something which Oxburgh et al. 
termed spontaneous empathy. 
                                                   
52 Gavin E. Oxburgh, James Ost, Paul Morris and Julie Cherryman, “The Impact of Question 
Type and Empathy on Police Interviews with Suspects of Homicide, Filicide and Child 
Sexual Abuse”, in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 2013, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 903–17. 
53 Barrett-Lennard, 1981, see above note 50. 
54 Oxburgh, Ost, Morris and Cherryman, 2013, see above note 52. 
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Figure 3. Model for measuring empathic responses in police interviews.55 
5.4.4. Question Typologies 
There has been a large amount of research that has concentrated on as-
sessing the efficacy of different questioning techniques used during inves-
tigative interviews with suspects, victims and witnesses.56 It is now wide-
ly accepted that using open-ended questions (for example, those starting 
with ‘tell me’, ‘explain’, ‘describe’) and more probing forms of questions 
(for example, five ‘WH questions’ – ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘why’, 
‘who’ and ‘how’) are the most productive and encourage interviewees to 
                                                   
55 Adapted from Anthony Suchman, Kathryn Markakis, Howard B. Beckman and Richard 
Frankel, “A model of empathic communication in the medical review”, in The Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 1997, vol. 277, no. 8, pp. 678–82. 
56 Colin Clarke, Becky Milne and Ray Bull, “Interviewing Suspects of Crime: The Impact of 
PEACE Training, Supervision and the Presence of a Legal Advisor”, in Journal of Investi-
gative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2011, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 149–62; Trond Mykle-
bust and Roald A. Bjørklund, “The Effect of Long-Term Training on Police Officers’ Use 
of Open and Closed Questions in Field Investigative Interviews of Children (FIIC)”, in In-
ternational Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2006, vol. 3, no. 3, 
pp. 165–81; Trond Myklebust and Roald A. Bjørklund, “The Child Verbal Competence Ef-
fect in Court: A Comparative Study of Field Investigative Interviews of Children in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases”, in Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2009, 
vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 117–28; Oxburgh, Ost and Cherryman, 2012, see above note 4; Oxburgh, 
Ost, Morris and Cherryman, 2013, pp. 903–917, see above note 52. See below note 57 for 
a full review of the use of question typologies. 
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freely recall events, that in turn, are also associated with more fulsome 
and accurate accounts.57 However, interviewers do not appear to be using 
appropriate questions.58 A notable concern is the more regular use of in-
appropriate questions (that is, closed, leading, multiple, forced choice, 
opinion or statement) by interviewers that encourage interviewees to re-
spond on the basis of recognition memory, rather than on the basis of free 
recall which can dramatically increase the probability of error in the pro-
vided answers.59 The classification of question types does not adhere to a 
universally accepted protocol and consequently this can result in confu-
sion when trying to compare different research findings.60 
                                                   
57 Jan Aldridge and Sandra Cameron, “Interviewing Child Witnesses: Questioning Tech-
niques and the Role of Training”, in Applied Developmental Science, 1999, vol. 3, no. 2, 
pp. 136–47; Ann-Christin Cederborg, Yael Orbach, Kathleen J. Sternberg and Michael E. 
Lamb, “Investigative Interviews of Child Witnesses in Sweden”, in Child Abuse and Ne-
glect, 2000, vol. 24, no. 10, pp. 1355–61; Graham M. Davies, Helen L. Westcott and 
Noreen Horan, “The Impact of Questioning Style on the Content of Investigative Inter-
views with Suspected Child Sexual Abuse Victims”, in Psychology, Crime and Law, 2000, 
vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 81–97; Elizabeth F. Loftus, “Interrogating Eyewitnesses – Good Ques-
tions and Bad”, in R. Hogarth (ed.), Question Framing and Response Consistency, Josey-
Bass, San Francisco, 1982, pp. 51–63; Milne and Bull, 2006, pp. 7–24, see above note 4; 
Myklebust and Bjørklund, 2006, pp. 165–81, see above note 56. 
58 John Baldwin, “Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof?”, in British 
Journal of Criminology, 1993, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 325–52; Davies, Westcott and Horan, 
2000, pp. 81–97, see above note 57; Michael E. Lamb, Irit Hershkowitz, Kathleen J. 
Sternberg, Barbara Boat and Mark D. Everson, “Investigative Interviews of Alleged Sexual 
Abuse Victims with and Without Anatomical Dolls”, in Child Abuse and Neglect, 1996, 
vol. 20, no. 12, pp. 1251–59; Myklebust and Bjørklund, 2006, pp. 165–81, see above note 
56. 
59 Helen R. Dent, “The Effects of Interviewing Strategies on the Results of Interviews with 
Child Witnesses”, in Arne Trankell (ed.), Reconstructing the Past, Kluwer, Deventer, 1982, 
pp. 279–98; Helen R. Dent, “An Experimental Study of the Effectiveness of Different 
Techniques of Questioning Mentally Handicapped Child Witnesses”, in British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 1986, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 13–17; Helen R. Dent and Geoffrey M. Ste-
phenson, “An Experimental Study of the Effectiveness of Different Techniques of Ques-
tioning Child Witnesses”, in British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1979, vol. 
18, no. 1, pp. 41–51; Yael Orbach and Michael E. Lamb, “The Relationship Between With-
in-Interview Contradictions and Eliciting Interviewer Utterances”, in Child Abuse and Ne-
glect, 2001, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 323–33. 
60 Debra A. Poole and Michael E. Lamb, Investigative Interviews of Children: A Guide for 
Helping Professionals, American Psychological Association, 1998. 
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5.5. Interviewing Vulnerable Witnesses 
During the last three decades, an impressive body of research has been 
published about the capacity of vulnerable witnesses to provide reliable 
information about their experiences.61 Within the extant literature-base, a 
witness can be broadly defined as ‘vulnerable’ by: 
• reason of their age; 
• their psychological state; 
• having a mental disorder; 
• being significantly impaired in relation to intelligence and social 
functioning; 
• intellectual functioning; or 
• having a physical disability. 
In general terms, being vulnerable refers to a witness’ ability in giv-
ing evidence and to give answers which address the questions put to them 
and can be understood both individually and collectively.62 As outlined by 
Gudjonsson, a vulnerable witness has “psychological characteristics or 
mental state which render a witness prone, in certain circumstances, to 
providing information which is inaccurate, unreliable or misleading”.63 
The capacity of the interviewee to cope with an interview also de-
pends on many other circumstances, including culture, interactions (or 
sense-making), personality, and health. 64 Today we are leaning from a 
                                                   
61 For an overview see for example, Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck, Jeopardy in the 
Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children’s Testimony, American Psychological Associ-
ation, Washington, D.C., 1995; Kevin R.H. Smith and Steve Tilney, Vulnerable Adult and 
Child Witnesses, Oxford University Press, 2007; Joyce Plotnikoff and Richard Woolfson, 
Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: Improving Communication for Vulnerable 
Witnesses and Defendants, Policy Press, Bristol, 2013, pp. 1–352; Gavin E. Oxburgh, 
Trond Myklebust, Tim D. Grant and Rebecca Milne (eds.), Communication in Investiga-
tive and Legal Contexts: Integrated Approaches from Psychology, Linguistics and Law En-
forcement, Wiley, Chichester, 2016; Michael E. Lamb, Deirdre A. Brown, Irit Hershkowitz, 
Yael Orbach and Phillip W. Esplin, Tell Me What Happened: Questioning Children About 
Abuse, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 2018. 
62 Ministry of Justice, 2011, see above note 31. 
63 Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “The Psychological Vulnerabilities of Witnesses and the Risk of 
False Accusations and False Confessions”, in Anthony Heaton-Armstrong, Eric Shepherd, 
Gisli Gudjonsson and David Wolchover (eds.), Witness Testimony: Psychological, Investi-
gative and Evidential Perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 68. 
64 Gisli H. Gudjonsson and James MacKeith, Disputed Confessions and the Criminal Justice 
System, Meudsley Discussion Paper, Institute of Psychiatry, London, 1997; see also, Lind-
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large body65 of scientific research that has investigated various elements 
of the investigative interview, including: 
• the interviewer; 
• the interviewee; 
• the context of the interview (and where it takes place); and 
• the interplay between these factors. 
One of the first scientists to study various elements of an interview 
was the German-born William Stern.66 In his early studies of children in 
1903, he demonstrated the importance of the distinction between different 
question typologies in achieving the most valid information from the in-
terviewee. His research was the starting point for the focus on the way to 
phrase questions during legal proceedings, especially among vulnerable 
witnesses. Now, there are three main models that have been thoroughly 
researched, developed and scientifically-proven to elicit information 
through questioning without generating inaccurate accounts or confabula-
tions: (i) the CI; (ii) the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development (‘NICHD’) protocol; and (iii) Achieving Best Evidence 
(‘ABE’). Each will now be discussed. 
5.5.1. Cognitive Interview 
The CI technique was developed by Fisher and his colleagues67 in the 
early 1980s and is based on four memory retrieval rules: 
1. Mental reinstatement of environmental and personal contexts. 
The interviewee is asked to mentally revisit the ‘to-be-remembered’ 
(‘TBR’) event. The interviewer may ask them to form a mental pic-
ture of the environment in which they witnessed the event. The par-
ticipant is also asked to revisit their personal mental state during the 
event and then describe it in detail. The purpose of this process is to 
                                                                                                                        
say D.G. Thompson, “Disputed Confessions and the Criminal Justice System, Maudsley 
Discussion Paper No. 2.”, in Psychiatric Bulletin, 1998, vol. 22, no. 4, p. 270. 
65 See, for example, Ceci and Bruck, 1995, see above note 61; Neil Brewer and Kipling D. 
Williams (eds.), Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective, Guilford Press, New 
York, 2005; Oxburgh, Myklebust, Grant and Milne, 2016, see above note 61. 
66 William Stern, Beiträge zür Psychologie der Aussage, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 
Leipzig, 1903–04. 
67 Ronald P. Fisher and Edward R. Geiselman, Memory-Enhancing Techniques for Investiga-
tive Interviewing: The Cognitive Interview, Charles Thomas, Springfield, 1992. 
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increase the feature overlap between initial witnessing and subse-
quent retrieval contexts. 
2. In-depth reporting – report everything. 
The interviewer encourages the reporting of every detail, regardless 
of how peripheral it may seem to the main incident. 
3. Describing the to-be-remembered event in several orders. 
This process may provide a new perspective of the event which 
subsequently provides an opportunity for new information to be re-
called. 
4. Change perspective technique – reporting the TBR event from dif-
ferent perspectives. 
The participant is asked to report the event from several different 
perspectives; like that of another witness or even a participant. If 
the participant witnessed a robbery, for example, the interviewer 
may ask, “what do you think the cashier saw?”, and then ask for the 
participant’s perspective. 
5.5.2. NICHD Protocol 
Elaborating on the CI’s four elements, the NICHD protocol was one of the 
first to translate the recommendations from the CI into practice, focusing 
on how to interview children effectively. This tool was developed through 
the intensive efforts of US Government Scientists at the National Insti-
tutes of Health in the 1990s and has been the subject of intensive evalua-
tion and research ever since.68 
The advantage of using the NICHD protocol is to have the same 
standardised step-wise approach with all children, regardless of whether 
they are a victim or witness. It ‘levels the playing field’, giving every 
child who is interviewed an equal opportunity to disclose or not disclose 
the TBR event. Personal biases such as underestimating children’s capa-
bilities, or those resulting from certain case characteristics, are also mini-
mised. Forensic interviewers sometimes also lack self-awareness or self-
                                                   
68 For a review, see, for example, David La Rooy, Sonja P. Brubacher, Anu Aromäki-Stratos, 
Mireille Cyr, Irit Hershkowitz, Julia Korkman, Trond Myklebust, Makiko Naka, Carlos E. 
Peixoto, Kim P. Roberts, Heather Stewart and Michael E. Lamb, “The NICHD Protocol: A 
Review of an Internationally-Used Evidence-Based Tool for Training Child Forensic Inter-
viewers”, in Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice, 2015, vol. 1, no. 2, 
pp. 76–89. 
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monitoring regarding their own interviewing practices and, thus, a stand-
ardised format aids in efforts to maintain desirable interview standards. 
The NICHD protocol is validated in over 40,000 interviews worldwide.69 
Based on the same psychological principles, other step-wise approaches 
and guidelines have been designed to interview a wider segment of vul-
nerable or intimidated victims and witnesses (for example, adults with 
different disabilities such as a mental disorder, are impaired in relation to 
intelligence and social functioning, or have a physical disability). 
5.5.3. ABE in Criminal Proceedings Guidelines 
One of the most referred-to guidelines in use is the ABE guidelines that 
were first published in England and Wales in 200270 and a large number 
of the special measure provisions in their 1999 Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act71 were implemented and replaced the previous guidance set 
out in the 1992 Memorandum of Good Practice for video-interviewing 
children.72 The ABE guidance was later updated in 2007, with the most 
recent revision, to date, being released in 2011 (although a further update 
is due imminently).73 This guidance document is predominantly aimed at 
officers conducting visually-recorded interviews with vulnerable, intimi-
dated and significant witnesses or victims. It is also utilised by those of-
ficers that are tasked with preparing and supporting witnesses or victims 
during the criminal justice process and those involved at the trial, both in 
supporting and questioning the witness or victim in Court. While the 
guidance is not compulsory, it is advised. Compliance (in conjunction 
with effective training) with the guidance is likely to enhance the quality 
of the interview, which is likely to benefit the interviewer, the interviewee, 
practitioners and the Court. 
                                                   
69 See ibid.; Lamb, Brown, Hershkowitz, Orbach and Esplin, 2018, see above note 61. 
70 Home Office, Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance for Vulnerable 
or Intimidated Witnesses, Including Children, Implementing the Speaking Up for Justice 
Report, Home Office Communication Directorate, January 2002. 
71 UK, Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, 27 July 1999 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/3eb20e). 
72 Home Office in conjunction with Department of Health, Memorandum of Good Practice 
on Video Recorded Interviews with Child Witnesses for Criminal Proceedings, HMSO, 
London, 1992. 
73 Ministry of Justice, 2011, see above note 31. 
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The revised edition of the ABE includes amendments that account 
for legislative changes to the 1999 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act, that were introduced to eradicate some of the difficulties associated 
with giving oral evidence by granting ‘vulnerable’ and ‘intimidated’ wit-
nesses or victims the use of alternative trial arrangements (with limitations 
and conditions attached). There are a wide variety of modifying measures 
that can be used to protect witnesses or victims from recognised court 
related stressors, including the erection of temporary screens to shield 
them from the view of the defendant, or the use of live-links to allow 
them to give evidence from a room remote from the main courtroom in a 
comparatively informal, relaxed environment (all the while remaining 
visible and audible to those in Court). Previous research has identified the 
positive impact that special measures can have on cases involving vulner-
able victims with almost half of the sampled victims stating that special 
measures had enabled them to give evidence and that they would not oth-
erwise have been willing or able to give.74 
Finally, given the importance of visually-recorded statements, it is 
imperative that they are of good quality so as to ensure that where a pros-
ecution takes place this can be conducted as effectively as possible. 
Therefore, it is advised that officers read the guidance Advice on the 
Structure of Visually Recorded Witness Interviews75 in conjunction with 
the ABE as this will further reinforce good practice. This guidance was 
developed based on feedback from a range of sources about recurrent 
problems with the way visually recorded interviews had been conducted 
and how they then were used as evidence in Court. The next section will 
detail what guidance the ABE provides officers with on how they should 
conduct an interview. 
The ABE guidance document given to officers has four recom-
mended phases that fall under the section related to ‘conducting the inter-
view’ and these include: 
1. Establishing rapport; 
                                                   
74 Mandy Burton, Roger Evans and Andrew Sanders, Are Special Measures for Vulnerable 
and Intimidated Witnesses Working? Evidence from the Criminal Justice Agencies, 2006, 
Home Office, London; Becky Hamlyn, Andrew Phelps, Andrew Phelps, Jenny Turtle and 
Ghazala Sattar, Are Special Measures Working? Evidence from Surveys of Vulnerable and 
Intimidated Witnesses, 2004, Home Office, London. 
75 The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and the College of Policing, Advice on the 
Structure of Visually Recorded Witness Interviews, 3rd edition, 1 October 2016. 
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2. free narrative account; 
3. questioning; and 
4. closing the interview. 
Phase one is a process whereby the interviewer should establish 
rapport with the witness or victim to personalise the interview and put 
them at ease. The initial interaction is recognised as determining the suc-
cess of the interview, as well as assisting in the quantity and quality of 
information gained in the interview, by establishing a sense of trust that 
can help in laying the foundations for future, successful, communica-
tion.76 Through this process, the interviewer is reducing any possible ten-
sion and insecurity felt by the witness or victim, treating them with a 
unique set of needs, as opposed to being ‘just another witness or victim’. 
The significance of building rapport within the investigative interview is 
highlighted straight away in this first phase of the ABE and was previous-
ly discussed in this chapter. 
Phase two of the interview recommends that the interviewer should 
initiate an uninterrupted free narrative account from the witness or victim 
through the use of an open-ended invitation. This would be through an 
open question framed in such a way that the witness or victim is able to 
give an unrestricted answer, which in turn enables them to control the 
flow of information in the interview (that is, “tell me”, “explain” or “de-
scribe”). The free narrative account allows the interviewer to gain a better 
understanding of the way in which the witness or victim holds the infor-
mation about the event in their memory. Thus, note taking is recommend-
ed at this stage. However, the detail of note taking is down to the inter-
viewer, too many notes may distract the witness or victim, which subse-
quently could hinder the flow of recall. On the other hand, if the inter-
viewer slows the witness or victim down in order to record detailed notes, 
this could potentially hinder maximum retrieval. 
Phase three focuses on the questioning of the witness or victim, as 
most will not be able to recall everything relevant to the event that is in 
their memory. Therefore, their accounts could greatly benefit from the 
interviewer asking appropriate questions related to the event that could 
assist in further recall. Those officers conducting the interviews need to 
fully appreciate that there are various types of questions that vary in how 
direct they are (as previously discussed). The questioning phase should, 
                                                   
76 Ministry of Justice, 2011, see above note 31. 
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whenever possible, commence with open-ended questions and then pro-
ceed, if necessary, to specific closed questions. These are the second-best 
type of question (to open-ended questions) and should be used to obtain 
information not provided by the witness or victim in the free narrative 
account and not elicited through the use of open-ended questions. A spe-
cific closed question is one that allows only a relatively narrow range of 
responses. 
Finally, phase four centres around closing the interview by briefly 
summarising what the witness or victim has said, using words and phrases 
used by them as much as possible. By adopting such practices allows the 
witness or victim to check the interviewer’s recall for accuracy. The inter-
viewer must explicitly tell the witness or victim to correct them if they 
have missed anything out or have got something wrong. 
These four phases are basic for most communication models in in-
vestigative interviewing, however, from our perspective, the ABE is the 
one, at present, presenting the most theoretical approach from various 
disciplines including psychology, linguistics and law. However, there is 
another model which takes account of the entire ‘whole’ process of being 
interviewed and providing testimony at Court: the Nordic Model. 
5.5.4. The Nordic Model 
There is a model that has been implemented in the Nordic countries for 
more than a decade which attempts to meet children’s needs by offering 
multiple services in child-friendly premises and ‘under one roof’: the 
Nordic Barnahus model.77 This model was first introduced in Iceland and 
drew on experiences from Children’s Advocacy Centres (CAC) in the 
United States. The implementation of the Barnahus model is linked to a 
long-lasting concern for the protection of children at risk and for the way 
children’s needs are met during a criminal investigation, increasing the 
likelihood of obtaining complete and precise information as well as a lack 
of co-ordinated follow-up services for children and families that need 
treatment or support related to the child’s experiences. 
The primary aim is to reduce the stress of being part of a much 
larger legal process for victimised children and their families, but also for 
                                                   
77 Susanna Johansson, Kari Stefansen, Elisiv Bakketeig and Anna Kaldal (eds.), Collaborat-
ing Against Child Abuse, Exploring the Nordic Barnahus Model, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017. 
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adult victims that suffer with mental health problems. The Barnahus is 
generally staffed with a manager, four to six employees, and a part time 
medical examiner. The main functions are: 
• to facilitate the forensic interview and the medical examination; 
• to evaluate the child and family’s need for social assistance; and 
• to provide short-term treatment and support. 
At the Barnahus, the vulnerable victim is met by a specially trained 
police officer (the interviewer) and representatives from the Barnahus, 
together with representatives from the prosecution, defence lawyers, 
State-funded counsel to the complainant, and, in some cases, the Social 
services monitoring the interview from an adjoining room. In this way, the 
interview is planned and conducted based on a team approach from spe-
cialists within different areas of communication with vulnerable victims 
and witnesses. 
5.5.5. Registered Intermediaries 
Another approach for improving communication for vulnerable persons is 
by using Registered Intermediaries (‘RI’) – currently used within England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.78 The central part of the RI’s role is to assist 
in communication in its widest sense. In other words, to assist the legal 
process, both prior to (at police interviews) and during the giving of evi-
dence by the witness in Court, by facilitating two-way communication in 
order to achieve best evidence.79 The role can be specifically defined as to 
communicate to the witness, any questions put to the witness, and to any 
persons asking such questions, the answers given by the witness in reply 
to them; and to explain such questions or answers so far as necessary to 
enable them to be understood by the witness or the questioner.80 
5.6. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that a good quality interview with victims, witnesses or 
suspects is conducted in a fair, compassionate manner using appropriate 
                                                   
78 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, 2013, see above note 61. 
79 Ministry of Justice, Registered Intermediary Procedural Guidance 2019, Crown Publish-
ing Service, London, 2019. For more detailed information, see Johansson, Stefansen, 
Bakketeig and Kaldal, 2017, see above note 77, and The Advocated Gateway, “Intermedi-
aries” (available on its web site). 
80 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, Section 29, see above note 71. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 322 
questions, empathy and rapport throughout. Researchers have argued that 
there are clear indications that the use of non-humane tactics in investiga-
tive interviews is wholly ineffective and that more empathic, rapport-
based strategies have more of an effect in generating relevant information 
from the interviewee.81 These findings are reflected in the discovery of 
specific qualities that have been found in ‘skilful’ police interviews, 
amongst which positive communication skills, empathy and open-
mindedness were all present.82 
However, to date, empirical research examining empathic inter-
viewing styles in relation to its impact and efficacy during the interview-
ing process is in its relative infancy. The research that has been conducted 
has tended to focus more on the interviewing of suspected offenders and 
their perceptions of their specific police interview. 83 However, the ab-
sence of having a precise operational explanation that professional inter-
viewers can understand, arguably leaves the term ‘empathy’ and ‘rapport’ 
open to interpretation, with potential negative consequences relating to 
how it is researched, understood, trained, and practiced. More research is 
needed in this fundamental area of psychology and communication. 
                                                   
81 Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib and Christiansen. 2013, pp. 411–31, see above note 20. 
82 Bull and Cherryman, 1995, see above note 29. 
83 Holmberg and Christianson, 2002, pp. 31–45, see above note 20; Mark Kebbell, Emily J. 
Hurren and Paul Mazerolle, “Sex Offenders’ Perceptions of How They Were Interviewed”, 
in Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services, 2006, vol. 4, pp. 67–75; Kebbell, Al-
ison, Hurren and Mazerolle, pp. 567–84, see above note 30; Oxburgh and Ost, 2011, pp. 
178–88, see above note 47; Oxburgh, Ost, Morris and Cherryman, 2013, pp. 903–17, see 
above note 52; Gavin E. Oxburgh, James Ost, Paul Morris and Julie Cherryman, “Police 
Officers’ Perceptions of Interviews in Cases of Sexual Offences and Murder Involving 
Children and Adult Victims”, in Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 
2015, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 36–50. 
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6.Child Soldier or Soldier? 
Estimating Age in Cases of Core International 




[…] the children were smaller than the Kalashnikovs they 
were carrying1 
In 2006, Witness P-0046 testified before Pre-trial Chamber I at the Inter-
national Criminal Court (‘ICC’) regarding her observations while working 
in MONUC’s child protection program in Ituri, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (‘DRC’). 2 As part of an ongoing investigation into war 
crimes allegedly committed by Mr. Lubanga, P-0046 had conducted inter-
views with young individuals believed to be child soldiers and she de-
scribed some of them as smaller than the Kalashnikovs they were carrying. 
When P-0046’s testimony was presented in Court, the defence claimed 
                                                   
* Moa Lidén is Postdoctoral Research Fellow, funded by Ragnar Söderberg Foundation and 
The Swedish Research Council, at the Department of Security and Crime Science, Centre 
for the Forensic Sciences, University College London, London. She holds a Ph.D. in Juris-
prudence from the Law Faculty of Uppsala University and her doctoral thesis was on the 
topic “Confirmation Bias in Criminal Cases”. For more on this topic in relation to investi-
gations of core international crimes, see Moa Lidén, “Confirmation Bias in Investigations 
of Core International Crimes: Risk Factors and Quality Control Techniques”, Chapter 7 be-
low; Moa Lidén, “Prevention of Factual Confirmation Bias During Offence-Driven Inves-
tigations”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-
film/190222-liden/). The author is grateful to Xabier Agirre Aranburu, Marie Allen and 
Fredrik Tamsen for their valuable inputs on this chapter. 
1 International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Testimony of P-0046 before Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, video excerpt EVD-OTP-00479; and the respective Transcript of Testimony, T-37-FR, p. 
23, lines 8–12. 
2 Ibid. 
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she “showed obvious bias in favor of the prosecution”.3 However, accord-
ing to the Trial Chamber, P-0046 had not exaggerated any material facts 
or otherwise provided biased or unreliable evidence, 4  an assessment 
which the Appeal’s Chamber agreed with.5 
Mr. Lubanga was convicted for the war crimes of enlisting and con-
scripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities, to a total of 14 years of imprisonment.6 Both the 
judgment and the sentence were upheld on appeal.7 A crucial and heavily 
disputed question in this case was whether the prosecution had proven 
beyond reasonable doubt that the individuals enlisted or conscripted by 
Lubanga were younger than 15 years within the time frame of the charges. 
The Court considered the age element proven, primarily on the basis of 
video evidence, but also oral evidence from witnesses such as P-0046 and 
forensic as well as documentary evidence was available. 
Age estimations are necessary in all jurisdictions, whether interna-
tional or national, and they also have consequences for a range of legal 
questions in distinct legal areas including for instance criminal law,8 asy-
                                                   
3 Ibid. On appeal, the defence also claimed that her testimony was hearsay evidence, a claim 
which the Appeals Chamber did not consider substantiated, see ICC, The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 December 2014, ICC-01/04-
01/06-3121-Red, paras. 244–46 (‘Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/585c75/). 
4 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 March 2012, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 648 (‘Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/677866/). However, the Trial Chamber rejected the admission into evi-
dence of a document entitled “Histoires individuelles” which were witness P-0046’s notes 
of interviews with 34 individuals who were allegedly under 15 years since the Prosecutor 
intended to introduce the document for the limited purpose of establishing the working 
methods of P-0046 and, given that this could be explained during her testimony, the 
Chamber considered “the merits of the suggested purpose for introducing this document 
are so slight that the arguments as regards prejudice are persuasive”. See ICC, The Prose-
cutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 7 July 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-
T-205-ENG, p. 3 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/083fc3/). During the course of her testi-
mony, P-0046 relied on a database of 687 individuals with whom she met rather than on 
the “Histoires individuelles”. Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, p. 92, see above note 3. 
5 Ibid., paras. 92–94. 
6 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, see above note 4. 
7 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, see above note 3. 
8 Since many crimes require that an individual is classified as a child such as child traffick-
ing or sexual exploitation or rape of a child. There is lots of variation in what more specific 
age limits are applicable across different jurisdictions. For instance, the range at which an 
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lum law9 and some parts of civil law.10 Although all legal age elements 
have potentially far-reaching consequences, this Chapter uses as a case 
study the 15-year threshold entailed in the war crime of conscripting, en-
listing and/or using child soldiers in armed forces or groups, see, for ex-
ample, The Rome Statute of the ICC Article 8(e)(vii) and Elements of 
Crimes Element 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
(‘SCSL’) Statute Article 4(c). Given the gravity of the crime in question 
and the associated controversiality, this legal age element has received 
relatively little scientific attention. There are many legal as well as official 
debates about whether alleged child soldiers are to be considered victims 
or perpetrators.11 This is likely to be a false dilemma, as individuals can 
                                                                                                                        
individual can provide legally acceptable sexual consent varies from 14 to 18 years and for 
criminal responsibility some US states do not legislate a minimum age at all, whereas oth-
ers apply, for example, 8, 10, 12, 14,15,16 or 18-year limits. For more on this see, for ex-
ample, ZHU Guangxing and Suzan van der Aa, “Trends of Age of Consent Legislation in 
Europe: A Comparative Study of 59 Jurisdictions on the European Continent”, in New 
Journal of European Criminal Law, 2017, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 21; Helmut Graupner, “Sexual 
Consent: The Criminal Law in Europe and Outside of Europe”, in Journal of Psychology 
and Human Sexuality, 2004, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 117–18. 
9 For instance, an individual’s chances of being granted asylum are influenced by the indi-
vidual’s age, and age can also be decisive for whether and in what way he or she may be 
detained. For more on this see Daja Wenke, Age Assessments: Council of Europe member 
States’ Policies, Procedures and Practices Respectful of Children’s Rights in the Context of 
Migration, Council of Europe, 2017, p. 18; Karin Schittenhelm, “Implementing and Re-
thinking the European Union’s Asylum Legislation: The Asylum Procedures Directive”, in 
International Migration, 2018, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 229–44; Tara Magner, “Refugee, Asylum, 
and Related Legislation in the US Congress: 2013-2016”, in Journal on Migration and 
Human Security, 2018, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 166–89. Overall, age is also relevant to determine 
an individual’s access to fundamental rights and safeguards that children under 18 years 
are entitled to in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other relevant 
international and European standards, see Maria Antonia Di Maio, Position Paper of Age 
Assessment in the Context of Separated Children in Europe, Separated Children in Europe 
Programme, 2012, p. 12; Devyani Prabhat, Ann Singleton and Robbie Eyles, “Age is Just a 
Number? Supporting Migrant Young People with Precarious Legal Status in the UK”, in 
The International Journal of Children’s Rights, 2019, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 228–50. 
10 For instance, age estimations may be necessary in relation to questions of legal capacity 
and legal guardianship. For more on this see Sevastian Cercel and Stefan Scurtu, “Full Le-
gal Capacity Acquired Before the Age of Majority”, in Revista de Stiinte Politice, 2015, 
vol. 4, no. 46, pp. 279–304; Amy Weatherburn and Yvonne Eloise Mellon, “Child Traffick-
ing Victims and Legal Guardians: Exploring the Fulfilment of the EU Trafficking Directive 
in the Context of the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015: Best Practice of Not Fit for Purpose? 
2019”, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 102–27. 
11 For instance, some argue that child soldiers are viewed either as helpless passive victims or 
irreparably damaged good, which is a false dilemma, as we can’t rely on stark divisions 
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be both victims and perpetrators simultaneously,12 but the debates have 
been refuelled by the ongoing ICC proceedings against the former child 
soldier Dominic Ongwen for having committed child soldiering crimes 
himself.13 Also, the 15-year threshold deviates from the so-called “straight 
18” position which is gaining ground14 and which raises questions as to 
                                                                                                                        
between passivity and agency if we wish to judge these cases well and fairly, see Mark 
Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 143–44. Much of this debate has also centred on the reasons why 
young individuals may choose to join the army, and whether there can be any real volun-
tariness. For instance, some argue that children perceive armed groups as a way to escape 
from domestic violence or ensure their protection from attacks by other groups, see Rachel 
Brett and Irma Specht, Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight, Lynne Reinner Pub-
lishers, Geneva, 2004. 
12 For instance, in the Holocaust, Jewish inmates had become so-called ‘Kapos’ or Ghetto 
Police in the extermination camps under the Nazis, and some of them were brought to trial 
in Israel. These trials have been described by Dan Porat, Israel Tries Holocaust Survivors 
as Nazi Collaborators, Harvard University Press, 2019. 
13 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15. Closing 
statements took place from 10 to 12 March 2020 and the Trial Chamber will now deliber-
ate. For a discussion relating to Ongwen’s case see, for example, Jill Stauffer, “Law, Poli-
tics, the Age of Responsibility, and the Problem of Child Soldiers”, in Law, Culture and the 
Humanities, 2020, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 42–52. Stauffer poses the question: “[a]t what point 
did he pass the line between too young to be responsible and old enough to have known 
better?” Furthermore, Stauffer argues that from one angle Ongwen’s case is about interna-
tional criminal law: that is, whether Ongwen is legally guilty of any of the crimes with 
which he is charged. From another angle it is about politics, will he be found guilty of 
crimes of which he is also a victim, crimes committed as part of a struggle where all sides 
used child soldiers and resorted to criminal means, but only some sides find their leaders 
indicted by the ICC. And from yet another angle it is about the limits of these two field to 
get at the heart of the questions: have either of these ways of understanding what is at stake 
in Ongwen’s case helped us clarify what it means to find someone with Ongwen’s back-
ground guilty, or to understand what the conditions are that allow a case as complicated as 
Ongwen’s to end up at the ICC. 
14 For instance, UN agencies aim to replace 15 with 18-year thresholds, advancing the 
“Straight 18” position. The first UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict 
had this goal in the context of recruitment of children in hostilities and the conviction has 
since been consolidated and expanded within the Office of the Special Representative. The 
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards identify as the 
“UN’s advocacy position” that “no person under 18 shall be recruited into or used in armed 
forces or groups”. Rosen remarks that “most human rights groups […] declare that there is 
now a universal ban on the recruitment of children under age eighteen”. David M. Rosen, 
“Who is a Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers”, in Connecticut Journal of In-
ternational Law, 2009, vol. 25, no. 1, p. 100. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Sol-
diers has spearheaded and international campaign to establish 18 years as the minimum 
age of recruitment, see David M. Rosen, “Review of Child Soldiers: From Violence to Pro-
tection”, in Studies in Social Justice, 2010, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 93–95. According to the Child 
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when children have reached a sufficient cognitive and developmental ma-
turity to be held criminally responsible for their acts.15 Although many 
jurisdictions have acknowledged the 15-year age limit as a reasonable 
threshold and are still using it today,16 a few debaters express dissatisfac-
tion with legal rules that enable the prosecution of soldiers younger than 
18 years.17 Yet, it should be noted that the ICC does not have any such 
jurisdiction.18 
                                                                                                                        
Soldiers International Annual Report 2017-18, 109 countries have a Straight 18 policy for 
military recruitment in practice, meaning a minimum age of 18 for enlistment as well as 
deployment while 46 States (23 per cent) still recruit under 18’s into their armed forces in 
practice, see pp. 18–23. Drumbl notes that as an international community we seem to be 
headed towards a Straight 18 position and poses the question: “Might it be counterproduc-
tive, however, to chronologically expand the membership of the protected class while stat-
ically relying on uniform, atrophied, and infantilized assumptions of the capacities of class 
members?”. Drumbl, 2012, p. 143, see above note 11. Thus, as a first step, it seems rea-
sonable to attempt to better understand the factors which make individuals capable or in-
capable of bearing responsibility for their actions, and only after that discuss and evaluate 
whether applicable age thresholds are fit for their purposes. 
15 Clearly this question has been answered differently across differently jurisdictions, see 
above note 8, and the debate in the literature is still ongoing. For instance, Rosen argues 
that viewing childhood as something uniform ignores variations across culture, gender, 
history and location and therefore clashes with many local standards not only about age 
but about responsibility and justice, and thereby it ignores the real-world experience of 
child soldiers as well as their victims, see Rosen, 2009, pp. 81–118, see above note 14; 
David M. Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism, Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, New Jersey, 2005. Along similar lines, some argue that individual variation 
among children make it virtually impossible to determine a fixed age at which a child de-
velops sufficiently rational and reasonable senses, and this questions has been discussed 
with respect to executive functions specifically, see, for example, Tyler Fagan, William 
Hirstein and Katrina Sifferd, “Child Soldiers, Executive Functions, and Culpability”, in In-
ternational Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol. 16, no. 2. pp. 258–86. 
16 For more on this as well as variation across different jurisdiction, see ZHU and van der Aa, 
2017, see above note 8. 
17 For instance, Drumbl argues that in ICL there is an unwillingness to prosecute child sol-
diers (younger than 18) and that the reluctance to exercise jurisdiction over minors is more 
than just a procedural technicality or admissibility criterion. It is also more than just a 
gravity limitation or leadership requirement. In fact, Drumbl argues, it instrumentalizes, re-
flects and contributes to the substantive notion within international legal imagination that it 
is unimportant, embarrassing, and unhelpful for child soldiers to answer for their involve-
ment in acts of atrocity in a courtroom, see Drumbl, 2012, p. 127, see above note 11. Also, 
David Crane, commenting on the Khadr prosecution states that: “No child has the mens 
rea, the criminal mind, to commit war crimes” (referring to children under the age of 18), 
cited in ibid. 
18 The ICC does not have any jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at 
the time of the alleged commission of a crime, see The Rome Statute of the International 
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While age is a legal question, to be answered ultimately by legal ac-
tors, their assessments often rely on scientific, medical or other expertise 
as well as witnesses, and so on. Across different jurisdictions, there is also 
large variation in how age estimations are usually made, involving several 
different experts such as radiologists, odontologists, paediatricians, 
pathologists, psychologists and social workers who use different meth-
ods19 to answer the same question.20 Thus, there is no internationally ac-
cepted framework specifying best practices, save for recommendations to 
use multidisciplinary and holistic approaches.21 This also means that legal 
actors like prosecutors and judges are faced with the challenge of under-
standing, accurately integrating and evaluating multidisciplinary evidence 
which is not only outside of their typical expertise but is also sometimes 
uncertain, vague or even contradictory. Hence, the age element, being 
only one element of the crime, can in itself result in several investigative 
and evaluative difficulties. These difficulties can easily be underestimated, 
especially if there is not much precedent, which was the case for instance 
at the outset of the Lubanga investigation.22 Thus, in line with the more 
                                                                                                                        
Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 26 (‘ICC Statute’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
7b9af9/). 
19 This includes non-medical methods such as documents (passports, ID documents, resi-
dence cards, travel documents, certificates, and so on), age assessment interviews and psy-
chological assessment, radiation free medical methods including, for example, dental ob-
servation, MRI/MR and observations of physical development, and as a measure of last re-
sort, other medical methods with radiation, including, for example, wrist (carpal) X-ray, 
collar bone X-ray and dental X-ray, see European Asylum Support Office (‘EASO’), EASO 
Practical Guide on Age Assessment, 2018, p. 33. The methods used also vary depending 
on what age limit (15, 18 or 21, and so on) is being assessed. 
20 For more on this see, for instance, ibid., pp. 1–116. 
21 The Study Group on Forensic Age Diagnostics (‘AGFAD’), an international assembly of 
experts, with approximately 18 years’ experience, have issued recommendations to use 
dental X-rays, wrist X-rays and collar bone X-rays for forensic age estimations, see, for 
example, Andreas Schmeling et al., “Criteria for Age Estimation in Living Individuals”, in 
International Journal of Legal Medicine, 2008, vol. 122, no. 6, pp. 457–60 and Andreas 
Schmeling et al., “Forensic Age Estimation: Methods, Certainty, and the Law”, in 
Deutsches Ärzteblatt International, 2016, vol. 113, no. 4, pp. 44–50. 
22 The case against Lubanga, see Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, above note 4 and 
Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, above note 3, was focused on child soldiers because 
it was assumed that this was easier to prove than other crimes. In other words, it was only 
plan B, while plan A was to investigate and charge a series of attacks resulting in massa-
cres and mass-destruction, charges that were later brought against Ntaganda. However, it is 
likely that the investigative difficulties associated with child soldiering, including the age 
element, were underestimated, and that this contributed to the “significant pressure” which 
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general observation of investigations into war crimes which Taylor made 
already in 1949, properly investigating and evaluating the age element is 
“far bigger and far more difficult […] than anyone had anticipated”.23 
Taking this challenge on, as is mandated by their roles, legal actors are 
also dealing with a politically and emotionally sensitive part of law. One 
major reason for this is that their decisions may influence the lives of a 
typically very well protected group, that is, children. Today, there is no 
framework supporting legal actors in their collection and evaluation of 
age evidence. Ideally, such a framework should help legal actors answer 
the following essential questions: 1) Where do doubts regarding age evi-
dence stem from (challenges) and what can be done to reduce it (opportu-
nities)? and 2) How to deal with the remaining doubt (diagnostic accura-
cy)? 
Hence, the purpose of this research is two-folded: 
1. It provides a potential framework for collection and evaluation of 
age evidence in the legal setting. This framework is designed to 
help answer the essential questions described above: Firstly, what 
are the causes of doubt regarding age evidence and what can be 
done to reduce it? This is addressed in Section 6.2. “Challenges and 
Opportunities with Age Estimations”. Secondly, how should legal 
actors deal with the remaining doubt? This is discussed in Section 
6.3. “Diagnostic Accuracy of Age Estimations”. 
2. It applies this framework in relation to age estimations in child sol-
diering cases (Section 6.4.) by addressing challenges and opportuni-
ties with estimations in this specific context. This requires an empir-
ical review of cases dealing with child soldiering charges to identify 
what types of evidence were used for age estimation purposes (Sec-
tion 6.4.2.). This is followed by an examination of the challenges 
and opportunities relating to each type of evidence, including foren-
sic, video, oral and documentary evidence (Section 6.5.). Thereafter, 
the diagnostic accuracy of age estimations in child soldiering cases 
will be discussed (Section 6.6.). 
                                                                                                                        
the investigation team was under, see Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 134 and 
142, see above note 4. 
23 Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on The Nuernberg War Crimes 
Trials under Control Council Law No. 10, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
1948, p. 124. 
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6.2. Challenges and Opportunities with Age Estimations 
This section addresses the questions; where do doubts regarding age evi-
dence stem from (challenges) and what can be done to reduce it (opportu-
nities)? Although it is clear that challenges can take many shapes this re-
search will focus primarily on challenges of three specific kinds namely; 
validity, reliability and biasability. The working definitions are provided 
below. 
Validity: the extent to which inferences can be made from ‘opera-
tionalizations’ of chronological age.24 Legal age elements, including that 
entailed in child soldiering crimes, are exclusively interested in one type 
of age; chronological age, that is, the number of years since a person was 
born.25 However, since chronological age is often unknown, there is a 
need for operationalizations, or ‘proxies’ of it. As will be outlined in the 
following, this usually entails biological, apparent and/or social age. In 
this research, biological age connotes results from forensic age estima-
tions (FAEs)  of, for example, bone and teeth,26 apparent age refers to 
how old an individual appears to be based on his or her physical appear-
ance or demeanour and social age refers the age of an individual as de-
termined by social or cultural factors rather than the number of days since 
birth. Hence, validity is the extent to which biological, apparent and social 
age fit the construct of interest here, the chronological age. In other words, 
                                                   
24 Hence, this definition is borrowed from so-called construct validity which in psychological 
research is taken to mean the degree to which a test measures what it claims, or purports, 
to be measuring, see, for example, William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. 
Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Infer-
ences, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 2002, pp. 64–82. 
25 See, for instance, Ording Muller et al., “Bone Age of Chronological Age Determination: 
Statement of the European Society of Pediatric Radiology Musculoskeletal Task Force 
Group”, in Pediatric Radiology, 2019, vol. 49, no. 7, pp. 979–82; Lloyd Rhodri et al., 
“Chronological Age vs. Biological Maturation: Implications for Exercise Programming in 
Youth”, in Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, 2014, vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 1454–
64. 
26 Bone age is often defined as the general degree of maturation of bone that subjects of a 
population reach at a certain average age, often based on the hand or wrist and dental age 
is defined as the general degree of development of teeth that subjects of a population reach 
at a certain average age. Also, skeletal age is used when referring to the entire skeleton, 
and is this the defined as the general degree of maturation of the skeleton that subjects of a 
population reach at a certain average age. Thus, unlike in this research, different kinds of 
biological age will be distinguished from one another, see Edel Doyle et al., “Guidelines 
for Best Practice: Imaging for Age Estimation in the Living”, in Journal of Forensic Radi-
ology and Imaging, 2019, vol. 16, pp. 38–49. 
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what is the more specific relationship between chronological age on the 
one side and biological, apparent and social age on the other side.27 
Reliability: although there are many types of reliability the term is 
here used primarily to refer to Between Expert Reliability. This connotes 
the extent to which different experts examining the exact same evidence 
make the same observations and draw the same conclusions in relation to 
that evidence.28 Some examples are whether two radiologists examining 
the same individual’s wrist or hand to estimate age make the same obser-
vations and draw the same conclusions regarding biological age, or 
whether two observers of the same individual’s physical appearance will 
make the same assessments as regards the individual’s apparent age. 
There may be corresponding reliability issues for one and the same expert 
who examines the same evidence at different points in time (Within Ex-
pert Reliability) .29 However, this research will focus on Between Expert 
Reliability since this type of reliability has direct implications for ques-
tions such as the necessity of a second opinion and/or how to properly 
integrate and understand dissent between different experts in legal pro-
ceedings. 
Biasability: similar to reliability this can be understood both as Be-
tween and Within Expert Biasability, whereof this Chapter will focus on 
the former category. Between Expert Biasability is the extent to which 
experts make the same observations and reach the same conclusions, de-
pending on what knowledge they have of potentially biasing contextual 
information such as a case hypothesis30 or the type of crime in question.31 
Importantly, bias often operates on a subconscious level and it may there-
                                                   
27 Clearly, it may also be important to think of the relationship between biological, apparent 
and social age respectively, especially in cases of contradictions. 
28 This definition comes from Itiel E. Dror, “A Hierarchy of Expert Performance (HEP)”, in 
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2016, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 121–27. 
29 Also this definition comes from ibid. 
30 See, for example, Saul Kassin, Itiel E. Dror and Jeff Kukucka, “The Forensic Confirmation 
Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions”, in Journal of Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition, 2013, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 42–52; Moa Lidén, Confirmation Bias in 
Criminal Cases, Uppsala University Press, Uppsala, 2018. 
31 See Dror, 2016, pp. 121–27, see above note 28. 
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fore be present despite individuals’ best efforts to remain objective.32 Also, 
the risk of bias is greater in relation to ambiguous material.33 
The term opportunities refers to current and ongoing research which 
is relevant in the sense that it may help to overcome some challenges with 
age estimations. Thereby it may also help to reduce, although not com-
pletely remove, doubts regarding someone’s chronological age. For in-
stance, this research offers new technologies or scientific methods for age 
estimations or suggest procedures on how to improve Between Expert 
Reliability or prevent bias. As such, the research is relevant for the experts 
or individuals involved in conducting the actual age estimations but also 
for legal actors who collect, integrate and evaluate age evidence within 
the context of a criminal case. Furthermore, the Chapter also identifies 
opportunities for researchers to contribute with more field specific empir-
ical investigations. 
6.3. Diagnostic Accuracy of Age Estimations 
After having considered what doubts are present in relation to age evi-
dence (challenges) and what could have or should have been done to re-
duce such doubts (opportunities), it is likely that some doubts about an 
individual’s chronological age will still remain. This section introduces 
the question of how to deal with such remaining doubts. Although there 
are no general answers to this question and the considerations will vary 
between different legal areas (criminal, asylum, etc.), this section will 
consider the question primarily in relation to criminal law and more spe-
cifically the war crime of conscripting, enlisting or using child soldiers in 
armed forces or groups.34 
Since the age element of interest is an element of a (war) crime, 
most lawyers are likely to intuitively say that any remaining doubts about 
                                                   
32 For more on this see Raymond Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon 
in Many Guises”, in Review of General Psychology, 1998, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 175–220; and 
Lidén, 2018, see above note 30. 
33 See, for instance, Kassin, Dror and Kukucka, 2013, pp. 42–52, see above note 30; Nikola 
K.P. Osborne and Rachel Zajac, “An Imperfect Match? Crime-related Context Influences 
Fingerprint Decisions”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2016, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 126–34. 
34 As defined by ICC Statute, Article 8(e)(vii), see above note 18; ICC, Elements of Crimes, 
11 June 2010, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3c0e2d/); and the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’) Statute, 16 January 2002, Article 4(c) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/aa0e20/). 
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an alleged child soldier’s age should be to the advantage of the accused. 
Legally speaking, this intuition is uncontroversial as it is clearly in line 
with fundamental principles of the criminal procedure such as in dubio 
pro reo (‘when in doubt for the accused’) and in dubio mitius (‘more leni-
ent in cases of doubt’). However, in line with the beyond reasonable doubt 
standard, following the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), Article 66(3),35 it is equally clear that the accused shall not have 
the advantage of virtually any doubt, but only the reasonable doubt, nei-
ther more nor less.36 Certainly, the assessment of what constitutes reason-
able doubt in a single case falls within the discretion of the judges37 and 
given the inherently open character of this standard it is impossible to say 
exactly what should be considered reasonable or unreasonable doubt.38 
Simultaneously, it is essential to promote a uniform application of the law, 
so that like cases are treated alike in practice and that predictability and 
legal security are promoted in a more general sense.39 While there are no 
                                                   
35 While the ICC Statute describes this standard as “beyond reasonable doubt” in English, the 
French translation is “audelà de tout doute raisonnable.’and in Spanish ‘más allá de toda 
duda razonable’. Also, in other contexts different English versions are used, including “be-
yond all reasonable doubt” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”. For historical perspectives 
on this topic see, for example, Barbara J. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Proba-
ble Cause, Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1991. 
36 This was addressed specifically by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 15 Ju-
ly 1999, IT-94-1-A, p. 77 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8efc3a/). The Trial Chamber 
had acquitted the accused of certain killings because they “may have been” committed by 
other perpetrators as a “bare possibility” and other elements “could suggest” different con-
clusions. On appeal, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the prosecutor that the participation 
of the accused in the killings was the only reasonable inference from the available evi-
dence and no witness had suggested an alternative hypothesis. Ibid., p. 79. For more on 
this, see Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “The Contribution of Analysis to the Quality Control in 
Criminal Investigation”, Chapter 3 of this volume. 
37 See, for instance, Jon Newman, “Quantifying the Standard of Proof Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt: A Comment on Three Comments”, in Law, Probability and Risk, 2006, vol. 5, pp. 
267–69. Quite a few scholars have attempted to quantify this evidentiary standard or in 
other ways understand it numerically, see, for example, Svein Magnussen et al., “The 
Probability of Guilt in Criminal Cases: Are People Aware of Being “Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt”?”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2013, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 196–203. 
38 For more on this topic see, for example, Larry Laudan, “Is Reasonable Doubt Reasona-
ble?”, in Legal Theory, 2003, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 295–331. 
39 There are quite a few critical reviews challenging the notion that like cases are treated 
alike in practice, see, for instance, Gerald Seniuk, “Systemic Incoherence in Criminal Jus-
tice: Failing to Treat Like Cases Alike”, in Canadian Bar Review, 2006, vol. 93, no. 3, pp. 
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general answers as to the meaning of the BARD standard neither in crimi-
nal law generally, nor in relation to the age element specifically, it may be 
helpful to think of the BARD standard in terms of diagnostic accuracy. 
The term diagnostic accuracy is commonly used in for instance the 
medical field as an expression of the extent to which a result of a medical 
test can be trusted. More specifically, diagnostic accuracy refers to wheth-
er a test accurately and fully identifies those carrying a disease as carrying 
the disease, while simultaneously excluding accurately and fully those 
who are tested for the disease but do not carry the disease.40 Hence, diag-
nostic accuracy is divided into two components: sensitivity and specificity. 
The sensitivity of a measurement instrument is the probability that a diag-
nostic test or instrument will be positive in persons who have a disease or 
condition.41 Sensitivity is also referred to as true positive rate. Tests or 
instruments that have high sensitivity are more likely to rule in, or accu-
rately confirm, the disease or condition when the disease or condition 
exists.42 By contrast, specificity is the ability of a measurement instrument 
to correctly identify persons without a disease or condition. In statistical 
terms, this is the probability that diagnostic tests or instruments will give 
negative results in individuals who do not have the disease or condition.43 
Tests or instruments that have high specificity are able to more accurately 
rule out a disease or condition. Specificity is often referred to as the true 
negative rate, meaning that a test is negative in persons without the dis-
ease or condition.44 
In the medical field, the importance of reasoning in terms of diag-
nostic accuracy is fairly straightforward since diagnostic errors (false pos-
itives and false negatives) can lead to inaccurate treatment, patient harm, 
and suffering both on a human level and in terms of financial costs due to 
                                                                                                                        
747–92 as well as questions being asked about what cases really are to be considered alike, 
see, for instance, Kenneth I. Winston, “On Treating Like Cases Alike”, in California Law 
Review, 1974, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 1–39. 
40 Stephen B. Hulley, Designing Clinical Research, Wolters Kluwer, Philadelphia, 2007. 
41 See, for instance, ibid. 
42 Stacey Plichta et al., Munro’s Statistical Methods for Health Care Research, Wolters 
Kluwer, Philadelphia, 2005; MA Xiaoye et al., “Statistical methods for multivariate meta-
analysis of diagnostic tests: an overview and tutorial”, in Statistical Methods in Medical 
Research, 2016, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 1596–619. 
43 Plichta et al., 2005, see above note 42; MA et al., 2016, see above note 42. 
44 Hulley, 2007, see above note 40. 
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law suits, and so on. Empirical research indicates that physicians’ over-
confidence in the own ability to reach accurate diagnosis is a contributing 
factor to diagnostic errors.45 Thus, there is a potential issue with diagnos-
tic calibration, that is, the relationship between the diagnostic accuracy 
and confidence in that accuracy.46 Diagnostic errors may occur when the 
relationship between accuracy and confidence is miscalibrated or misa-
ligned so that confidence is higher than it should be.47 It is unknown ex-
actly how physicians’ confidence relate to the accuracy of their diagnosis, 
and how common this problem is,48 but there are indications that physi-
cians, fairly regularly, are overconfident, that is, they are more confident 
than they are accurate.49 
Although age evidence may come from actors in a range of disci-
plines or fields, it is the legal actors, and ultimately the judges, who inte-
grate and draw conclusions from the evidence. In child soldiering cases, 
these legal actors use the evidence they collected and/or had presented for 
                                                   
45 Eta Berner and Mark L. Graber, “Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in Medi-
cine”, in The American Journal of Medicine, 2008, vol. 121, no. 5, pp. 22–23. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 The more specific relationship between diagnostic accuracy and confidence is discussed by, 
for instance, Donald A.B. Lindberg, “Introduction”, in The American Journal of Medicine, 
2008, vol. 121, no. 5, S1. If confidence and accuracy were perfectly aligned, then lower 
levels of confidence could cue physicians to deliberately seek diagnostic help and/or con-
duct additional tests. 
49 Daniel P. Davis et al., “The Association between Operator Confidence and Accuracy of 
Ultrasonography Performed by Novice Emergency Physicians”, in Journal of Emergency 
Medicine, 2005, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 259–64; Charles Friedman et al., “Are Clinicians Cor-
rect When They Believe they are Correct? Implications for Medical Decision Support”, in 
Studies in Health Technology and Informatics, 2001, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 454–58; Charles P. 
Friedman et al., “Do Physicians Know When Their Diagnoses are Correct? Implications 
for Decision Support and Error Reduction?”, in Journal of General Internal Medicine, 
2005, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 334–39; Matej Podbregar et al., “Should we Confirm Our Clinical 
Diagnosis Certainty by Autopsies?”, in Intensive Care Medicine, 2001, vol. 27, pp. 1750–
55; J. Yazbek et al., “Confidence of Expert Ultrasound Operators in Making a Diagnosis of 
Adnexal Tumor: Effect on Diagnostic Accuracy and Interobserver Agreement”, in Ultra-
sound in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 2010, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 89–93. See also Saul J. 
Weiner and Alan Schwartz, “Contextual Errors in Medical Decision Making: Overlooked 
and Understudied”, in Academic Medicine, 2016, vol. 91, no. 5, pp. 657–62. These authors 
present empirical data suggesting that whereas physicians provided error-free care in 73 
per cent of uncomplicated encounters, their care was appropriate in only 38 per cent of bi-
omedically complex encounters, 22 per cent of contextually complex encounters and just 9 
per cent of the combined biomedically and contextually complicated encounters. 
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them to categorize an alleged child soldier as either having reached a 
chronological age of 15 years or not. This process has similarities with 
how a physician categorizes a patient as either having a disease or condi-
tion or not. As such, just like physicians, legal actors may benefit from 
reasoning in terms of diagnostic accuracy. More specifically, the diagnos-
tic accuracy in relation to the age element in child soldiering cases would 
be the extent to which the ‘test’, that is, the process of determining age, 
accurately and fully identifies all those younger than 15 years as being 
under 15 years, as well as the extent to which the process is capable of 
accurately and fully excluding those aged 15 years or older. A perfect 
diagnostic accuracy would require that the process is fully sensitive; all 
those under 15 years are identified and legally classified as under 15 years, 
while the process is also fully specific: all those 15 years or older are le-
gally classified as 15 years or older.50 Thus, there are four possible out-
comes of an age estimation and this entails two correct and two incorrect 
outcomes, see Table 1. 
The two correct outcomes are: 
• A true negative: an individual 15 years or older is estimated to be 15 
years or older; and 
• A true positive: an individual younger than 15 years is estimated to 
be younger than 15 years. 
The two incorrect outcomes are: 
• A false positive: an individual 15 years or older is estimated to be 
younger than 15 years; and 
• A false negative: an individual younger than 15 years is estimated to 
be 15 years or older. 
                                                   
50 The diagnostic accuracy or predictive value of age estimations can also be understood and 
illustrated using the so-called signal detection theory, see David Green and John Swets, 
Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics, John Wiley, 1996. Most of the early research 
relating to signal detection theory aimed to determine how humans distinguish a ‘signal’ 
(more specifically a radar signal) from ‘noise’. Identifying a signal among noise would 
then be similar to identifying someone younger than 15 years among others who are 15 
years and above. In the process of identifying a ‘signal’, it seems humans have different 
subjective thresholds, as some want to feel more confident than others before calling 
something a signal. 
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Table 1. Four possible outcomes of age estimations in child soldering cases. 
Estimated Chronological Age 
Real Chronological Age 
15 or older Younger than 15 
15 or older True negative False negative 
Younger than 15 False positive True positive 
Since tests can usually not guarantee both sensitivity and specificity 
simultaneously there are often trade-offs between the two in practice. In 
this trade-off, whether sensitivity or specificity is prioritized is strongly 
context dependent. Since reasonable doubts should be to the advantage of 
the accused, this seems to imply that in the criminal context, specificity, 
the ability to accurately rule out those who are over 15 years, is somewhat 
prioritized over sensitivity. If evidentiary thresholds are set or applied in a 
way that requires a lot from the evidence, false positives are unlikely but 
there is also a substantial risk of false negatives. Hence, constantly resort-
ing to the burden of proof in criminal cases may make criminal justice 
inefficient as it is likely that there will always be some doubt (reasonable 
or not) in relation to the question of chronological age. 
It can be discussed whether and to what extent evidentiary difficul-
ties stemming from, for example, the inherent uncertainties in forensic age 
estimations are relevant in this context. There is no general answer as to 
how scientific uncertainty relates to the BARD standard.51 It can also be 
noted that the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) have approved 
of presumptions that are in fact to the disadvantage of the accused, since 
the crime in question otherwise would result in unreasonable evidentiary 
difficulties. For instance, in Salabiaku v France52 and the related case 
Pham Hoang v France,53  the ECHR considered a French rule according 
to which a person who has passed the customs with illegal goods is pre-
sumed to have had intent to smuggle the goods. The ECHR did not con-
                                                   
51 For more on this topic see, for example, Charles Weiss, “Expressing Scientific Uncertain-
ty”, in Law, Probability and Risk, 2003, vol. 2, pp. 25–46. 
52 European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), Salabiaku v. France, Judgment, 7 October 
1988, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1988:1007JUD001051983 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/af37
34/) (‘ECHR Salabiaku Judgment’). 
53 ECHR, Pham Hoang v. France, Judgment, 25 September 1992, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1992:
0925JUD001319187 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/hxjbrh/) (‘ECHR Pham Hoang Jud-
gment’). 
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sider this rule contradictory to the presumption of innocence while it add-
ed that Article 6(2) requires states to confine legal presumptions “within 
reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at 
stake and maintain the rights of the defense”.54 In asylum law, the scien-
tific uncertainty of age assessments have resulted in a presumption of mi-
nor age which benefits the individual whose age is being estimated55 and, 
in civil cases, evidentiary thresholds for establishing age elements are 
lower. 56 While age estimations for the purpose of deciding someone’s 
criminal guilt are clearly different, it seems reasonable to include consid-
erations like these into the interpretation of what constitutes reasonable 
doubt regarding someone’s chronological age. 
                                                   
54 ECHR Salabiaku Judgment, para. 28, see above note 52. These reasonable limits had not 
been trespassed since the French Courts had taken into consideration circumstances indi-
cating that the defendants had in fact acted unintentionally. Thus, the presumption was re-
buttable. Similarly, a presumption that the owner of a car is guilty of traffic offences com-
mitted using the car, was not considered a breach in, for example, ECHR, Falk v. Nether-
lands, Decision, 19 October 2004, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2004:1019DEC006627301 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/jsmie5/) and ECHR, Krumpholz v. Austria, Judgment, 18 March 
2010, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0318JUD001320105 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/vn3
bnz/), since the defence had been able to offer evidence in disproof. Neither the French 
rule according to which defamatory statements were presumed to be in bad faith was con-
sidered a breach, in ECHR, Radio France and others v. France, Judgment, 30 March 2004, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2004:0330JUD005398400 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ea66ee/). 
55 The ECHR has stated, for instance, in Yazgül Yilmaz v. Turkey, Judgment, 1 February 2011, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0201JUD003636906 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7bl57z/), that 
due to the scientific inaccuracy and unreliability of age assessments methods, age assess-
ment results have to be presented with a margin of error. Furthermore, the Court has em-
phasized that due the presumption of minor age and the best interest of the child, the mar-
gin of error should always be applied in favour of the person who has undergone age as-
sessment. In addition, this individual shall be treated as a child until any further evidence is 
provided to substantiate the age of the person. It can of course be discussed whether a pre-
sumption of minor age is always to the advantage of the examined individual. For instance, 
children may claim to be adults to be allowed to work, to marry or because they consider 
themselves to be adults responsible for the well-being of siblings, and so on. See EASO, 
2018, p. 17, see above note 19. 
56 For more on this topic see, for instance, Cercel and Scurtu, 2015, pp. 297–304, see above 
note 10 and LOO Wee Ling, “Full Contractual Capacity: Use of Age for Conferment of 
Capacity”, in Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2010, pp. 328–51. This delimitation 
does not mean that age estimations are only relevant in relation to such charges of war 
crimes. It can be noted that also other charges refer to ‘children’ such as forcibly transfer-
ring children of the group to another group, as part of a genocide, ICC Statute, Article 6(e), 
see above note 18. 
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6.4. Age Estimations in Child Soldiering Cases 
6.4.1. Method 
The purpose of this as well as the following sections is to apply the sug-
gested framework to age estimations in child soldiering cases. To this end, 
an empirical review of Court cases was conducted to identify the cases 
dealing with child soldiering charges, as defined by Article 8(b)(xxvi) and 
(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute and Article 4 of the SCSL Statute. This resulted 
in the identification of 11 cases, 4 from the SCSL and 7 from the ICC, all 
of which are outlined in Table 2. For the more specific question of what 
age evidence was used, only cases which had resulted in at least a first 
judgment, whether this judgment was appealed or not, were included. 
This was in total 8 cases, 4 from the SCSL and 4 from the ICC, see Table 
3. In appealed cases which had already been handled by two instances, 
both of the judgments were examined. Among the cases outlined in Table 
3, the ICC Lubanga case entailed the widest range of age evidence includ-
ing forensic, video, oral and documentary evidence. The Lubanga case 
was also the only case which dealt exclusively with child soldiering 
charges,57 enabling a more in-depth evaluation of the age evidence specif-
ically. Therefore, in Table 4, the age evidence available for each of the 19 
alleged child soldiers in the Lubanga case is outlined. This includes dif-
ferent kinds of contradictions as regards age, namely between different 
evidence types (external), between different items of the same evidence 
type (internal) and other types of contradictions, as well as the Court’s 
conclusions. 
The discussion of challenges (validity, reliability and biasability) 
and opportunities attributable to the different types of age evidence (Sec-
tion 6.5.) was based on a literature review. This entailed database searches 
for relevant literature on age estimations based on forensic evidence, doc-
                                                   
57 For the specifics of the charges, as well as the confirmation of the charges, ICC, The Pros-
ecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, 29 January 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, pp. 6–7 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/b7ac4f/) (‘Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’). Mr. Lubanga was 
charged as a co-perpetrator jointly with other FPLC officers and UPC members and sup-
porters for conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 years into the FPLC mil-
itary wing of the UPC since September 2002, and using them to participate actively in hos-
tilities. The Prosecution submitted that the crimes occurred in the context of an armed con-
flict not of an international character, and this was also the conclusion reached by the Trial 
as well as Appeals Chambers. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 340 
umentary evidence, oral evidence and video evidence or physical appear-
ance. 
6.4.2. Results 
This section outlines the results of the review of cases which involved 
allegations of conscripting, enlisting or using child solders. As noted be-
low Table 2 there are also other more or less well documented both histor-
ical and contemporary examples of child soldiering crimes worldwide 
which have not been considered suitable for this analysis (see more be-
low). 
Table 2. Cases involving charges of conscripting, enlisting and/or using child 
soldiers by court in chronological order (by date of last verdict with ongoing 
cases last).58 









C, E &/ 
U 
All three convicted for C 
&/ U59 in 2006. 










E/U Norman deceased before 
end of trial, proceedings 
terminated against him 
in May 2007.61 
                                                   
58 Under “Charges” and “Status”, “C” = Conscripting, “E” = Enlisting, “U” = Using, “&” = 
and, “/” = or, “&/” = and/or. The “Status” column refers to the outcome and present status 
in relation to child soldiering charges exclusively while this was often different in relation 
to other charges, that is, the defendant was acquitted for child soldiering charges but con-
victed for other charges that fall outside the scope of this research. 
59 SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor 
Kanu, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 20 June 2007, SCSL-2004-16-T, pp. 569–72 (‘SCSL 
Brima et al. Trial Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/87ef08/). 
60 It can be noted that neither of the defendants appealed specifically in relation to the ages of 
the alleged child soldiers but rather on points of location of child recruitment, see SCSL, 
The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 22 February 2008, SCSL-2004-16-A, pp. 13–19, paras. 27–
49 (‘SCSL Brima et al. Appeals Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
4420ef/). 
61 SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Trial 
Chamber, Judgment, 2 August 2007, SCSL-04-14-T, pp. 1–2 (‘SCSL Norman et al. Trial 
Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/025645/). The Trial against Norman 
began in June 2004. Norman died in hospital on 22 February 2007, after the completion of 
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Fofana acquitted and 
Kondewa convicted for 
E/U in 2007.62 
Kondewa’s conviction 










C/E/U Sesay and Kallon con-
victed for planning U,64 
Gbao acquitted in 
2009.65 
Upheld on appeal 26 
October 2009.66 
                                                                                                                        
trial but before pronouncement of Judgment. According to the indictment as well as the 
SCSL, Norman was the “National Coordinator” of the CDF while Fofana was “Director of 
War” and Kondewa was the CDF’s “High Priest” (Ibid., p. 1). Norman was first indicted in 
March 2003 and Fofana and Kondewa were indicted in June 2003. In February 2004, the 
Trial Chamber ordered a joint trial of the three accused. For more on the timeline see Re-
sidual Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘RSCSL’), “The CDF Trial” (available on its web 
site). 
62 SCSL Norman et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, see above note 61. 
63 SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Ap-
peals Chamber, Judgment, 28 May 2008, SCSL-04-14-A (‘SCSL Norman et al. Appeals 
Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31512/). 
64 Both Sesay and Kallon were found guilty for planning the use of persons under the age of 
15 to participants actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Kono and Bombali District between 
1997 and September 2000, under the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 
6(1), but not for personal commission, see SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, 
Morrie Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 March 2009, SCSL-04-15-T, 
paras. 2230–37 (‘SCSL Sesay et al. Trial Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/7f05b7/). 
65 Ibid. 
66 SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment, 26 October 2009, SCSL-04-15-A (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
133b48/). In their appeals, both Sesay and Kallon claimed that the Trial Chamber erred in 
finding them liable for planning the use of child soldiers since their acts did not amount to 
planning (substantial contribution to the crime). The acts in question were, for Sesay, for 
instance, ordering the training of child soldiers, receiving reports on such training, person-
ally visiting the Camp Lion training camp, addressing and threatening the child soldier 
conscripts there, see ibid., pp. 272–74. For Kallon’s reasoning in these parts see ibid., pp. 
324–28. The Appeals Chambers dismissed these grounds for appeal both in relation to 
Sesay and Kallon. The Trial Chamber had acquitted Gbao since, while it had found that 
Gbao loaded former child soldiers onto a truck and removed them from the Interim Care 
Centre in Makeni in May 2000, this was insufficient to constitute a substantial contribution 
to the widespread system of child conscription or the consistent pattern of using children to 
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C, E & U Convicted for C/E/U in 
2012.67 
Upheld on appeal 26 
September 2013.68 
ICC KATANGA 2003 DRC U Acquitted 7 March 
2014.69 




DRC C, E & U Convicted for C, E & U 
in 2012.70 
Upheld on appeal 1 De-
cember 2014.71 
ICC NGUDJOLO 2003 DRC U Acquitted in 2012.72 




DRC C, E & U Convicted for C, E & U 
in 2019.74 
Now in the appellate 
phase.75 
                                                                                                                        
actively participate in hostilities. While the acquittal was appealed by the Prosecution, its 
grounds for appeal were dismissed in this regard (ibid., pp. 414–23). 
67 SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 18 May 2012, 
SCSL-03-01-T (‘SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
8075e7/). 
68 SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 26 Sep-
tember 2013, SCSL-03-01-A (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3e7be5/). 
69 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 March 2014, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG (‘Katanga 
Trial Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f74b4f/). 
70 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, see above note 4. 
71 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, see above note 3. 
72 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 18 December 2012, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG 
(‘Ngudjolo Chui Trial Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2c2cde/). 
73 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 7 April 2015, 
ICC-01/04-02/12-271-Corr (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/efb111/). 
74 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 8 July 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359 (‘Ntaganda Trial 
Chamber Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/80578a/). 
75 The next session is scheduled for 12 October 2020, see ICC, “Ntaganda Case” (available 
on its web site). 
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ICC ONGWEN 2002–
2005 
Uganda C & U Trial phase, Trial Cham-
ber now deliberating.76 




CAR C, E & U Charges confirmed in 
relation to YEKATOM 
11 December 2019.77 
ICC KONY and OTTI 2002–
2004 
Uganda E Execution of arrest war-
rants pending.78 
As suggested above, Table 2 does not entail a complete list of all the 
historical and contemporary examples of child soldiering crimes or suspi-
cions worldwide. This is because many of those situations never resulted 
in Court cases and for those that did, the focus was not on child soldiering, 
let alone age estimations of alleged child soldiers. However, for the pur-
pose of a more complete record, some of these examples will be outlined 
briefly below. 
While the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia 
(‘ECCC’) was tasked with bringing the surviving members of the Khmer 
Rouge to justice and child recruitment was widespread during the late 
1970’s regime,79 no charges relating to child recruitment were brought 
                                                   
76 Closing statements took place from 10 to 12 March 2020, see ICC, “Ongwen Case” (avail-
able on its web site). 
77 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and 
Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
against Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, 11 December 2019, ICC-01/14-
01/18-403-Red-Corr (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/314uw9/). However, the initial 
charges included individual criminal responsibility for the child soldiering crimes both for 
Yekatom and Ngaïssona, see ICC, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard 
Ngaïssona, Pre-Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of “Document Containing the 
Charges”, 18 September 2019, ICC-01-14-01/18-282-AnxB1-Red, pp. 11–12 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/fdgouu/). 
78 Hence, Kony and Otti remain at large, 10 years after the issuance of the warrants of arrest, 
see ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, ICC-02/04-
01/05. Because of this, on 6 February 2015, Pre-Trial Chamber II severed the proceedings 
against Dominic Ongwen from the case against Kony and Otty: Decision Severing the 
Case Against Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05-424 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
16fb19/). Dominic Ongwen was surrendered to the ICC’s custody on 16 January 2015. For 
more on this see, for example, ICC, “Kony et al. Case”, Case Information Sheet (available 
on its web site). 
79 Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (‘LICADHO’), Child 
Soldiers in Cambodia, Briefing Paper, June 1998. 
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before this Court.80 There were reports of children as young as five years 
being trained while the majority of soldiers were up to 17 years.81 It is 
likely that omission of such charges was to avoid claims of retrospective 
law-making,82 since child soldiering was not specifically criminalized in 
Cambodian national legislation at the time of interest.83 Similarly, in Vi-
etnam, during the Vietnam war, children under 15 years referred to as 
‘tiny guerrilla’ were learning guerrilla warfare tactics and were also in-
volved in armed struggle.84 Also, some evidence has emerged of the use 
of child soldiers in Laos, by Hmong armed opposition groups.85 Similarly, 
                                                   
80 Like the SCSL, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’) is a 
hybrid institution, which was established in 2006. The interested reader can have a look at 
the following cases which do not entail any child soldiering charges or mentioning of child 
soldiers: ECCC, The Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, Supreme Court Chamber, Appeal 
Judgment, 3 February 2012, 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
681bad/); ECCC, The Prosecutor v. Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, Judgment, 7 August 
2014, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4888de/). 
81 LICADHO, 1998, see above note 79. 
82 For more on this see Julie McBride, The War Crime of Child Soldier Recruitment, Springer, 
p. 106. The recruitment and use of children as soldiers were not specifically criminalized 
in national legislation. Only in July 2004 did Cambodia ratify the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 
referring in its declaration to Article 42 of the Law on General Statutes for the Military 
Personnel of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, which set 18 as the minimum age for 
contractual-service military personnel, see “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict”, sect. “Declarations 
and Reservations” (available on United Nations Treaty Collection’s web site). However, it 
has been acknowledged that recruitment of children as soldiers and cadres was very com-
mon in the Khmer Rouge period (1975–79), see, for example, LICADHO, 1998, see above 
note 79. 
83 Only in July 2004 did Cambodia ratify the Optional Protocol, referring in its declaration to 
Article 42 of the Law on General Statutes for the Military Personnel of the Royal Cambo-
dian Armed Forces, which set 18 as the minimum age for contractual-service military per-
sonnel, see “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the in-
volvement of children in armed conflict”, sect. “Declarations and Reservations” (available 
on United Nations Treaty Collection’s web site). 
84 For instance, children were in the Nguyễn Văn Trỗi Youth Group in the Quảng Nam prov-
ince, see Việt Nam, 1969, no. 141, 6, p. 29 (British Library, SU216). Many of these chil-
dren were decorated with awards and “glorious titles” such “Iron Font Children” or “Val-
iant Destroyer of the Yanks”, see ibid. See also Brenda M. Boyle and Jeehyun Lim (eds.), 
Looking Back on the Vietnam War: Twenty-first-Century Perspectives, Rutgers University 
Press, 2016. 
85 This included evidence from journalists who visited Laos clandestinely and photographed 
children with guns in jungle areas, see, for example, Andrew Perrin, “Welcome to the Jun-
gle”, TIME Asia Magazine, 5 May 2003 (available on its web site). In 2003, Amnesty In-
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a Sri Lankan rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (‘LTTE’) 
made extensive use of children in its war against the Sinhalese govern-
ment, recruiting more than seven hundred child soldiers during 2003 
alone. 86  Children have also played active roles in armed conflicts in 
Kashmir, the Philippines and Burma/Myanmar. 87 In Afghanistan, child 
fighters were involved in the successive insurgencies against the Soviets, 
the Taliban, and the American and European Coalition forces.88 
In Rwanda, child soldiering cases were fairly well documented but 
never dealt with by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(‘ICTR’) since this tribunal was more concerned with adjudicating high-
level conspiracies to commit genocide. 89  Instead, adolescent children 
were prosecuted and convicted by the domestic Courts of Rwanda, includ-
ing the Gacaca Courts,90 even though there seem to have been doubts 
                                                                                                                        
ternational urged opposition groups not to permit children to participate in combat, see Co-
alition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, “Laos”, in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004, 
2004, p. 183 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f96pr8/). 
86 United Nations Children’s Fund (‘UNICEF’), The State of the World’s Children, 1996. See 
also Chris Hobbs et al., “Conscription of Children in Armed Conflict: A Form of Child 
Abuse. A Study of 19 Former Child Soldiers”, in Child Abuse Review, 2001, vol. 10, no. 5; 
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto, “A War of Attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers”, in Small 
Wars and Insurgencies, 2009, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 573–87, Harendra de Silva, “The Use of 
Child Soldiers in War with Special Reference to Sri Lanka”, in Paediatrics and Interna-
tional Child Health, 2013, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 273–80; Alcinda Manuel Honwana, Child 
Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006. 
87 For more on this see, for example, ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Sara Rakita, Rwanda, Lasting Wounds: Consequences of Genocide and War for Rwanda’s 
Children, Human Rights Watch, New York, 2003, p. 18. 
90 Rwanda was the first country to hold individuals accountable for genocide committed as 
minors, see ibid. According to the Rwandan Penal Code a minor is defined as an individual 
aged 14 to 18 years when the crime was committed, see The Rwandan Penal Code, 18 Au-
gust 1977, Article 77 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/71507b/). This means that children 
under the age of 14 cannot be held criminally responsible but can instead be placed in re-
habilitation centres. In December 1996, the first trails of genocide suspects began in the 
national Courts. To deal with the large number of individuals charged with genocide, the 
Government established the Gacaca Courts, which, unlike the national courts, rely on tra-
ditional processes of addressing disputes within the community as well as national law. For 
more on this see Constance Morrill, “Reconciliation and the Gacaca: The Perceptions and 
Peace-Building Potential of Rwandan Youth Detainees”, in Online Journal of Peace and 
Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–66, citing, inter alia, statistics originally 
from the Rwandan Ministry of Justice, see “Q & A: Rwanda’s Long Search for Justice”, 18 
December 2008, BBC News (available on its web site). Of the 121,500 people in detention 
at the end of 1999, 4,454 were children, according to the Report on the Situation of Human 
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regarding their ages.91 Traditionally, such doubts should have been to their 
advantage as criminal defendants.92 Also, the use of child soldiers has 
been well documented in countries like Mozambique and Angola93 as well 
as Algeria, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan.94 
There are examples also from other parts of the world. In Indonesia, 
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (‘SPSC’) in Dili, East Timor, al-
lowed for the prosecution of individuals younger than 15 years following 
mass political violence in 1999 that involved children in armed groups.95 
There are also a few examples of children being convicted for, for exam-
                                                                                                                        
Rights in Rwanda, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/41, 25 February 2000 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/tsm2j8/). The majority of the genocide suspects were dealt with by these more in-
formal jurisdictions. 
91 For more on this see Jastine Barret’s field research in Rwanda, Jastine C. Barett, “What a 
Difference a Day Makes: Young Perpetrators of Genocide in Rwanda”, in University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law, 2014, Research Paper No. 24, pp. 1–31, noting that this re-
search defines someone younger than 18 years as a child. Barret points out that the Rwan-
dan birth certificates usually only contained the year of birth but not the exact date and al-
so that many documents were destroyed during the genocide. As such, the Courts were 
sometimes unable to verify a defendant’s age. 
92 Through field research in the Rwandan Courts, Barett finds that the accused were not 
always given the benefit of doubt, see ibid., p. 6. For example, a defendant’s file stated 
1980 as year of birth but the prosecutor argued that his sources had confirmed the year of 
birth as 1975. Despite doubt over his age, the Court continued to hear witnesses without 
investigating further. In another case, an accused had two conflicting pieces of evidence; a 
census form stating 1974 as the year of birth and an identity card showing 1976. The Court 
relied on the census form as this pre-dated the identity card and the accused was sentenced 
as an adult. 
93 In Mozambique and Angola large numbers of children were used as soldiers by rebels and 
government forces. RENAMO exploited at least 1,000 child soldiers some as young as six 
years old. In Angola, a 1995 survey found that 36 per cent of children had accompanied or 
supported soldiers and 7 per cent of Angolan children had fired at somebody, see UNICEF, 
The State of World’s Children 1996: Children in War, 1996 and Honwana, 2006, see above 
note 86. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (‘UNTAET’), Regulation 
2001/25 on The Amendment of UNTAET, 14 September 2001, UNTAET/REG/2001/25 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b35f1b/), UNTAET, Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Or-
ganization of Courts in East Timor, 6 March 2000, UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/2bedb8/) and UNTAET, Regulation No. 2000/30 on the Transitional 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 25 September 2000, UNTAET/REG/2000/30 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/f3e141/). However, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (‘SPSC’) 
stipulated a specific legal regime for offenders under 16 years. 
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ple, war crimes by military tribunals,96 while the mixed State Court in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (‘BiH’) allowed prosecution of individuals over 
15 years at the time of the offence.97 In Latin America, children have been 
directly involved in civil wars since the 1980s, for instance in Peru,98 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua99 and more recently Colombia.100 In 
fact, already the youth factions of the Nazi Party in Germany, the Hitler-
jugend101 and the Deutsches Jungvolk in der Hitler Jugend102 consisted of 
boys aged 10 to 18 years.103 
For more on any of these cases, the reader is referred to the cited 
literature. In the following, these cases will not be further considered. 
Table 3 only includes those cases from Table 2 which have resulted in a 
                                                   
96 A prominent as well as controversial example is the case of Omar Khadr, who was the first 
child to be prosecuted and tried before a military tribunal for alleged war crimes, after his 
transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in September 2002, see, for example, Chris Lewis, 
“Abu Ykhiel to Guantanamo Bay and Beyond: The Paper Trials of Omar Khadr 2002-
2017”, in Social Identities: War and Visual Technologies, 2019, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 476–95. 
There are also examples from the DRC. For instance, Amnesty International reports about 
a 14-year old child soldier who was tried by a military court for murder and executed 30 
min later, see Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Massive Violations 
Kill Human Decency”, 31 May 2001, AFR 62/011/2000, p. 1. 
97 See the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1(11), 1(12), Article 10 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/46b8dc/), albeit with special rules regarding treatment and pun-
ishment of juvenile offenders. ICTY focused on deterring the adult leadership in the Bal-
kans, see, for example, Jaimey Fisher, Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Re-
construction after the Second World War, Kritik, 2007, pp. 1–59. 
98 In Peru, children and youth fought in the Shining path rebellion, see, for example, Pino H. 
Ponciano, “Family, Culture and Revolution: Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso”, in 
Steve J. Stern (ed.), Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995, Duke 
University Press, 1998, pp. 158–92. 
99 In civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua armed groups and paramilitaries, in-
cluding irregular forces that support existing governments and those that oppose the, con-
tinue to recruit and use children under the age of fifteen, see Honwana, 2006, p. 30, see 
above note 86. 
100 Human Rights Watch, You Will Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia, 2003 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f44978/). According to the report more than 11,000 chil-
dren were fighting in irregular armies, including paramilitaries and urban militias, in re-
gions such as Alto Naya and Tierradentro. 
101 The Hitler Youth. 
102 German Youngsters in the Hitler Youth. 
103 See, for example, Philip Baker, Youth led by Youth: Some Aspects of the Hitlerjudgend, 
Vilmor, London, 1989; Brenda Lewis and Staffan Olsson, Hitlerjugend: I Krig och Fred, 
Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibiliotek, Hallstavik, 2007. 
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first judgment, whether this judgment was appealed or not. Table 3 out-
lines the different types of age evidence that were present in these cases. 
Descriptions and examples of these different evidence types are provided 
below Table 3. 
Table 3. Evidence used for estimating age of alleged child soldiers by court and 
case.104 


































  X X 
SCSL TAYLOR Convicted (Final)   X X 
ICC LUBANGA Convicted (Final) X X X X 
ICC NGUDJOLO Acquitted (Final)   X X 
                                                   
104 Evidence categories marked as “X” indicate the presence of this type of evidence in the 
case. For an “X” mark, it suffices that this evidence was available for one of the alleged 
child soldiers. The “Verdict” column refers to the verdict in relation to child soldiering 
charges exclusively while the verdict might have been different in relation to other charges. 
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ICC KATANGA Acquitted (Final)  X X X 
ICC NTAGANDA Convicted (Appealed)  X X X 
Forensic evidence. This evidence type entails experts’ estimations 
of ages based on visual assessments of X-rays of hands or wrists and teeth 
and was only present in the Lubanga case before the ICC. In this case, two 
experts; one professor in paediatric radiology and one paediatrician and 
forensic doctor, provided estimations in relation to nine UPC child sol-
diers.105 While the first expert had the main responsibility for the hand or 
wrist assessments and the second expert had the main responsibility for 
the teeth assessments, they presented joint conclusions in a report jointly 
signed.106 The experts regularly worked together on age assessment mat-
ters.107 When assessing the hands or wrists the experts used the so-called 
Greulich and Pyle index.108 
While forensic evidence was not referred to in any of the SCSL cas-
es, there are odd examples of witnesses themselves describing that 
they’ve undergone less invasive age assessment forensic methods. For 
instance, in the RUF case one alleged child soldier described that a nurse 
had examined his teeth and only then did he find out that he was 14 
years.109 Since this examination was not made part of the case material, 
the Court could not consider it directly and it has therefore not been in-
                                                   
105 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 12 May 2009, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-T-172-ENG, p. 80 (‘Lubanga Transcript of 12 May 2009’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/e522af/). 
106 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 13 May 2009, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-T-173-ENG, pp. 46–47 (‘Lubanga Transcript of 13 May 2009’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/3acffb/). After a question from the defence on this matter, the se-
cond expert indicated that she did look at the hand or wrist X-rays as well, although her 
conclusions in the report bore only on the dental age assessments. 
107 Ibid., p. 22. 
108 Ibid., pp. 44–45. 
109 SCSL Sesay et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1628, see above note 64. The SCSL 
notes that: “[…] during the DDR process it was established through the use of verification 
of age methods such as the physical inspection of teeth that many of the children who had 
fought with the RUF and AFRC forces were under 15 years at that time, which was to-
wards the end of the Indictment period” (ibid., p. 487, para. 1628). Thus, it is not clear 
from the verdict what other age verification methods were used but presumably, the Court 
is here referring to other types of forensic evidence. 
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cluded in Table 3, while it is commented on in Section 6.5.3. on oral evi-
dence. 
Video or Photo evidence. In the Lubanga case, the prosecutor re-
lied “on a number of video excerpts to establish that some of the 
UPF/FPLC recruits were ‘visibly’ under the age of 15”. 110  The Trial 
Chamber agreed with the prosecution that children who are undoubtedly 
less than 15 years can be distinguished from those undoubtedly over 
15,111 while it also noted the defence’s contention that “it is impossible to 
distinguish reliably between a 12 or 13 year-old and a 15 or 16 year-old 
on the basis of a photograph or video extract alone”.112 In its own assess-
ment of the video excerpts the Trial Chamber identified specific individu-
als who, in its opinion, were “evidently”,113 “clearly”114 or “significant-
ly”115 under the age of 15 years. This approach was also approved by the 
Appeals Chamber which stated that: “[…] given the margin of error ap-
plied by the Trial Chamber, its approach was not unreasonable”.116 
Also in the Ntaganda case, video evidence was referred to and used 
for age estimation purposes. For instance, on the basis of three video ex-
tracts, the Trial Chamber identified two individuals whom it considered 
“manifestly under the age of 15”117 at the time the extracts were recorded, 
around February 2003.118 In relation to another video extract the Chamber 
considered “in particular, the facial features of the relevant individual”119 
and while it allows for “a wide margin of error, the Chamber is satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that this individual was manifestly under 15 
years of age around May 2003, the time when the video extract was rec-
orded”.120 In its appeal of Ntaganda’s conviction, the defence suggested 
                                                   
110 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 644, see above note 4. 
111 Ibid., para. 643. 
112 Ibid., para. 644. 
113 Ibid., para. 861. 
114 Ibid., paras. 713, 792, 854, 858, 862, 869, 912, 915, 1348. 
115 Ibid., paras. 1249, 1251–52. 
116 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 222, see above note 3. 
117 Ntaganda Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 386–87, see above note 74. 
118 Ibid. Before this, the Chamber points out that witness testimonies were insufficient for 
establish the age element. 
119 Ibid., paras. 388. 
120 Ibid., paras. 388–99. However, the Chamber also adds that there was other evidence pro-
vided by witnesses who were in regular contact with, or had sufficient opportunities to ob-
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that the Trial Chamber only relied on video images,121 which was contest-
ed by the Prosecution suggesting that the Chamber also relied on other 
corroborating evidence.122 The defence also claimed that the Trial Cham-
ber did not explain its approach to age assessments based on visual imag-
es and also disputed the Chamber’s age assessments of three individuals 
depicted in the “Rwampara” video. 123  Also this was contested by the 
prosecution, which argued that the Chamber’s findings were reasoned and 
based on the size and physical appearance (including the facial features of 
one individual) of the alleged child soldiers. 124  Also, the prosecution 
pointed out that the Chamber allowed for a wide margin of error.125 Only 
time can tell what the Appeal’s Chamber will think of these claims.126 
In the Katanga case there was no systematic references to video or 
photo evidence but in relation to one alleged child soldier, Katanga’s 
youngest bodyguard127 there was one photograph. Katanga himself had 
described his bodyguard as a young man whom he put at around 22 years 
old in 2004, while witness P-28 described the bodyguard as young and 
                                                                                                                        
serve, individuals serving within Mr. Ntaganda’s escort, which also demonstrates that Mr. 
Ntaganda’s escort comprised Kadogos, including individuals under 15 years of age. 
121 But, as pointed out by the Prosecution in its response, the Defence later conceded that the 
Chamber had also relied on testimonial evidence, referring to ICC, The Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, Defence, Corrigendum of the “Public Redacted Version of ‘Defence Ap-
peal Brief – Part II’, 31 January 2020, ICC-01/04-02/06-2465”, 27 March 2020, ICC-
01/04-02/06-2465-Red, 30 June 2020, ICC-01/04-02/06-2465-Red-Corr, paras. 232–33, 
243, 246 (‘Ntaganda Defence Appeal Brief – Part II’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
krrzxw/). 
122 More specifically the Prosecution here refers to oral evidence and “the Chamber’s own 
assessment of four video extracts in which P-0010 and P-0898 identified three individuals 
in Ntaganda’s escort as under the age of 15”, see ICC, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 
OTP, Public Redacted Version of “Prosecution Response to ‘Defence Appeal Brief – Part 
II’”, 3 April 2020, ICC-01/04-02/06-2500-Conf, 14 April 2020, ICC-01/04-02/06-2500-
Red, para. 176 (‘Prosecution Response to ‘Defence Appeal Brief – Part II’’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/p24gqr/) 
123 Ntaganda Defence Appeal Brief – Part II, paras. 238–40, citing video excerpt DRC-OTP-
0120-0293, see above note 121. 
124 Prosecution Response to ‘Defence Appeal Brief – Part II’, p. 77–78, paras. 178–79, see 
above note 122. 
125 Ibid., p. 78, para. 179. 
126 For updates see ICC, “Ntaganda Case” (available on its web site). 
127 As acknowledged by Katanga himself, see Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1079, 
see above note 69. 
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that he did not yet have a beard. From the photograph, the Chamber itself 
stated that “he resembled an adult”.128 It then added: 
In the light of these two contradictory testimonies from, on 
the one hand, the Accused and, on the other, P-28, whose ev-
idence requires corroboration on this vital point since it has a 
direct bearing on Germain Katanga’s criminal responsibility, 
the Chamber is not in a position to ascertain whether, at the 
material time, one of the Accused’s bodyguards was under 
the age of 15 years.129 
No other cases before the ICC or SCSL involved video or photo ev-
idence, but clearly, prosecutors and judges can, consciously or subcon-
sciously, make assessments based on the physical appearance and/or de-
meanour of anyone present physically, present via video link or similar 
arrangements. In the Taylor case, the SCSL Trial Chamber explicitly took 
physical appearance into account when it stated that “he looked young at 
the time he gave evidence in 2008 ten years after the incidents he testified 
about”.130 It is possible that physical appearance has had an impact on age 
assessments also in other cases, although more subtly and implicitly. Im-
portantly, such an impact is not necessarily conscious to legal actors but 
rather based on more or less subconscious processing of physical appear-
ance, which is a relatively dominant aspect of our perceptions of others.131 
Oral evidence. As outlined in Table 3, oral evidence was referred to 
in all of the cases. This entails both the testimony of the alleged child sol-
diers themselves as regards their own ages and/or the ages of other alleged 
                                                   
128 Ibid., para. 1080. 
129 Ibid. 
130 SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1431, see above note 67. 
131 For more on this see, for example, the conceptual framework on social perception, Leslie 
Zebrowitz and Joann Montepare, “Social Psychological Face Perception: Why Appearance 
Matters”, in Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2008, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 1–16; 
Leslie Zebrowitz, New Directions in Social Psychology, Reading Faces: Window to the 
Soul?, Westview Press, 1997. Also, there are several studies suggesting that facial appear-
ance predicts criminal justice decisions, see, for example, Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., 
“Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-
Sentencing Outcomes”, in Psychological Science, 2006, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 383–86; John 
Wilson and Nicholas O Rule, “Facial Trustworthiness Predicts Extreme Criminal-
Sentencing Outcomes”, in Psychological Science, vol. 26, no. 8, pp. 1325–31; Leslie 
Zebrowitz and Susan M. McDonald, “The Impact of Litigant’s Baby-Facedness and At-
tractiveness on Adjudications in Small Claims Courts”, in Law and Human Behavior, 1991, 
vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 603–23. 
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child soldiers, as well as the testimony of for instance parents, social 
workers or insider witnesses. In the following all of these testimonies are 
referred to as age statements. 
To illustrate, in the RUF case, the alleged child soldier TF1-314 tes-
tified that she was 10 years when she was captured and raped by the RUF 
in Masingbi, Tonkolili District.132 Both the Sesay and the Gbao defence 
asserted that TFI-314 was not to be relied upon, for example, because 
there were significant inconsistencies in her evidence. 133 However, the 
Chamber opined that her evidence was “largely credible” and that “slight 
variations” between prior statements and those made at trial were immate-
rial.134 
When it comes to the age statements provided by others than the al-
leged child soldiers themselves, these varied in their degree of specificity. 
For instance, in the AFRC case some of the age statements were not spe-
cific at all but describing, for example, a “young boy”135 or indicating 
relatively wide age spans like “between the ages of 10 and 14 years 
old”136 or “some no older than 12 years”.137 In the CDF case, both the 
prosecution witnesses and the defence witnesses indicated the presence of 
children younger than 15. 138 Witness TFI-334 stated that among those 
captured were “many”139 small boys, including some as young as 9 or 10 
years old.140 They were later trained as SBUs (Small Boys Unit) and the 
witness himself had two SBUs. In the RUF case, a witness estimated that 
“45 per cent” of those taken to train at Bunumbu were under the age of 
15.141 Occasionally, there were defence witnesses who disputed the pres-
                                                   
132 SCSL Sesay et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 592–94, see above note 64. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 This was the statement of Witness TF1-023 who testified that she was captured by a 
“young boy” holding a gun on 22 January 1999, see the SCSL Brima et al. Trial Chamber 
Judgment, para. 1262, see above note 59. 
136 This was Witness TF1-227, see ibid., para. 1263. 
137 Witness TF1-122 about the use of children in Kenema District. This witness testified that 
during the Junta period he saw child soldiers, “some no older than 12 years old […]”, ibid., 
para. 1265. 
138 Although these witnesses said that the abductees ranged in “age from 14 to 18 years old”, 
see ibid., para. 1269. 
139 Ibid., para. 1272. 
140 Ibid. 
141 SCSL Sesay et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1438, see above note 64. 
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ence of soldiers younger than 15 years in the armed groups, for example, 
the Zumbe group and the Bedu-Ezekere group in the Ngudjolo case be-
fore the ICC.142 However, in the Ngudjolo case, the Chamber considered 
that the presence of child soldiers had been established, on the basis of 
other witnesses and documentary evidence, while it acquitted Ngudjolo 
for other reasons.143 
Also, there are connections between the video or photo evidence 
and the age statements in the sense that some witnesses based their age 
statements on the physical appearance of the alleged child soldiers. For 
instance, in the Katanga case, the Trial Chamber relied on the observa-
tions of various eyewitnesses as proof of the age element in relation to 
children involved in the attack on Bogoro in February 2003. 144  The 
Chamber noted that: 
P-132 stated without hesitation, on the basis of their physical 
appearance – specifically, their size and facial features – that 
the attackers, whom she had seen and estimated to be ‘small 
children’, were in her view, from 10 to 13 years old, and she 
explained in this regard that ‘you can see a child’s face, and 
from that you can easily tell that he or she is still a child.145 
Similarly, in Ntaganda, witness P-0017 testified that alleged child 
soldiers acting as bodyguards appeared to be between 12 and 13 years 
old. 146 P-0017 based this on the “physiognomy” (own addition: facial 
features or expression), their sizes and the fact that they played, and that 
“they looked more like young boys because they didn’t have any 
breasts”.147 
When comparing the evaluations made by the SCSL and the ICC, it 
appears the SCSL has trusted the provided age statements – particularly 
those of the alleged child soldiers themselves – to a greater extent than the 
                                                   
142 Ngudjolo Chui Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 515–16, see above note 72. The Chamber 
was unable to establish beyond reasonable doubt a link between the accused and the chil-
dren who were in Bogoro on 24 February 2003. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1060, see above note 69. 
145 Ibid., para. 1062. 
146 Ntaganda Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 235, fn. 1508, see above note 74. 
147 Ibid. The Trial Chamber, whose conviction of Ntaganda is now appealed, used this, as well 
as other witness testimony as its basis for concluding that soldiers younger than 15 years 
participated in the assaults forming part of the First Operation, see ibid., p. 235, para. 511. 
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ICC. The likely main explanation of this is that while the age statements 
presented before the SCSL were largely uncontested,148 many of the age 
statements presented before the ICC were strongly contested.149 For in-
stance, in the AFRC case the Trial Chamber150 simply noted that TF1-157 
and TFI-158 were 20 and 18 years old when they testified before the 
Court.151 None of these witnesses could remember the precise year of the 
alleged crimes but the Court inferred their ages at the relevant time on the 
basis of information provided by the witnesses, for example, “given the 
precision with which the witness described his journey […]”,152 in rela-
tion to TFI-157.153 While the AFRC case, the Taylor case and the RUF 
case all resulted in convictions (save for Gbao), the final verdict in the 
CDF case was an acquittal. As outlined in Table 2, the only age evidence 
in the CDF case was oral evidence. The Trial Chamber had accepted and 
considered oral evidence of several witnesses including three former child 
soldiers in determining Kondewa’s responsibility for child enlistment. 
However, it relied solely on the evidence of Witness TF2-021 in arriving 
at its conclusion. The Trial Chamber found that the evidence of witness 
TF2-021 was pivotal in making its factual findings and noted that the 
events in questions occurred when he was very young and that his testi-
mony came many years after the events in question. Nevertheless, the 
Trial Chamber found the testimony of Witness TF2-021 “highly credible 
                                                   
148 Although in the AFRC case, the defence questioned the legal 15-year threshold in a wider 
sense, since it considered it arbitrary as “the ending of childhood (in the traditional African 
setting) has little to do with achieving a particular age more to do with physical capacity to 
perform acts reserved for adults”. See SCSL Brima et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 
730, see above note 59; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Defence, Kanu – Defence Trial Brief, 8 December 
2006, SCSL-2004-16-T, para. 75 (‘Brima et al. Kanu Defence Trial Brief’), referring to 
exhibit D-37, Defence Expert Research Report on the Use of Child Soldiers in the Sierra 
Leone Conflict by Mr. Osman Gbla, paras. 9–11. This contention is discussed in more de-
tail in Section 6.5.3.1.1.1. “Social Age”. 
149 Not the least in case of Lubanga, in which many of the alleged child soldiers were believed 
to have been influenced in their age statements by an intermediate. 
150 SCSL Brima et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1253, 1256, see above note 59. The 
Trial Chambers’ convictions in relation to all three defendants were upheld on appeal, see 
SCSL Brima et al. Appeals Chamber Judgment, see above note 60. 
151 SCSL Brima et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1254, see above note 59. 
152 Ibid. 
153 However, it should also be noted that three other former child soldiers testified before the 
Trial Chamber, TF1-199 TF1-180 and TF1-085 but the Trial Chamber concluded that their 
testimonies were problematic, see ibid. 
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and reliable”154 and on this basis alone, it concluded that he was 11 years 
old at the time of the first enlistment and 13 years old at the time of the 
second enlistment.155 Subsequently, it convicted Kondewa for having en-
listed this one child soldier.156 However, the Appeals Chamber acquitted 
Kondewa of enlisting TF2-021 since it considered that TF2-021 had al-
ready been enlisted when Kondewa initiated him into the Kamajors (and 
the initiation could therefore not be considered enlistment).157 There were 
also other alleged child soldiers and TF2-021 had testified that they were 
of the same age as him but the Appeal’s Chamber referred to “the lack of 
evidence of the ages of the boys who were initiated along with witness 
TF2-021”158 and upheld the Trial Chamber’s acquittal in these parts.159 
Hence, an overall observation on the basis of the SCSL practice is that 
while age statements, together with documentary evidence, have been 
sufficient for proving the age element at the SCSL, the single testimony of 
one alleged child soldier was considered insufficient as regards the ages 
of others.160 When it comes to the ICC cases, regardless of whether they 
have resulted in convictions or acquittals, the Court has not considered the 
age element proven on the basis of age statements. In its assessments, the 
Court has placed emphasis on whether the age statements were consistent 
                                                   
154 SCSL Norman et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 282, see above note 61. 
155 Ibid., para. 970. 
156 Ibid. 
157 SCSL Norman et al. Appeals Chamber Judgment, paras. 145–46, see above note 63. Jus-
tice Winter was dissenting. 
158 Ibid., para. 132. 
159 In relation to Fofana, neither the Trial Chamber nor the Appeals Chamber discusses the age 
element in any detail as they both find that the Prosecution did not establish beyond rea-
sonable doubt that Fofana was individually responsible for any child soldiering crime, see 
SCSL Norman et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 959 and 963, see above note 61 and 
SCSL Norman et al. Appeals Chamber Judgment, paras. 153–54, see above note 63. 
Fofana had acknowledged that the CDF as an organization enlisted child soldiers, but 
submitted that this was insufficient proof that he was personally involved in the crime of 
enlistment. His mere presence at events and his position of authority in the CDF do not 
amount to encouragement or assistance for the purpose of aiding and abetting, see SCSL, 
The Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Defence, 
Fofana Response to Prosecution Appeal Brief, 21 January 2007, SCSL-04-14-A, paras. 60 
and 76. 
160 Although it should be reinforced that the Appeals Chamber did not acquit Kondewa be-
cause they didn’t consider the age element to have been proven on the basis of TF2-021’s 
age statement, but rather that he had already been enlisted when Kondewa initiated him in-
to the Kamajors. 
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over time as well as consistent with other age evidence. This is most 
clearly spelled out in the Lubanga case,161 but also the Katanga162 and 
Ntaganda163 cases illustrate this point. 
Documentary evidence. The documentary evidence entailed a 
range of different document types that provided information about the age 
of specific alleged child soldiers or more generally about groups of al-
leged child soldiers. 
In the former category were for instance ad hoc birth certificates,164 
electoral cards,165 school registers166 and lists of recruits167 which were 
common in many of the ICC cases (for example, Katanga and Lubanga) 
but also in some of the SCSL cases (for example, Taylor and RUF). There 
were often discrepancies between the ages indicated by these different 
documents,168 and/or in relation to the statement of the alleged child sol-
                                                   
161 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 406, see above note 4 where the Trial Chamber 
states that “the extent of the inconsistencies and the other problems with this witness’s evi-
dence supports the suggestion that he provided an account that was false, at least in part”, 
and para. 479: “Nonetheless, for the reasons identified in the relevant analysis for each 
witness, the inconsistencies or other problems with their evidence has led to a finding that 
they are unreliable as regards the matters that are relevant to the charges in this case”. 
162 In this case, several alleged child soldiers appeared in Court but their testimonies were 
considered problematic, see Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment, pp. 1086–87, see above 
note 69. The Chamber considered there was an absence of evidence regarding Katanga’s 
direct involvement in the use of child soldiers and therefore acquitted him. 
163 For instance, P-0809 testified that he joined the UPC when he was “between 13 and a half 
and 14 years of age”, see Ntaganda Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 202 and fn. 482, see 
above note 74 which was consistent with his statement concerning his date of birth, which, 
in turn, corresponded to the information provided in several documents: an electoral card, 
a citizenship certificate and a birth certificate. In the light of this, and absent any specific 
challenges concerning the witness’s date of birth, the Chamber found that he was under 15 
years old at the relevant time. Thus, when the witness was consistent with himself and age 
was not disputed, the age element was considered proven. 
164 For instance, Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 231 and 248, see above note 4. 
165 Ibid., para. 248, citing evidence EVD-D01-00762 (electoral card). 
166 Ibid., for instance, paras. 266 and 397. 
167 See, for example, SCSL Sesay et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1639, see above note 
64. The lists of recruits had been drawn up by adjutants at the base including their names, 
ages and other personal data. 
168 For details on this see Table 3 but, for example, there were inconsistencies in the documen-
tary evidence used to establish P-0007’s age. While the voter card indicated 1987, the birth 
certificate indicated 1990 as his year of birth, see Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 
236, see above note 4. 
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dier him or herself.169 Occasionally, there were also questions relating to 
the veracity of the documents.170 In the Lubanga case the discrepancies 
were believed to have resulted from interference by an intermediary and 
this resulted in that the age element was not considered proven for many 
of the alleged child soldiers. In the SCSL cases, discrepancies were ac-
cepted to a somewhat greater extent, and a contributing cause of this dif-
ference is probably that these discrepancies were not believed to originate 
from interference by an intermediary or similar. For instance, in the Taylor 
case, the Trial Chamber accepted, in relation to “Sumana”, that he “may 
not himself have known his exact age at the time of his abduction, he was 
“very small” at the time and did not yet have facial hair. His father ‘used 
to tell him’ that he was 14, whereas according to his recently acquired 
birth certificate he was actually only 13”.171 The age stated in the birth 
certificate was also inconsistent with the exact age in Sumanas voter ID 
card, but since both documents suggested he was 13 at the time of his 
abduction, the Chamber considered it proven beyond reasonable doubt 
that he was under 15 years at the time of interest.172 
The latter more general category of documents include for instance 
different kinds of reports, like a UN (‘United Nations’) Report in the 
AFRC case.173 This report was released in the wake of the January 1999 
invasion of Freetown and stated that “a significant number of rebel com-
batant were children. Reports were received of death and injuries being 
inflicted by boys as young as 8 to 11 years old”.174 Together with the evi-
dence provided by the alleged child soldiers themselves, as well as that of 
other witnesses, the Trial Chamber considered this sufficient to establish 
                                                   
169 This is outlined in detail in Table 3, but, for example, P-007, at different points in time 
stated that he was born in 1986, 1987 and that he did not know his age, while his voter 
card indicated 1987 and his birth certificate indicated 1990 as his year of birth, see ibid. 
170 For example, in ibid., para. 397, a school register indicated that P-0213 was born in 1989 
but it was established by expert evidence that the entry for the year 1989 overwrote a pre-
vious entry which was partially visible underneath and the underlying reference could not 
be made out. The Trial Chamber considered this entry potentially unreliable and placed lit-
tle reliance on it. 
171 SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1391, see above note 67. 
172 Ibid., paras. 1392–93. 
173 SCSL Brima et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1274, see above note 59, Exhibit P-46, 
“Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra 
Leone”, UN Doc. S/1999/237, 4 March 1999. 
174 Ibid. 
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that children younger than 15 years had been conscripted and/or used dur-
ing the period covered by the indictment.175 However, in the Taylor case, 
the Trial Chamber evaluated similar documentary evidence somewhat 
differently. The Chamber discussed the significance of several reports, for 
example, one from the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers accord-
ing to which 10 per cent of the armed forces which attacked Freetown in 
January 1999 were children.176 There was also a UN Secretary-General 
report stating that a significant number of rebel fighters in the Freetown 
attack were children and that boys as young as 8 to 11 years were killing 
and inflicting injuries.177 The Trial Chamber found that the information 
contained in these, as well as a few other exhibits,178 was based on hear-
say and did not provide sufficient information about the age element.179 
Reports of a similar nature were also present in the ICC case Katanga. 
More specifically, there was a MONUC report on events in Ituri in 2002–
03 according to which 40 per cent of each militia consisted of children 
under the age of 18 years, with a significant minority below the age of 
15.180 In the same case, also an internal register of children admitted to a 
demobilization centre (“the Log Book”) was tendered into evidence.181 It 
contained 952 names of children aged from 9 to 17 years, about 40 of 
whom were under the age of 15 years.182 Although there were doubts as to 
the number of these who were to be considered demobilized child soldiers, 
the Trial Chamber considered itself to be: 
in a position to find that children under the age of 18 years, 
some of whom were under 15 years of age, joined the armed 
                                                   
175 Ibid., para. 1275. 
176 SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 1566–68, see above note 67. 
177 Ibid. 
178 More specifically, the Chamber discusses a confidential report (Exhibit P-0077) according 
to which during the rebels’ attack on Freetown, 8 to 11 year old boys raped, killed and am-
putated the hands of civilians, as well as a Human Rights Watch report (Exhibit P-328, 
Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, and Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 
1999) suggesting that RUF child combatants, armed with pistols, rifles and machetes, were 
seen actively participating in killings and amputations during the Freetown attack, see ibid., 
paras. 1566–68. 
179 Ibid., para. 1573. 
180 Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1052, see above note 69. 
181 Ibid., para. 1054 and fn. 2532, citing evidence EVD-OTP-00120: Admissions log book of 
the Aveba transit site. 
182 Ibid., para. 1054. 
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groups within the Ngiti community of Walendu-Bindi collec-
tivité from 2002 and that some of these, also under the age of 
15 years, were ‘combatants’ within Walendu-Bindi collec-
tivité at the material time.183 
It reached this conclusion based on both the documentary evidence 
and witness evidence,184 but still acquitted Katanga from the child soldier-
ing charges for other reasons than the age element not being proven.185 
Also in the Ngudjolo case, a MONUC Report, together with oral evidence, 
was relied upon for the finding of children younger than 15 years in the 
armed groups. According to this report, there could be “no doubt that all 
of the armed groups […] systematically recruited […] children – ranging 
from 7 to 17 years old – through the district of Ituri”.186 It further stated 
that “at least 40 per cent of each militia force are children below the age 
of 18, with a significant minority below the age of 15”.187 
In two cases from the SCSL; the AFRC case and the Taylor case 
there were also what the Court referred to as “expert witness reports”.188 
While it was never made clear in what way the individuals writing these 
reports had expertise in age estimations specifically, the Court did refer to 
their reports when determining the age element. This is manifested in the 
AFRC case when the Trial Chamber “stresses that both experts agree that 
persons under the age of 15 were used for military purposes by all fac-
                                                   
183 Ibid., para. 1059. 
184 Ibid., pp. 399–400. 
185 As such, the Trial Chamber found that there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that 
there were children within the Ngiti militia and among the combatants who were in Bogo-
ro on the day of the attack. However, the Chamber concluded that the evidence presented 
in support of the accused’s guilt did not satisfy it beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s 
responsibility for these crimes, see ICC, “Katanga Case”, Case Information Sheet (availa-
ble on its web site). Yet, in relation to some alleged child soldiers present in, for example, 
the Ngiti militia’s camps on or around 24 February 2003, the Chamber did not find the age 
element substantiated since there was only one eye-witness testimony which it considered 
insufficiently detailed. Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 1070–73, see above note 
69. 
186 Ngudjolo Chui Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 511, fn. 1182, citing evidence EVD-OTP-
00285: MONUC Report on the Events in Ituri, para. 138, as well as paras. 6, 39, 141, 143, 
147, see above note 72. 
187 Ibid. 
188 SCSL Brima et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, fn. 2243, citing testimony of expert witness 
TF1-296, Transcripts of 4 October 2005 and 5 October 2005, see above note 59. 
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tions, including the AFRC”. 189  A closer examination of these reports 
shows that the prosecution’s expert based the report on “sources”,190 some 
of which has referred to child soldiers as individuals under the age of 18 
rather than 15.191 While this limitation is acknowledged by the Court,192 
there is no questioning of whether the sources have any type of proficien-
cy in estimating age. The defence expert report has similar issues as re-
gards its probative value in relation to the age element, since it is based on 
interviews with individuals in the security forces,193 documents194 and on 
secondary sources.195 
Among the cases outlined in Table 3, the ICC Lubanga case entailed 
the widest range of age evidence, including forensic, video, oral and doc-
umentary evidence. Since the Lubanga case was also the only case which 
dealt exclusively with child soldiering charges,196 the evaluation of the 
age evidence was more in-depth. Therefore, in Table 4, the Court’s evalu-
ation of each piece of evidence available for each respective child soldier 
                                                   
189 Ibid., para. 1251. 
190 Ibid., para. 1248. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Especially the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (‘RSLAF’) and the Sierra Leone 
(‘SLP’) as well as the personnel at the Special Court of Sierra Leone and representative of 
child protection agencies, see SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Defence, Research Report: The Use of Child Soldiers 
in the Sierra Leone Conflict, 11 October 2006, SCSL-2004-16-T, p. 10 (‘Brima et al. De-
fence Research Report on the Use of Child Soldiers in the Sierra Leone Conflict’). 
194 The author cites international documents like the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (‘UNCRC’), the Graca Machel Reports (1996 and 2001) and the Sierra Leone Mili-
tary Forces Act of 1961, see Brima et al. Defence Research Report on the Use of Child 
Soldiers in the Sierra Leone Conflict, p. 11, see above note 193. 
195 Such as desk research and review of relevant documents including books, journal articles, 
reports and newspapers bearing relevance to the issue of child soldiers in the Sierra Leone 
conflict, see ibid. 
196 For the specifics of the charges, as well as the confirmation of the charges, see Lubanga 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, see above note 57. Lubanga was charged as a 
co-perpetrator jointly with other FPLC officers and UPC members and supporters for con-
scripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 years into the FPLC military wing of 
the UPC since September 2002, and using them to participate actively in hostilities. The 
Prosecution submitted that the crimes occurred in the context of an armed conflict not of 
an international character, and this was also the conclusion reached by the Trial as well as 
Appeals Chambers. 
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in the Lubanga case is outlined. In Appendix 1 more details about the 
evidence items, contradictions and the Court’s evaluations are provided. 
Table 4. Implications of age evidence, contradictions and conclusions in relation 



















and O v. D 









and O v. D 
Other: F v. O 
Not prov-
en 
                                                   
197 In the table: “Under” = Any age below 15 years within the time frame of the charges, 
“Over” = 15 years or any age above 15 within the time frame of the charges, “Under/Over” 
= For this evidence type, different evidence items contradicted each other so that some in-
dicated that the individual was under 15 years and some indicated that the individual was 
15 years or over. Furthermore, “NA” = This evidence type was not available, “X” = No 
conclusion was offered. In the column “Contradictions”, “F” = Forensic evidence, “V” = 
Video evidence, “O” = Oral evidence and “D” = Documentary evidence. “External” = Ex-
ternal contradiction, that is, contradictions between different evidence types some suggest-
ing under and other 15 years or older, “Internal” = Internal contradiction, that is, contradic-
tions between different evidence items within the same evidence type some suggesting un-
der and other 15 years or older. “Other” = Other types of contradictions about the specific 
birth year or day while both still suggested either under or 15 years or older or an initially 
retracted testimony. In the column “Court’s conclusion”, “Not proven” = It was not estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt that the individual was under 15 years within the time 
frame of the charges and “Proven” = It was established beyond reasonable doubt that the 
individual was under 15 years within the time frame of the charges. 
198 For all alleged child soldiers in relation to whom forensic evidence was available, this 
forensic evidence was hand or wrist as well as dental X-rays. When evaluating the hand or 
wrist X-rays, the experts used the Greulich and Pyle Atlas. 
199 Contradictions but all accounts suggested under 15 years. 
200 Contradictions, some documents suggested under and other over 15 years. 
201 Contradictions but all accounts suggested under 15 years. 
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P-0010 Un-
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External: F 
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External: F 
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Not prov-
en 
                                                                                                                        
202 Contradictions, some documents suggested under and other over 15 years. 
203 The forensic experts stated it was “scientifically possible” that P-0010 was under 15 years 
at the time of her recruitment. 
204 Contradictions but all own accounts suggested under 15 years. Accounts from defence 
witnesses contradicted this and suggested P-0010 was 15 or older. 
205 Contradictions, some documents suggested under and other over 15 years. 
206 Contradictions but all accounts suggested under 15 years. 
207 According to P-0157’s own testimony he was under 15 years. Defence witnesses were 
unspecific about the age of P-0157. 
208 According to P-0213’s own testimony he was under 15 years. Defence witnesses were 
unspecific about the age of P-0213. 
209 P-0213 had a school register suggesting he was under 15 years but according to expert 
evidence this was unreliable and the Trial Chamber placed little reliance on it. 
210 Contradictions but all documents suggested over 15 years. 
211 Hand, wrist, dental examination suggested P-0297 was under 15 years within the time 
frame of the charges but between 16 and 17 years in January 2008. 
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External: V v. 
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NA Under220 Over221 NA Yes 





NA Under222 Under223 NA No Proven 
                                                                                                                        
212 According to P-0297’s own testimony he was under 15 years. Defence witnesses unspecif-
ic about his age. 
213 Although there were some contradictions in P-0298’s own testimony, first stated he was 
born in 1989 and then couldn’t remember, and also compared to his father’s testimony, ac-
cording to which he was born in 1991. P-0298 initially retracted his testimony in Court but 
maintained his original testimony when appearing in Court two weeks later. 
214 Video excerpt EVD-OTP-00574, filmed at Lubanga’s office, 24 February 2003, 01:49:02. 
215 According to D-0040’s own testimony, introduced by the defence, he was born on 8 April 
1983 and therefore 20 years at the time the footage was shot. 
216 “Manifestly under the age of 15 years”, according to the Trial Chamber. Video excerpt 
EVD-OTP-00571, taken during a presidential rally at the Bunia city stadium, 11 January 
2003, 02:47:15 to 02:47:19. 
217 According to D-0041’s own testimony, introduced by the defence, he was born on 2 De-
cember 1984 and therefore 19 years at the time the footage was shot. 
218 “Clearly under the age of 15” according to the Trial Chamber. Video excerpt EVD-OTP-
00572, showing a group from the UPC meeting with Lendu representatives near the city of 
Lipri, 14 January 2003, 00:00:50, 00:02:47 and 00:28:42. 
219 A witness estimated the age of ‘Bodyguard 1’ to 16 years. 
220 “Clearly under the age of 15”, according to the Trial Chamber. Video excerpt EVD-OTP-
00572, showing a group from the UPC meeting with Lendu representatives near the city of 
Lipri, 14 January 2003, 00:00:50, 00:02:47 and 00:28:42. 
221 A witness estimated the age of ‘Bodyguard 2’ to be 16. 
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Individual 
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NA Under224 NA NA No Proven 
Individual 
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NA Under225 NA NA No Proven 
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NA Under226 NA NA No Proven 
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NA Under227 NA NA No Proven 
Individual 
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9 of 19 
8 un-
der 15 
10 of 19 
10 under 
15 
14 of 19 
9 under 
15 
11 of 19 
3 under 
15 
12 of 19 Proven: 
10 of 19 
As outlined in Table 4, contradictions were relatively common, es-
pecially external contradictions between different evidence types (10 out 
19), followed by other types of contradictions (5 out of 19) and lastly in-
ternal contradictions (3 out of 19). Seemingly, these contradictions im-
pacted differently on the Court’s conclusions in relation to the 15-year 
threshold, probably because some contradictions were believed to arise 
from interference by an intermediary. For 8 out of 19 alleged child sol-
diers, there was forensic evidence suggesting they were younger than 15 
years but for all of these individuals, save for one (P-0213), this was con-
tradicted by oral and/or documentary evidence or there were internal con-
                                                                                                                        
222 “Significantly below 15 years of age” according to the Trial Chamber, Video excerpt EVD-
OTP-00571, taken during a presidential rally at the Bunia city stadium, 11 January 2003, 
02:22:52 to 02:22:54. 
223 According to P-0010 Individual 1 was below 12 years. 
224 Video excerpt EVD-OTP-00570, shot at Rwampapra training camp, 12 February 2003, 
00:06:57 . The Trial Chamber specified that, in its view, the person was a “young male 
who is well below the age of 15”. 
225 “Evidently under the age of 15” according to the Trial Chamber. Video excerpt EVD-OTP-
00571, taken during a presidential rally at the Bunia city stadium, 11 January 2003, 
02:02:44. 
226 “Plainly under the age of 15” according to the Trial Chamber. Testimony of P-0002, evi-
dence EVD-OTP-00410; and video excerpt EVD-OTP-00676, showing a UPC/FPLC rally 
at the stadium in the centre of Bunia, opposite the Ituri Hotel, 26 February 2003, 00:52:14. 
227 “Clearly under the age of 15 years” according to the Trial Chamber. Video excerpt EVD-
OTP-00574, filmed at Lubanga’s office, 24 February 2003, 00:36:21. 
228 “Clearly under the age of 15 years” according to the Trial Chamber. Ibid. 
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tradictions between the oral or documentary items. For none of these indi-
viduals, the age element was considered proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
For the remaining 1 alleged child soldier with forensic, oral and documen-
tary evidence all suggesting he was younger than 15 years (P-0213), the 
result was the same, that is, the Court decided it had not been established 
beyond reasonable doubt that this individual was under 15 years within 
the time frame of the charges. 
The Court seems to have accepted contradictions only for 4 of the 
alleged child soldiers. For these 4 individuals, the video evidence sug-
gested they were younger than 15 years, while the oral and documentary 
evidence introduced by the defence suggested they were over 15 years (D-
0040, D-0041, Bodyguard 1, Bodyguard 2). This contradictory evidence 
did not seem to impact significantly on the Court’s conclusions since the 
Court found it proven beyond reasonable doubt that these individuals 
were younger than 15 years. The same conclusion was reached in relation 
to the 6 remaining alleged child soldiers (Individuals 1–6). For these indi-
viduals only video evidence was available, save for 1 witness in relation 
to Individual 1, and there were no contradictions. 
Hence, from Table 4 it is evident that the Court placed trust in its 
own age assessments based on the physical appearance of alleged child 
soldiers, as they appeared in the video evidence. These assessments were 
considered more reliable than contradictory evidence introduced by the 
defence (D-0040, D-0041, Bodyguard 1, Bodyguard 2) and were also 
considered sufficient even lacking any other age evidence (Individuals 1–
6). Conversely, forensic evidence was not trusted, neither when the other 
evidence offered no contradictions (P-0213), nor when it was wholly or 
partially contradicted by oral and/or documentary evidence introduced by 
the prosecution. Since this analysis only pertains to 19 alleged child sol-
diers in Lubanga, the generalizability of these findings is unknown. One 
important development in this regard will be the Appeal Chamber’s as-
sessments of similar issues in the Ntaganda case.229 As such, the data pre-
sented here, as well as the prospect of future similar assessments motivate 
a thorough examination of challenges and opportunities pertaining to each 
of the relevant evidence types. Such examination is offered in the next 
Section. 
                                                   
229 For more on this see Ntaganda Trial Chamber Judgment, see above note 74. 
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6.5. Challenges and Opportunities with Age Estimations 
This Section examines challenges and opportunities for each of the evi-
dence types that were present in the cases outlined in Table 3, as well as in 
the LUBANGA case specified in Table 4, that is, forensic evidence (Sec-
tion 6.5.1.), video or photo evidence (Section 6.5.2.), oral evidence (Sec-
tion 6.5.3.) and documentary evidence (Section 6.5.4.). 
6.5.1. Forensic Evidence 
6.5.1.1. Challenges 
6.5.1.1.1. Validity 
[…] this approach will only provide an approximate answer, 
particularly given it is not an exact science.230 
Forensic age estimation (FAE) has an inherent challenge to validity, 
namely that forensic methods enable assessments of physiological or bio-
logical age, rather than chronological age.231 Hence, there is a mismatch 
between the construct of interest here; the chronological age and the fo-
rensic ‘proxies’ or operationalizations of it. Although the more specific 
forensic age indicators and methods used vary extensively across different 
jurisdictions, the three most common ones among EU states are assess-
ments including the hand or wrist, that is, bone age,232 teeth, that is, dental 
age233 and clavicle or collarbone (also bone age).234 As outlined in Table 4, 
the Lubanga case entailed hand or wrist and dental X-rays in relation to 9 
alleged UPC child soldiers and when assessing the hands or wrists the 
experts used the so-called Greulich and Pyle (GP) index.235 
One major reason for the lacking validity is that for instance bone 
age and dental age are general in the sense that they indicate trends in a 
                                                   
230 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 176, see above note 4. 
231 See, for example, Doyle et al., 2019, pp. 38–49, see above note 26. 
232 Bone age is defined as the general degree of maturation of bone that subjects of a popula-
tion reach at a certain average age. This term may be used when referring to the bone age 
of a specific anatomical region such as the bone age in the hand and wrist, see ibid. 
233 Dental age is defined as the general degree of development of teeth that subjects of a popu-
lation reach at a certain average age, see ibid. 
234 Dental X-rays, wrist X-rays and collar bone X-rays are all age indicators included in the 
recommendations by The Study Group on Forensic Age Diagnostics, see Schmeling et al., 
2008, see above note 21; Schmeling et al., 2016, see above note 21. 
235 Lubanga Transcript of 12 May 2009, pp. 44–45, see above note 105. 
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population and it is uncertain whether and to what extent such trends are 
informative for individual assessments such as legal age estimations. This 
means that FAEs are properly understood as estimations of the most prob-
able chronological age of an individual considering their skeletal and den-
tal age, as well as their specific demographic characteristics such as sex, 
health, nutrition, and so on. As such, it is unknown exactly how bone age 
and dental age correlate with chronological age.236 Consequently, it has 
been widely acknowledged that estimating chronological age is complex, 
some say “at best an educated guess”237 and when possible, multiple tech-
niques from different forensic disciplines should be used.238 
Hence, the research available today does not allow safe conclusions 
about how much or little the results of FAEs deviate from the chronologi-
cal ages of individuals or whether over- or under-estimations are more 
likely. While research has enabled the identification of error intervals 
and/or the proportion of false positives/negatives, these studies use differ-
ent methodologies, for example when it comes to imaging techniques 
and/or the applied assessment scales as well as different samples,239 and 
they also define and express error somewhat differently. 240 Hence, the 
more specific error which is most relevant for an individual assessment 
will vary. Appendix 2 provides an overview of meta-analyses and other 
studies outlining error intervals and/or the risk of false positives/negatives 
                                                   
236 In other words, chronological age, dental age and bone age are not necessarily the same in 
a given individual, see, for example, Francesco Introna and Carlo P. Campobasso, “Biolog-
ical vs Legal Age of Living Individuals”, in Aurore Schmitt, Eugénia Cunha and João Pin-
heiro (eds.), Forensic Anthropology and Medicine, Humana Press, 2006, pp. 57–82. 
237 Wenke, 2017, p. 29, see above note 9. 
238 See, for example, EASO, 2018, p. 17, see above note 19. 
239 As implied above, the errors identified in research stem from studies using different kinds 
of methodologies, as a result of the disparities and lack of incorporated best practices for 
FAEs. This also means that it is unknown to what extent the error rates will be representa-
tive for the specific assessment in question, for example, in a real criminal case. Even 
though more specific information of the respective studies is provided in Appendix 2, this 
research is not necessarily sufficient to establish sound error intervals for each specific 
methodology. For that purpose, more studies with the exact same methodology would have 
to be conducted. For more on how error rates are often a problematic construct, see Itiel E. 
Dror, “The Error in ‘Error Rate’: Why Error Rates Are So Needed, Yet so Elusive”, in 
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2020, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 1–27. 
240 For instance, some of the studies define and express error as a deviation from the exact 
known chronological age while other studies use percentages to express how many false 
positives or false negatives were obtained in relation to a specific age threshold (15, 18, 21) 
using a certain methodology to study a certain skeletal area in a certain sample. 
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in this regard. Research is still being conducted as regards the most ap-
propriate methodological choices 241 as well as which skeletal areas to 
assess.242 
Due to the large variation in how research studies have been con-
ducted, it is uninformative to present average errors in estimations of 
chronological age based on hand/wrist, dental, clavicle as well as com-
bined assessments. However, it is possible to outline factors that are likely 
to influence the error interval/risk of a false positive or negative. Legal 
actors should aim to gain an understanding of these factors for example by 
asking the hired and/or other experts. These factors include, but are not 
limited to, the following three. 
To begin with, it varies whether and to what extent the applied 
methods/scales etc. have been validated in relation to the population of 
interest. In this regard, it can be noted that while the GP Index,  which 
was used by the experts in Lubanga, is the most commonly used index 
today,243 there are indications that it results in over-estimations of age for 
                                                   
241 For instance, when it comes to which imaging modalities to use. Some modalities that are 
discussed are ultrasound, CT, DXA/DEXA and MRI. See Sara Larsen, Arge Tangmose and 
Niels Lynnerup, “The Danish Approach to Forensic Age Estimation in the Living: How, 
How Many and What’s New? A Review of Cases Performed in 2012”, in Annals of Human 
Biology: Age Estimation, 2015, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 342–47; Fukran Ufuk, Kadir Agladiogl 
and Nevzat Karabulut, “CT Evaluation of Medial Clavicular Epiphysis as a Method of 
Bone Age Determination in Adolescents and Young Adults”, in Diagnostic and Interven-
tional Radiology, 2016, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 241–46; Denise Heppe, “Bone Age Assessment 
by Dual-energy X-ray Absorptiometry in Children: An Alternative for X-ray”, in British 
Journal of Radiology, 2012, vol. 85, no. 1010, pp. 114–20; Dedouit et al., “Age Assess-
ment by Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Knee: A Preliminary Study”, in Forensic Sci-
ence International, 2012, vol. 217, pp. 232.e1-232.e7; Krämer et al., “Forensic Age Esti-
mation in Living Individuals using 3.0 T MRI of the Distal Femur”, in International Jour-
nal of Legal Medicine, 2014, vol. 128, pp. 509–14. 
242 Apart from the already mentioned skeletal areas, reference data sets and atlases exists also 
for knees, foot/ankle, elbow and iliac crest. For more on this, see Sarah Pyle and Normand 
Louise Hoerr, Radiographic Atlas of Skeletal Development of the Foot and Ankle: A 
Standard of Reference, Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1957; Herman Grossman, “Ra-
diology of the Pediatric Elbow”, in Pediatric Annals, 1982, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 560–62; 
Sven Schmidt et al., “Sonographic Evaluation of Apophyseal Ossification of the Iliac Crest 
in Forensic Age Diagnostics in Living Individuals”, in International Journal of Legal Med-
icine, 2011, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 271–76. 
243 The Greulich and Pyle (GP) Atlas is based on Dr. William Walter Greulich and Dr. Sara 
Ideel Pyle’s The Radiographic Atlas of Skeletal Development of the Hand and Wrist which 
was first published in 1959, but remains today the most commonly used atlas for skeletal 
age measurement by radiologists. The GP Atlas contains reference images of the left 
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some populations.244 Therefore, it is often recommended that the GP is 
combined with other methods to promote a more accurate result. Although 
the GP approach is considered applicable and reliable for children in the 
UK, 245Australia 246 and the Middle East, 247 disparities have been noted 
with for example Asian children, 248  and Afro-American and Hispanic 
samples.249 For this reason, the GP approach has been adapted to a few 
populations, for example, from the Basque Country (used as a national 
reference in Spain)250 and Germany,251 but not for populations in any of 
                                                                                                                        
hand/wrist for male and female standard from birth till 18 years of age for females and 19 
years of age for males. There are also written explanations of gradual age-related changes 
observed in the bone structure that accompany each standard image. To calculate bone age, 
a non-dominant wrist radiograph of the subject is compared with the nearest matching ref-
erence radiographs in the atlas. For more on this, see Cree M. Gaskin et al., Skeletal De-
velopment of the Hand and Wrist: A Radiographic Atlas and Digital Bone Age Companion, 
Oxford University Press, 2011; William W. Greulich and S. Idell Pyle, Radiographic Atlas 
of Skeletal Development of hand and Wrist, Stanford University Press, 1959; Abdul M. 
Zafar, “An Appraisal of Greulich-Pyle Atlas for Skeletal Age Assessment in Pakistan”, in 
Journal of Pakistan Medical Association, 2010, vol. 60, no. 7, pp. 552–55. 
244 Vilma Pinchi et al., “Skeletal Age Estimation for Forensic Purposes: A Comparison of GP, 
TW2 and TW 3 Methods on an Italian Sample”, in Forensic Science International, 2014, 
vol. 238, pp. 83–90. 
245 Lucina Hackman and Sue Black, “Age Estimation from Radiographic Images of the Knee”, 
in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2013, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 732–37. 
246 LIN Ni-Hung, “New Growth References for Assessment of Stature and Skeletal Matura-
tion in Australians”, in Australasian Orthodontic Journal, 2015, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1–10. 
247 Michalle Soudack et al., “Bone Age in the 21st Century: is Greulich and Pyle’s Atlas Accu-
rate for Israeli Children”, in Pediatric Radiology, 2012, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 343–48. 
248 Bora Buken et al., “Is the Assessment of Bone Age by the Greulich-Pyle Method Reliable 
at Forensic Age Estimation for Turkish Children”, in Forensic Science International, 2007, 
vol. 173, no. 2, pp. 146–53; Zafar, 2010, pp. 552–55, see above note 243. 
249 Pedro Manuel Garamendi et al., “Reliability of the Methods Applied to Assess Age Minor-
ity in Living Subjects Around 18 years Old – A Survey on a Moroccan Origin Population”, 
in Forensic Science International, 2005, vol. 154, no. 1, pp. 3–12; Randall T. Loder et al., 
“Applicability of the Greulich and Pyle Skeletal Age Standards to Black and White Chil-
dren of Today”, in American Journal of Diseases of Children, 1993, vol. 147, no. 12, pp. 
1329–33; Stefano Mora et al., “Skeletal Age Determinations in Children of European and 
African Descent: Applicability of the Greulich and Pyle Standards”, in Pediatric Research, 
2001, vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 624–28; Francesca K. Ontell, “Bone Age in Children of Diverse 
Ethnicity”, in American Journal of Roentgenology, 1996, vol. 167, no. 6, pp. 1395–98. 
250 Manuel Hernández, Skeletal Maturation and Height Prediction: Atlas and Scoring Meth-
ods, Ediciones Diaz de Santos, 1991. 
251 Hans-Heinrich Thiemann, Inna Nitz and Andreas Schmeling, “Röntgenatlas Der Normalen 
Hand im Kindesalter” (Radiographic Atlas of the Normal Hand At an early Age), in Inter-
national Journal of Legal Medicine, 2007, vol. 12, p. 149. 
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the countries in which the child soldiering crimes allegedly have taken 
place (see Table 2). 
Secondly, it is essential to find out whether and how demographic 
factors (sex, health, nutrition etc.) pertaining to the examined individual 
have been taken into account by the expert. There is no universally ac-
cepted standard for how to quantify demographic factors, although evi-
dence-based guidelines252 encourage forensic practitioners to find out as 
much assessment-relevant information as they possibly can.253 This does 
not eliminate the issue since compliance rates are unknown254 and it is far 
from self-evident how experts should integrate and express such factors. 
Thirdly, so-called age mimicry, means that the specific age distribu-
tion in the studied population influences the results obtained for different 
                                                   
252 A number of guidelines exist in age estimation in living individuals, see, for example Sue 
Black, Anil Aggrawal and Jason Payne-James, Age Estimation in the Living: The Practi-
tioner’s Guide, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010; EASO, 2018, p. 17, see above note 19; Daniel 
Franklin et al., “Forensic Age Estimation in Living Individuals: Methodological Consider-
ations in the Context of Medico-Legal Practice”, in Research and Reports in Forensic 
Medical Science, 2015, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 53–66; Michael J. Thali, Mark D. Viner and Gil 
Brogdon, Brogdon’s Forensic Radiology, CRC Press, 2012. There are also guidelines on 
how to formulate the expert witness statement, see, for example American College of Ra-
diologists, ACR Practice Parameter on the Physician Expert Witness in Radiology and 
Radiation Oncology, 2014; Royal College of Radiologists, Providing Expert Advice to the 
Court: Guidance for Members and Fellows, 2012. 
253 Forensic practitioners are encouraged to ensure that they have knowledge of all of the 
information that is available about the individual in questions, including but not limited to: 
sex, ancestry, geographical background, socio-economic status, health status, medication, 
diet, and lifestyle habits. Furthermore, these factors are to be taken into account when un-
dertaking the skeletal age assessment. For more on this, see, for example, Robert Camer-
iere et al., “Effects of Nutrition on Timing of Mineralization in Teeth in a Peruvian Sample 
by the Cameriere and Demirjian Methods”, in Annals of Human Biology, 2007, vol. 34, no. 
5, pp. 547–66; Lynn Meijerman et al., “Variables Affecting the Probabiliy of Complete Fu-
sion of the Medial Clavicular Epiphysis”, in International Journal of Legal Medicine, 
2007, vol. 121, no. 6, pp. 463–68; Andreas Olze et al., “Forensic Age Estimations in Liv-
ing Subjects: The Ethic Factor in Wisdom Tooth Mineralization”, in International Journal 
of Legal Medicine, 2004, vol. 118, no. 3, pp. 170–73; Andreas Schmeling et al., “Effects of 
Ethnicity on Skeletal Maturation: Consequences for Forensic Age Estimation”, in Interna-
tional Journal of Legal Medicine, 2000, vol. 113, no. 5, pp. 252–58; Andreas Schmeling, 
“The Impact of Economic Progress and Modernization in Medicine on the Ossification of 
Hand and Wrist”, in International Journal of Legal Medicine, 2006, vol. 120, no. 2, pp. 
121–26. 
254 Overall, there is a need for better co-ordination in the field of forensic age estimations. 
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ossification/mineralization stages. 255  To illustrate, the ossification of a 
skeletal area may be graded on a scale from 1 to 5 and researchers try to 
understand at what age stage 4 is reached. In a study, the ages of the stud-
ied population are evenly distributed between 15 and 20 years, and the 
result is that stage 4 is reached at 17 years with a 2-year dispersion. Later, 
the study is extended to also include 12 to 14-year olds so that the ages in 
the studied population are evenly distributed between 12 and 20 years. 
Now, the average age at which stage 4 is reached is 16 years with a diver-
sion of 2.5 years. This is because the extended study also included indi-
viduals whose skeleton ossified unusually early, and thereby they reach 
stage 4 before they turn 15 years. These individuals will then decrease the 
average age at which stage 4 is reached and also increase the diversion. 
Since legal age elements such as the 15-year threshold of interest 
here entail dichotomous decisions; either someone is considered younger 
than 15 years or instead 15 years or older, it is not necessarily a require-
ment to know someone’s exact age. In other words, it does not matter 
whether an alleged child soldier is 13 or 14 years as long as he or she is 
younger than 15 years and vice versa; it does not matter if he or she is 17 
or 18 years as long as he or she has turned 15 years or more. Consequently, 
the error intervals are only a problem if they comprehend the 15-year 
threshold (for example, 13–16 years) or if the crime in question is a con-
tinuous crime and it is relevant to establish whether someone turned 15 
years in the duration of the crime. The war crime(s) of conscripting, en-
listing and/or using child soldiers is indeed a continuous crime256 and it is 
possible that such questions will arise. However, the dichotomous nature 
of the age element means that not all types of uncertainty are necessarily 
legally relevant, even if they come from a science that is inexact.257 Argu-
                                                   
255 For more on age mimicry and possible methods for researchers to prevent it, see, for ex-
ample, Øyvind Bleka et al., “BioAlder: A Tool for Assessing Chronological Age Based on 
Two Radiological Methods”, in International Journal of Legal Medicine, 2019, vol. 133, 
pp. 1177–89. See also The Norwegian Institute of Public Health (NIPH), “Demirjian’s De-
velopment Stages on Wisdom Teeth for Estimation of Chronological Age: A Systematic 
Review”, March 2017 (available on its web site). 
256 As such, it only ends when the child reaches the 15-year threshold or leaves the force or 
group, see Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 618, see above note 4. 
257 It can be noted that the statement from the Trial Chamber that forensic age estimations can 
only provide approximate answers since they do not come from an exact science, is likely 
to originate from the testifying expert herself, since she, fully accurately and in line with 
provided guidelines draws the Court’s attention to sources of variation in the estimations, 
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ably, there is no such thing as an exact science, but rather scientific fields 
or scientists that are more or less effective in communicating uncertainty 
and what uncertainty means.258 In this specific context, a prerequisite for 
communicating uncertainty effectively is for experts to state their conclu-
sions as age intervals with minimum and maximum ages rather than one 
single age.259 While such conduct is in line with guidelines developed to 
promote international best practice among forensic practitioners, it is un-
known to what extent the guidelines are abided by in practice.260 In the 
Lubanga case the experts did not offer any specific age intervals but did 
express uncertainty in their estimations, for instance that it was “scientifi-
cally possible”261 that an alleged child soldier was under 15 years. In rela-
tion to other alleged child soldiers, the experts provided more general 
statements like someone being “born before December 1988”.262 Presum-
ably, this is an indication that the experts knew that December 1988 was 
                                                                                                                        
see Lubanga Transcript of 12 May 2009, see above note 105, p. 34, lines 15–20: “[…] But 
you must understand that this is not a precise science […] There are a number of variation 
factors, and they are well known”. Whether the expert and the Court understands precise-
ness or exactness in the same way is a different topic. 
258 The topic of communicating scientific uncertainty between scientific experts and legal 
experts has received more attention in recent years as this has proven to be relatively chal-
lenging, see, for example, Agnes S. Bali et al., “Communicating Forensic Science Opinion: 
An Examination of Expert Reporting Practices”, in Science and Justice, 2020, vol. 60, no. 
3, pp. 1–9; Rafael Urbaniak et al., “Decision-theoretic and Risk-based Approaches to Na-
ked Statistical Evidence: Some Consequences and Challenges”, in Law, Probability and 
Risk, 2020, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1–17. A topic that seems particularly relevant is how uncer-
tainty reported from different scientific fields relate to ‘reasonable doubt’. Although age 
estimations will always be associated with doubts, some doubts may be unreasonable giv-
en that there may not be more certain scientific methods available and in an epistemologi-
cal sense it might not make sense to doubt this knowledge. Similarly, if scientific uncer-
tainty is regularly understood as reasonable doubt, this may make criminal justice ineffi-
cient. 
259 For more on this see Doyle et al., 2019, pp. 38–49, see above note 26. 
260 See ibid. Some argue that the so-called minimum age concept is a useful approach in the 
forensic setting, see Schmeling et al., 2016, pp. 44–50, see above note 21. 
261 Experts P-0358 and P-0359: “it is scientifically possible for P-0010 to have been under the 
age of 15 at the time of her recruitment in late 2002”. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, OTP, Prosecution’s Closing Brief, 1 June 2011, ICC-01/04-01/06-2748-
Red, para. 400, fn. 1156, citing expert report EVD-OTP-00430 (‘Lubanga Prosecution’s 
Closing Brief’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/92ecf9/); and Lubanga Trial Chamber 
Judgment, para. 264, see above note 4. 
262 See ibid., para. 177, fn. 452, citing expert report EVD-OTP-00428, T-172-Red-ENG, p. 47, 
lines 7 ff. The expert concluded that the witness was aged at least 19 on 5 December 2007 
and was therefore born before December 1988. 
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an important date in relation to the 15-year threshold, and it can be ques-
tioned whether their assessments would have been different without such 
knowledge (for more on this see Section 6.5.1.1.3. “Biasability”). 
Yet another potential challenge with using FAE’s is the frequently 
long time-span from the point in time when the alleged war crime(s) in-
volving child soldiers took place to the point in time when the ages of the 
alleged child soldiers are to be estimated. In the Lubanga case, the official 
documents do not indicate when the dental and hand or wrist X-rays were 
taken, but as outlined in Table 2, approximately 10 years had passed since 
the beginning of the alleged crime (2002) up until the first conviction 
(2012). Even though such a time span is common in child soldiering cas-
es263 and unsurprising given the complexities associated with such inves-
tigations264 it poses a risk that FAEs are no longer informative. More spe-
cifically, alleged child soldiers who were younger than 15 years at the 
time of the alleged crimes will have matured physically to the extent that 
examining their wrists, teeth or collarbones is pointless. Their hands or 
wrists and collarbones may already have fully fused and their teeth may 
have fully emerged as well as mineralized. Although there is clearly indi-
vidual variation as to when this happens, research suggests that hand or 
wrist ossification as well as third molar (“wisdom teeth”) mineralization 
are commonly completed at some point between 18 and 20 years.265 Also, 
                                                   
263 See, for instance, the Taylor case in which approximately 16 years passed between the 
commencement of the crime and the first conviction (1996–2012) and the Ntaganda case 
in which approximately 17 years had passed (2002–19), although neither of these cases en-
tailed forensic evidence about the alleged child soldiers’ ages. 
264 See, for example, Elinor Fry, “The Nature of International Crimes and Evidentiary Chal-
lenges”, in Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiliev (eds.), Pluralism in International Crim-
inal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 251–72; Mark Klamberg, Evidence 
in International Criminal Procedure: Confronting Legal Gaps and the Reconstruction of 
Disputed Events, Stockholm University, Stockholm, 2012. 
265 Different studies show different results, and age mimicry is one possible explanation of 
this. For more on the topic, see Mattias Haglund and Håkan Mörnstad, “A Systematic Re-
view and Meta-analysis of the Fully Formed Wisdom Tooth as a Radiological Marker of 
Adulthood”, in International Journal of Legal Medicine, 2019, vol. 133, no. 1, pp. 231–39, 
according to which 50 per cent of the studied individuals had fully matured wisdom teeth 
when 20 years old; Petter Mostad and Fredrik Tamsen, “Error Rates for Unvalidated Medi-
cal Age Assessment Procedures”, in International Journal of Legal Medicine, 2019, vol. 
133, pp. 613–23, suggesting that this occurs at 19.5 years for 50 per cent of the studied in-
dividuals; Manzor Mughal, Arsalan Hassan and Anwar Ahmed, “Bone Age Assessment 
Methods: A Critical Review”, in Pakistan Journal of Medical Sciences, 2014, vol. 30, no. 
1, pp. 211–15, implying that some individuals have fully matured bones at 18 years. 
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the medial epiphysis of the clavicle or collarbone fuses around the age of 
22 years.266 Therefore, a CT of the medial end of the clavicle is the most 
commonly used and extensively developed modality for assessing indi-
viduals aged 18–22 years.267 It is therefore possible that further evaluation 
based on the clavicle could have provided more relevant information in 
the Lubanga case for some of the alleged child soldiers. For instance, 
based on the hand or wrist assessment of one alleged child soldier, the 
expert noted that: 
It is a simple case here. There is no growth cartilage any 
longer, and there is no clear or light line around the radius of 
the ulna. Therefore, we can conclude that this young individ-
ual has finished growing, has reached the last stage of the 
Greulich and Pyle index. That is, he is at least 19 years of 
age. From that point onward, we cannot determine whether 
he’s 19, 25, or 90 years old, because once the bones have 
fused, it’s forever.268 
Other possibilities to estimate age in situations like these, including 
for example DNA methylation are discussed in Section 6.5.1.2. Opportu-
nities. 
6.5.1.1.2. Reliability 
Since X-rays are depictions of human skeleton made using more or less 
accurate and precise technologies, X-rays can often be quite ambiguous. 
The task difficulty stemming from the X-ray itself is likely to result in a 
more or less serious lack of Between Expert Reliability.269 In other words, 
                                                   
266 Although this is dependent on the biological sex of the individual, see Louise Scheuer and 
Sue M. Black, Developmental Juvenile Osteology, Academic Press, London, 2000; Andre-
as Schmeling et al., “Studies on the Time Frame for Ossification of the Medial Clavicular 
Epiphyseal Cartilage in Conventional Radiography”, in International Journal of Legal 
Medicine, 2004, vol. 118, no. 1, pp. 5–8. 
267 See Doyle et al., 2019, pp. 38–49, see above note 26; Mughal, Hassan and Ahmed, 2014, 
pp. 211–15, see above note 265. 
268 Lubanga Transcript of 12 May 2009, pp. 44–45, see above note 105. 
269 For more on the topic of why experts disagree with one another see, for example, Moa 
Lidén and Itiel E. Dror, “Expert Reliability in Legal Proceedings: “Eeny, Meeny, Miny, 
Moe, With Which Expert Should We Go?””, in Science and Justice, 2020, pp. 1–21; Itiel E. 
Dror and Daniel C. Murrie, “A Hierarchy of Expert Performance (HEP) Applied to Foren-
sic Psychological Assessments”, in Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2018, vol. 24, no. 
1, pp. 11–23; Lucy A. Guarnera, Daniel C. Murrie and Marcus T. Boccaccini, “Why Do 
Forensic Experts Disagree? Sources of Unreliability and Bias in Forensic Psychology 
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experts examining the exact same X-ray to estimate the age of the exact 
same individual, are likely to make different observations and also draw 
different conclusions. There is no worldwide study on the prevalence and 
extent of this problem. However, field data from asylum cases dealt with 
by the Swedish Board of Forensic Medicine shows that two independent 
odontologists examining the exact same dental X-rays to make determina-
tions in relation to the 18 year threshold reached different conclusions as 
to whether the third molars (“the wisdom teeth”) were fully matured or 
not in 9.29 per cent of the cases.270 Similarly, radiologists examining the 
exact same knee X-rays disagreed about whether the knees were fully 
fused in 8.05–55.00 per cent of the cases.271 Notably, also across these 
different categories of experts there was disagreement in 11.98–42.66 per 
cent of the cases.272 In other words, age estimation in relation to the same 
individual may vary depending on whether an odontologist or radiologist 
is asked to conduct the assessment,273 as well as which more specific od-
ontologist or radiologist makes the assessment. Similar results have been 
found under controlled experimental conditions for age estimations based 
on knee X-rays274 and wrist X-rays,275 other types of radiological interpre-
                                                                                                                        
Evaluations”, in Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 2017, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 
143–52; Daniel C. Murrie and Janet Warren, “Clinician Variation in Rates of Legal Sanity 
Opinions: Implications for Self-Monitoring”, in Professional Psychology: Research and 
Practice, 2005, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 519–24; Marcus T. Boccaccini, Darrel B. Turner and 
Daniel C. Murrie, “Do Some Evaluators Report Consistently Higher or Lower PCL-R 
Scores than Others? Findings from a Statewide Sample of Sexually Violent Predator Eval-
uations”, in Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2008, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 262–83. 
270 For more on the Swedish data and the problem of lacking between expert reliability see 
Lidén and Dror, 2020, pp. 1–21, see above note 269. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
273 As regards the national context, it can be noted that most European countries use two or 
more age indicators but which these two indicators are vary somewhat, see EASO, 2018, p. 
58, see above note 19. 
274 More specifically, this related to estimations based on the proximal tibial epiphyses, in 
relation to which interobserver agreement of κ = 0.941–0.951, see Christian Ottow et al., 
“Forensic Age Estimation by Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Knee: the Definite Rel-
evance in Bony Fusion of the Distal Femoral- and the Proximal Tibial Epiphyses using 
Closest to Bone TI TSE Sequence”, in European Radiology, 2017, vol. 27, no. 12, pp. 
5041–48. 
275 Hans Henrik Thodberg and Lars Sävendahl, “Validation and Reference Values of Automat-
ed Bone Age Determination for Four Ethnicities”, in Academic Radiology, 2010, vol. 17, 
no. 11, p. 1428. 
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tations relating to wrist X-rays276 as well as in specialist neuroradiolo-
gy.277 
Unlike in the studies cited above, it seems like the experts involved 
in the Lubanga case were not strictly speaking independent of one another 
as they regularly worked together on age assessment matters278 and while 
they had different main responsibilities, they presented joint conclusions 
in a report jointly signed.279 Although the more specific circumstances of 
their assessments are unknown, it is possible that they were aware of each 
other’s conclusions and were influenced by them, and such influence is 
not necessarily conscious at all. Reasonably, the evidence from two or 
more independent examiners who reach the same conclusions has a 
stronger probative value. Yet, it should also be noted that one of the ex-
perts testifying in the Lubanga case herself pointed out the potential prob-
lem of lacking Between Expert Reliability (as well as Within Expert Reli-
ability). More specifically, she stated that the likely variability in relation 
to the interpretation of hand X-rays between experts is one year, while the 
variation between one and the same experts at different points in time is 
less.280 Clearly, neither the Trial nor the Appeals Chamber trusted the fo-
rensic evidence as a bases for age estimations of the alleged child soldiers, 
see Table 4, since this evidence was believed to come from an inexact 
science. While this is obviously true, an alternative approach would have 
                                                   
276 More specifically, this was for the detection of bone erosion in rheumatoid arthritis and 
disagreement varied depending on what radiological technique was used, see Richard Wa-
ver et al., “Carpal Pseudoerosions: A Plain X-ray Interpretation Pitfall”, in Skeletal Radi-
ology, 2014, vol. 43, no. 10, pp. 1377–85. 
277 Gaving Briggs et al., “The Role of Specialist Neuroradiology Second Opinion Reporting: 
Is there Added Value?”, in Clinical Radiology, 2008, vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 791–95. 
278 Lubanga Transcript of 13 May 2009, p. 22, see above note 106. 
279 Ibid., pp. 46–47. After a question from the defence on this matter, the second expert indi-
cated that she did look at the hand or wrist X-rays as well, although her conclusions in the 
report bore only on the dental age assessments. 
280 See ibid. The expert is asked what the limits of the conclusions are and answers inter alia 
that: “[…] you must understand that this is not a precise science […]” (ibid., p. 34). Then 
she specifies: “First of all, there is what we call intra-or inter-individual variability […]” 
(ibid.) and later on explains that “We deemed that the inter-variability is about one year […] 
and we know that this intra-variability, individual variability, is lower, shorter than one 
year”. (ibid., p. 35). As other factors that limit the conclusions, she states, for example, so-
cio-economic conditions and geographical origin and the fact that the Atlas used assess age 
was based on other populations than those of interest in the Lubanga case. 
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been to include more experts, and independent experts, for example, from 
different countries. This is elaborated on in Section 6.5.1.2. 
6.5.1.1.3. Biasability 
Today, there is ample research into the so-called forensic confirmation 
bias.281 This research highlights how the assessments of forensic examin-
ers can be biased by knowledge of different types of contextual infor-
mation, for instance that the suspect confessed,282 what the investigators’ 
hypothesis is283 or other evidence available in the case,284 especially if 
such evidence has strong emotional content (for example, pictures of 
wounded children). 285  Effects of contextual information have been 
demonstrated in relation to fingerprint analysis,286 comparisons of shoe 
prints,287 bite marks,288 bullets289 and handwriting samples.290 It has also 
                                                   
281 For an overview of this field see Kassin, Dror and Kukucka, 2013, pp. 42–52, see above 
note 30. For a response by a forensic examiner see Leonard Butt, “The Forensic Confirma-
tion Bias: Problems, Perspective, and Proposed Solutions: Commentary by a Forensic Ex-
aminer”, in Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2013, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 
59–60. For other parts of this debate see Jeff Kukucka, “People Who Live in Ivory Towers 
Shouldn’t Throw Stones: A Refutation of Curley et al.”, in Forensic Science International, 
2020, vol. 2, pp. 1–11. 
282 See, for example, Jeff Kukucka and Saul Kassin, “Do Confessions Taint perceptions of 
Handwriting Evidence? An Empirical Test of the Forensic Confirmation Bias”, in Law and 
Human Behavior, 2013, vol. 38. no. 3, pp. 1–15. 
283 See, for example, Kassin, Dror and Kukucka, 2013, pp. 42–52, see above note 30. 
284 See, for example, Itiel E. Dror and David Charlton, “Why Experts Make Errors”, in Jour-
nal of Forensic Identification, 2006, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 600–16; and Itiel E. Dror, David 
Charlton and Ailsa E. Péron, “Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Mak-
ing Erroneous Identifications”, in Forensic Science International, 2006, vol. 156, no. 1, pp. 
74–78. 
285 See, for example, Itiel E. Dror et al., “When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of 
Contextual Top-down processing on Matching Fingerprints”, in Applied Cognitive Psy-
chology, 2005, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 799–809. 
286 Osborne and Zajac, 2016, pp. 126–34, see above note 33. 
287 José H. Kerstholt, Roos Passhuis and Marjan Sjerps, “Shoe Print Examinations: Effects of 
Expectation, Complexity and Experience”, in Forensic Science International, 2007, vol. 
165, no. 1, pp. 30–34. 
288 Nikola K.P. Osborne et al., “Does Contextual Information Bias Bitemark Comparisons?”, 
in Science and Justice, 2014, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 267–73. 
289 José H. Kerstholt et al., “Does Suggestive Information Cause a Confirmation Bias in Bul-
let Comparisons?”, in Forensic Science International, 2010, vol. 198, no. 1, pp. 138–42. 
290 Kukucka and Kassin, 2013, pp. 1–15, see above note 282. 
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been noted in bloodstain pattern analysis (‘BPA’),291 dog detection evi-
dence,292 evaluations of skeletal remains,293 arson investigations,294 foren-
sic pathology295 and a range of forensic reconstructions.296 Also, a bias 
may be introduced because of base rate expectations, that is, the bias does 
not originate from anything related to the specific case at hand but instead 
on past experience of other cases in the past, which results in expectations 
about the nature of this specific case.297 Such expectations may impact on 
examiners’ perceptions of a specific piece of evidence, even if logically 
speaking, the expectations cannot change the nature of the evidence. 
While the question of bias in relation to interpretations of X-rays or 
MRI-images specifically has not been empirically evaluated yet, the cited 
                                                   
291 Nikola K.P. Osborne, Michael C. Taylor and Rachel Zajac, “Exploring the Role of Contex-
tual Information in Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: A Qualitative Approach”, in Forensic Sci-
ence International, 2016, vol. 260, pp. 1–8. 
292 Lisa Lit, Julie B. Schweitzer and Anita M. Oberbauer, “Handler Beliefs Affect Scent De-
tection Dog Outcomes”, in Animal Cognition, 2011, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 387–94. Also, since 
the ultimate determination that an alert has been signalled by the dog rests solely with the 
human handler, the process is highly dependent on human judgments and therefore also 
potentially fallible in this regard, see Sherri Minhinnick et al., “Training Fundamental and 
the Selection of Dogs and Personnel for Detection Work”, in Tadeusz Jezierski, John 
Ensminger, L.E. Papet (eds.), Canine Olfaction Science and Law: Advances in Forensic 
Science, Medicine, Conservation, and Environmental Remediation, CRC Press, 2016, pp. 
155–71. 
293 Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, Ian Hanson and Nathalie Dozzi, “The Power of Contextual Effects 
in Forensic Anthropology: A Study of Biasability in the Visual Interpretations of Trauma 
Analysis on Skeletal Remains”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2014, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 
1177–83; Sherry Nakhaeizadeh et al., “Cascading Bias of Initial Exposure to Information 
at the Crime Scene to the Subsequent Evaluation of Skeletal Remains”, in Journal of Fo-
rensic Sciences, 2018, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 403–11. 
294 Paul Bieber, “Fire Investigation and Cognitive Bias”, in Allan Jamieson and Andre 
Moenssens (eds.), Wiley Encyclopedia of Forensic Science, Wiley, 2014, pp. 1–13. 
295 William R. Oliver, “Effect of History and Context on Forensic Pathologist Interpretation of 
Photographs of Patterned Injury of the Skin”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2017, vol. 
62, no. 6, pp. 1500–05. 
296 See, for instance, Emma A. Levin et al., “A Comparison of Thresholding Methods for 
Forensic Reconstruction Studies Using Fluorescent Powder Proxies for Trace Materials”, 
in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2019, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 1–10; Rachael Carew, Ruth M. 
Morgan and Carolyn Rando, “A Preliminary Investigation into the Accuracy of 3D Model-
ling and 3D Printing in Forensic Anthropology Evidence Reconstruction”, in Journal of 
Forensic Sciences, 2008, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 342–52. 
297 See, for example, Itiel E. Dror, “Human Expert Performance in Forensic Decision Making: 
Seven Different Sources of Bias”, in Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2017, vol. 
49, no. 5, p. 544. 
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research about similar complex and visual assessments do indeed high-
light a risk of bias. For this reason, it is important not only to conduct 
research into X-ray interpretation specifically but also, in the meantime, to 
be aware of what type of information is available to odontologists, radiol-
ogists or other forensic experts that are consulted. It is likely that cases 
concerning child soldiering charges contain many potential sources of 
bias. In fact, the crime type itself is likely to generate emotional reactions, 
for instance because it, potentially, involves children and very vulnerable 
children. Experts may, more or less subconsciously, be motivated to reach 
certain conclusions, for example, that an individual is a child soldier ra-
ther than a soldier, and this motivation may lead them to subconsciously 
attend to and emphasize more the aspects of the X-rays supporting the 
conclusion that the individual was younger than 15 years within the time 
frame of the charges.298 
Another possible source of bias in relation to child soldiering 
charges is base rate expectations. For instance, the experts may be aware 
that the examined individual lived in a village from which many child 
soldiers were recruited or kidnapped or that the individual belonged to a 
group in which the prevalence of children is known. In the cases dealt 
with by the SCSL, it was accepted as an established fact that the Revolu-
tionary United Front (‘RUF’) or Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(‘AFRC’) had Small Boys Units (‘SBUs’) and Small Girls Units (‘SGUs’). 
According to testimony known at the time, these units consisted of young 
or even very young children. In the Taylor case some witnesses testified to 
seeing children as young as five years in these units.299 Similarly, in the 
Lubanga case it was accepted that there were “Kadogos”, that is young 
fighters, although compared to the SCSL cases, there was more uncertain-
ty due to the multiple age ranges suggested by witnesses. The Trial 
Chamber stated that the military wing of the UPC, under Lubanga’s lead-
ership, was known to recruit young people, regardless of age, in schools 
and in villages. Some of these recruitment efforts were coercive, including 
abductions. This meant that children under 15 years old were recruited – 
in violation of international law – whether or not this was specifically 
                                                   
298 For more on the topic of motivated reasoning as well as the so-called compassion fade 
effect see Moa Lidén, “Emotions in International Criminal Justice: A Threat and a Prom-
ise?”, in Forensic Science International: Mind and Law, 2020, pp. 1–17 (forthcoming). 
299 SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1597, see above note 67. 
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intended. The children were sent to training camps where “they were 
beaten, whipped, imprisoned and inadequately fed”. Young female re-
cruits were raped. The children were encouraged to smoke cannabis and 
“drink alcohol” and were frequently intoxicated.300 
It is unknown whether and to what extent experts in, for example, 
the Lubanga case were aware of such information. To a certain extent, it 
has been acknowledged that base rates are in fact relevant for forensic 
decision making.301 This is in line with Bayes theorem which is used and 
incorporated into many types of forensic assessments. However, it is im-
portant to remember the distinction between observations and conclusions. 
Statistically speaking, it may be reasonable to incorporate base rates into, 
for example, the stated certainty of a certain conclusion. Yet, a known 
base rate cannot, regardless of how accurate it is, change the nature of the 
evidence. The X-ray is exactly the same regardless of whether there were 
“Kadogos”, SBUs or SGUs or not. Hence, if base rate expectations bias 
examiners in the sense that they perceive of the X-rays differently than 
someone without such base rate expectations, this is neither rational nor 
desired applying Bayes theorem. In practice, this could mean that the base 
rate is triple counted, first in the observations, then in the stated certainty 
of the conclusion, and then also by the judges who are to integrate all the 
information, including the age estimation and knowledge that the individ-
ual was considered a “Kadogo” or belonged to a SBU or SGU. 
6.5.1.2. Opportunities 
To the extent that traditional FAEs based on, for example, wrists and teeth 
are still informative at the time when alleged child soldiers are examined, 
recently developed and tested deep learning approaches can be useful 
since they seem to entail smaller risks of error. Such results have been 
obtained using hand X-rays in the age range of 3 to 17 years,302 pelvic X-
                                                   
300 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 32, see above note 4. 
301 See the vast literature on the base rate fallacy, see, for example, Gunnar Goude, “Base-rate 
Fallacy: Who is Wrong About What in What Way?”, in Uppsala Psychological Reports, 
Uppsala, 1981. 
302 KIM Jeong Rye et al., “Computerized Bone Age Estimation Using Deep Learning: Based 
Program: Evaluation of the Accuracy and Efficiency”, in American Journal of Roentgenol-
ogy, 2017, vol. 209, no. 6, pp. 1374–80. See also LEE Jang Hyung et al., “Bone Age Esti-
mation Using Deep Learning and Hand X-ray Images”, in Biomedical Engineering Letters, 
2020, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 1–10. 
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rays in the age range of 10 to 25 years303 as well as MRI-images of knees 
in the age range of 14 to 21 years.304 To illustrate, with the automated 
approach used in the last study (MRI knee), 98.10 per cent of male sub-
jects and 95.00 per cent of female subjects were correctly classified in 
relation to the 18 year threshold.305 One automated approach which ad-
dress specifically the problem of lacking Between Expert Reliability as 
well as issues stemming from ethnical variations is the BoneXpert soft-
ware306 which replaces the Greulich and Pyle (GP) assessment.307 This 
software was developed and validated with data from European Caucasian 
children308 but more recently it has also been validated with a large da-
taset from Los Angeles including images of children’s wrists recorded on 
                                                   
303 LI Yuan et al., “Forensic Age Estimation for Pelvic X-ray Images using Deep Learning”, 
in European Radiology, 2018, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 2322–29. 
304 Ana Dallora et al., “Age Assessment of Youth and Young Adults Using Magnetic Reso-
nance Imaging of the Knee: A Deep Learning Approach”, in JMIR Medical Informatics, 
2019, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1–17. MRI examinations were conducted for 402 volunteer subjects, 
221 males and 181 females. The method comprised two convolutional neural network 
(‘CNN’) models: the first one selected the most informative images of MRI sequence for 
age assessment purposes. These were then used in the second module, which was respon-
sible for the age estimation. Different CNN architectures were tested, both training from 
scratch and employing transfer learning. The CNN architecture that provided the best re-
sults was that referred to as ‘GoogLeNet’, pretrained on the ImageNet database. 
305 For the male subjects in the range of 14-20.5 years, the mean absolute error (‘MAE’) was 
0.793 years, and for the female subjects in the range of 14-19.5 years, the MAE was 0.988 
years. 
306 See BoneXpert’s web site. This software is a commercially available medical device in 
Europe and an investigation device in the US has been certified for use in the clinical set-
ting in Europe. For more see Hans Henrik Thodberg, “Clinical Review: An Automated 
Method for Determination of Bone Age”, in The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and 
Metabolism, 2009, vol. 94, no. 7, pp. 2239–44; Rick R. van Rijn, Maarten H. Lequin and 
Hans Henrik Thodberg, “Automatic Determination of Greulich and Pyle Bone Age in 
Healthy Dutch Children”, in Pediatric Radiology, 2009, vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 591–97; Hans 
Henrik Thodberg et al., “The BoneXpert Method for Automated Determination of Skeletal 
Maturity”, in IEEE Transactions on Medical Imaging, 2009, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 52–66; 
Thodberg and Sävendahl, 2010, pp. 1425–32, see above note 275. 
307 Ibid.; Hans Henrik Thodberg et al., “Automated Determination of Bone Age from Hand X-
rays at the End of Puberty and Its Applicability for Age Estimation”, in International Jour-
nal of Legal Medicine, 2017, vol. 131, no. 3, pp. 771–80. 
308 Thodberg et al., 2009, pp. 2239–44, see above note 306; David D. Martin et al., “Clinical 
Application of Automated Greulich-Pyle Bone Age in Children with Short Stature”, in Pe-
diatric Radiology, 2009, vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 598–607; van Rijn, Lequin and Thodberg, 2009, 
pp. 591–97, see above note 306. 
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multiple occasions between 1993 and 2006 with children from four eth-
nicities; Caucasian, African American, Hispanic and Asian.309 
The automated approaches described above are likely to help also 
with issues such as lacking Between Expert Reliability as well as Biasa-
bility. When it comes to Between Expert Reliability it is also, from the 
perspective of the legal actors, desirable to include more experts, and in-
dependent experts, for example, from different countries. Should these 
experts disagree it may constitute reasonable doubt regarding the alleged 
child soldiers’ ages. However, should these experts agree, it is likely that 
at least some of the uncertainty has been removed and it may no longer be 
reasonable to doubt the experts’ opinions, particularly not if they are ex-
pressed as age intervals. As discussed in Section 6.3. on diagnostic accu-
racy, there are no general answers as to how scientific uncertainty relates 
to the BARD-standard,310 but, it should be viewed in the light of how 
much uncertainty other types of age assessments such as those based on, 
for example, physical appearance or oral evidence entail. Furthermore, 
from the perspective of the forensic practitioners, it is essential to engage 
in continuous training, including attempts to calibrate assessments of dif-
ferent practitioners within the same discipline. There are many reasons as 
to why experts may disagree including differences in training, experience, 
personality, task difficulty, and so on. This also means that some types of 
disagreement are more desirable than others. If the disagreement stems 
from task difficulty, it is essential that legal actors are made aware of the 
disagreement as it is directly relevant for their legal assessments. Clearly, 
disagreement between experts does not have to be an indication that the 
experts lack proper experience or assessment tools. Interpreting X-rays is 
a difficult task and radiology is a medical specialty in relation to which 
the need for continuous training, including calibration attempts, has been 
noted for several different types of interpretations.311 Forensic practition-
                                                   
309 Thodberg and Sävendahl, 2010, pp. 1425–32, see above note 275. 
310 See, for example, David B. Allison, Pavela Gregory and Ivan Oransky, “Reasonable Versus 
Unreasonable Doubt”, in American Scientist, 2018, vol. 106, no. 2, p. 84; Weiss, 2003, pp. 
25–46, see above note 51. 
311 See, for example, S. Wentzel et al., “E-learning for Chest X-ray Interpretation Improves 
Medical Student Skills and Confidence Levels”, in BMC Medical Education, 2018, vol. 18, 
pp. 1–8. In this study, the findings demonstrated a modest improvement in basic chest X-
ray interpretation skills and confidence among first year graduate entry medical school 
students following the introduction of an e-learning module. For similar studies see Chris-
tiane M. Nyhsen et al., “Undergraduate Radiology Teaching from Student’s Perspective”, 
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ers are also encouraged to engage in continued education and training.312 
Also, of international recognition is the German Study Group on Forensic 
Age Diagnostics (‘AGFAD’) of the German Society of Legal Medicine 
which offers proficiency tests on annual basis to promote quality.313 
When it comes to the question of Biasability specifically, it is im-
portant that forensic practitioners, as far as possible conduct contextual 
information management (‘CIM’), whereby a context manager makes 
assessment of whether information is relevant or irrelevant for the foren-
sic assessment as well as potentially biasing or not.314 On this basis, the 
context manager will then chose what information to disclose to forensic 
examiners, and when. While implementing CIM is the primary responsi-
bility of forensic laboratories, contextual information may be provided in 
communication with legal actors, who should therefore also be aware of 
the potential issues stemming from this. 
In situations where traditional FAEs are unlikely to be informative, 
or as an alternative or complement to them in other situations, one possi-
bility which is currently being researched is based on genetics and called 
DNA methylation. In the past five years a number of reports have shown 
that distinct epigenetic changes, that is, altered methylation levels, occur 
during the process of aging, and these changes show a high degree of cor-
relation (both increased and decreased methylation levels) with chrono-
                                                                                                                        
in Insights into Imaging, 2013, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 103–09; Martin Maleck et al., “Do Com-
puters Teach Better? A Media Comparison Study for Case-Based Teaching in Radiology”, 
in Radiography, 2013, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 1025–32. 
312 For instance, in the case of radiographers, such professional training is outlined by the 
International Association of Forensic Radiographers (‘IAFR’), in conjunction with profes-
sional bodies like the Irish Institute of Radiography and Radiation Therapy (‘IIRRT’) and 
The Society and College of Radiographers (‘SOR’). For more on this see, for example, 
The Society and College of Radiographers and the International Association of Forensic 
Radiographers, Guidance for Radiographers Providing Forensic Radiography Services, 
2014 and the Irish Institute of Radiography and Radiation Therapy, Forensic Imaging: Best 
Practice Guidelines, 2013. 
313 This certification ensures at a global level, although especially European level, that the 
forensic practitioners have the skills to assess age and regularly review these skills to en-
sure they are up to date, valid and admissible. For more on this see, for example, Schmel-
ing et al., 2008, see above note 21. 
314 See, for example, Michael C. Taylor and Nikola K.P. Osborne, “Letter to the Editor: A 
Contribution to Contextual Information Management in Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: Pre-
liminary Ideas for a Two-Step Method of Analysis”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2018, 
vol. 63, no. 1, p. 341. 
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logical age.315 Human and mouse studies indicate that using a small set of 
biomarkers measuring DNA methylation can provide a way to measure 
chronological age across the entire age spectrum and in all tissues, despite 
the fact that patterns of DNA methylation vary considerably across tis-
sues.316 For instance, the data obtained by Horvath and colleagues sug-
gests that their so-called epigenetic clock317 predicts ages fairly accurately 
with 1 year error intervals for individuals younger than 30 years and with 
a 3 year error interval for individuals older than 30 years.318 Apart from 
                                                   
315 Steve Horvath and Kenneth Raj, “DNA Methylation-based Biomarkers and the Epigenetic 
Clock Theory of Ageing”, in Nature Reviews Genetics, 2018, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 371–84; 
Ana Freire-Aradas et al., “Tracking Age-correlated DNA Methylation Markers in the 
Young”, in Forensic Science International: Genetics, 2018 vol. 36, pp. 50–59; Ana Freire-
Aradas et al., “Development of a Methylation Marker set for Forensic Age Estimation us-
ing Analysis of Public Methylation data and the Agena Bioscience EpiTYPER system”, in 
Forensic Science International: Genetics, 2016, vol. 24, pp. 65–74. 
316 Vallentina Bollati, “Decline in Genomic DNA Methylation through Aging a Cohort of 
Elderly Subjects, Mechanisms of Ageing and Development”, in Mechanisms of Ageing and 
Development, 2009, vol. 130, no. 4, pp. 234–39; LIM Unhee and SONG Min-Ae, “DNA 
Methylation as a Biomarker of Aging in Epidemological Studies”, in Ramona G. Dumi-
trescu and Mukesh Verma (eds.), Cancer Epigenetics for Precision Medicine: Methods and 
Protocols, Humana Press, New York, 2018, pp. 219–31; Steve Horvath, “DNA Methyla-
tion Age of Human Tissues and Cell Types”, in Genome Biology, 2013, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 
1–19; Horvath and Raj, 2018, pp. 371–84, see above note 315. 
317 For more on the term “epigenetics” see Aaron D. Goldberg, C. David Allis and Emily 
Bernstein, “Epigenetics: A Landscape Takes Shape”, in Cell, 2007, vol. 128, no. 4, pp. 1–4. 
These authors describe epigenetics as a bridge between genotype and phenotype, a phe-
nomenon that changes the final outcome of locus or chromosome without changing the 
underlying DNA sequence. Historically, the word “epigenetics” was used to describe 
events that could not be explained by genetic principles. Conrad Waddington (1905–75), 
who is given credit for coining the term, defined epigenetics as “the branch of biology 
which studies the causal interactions between genes and their products, which bring the 
phenotype into being”, see Conrad Hal Waddington, “The Epigenotype”, in Endeavour, 
1942, vol. 1, pp. 18–20; Conrad Hal Waddington, The Strategy of the Genes: a Discussion 
of Some Aspect of Theoretical Biology, Allen and Unwin, 1957. Over the years, numerous 
biological phenomena, some considered bizarre and inexplicable, have been lumped into 
the category of epigenetics. Today, a simplified definition of epigenetics for the uninitiated 
is that epigenetics is the study of biological mechanisms that will switch genes on and off, 
see, for example, Shelley L. Berger et al., “An Operational Definition of Epigenetics”, in 
Genes and Development, 2009, vol. 23, no. 7, pp. 781–83. 
318 The Horvath clock is based on the weighted average of 353 CpGs correlated with age, 
whereby methylation of 193 CpGs is positively correlated (hypermetylated) with age, 
while methylation of the other 160 CpGs is negatively correlated (hypomethylated) with 
age, see Horvath, 2013, pp. 1–19, see above note 316; Steve Horvath et al., “Epigenetic 
Clock for Skin and Blood Cells Applied to Hutchinson Gilford Progeria Syndrome and Ex 
Vivo Studies”, in Aging, 2018, vol. 10, no. 7, pp. 1758–75. An interesting feature of the ep-
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 386 
this being a potential solution to the time issue, DNA methylation may 
also be associated with fewer practical difficulties, since obtaining buccal 
swabs or blood from alleged child soldiers may be easier than to have 
them taken to facilities with X-rays or MRI machines. However, to better 
understand the usefulness of DNA methylation for age estimations of al-
leged child soldiers specifically, careful evaluation is needed in relation to, 
for example, environmental factors such as poor nutrition, trauma, and so 
on.319 Clearly, this technique, like other forensic methods, also requires 
that the alleged child soldiers have been identified and agree to being 
swabbed in the mouth or to have a blood sample taken. Such examina-
tions should not jeopardize the security of alleged child soldiers and their 
families or others. As exemplified by the evidence available in the Luban-
ga case, see Table 4, forensic evidence was not obtained for all alleged 
child soldiers. For some of them, the age assessments were instead based 
on documentary, oral and video evidence, whereof the last category was 
given most weight by the judges. Hence, the next Section discusses the 
challenges and opportunities with age estimations based on video or photo 
evidence. 
6.5.2. Video or Photo Evidence 
6.5.2.1. Challenges 
6.5.2.1.1. Validity 
Video images are routinely admitted as evidence in interna-
tional tribunals because ‘the video footage contained therein 
will usually speak for itself.’. – Office of the Prosecutor, The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 2013 
In line with the prosecutor’s statement in Lubanga, video evidence is reg-
ularly admissible, meaning that, as a matter of law, the age element can be 
                                                                                                                        
igenetic clock is that it does not seems to be restricted to specific tissue, but that it is in-
stead a tissue independent correlation with similar are estimates regardless of tissue type 
including brain, skin, kidney, colon, lung etc, see Horvath, 2013, see above note 316. 
There is also data today suggesting that epigenetic clock is maintained in the retina, as a 
strong correlation, r = 0.80, between the epigenetic age and chronological age in the fetal 
retina. 
319 For instance, it is clear that some factors may lead to accelerated DNA methylation, as 
exemplified by Steve Horvath et al., “Accelerated Epigenetic Aging in Down Syndrome”, 
in Aging Cell, 2015, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 491–95. Analyses of samples with Down syndrome 
show the pronounced acceleration of the DNA methylation age even in fetal stages, similar 
to what has been observed in adult tissues. 
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established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of such evidence. This is 
consistent with national as well international jurisprudence and specifical-
ly Rule 63(4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, according to which 
a Chamber shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is re-
quired in order to prove any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.320 
Yet, as regards the second half of the prosecutor’s statement, that 
the “video footage contained therein will usually speak for itself”, there 
seems to be more room for discussion. Certainly, how old an individual 
appears to be based on his or her physical appearance, demeanour, and so 
on, here referred to as apparent age, is not necessarily a valid operational-
ization of the individual’s chronological age. While this may seem self-
evident, it deserves to be emphasized that conclusions about chronological 
age are drawn on the basis of apparent age, and it is unknown whether, 
how and to what extent these two correlate, neither in a general popula-
tion nor in the population of alleged child soldiers involved in these cases. 
Compared to the correlation between biological age and chronological age 
(see Section 6.5.1.), the relationship between apparent age and chronolog-
ical age has received relatively little scientific attention so far. Hence, it 
should be carefully considered in which situations and for which more 
specific purposes video or photo evidence is used, even if the evidence is 
admissible as such. 
In the national cases referred to by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Lubanga case, video footage was used in somewhat different contexts and 
for somewhat different purposes. For instance, the national cases con-
cerned child pornography, the relevant age thresholds were 16 or 18 years, 
and none of the alleged child victims had been identified, meaning that 
they were not present before the Court and no other methods for estimat-
ing their ages could be used. Furthermore, and importantly, in the national 
cases, the video evidence was not used to establish objective crime ele-
ments of chronological age, but rather subjective crime elements of ap-
                                                   
320 It can also be noted that when it comes to the identification of a child as an unaccompanied 
and separated child, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’)’s General 
Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their 
Country of Origin, 2005, states that the age assessment should take into account the indi-
vidual’s physical appearance as well as psychological maturity. It is also pointed out that 
the assessment must be conducted in a scientific, safe, child and gender sensitive and fair 
manner, avoiding any risk of violation of the physical integrity of the child, giving due re-
spect to human dignity. Ibid., para. 31.A. (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6fb257/). 
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parent age, that is, the intent of the accused in relation to the depicted 
individuals’ apparent ages. This is clearly spelled out in, for example, 
Police v. Kennedy321 in which it is noted that: 
The prosecution did not attempt to prove that any of the per-
sons depicted in the material were in fact under the age of 16 
years. The source of the material and the identity of the per-
sons in the photographs were quite unknown. Therefore it 
would have been impossible to have proved the actual age of 
the persons by any acceptable evidence. The prosecution re-
lied on the photographs themselves together with some parts 
of the written text as depicting or describing a person or per-
sons apparently under the age of 16 years.322 
Also, some of the cited cases, such as R. v. Loring323 and R. v. Gar-
bett,324  refer to whether the depicted individuals would be perceived by a 
“reasonable observer” as being under the age of 18 years.325 If so, the 
                                                   
321 Supreme Court of South Australia, Police v. Peter Melbourne Kennedy, Decision, 28 April 
1998, [1998] SASC 7122 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1ba636/). 
322 Ibid., p. 12. 
323 Supreme Court of British Columbia, R. v. Loring, Decision, 5 February 2001, [2001] 
BCSC 200 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d277c2/). 
324 Ontario Court of Justice, R. v. Garbett, Judgment, 4 March 2008, [2008] ONCJ 97 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/765fd2/). 
325 In R. v. Loring, Justice Wilson observed: 
In the absence of any evidence of the ages of the other persons depicted in these video 
recordings, Mr. Lauder submits that it is open to me to make a finding of “apparent 
age” by looking at the video recording. 
I have no expertise in assessing the age of young persons. I have no confidence 
that I would be able to give a reliable opinion on “apparent age” or otherwise, which 
would permit a distinction between one aged seventeen years and nine months, and 
one aged eighteen years one month. My confidence is in no way enhanced if I am 
asked to distinguish between an eighteen year old and a fifteen, sixteen or seventeen 
year old. These matters ought not to be determined on a guess. I decline Mr. Lauder's 
invitation to speculate on the apparent age of the unidentified persons depicted in the 
video recording. 
Supreme Court of British Columbia Loring Decision, paras. 14–15, see above note 323. In 
R. v. Garbett, the Justice states, inter alia, that the test: 
requires a consideration of whether I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
reasonable observer, looking at this photograph, would perceive either of these females 
as being under 18. In this respect, the nature of the bedding, which appears to be of a 
kind favoured by an adolescent or a child, and the child-like ring on the second fe-
male’s finger together with the matching bracelet are relevant circumstances. They are 
part of the context to consider in relation to the perception that a reasonable observer 
6. Child Soldier or Soldier? Estimating Age in Cases of Core International Crimes: 
Challenges and Opportunities 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 389 
intent of the accused was to be assumed. While the connection between 
subjective crime elements, the “reasonable observer” and apparent age is 
relatively straightforward, the connection between objective crime ele-
ments (aimed at chronological age) and apparent age is more complex and 
probably weaker. If the applicable law asks to determine apparent age, as 
in the national cases, apparent age is a valid operationalization, even if 
there may still be reliability and biasability issues. However, if the appli-
cable law asks to determine chronological age as in child soldiering cases, 
apparent age is less of a valid operationalization. Hence, save for the dif-
ferences in crime types, the contexts are fairly similar, since also in the 
child soldiering cases some individuals had not been identified and other 
types of age estimations were not possible. Yet, the purposes of the age 
estimations are quite distinct. In the national cases, the purpose was to 
establish apparent age and in the child soldiering cases, the purpose was 
to establish chronological age. The relevance of apparent age for objective 
rather than subjective crime elements needs further discussion, not the 
least when it comes to the probative value.326 
                                                                                                                        
would form of the age of the females. So too, however, is the logo in the bottom corner, 
which suggests that the image comes from the web site of someone who is 18, and the 
inset photograph. As I have said, I do not believe that a reasonable observer would 
perceive the person in the inset photograph, who resembles the first female in picture 
#41, as being under 18 years of age. 
Taking all of these circumstances into account, and applying the test set forth by 
Chief Justice McLachlin in Sharpe, I am not satisfied that “a reasonable observer 
[would] perceive [either] person in the representation as being under 18”. It seems to 
me to be just as likely that a reasonable observer would be unable to form an opinion 
one way or the other. 
I am left with a reasonable doubt with respect to whether either person in picture 
#41 “is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years”. Accordingly, the 
Crown has not proved that picture #41 constitutes child pornography. 
For these reasons Mr. Garbett was found not guilty of both charges before the Court. On-
tario Court of Justice Garbett Judgment, paras. 91–93, see above note 324. 
326 The Court expresses related, although not the same, limitations with such age estimations. 
For instance, in Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 711, see above note 4, the Trial 
Chamber stated that it has “independently assessed the ages of the children identified in 
the video footage and about whom this witness expressed a view, to the extent it is possible 
to draw a safe conclusion based on their appearance”. Also, the Lubanga Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, para. 222, see above note 3, expresses a similar view, that it “considers that the 
Trial Chamber was indeed aware of the limitations of determining age on the basis of 
physical appearance, including video images, and expressed caution with regard to age as-
sessment on that basis. […] The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber indicated 
that it applied a large margin of error and made findings as to the age of the children only 
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As implied above, both the SCSL and the ICC have used apparent 
age to establish objective crime elements, as defined by Article 4(c) of the 
Statute of the SCSL and Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Seem-
ingly, these Courts have had different strategies in dealing with the poten-
tial mismatch between apparent age and chronological age. In the Taylor 
case, the SCSL Trial Chamber noted that: “he [the alleged child soldier] 
looked young at the time he gave evidence in 2008 ten years after the 
incidents he testified about”.327 This does not make any explicit reference 
as to the required subjective certainty regarding the alleged child soldier’s 
age, but presumably the Court applied the BARD-standard. However, in 
the Lubanga case before the ICC, the prosecutor relied on “a number of 
video excerpts to establish that some of the UPF/FPLC recruits were “vis-
ibly” under the age of 15”.328 In other words, the prosecution here claimed 
that, for some of the recruits, the chronological ages were visible, that is, 
there was a strong positive correlation between apparent and chronologi-
cal age. The Trial Chamber agreed with the prosecution that children who 
are undoubtedly less than 15 years can be distinguished from those un-
doubtedly over 15 years,329 while it also noted the defence’s contention 
that “it is impossible to distinguish reliably between a 12 or 13 year-old 
and a 15 or 16 year old on the basis of a photograph or video extract 
alone”.330 In its own assessment of the video excerpts the Trial Chamber 
identified specific individuals who, in its opinion, were “evidently”,331 
“clearly”332 or “significantly”333 under the age of 15 years. This approach 
was also approved by the Appeals Chamber which stated that: “[…] given 
the margin of error applied by the Trial Chamber, its approach was not 
unreasonable”.334 While the Appeals Chamber does not spell out precisely 
its view on how these requirements relate to the BARD-standard, re-
                                                                                                                        
where the children were, in its assessment, “clearly” under age of fifteen years. The Ap-
peals Chamber considers that such an approach is not unreasonable, even though the rea-
soning of the Trial Chamber in that regard could have been more extensive […]”. 
327 SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1431, see above note 67. 
328 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 644, see above note 4. 
329 Ibid., para. 643. 
330 Ibid., para. 644. 
331 Ibid., para. 861, 1254. 
332 Ibid., paras. 713, 792, 854, 858, 862, 869, 912, 915, 1348. 
333 Ibid., paras. 1251–52. 
334 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 236, see above note 3. 
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quirements such as “evidently”, in a literal sense, seem to require more of 
the evidence. It can be questioned what this means in terms of the risk of 
false negatives, that is, that someone younger than 15 years, but not “evi-
dently” so, is classified as 15 years or older, see Table 1 in Section 6.3. 
and Section 6.6. on diagnostic accuracy. In the Katanga case, only one 
photo of Katanga’s youngest bodyguard was used for age assessment pur-
poses and the Trial Chamber believed it was “not in a position to ascertain 
[…]”335 whether this individual was under 15 years, especially in the light 
of other contradictory testimony. 
From a scientific point of view, the available research suggests that 
when individuals try to estimate chronological age based on someone’s 
physical appearance, the error intervals are fairly large and chronological 
age can be both underestimated and overestimated. The earliest research 
in this field focused on age estimations based on faces and used relatively 
small samples.336 These studies suggest errors in the range of three to four 
years.337 In more recent research, with larger samples and wider age rang-
es, the errors were larger, with a mean error around six years.338 The today 
most extensive research study, using a database of standardized passport 
images of individuals of heterogenous ages (n = 3948) found that the av-
erage age estimation error was approximately 8 years.339 Looking only at 
the estimations of individuals in the age range 12 to 19 years, the average 
estimation error was 5.39 years.340 The cited research concerns age guess-
                                                   
335 Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1080, see above note 69. 
336 Small samples both in terms of the faces used and the participants who were asked to 
estimate age on the basis of those faces. 
337 Michael Burt and David I. Perrett, “Perception of Age in Adult Caucasian Male Faces: 
Computer Graphic Manipulation of Shape and Colour Information”, in Proceedings of the 
Royal Society, 1995, vol. 259, no. 1355, pp. 137–43; Patricia A. George and Graham J. 
Hole, “The Role of Spatial and Surface Cues in the Age-processing of Unfamiliar Faces”, 
in Visual Cognition, 2000, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 485–509; Patrik Sörqvist and Mårten Eriksson, 
“Effects of Training on Age Estimation”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2007, vol. 21, 
no. 1, pp. 131–35. 
338 Manuel C. Voelkle et al., “Let Me Guess How Old You Are: Effects of Age, Gender, and 
Facial Expression on Perceptions of Age”, in Psychology and Aging, 2012, vol. 27, no. 2, 
pp. 265–77; Evelyn Moyse and Serge Brédart, “An Own-age Bias in Age Estimation of 
Faces”, in European Review of Applied Psychology, 2012, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 3–7. 
339 Colin Clifford, Tamara Watson and David White, “Two Sources of Bias Explain Errors in 
Facial Age Estimation”, in Royal Society Open Science, 2018, vol. 5, no. 10, pp. 1–10. 
340 This data was obtained through personal contact with Colin Clifford, Tamara Watson and 
David White who kindly shared the data they collected and towards whom the author of 
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es in relation to faces of individuals living in Australia, the US and the 
UK and while these countries are multicultural or ethnical, the generaliza-
bility of the findings to a more general world population or a population 
of alleged child soldiers is uncertain. Similarly, the assessments of crowd 
sourced responses deviated from the chronological age by 4.57 years on 
average, suggesting there is not really any “wisdom of the crowd” in this 
context.341 Unsurprisingly, this research also suggests that for some indi-
viduals the age is even more difficult to estimate. For instance, for a 14-
year-old girl, the mean estimated age was 20.10 years and the age guesses 
varied widely from 14 to 29 years.342 Also outside of the laboratory simi-
lar findings have been made. For instance, shopkeepers asked to estimate 
whether 16-year-old boys and girls had reached legal drinking age (18), 
misjudged 38 per cent of the boys and 56 per cent of the girls to be at least 
18 years.343 
As noted, it is unknown whether the errors identified in the cited re-
search are representative for the population of alleged child soldiers. 
However, the research still seems relevant in relation to the margin of 
error applied in Lubanga. The Trial Chamber did not outline any specific 
age range to be used, but simply described a “wide” margin of error.344 
                                                                                                                        
this chapter is grateful. For more on the research in relation to which the data was collected 
see ibid. The average 5.39 was obtained when each individual experiment included in this 
research was given equal weight. If instead, one gives equal weight to each rater, the aver-
age estimation error would be 5.32. 
341 Jared Rondeau and Marco Alvarez, “Deep Modeling of Human Age Guesses for Apparent 
Age Estimation”, in 2018 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), 
IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–8. 
342 These results were obtained using the so-called Appa-Real database in which each face 
image is labelled with a number of human guesses, on average 38 per image, see ibid. The 
APPA-real database is considered a state-of-the art dataset, for more see Eirikur Agustsson 
et al., “Apparent and Real Age Estimation in Still Images with Deep Residual Regressors 
on Appa-Real Database”, in 2017 12th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face 
& Gesture Recognition (FG 2017), IEEE, 2017, pp. 87–94. This dataset provides a large 
number of face images labelled with real and apparent age annotations. APPA-real con-
tains 7.6k face images with an associated number of nearly 300k human guesses. 
343 Paul Wilner and Gavin Rowe, “Alcohol Servers’ Estimates of Young People’s Ages”, in 
Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 2001, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 375–83. 
344 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 643–44, see above note 4 and Lubanga Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, para. 222, see above note 3. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial 
Chamber indicated that it applied a large margin of error and made findings as to the age 
of the children only where the children were, in its assessment, “clearly” under the age of 
fifteen years. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber noted that the reasoning of the Trial 
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Among the error intervals found in the cited research, the most relevant 
one seems to be that found for individuals in the age range 12 to 19 years, 
where the mean estimation error was 5.39 years.345 Hence, from a scien-
tific perspective, a “wide enough” margin should probably be around at 
least 5.39 years. 
This bring us back to the defence’s claim in the Lubanga case, 
namely that it is impossible to distinguish reliably between 12 or 13 year 
olds and 15 or 16 year olds on the basis of their physical appearance 
alone. 346  There are today no systematic empirical studies evaluating 
whether and how the discriminatory ability changes as one moves closer 
to and away from the 15-year age threshold. A reasonable prediction is 
that error would be at its peak in the interval of 13 to 17 years, thus leav-
ing error fairly normally distributed around the 15-year threshold, as illus-
trated in Figure 1 below. The reader should note that this prediction is 
made solemnly on the notion expressed by the Trial Chamber in Lubanga 
that, generally, children with chronological ages clearly under or clearly 
over 15 years are likely to look a lot more like children or adults (apparent 
ages) than those closer to the 15-year threshold.347 Certainly, individual 
variation means that, in practice, several factors may influence what the 
estimation error curves look like, including, for example, biological sex 
and what more specific aspects of an individual’s appearance are used to 
estimate age. In both the SCSL and the ICC cases, witnesses were some-
times asked to explain the more specific bases for their age estimations. 
The responses include a range of physical or developmental cues such as 
size, 348  the change in a boy’s voice when he reaches puberty 349  and 
                                                                                                                        
Chamber in that regard “could have been more extensive” (ibid., para. 222) as this would 
have facilitated appellate review. 
345 Clifford, Watson and White, 2018, see above note 339. 
346 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 644, see above note 4. 
347 The Trial Chamber states that: 
Given the undoubted differences in personal perception as regards estimates of age, 
and most particularly in the context of this case, the difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween young people who are relatively close to the age of 15 (whether above or below), 
the Chamber has exercised caution when considering this evidence. 
See ibid., para. 643. 
348 P-0046 recalled holding the hand of a younger child when crossing the street. Her evidence 
was that “he was so small”. Ibid., para. 654. 
349 P-0014 observed there was “no age limit” in regard to the children recruited into the 
UPC/FPLC and he saw 8–15-year olds who had been forcibly recruited. He stated that 
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whether a girl has developed breasts.350 One witness, who used to be a 
teacher, described that his estimation that a specific child was five years 
old was based on that a six year old should be able to reach over his head 
and touch his opposite ear, and the child in question was unable to do 
so.351 Also, the witnesses sometimes referred to behavioural cues like: 
“[s]ome would cry for their mother when they were hungry”352 or their 
manner of playing, for instance young girls at Mandro Camp had “braided 
a particular type of grass in the way that young girls who have not reached 
the age of maturity tend to do, as if they are braiding the hair of a doll”.353 
When it comes to the Court’s own reasoning about age it is not specified 
in the verdicts why an individual is considered to be “evidently”, “clearly”, 
or “significantly” under 15 years. However, the Appeals Chamber in 
Lubanga noted that the estimations in the lower instances had been based 
on the size and general appearance of the individuals, rather than their 
specific facial features.354 It is unknown whether and to what extent the 
cues described here (physical or developmental or behavioural) are good 
age indicators and also whether age estimations based on the different 
cues may result in different types of errors or error rates. 
In this regard it deserves to be emphasized that legal age elements 
are dichotomous. Hence, they only require determinations of whether the 
15-year threshold has been reached or not. As such, through pure guessing 
without even looking at the evidence (the alleged child soldier), one has a 
50 per cent chance of getting it right. Overall, it seems reasonable to claim 
that legal determinations should be, or at least seriously aim to be, far 
more accurate than chance. Otherwise it seems difficult to make any seri-
ous legitimacy claims. Consequently, an accuracy level significantly 
                                                                                                                        
when estimating the ages of children, he took into account, inter alia, the children’s psy-
chical characteristics, including such things as the change in a boy’s voice when he reaches 
puberty. See ibid., para. 708. 
350 Ibid., para. 680. 
351 This was the testimony of P-0014. See ibid., para. 708. 
352 P-0017 indicated “you could see it from their behaviour. Some would cry for their mother 
when they were hungry. They would whine at night, and during the day they were playing 
games, children’s games, even if they had their weapon next to them […]”. See ibid., para. 
681. 
353 Ibid., para. 807. This was the statement of P-0016 who indicated there were young girls at 
Mandro camp and although he did not give an exact indication of their ages he said “they 
must have been very young” as they behaved “like girls who were still at home”. 
354 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 229, see above note 3. 
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above 50 per cent and as close to 100 per cent as possible, would be desir-
able. Just how close to the 15-year threshold one can get before the dis-
criminatory ability is getting unacceptably close to 50 per cent (or even 
lower) is a question that requires empirical research. 
 
Figure 1. Predicted normally distributed error around the 15-year threshold in 
estimations of chronological age based on apparent age. 
If the above general prediction is correct, age estimations on the ba-
sis of apparent age are likely to provide a better protection for individuals 
who are clearly younger than 15 (for example, 9–10 years), compared to 
those closer to 15 (for example, 12–14 years), even if both groups are 
considered equally worthy of protection, from a legal normative point of 
view. 
Hence, if forensic age estimations are an inexact science,355 then it 
seems fair to conclude that so are estimations of chronological age based 
on apparent age. Generally, legal proceedings are not under the same sci-
entific scrutiny as sciences are. However, if legal actors choose to not 
place trust in forensic evidence because it stems from an inexact science, 
it appears to put some burden of explanation on them as to why visual age 
                                                   
355 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 176, see above note 4. 
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assessments are more valid.356 It is possible that some individuals can be 
safely identified as under 15 years but, using scientific terminology, what 
method is used to establish this? The method used to reach the conclusion 
is decisive for the validity of the conclusion. In the Lubanga case, the Ap-
peals Chamber touches upon this, whether intended or not, when it states 
that the Trial Chamber’s reasoning in relation to the video evidence was 
“not unreasonable” but “could have been more extensive” as this “would 
have facilitated appellate review”.357 Possible ways to extend this reason-
ing would be to include age intervals, rather than a single age, as is rec-
ommended to forensic practitioners. Other appropriate questions to ad-
dress would be what more specific aspects of the physical appearance 
were used and why. Of course, transparency in the reasoning of a legal 
verdict opens up for criticism, particularly if the reasoning is very specific 
and extensive as regards how the Court reached its conclusions. But that 
is the point. 
6.5.2.1.2. Reliability 
Already the Court cases themselves illustrate the possibility of lacking 
‘Between Observer Reliability’, that is, that different observers make dif-
ferent observations and/or draw different conclusions as regards the age of 
the same individual based on his or her physical appearance.358 In the 
Lubanga case the Trial Chamber explicitly states that a margin of error is 
indeed called for due to: “the undoubted differences in personal percep-
tion as regards estimates of age”359 on the basis of video excerpts. This 
raises follow-up questions such as what more specific factors may cause 
such differences, whether some individuals are better observers than oth-
ers and if so, what this tells us about whose estimations to trust. 
                                                   
356 As illustrated in Table 4, in the case of Lubanga, the forensic and the video evidence per-
tained to different alleged child soldiers and the Court has therefore not directly chosen to 
prioritize one type of evidence over the other in relation to the same individual. However, 
the estimated ages implied by the forensic evidence was often not trusted because the sci-
ence was not trusted and because of inconsistencies with other evidence types as well as 
inconsistencies in oral as well as documentary evidence. Logically speaking, the validity 
of the forensic evidence should remain the same regardless of such inconsistencies. 
357 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 222, see above note 3. 
358 Note that ‘Between Observer Reliability’ is an adjustment of ‘Between Expert Reliability’, 
as defined by the HEP framework, in relation to human observers, rather than experts. For 
more on the HEP framework see Dror, 2016, pp. 121–27, see above note 28. 
359 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 643, see above note 4. 
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Both the SCSL and the ICC express some notions as to which indi-
viduals would be better observers than others. For instance, in several of 
the SCSL cases, the Chambers rely on the notion that witnesses who have 
children themselves or in other ways obtained experience of children 
(such as school teachers) should be trusted in their age estimations. This is 
apparent for instance in Taylor, where the Court trusts the witness Conteh 
as “he was the father of three children and had been a secondary school 
teacher for several years prior to his capture”360 as well as the testimony 
of Gbonda who was the “father of several children”361 and yet another 
witness who was “the mother of four children”.362 Also in the ICC prac-
tice, the experience of having worked as a teacher363 has been considered 
beneficial, as well as having worked close to the children and/or on a dai-
ly basis.364 Although the Courts do not specify what this notion is based 
on, it will be presumed that the Courts believe that the experience of being 
a parent exposes you to children, not only your own but other children as 
well. Potentially, this would provide some relevant empirical data, that is, 
knowledge of the range of possible physical appearances of children with, 
presumably, known chronological ages. However, the lack of birth records 
in Sierra Leone, as well as the countries investigated by the ICC was the 
very justification for conducting age estimations to begin with. It can still 
be the case that parents and teachers have better access to such age rele-
vant data than individuals who do not regularly interact with children. Yet, 
if the Courts hold this notion to be true for the stated reasons,365 then 
                                                   
360 SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1419, see above note 67. 
361 Ibid., para. 1486. 
362 Ibid., para. 1489. 
363 See, for example, the evaluation of P-0014’s testimony who used to be a teacher and had 
been in daily contact with individuals within this age group, and his evidence on the sub-
ject of age was considered credible and reliable, see Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, pa-
ra. 709, see above note 4. 
364 For instance, the Trial Chamber in the case of Lubanga stated in relation to P-0024 that he 
gave honest, consistent and reliable evidence as regards his work with demobilized chil-
dren. Although he did not train as a social worker, he spent over a year working with chil-
dren and “although he did not give evidence as to how he assesses the children’s ages, his 
interaction with them during those months provided a solid and credible basis for his as-
sessments”. See ibid., para. 662. 
365 Certainly, it is unknown whether the notions expressed by the Courts are correct. The idea 
that some individuals have capacitates to conduct more accurate age estimations resemble 
the notion that there are so-called ‘Super Recognizers’. These are individuals believed to 
be exceptionally good at recognizing faces and therefore particularly suitable for investiga-
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should not the ‘gold standard’ for an age estimation be a paediatrician 
who is likely to be in possession of more such empirical data than most 
other people?366 Also, a paediatrician would be less likely to have strong 
emotional or societal ties to the alleged child soldiers (see next Section 
6.5.2.1.3. on Biasability). 
The available psychological research does not address the effect of 
living with or working with children, or whether some individuals are 
inherently better at visual age assessments than others,367 but the research 
has some other implications. More specifically, it suggests that in-group 
age estimations are usually superior to out-group estimations. Thus, age 
estimations are more accurate when observers make estimates of individ-
uals belonging to their own age groups.368 There is also some data indicat-
                                                                                                                        
tive tasks such as recognizing individuals from CCTV. Although it is relatively uncontro-
versial to claim that there are differences in what individuals observe and conclude on the 
basis of the exact same stimuli, given experience, it is more controversial given the lack of 
data, to claim which individuals have superior abilities than others. For more on this see 
University of Greenwich, described briefly online, “Super Recognisers Greenwich” (avail-
able on its web site). See also Andrew W. Young and Eilidh Noyes, “We Need to Talk 
About Super-recognizers: Invited Commentary on: Ramon, M., Bobak, A.K., and White, D. 
Super‐recognizers: From the Lab to the World and Back Again.”, in British Journal of 
Psychology, 2019, vol. 110, no. 3, pp. 492–94. 
366 Children’s’ chronological ages are likely to be apparent in medical journals, and so on, and 
this, together with observing the children’s’ physical appearance is likely to give paediatri-
cians overall quite good references/bases for estimating ages also of other, non-clinical, 
children. Also, a more specific context in which children’s’ ages are used is to predict their 
weight in emergency departments, where it is not always feasible to measure weight but 
the children require weight-based resuscitative measures. For more on this see, for exam-
ple, Daming Pan et al., “How Well Does the Best Guess Method Predict Children’s Weight 
in an Emergency Department in 2018-2019?”, in Emergency Medicine Australasia, 2020, 
vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 135–40; Katie Tinning and Jason Acworth, “Make your Best Guess: An 
Updated Method for Paediatric Weight Estimation in Emergencies”, in Emergency Medi-
cine Australasia, 2007, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 528–34. 
367 An interesting finding in this regard is that individuals who do not possess the ability to 
identify faces, so-called Developmental Prosopagnosia, nevertheless seem to have normal 
ability to estimate the age of faces, see Garga Chatterjee and NAKAYAMA Ken, “Normal 
Facial Age and Gender Perception in Developmental Prosopagnosia”, in Cognitive Neuro-
psychology, 2012, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 482–502. 
368 George and Hole, 2000, pp. 485–509, see above note 337; Voelkle et al., 2012, pp. 265–77, 
see above note 338; Moyse and Brédart, 2012, pp. 3–7, see above note 338. See also Jef-
frey S. Anastasi and Matthew G. Rhodes, “Evidence for an Own-age Bias in Face Recogni-
tion”, in North American Journal of Psychology, 2006, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 237–53; Burt and 
Perrett, 1995, pp. 137–43, see above note 337. This effect may be present in children as 
well. For example, George and Hole showed children pairs of faces from nine age catego-
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ing that age estimates are more accurate when observers assess individu-
als of the same race or ethnicity as their own, but this evidence is incon-
sistent.369 There are some occasional acknowledgments of these in-group 
and out group effects in the Courts’ practice. For instance, in the Ntaganda 
case, the Trial Chamber mentions in passing that the assessments a wit-
ness provided “related to individuals who were in the same age range as 
the witness” and this was a reason for considering the witness’ age estima-
tion reliable.370 
6.5.2.1.3. Biasability 
The existing research suggests that age estimations based on physical 
appearance (facial images) show a serial dependency whereby estimates 
are systematically biased towards the age of the preceding face, that is, a 
serial positioning bias. 371 More specifically, this entails a tendency to 
underestimate age when the previous face was younger than the present 
one and to overestimate age when the previous face was older. This re-
search also found a bias towards middle-aged faces, resulting in that 
younger faces appeared older than they were and older faces appeared 
younger.372 Further, the strength of these biases was modulated by the 
degree of visual noise present in the stimulus so that their combined effect 
was strongest when perceptions were most uncertain. These findings, par-
                                                                                                                        
ries ranging in age from 1 to 80 and asked participants to identify the oldest face in each 
pair. In general, discrimination was better when both faces in a pair were children than 
when both were adults. George and Hole, 2000, see above note 337. See also Arthur Wein-
berger, “Stereotyping the Elderly: Elementary School Children’s Responses”, in Research 
on Aging, 1979, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 113–36. 
369 See Hedwidge Dehon and Serge Brédart, “An ‘Other-race’ Effect in Age Estimation of 
Faces”, in Perception, 2001, vol. 30, no. 9, pp. 1107–13. In this study, white and black par-
ticipants made age estimates for white and black faces ranging from 20 to 45 years of age. 
Results showed that white participants’ age estimates were reliably more accurate for white 
faces compared to black faces. By contrast, black participants’ estimation accuracy did not 
differ based on the race of the face, a finding that Dehon and Brédart attributed to the fact 
that all of the black participants tested had lived in a predominantly white country (Bel-
gium) for at least five years. See also Christian A. Meissner and John C. Brigham, “Thirty 
Years of Investigating the Own-race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-analytic Review”, 
in Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2001, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 3–35. 
370 Ntaganda Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 203, see above note 74. However, there is more 
uncertainty as relates to the bases for this witnesses’ assessments, namely the “size and 
other physical features of the relevant individuals”. 
371 Clifford, Watson and White, 2018, pp. 1–10, see above note 339. 
372 Ibid. 
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ticularly the serial positioning bias, are in line with research into the so-
called anchoring effect.373 This is a bias in relation to an anchor; an initial 
piece of information upon which decision makers seem to rely heavily as 
they only make small adjustments or deviations from it.374 Importantly, 
this happens even when the anchor is explicitly random and irrelevant for 
the judgment task at hand. Taken together, this research underlines that 
estimations of ages based on physical appearance are likely to be strongly 
context dependent.375 For instance, if judges look at the exact same indi-
vidual with the exact same characteristics in a picture but the context of 
the picture changes, for example, who is standing next to the individual, 
there is a risk that also the judges’ observations of this individual’s charac-
teristics will vary, just like their conclusions regarding his or her age.376 
In child soldiering cases, for instance Lubanga, many individuals 
were depicted together and some of them stood out, for example, because 
they were shorter than the rest of the individuals. Possibly, these individu-
als would have come across as older or younger if presented together with 
other individuals or alone. In fact, it is explicit in the reasoning of the Tri-
al Chamber that the context was taken into account, for instance in rela-
tion to the second video excerpt showing Mr. Lubanga returning to his 
residence after an event at the Hellenique Hotel on 23 January 2003.377 Mr. 
Lubanga was travelling in a vehicle accompanied by members of the pres-
idential guard who were armed and wearing military clothing and on the 
                                                   
373 Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 1124–30. 
374 Ibid. In their pioneering studies, Tversky and Kahneman asked participants about the 
percentage of African nations in the UN. In a first comparative question, participants indi-
cated whether the percentage was higher or lower than an arbitrary number (the anchor) 
that had been determined by spinning a wheel of fortune, showing 65 per cent or 10 per 
cent. In a subsequent absolute anchoring question, participants gave their best estimate of 
this percentage. Results showed that the absolute judgments were assimilated to the explic-
itly random anchor values. For more on this in the legal context see, for example, Birte 
Englich, “Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom 
Based on Given Numerical Representations”, in Law and Policy, 2006, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 
497–514. 
375 The context dependency is also emphasized by Clifford, Watson and White, 2018, pp. 1–
10, see above note 339. 
376 Apart from the research cited in the main text, this is also related to so-called carry-over 
bias, see, for example, Steven J. Ferris et al., “Carryover Bias in Visual Assessment”, in 
Perception, 2001, vol. 30, no. 11, pp. 1363–73. 
377 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 862, see above note 4. 
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back of a truck there were two individuals, alleged child soldiers, in cam-
ouflage clothing. The Trial Chamber compared these two individuals with 
the other individuals present in the video excerpt and found that the latter 
individuals were “taller”.378 This was taken into account when reaching 
the conclusion that the two individuals were significantly under the age of 
15 years.379 The fact that the Chamber explicitly took this information 
into account does not necessarily mean that their assessments were not 
biased. Knowledge of contextual information is always conscious in one 
way or another, but decisions makers are not necessarily in control over 
how such information influences their perceptions.380 
Furthermore, the context of the video excerpt may introduce base 
rate expectations. For instance, knowing that a video was recorded in a 
training camp where children were present can be a biasing factor since it 
suggests that the likelihood of children appearing in the video is relatively 
high.381 There are also many other possible sources of bias in the interpre-
tation of visual evidence including, for example, selective attention382 or a 
hypothesis at hand383 causing the examiners to “see what they expect to 
see”, as exemplified by research into perceptions of body-worn camera 
(‘BWC’) recordings.384 
Clearly, biases like those discussed here constitute risk factors in re-
lation to the accuracy of age estimation based on video evidence. Any 
such risks can be empirically evaluated and such research should also take 
into account how any biases play out and interact with other factors pre-
                                                   
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid. 
380 For more on the topic of whether conscious and subconscious parts of decision making 
processes can be distinguished see, for example, Kahneman and Fredrick’s dual process 
theory of probability judgment, describing how the so-called System 1 and System 2 inter-
act in the decision making process, Daniel Kahneman and Shane Fredrick, “A Model of 
Heuristic Judgment”, in Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 267–94. 
381 See, for example, Dror, 2017, p. 544, see above note 297. 
382 See, for example, Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, Itiel E. Dror and Ruth M. Morgan, “Cognitive 
Bias in Forensic Anthropology: Visual Assessment of Skeletal Remains is Susceptible to 
Confirmation Bias”, in Science and Justice, 2014, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 208–14. 
383 See, for example, Lidén, 2018, see above note 30. 
384 See, for instance, Kristyn A. Jones, William E. Crozier and Deryn Strange, “Believing is 
Seeing: Biased Viewing of Body-worn Camera Footage”, in Journal of Applied Research 
in Memory and Cognition, 2017, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 460–74. 
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sent in these assessments, such as gender and ethnical differences between 
the observer and the observed individual. 
6.5.2.2. Opportunities 
Today, there is a growing number of research studies examining possibili-
ties of estimating age on the basis of facial images by using handcrafted 
algorithms or deep learning technology.385 In this research chronological 
age is considered a significant personal feature that can be derived from 
the emerging of patterns of the facial appearance.386 Thus, the purpose of 
this research is to “label a face image automatically with the exact age 
(year) or the age group (year range) of the individual face”.387 So far, this 
approach has been evaluated in relation to areas such as aged-based ac-
cess control for websites or mobile applications, and so on,388 that is, 
fields that are distinct from legal age determinations. Hence, its value in 
the legal context still needs to be evaluated, empirically and systematical-
ly. 
Although only time can tell what the more specific challenges of 
this approach may be,389 the viability of this research depends on its abil-
ity to identify relevant large-scale data sets in which the ground truth in 
                                                   
385 For an overview of this research see Arwa S. Al-Shannaq and Lamiaa A. Elrefaei, “Com-
prehensive Analysis of the Literature for Age Estimation from Facial Images”, in IEEE Ac-
cess, 2019, vol. 7, pp. 1–21. The main difference between handcrafted algorithms and deep 
learning technology is the process of features extraction and selection which is accom-
plished manually for handcrafted models. 
386 FU Yun, GUO Guodong and HUANG Thomas S., “Age Synthesis and Estimation via 
Faces: A Survey”, in IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 
2010, vol. 32, no. 11, pp. 1955–76. 
387 Ibid.; GENG Xin, YIN Chao and ZHOU Zhi-Hua, “Facial Age Estimation by Learning 
from Label Distributions”, in IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelli-
gence, 2013, vol. 35, no. 10, pp. 2401–12. 
388 See, for example, Ali Elmahmudi and Hassan Ugail, “Deep Face Recognition Using Im-
perfect Facial Data”, in Future Generation Computer Systems, 2019, vol. 99, pp. 213–25; 
HUANG Jin et al., “Age Classification with Deep Learning Face Representation”, in Mul-
timedia Tools and Applications, 2017, vol. 76, pp. 20231–47; and Narayanan Ramanathan, 
Rama Chellappa and Soma Biswas, “Computational Methods for Modelling Facial Aging: 
A Survey”, in Journal of Visual Languages and Computing, 2009, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 131–
44. 
389 For an overview of challenges relating to the more general field of facial analysis that have 
already been identified see, for example, FU, GUO and HUANG, 2010, pp. 1955–76, see 
above note 386; Ramanathan, Chellappa and Biswas, 2009, pp. 131–44, see above note 
388. 
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relation to chronological age is known.390 As manifested by the lack of 
birth certificates to establish ground truth for many alleged child soldiers, 
this may prove to be difficult, although not necessarily impossible. Fur-
thermore, there may be some general similarities in the aging process of 
all people, but it remains to be seen whether and to what extent this re-
search can integrate individual differences due to internal factors (health 
status, gender, genetics, ethnicity) and external factors (life style, envi-
ronment).391 
Since the aging process is unique to every individual, and individu-
als also generally look quite different, two individuals with the exact same 
chronological age can have quite different facial appearances.392 Clearly, 
this may complicate extraction of information from group level data to the 
individualized assessments. When it comes to the early stages of life, 
from birth to adulthood, the available research suggests that the main 
change in a human face is so-called craniofacial growth, that is, changes 
in the face shape and geometry. Craniofacial studies indicate that with age 
there is a modification from a circular to an oval face shape.393 
The research focusing on specific facial characteristics as indicators 
of age is particularly interesting given that it seems to vary to what degree 
such characteristics have been incorporated into the visual age assess-
                                                   
390 Currently there are several databases, some of them available online, that can be used for 
this purpose. For more on such databases see, for example, Al-Shannaq and Elrefaei, 2019, 
pp. 1–21, see above note 385; Sergio Escalera et al., “ChaLearn Looking at People 2015: 
Apparent Age and Cultural Event Recognition Datasets and Results”, in IEEE Internation-
al Conference on Computer Vision Workshop (ICCVW), IEEE, 2015. 
391 For more on this topic see, for example, Zebrowitz, 1997, see above note 131; Midori 
Albert, Karl Ricanek and Eric Patterson, “A Review of the Literature on the Aging Adult 
Skull and Face: Implications for Forensic Science Research and Applications”, in Forensic 
Science International, 2007, vol. 172, pp. 1–9; LI Ya et al., “Facial Age Estimation by Us-
ing Stacked Feature Composition and Selection”, in The Visual Computer, 2016, vol. 32, 
no. 12, pp. 1525–36; DUAN Mingxing, LI Kenli and LI Kegin, “An Ensemble CNN2ELM 
for Age Estimation”, in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2018, 
vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 758–72. 
392 HAN Hu, Charles Otto and Anil K. Jain, “Age Estimation from Face Images: Human vs. 
Machine Performance”, in International Conference on Biometrics, 2013, vol. 6, pp. 1–8. 
393 Narayanan Ramanathan and Rama Chellappa, “Face Verification Across Age Progression”, 
in IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, 2006, vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 3349–61; Moham-
mad Dehshibi and Azam Bastanfard, “A New Algorithm for Age Recognition from Facial 
Images”, in Signal Processing, 2010, vol. 90, no. 8, pp. 2431–44. For the stage from adult-
hood to old age, primarily texture change in the skin are relevant, but also slight changes in 
face shape may occur. 
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ments made by the Courts. For instance, in the Lubanga case, the Appeals 
Chamber explicitly recognizes “size and general appearance” as valid age 
estimation indicators while simultaneously noting that the Trial Chamber 
did not make any reference to the facial features of the individuals con-
cerned.394 In the Ntaganda case, the Trial Chamber mentions in relation to 
one video extract that it considers: “in particular, the facial features of the 
relevant individual”.395 It is unknown why the Chambers have decided to 
focus more or less on size, general appearance and facial features. From a 
research perspective, it is essential to better understand how and why dif-
ferent observers may vary in their observations as well as what types of 
contextual information may be biasing. Paediatricians’ ability to estimate 
age should also be evaluated. 
Clearly, the extent to which facial features can even be accurately 
perceived is dependent on image quality and focus, which was problemat-
ic in Lubanga. Preliminary empirical data suggests that even with relative-
ly poor image quality, machine learning approaches can make sound clas-
sifications.396 If an alleged child soldier is participating, photos can also 
be taken at a later stage under controlled conditions and then be used for 
age estimation. Such an approach requires that the time frame for the al-
leged crime can be established reasonably well.397 This is to allow sub-
traction of the years that have passed by since then and use this to calcu-
late the chronological age of the individual in question at the time period 
during which the crime(s) was (were) allegedly committed. 
Although there seems to be some potential in age estimations based 
on faces, it is uncertain whether and to what extent it can help with the 
specific problem of distinguishing, for example, a 14-year-old from a 16- 
year old alleged child soldier. In this small age interval, there are probably 
                                                   
394 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 228, see above note 3. 
395 Ntaganda Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 388, see above note 74. 
396 So far, this has been tested primarily in the medical field, see, for example, LEE Hyunk-
wang et al., “Pixel-Level Deep Segmentation: Artificial Intelligence Quantifies Muscle on 
Computed Tomography for Body Morphometric Analysis”, in Journal of Digital Imaging, 
2017, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 487–98; Martina Sollini et al., “Towards Clinical Application of 
Image Mining: A Systematic Review on Artificial Intelligence and Radiomics”, in Europe-
an Journal of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, 2019, vol. 46, no. 13, pp. 2656–
72; Ahmed Hosny et al., “Artificial Intelligence in Radiology”, in Nature Reviews Cancer, 
2018, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 500–10. 
397 Certainly, the prosecutor would have to establish the time frame anyways, in order to 
prove the crime(s) beyond reasonable doubt. 
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very gradual changes that are not necessarily visible at all, not the least 
considering all individual variation. Hence, it remains to be seen whether 
sufficiently nuanced and detailed estimations can be made to tackle this 
problem. Also, the relative accuracy of human age perceptions based on 
faces vs. the estimations obtained by using machine learning approaches 
has not been systematically and empirically evaluated.398 Psychological 
research suggests that also humans who assess age on the basis of facial 
features rely on similar features as those identified to be the most reliable 
indicators through deep learning research.399 In this regard, it is interest-
                                                   
398 Although early research suggests that deep learning approaches outperform humans, see 
HAN, Otto and Jain, 2013, see above note 392. 
399 For an overview of this research see Matthew G. Rhodes, “Age Estimation of Faces: A 
Review”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2009, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1–12. This research 
examines that facial cues individuals use for age estimations, consciously or subconscious-
ly. For assessments of young individuals, up until approximately 20 years, age estimates 
seem to be sensitive to the level of cardioidal strain, that is, regularities in craniofacial 
growth which are sometimes described as a geometric transformation of the face. As car-
dioidal strain (and perceived age) increases, the skull casing is less pronounced and slopes 
further backward, the chin becomes more prominent and ‘juts out’ to a greater degree and 
the nose is placed higher in the face, see John B. Pittenger and Robert E. Shaw, “Aging 
Faces as Viscal-Elastic Events: Implications for a Theory of Non-rigid Shape Perception”, 
in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1975, vol. 1, 
no. 4, pp. 374–82. For more on cardioidal strain see, for example, Leonard S. Mark et al., 
“Wrinkling and Head Shape as Coordinated Sources of Age Level Information”, in Per-
ception and Psychophysics, 1980, vol. 27, pp. 117–24; Leonard S. Mark et al., “Percep-
tions of Growth: A Geometric Analysis of How Different Styles of Change are Distin-
guished”, in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
1981, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 855–68; John B Pittenger and Robert E. Shaw, “Perception of Rela-
tive and Absolut Age in Facial Photographs”, in Perception and Psychophysics, 1975, vol. 
18, pp. 137–43; Vicki Bruce et al., “Further Experiment on the Perception of Growth in 
Three Dimensions”, in Perception and Psychophysics, 1989, vol. 46, pp. 528–36. Interest-
ingly, cardioidal strain also predicted the majority of variability in facial development evi-
dent in longitudinal studies of growth. For example, using X-rays of the skull of the same 
individual taken at several ages, a cardioidal strain transformation applied to growth at 4 
years of age could predict the majority of the variability in facial growth at age 19, see 
James T. Todd and Leonard S. Mark, “Issues Related to the Prediction of Craniofacial 
Growth”, in American Journal of Orthodontics, 1981, vol. 79, no. 1, pp. 63–80. A rounded 
skull, with a small chin and nose situated at a lower position are characteristics of early 
development (low levels of strain). Not surprisingly, also the skin texture among children 
is different than that of adults. The effect of contextual factors such as impoverished view-
ing conditions and clothing as well as training have on age estimations still need to be fur-
ther examined. For more on these findings see Rhodes, 2009, pp. 1–12, see above note 399; 
Diane S. Berry and Leslie Z. McArthur, “Perceiving Character in Faces: The Impact of 
Age-related Craniofacial Changes on Social Perception”, in Psychological Bulletin, 1986, 
vol. 100, pp. 3–18. See also Sörqvist and Eriksson, 2007, pp. 131–35, see above note 337. 
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ing to note that deep learning approaches to age estimations have already 
been tested on a preliminary basis in child pornography cases.400 Here, the 
algorithms are used to identify a minor in a given image or video.401 
While this research still needs to be replicated it indicates that “the ma-
chines” outperform humans.402 To properly evaluate such opportunities 
also in relation to age estimations of alleged child soldiers seem all the 
more important provided that it may be impossible to obtain other age 
evidence than video or photo evidence in relation to some alleged child 
soldiers, while the applicable law still requires objective elements of the 
crime to be determined. Also, even if there is other evidence such as oral 
evidence it is often fraught with serious challenges as well, as discussed in 
the next Section. 
6.5.3. Oral Evidence 
6.5.3.1. Challenges 
6.5.3.1.1. Validity 
This section focuses on age statements, that is, claims or estimations of 
age put forward either by the alleged child soldiers themselves or by other 
individuals like parents, social workers, NGO personnel, insiders or other 
witnesses. As such, this section has a different and more specific interest 
than the oral evidence presented by alleged child soldiers in a wider 
sense.403 When the mentioned individuals provide their age statements, it 
                                                                                                                        
In this study, participants made age estimates for groups of young (15–24 years of age), 
middle-aged (34–46 years of age) and older (56–65 years of age) adults. Participants in a 
training group made age estimates and were given feedback in the form of the actual age 
of the individual. A control group practised making age estimates but was not provided 
feedback. Results showed that the provision of feedback improved performance relative to 
participants who were not given feedback. Yet, the improvements were restricted to esti-
mates of the ages of older adults, limiting the utility of this training programme for age es-
timation of children and young adults. 
400 Jared Rondeau, Deep Learning of Human Apparent Age for the Detection of Sexually 
Exploitative Imagery of Children, University of Rhode Islands, 2019. 
401 Ibid. 
402 See, for example, HAN, Otto and Jain, 2013, see above note 392. These results were ob-
tained using a database of 2200 face images in relation to which human age estimation (M-
Turkers), 10 for each image, were obtained and compared to the accuracy obtained using 
machine learning approach. 
403 That more general question has already been empirically evaluated by See Barbora Holá 
and Thijs Bouwknegt, “Child Soldiers in International Courtrooms: Unqualified Perpetra-
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is often unknown what the bases for their statements are. As outlined and 
discussed in the following, age statements can be based on chronological 
age but they can also or alternatively be based on biological age (Section 
6.5.1.), apparent age (Section 6.5.2.) and/or social age, that is, a socially 
constructed age which is more strongly related to life events and to other 
people404 or functional and physiological attributes405 than the time that 
has passed since birth. It is today fairly widely acknowledged that age406 
is constructed, understood and used differently across different cultures 
and that this can result in communicational issues cross-culturally.407 The 
child soldiering cases provide a perfect example of this. Importantly, this 
is not because the SCSL and the ICC hold a Western understanding of the 
age concept while the interviewed individuals do not. Both at the SCSL 
and the ICC the staff was or is multicultural as mandated and exemplified 
by, for example, the election rules for the ICC judges (Article 36 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC).408 Rather, the legal culture or context in which 
                                                                                                                        
tors, Erratic Witnesses and Irreparable Victims?”, in Mark A. Drumbl and Jastine C. Bar-
rett (eds.), Research Handbook on Child Soldiers, Edward Elgar, 2019, pp. 1–21. 
404 Ashish Vaska et al., “Age Determination in Refugee Children: A Narrative History Tool for 
Use in Holistic Age Assessment”, in Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health, 2016, vol. 5, 
p. 527. 
405 Terry Smith and Laura Brownless, Age Assessment Practices: A Literature Review and 
Annotated Bibliography, UNICEF, 2011; Deborah Durham, “Youth and the Social Imagi-
nation in Africa: Introduction to Parts 1 and 2”, in Anthropological Quarterly, 2000, vol. 
73, no. 3, pp. 113–20 and Derrick B. Jelliffe, “Age Assessment in Field Surveys of Chil-
dren of the Tropics”, in The Journal Pediatrics, 1966, vol. 69, no. 5, pp. 826–28. 
406 As well as time in a more general sense. 
407 This has been explored in relation to refugee children and this research demonstrates, inter 
alia, that age can be a significant factor but understood and remembered differently with 
knowledge of an exact date not required for functioning in participant’s home societies. 
The researchers found that information regarding age was embedded in narrative accounts 
related to events and other people. Since birth was not always registered, birth and age-
containing documentation was only obtained later in life. These documents often reflected 
cultural ideas regarding age, rather than recording true chronological age. See Vaska et al., 
2016, p. 527, see above note 404. See also Carla Willig, “Beyond Appearances: A Critical 
Realist Approach to Social Constructionist Work”, in David J. Nightingale and John 
Cromby (eds.), Social Constructionist Psychology: A Critical Analysis of Theory and 
Practice, Open University Press, Philadelphia, 1999, pp. 37–51. 
408 For instance, according to Article 36(8) the State Parties shall, in the selection of judges, 
take into account the need, within the membership of the Court for: the representation of 
the principal legal systems of the world, equitable geographical representation and a fair 
representation of female and male judges. Also, in accordance with Article 36(7) no two 
judges may be nationals of the same country. For more on the topic of multiculturalism at 
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this staff operates has one very specific understanding of what kind of age 
is relevant, that is, chronological age, and for its legal determinations it is 
ultimately interested in in chronological age exclusively. Social age as an 
operationalization of chronological age will be discussed in more detail in 
this Section (Section 6.5.3.1.1.1. “Social Age”). Furthermore, age state-
ments can also be false or honestly mistaken. Given this complexity, a few 
steps have to be taken in order to understand and evaluate the validity of 
an age statement as a measure of chronological age, namely: 
1. The basis (or bases) for the age statement needs to be established. 
For age statements based on biological and/or apparent age, the 
reader is referred to these respective Sections (Section 6.5.1. and 
6.5.2.). For age statements based on chronological age, the reader is 
referred to question 2 below. For age statements based on social age 
the reader is referred to the issues discussed in the subsequent text 
(Section 6.5.3.). Regardless of what the claimed basis (or bases) for 
the estimation is, it will always be relevant to answer question 3 be-
low. 
2. If an interviewee claims that the basis for the age statement is the 
chronological age an essential question is of course to establish 
whether the interviewee can be and is knowledgeable about his or 
her own chronological age or the chronological age of the alleged 
child soldier. If an unknowledgeable interviewee happens to guess 
the right age, this is a matter of luck rather than validity. The possi-
bility that the interviewee confuses chronological age with social 
age should be evaluated (Section 6.5.3.1.1.1.). 
3. How can legal actors know whether the interviewee providing the 
age statement is telling the truth, lying or is simply mistaken? Note 
that honest mistakes as regards chronological age are not defined as 
lies here.409 To fully distinguish these three possibilities, legal actors 
would need a fool proof method distinguishing between individuals 
who are telling the truth, lying and making honest mistakes in their 
age statements, see Section 6.5.3.1.1.2. 
                                                                                                                        
the ICC, see, for example, YEE Sienho and Jacques-Yvan Morin, Multiculturalism and In-
ternational Law: Essays in Honour of Edward McWhinney, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009. 
409 Neither are they defined as such in lie detection research, see Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies 
and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities, Wiley, 2008. 
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The legal cases themselves as well as relevant empirical research 
strongly suggests that the three questions posed above are usually very 
difficult to answer in practice. It might not even be possible to pass 
through question 1. These challenges are not any news to international 
criminal justice today, as manifested by that the ICC judges tend to not 
rely upon age statements, see, for example, the Lubanga case and Table 
4.410 However, it can be noted that the SCSL judges did in fact trust the 
child soldier’s own age statements to a relatively large extent. The most 
likely reason for this difference between the Courts is that age was rarely 
contested in the SCSL cases.411 Despite these challenges, oral evidence 
are still extensive in these cases and individuals, especially those under 
the age of 15 years, should be interviewed in ways that promote their 
rights.412 
6.5.3.1.1.1. Social Age 
Since age is constructed, understood and used differently across different 
cultures, and the legal culture’s understanding of age as something entire-
ly chronological can deviate from the understandings of age held by inter-
viewees, there may be communicational issues when conducting and 
evaluating interviews with for instance victims and witnesses. Instead of 
focusing on a particular date of birth as legal age elements do, age may be 
considered to exist within a time span or bracket, which is more strongly 
related to significant life events and to other people413 or functional and 
physiological attributes. 414 Also, apart from cultural differences, break-
                                                   
410 This was largely because of contradictions and the possible interference of an intermediate, 
see the discussion in Section 6.4.1. 
411 As will be discussed later, the age was often not heavily contested by the defence in these 
cases, there was no other evidence available and the SCSL also seem to have inferred ages 
of alleged child soldiers on the basis of them having been part of Small Boys Units (‘SBU’) 
or Small Girls Units (‘SGU’). 
412 See, for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and two of its Optional Proto-
cols: CRC-OPAC and CRC-OPSC. There are also commitments to follow a child-sensitive 
approach, see, for example, ICC-OTP, Policy on Children, 2016, pp. 30–33 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c2652b/). The latter document describes, for example, the OTP’s 
“commitment to follow a child-sensitive approach” (p. 30) and that “[a]ll interviews with 
children will be conducted by staff members with expertise in interviewing and interacting 
with children, seeking the support of external experts if and when required” (pp. 31–32). 
413 Vaska et al., 2016, p. 527, see above note 404. 
414 Smith and Brownless, 2011, see above note 405; Durham, 2000, pp. 113–20, see above 
note 405; and Jeliffe, 1966, see above note 405. 
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downs of structures such as education, healthcare and employment or of 
families and communities, memories and records may leave individuals 
with neither a socio-relational nor a record-based means of recalling 
age.415 This means that age statements are often a measure of socially 
constructed age or inferred age, here referred to as social age, and it is 
unknown how this correlates with chronological age. In other words, this 
is a question of how valid social age is as a measure of chronological age. 
At the SCSL, and more specifically the AFRC case, the potential 
mismatch between social age and chronological age was expressed and 
discussed by the Kanu defence expert. According to this expert opinion, 
the 15-year threshold is arbitrary because the “traditional African set-
ting”416 offers a different conception of childhood in which: 
the ending of childhood has little to do with achieving a par-
ticular age and more to do with physical capacity to perform 
acts reserved for adults. Marriage and the establishment of a 
new homestead are traditionally two prime indications of an 
adult male. As such, childhood refers more to a position in a 
societal hierarch than to biological age417 and in order to be-
come an adult it is necessary to ascend this hierarchy.418 
Hence, this expert opinion challenges the conception of childhood, 
as expressed by SCSL (as well as ICC) Statutes. While the Trial Chamber 
in the AFRC rejected any defence based on cultural distinctions regarding 
the definition of childhood,419 it is obvious in the statements of some of 
                                                   
415 Vaska et al., 2016, p. 527, see above note 404. Also, children may have false documents or 
may not know their age, or they may have no documentation to prove their identity or lit-
erally may not know their date of birth, see Laura Brownlee and Terry Smith, Lives in the 
Balance: The Quality of Immigration Legal Advice Given to Separated Children Seeking 
Asylum, Refugee Council, 2011. 
416 Brima et al. Defence Research Report on the Use of Child Soldiers in the Sierra Leone 
Conflict, p. 6, see above note 193. 
417 Own addition: Presumably, what the expert is referring to here is chronological age, not 
biological age as it is used in this research. 
418 Brima et al. Defence Research Report on the Use of Child Soldiers in the Sierra Leone 
Conflict, p. 6, see above note 193. 
419 The more specific arguments of the defence in the AFRC case was that the practice of 
recruiting and involving child soldiers was extensive and used by all the warring factions 
in the Sierra Leone conflict, that is, RUF-SL, the AFRC/SLA, West Side Boys and the pro-
government forces including the Civil Defence Forces (‘CDF’s’), see Brima et al. Defence 
Research Report on the Use of Child Soldiers in the Sierra Leone Conflict, p. 18, see 
above note 193. According to the KANU defence this practice impacted on KANU’s 
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the alleged child soldiers, that they simply did not know their chronologi-
cal age at the time of interest. Rather, from their statements it is clear that 
they had inferred their chronological ages wholly or partially from what 
others had told them or other external events. For instance, in the Taylor 
case, Sumana told the SCSL that his father “used to tell him”420 that he 
was 14 years at the relevant time. Furthermore, Sumana stated that he was 
abducted during the “mango season”421 and that this was “at the time we 
were finally driven out of Koidu Town”.422 Similarly, Tholley testified 
that she had not yet had her menses when she was raped.423 When age is 
inferred from external events, the validity will depend on whether 1) the 
individual is telling the truth or not making any subconscious mistakes in 
relation to the external events and when they took place and 2) that the 
dates of the external events can be corroborated. In some situations this 
can be made somewhat easier, for example, if cultural traditional events 
regularly take place within a certain time frame from birth, for example, 
celebrations seven days after child birth in Burundi424 or traditional head 
shaving referred to as chawar in Bhutan.425 If such events take place, 
which is often at the instigation of the parents of the child,426 it may be 
easier to remember or infer chronological age. Other examples highlight 
that social age can sometimes also have strong ties to other types of ages, 
for example, biological age. For instance, in the RUF case, TFI-141 in-
formed the Court that he only learned of his age “during his demobiliza-
tion in 2000, when a nurse counted his teeth and determined he was 14 
                                                                                                                        
awareness as to the unlawfulness of conscripting, enlisting or using child soldiers below 
the age of 15. The defence submitted that such conduct was not on its face manifestly ille-
gal and therefore no conviction should be entered on the ground of mistake of law. The 
Trial Chamber dismissed this submission stating that it was not persuaded that the defence 
of mistake of law could be invoked, since the rules of customary international law are not 
contingent on domestic practice in the given country, see SCSL Brima et al. Trial Chamber 
Judgment, pp. 226–27, see above note 59. 
420 SCSL Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1378, see above note 67. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Ibid., para. 1454. 
424 Martha Nemes Fried and Morton H. Fried, Transitions: Four Rituals in Eight Cultures, 
Norton, New York, 1980; Henry Harald Hansen, The Kurdish Woman’s Life: Field Re-
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years old”.427 Hence, all of the issues associated with the different types 
of ages may be intertangled in an age statement. 
6.5.3.1.1.2. Truths, Lies and Honest Mistakes 
Apart from the potential mismatch between chronological age and social 
age, or social age intertangled with biological and apparent age, the SCSL 
and ICC cases also highlight another potentially problematic aspect of 
relying on age statements. This is when there is a real possibility that age 
statements are false or honestly mistaken. As indicated above, age state-
ments can be false for many reasons. It could be that the person providing 
the statement is consciously lying, is honestly mistaken and/or has been 
led to provide a certain statement, whether he or she realizes that the 
statement is false or not. The possibility of interviewer generated state-
ments has been widely acknowledged in the psychological literature and 
also in individual cases in national jurisdictions. Interestingly, this possi-
bility was noted by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case in relation to 
Intermediary 143 and the alleged child soldiers he introduced to the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’).428 More specifically, the Chamber stated 
that: 
[…] there is a real risk that he [own addition: the Intermedi-
ary] played a role in the markedly flawed evidence that these 
witnesses provided to the OTP and to the Court […] it is 
likely that as the common point of contact he persuaded, en-
couraged or assisted some or all of them to give false testi-
mony. The Chamber accepts that the accounts of P-0007, P-
0008, P-0010 and P-0011 were or may have been truthful 
and accurate in part, but it has real doubts as to critical as-
pects of their evidence, in particular their age at the relevant 
time. Although other potential explanations exist, the real 
possibility that Intermediary 143 corrupted the evidence of 
the four witnesses cannot be safely discounted.429 
While this provides an example of a seemingly conscious influence 
on behalf of the interviewer, there are also more subtle forms of influ-
ences to take into account here, not the least provided the different under-
standings of age that might be at play during an interview. Presume that 
                                                   
427 SCSL Sesay et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 78, see above note 64. 
428 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 291, see above note 4. 
429 Ibid. 
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an interviewee has never or only very rarely had to speak about his or her 
chronological age, since this type of age has never been a big deal, or 
even a deal at all, in the individual’s community. Is it even reasonable to 
expect that the interviewee could him or herself provide a specific age? As 
outlined in Table 3 many of the alleged child soldiers, also those who 
were not introduced by Intermediary 143, did provide own oral testimony 
as to their year of birth and/or specific age when they were abducted. 
This raises questions in relation to investigative interviewing, 430 
which is today a well-established and respected interview framework, as 
well as an accepted part of the ICC’s investigative practice.431 The overall 
aim of this framework is to conduct sound interviews that generate accu-
rate and reliable information. This presupposes that the interview is con-
ducted without impacting on the interviewee’s memory retrieval or state-
ment. 432  To this end, it is often recommended to establish so-called 
ground rules of the interview to ensure that the interviewee understands 
for instance what the difference between a truth and a lie is.433 When it 
comes to interviews seeking to establish someone’s chronological age, it 
                                                   
430 Investigative interviewing is based on systematic and replicated empirical research, see, 
for example, Tom Williamson (ed.), Investigative Interviewing: Rights, Research, Regula-
tion, Routledge, 2006; Ray Bull (ed.), Investigative Interviewing, Springer, New York, 
2014. It includes interview models such as the PEACE model. For a summary see, for ex-
ample, Becky Milne and Martine Powell, “Investigative Interviewing”, in Jennifer M. 
Brown and Elizabeth A. Campbell (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Forensic Psychol-
ogy, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 208–14. 
431 For more on this see, for example, International Investigative Interviewing Research 
Group’s web site. 
432 See, for example, Genevieve Waterhouse, Anne Ridley, Rachel Wilcock and Ray Bull, 
“Investigative interviewing in England and Wales: Adults, Children and the Provision of 
Support for Child Witnesses”, in David Walsh, Gavin E. Oxburgh, Allison D. Redlich and 
Trond Myklebust (eds.), International Developments and Practices in Investigative Inter-
viewing and Interrogation, Volume 1: Victims and Witnesses, Routledge, 2016, pp. 112–29; 
Bull (ed.), 2014, see above note 430. 
433 Several others describe ground rules but see, for instance, NAKA Makiko, “A Training 
Program for Investigative Interviewing of Children”, in Ray Bull (ed.), Investigative Inter-
viewing, Springer, New York, 2014, pp. 103–22. Other ground rules are, for instance, to 
encourage that the child says “I don’t know” if the child does not know the answer and that 
the child should correct the interviewer if he or she makes a mistake. It has also been 
acknowledged by Naka, as well as several other authors that with repetitive interviews, 
children may say untrue things, consciously or subconsciously. For more on this see 
TAKAOKA Masako et al., “False Memories in Children Created Through a Series of In-
terviews: Who Took a Boy Away?”, in International Journal of Police Sciences and Man-
agement, 2002, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 62–72. 
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seems relevant to also establish ground rules in relation to temporal as-
pects, for instance by asking questions such as: “What is a month?”, 
“What is a year?”, “What year is it now?” and “If I say that I am 7 years 
old, what am I doing then?”.434 The interviewees’ answers to such ques-
tions would be indicative of whether the interviewee is at all capable of 
providing accurate information about chronological age. If ground rules 
have not been established, this is one possible explanation of differences 
between statements of the same or different individuals. Although it is 
unknown exactly why deviations occur, the Lubanga case has multiple 
examples of internal contradictions between the same alleged child sol-
dier’s statement at different points in time,435 see Table 4. 
If an interviewer tries to establish ground rules relating to temporal 
aspects and it becomes clear that the interviewee does not understand the 
relevant terms, guiding the interviewee in providing his or her own age 
statement will probably entail a very delicate balancing act. On the one 
hand, the interviewee needs support but on the other hand, the risk of 
leading the interviewee is probably quite large. Given the complexity of 
eliciting reliable age statements from individuals with age concepts fun-
damentally different from the legal age concept, the understanding of 
what constitutes a leading question in this specific context has to be more 
carefully examined.436 An important aspect of this is of course that while 
                                                   
434 This last question is intended to test the understanding of a lie in relation to age specifical-
ly. Note that none of these questions have been empirically evaluated but are rather sug-
gestions based on similar suggestions primarily for interviews with children, for example, 
to determine whether the child understands the difference between lying and telling the 
truth, an interviewer could ask: “If I tell you that I am wearing a red shirt, what am I doing 
then?”, presuming that the interviewer is wearing a shirt of some other colour. The usage 
of such questions to establish ground rules has been accepted as an important part of inves-
tigative interviewing, see, for example, Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, Investigative Inter-
viewing: Psychology and Practice, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, 1999. 
435 Also, there were differences between the accounts of P-0298 who said he spent about four 
months at the camp and his father P-0299 who gave evidence that P-0298 left school and 
went to training camp for two months, see Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 434, 
see above note 4. 
436 Especially considering that other suggestive elements may also be at play, for instance that 
the interviewee perceives of the interviewer as an authority figure. Suggestibility in chil-
dren has been discussed at length, not the least in relation to events that occurred a long 
time ago and with interviewers who the children perceive as authority figures, when there 
is a tangible risk that the child feels that he or she has to answer in accordance with the in-
terviewer’s suggestion, see, for example, Milne and Bull, 1999, see above note 434; Barry 
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the ICC staff has training in conducting investigative interviewing, this is 
not necessarily the case for intermediaries, social workers and other indi-
viduals who conduct age interviews.437 Importantly, the interviewer will 
not necessarily be aware that he or she is impacting on the individual’s 
statement. But, since the interviewer is aware of what type of age state-
ment is required for the statement to be used and relied upon by the prose-
cution or in Court, it is possible that the interviewer will subtly steer the 
interviewee towards providing an age statement he or she otherwise 
would not have provided.438 
While there is emerging research into statement analysis in the con-
text of international criminal law, see Chapter 3 by Agirre Aranburu in 
this volume,439 most of the existing research has focused on national ju-
                                                                                                                        
Feld, “Cops and Kids in the Interrogation Room”, in Ray Bull (ed.), Investigative Inter-
viewing, Springer, New York, 2014. 
437 For more on the research that has already been conducted focusing on the cultural aspects 
on investigative interviewing see, for example, Melanie O’Brien and Mark Kebbel, “Inter-
view Techniques in International Criminal Court and Tribunals”, in Ray Bull (ed.), Investi-
gative Interviewing, Springer, New York, 2014, pp. 91–103. As pointed out by these au-
thors much of the evidence in trials concerning international criminal law is elicited from 
witnesses, victims and suspects, and therefore, the way in which they are interviewed is 
critical to successful prosecutions of the guilty. The participants in this research report 
challenges of cultural differences in interviews because the method of storytelling and 
concept of time differ in some parts of Africa from those in Western cultures, seeking suc-
cessfully to develop a rich and detailed narrative by the suspect or witness. However, a sto-
ry as told by an African storyteller may not be told chronologically. Time is not measured 
by a clock or calendar but in reference to events. For example, a person in the UK might 
recount an event as occurring on 7 April 2009, whereas an event in the DRC might be 
mentioned relative to the rains. Also, a meaningful body of work on interviewing vulnera-
ble witnesses of international crimes has been produced by scholars and NGO’s on topics 
such as victims of sexual and gender-based violence and children, see Morten Bergsmo 
and William H. Wiley, “Human Rights Professional and the Criminal Investigation and 
Prosecution of Core International Crimes”, in Siri Skåre, Ingvild Burkey and Hege Mørk 
(eds.), Manual on Human Rights Monitoring: An Introduction for Human Rights Field Of-
ficers, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Oslo, 2008, pp. 18–21 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8362d5/). 
438 This should be seen against the background that cases have previously ‘collapsed’ before 
the Court because witness testimonies are considered unreliable. Also, the Court’s reluc-
tance to trust specifically the statements of alleged child soldiers has been documented in 
recent empirical research, see Holá and Bouwknegt, 2019, pp. 1–21, see above note 403. 
439 Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “The Contribution of Analysis to the Quality Control in Criminal 
Investigation”, Chapter 3 above; Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “On How Analysis Can Enhance 
the Quality of Investigation and Case Preparation”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 Febru-
ary 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-agirre/); Gabriele Chlevickaite and 
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risdictions and statements in a more general sense, rather than age state-
ments.440 Since evidence corroborating or disproving witness statements 
is sometimes scarce or even non-existent, many national as well as inter-
national tribunals have established criteria upon which evaluations of reli-
ability and credibility should be made.441 The extent to which such criteria 
(like detail, consistency criteria, and so on) are indicative of a truthful, 
deceptive (or mistaken) testimony has also been the topic of much re-
search into so-called statement analysis techniques such as Statement Va-
lidity Assessment (‘SVA’) 442  and Reality Monitoring (‘RM’). 443  These 
techniques all have a notion in common, namely that there are qualitative 
and quantitative differences between truthful and deceptive testimony. 
Research into these techniques suggest that statement analysis techniques 
have overall error rates of 25–30 per cent,444 that is, when the criteria are 
used to decide whether someone is lying or telling the truth, these deci-
sions are wrong in 25–30 per cent of the cases. Among the specific criteria 
                                                                                                                        
Barbora Holá, “Empirical Study of Insider Witnesses’ Assessments at the International 
Criminal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 673–702. 
440 See, for example, Richard A. Wise, Giuseppe Sartori, Svein Magnussen and Martin A. 
Safer, “An Examination of the Causes and Solutions to Eyewitness Error”, in Frontiers in 
Psychiatry, 2014, vol. 5, pp. 1–8; Richard A. Wise, Kirsten A. Dauphinais and Martin A. 
Safer, “A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error”, in The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 2007, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 807–71. 
441 For more information about what criteria are used for Source Evaluation by the ICC-OTP 
see Agirre Aranburu, 2020, see above note 439. 
442 See, for example, Gunther Köhnken, “Statement Validity Analysis and the “Detection of 
Truth”, in Pär Anders Granhag and Leif A. Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in 
Forensic Contexts, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 41–63. 
443 See, for example, Marcia K. Johnson and Carol L. Raye, “Reality Monitoring”, in Psycho-
logical Review, 1981, vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 67–85 and Sigfried L. Sporer, “Reality Monitoring 
and Detection of Deception”, in Pär Anders Granhag and Leif A. Strömwall (eds.), The De-
tection of Deception in Forensic Contexts, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 64–102. 
See also the so-called Multivariable Adults’ Statements Assessment Model (‘MASAM’), 
which has been tested in one study with suspect statement but still needs more evaluation, 
Bartosz Wojciechowski, Minna Gräns and Moa Lidén, “A True Denial or a False Confes-
sion? Assessing Veracity of Suspects’ Statements using MASAM and SVA”, in PloS One, 
2018, vol. 13, no. 6. 
444 The overall error rate for SVA is estimated to 30 per cent, for a summary see Bartosz 
Wojciech Wojciechowski, “Content Analysis Algorithms: An Innovative and Accurate Ap-
proach to Statement Veracity Assessment”, in European Polygraph, 2014, vol. 8, no. 3, p. 
121. The overall error rate for RM is 25 per cent, see Jaume Masip et al., “The Detection 
of Deception with the Reality Monitoring Approach: A Review of the Empirical Evidence”, 
in Psychology, Crime and Law, 2005, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 99–122. 
6. Child Soldier or Soldier? Estimating Age in Cases of Core International Crimes: 
Challenges and Opportunities 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 417 
entailed in statement analysis techniques, the detail criterion (the number 
of details) has gained the strongest scientific support, in both field and 
experimental studies. 445 Furthermore, a recent expert evaluation of the 
criteria previously used by the Swedish Supreme Court suggests that a 
truthful statement is significantly longer than a false statement.446 Moreo-
ver, according to the expert evaluation, the fact that a statement is clear 
and detailed can suggest that the statement is truthful, whereas there is no 
real support for the notion that lacking consistency indicates deception.447 
                                                   
445 While this is accurate of the research available, it does not necessarily mean that the detail 
criterion is useful in applied settings, for example due to embedded lies or that it is diffi-
cult to determine when a statement is detailed enough to satisfy this criterion. For a critical 
analysis of the detail criterion, see Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “The Contribution of Analysis 
to the Quality Control in Criminal Investigation”, Chapter 3 in this volume. For research 
pertaining to the detail criterion in controlled experimental setting and some field studies, 
see Galit Nahari et al., “Language of Lies: Urgent Issues and Prospects in Verbal Lie De-
tection Research”, in Legal and Criminological Psychology, 2019, vol. 24, pp. 1–23. As 
pointed out by these authors: “There seems to be an emerging consensus among scholars 
about the validity of a limited number of cues. For example, ample research has shown that 
truthful statements are more detailed than deceptive statements”. Ibid., p. 10. However, 
they also emphasize difficulties in measuring the level of detail in practice as well as aca-
demic research, for instance, because coding schemes may produce arbitrary choices. See 
also Wendy L. Morris and Bella M. DePaulo, “Discerning Lies from Truths: Behavioral 
Cues to Deception and the Indirect Pathway of Intuition”, in Pär Anders Granhag and Leif 
A. Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2004, pp. 15–40; Aldert Vrij et al., “Detecting Deceit via Analysis of Verbal and 
Nonverbal Behavior”, in Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 2000, vol. 24, pp. 239–63. For 
more on the detail criteria in the context of investigations into core international crimes, 
the reader is referred to Agirre Aranburu, 2020, see above note 439. 
446 See Lena Schelin, Bevisvärdering av utsagor i brottmål, Norstedts Juridik, Stockholm, 
2007, p. 86. This is based on research by, for example, Maria Alonso-Quecuty, “Deception 
Detection and Reality Monitoring: A New Answer to an Old Question?”, in Friedrich Lösel, 
Doris Bender and Thomas Bliesener (eds.), Psychology and Law: International Perspec-
tives, Walter De Gruyter, 1992, pp. 328–32; Vrij, 2008, see above note 409; Morris and 
DePaulo, 2004, see above note 445. 
447 The expert evaluation was made in relation to The Swedish Supreme Court case NJA 2010 
p. 671, the Swedish Supreme Court, NJA 2010 p. 671, Bevisvärdering i mål om sexualbrott, 
28 December 2010. For the full expert evaluation see the Swedish Government Official 
Reports, SOU 2017:7 appendix 7. In this case, the Court had stated that a reliable state-
ment is characterized by that it is clear, long, vivid logical, rich in detail, proven to be true 
in relation to important details, free from errors, contradictions, exaggerations, details that 
are difficult to explain, lack of consistency/context or hesitation in important parts. The 
purpose of the review was to evaluate whether and to what extent these criteria were con-
sistent with findings in lie detection research. The result of the expert evaluation made the 
Supreme Court revise its criteria, as acknowledged by the Court in NJA 2017 s. 316. 
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Even if some of the statement criteria have empirical support, their 
usefulness and accuracy in an applied setting can be discussed. The re-
search findings often come from controlled experimental studies that may 
be relatively different to real-world contexts, and, the studies usually 
compare statements that are fully true to those that are fully false. This 
means that they largely disregard the possibility of so-called embedded 
lies, that is, when a liar takes an otherwise truthful statement and changes 
one detail that completely alters the significance of the account, for in-
stance changing the date of when something happened or the identity of 
an individual.448 While this strategy is believed to be fairly common in 
practice, little is known about whether and how it changes the characteris-
tics of the statement.449 Furthermore, it is difficult to decide when the 
criteria are fulfilled, as it is unclear what is long or detailed enough. In 
relation to the length criteria, research studies enable words and syllables 
to be counted and compared in written statements. This is clearly different 
from for example Court deliberations when the assessments usually have 
to be made only on the bases of a specific or several oral statements, 
without any possibility of comparing it to any objective length measure, 
or the witness’s individual baseline. On top of this, verbal cues to decep-
tion are culturally specific450 as well as age specific.451 
                                                   
448 See, for example, Drew A. Leins, Ronald P. Fisher and Stephan J. Ross, “Exploring Liars’ 
Strategies for Creating Deceptive Reports”, in Legal and Criminological Psychology, 2013, 
vol. 18, pp. 141–51; Galit Nahari and Aldert Vrij, “Systematic Errors (Biases) in Applying 
Verbal Lie Detection Tools: Richness in Detail as a Test Case”, in Crime Psychology Re-
view, 2015, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 98–107; Aldert Vrij, Pär Anders Granhag and Stephen Porter, 
“Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection”, in Psychological Sci-
ence in the Public Interest, 2010, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 89–121. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Cross cultural variations in the language of liars have been found that are consistent with 
known cultural difference in self-construction and episodic memory, see Paul J. Taylor et 
al., “Culture Moderates Changes in Linguistic Self-Presentation and Detail provision 
When Deceiving Others”, in Royal Society Open Science, 2017, vol. 4, no. 8, pp. 1–11. For 
example, participants considered to come from an individualistic culture (White and Brit-
ish), reduced their first-person pronoun use when lying compared to telling the truth. By 
contrast, collectivist North African participants increased their use of the first-person pro-
noun when lying, in part to compensate for their reduction in use of third-person pronouns 
and references to family. 
451 For instance, Reality Monitoring (‘RM’) cannot be used with younger children because 
they have more difficulties distinguishing facts from fantasy, see, for example, Stephan 
Lindsay, “Children’s Source Monitoring”, in Helen L. Westcott, Graham M. Davies and 
Ray H.C. Bull (eds.), Children’s Testimony: A Handbook of Psychological Research and 
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When it comes to age statements specifically, they come with a spe-
cial set of concerns. Given the social and cultural dimensions, any differ-
ences that may exist between truthful and deceptive statements may not 
be the same as for statements in a more general sense. Against this back-
ground, it seems reasonable to ask what internal consistencies or incon-
sistencies in age statements really mean.452 According to the SCSL in the 
RUF case, inconsistency (in a general sense) is certainly a factor to take 
into consideration but alone it does not mean that the whole of the testi-
mony is unreliable, 453 and here it refers to the ICTY Čelebići Appeal 
Judgment.454 This view is clearly different from the fairly heavy reliance 
on inconsistencies (external, internal and other) as a cue to unreliability in 
the Lubanga case, see Table 4. However, this difference is likely to be due 
to the interference of an intermediary in the latter but not the former case. 
As suggested by the expert evaluation of the Swedish Supreme Court cri-
teria, there is no real support that inconsistency is a good cue to deception 
in general.455 Also, for age statements, inconsistencies may have a differ-
ent and relatively unique meaning. 
                                                                                                                        
Forensic Practice, Wiley-Blackwell, 2002, pp. 83–98; Stephan Lindsay and Marcia K. 
Johnson, “Reality Monitoring and Suggestibility: Children’s Ability to Discriminate 
Among Memories from Different Sources”, in Stephan J. Ceci, Michael P. Toglia and Da-
vid F. Ross (eds.), Children’s Eyewitness Memory, Springer, New York, 1987, pp. 91–121. 
452 Clearly, failure to provide a fully consistent age statement could also have to do with, for 
example, memory issues, as highlighted by the Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Odio Benito, para. 32 in the Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, see above note 4: 
These witnesses (and anyone under those circumstances) could explicably and logical-
ly have difficulties in recollecting events since the time elapsed between the events 
(2002-2003), the first interviews with OTP investigators (2005) and the actual trial 
(2009-2010). In fact, with such elapses of time it would be suspicious if the accounts 
would remain perfectly alike and unchanged. Memory is faulty. This is more the case 
for children and adults have suffered any traumatic events. 
453 SCSL Sesay et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 490, see above note 64. 
454 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 20 February 2001, IT-
96-21-A (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/051554/). The trial related to events that took 
place in 1992 in a prison camp near the town of Čelebići, in central Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The accused were charged with numerous counts of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 under Article 2 of the Tribunal’s Statute. For more on the case see 
ICTY, “Appeal Judgement in the Čelebići case”, 20 February 2001, JL/P.I.S./564-e (avail-
able on its web site). 
455 This is even more so if ground rules relating to temporal aspects have not been established. 
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6.5.3.1.2. Reliability 
Between Expert Reliability can be discussed in relation to age statements 
primarily in two regards: 1) Between Interviewer Reliability, that is, that 
interviewers may have different approaches that results in different age 
statements and 2) Between Evaluator Reliability, that is, analysts or judg-
es who evaluate age statements using statement validity criteria may make 
different observations and draw different conclusions. 
It is well-established that the quality of communication between in-
terviewer and interviewee can vary depending on a number of factors, for 
instance the personal attributes of the interviewer456 and the amount of 
social support shown by the interviewer.457 Similarly, given the inherently 
open character of statement criteria, different evaluators are likely to em-
phasize different criteria and also interpret these criteria differently. As 
implied above, even if criteria such as the detail criterion have some pre-
dictive value of a truthful statement this does not help the assessment of 
what is a detailed (or consistent, clear, etc.) statement, considering, for 
example, how an individual usually speaks and the context of the state-
ment. Accordingly, research suggests that the level of agreement between 
different raters who rate the same statement for the detail criteria, is 
low.458 
                                                   
456 See, for example, Gail S. Goodman et al., “Mother Knows Best: Effects of Relationship 
Status and Interviewer Bias on Children’s Memory”, in Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 1995, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 195–228; David F. Björklund et al., “Social Demand 
Characteristics in Children’s and Adults’ Eyewitness Memory and Suggestibility: The Ef-
fect of Different Interviewers of Free Recall and Recognition”, in Applied Cognitive Psy-
chology, 2000, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 421–33. 
457 See, for example, Molly Carter Imhoff and Lynne Baker-Ward, “Preschoolers’ Suggestibil-
ity: Effects of Developmentally Appropriate Language and Interviewer Supportiveness”, in 
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 1999, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 407–29; Bette L. 
Bottoms, Jodi A. Quas and Suzanne L. Davis, “The Influence of Interviewer-provided So-
cial Support on Children’s Suggestibility, Memory, and Disclosures”, in Margaret-Ellen 
Pipe, Michael E. Lamb, Yael Orbach and Ann-Christin Cederborg (eds.), Child Sexual 
Abuse: Disclosure, Delay, and Denial, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2007, pp. 
135–58; TEOH Yee San and Michael Lamb, “Interviewer Demeanor in Forensic Inter-
views of Children”, in Psychology, Crime and Law, 2013, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 145–59. 
458 Leif Strömwall and Pär Anders Granhag, “How to Detect Deception? Arresting the Beliefs 
of Police Officers, Prosecutors and Judges”, in Psychology, Crime and Law, 2003, vol. 9, 
no. 1, pp. 30–34; Pär Anders Granhag and Leif Strömwall, “Deception Detection: Examin-
ing the Consistency Heuristic”, in C.M. Breur, M.M. Kommer, J.F. Nijboer and J.M. 
Reijntjes (eds.), New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence, Intersentia, 2000, p. 
215. 
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Certainly, it can be discussed whether and to what extent lacking 
Between Expert Reliability in this context is a problem, or in fact an asset. 
In situations where there is only one interviewer or one evaluator, dispari-
ties can be problematic since the result of the interview or evaluation may 
become more dependent on the involved individual than anything else. 
However, when it comes to, for example, investigative teams and Court 
deliberations, it is possible that many evaluators can examine the same 
statement and, if dissent is successfully integrated into the decision-
making process, it can in fact be an asset. This presupposes that the group 
climate allows such open discussions where group members dare to state 
their opinions freely. This is not always the case since groups and group 
climate can be quite complex.459 
6.5.3.1.3. Biasability 
There are many potential sources of bias in interviews and evaluations of 
age statements. For instance, an interviewer who has a clear hypothesis 
about the age of a certain individual might conduct the interview in a way 
that, as far as possible, confirms this hypothesis, for instance through the 
usage of leading questions.460 Similar tendencies have been noted not the 
least in relation to child interviews.461 Also, as implied by research on so-
called asymmetrical scepticism, reliability and credibility assessments 
may be biased by, for example, case hypotheses. 462 More specifically, 
                                                   
459 This is clear from research into group think and group polarization. For a summary of this 
research relating to the legal setting and more specifically Court deliberations see Lidén, 
2018, pp. 129–43, see above note 30. 
460 See the related discussion on suggestibility in the validity Section 6.5.3.1.1. 
461 See, for instance, Stephan Ceci and Maggie Bruck, “The Role of Interviewer Bias”, in 
Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck (eds.), Jeopardy in the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis 
of Children’s Testimony, American Psychological Association, 1995 pp. 87–108; Jessica 
Sparling et al., “Effects of Interviewer Behavior on Accuracy of Children’s Responses”, in 
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 2011, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 587–92; William C. 
Thompson, Alison Clarke-Stewart and Stephan J. Lepore, “What Did the Janitor Do? Sug-
gestive Interviewing and the Accuracy of Children’s Accounts”, in Law and Human Be-
havior, 1997, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 405–26. 
462 The framework on asymmetrical scepticism essentially holds that decision makers per-
ceive of evidence consistent with their hypothesis as more reliable and credible than evi-
dence which is inconsistent with their hypothesis, even if there are no other differences be-
tween these statements. For more on this see Tamara Marksteiner et al., “Asymmetrical 
Scepticism Towards Criminal Evidence: The Role of Goal- and Belief Consistency”, in 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2011, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 541–47. For a review of this re-
search see, for example, Karl Ask and Laurence J. Alison, “Investigators’ Decision Mak-
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interviewers or evaluators tend to uncritically approve of information 
supporting their hypothesis, while critically scrutinizing hypothesis incon-
sistent information. Similarly, research on coherence-based reasoning 
suggests that premises and conclusions are sometimes blurred so that the 
premises are interpreted in the light of a preferred conclusion and, only in 
this way, the conclusion is ‘supported’ by the premises.463 
Furthermore, alleged child soldiers may have experienced severe 
trauma and hardship, and interacting with them is likely to have an emo-
tional impact. In the reports from, for example, social workers and NGO-
workers who have conducted such interviews there are some examples of 
this. One such example was cited in the introduction of this chapter, 
namely P-0046 who worked in MONUC’s child protection program and 
who had conducted interviews with alleged child soldiers in Ituri in 2003–
04, within the context of the Lubanga case.464 Apart from her disputed 
testimony that some children were smaller than the Kalashnikovs they 
were carrying,465 she also reported that two boys, 11 and 13 years old, had 
been frightened by the military and when she began asking questions one 
of them broke down in tears. P-0046 recalled holding the hand of the 
younger child when crossing the street. Her evidence was that “he was so 
small”. 466  It is possible that such emotional impact makes individuals 
motivated to reach certain conclusions,467 suggesting a possible emotional 
bias in this context. 
                                                                                                                        
ing”, in P.A. Granhag (ed.), Forensic Psychology in Context: Nordic and International 
Perspectives, Routledge, 2010, pp. 35–55. 
463 Andreas Glöckner and Christoph Engel, “Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? Standards of 
Proof and the Probative Value of Evidence in Coherence-Based Reasoning”, in Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies, 2013, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 230–52. 
464 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 644–45, see above note 4. 
465 Ibid., para. 648, fn. 1839, citing ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Defence, 
Closing Submissions of the Defence, 15 July 2011, ICC-01/04-01/06-2773-Red-tENG, pa-
ra. 645 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ca1fcd/), referring to Testimony of P-0046 before 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, video excerpt EVD-OTP-00479; and the respective Transcript of Tes-
timony, T-37-FR, p. 23, lines 8–12. 
466 Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, fn. 1840, see above note 4, citing Testimony of P-0046 
before Pre-Trial Chamber I, video excerpt EVD-OTP-00490; and the respective Transcript 
of Testimony, T-38-ENG, p. 83, lines 18–25. 
467 However, see also research on the compassion fade effect. For an overview of both moti-
vated reasoning and compassion fade effect in the context of international criminal law, see 
Lidén, 2020, pp. 1–17, see above note 298. 
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6.5.3.2. Opportunities 
From a research perspective, one appropriate first step is to evaluate 
whether and how the investigative interviewing framework can be used to 
promote accurate age statements, for example, through establishment of 
ground rules. Today, there are also interviewing frameworks introduced 
and/or used in asylum cases as well as by health professionals, in order to 
conduct appropriate interviews in relation to the question of age specifi-
cally. An example is the Age Assessment Tool Questionnaire.468 It is pos-
sible that aspects of such interviewing tools can be useful to incorporate 
into the investigative interviewing framework used with alleged child 
soldiers, since such questionnaires have previously enabled age estima-
tions within ranges that approximate chronological age.469 As regards the 
evaluation of age statements, an appropriate first step would be to conduct 
experimental studies addressing the question of whether, in a controlled 
environment, there are any systematic, quantitative or qualitative differ-
ences between truthful, deceptive and mistaken age statements. Further-
more, and similar to forensic and video evidence, issues of lacking Be-
tween Expert Reliability and Biasability can be mitigated through training 
and calibration as well as CIM procedures. 
6.5.4. Documentary evidence 
6.5.4.1. Challenges 
6.5.4.1.1. Validity 
Similar to oral evidence, the more specific validity challenges relating to 
documentary evidence depends on what constitutes the basis for the age 
stated in the document. As outlined in the Results Section (6.4.2.) the cat-
egory documentary evidence includes a range of different types of docu-
ments, for instance ad hoc birth certificates, electoral cards, school rec-
ords, lists of recruits as well as more general reports regarding the preva-
lence of individuals under 15 years who actively participated in armed 
conflict. It is relatively uncommon for the courts to spell out explicitly 
what the basis for the provided ages are but this seems to entail all of the 
ages that have been discussed above, that is, biological, apparent and so-
cial age as well as combinations of these. Also, it is of course possible that 
                                                   
468 Vaska et al., 2016, p. 527, see above note 404. 
469 Ibid. 
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documents contain plainly false age information, a problem which over-
laps with that described in relation to oral evidence (Section 6.5.3.1.1.). 
For instance, in the Lubanga case, P-0213 had a school register suggesting 
he was under 15 years but this document was considered unreliable as an 
expert had established that the age information overwrote a previous entry 
which was partially visible underneath (see Table 4 in Section 6.4.2.). 
Similarly, as was noted by the SCSL Trial Chamber in the Taylor case, 
more general reports regarding the prevalence of child soldiers may be 
based on hearsay.470 The range of possible bases for ages stated in docu-
ments is one possible explanation for the many contradictions found be-
tween different documents in the Lubanga case (see Table 4 in Section 
6.4.2.). Additionally, this can be because administrative procedures are 
flawed and that it is possible for anyone to obtain identity documentation 
“containing information which may or may not have been accurate, at his 
or her convenience”,471 as suggested in the Lubanga case. As such, there 
may not be any authenticity issues with the document itself, but the age 
information contained therein is still inaccurate. Since the document is 
simply the carrier of the age information, validity issues with documen-
tary evidence largely coincide with the validity issues described in the 
previous sections. Taken together this seems to suggest that evaluating 
validity in relation to documentary evidence is about answering two ques-
tions: 
1) Is the document authentic? Depending on how the document is 
believed to have been produced there are many possible methods for 
evaluating its authenticity, including for instance different types of analy-
                                                   
470 The Chamber discussed the significance of several reports, one from the Coalition to Stop 
the Use of Child Soldiers according to which 10 per cent of the armed forces which at-
tacked Freetown in January 1999 were children. There was also a UN Secretary-General 
report stating that a significant number of rebel fighters in the Freetown attack were chil-
dren and that boys as young as 8 to 11 were killing and inflicting injuries. SCSL Taylor 
Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 566, paras. 1566–68, see above note 67. 
471 Counsel submitted that the voting cards and the personal information contained in the 
database of the DRC Independent Electoral Commission lacked probative value because, 
at the time in Ituri, the administrative procedure for issuing identity documents were seri-
ously flawed and it was possible for anyone to obtain identity document “containing in-
formation which may or may not have been accurate, at his or her convenience”, see ICC, 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Office of Public Counsel for Victims, Closing 
Submissions of the Legal Representative of Victims a/0047/06, a/0048/06, a/0050/06 and 
a/0052/06, 31 May 2011, ICC-01/04-10/06-2744-Red-tENG, para. 33 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/5859d9/). 
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sis of the chemical composition of ink472 and forensic handwriting exami-
nation (‘FHE’).473 
2. What is the basis for the age stated in the document? As suggest-
ed above, apart from chronological age, the basis could be biological, 
apparent, social age or combinations of these. It could also be plainly false 
information in an authentic document, or information based on hearsay, 
and so on. This research provides a basis for analysis for the three first 
possibilities, see Sections 6.5.1.–6.5.3. 
6.5.4.1.2. Reliability 
Many forensic pattern examinations, including, for example, Forensic 
Handwriting Examination (FHE), use human perceptual and cognitive 
processes almost exclusively to form opinions regarding evidence. 474 
                                                   
472 Such as Easy Ambient Sonic-spray Ionization Mass Spectrometry (‘EASI-MS’), infrared 
spectroscopy and laser desorption ionization mass spectrometry (‘LDI-MS’). See, for ex-
ample, Romao Wanderson et al., “Analyzing Brazilian Vehicle Documents for Authenticity 
by Easy Ambient Sonic-Spray Ionization Mass Spectrometry”, in Journal of Forensic Sci-
ences, 2012, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 539–43. 
473 FHEs are common and include the examination of cursive writing, hand printing, signa-
tures, and numbers, and is part of a broader field of forensic document examination. An 
examiner may be called upon to assist fact finders to answer questions such as: are these 
writing samples written by the same or different people, or whether the writings in ques-
tion were all written by one individual. 
474 Nikola Osborne, Carolyne Bird and Reinoud Stoel, “Forensic Handwriting Examination 
and Cognitive Bias: Recommendations from the NIST Expert Working Group on Human 
Factors”, in Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2019, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 141–44; 
Bryan Found and John Ganas, “The Management of Domain Irrelevant Context Infor-
mation in Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework”, in Science and Justice, 2013, vol. 
53, no. 2, pp. 155–58. In fact, in US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
US v. Starzecpyzel, Memorandum and Order, 3 April 1995, 880 F. Supp. 1027, Judge 
McKenna ruled that forensic document examination (‘FDE’) was technical rather than sci-
entific. Judge McKenna argued this is because forensic document examiners (FDEs) have 
no feedback as to whether their opinions are correct or not. The FDE’s opinion may have 
been wrong even if the side for which they testify win the case. As pointed out by Mo-
hammed, this way of reasoning seems to be related to Popper’s criteria for determining 
whether a method is scientific, namely whether it is falsifiable, see Linton A. Mohammed, 
Forensic Examination of Signatures, Academic Press, 2019, pp. 129–30. In other words, 
there should be a way to test that the method is wrong. However, it is also clear that a 
method can be falsifiable even if the expert cannot reasonably know whether he or she is 
right in an individual case, where the basis for their examination is that the ground truth is 
not known. Also, research suggests that Forensic Handwriting Examiners develop special-
ist skills as they outperform lay persons on blind comparison tasks, see, for example, 
Moshe Kam, Joseph Wetstein and Robert Conn, “Proficiency of Professional Document 
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Therefore, there is room for experts making different observations and 
reaching different conclusions also in relation to this type of evidence. 
Indeed, research suggests that this is the case, as for instance the interpre-
tation of handwriting varies between different handwriting examiners who 
have different years of experience.475 There are also variations between 
handwriting examiners in their selections of different features of the 
handwriting.476 
6.5.4.1.3. Biasability 
The inherently open nature of forensic document examination, 477  also 
means that these examinations are prone to bias. This can be manifested 
in, for example, evaluations involving comparisons of the number and 
quality of similarities and differences between a questioned sample and 
the reference, in relation to which explicit and transparent criteria are 
sometimes lacking.478 For instance, participants who were aware of a sus-
pect’s confession rated non-matching handwriting samples from the sus-
pect and perpetrator as more similar to each other and were also more 
likely to misjudge them as having been authored by the same individu-
al.479 Also, since handwriting examination usually requires a comparison 
between the questioned and known handwriting, the features contained in 
one could influence the selection and interpretation of the features con-
tained in the other.480 
                                                                                                                        
Examiners in Writer Identification”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 1994, vol. 39, no. 1, 
pp. 5–14; Bryan Found, Jodi C. Sita and Doug Rogers, “The Development of a Program 
for Characterising Forensic Handwriting Examiner’s Expertise: Signature Examination Pi-
lot Study”, in Journal of Forensic Document Examination, 1999, vol. 12, p. 69–80 and 
Jodi Sita, Bryan Found and Douglas K. Rogers, “Forensic Handwriting Examiner’s Exper-
tise for Signature Comparison”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2002, vol. 47, no. 5, pp. 
1117–24. 
475 LI Bing and MA Tiantian, “Research on Subjective Bias Cognition Effect in Handwriting 
Identification”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences and Medicine, 2018, vol. 4, no. 4, p. 212. 
476 Ibid., p. 210. 
477 Found and Ganas, 2013, pp. 155–58, see above note 474. 
478 LI and MA, 2018, pp. 203–12, see above note 475. 
479 Jeff Kukucka, An Investigation of Factors that Create and Mitigate Confirmation Bias in 
Judgments of Handwriting Evidence, City University of New York, 2014. 
480 Dan E. Krane et al., “Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in 
Forensic DNA Interpretation”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2008, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 
1006–07; Itiel E. Dror et al., “Letter to the Editor: Context Management Toolbox: A Linear 
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6.5.4.2. Opportunities 
For the questions of whether a document is authentic, there are some rele-
vant developments in recent research. The convolutional neural network 
(‘CNN’) is a state-of-the art deep learning tool that extracts spatial fea-
tures from images.481 It has improved image classification systems in a 
wide range of settings,482 and has also evolved as an effective tool for 
classification of so-called hyperspectral images (‘HSIs’), which provides 
broad spectral information that allows for identification of the underlying 
material in images using signal-processing techniques.483 HSI analysis has 
gained enormous interest in forensic science as it adds to the potential of 
forensic experts for viewing and interpreting various forensic traces such 
as fingerprints, inks, bloodstains, hair and drugs. 484  Being a non-
destructive tool, HSI analysis has also been widely used in document im-
aging for improving readability and determination of ink age, backdating 
and forgery in documents,485 recovery of erased and overwritten scripts486 
and identification of inks and pigments for dating of manuscripts.487 As 
                                                                                                                        
Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for Minimizing Cognitive Bias in Forensic Deci-
sion Making”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2015, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 1111–12. 
481 Yann LeCun et al., “Gradient-based Learning Applied to Document Recognition”, in Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE, 1998, vol. 86, no. 11, pp. 2278–324. 
482 Such as military target detection, speech recognition, character recognition, natural lan-
guage processing, gaming, large-scale video classification and breast cancer detection, see, 
for example, Gyrgalcon Technology Inc., Natural Language Processing using CNN Based 
Integrated Circuit, 2018; Mahesh Gour, Sweta Jain and T. Kumar Sunil, “Residual Learn-
ing Based CNN for Breast Cancer Histopathological Image Classification”, in Internation-
al Journal of Imaging Systems and Technology, 2020, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 621–35. 
483 Muhammad Jaleed Khan et al., “Modern Trends in Hyperspectral Image Analysis: A Re-
view”, in IEEE Access, 2018, vol. 6, pp. 14118–29. 
484 The portability and speed of hyperspectral sensing systems has increased tremendously 
over the last few decades, thus making it the appropriate choice for investigation of foren-
sic traces at crime scenes. See Muhammed Jaleed Khan et al., “Deep Learning for Auto-
mated Forgery Detection in Hyperspectral Document Images”, in Journal of Electronic 
Imaging, 2018, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 1–9. 
485 KIM Seon Joo, DENG Fanbo and Michael S. Brown, “Visual Enhancement of Old Docu-
ments with Hyperspectral Imaging”, in Pattern Recognition, 2011, vol. 44, no. 7, pp. 
1461–69. 
486 Costas Balas et al., “A Novel Hyper-spectral Imaging Apparatus for the Non-destructive 
Analysis of Objects of Artistic and Historic Value”, in Journal of Cultural Heritage, 2003, 
vol. 4, pp. 330–37. 
487 Anastasia Giakoumaki, Kristalia Melessanaki and Demetrios Anglos, “Laser Induced 
Breakdown Spectroscopy and Hyper-spectral Imaging Analysis of Pigments on an Illumi-
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such, HIS analysis has significantly improved the efficiency of forgery 
detection systems over the recent years. Various HIS-based techniques for 
automated forgery detection are proposed in the literature.488 HIS bears a 
tremendous potential for accurate differentiation of materials based on 
their unique spectral signatures.489 For instance, ink mismatch detection is 
a key step in document forgery detection, and using a deep-learning 
method effectively identifies different ink types in a hyperspectral docu-
ment image for forgery detection and achieves an overall accuracy of 
98.20 per cent for blue and 88.00 per cent for black inks.490 
Automated approaches may help with the problem of lacking Be-
tween Expert Reliability and Biasability but in this regard, it is also desir-
able to undertake other measures such as training, calibration as well as 
hiring of more than one expert. It is also recommended that examiners 
should analyse the questioned material before the reference material, us-
ing so-called linear sequential unmasking.491 Task-irrelevant case infor-
mation, for example, background circumstances of investigator’s theo-
ries492 can be managed by a context manager who passes on to the exam-
iner only the information that is task-relevant.493 Interestingly, one study 
suggests that most handwriting examiners (75 per cent) believe that their 
examinations involve subjective influences. However, they still believe 
that it is necessary to understand the context when conducting an exami-
nation and that, in fact, it is something that can promote professional ex-
                                                                                                                        
nated Manuscript”, in Spectrochimica Acta Part B: Atomic Spectroscopy, 2001, vol. 56, no. 
12, pp. 2237–346. 
488 Eric Brauns and Brian R. Dyer, “Fourier Transform Hyperspectral Visible Imaging and the 
Nondestructive Analysis of Potentially Fraudulent Documents”, in Applied Spectroscopy, 
2006, vol. 60, no. 8, pp. 833–40; Roberto Padoan et al., “Quantitative Hyperspectral Imag-
ing of Historical Documents: Techniques and Applications”, in 9th International Confer-
ence on NDT of Art, Jerusalem, 2008. 
489 David Landgrebe, “Information Extraction Principles and Methods for Multispectral and 
Hyperspectral Image Data”, in CHEN C.H. (ed.), Information Processing for Remote Sens-
ing, World Scientific Publishing, River Edge, 1999, pp. 3–37. 
490 Khan et al., 2018, pp. 1–9, see above note 484. 
491 Krane et al., 2008, pp. 1006–07, see above note 480; Dror et al., 2015, pp. 1111–12, see 
above note 480. 
492 For instance, Miller proposed that Forensic Document Examiners may be influenced by 
their interactions with police, see Larry S. Miller, “Bias Among Forensic Document Exam-
iners: A Need for Procedural Change”, in Journal of Police Science and Administration, 
1984, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 407–11. 
493 Found and Ganas, 2013, pp. 154–58, see above note 474. 
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aminers to formulate correct expert opinions.494 Such views do not neces-
sarily contradict CIM procedures since these suggest to blind examiners 
not to virtually all information but only the potentially biasing and irrele-
vant information. The context manager can also choose to postpone the 
disclosure of potentially biasing but relevant information. 
6.6. Diagnostic Accuracy of Age Estimations in Child Soldiering 
Cases 
Building on the previous Sections, this Section will summarize and round 
off with a discussion about the diagnostic accuracy of age estimation in 
child soldiering cases. As a reminder from Section 6.3., diagnostic accura-
cy in relation to the age element in child soldiering cases is here defined 
as the extent to which the process of determining age accurately and fully 
identifies all those younger than 15 years as being under 15 years, as well 
as the extent to which the process is capable of accurately and fully ex-
cluding those aged 15 years or older. A perfect diagnostic accuracy would 
require that the process is fully sensitive; all those under 15 years are 
identified and legally classified as under 15 years, while the process is 
also fully specific: all those 15 years or older are legally classified as 15 
years or older.495 Deviations from perfect diagnostic accuracy are the re-
sult of two types of errors: 
• False positives: Individuals 15 years or older is estimated to be 
younger than 15 years; and 
• False negatives: Individuals younger than 15 years is estimated to 
be 15 years or older. 
As outlined in Table 3 (Section 6.4.) age estimations in the child 
soldiering cases were based on forensic, video or photo, documentary and 
oral evidence. The two most common evidence types used for age estima-
tion purposes were oral evidence (eight out of eight of cases) and docu-
                                                   
494 LI and MA, 2018, pp. 210–12, see above note 475. 
495 The diagnostic accuracy/predictive value of age estimations can also be understood and 
illustrated using the so-called signal detection theory, see Green and Swets, 1966, see 
above note 50. Most of the early research relating to signal detection theory aimed to de-
termine how humans distinguish “signal” (more specifically radar signals) from “noise”. 
Identifying a signal among noise would then be similar to identifying someone younger 
than 15 among others who are 15 and above. In the process of identifying a “signal”, it 
seems humans have different subjective thresholds, as some want to feel more confident 
than others before calling something a signal. 
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mentary evidence (seven out of eight cases). Two of the ICC cases also 
had video evidence. Only one case involved forensic evidence, namely the 
Lubanga case. Also, following from Table 4 (Section 6.4.), in the Lubanga 
case, there were often external contradictions between these different evi-
dence types, but also internal contradictions between different evidence 
items within the same evidence type as well as other types of contradic-
tions, like an individual stating different years of birth even if they all 
indicate that the individual was younger than 15 years at the time of inter-
est. The Court seems to have accepted contradictions only for four of the 
alleged child soldiers. For all of these four individuals, the video evidence 
suggested they were younger than 15 years, while the oral and documen-
tary evidence introduced by the defence suggested they were over 15 
years (D-0040, D-0041, Bodyguard 1, Bodyguard 2). The Court consid-
ered it proven beyond reasonable doubt that these individuals were 
younger than 15 years. This conclusion was also reached in relation to the 
six remaining individuals (1–6). For these individuals only video evidence 
was available, save for 1 witness in relation to Individual 1, and there 
were no contradictions. Hence, the Court placed trust in its own age as-
sessments based on the physical appearance of alleged child soldiers, as 
they appeared in the video evidence. These assessments were considered 
more reliable than contradictory evidence introduced by the defence (D-
0040, D-0041, Bodyguard 1, Bodyguard 2) and were also considered suf-
ficient even lacking any other age evidence (Individuals 1–6). Conversely, 
forensic evidence was not trusted, neither when the other evidence offered 
no contradictions (P-0213), nor when it was wholly or partially contra-
dicted by oral and/or documentary evidence introduced by the prosecution. 
As summarized in Table 5, there are many challenges with age es-
timations based on each of the evidence types. These challenges will in-
crease the risks of false positives as well as false negatives, and thereby 
they are detrimental to the diagnostic accuracy. Today, or within a reason-
able future, it may be possible to use some of the currently developing 
methods for age estimations outlined under opportunities and thereby 
decrease the risk of false positives and false negatives. As mentioned 
throughout the text, it is likely that automated approaches can help over-
come human factors including Between Expert Reliability and Biasabil-
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ity.496 However, it is essential that such methods are tested and evaluated 
in the child soldiering context specifically. 
Table 5. Summary of challenges and opportunities with age estimations based on 




Forensic Validity 1) Deep Learning approaches (hand/wrist, 
teeth, knees etc.). 
2) DNA methylation. 
3) Calibration training. 
4) Contextual Information Management 
(CIM). 













Validity 1) Deep Learning approaches based on facial 
features. 
2) Empirical research into observer differ-
ences, including paediatricians. 
3) Empirical research into more specific 
sources of bias. 






Serial positioning bias, 
anchoring effects, base 
rate bias, etc. 
Oral Validity 1) Elaborate interview framework with ground 
rules investigative relating to temporal aspects 
and, for example, Age Assessment Tool Ques-
tionnaires. 
2) Experimental research into criteria for 
statement analysis specifically addressing age 
Social, Biological and 
Apparent age v. 
Chronological age. 
Reliability 
                                                   
496 Although this depends on the quality of the data that is used to train the artificial intelli-
gence to make accurate predictions. Some data may have inherited biases from human de-
cision making. 
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3) Calibration training. 
4) Contextual information management 
(CIM). 
Biasability 
Emotional bias, base 
rate bias. 
Documentary Validity 1) Deep Learning approaches to, for example, 
ink-mismatch detection. 
2) Calibration training. 
3) Contextual Information Management 
(CIM). 
Biological, Apparent 









Before new methodologies have been sufficiently evaluated, and 
even after this has happened, it is likely that some doubts regarding al-
leged child soldiers’ ages will still remain. As implied by the discussion 
on forensic evidence in Section 6.5.1.1.1., forensic age estimations entail 
risks both of false negatives and false positives. With the developing deep 
learning approaches, the estimations become gradually more accurate and 
DNA methylation in those under 30 years has an error rate of ±1 year (±3 
years for those over 30 years). Such developing methods may be able to 
provide answers which make it unreasonable to doubt the ages of alleged 
child soldiers. For instance, if the result of DNA methylation suggests that 
an individual was 12–13 years or 17–18 years at the time of interest, it 
seems sensible for the Court to trust these results. It seems unlikely that 
scientists or anyone else will be able to provide more exact answers with-
in a reasonable time period. Accepting such evidence, even if it comes 
with an error interval, is not to be considered a presumption to the disad-
vantage of the accused497 but rather it expresses a balanced interpretation 
                                                   
497 Although such presumptions have been accepted by the ECHR in relation to smuggle 
offences, in for example, ECHR Salabiaku Judgment, see above note 52 and the related 
case ECHR Pham Hoang Judgment, see above note 53. 
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of what reasonable as well as unreasonable doubt means in relation to 
forensic age evidence. However, if such a result suggests that someone 
was 14–15 years at the time of interest, a possible approach would be to 
also require more age evidence, whether forensic or of a different type. 
Just like forensic evidence, video or photo evidence entails risks of 
false negatives as well as false positives. While this topic has received 
less attention, and it is unknown whether and how results will change with 
time, the most relevant error interval available today seems to be that of ± 
5.39 years obtained in relation to 12–19-year olds. However, it deserves to 
be emphasized that the relative risk of such errors is not solemnly depend-
ent on error intervals identified in research but also how the Courts deal 
with the uncertainty they are faced with. As outlined and discussed in 
detail in Section 6.5.2.1. the approach adopted by the Trial Chamber in 
Lubanga, which was approved by the Appeals Chamber, and which is also 
disputed with the appeal of Ntaganda’s conviction, is a cautionary ap-
proach. More specifically, this means that the Court applies criteria by 
which only those alleged child soldiers who are “clearly” or “manifestly” 
under the age of 15 years are recognized as being under 15 years.498 It is 
likely that the Chambers considered these criteria appropriate because of 
the rights of the accused that uncertainty should be to his or her advantage. 
However, this raises several questions. The criteria seem to require a very 
high degree of subjective certainty, probably higher than beyond reasona-
ble doubt. Clearly, the BARD-standard is already an outlet for the ac-
cused’s benefit of doubt as well as an expression of how extensive this 
benefit should be from a legal normative perspective. The Trial Cham-
ber’s judgment also explicitly excludes individuals who do not make the 
judges sufficiently certain, as it states for instance that a two-second video 
excerpt depicts “children who could be under the age of 15 but they ap-
pear too briefly to enable a definite finding”.499 This cautionary approach 
seems to entail a larger risk for false negatives than false positives. Since 
the threshold for agreeing to call someone “under 15” is set high, it is 
unlikely that individuals older than 15 years will be categorized as under 
                                                   
498 See Lubanga Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 222, see above note 3. 
499 See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, fn. 2432, see above note 4, referring to video ex-
cerpt EVD-OTP-00571, taken during a presidential rally at the Bunia city stadium, 11 Jan-
uary 2003, 02:47:15 to 02:47:19, and stating that “In addition the Chamber observes that at 
02:22:52–02:22:54 there are children who could be under the age of 15 but they appear too 
briefly to enable a definite finding”. 
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15 years (false positives) but this comes at the cost that some individuals 
who are under 15 years may be categorized as 15 years or older (false 
negatives). Hence, the procedure’s sensitivity may become an issue, since 
this decreases the probability that the procedure will identify someone 
under 15 years as being under 15 years. This is particularly the case if the 
Court relies heavily on video or photo evidence for age estimation pur-
poses, which was the case in Lubanga, and, according to the defence, this 
is also the situation in Ntaganda.500 Hence, it is possible that such a cau-
tionary approach is problematic considering what Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC sets out to protect, namely all individuals under 15 
years, not just those “clearly” or “evidently” so. 
Furthermore, the cautionary approach presupposes that judges’ con-
fidence in their assessments and the accuracy of their assessments are well 
calibrated. In other words, when judges determine that a certain individual 
is “clearly” or “manifestly” under 15, they are very unlikely to be wrong 
and all, or nearly all, of the individuals classified as younger than 15, will 
also have actual chronological ages below 15 (true positives). There is no 
data on this issue specifically but some predictions can be made, taking 
into consideration the already existing research suggesting that, in other 
contexts, such as the medical field, experts’ confidence and accuracy lev-
els are not necessarily well calibrated.501 For instance, overall, it is likely 
that confidence and accuracy is better calibrated in relation to individuals 
whose chronological ages are further away from the 15 year threshold, for 
example, 6, 8 or 10, 20, 23, 25 year olds, compared to individuals whose 
chronological ages are closer to the threshold, for example, 13, 14, 16 or 
                                                   
500 This is contested by the Prosecution which suggests that the Trial Chamber also relied on 
other corroborating evidence for age estimation purposes. More specifically the Prosecu-
tion here refers to oral evidence and the Chamber’s own assessment of four video extracts 
in which P-0010 and P-0898 identified three individuals in Ntaganda’s escort as under the 
age of 15, see Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, see above note 4 and Prosecution Re-
sponse to ‘Defence Appeal Brief – Part II’, para. 176, see above note 122. Also, as pointed 
out by the Prosecution in its response, the Defence later conceded that the Chamber had al-
so relied on testimonial evidence, referring to Ntaganda Defence Appeal Brief – Part II, 
paras. 232–33, 243, 246, see above note 121. 
501 Davis et al., 2005, pp. 259–64, see above note 49; Friedman et al., 2001, pp. 454–58, see 
above note 49; Friedman et al., 2005, pp. 334–39, see above note 49; HUANG Haiyan and 
DENG Min, “Ultrasound Operators’ Confidence Influences Diagnosis of Ovarian Tumors: 
a Study in China?”, in Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention, 2011 vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 
1275–77; Podbregar et al., 2001, pp. 1750–55, see above note 49; Yazbek et al., 2010, pp. 
89–93, see above note 49. 
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17 year olds. Just how close or far away from the threshold individuals 
have to be, for the calibration between confidence and accuracy to be on 
an acceptable level is unknown. However, it can be noted that, if anything, 
the applied criteria is likely to result in false negatives in the age group of 
13 to 14 years or similar, that is, individuals very close to the threshold, 
but still younger. This is related to what Judge Ušacka expresses in her 
dissenting opinion in the Lubanga case, namely that there are inherent 
difficulties in establishing age based on physical appearance exclusively 
and that it is unclear whether the Trial Chamber has, in effect, applied the 
said “cautious approach” as well as how this approach relates to the be-
yond reasonable doubt standard.502 
Compared to forensic and video or photo evidence, less is known 
about errors in relation to oral evidence (age statements). More specifical-
ly, there is no empirical data on individuals’ tendencies to under – or 
overestimate the chronological age of an individual based on the state-
ment of this individual. Yet, it is unknown what is the relative importance 
of what the interviewee says during the interview compared to the inter-
viewee’s physical appearance or demeanour. Since physical appearance is 
a relatively dominant aspect of our perceptions of others, both on con-
scious and subconscious levels,503 it is possible that physical appearance, 
in fact, is more decisive than what is being said.504 Hence, it is possible 
that the error interval of 5.39 years indicated above for video or photo 
evidence is relevant also for this category of age evidence. If this is fairly 
representative it would mean that also oral evidence entails risks of both 
false positives and false negatives. Nevertheless, these respective risks are 
also dependent on the Court’s way of dealing with the uncertainty. As 
noted in Section 6.4.2. the SCSL trusted the age statements, particularly 
those provided by alleged child soldiers themselves, to a larger degree 
                                                   
502  ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Dissenting opinion of 
Judge Anita Ušacka, 1 December 2014, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Anx2, paras. 35-51 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/df4480). 
503 For more on this see, for example, Zebrowitz and Montepare, 2008, pp. 1–16, see above 
note 131; Zebrowitz, 1997, see above note 131. Also, there are several studies suggesting 
that facial appearance predicts criminal justice decisions, see, for example, Eberhardt, 
2006, pp. 383–86, see above note 131; Zebrowitz and McDonald, 1991, pp. 603–23, see 
above note 131. 
504 When it comes to oral evidence provided by others than the alleged child soldiers them-
selves, these have often been based, explicitly, on the physical appearance of the alleged 
child soldier. 
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than what the ICC has done so far.505 This is explained by that the ages of 
the alleged child soldiers were contested to a much larger degree at the 
ICC, and many of the testimonies also entailed contradictions (internal, 
external or other types, see Table 4 in Section 6.4.2.). Yet, in line with the 
above, an overly cautionary approach will result in an increased risk of 
false negatives (while the risk of false positives is greatly reduced). While 
such an approach is obviously in line with the idea that doubts should be 
to the advantage of the accused, it seems reasonable to seriously evaluate 
what can be expected from statements that alleged child soldiers or others 
provide. Inconsistencies may have other explanations than deceit or ma-
nipulation, for instance that the interviewer and the interviewee do not 
have the same understanding of temporal aspects since ground rules have 
not been established (see Section 6.5.3.1.1. on investigative interviewing). 
If an interviewee is interviewed on repeated occasions but it is uncertain 
whether he or she is able to provide (own) free accounts of his or her 
chronological age, inconsistencies between different interviews are unsur-
prising.506 
Also, the oral evidence raises questions regarding the relevance or 
irrelevance of social age for legal age determinations. In a strict sense, it 
is clear that legislators have had chronological not social age in mind 
when creating legal age elements. However, the purposes behind legal age 
thresholds are usually to protect individuals who have not yet reached a 
sufficient level of psychological maturity to properly protect their own 
best interests.507 Psychological maturity is likely to often coincide with 
what roles and responsibilities an individual has in a society. Just like 
chronological age, social age is directly related to the expectations a so-
ciety has on the individuals living in it when it comes to schooling, home 
duties, and so on. As such, it is possible that relying on social age can also 
help promote the purposes behind the law. Hence, it can be argued that 
social age is in fact legally relevant, not just as an estimation of chrono-
                                                   
505 However, the SCSL clearly did not accept any testimony. As illustrated by The Prosecutor 
v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, a single testimony of one al-
leged child soldier was considered insufficient as regards the ages of other alleged child 
soldiers, see SCSL Norman et al. Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 132, see above note 
63. 
506 Also, in such situations, interviewers will have to provide guidance, and even if this is 
done with the best intentions, it can still influence the interviewee’s response. 
507 Or more specifically what the law considers to be their best interests. 
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logical age, but on its own merits.508 This question has not been addressed 
specifically by the Courts, although it was raised to a certain extent by the 
Kanu defence in the AFRC case at the SCSL.509 
Given that documentary evidence is simply the carrier of age in-
formation, which can be based on biological, apparent and social age or 
combinations of these (as well as false information or hearsay), many of 
the doubts relating to documentary evidence coincide with doubts de-
scribed in relation to forensic, video or photo and oral evidence. In addi-
tion, there may be doubts relating to whether the document is authentic or 
not and recently developed deep learning approaches may be helpful in 
this regard. 
In sum, it is likely that there will always be uncertainties pertaining 
to legal age elements and these uncertainties are clearly unsettling, partic-
ularly when they are an element of a crime with potentially far-reaching 
consequences both for the defendant and the alleged victims, including, 
for example, whether someone is entitled to victim reparations. Since this 
is indeed the case when it comes to child soldiering charges, it is essential 
that investigation agencies establish procedures that as safely and accu-
rately as possible determine individuals’ ages. While many different actors, 
including radiologists, odontologists, paediatricians, social workers and 
witnesses may be involved in this process and measures certainly should 
be undertaken among some of these actors as well, the legal actors are 
those ultimately responsible for collecting, integrating and evaluating the 
age evidence. This research has suggested a framework for doing so. 
While one important part of this framework is about ensuring that there is 
as little doubt as possible regarding the age evidence (see challenges and 
opportunities) another equally important part discussed in this section is 
what to do with any remaining doubts (diagnostic accuracy). This frame-
work can aid both the formulation of best practices for collecting age evi-
dence during the investigation and the evaluation of such evidence pre-
                                                   
508 Clearly, this possibility makes the question of the validity of social age as an operationali-
zation of chronological age come into somewhat different light. 
509 The defence questioned the legal 15-year threshold in a wider sense, since it considered it 
arbitrary as “the ending of childhood (in the traditional African setting) has little to do with 
achieving a particular age more to do with physical capacity to perform acts reserved for 
adults”. See Brima et al. Kanu Defence Trial Brief, para. 75, see above note 148, referring 
to exhibit D-37, Defence Expert Research Report on the Use of Child Soldiers in the Sierra 
Leone Conflict by Mr. Osman Gbla, paras. 9–11, 39. 
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sented in Court. Although it is likely that at least some of the scientific 
aspects on this issue fall outside of legal actors’ typical expertise, under-
standing, integrating and applying such aspects indeed fall within their 
professional roles and responsibilities. This goes for age estimations of 
alleged child soldiers which this chapter has focused on, but also for age 
estimations in other legal contexts, whether national or international, and 
to which the suggested framework can be adjusted and applied. 
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Appendix 1: Detailed descriptions of age evidence for child soldiers 
in the Lubanga case 
This appendix provides more detailed information about the age evidence 
outlined in Table 4 above pertaining to child soldiers in the Lubanga case. 
P-0007 
Oral Evidence 
P-0007 provided somewhat different accounts of his age as he first stated 
he was born in 1986, then 1987 and then that he didn’t know. P-0007 tes-
tified during meetings with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) that 
all of his answers were accurate but later, he said that he did not know his 
true date of birth. In August 2004, he told the IEC that his year of birth 
was 1986 and gave them a name that differed from the one he had provid-
ed to the OTP. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial 
Chamber, Transcript, 13 March 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-148-Red2-ENG, 
p. 18, lines 14–17 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5a6e16/); and Luban-
ga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 223, see above note 4. 
According to a defence witness P-0007 was never in the military. 
Documentary Evidence 
P-0007’s voter card indicated that his year of birth was 1987 while his 
birth certificate indicated 1990. Intermediary 143 had provided the birth 




Contrary to the forensic expert testimony, P-0008’s account was that he 
was born in 1989 (although both indicated that P-0008 was under 15 
years). See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, 
Transcript, 25 February 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-135-Red3-ENG, p. 64, 
lines 12–14 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a6a08/). The prosecution 
relied on the evidence of the witness (P-0008) as to his age. See Lubanga 
Prosecution’s Closing Brief, para. 245, see above note 261. Overall, the 
Trial Chamber considered his statement to be “contradictory and implau-
sible”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 232, see above note 4. 
According to a defence witness P-0008 was never in the military. 
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Documentary Evidence 
P-0008’s electoral card indicated he was born in 1987 and his birth certifi-
cated indicated he was born in 1991. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judg-
ment, para. 231, see above note 4; and ibid., fn. 613, citing extract of the 
IEC database, EVD-D01-01028, and the declaration of the electoral card, 
EVD-OTP-00658. There was also a record from P-0031 suggesting that 
P-0008 was 11 years old when he arrived at the center. See Lubanga Trial 
Chamber Judgment, para. 236, see above note 4. 
P-0010 
Forensic Evidence 
Experts P-0358 and P-0359 stated that: “it is scientifically possible for P-
0010 to have been under the age of 15 at the time of her recruitment in 
late 2002”. See Lubanga Prosecution’s Closing Brief, para. 400, see above 
note 261; and ibid., fn. 1156, referring to expert report EVD-OTP-00430; 
and Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 264, see above note 4. 
Video Evidence 
The witness recognised herself in a portion of a video recording as the 
figure standing in the centre of the screen with her hands together in front 
of her body. See video excerpt EVD-OTP-00570, shot at Rwampara train-
ing camp, 12 February 2003; and Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 
254, see above note 4. The witness also recognized one of her friends 
whom she said was an escort. In another video section (EVD-OTP-00570), 
the witness said the people moving toward a vehicle in the video were 
leaving and also identified a bodyguard in the video: a uniformed soldier 
who was shorter than the others. She did not know his name or age but 
said he was young and a ‘Kadogo’, probably around 10 years old. Accord-
ing to the Trial Chamber: “a body of evidence undermines the reliability 
of the witness account but the video material speaks for itself and falls 
into a separate category”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 
257, see above note 4. 
Oral Evidence 
According to P-0010’s own testimony she was born in 1989. Defence 
witnesses suggested that P-0010 was born in 1985 or 1986 or that they 
didn’t know. At one point, P-0010 said she was born in 1989, and also 
stated a particular month but later said she did not know the day or month. 
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If she was born in 1989, she would have been 13 years when she was ab-
ducted. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 250, see above note 
4. 
D-0005 stated that P-0010 was born in 1985 and D-0006 said P-
0010 was either his age or he was a year older than her and he was born 
on 18 April 1985, although he later stated he did not know her age. See 
Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 259–61, see above note 4; and 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 
8 March 2010, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-255-Red3-ENG, p. 12, lines 22–24 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d812b/). 
Documentary Evidence 
P-0010’s birth certificate indicated she was born in 1988, the electoral 
card indicated 1986 and the individual case story indicated 1987. See 
Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 248–50, see above note 4; and 
evidence EVD-D01-01102 (birth certificate), EVD-D01-00762 (electoral 
card), EVD-D01-00082 (individual case story). 
Not Proven 
While the Trial Chamber accepted that P-0010 at some stage may have 
served as a soldier within the UPC, it did not consider it proven beyond 
reasonable doubt that this occurred when she was under 15 years of age. 
See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 480, see above note 4. Due 
to the internal contradictions in her accounts, including the unexplained 
differences as to her date of birth in both her testimony and the documen-
tary evidence, together with the strength of the conflicting external evi-
dence, the Chamber was unable to rely on her testimony. However, the 
Chamber points out that the: “video material and her comments on it re-
main essentially unaffected by these criticisms”. See Lubanga Trial 
Chamber Judgment, para. 268, see above note 4. 
P-0011 
Oral Evidence 
According to P-0011’s own testimony he was born in 1992 but he also 
provided other dates to the investigators. Although he stated 1992, this 
date differed from the date in his original statement, provided to the inves-
tigators in July 2005. P-0011 stated that this date had been indicated to 
him by members of his family, and in particular his grandmother had sug-
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gested it prior to his first meeting with one of the representatives of the 
OTP and that this latter date was a mistake that he had made. See Lubanga 
Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 270, see above note 4. The Trial Chamber 
noted inconsistencies in the stated name of this witness as well as in in-
formation about where he attended school. The witness also said he joined 
the UPC in July 2003, although with inconsistencies across his statements. 
Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 269–72, see above note 4. 
According to defence witnesses P-0011 was born in 1990–91. 
Documentary Evidence 
According to a birth certificate, P-0011 was born in 1992. 
Not Proven 
Given the internal contradictions and the confusion within the evidence of 
P-0011 and taking into account the evidence of D-0024, the Chamber had 
real doubts as to the suggestions that P-0011 served as child solider with 
the UPC in the circumstances he described, namely when he was under 15 
years of age and during the period covered by the charges. See Lubanga 
Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 480, see above note 4. Due to the internal 
contradictions in his account and conflicting external evidence, the 
Chamber did not rely on his account. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judg-
ment, para. 288, see above note 4. 
P-0157 
Forensic Evidence 
This evidence suggested that P-0157 was born before December 1988. 
See expert report EVD-OTP-00435; and Lubanga Transcript of 12 May 
2009, p. 53, lines 13–22, see above note 105. The Trial Chamber noted: 
“Although of limited value, the X-ray evidence tends to support the sug-
gestion that P-0157 was over the age of 15 at the time of his alleged con-
scription”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 512, see above 
note 4. 
Oral Evidence 
Contrary to the forensic expert testimony, P-0157’s account was that he 
was born in 1991 and therefore younger than 15 years old. See ICC, The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 3 June 
2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-185-Red2-ENG, p. 63, line 7 (https://www.
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legal-tools.org/doc/52f1e0/). Also, P-0157 stated that he did not know his 
date of birth. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial 
Chamber, Transcript, 9 June 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-188-Red2-ENG, p. 
66, lines 1–6 (‘Lubanga Trial Transcript of 9 June 2009’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/612a86/). When shown a document from the general 
inspectorate for secondary and professional education stating that he was 
born in 1986 and asked whether it was possible that in 1998 he was in 6th 
grade at a certain primary school, he answered: “It could be true. It’s a 
certified document, a document that states that”. See Lubanga Trial Tran-
script of 9 June 2009, p. 67, lines 7–11. The prosecution argued that 
school records were unreliable and appeared to have been altered. See 
Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 463, see above note 4. The Pros-
ecution relied on the evidence of the witness as to his age. See Lubanga 
Prosecution’s Closing Brief, para. 511, see above note 261. 
D-0025 said him and P-0157 went to school together and that he 
was younger than P-0157 but that he did not know P-0157’s age. Lubanga 
Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 468, see above note 4. 
P-0031 simply described P-0157 as a child who had been a member 
of the FNI. Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 472, see above note 4. 
Documentary Evidence 
The documentary evidence in relation to the age of P-0157 (voter’s card, 
school register, certificate award) suggested that in 2002 and 2003, P-
0157 was over 15 years of age. THE IEC database demonstrated that P-
0157 had a voter’s card bearing his photograph and a date of birth in 1986. 
See evidence EVD-D01-01031 (voter’s card). Moreover, his name ap-
peared on the enrolment register for a particular school and, at what was 
seemingly his entry, it was recorded that P-0157 was born on an identified 
date in 1986. See Lubanga Trial Transcript of 9 June 2009, p. 63, line 24 
to p. 65, line 14; evidence EVD-D01-00170 (enrolment register for a par-
ticular school); and evidence EVD-D01-00257 (extract of the complete 
enrolment registry for a particular school, EVD-D01-00170). Also, a 
1991–2002 certificate award register for this school indicates that a certif-
icate was awarded to P-0157, born on the same date in 1986. See Lubanga 
Trial Transcript of 9 June 2009, p. 66, lines 1–6. There was also a docu-
ment from the general inspectorate for secondary and professional educa-
tion which comprised a list of students in the 6th grade in the same prima-
ry school for the year 1998, in which it was also recorded that P-0157 was 
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born in 1986. See Lubanga Trial Transcript of 9 June 2009, p. 66, lines 
15–22; and evidence EVD-D01-00258. 
P-0213 
Oral Evidence 
According to P-0213’s own testimony he was born in 1991. See ICC, The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 20 Feb-
ruary 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-132-ENG, p. 6, lines 12–13 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/0058ac/). 
Defence witnesses were unspecific about P-0213’s age. 
A school teacher, D-0029, testified for the defence, stating that there 
was no primary school with the name referred to by P-0213 where he 
claimed he attended his first years of schooling. D-0029 also stated that P-
0213 was not a child soldier. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 
399, see above note 4. 
Documentary Evidence 
P-0213 had a school register suggesting he was born in 1989 but expert 
evidence established this was unreliable. According to the expert evidence, 
the entry for the year 1989 in the school register overwrote a previous 
entry which was partially visible underneath. The Trial Chamber placed 
little reliance on the school register. 
Not Proven 
According to the Trial Chamber the extent of the inconsistencies and the 
other problems with this witness evidence supported the suggestion that 
he provided a false account, at least in part. See Lubanga Trial Chamber 
Judgment, para. 480, see above note 4. Moreover, the fact that he was 
introduced to the prosecution’s investigators by P-0321 raised additional 
concerns that the latter may have influence his testimony. In light of all 
these circumstances, the Chamber concluded that P-0213 was not a wit-
ness who could safely be relied upon. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judg-
ment, para. 406, see above note 4. 
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P-0294 
Forensic Evidence 
This evidence suggested P-0294 was born before December 1989. See 
expert report EVD-OTP-00440; and Lubanga Transcript of 12 May 2009, 
p. 69, line 23 to p. 70, line 11, see above note 105. 
Oral Evidence 
Contrary to the forensic expert testimony, P-0294’s own testimony was 
that he was born in December 1991 (although both suggest under 15 
years). See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, 
Transcript, 18 March 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-150-Red3-ENG, p. 44, 
lines 13–14 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0f8cd1/) and ICC, The Pros-
ecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 19 March 
2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-151-Red2-ENG, p. 53, lines 15–17 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/64a0fa/). 
Documentary Evidence 
According to a voter registration card, P-0294 was born in 1987. See evi-
dence EVD-D01-00764 (extract of the register of the independent elec-
toral commission) and EVD-D01-01006 (voter registration card). Accord-
ing to a certificate of family reunification, P-0294 was born in 1988. See 
evidence EVD-D01-00069 (certificate of family reunification) at page 
DRC-OTP-0160-0188. When asked about this document P-0294 said he 
did not give his correct age and he did not really know how old he is or 
was. According to a school register, P-0294 was born in 1988. 
Not Proven 
The Trial Chamber stated that this evidence, considered cumulatively, 
raised serious questions as to the reliability of P-0294. The documentary 
and oral evidence established that he did not tell the truth about his age 
and there were also real concerns he had lied about his military service. 
Moreover, the fact that P-0294 was introduced to the prosecution’s inves-
tigators by P-0321 raised additional concerns because of the real possibil-
ity the he may have influenced this witness testimony. Given P-0294’s 
credibility and that the reliability of his evidence was seriously at issue, 
the Chamber was unable to rely on his account. See Lubanga Trial Cham-
ber Judgment, para. 415, see above note 4. 
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P-0297 
Forensic Evidence 
Examination of hand and wrist bones along with the dental records sug-
gest that P-0297 was under 15 years within the time frame of the charges. 
See Lubanga Prosecution’s Closing Brief, paras. 442 and 444, see above 
note 261. The experts concluded he was between 16 and 17 years old in 
January 2008. See expert report EVD-OTP-00618, p. 435. The Trial 
Chamber stated: “However, these forensic assessments of age lack preci-
sion and they provide an inadequate basis, taken alone, for determining an 
individual’s age”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 423, see 
above note 4. 
Oral Evidence 
According to P-0297’s own testimony, he was born in 1990. 
Other witnesses were unspecific about P-0297’s age. 
According to defence witnesses, a school teacher and D-0036, P-
0297 was never a child soldier. In response to this, P-0297 suggested that 
two defence witnesses were sent to the Court by Cordo in order to state 
falsely that one of them and P-0297 had not served as child soldiers in the 
UPC. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 399–421, see above 
note 4. 
Documentary Evidence 
The school documents suggested that P-0297 was significantly over 15 
years of age in 2002. Furthermore, these records suggested that someone 
with P-0297’s identity attended one of the schools in October 1997 when 
he was allegedly living elsewhere. However, The Trial Chamber did not 
see any credible evidence to support the contention that it was a forgery. 
See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 419–23, see above note 4. 
Not Proven 
The Chamber recognised that this witness may have been confronted with 
difficult circumstances but considered his account to be unreliable. Not-
withstanding the allegation made by P-0297 against some of the other 
witnesses, the Chamber considered it likely that P-0321 persuaded or en-
couraged him to give false evidence and was therefore unable to rely on 
his account. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 429, see above 
note 4. 
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P-0298 
Oral Evidence 
P-0298 provided different accounts about his age; that he did not remem-
ber and that he was born in 1989. Initially he retracted his testimony in 
Court but then maintained his original testimony when reappearing in 
Court two weeks later. When retracting his testimony, P-0298 stated that 
he, together with his friends, had been promised clothes and many other 
things. He had never been to training camp, but instead been taught the 
details of his account, and although he said he would do what they had 
asked, when he came to Court he decided to speak the truth. The Trial 
Chamber noted that, presumably, he was influenced by the presence of the 
accused in the Courtroom. Upon return two weeks later, P-0298 again 
stated that he had been enlisted by UPC soldiers, in line with his original 
statement. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 430–31, see 
above note 4. 
P-0299, the father of P-0298 said that P-0298 was born in 1991 and 
that he was in a possession of a birth certificate which showed this year of 
birth. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 438, see above note 4. 
Documentary Evidence 
Various school documents suggested P-0298 was born in 1989, although 
the implications of these documents were contested by the defence. 
Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 438, see above note 4. 
Not Proven 
The Trial Chamber noted that, notwithstanding the prosecution’s sugges-
tion that P-0298’s initial testimony in Court (where he retracted his previ-
ous statement) was merely the result of his anger, the evidence created a 
real doubt as to his honesty and reliability. Additionally, the Chamber 
considered there was a real possibility that he was encouraged and assist-
ed by P-0321 to give false evidence. P-0298 was therefore not a witness 
on whom the Chamber was able to rely. See Lubanga Trial Chamber 
Judgment, para. 441, see above note 4. 
D-0040 
Video Evidence 
Video filmed at Lubanga’s office, 24 February 2003. See video excerpt 
EVD-OTP-00574, 01:49:02. 
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Oral Evidence 
According to D-0040’s own testimony, introduced by the defence, he was 
born on 8 April 1983 and therefore 20 years at the time the footage was 
shot. 
Documentary Evidence 
The voting card and a state diploma, introduced by the defence, confirmed 
D-0040’s own testimony, that he was born on 8 April 1983. See evidence 
EVD-D01-01111 (voter registration card); and ICC, The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 13 June 2012, ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-360-Red2-ENG, p. 22, lines 5–23 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/02a5ae/). 
Proven 
In the assessment of D-0040’s age, based on the video evidence, the 
Chamber determined that he was much younger than 15 years when the 
footage was shot, even when a wide margin of error was applied. See 
Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 643, see above note 4. 
D-0041 
Video Evidence 
According to the Trial Chamber, the individual in the foreground of the 
excerpt clad in camouflage clothing, wearing a beret and bearing a rifle on 
the right shoulder was “manifestly under the age of 15 years”. Video ex-
cerpt EVD-OTP-00571, taken during a presidential rally at the Bunia city 
stadium, 11 January 2003, 02:47:15 to 02:47:19. 
Oral Evidence 
According to D-0041’s own testimony, introduced by the defence, he was 
born on 2 December 1984 and therefore 19 years at the time the footage 
was shot. 
Documentary Evidence 
According to a voting card, D-0041 was over 15. Evidence DRC-D01-
0003-5983 (voting card). 
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Proven 
The Chamber considered that the individual in the foreground of the video 
excerpt (D-0041) wearing camouflage clothing, a beret and bearing a rifle 
on the right should was “manifestly under the age of 15 years”. See 
Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 713, 860, 915, 1251, see above 
note 4. 
Bodyguard 1 
According to the defence, Bodyguards 1 and 2 were in fact the same indi-
vidual. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Defence, Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga’s Appellate Brief Against the 14 March 2012 Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 3 December 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-
2948-Red-tENG, p. 49, para. 172 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
23428f/). 
Video Evidence 
This is footage shot during a meeting between a UPC delegation and rep-
resentative from the Lendu community in the Lipri region on 14 January 
2003. See video excerpt EVD-OTP-00572, 00:00:50, 00:02:47 and 
00:28:42. According to the Trial Chamber, these individuals were “clearly 
under the age of 15”. 
Oral Evidence 
A witness had indicated to the investigators of the OTP that he estimated 
the age to 16 years. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Trial Chamber, Transcript, 26 May 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-178-Red3-
ENG, p. 46, line 7 to p. 47, line 4 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
fe35bc/). 
Proven 
The Trial Chamber found that the excerpts show soldiers “clearly under 
the age of 15 years”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 915, 
see above note 4. 
Bodyguard 2 
According to the defence, Bodyguards 1 and 2 were in fact the same indi-
vidual. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Defence, Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga’s Appellate Brief Against the 14 March 2012 Judgment 
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Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 3 December 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-
2948-Red-tENG, p. 49, para. 172 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
23428f/). 
Video Evidence 
This is footage shot during a meeting between a UPC delegation and rep-
resentative from the Lendu community in the Lipri region on 14 January 
2003. See video excerpt EVD-OTP-00572, 00:00:50, 00:02:47 and 
00:28:42. According to the Trial Chamber, these individuals were “clearly 
under the age of 15”. 
Oral Evidence 
A witness had indicated to the investigators of the OTP that he estimated 
the age of Bodyguard 2 to be 16 years. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thom-
as Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 26 May 2009, ICC-01/04-
01/06-T-178-Red3-ENG, p. 46, line 7 to p. 47, line 4 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/fe35bc/). 
Proven 
The Trial Chamber found that the excerpts show soldiers “clearly under 
the age of 15 years”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 915, 
see above note 4. 
Individual 1 
Video Evidence 
Video excerpt EVD-OTP-00571, taken during a presidential rally at the 
Bunia city stadium, 11 January 2003, 02:22:52 to 02:22:54. The Trial 
Chamber found one of the soldiers appearing in the excerpt to be “signifi-
cantly below 15 years of age”. 
Proven 
The Chamber found one of the soldiers appearing in the excerpt to be 
“significantly below 15 years of age”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judg-
ment, para. 1249, see above note 4. 
Individual 2 
The Trial Chamber concluded that this person was a “young male who is 
well below the age of 15”. The defence pointed out that this finding was 
6. Child Soldier or Soldier? Estimating Age in Cases of Core International Crimes: 
Challenges and Opportunities 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 451 
at odds with the statements of one of the Prosecution witnesses who testi-
fied that the soldier was female and argued that this erroneous finding on 
behalf of the Chamber made clear that it is impossible even to determine 
the sex of the individual concerned from the footage. The Appeals Cham-
ber found that, an error as to biological sex does not affect the reasonable-
ness of the Trial Chamber’s finding that the individual was clearly under 
the age of 15 years. 
Video Evidence 
Video excerpt EVD-OTP-00570, shot at Rwampara training camp, 12 
February 2003, 00:06:57. The Trial Chamber specified that, in its view, 
the person was a “young male who is well below the age of 15”. 
Proven 
The Chamber stated that this individual was a “young male who is well 
below the age of 15”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 1242, 
see above note 4. 
Individual 3 
Video Evidence 
Video excerpt EVD-OTP-00571, taken during a presidential rally at the 
Bunia city stadium, 11 January 2003, 02:02:44. According to the Trial 
Chamber, this individual was “evidently under the age of 15”. 
Proven 
The Chamber found that the young man in camouflage clothing and bear-
ing a weapon was “evidently under the age of 15”. See Lubanga Trial 
Chamber Judgment, para. 861, see above note 4. 
Individual 4 
Video Evidence 
Testimony of P-0002, evidence EVD-OTP-00410; and video excerpt 
EVD-OTP-00676, showing a UPC/FPLC rally at the stadium in the centre 
of Bunia, opposite the Ituri Hotel, 26 February 2003, 00:52:14. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 452 
Proven 
The Chamber found that the young man in camouflage clothing and in the 
middle of the frame was “plainly under the age of 15”. See Lubanga Trial 
Chamber Judgment, para. 779, see above note 4. 
Individual 5 
The defence argued that this individual and Individual 6 below could be 
the same individual. 
Video Evidence 
The Chamber found that the excerpt showed two soldiers “clearly under 
the age of 15 years”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 712, 
862, 915 and 1252, see above note 4. 
Individual 6 
The defence argued that this individual and Individual 5 above could be 
the same individual. 
Video Evidence 
Video excerpt EVD-OTP-00574, filmed at Lubanga’s office, 24 February 
2003, 00:36:21. The Chamber found that the excerpt showed two soldiers 
“clearly under the age of 15 years”. See Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, 
paras. 712, 862, 915 and 1252, see above note 4. 
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Appendix 2: Meta-analyses and other studies on forensic age estima-
tions including error intervals and/or the proportion of 
false positives/negatives. 
Table A1 below summarizes meta-analysis as well as a few other studies 
considered relevant for the context of child soldiering cases. The table 
should not be considered an exhaustive list of all available research in the 
area and the reader is recommended to do additional literature searches, 
depending on the more specific case at hand. Table A1 includes research 
in which chronological age (CA) has been estimated on the basis of hand 
or wrist, dental, collarbone as well as combined assessments. Sometimes 
also other assessments of, for example, knees or pelvic bones are made for 
these purposes. 
Table A1. Meta-analyses and other studies on forensic age estimations including 
















tion Study510 E 
American, 
3 months to 
17 years, 
























                                                   
510 Elisabeth Ebert and Katherine Simmons, The Brush Foundation Study of Child Growth 
and Development: II. Physical Growth and Development, Wiley, 1943. See also Greulich 
and Pyle, 1959, see above note 243; Gaskin et al., 2011, see above note 243. 
511 Ebert and Simmons, see above note 510, Greulich and Pyle, 1959, see above note 243 and 
Gaskin et al., see above note 243. 
512 However, this sample consisted of a more diverse body of children (compared to the Brush 
Foundation Study), many of whom were from less privileged socioeconomic groups, see 
Gaskin et al., p. 1, see above note 243. 
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513 Khalaf Alshamrani, Fabrizio Messina and Amaka C. Offiah, “Is the Greulich and Pyle 
Atlas Applicable to All Ethnicities? A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis”, in European 
Radiology, 2019, vol. 29, pp. 2910–23. 
514 Caucasian, Asian, African, Hispanic. 
515 In African females. Hence, in African females, bone was significantly advanced when 
compared to the Greulich and Pyle standard. 
516 In Asian males. Hence, in Asian males, bone age was significantly delayed between six 
and nine years old and significantly advanced at 17 years old when compared to the Greu-
lich and Pyle standard. Thus, the ethnicity or origin of the child seemed to influence the 
applicability of the Greulich and Pyle standard. 
517 Sunpatch Benjavongkulchai and Pisha Pittayapat, “Age Estimation Methods Using Hand 
and Wrist Radiographs in a Group of Contemporary Thais”, in Forensic Science Interna-
tional, 2018, vol. 287, pp. 218.e1–218.e8. 
518 Hence, in this study, the average error, including both under and overestimations, for all 
age thresholds ranged between 19.54–38.07 per cent of all individuals, depending in which 
more specific method was used. 
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519 Pinchi et al., 2014, pp. 83–90, see above note 244. 
520 Thus, 14.26–21.72 per cent were classified inaccurately depending on which more specific 
method was used. 
521 Maria Melo and Javier Ata-Ali, “Accuracy of the Estimation of Dental Age in Comparison 
with Chronological Age in a Spanish Sample of 2641 Living Subjects using the Demirjian 
and Nolla Methods”, in Forensic Science International, 2017, vol. 270, pp. 276.e1–276.e7. 
522 However, when combining Nolla and Demirjian the percentage of true positives was 99.20 
per cent. 
523 Alexandra Meinl et al., “The Chronology of Third Molar Mineralization in the Austrian 
Population: A Contribution to Forensic Age Estimation”, in Forensic Science International, 
2007, vol. 169, no. 2, pp. 161–67. 
524 Hence, when using stage H, 99.3–99.5 per cent of all the individuals were accurately clas-
sified. 
525 Jayakumar Jayaraman et al., “The French-Canadian Data Set of Demirjian for Dental Age 
Estimation: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis”, in Journal of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine, 2013, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 373–81. 
526 For instance, Australia, Brazil, Finland, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sen-
egal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, Venezuela. 
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527 Temitope Ayodejj Esan, “The Demirjian versus the Willems Method for Dental Age Esti-
mation in Different Populations: A Meta-analysis of Published Studies”, in PloS one, 2017, 
vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 1–23. 
528 For instance, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, India, Nigeria, Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, 
France, South Africa. 
529 Mohd Yusof et al., “Performance of Willem’s Dental Age Estimation Method in Children: 
A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis”, in Forensic Science International, 2017, vol. 
280, pp. 245.e1–245.e10. 
530 For instance, China, Serbia, South Korea, Malaysia, India, Japan, Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
531 Ademir Franco et al., “Assessment of Dental Age Estimation Methods applied to Brazilian 
Children: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis”, in Dento-Maxillo-Facial Radiology, 
2020, vol. 6, pp. 1–9. 
532 Jagmahender Singh Sehrawat et al., “Forensic Dental Age Estimation of Sub-adult Indi-
viduals Using Nolla’s Radiographic Method: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis”, in 
Brazilian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2016, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 32–46. 
533 For instance, Turkey, India, UK, Malaysia, Brazil and Pakistan. 
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534 Jagmahender Singh Sehrawat and Monika Singh, “Willems Method of Dental Age Estima-
tion in Children: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis”, in Journal of Forensic and Le-
gal Medicine, 2017, vol. 52, pp. 122–29. 
535 For instance, Belgium, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Serbia, Thailand, UK and Venezuela. 
536 Haglund and Mörnstad, 2019, see above note 265. 
537 Asian, Middle East, African, African-American, European and Caucasian, Latin American 
and Hispanic. 
538 Diagnostic accuracy was 71 per cent and the false positive rate was 3.1 per cent. 
539 Temitope Esan and Lynne A. Schepartz, “The Timing of Permanent Tooth Development in 
a Black Southern African Population using the Demirjian Method”, in International Jour-
nal of Legal Medicine, 2018, vol. 133, no. 1, pp. 1–13. 
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540 Coralie Hermetet et al., “Forensic Age Estimation using Computed Tomography of the 
Medial Clavicular Epiphysis: A Systematic Review”, in International Journal of Legal 
Medicine, 2018, vol. 132, pp. 1415–25. 
541 Referred to by the authors as “systematic review”. 
542 Turkey, Germany, China, Australia, Thailand and France. 
543 The minimum age of stage four individuals was 18.1 years in the male population and 19.5 
years in the female population. 
544 Same result was obtained concerning stage 3c, except in one article (Thailand). 
545 Manuel Kellinghaus et al., “Forensic Age Estimation in Living Subjects Based on the 
Ossification Status of the Medial Clavicular Epiphysis as Revealed by Thin-slice Multide-
tector Computed Tomography”, in International Journal of Legal Medicine, 2010, vol. 124, 
pp. 149–54. 
546 Murat Serdar Gurses et al., “Evaluation of the Ossification of the Medial Clavicle accord-
ing to the Kellinghaus Substage System in Identifying the 18-year-old Age Limit in the Es-
timation of Forensic Age: Is it Necessary?”, in International Journal of Legal Medicine, 
2017, vol. 131, pp. 585–92. 
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547 Pedro Garamendi et al., “Forensic Age Estimation on Digital X-ray Images: Medial 
Epiphyses of the Clavicle and First Rib Ossification in Relation to Chronological Age”, in 
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2011, vol. 56, no. s1, pp. S3–S12. 
548 This was analysed because complete fusion of the medial clavicle is a parameter recom-
mended by AGFAD for a FAE around 21 years. 
549 Ufuk, Agladiogl and Karabulut, 2016, pp. 241–46, see above note 241. 
550 Also, the probability of an individual being 18 years or older was 70.80 per cent in Stage 
III A and 100 per cent in Stages III B, IV and V in females and males. 
551 Volker Vieth et al., “Age Estimation in U-20 Football Players using 3.0 Tesla MRI of the 
Clavicle”, in Forensic Science International, 2014, vol. 241, pp. 118–22. 
552 Thus, the presence of a fully ossified clavicular epiphyseal plate appeared to provide evi-
dence of completion of the 20th year of life. 
553 Biance Gelbrich et al., “Combining Wrist Age and Third Molars in Forensic Age Estima-
tion: How to Calculate the Joint Age Estimate and its Error Rate in Age Diagnostics”, in 
Journal of the Society for the Study of Human Biology, 2015, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 389–96. 
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554 Valeria Santoro et al., “Forensic Age Estimation in Living Individuals: A Retrospective 
Analysis”, in Forensic Science International, 2009, vol. 193, pp. 129.e1–129.e4. 
555 Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco 
and Nigeria. 
556 Note that this is the difference between the estimated age and the age reported by the 
subject, thus not a known chronological age. 
557 Mostad and Tamsen, 2019, pp. 613–23, see above note 265. 
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7.Confirmation Bias in Investigations of 
Core International Crimes: 
Risk Factors and Quality Control Techniques 
Moa Lidén* 
If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect 
of human reasoning that deserves attention above all others, 
the confirmation bias would have to be among the candi-
dates for consideration.1 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Although the historical roots, contemporary challenges, material as well 
as procedural law vary across different jurisdictions, all jurisdictions have 
one common and continuous denominator; they are all fundamentally 
dependent on the decision-making processes of humans operating inside 
of them. As such, the topic of bias in human decision making is directly 
related to issues of legitimacy, not the least when it comes to decision 
making in criminal case procedures. 
This chapter examines the more specific context of investigations 
into core international crimes. Although the literature describes a range of 
                                                   
* Moa Lidén is Postdoctoral Research Fellow, funded by Ragnar Söderberg Foundation and 
The Swedish Research Council, at the Department of Security and Crime Science, Centre 
for the Forensic Sciences, UCL, London. She holds a Ph.D. in Jurisprudence from the Law 
Faculty of Uppsala University and her doctoral thesis was on the topic “Confirmation Bias 
in Criminal Cases”. This chapter is based on a presentation at a conference organised by 
the Centre of International Law Research and Policy (CILRAP) at the Indian Law Institute 
in New Delhi, see Moa Lidén, “Prevention of Factual Confirmation Bias During Offence-
Driven Investigations”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.
org/cilrap-film/190222-liden/). The author is grateful to Xabier Agirre Aranburu for his re-
view of this chapter. 
1 Raymond Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises”, in 
Review of General Psychology, 1998, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 175. 
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biases, 2 research since the 1960’s into the so-called confirmation bias 
illustrates its pervasive and multifaceted nature as well as its potentially 
devastating consequences,3 rendering it a top candidate for consideration. 
The definition of confirmation bias, which was first presented by 
Raymond Nickerson in 1998 and is today well-established, describes it as 
a human “tendency to search for and interpret information in ways that are 
partial to existing hypotheses”.4 At the same time, opposing information is 
ignored or interpreted in ways that do not threaten the predetermined con-
clusion.5 Thus confirmation bias entails one-sidedness both in how deci-
sion makers search for information and in how they evaluate the infor-
mation. Importantly, this one-sidedness in reasoning happens more or less 
subconsciously. Today, 21 years later, the research on confirmation bias 
                                                   
2 See, for example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases”, in Science, 1974, vol. 185, no. 4157, pp. 1124–31; Martin Hilbert, 
“Toward a Synthesis of Cognitive Biases: How Noisy Information Processing can Bias 
Human Decision Making”, in Psychological Bulletin, 2012, vol. 138, no. 2, pp. 211–37; 
Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008; 
Eugeniusz Pronin, “Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment”, in Trends 
in Cognitive Science, 2006, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 37–43; Steven Schwartz and Martin F. 
Kaplan, Human Judgment and Decision Processes, Academic Press, London, 1975. For a 
summary of a range of cognitive tendencies and biases overlapping confirmation bias, see 
Moa Lidén, Confirmation Bias in Criminal Cases, Uppsala University Press, Uppsala, 
2018, pp. 106–08. 
3 This research has primarily been conducted by cognitive psychologists using experimental 
methods. The research began with Peter Cathcart Wason’s today famous 2-4-6 task with 
which he illustrated that people tend to use evaluation strategies that can potentially con-
firm their hypothesis, but not strategies that can potentially disconfirm their hypothesis, 
see Peter Cathcart Wason, “On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task”, 
in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1960, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 129–40. Alt-
hough this task has been criticised, for example, for creating artificial results, the findings 
have since then been replicated in a range of settings and with more realistic tasks. The 
two most important meta-analyses which summarise these studies are William Hart, 
Dolores Albarracín, Alice H. Eagly, Inge Brechan, Matthew J. Lindberg and Lisa Merrill, 
“Feeling Validated Versus Being Correct: A Meta-Analysis of Selective Exposure to In-
formation”, in Psychological Bulletin, 2009, vol. 135, no. 4, pp. 555–88; Alice H. Eagly, 
Serena Chen, Shelly Chaiken and Kelly Shaw-Barnes, “The Impact of Attitudes on 
Memory: An Affair to Remember”, in Psychological Bulletin, 1999, vol. 125, no. 1, pp. 
64–89. 
4 Nickerson, 1998, pp. 175–76, see above note 1. 
5 Ibid. 
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has not only been widely replicated but the bias has also been found in a 
range of distinct contexts6 including criminal investigations.7 
On a general level, it can be noted that confirmation bias strongly 
contradicts legal demands on decision making, such as the presumption of 
innocence8 and, in the context of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), 
the prosecutor’s duty to investigate both incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally.9 Given the largely subconscious nature of confir-
mation bias, even legal actors who make every effort to remain objective 
and who might even perceive of themselves as objective, can in fact dis-
play this one-sidedness. As such, confirmation bias can result in wrongful 
suspicions, or even convictions, as well as the loyal companions of these 
problems, namely that the real perpetrator(s) remain at large or that inves-
tigation into their guilt is initiated too late, when it is unlikely that evi-
dence sufficient for a conviction will be found. Alternatively, even if a 
hypothesis is correct in the sense that a certain suspect has committed a 
crime, the hypothesis might be wrongful, for example, in relation to the 
course of event or the hierarchical structure that was used for a criminal 
                                                   
6 One example is found within medicine, namely that physicians who are aware of a pa-
tient’s medical diagnosis tend to make more diagnosis-consistent interpretations of infor-
mation regarding the patient, as compared to physicians who are unaware of the diagnosis, 
see Tanya Lyn Eadie, “Does Knowledge of Medical Diagnosis Bias Auditory-perceptual 
Judgments of Dysphonia?”, in Journal of Voice: Official Journal of the Voice Foundation, 
2015, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 420–29. However, there are also examples of non-experimental 
research studies, such as historical studies of the witch hunt between the 16th and 19th cen-
turies in Western Europe, which is sometimes described as a consequence of confirmation 
bias on a societal level, that is, an example of how a dominating general belief that some 
women were witches, had devastating consequences, in this case the execution of tens of 
thousands of women, see Craig Cabell, Witchfinder General: The Biography of Matthew 
Hopkins, Sutton Publishing Ltd., Stroud, 2006; Bror Gadelius, Häxor och Häxprocesser, 
Prisma, Stockholm, 1986; Bror Gadelius, Tro och Öfvertro i Gångna Tider, Geber, Stock-
holm, 1912. 
7 This research will be discussed in detail in the chapter but some examples of such research 
studies are Willem A. Wagenaar, Peter J. van Koppen and Hans F.M. Crombag, Anchored 
Narratives: The Psychology of Criminal Evidence, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1994; 
Saul M. Kassin, Itiel E. Dror and Jeff Kukucka, “The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Prob-
lems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions”, in Journal of Applied Research in Memory 
and Cognition, 2013, vol. 2. no. 1, pp. 42–52; Lidén, 2018, see above note 2. 
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 66 (‘ICC Statute’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9) 
9 Ibid., Article 54(1)(a). 
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conduct, 10  as well as the associated legal labels. The potential conse-
quences of confirmation bias in criminal investigations highlight an im-
portant part of quality control, namely to find effective debiasing tech-
niques that prevent or at least mitigate the bias. Such debiasing techniques 
promote proper factual analysis and evidence-review, including careful 
and balanced evaluations of strengths and weaknesses in existing hypoth-
eses as well as thorough exploration of alternative hypotheses. The tech-
niques are therefore relevant in relation to the second and third bottle-
necks (‘factual analysis’ and ‘evidence-review’) identified in Morten 
Bergsmo’s policy brief “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal 
Investigations” that serves as the concept paper of the research project of 
which this anthology is part.11 Due to the multifaceted nature of confirma-
tion bias, finding effective debiasing techniques requires knowledge of, 
not only how the bias might manifest itself, but also why the bias occurs. 
Such knowledge can then be used to tailor-make debiasing techniques for 
the context in which they are intended to be used. 
To address these questions, this chapter consists of two main parts: 
1) Manifestations of confirmation bias: What is known about how con-
firmation bias manifests itself in criminal investigations and how 
can this knowledge be used to identify risk factors in investigations 
                                                   
10 The importance of establishing hierarchical structures in investigations into core interna-
tional crimes is discussed by, for example, Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “Gravity of Crimes 
and Responsibility of the Suspect”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and 
Selecting Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher (‘TOAEP’), Os-
lo, 2010, p. 234; Elinor Fry, “The Nature of International Crimes and Evidentiary Chal-
lenges – Preserving Quality While Managing Quantity”, in Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey 
Vasiliev (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2014, pp. 264–65. See also Ohlin who describes international criminal law as a “constant 
balancing of collective elements and individual responsibility”, see Jens David Ohlin, 
“Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law”, in 
UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 2009, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 92. 
11 Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief No. 94 (2019), TOAEP, Brussels, 2019, pp. 2–3 (http://www.toaep.
org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). See also Morten Bergsmo, “Rethinking Instruments of Quality 
Control in the Investigation and Preparations of Core International Crimes Cases”, 
CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-
bergsmo/). Furthermore, Carsten Stahn describes two macro problems that are similar in 
preliminary examinations and investigations: 1) cognitive bias, including confirmation bias, 
and 2) addressing bottlenecks, see Carsten Stahn, “From Preliminary Examination to In-
vestigation: Rethinking the Connection”, chap. 1 above. 
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into core international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide)? 
2) Explanations of confirmation bias and debiasing techniques: What 
are the explanations of confirmation bias and how can these be used 
to identify potential debiasing techniques? How can debiasing tech-
niques be tested as to allow sound and accurate evaluations of their 
potential? 
7.2. Manifestations of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations 
7.2.1. Suspect-Driven Investigations 
On February 14, 2005, at 12:50 p.m., former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Hariri and 22 other individuals were killed in an 
explosion in downtown Beirut. A United-Nations fact-
finding mission arrived in Beirut to investigate the assassina-
tion on February 25, 2005. […] By December 17, 2005, the 
chief UN investigator, Detlev Mehlis, had told an Arab 
newspaper he believed that Syria was directly responsible for 
Hariri’s assassination. By the end of 2005, 19 suspects had 
been identified, including 5 high-level Syrian security offi-
cials and 4 Lebanese generals.12 
The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri13 and 
the events following it, not the least the so-called ‘Mehlis Report’ which 
implicated Syrian and Lebanese officials,14 illustrate how powerful sus-
                                                   
12 Robert M. Bosco, “The Assassination of Rafik Hariri: Foreign Policy Perspectives”, in 
International Political Science Review, 2009, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 354. 
13 Rafik Hariri took over as Lebanon’s Prime Minister in 1992 with the support of Saudi 
Arabia and the United States. For more about Hariri’s rise to power, Lebanon’s civil war 
(1975–90) and the two distinct power alliances that, by 2004, the year before Hariri’s as-
sassination, had emerged between on the one hand Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Leb-
anese President Émile Lahoud, and the cross-border security forces, and, on the other, 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his domestic and international supporters, 
Bosco, 2009, pp. 351–53, see above note 12. 
14 For more on this, see, for example, William Harris, “Investigating Lebanon’s Political 
Murders: International Idealism in the Realist Middle East”, in The Middle East Journal, 
2013, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 9–27. In October and December 2005, the inquiry produced two 
reports under the signature of United National International Independent Investigation 
Commission (‘UNIIIC’) chief Detlev Mehlis. According to Harris, Mehlis had the unani-
mous support of all seven international prosecutors in his team for the findings. After re-
ceiving death threats, he was advised by the United Nations (‘UN’) that he could no longer 
lead the inquiry and declined renewal of his contract. After this, he was replaced by Bel-
gian prosecutor Serge Brammertz in January 2006. 
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pect identification can be.15 Shortly after the assassination, the UNIIIC 
was established, initially led by senior German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, 
to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation, including “identi-
fying perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices”.16 However, the 
decision to create a commission of inquiry focusing on one specific 
bombing was soon heavily criticised for being politically selective, much 
due to the early identification of certain suspects in the Mehlis Report.17 
The report resulted in that four allegedly pro-Syrian Lebanese generals 
were arrested and detained in September 2005.18 In November 2005, a 
key witness of the report publicly recanted his testimony saying he had 
been coerced,19 only days after another witness allegedly was paid to tes-
tify.20 However, the four generals were held in Lebanese prison for almost 
four years.21 It was not until 2009, after the Hariri file had been trans-
ferred to the Special Tribunal of Lebanon (‘STL’),22 that the STL Prosecu-
                                                   
15 Although the official Mehlis report only pointed to ‘Lebanese and Syrian involvement’, an 
unedited version which found its way into the hands of journalists carried the names of 
several senior Lebanese and Syrian officials, see Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon: 
The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East, Bloomsbury Publish-
ing, New York, 2006, pp. 178–79. 
16 See Security Council Resolution 1595, UN Doc. S/RES/1595 (2005), 7 April 2005, para. 1 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/4a0623); Amal Alamuddin and Anna Bonini, “The UN Investi-
gation of the Hariri Assassination”, in Amal Alamuddin, Nidal Nabil Jurdi and David Tol-
bert (eds.), The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014, p. 52. 
17 Alamuddin and Bonini, 2014, p. 52, see above note 16. Another part of the criticism was 
that other assassinations and crimes in Lebanon had gone un-investigated and unpunished 
before, during and after the Commission’s life. The expansion of the Commission’s man-
date to cover other terrorist bombings that took place in Lebanon after 1 October 2004 on-
ly partially addressed this concern. See also Amnesty International, The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon: Selective Justice?, London, 27 February 2009 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
rj32ah). 
18 Alamuddin and Bonini, 2014, pp. 60–61, see above note 16. 
19 This key witness was Hussam Hussam who said he was coerced by Saad Hariri and other 
March 14 coalition leaders, see Blanford, 2006, p. 184, see above note 15. 
20 This witness was Zuahir Ibn Mohammed Said Saddik who allegedly was paid to testify by 
Rifaat al-Assad, Bashar’s uncle, who still had an eye on the presidency, see Blanford, 2006, 
p. 184, see above note 15. 
21 Alamuddin and Bonini, 2014, pp. 60–61, see above note 16. 
22 STL, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘Hariri Tribunal’ was established following a 
request by the government of Lebanon to the UN and its primary mandate is to hold trials 
for the people accused of carrying out the attack of 14 February 2005 which killed Hariri 
as well as 22 other people, see STL, “About the STL” (available on its web site). 
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tor requested that the generals be released based on, inter alia, the “incon-
sistencies in the statements of key witnesses and of a lack of corroborative 
evidence to support these statements”.23 As a result, the pre-trial judge 
ordered the generals’ immediate release.24 
Although it is difficult to assess conclusively the workings of any 
criminal investigations, always complex and confidential, according to the 
judicial record and the prevailing view among experts, it appears that the 
initial fact-finding on the Hariri assassination was strongly influenced by 
the expectations of key stakeholders and the early identification of sus-
pects, offering a compelling example of this kind of bias in international 
investigations. Later, based on, for example, forensic expert statements of 
how the bombings happened25 as well as analysis of telephone communi-
cations believed to be instrumental for the planning of the assassination,26 
four other suspects were identified and their guilt tried in absentia by the 
STL.27 Still today the STL is deliberating whether the Prosecution has 
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.28 
Even though identifying suspects are both desired and necessary 
parts of criminal investigations, early suspect identification can be prob-
                                                   
23 STL, Pre-Trial Judge, Order Regarding the Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in 
Connection with the Case of the Attack Against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others, 29 
April 2009, CH/PTJ/2009/06, para. 34(vi) (‘Order Regarding the Detention of Persons De-
tained in Lebanon in Connection with the Case of the Attack Against Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri and Others’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/60381f); Alamuddin and Bonini, 2014, p. 
61, see above note 16. 
24 Order Regarding Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in Connection with the Case 
of the Attack Against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others, see above note 23. 
25 These statements came from experts from Germany, the Netherlands and Japan, see Mar-
wan Iskandar, Rafiq Hariri and the Fate of Lebanon, Saqi, London, 2006, pp. 207–08. 
Previously there had been discussions about whether the bomb blast was above-ground or 
subterranean. According to Blanford, the Lebanese authorities were pressing the idea of an 
above-ground blast caused by a suicide bomber, citing the mysterious Abu Adas video con-
fession, but those who firmly believed Syria was responsible for the assassination pinned 
their hopes on a subterranean blast, as digging a hole in the main road outside the St 
Georges Hotel would require the collusion of the authorities. For more on this, see Blan-
ford, 2006, pp. 150–51, see above note 15. 
26 According to the prosecution, the cell site-records demonstrate that the cellular phones 
using the identified six calling cards were placed to cover any route that Hariri would have 
taken that day. Iskandar, 2006, p. 207, see above note 25. 
27 STL, The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01. 
28 See the current status of the Ayyash et al. case: STL, “Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01)” (availa-
ble on its web site). 
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lematic as it may steer the investigation towards searching for, only or 
primarily, evidence supporting the hypothesis that the suspect is guilty.29 
Thus, in such investigations, the mindset of investigators is not to careful-
ly evaluate the hypothesis by searching for both incriminating and exon-
erating information, but instead to “find the evidence”30 that supports the 
hypothesis. Logically speaking, it is of course possible to find hypothesis-
consistent evidence, even if the hypothesis is wrongful. However, given 
the one-sidedness of the investigation, it cannot properly evaluate whether 
this is the case or not. These so-called suspect-driven investigations, 
which were first described by Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag in 
1993, are, today, widely acknowledged manifestations of confirmation 
bias.31 
Wagenaar and colleagues based their framework regarding suspect-
driven investigations on an analysis of Dutch criminal cases that were 
dubious in the sense that they contained legal or logical problems and 
were later reversed by the Court of Appeals (due to a different evaluation 
of the evidence, or that the defence attorney remained strongly convinced 
of a client’s innocence).32 Some of the cases were acknowledged wrongful 
convictions. Wagenaar and colleagues found that all these cases had 
something in common; a suspect had been identified at an early stage of 
the investigation and, from there on, this guilt hypothesis dictated the in-
vestigation as its only aim was to find hypothesis confirming information. 
They also distinguished suspect-driven investigations from offence-driven 
investigations, the latter in which it is the available information, rather 
than a predetermined conclusion, which guides the search for further in-
formation and, eventually, the formation of the case’s hypothesis.33 Hence, 
                                                   
29 Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag, 1993, p. 11, see above note 7. 
30 This determinative mindset has been described, using the same words, by, for example, 
Eric Rassin, Anita Eerland and Ilse Kuijpers, “Let’s Find the Evidence: An Analogue Study 
of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations”, in Journal of Investigative Psychology 
and Offender Profiling, 2010, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 231–46. Interestingly, this is similar to how 
a former International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) attorney describes the first Prosecutor of the 
ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to a New York Times magazine journalist, that is: “He 
would see the leader of a state and say: ‘There must be evidence out there. Go get it for 
me’”. See James Verini, “The Prosecutor and the President”, The New York Times, 22 June 
2016 (available on its web site). 
31 Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag, 1993, p. 11, see above note 7. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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in offence-driven investigations, case hypotheses are formulated at later 
stages and on the basis of more information than in suspect-driven inves-
tigations. 
Although postponing the formulation of a case hypothesis makes 
the accuracy of the hypothesis less dependent on chance and more de-
pendent on sound investigation, a criminal investigation can of course not 
proceed without any hypothesis for too long. This would not only be 
draining in terms of resources, but also defeat the purpose of finding out 
whether any crime has been committed and by whom. In many investiga-
tions, and particularly those into core international crimes, there is a po-
tentially endless amount of information of different degrees of relevance. 
Such investigations sometimes face allegations implying the killing of 
tens of thousands of civilians, the forcible displacement of several hun-
dred thousand persons, and the unlawful destruction of more than one 
hundred thousand homes. In practice, it is rarely or never possible to take 
all of this information into account. 
There are no specific answers as to exactly how this balancing 
should be made. Yet, the investigation should, as far as possible, help 
evaluate and potentially eliminate alternative hypotheses in relation to the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard.34 If a confirmation bias is at play, this 
ability is greatly undermined as investigators, subconsciously, fail to see 
that there are other reasonable hypotheses and therefore do not initiate 
investigation into them. Alternatively, investigators do search for and find 
evidence in favour of another hypothesis, but systematically downgrade 
this evidence so that it does not threaten their predetermined conclusion. 
As such, the working hypothesis may appear essentially impeccable to 
investigators whereas others can more easily see that this is not the case. 
Thus, the aim of preventing confirmation bias is not to ensure that 
literally all information is taken into account, but instead to promote care-
ful and balanced evaluations of strengths and weaknesses of existing hy-
                                                   
34 See, for example, Mark Klamberg, “Fact-Finding in International Criminal Procedure – 
How Collection of Evidence May Contribute to Testing of Alternative Hypotheses”, in 
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011, pp. 1–20; Mark Klamberg, “The Alternative Hypothesis 
Approach, Robustness and International Criminal Justice: A Plea for a ‘Combined Ap-
proach’ to Evaluation of Evidence”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2015, vol. 
13, no. 3, pp. 535–53. 
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potheses as well as genuine and through exploration of alternative hy-
potheses.35 
Against this background, the usage of investigation plans36 and the 
tradition of focusing on the most responsible perpetrators37 in investiga-
tions of core international crimes, are of interest. On the one hand, there is 
no doubt that this helps the management, planning and allocation of in-
vestigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources.38 On the other hand, it 
seems reasonable to ask whether and to what extent this triggers a confir-
mation bias, manifested in, for example, a suspect-driven investigation. 
When it comes to investigation plans specifically, these may, of 
course, vary in how open or closed they are. For instance, there are varia-
tions in when and on what bases individuals are identified as suspects. In 
the first Darfur case,39 the initial plan adopted in 2005 did not identify any 
suspect, as this only happened after about one year and then on the basis 
of ICC evidence.40 However, in the Kenya investigation,41 suspects were 
                                                   
35 This is a crucial part of quality control, particularly in relation to the second and third 
bottlenecks ‘factual analysis’ and ‘evidence-review’, see Bergsmo, 2019, pp. 2–3, see 
above note 11. 
36 See, for example, Markus Eikel, “Nature and Use of Investigation Plans at the Internation-
al Criminal Court”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/
cilrap-film/190223-eikel/). 
37 Agirre Aranburu, 2010, p. 218, see above note 10. 
38 See ICC, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 
2003, p. 7 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f53870), in which it is stated that the Office of the 
Prosecutor (‘OTP’) should focus “investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on 
those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization 
allegedly responsible for those crimes”, cited by Agirre Aranburu, 2010, p. 222, see above 
note 10. 
39 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Presidency, Decision Assigning the Situation in Darfur, 
Sudan to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 21 April 2005, ICC-02/05-1 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
8e8a93). On 1 June 2005, the Prosecutor determined that there was a reasonable basis to 
initiate an investigation and notified the Chambers and Presidency accordingly, see Wil-
liam A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, London, 2017, p. 48. 
40 See, for example, Xabier Agirre Aranburu and Roberta Belli, “The ICC and the Darfur 
Investigation – Progress and Challenges”, in Mangai Natarajan (ed.), International and 
Transnational Crime and Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, and OTP, 
First Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 
1593 (2005), 29 June 2005. 
41 On 26 November 2009, the Prosecutor requested the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorisation 
to conduct investigations in Kenya. See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, OTP, 
Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 2009, 
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identified early on in 2009, on the basis of prior investigations of two 
different fact-finding commissions.42 Thus, adopting an investigation plan 
is not necessarily a trigger of confirmation bias in itself. Yet, recent re-
search highlights the risk that investigators’ minds “seize and freeze”43 
already with decisions about who should be investigated and through 
what tactics,44 or with the identification45 and/or apprehension or arrest of 
a suspect.46 This means that the extent to which an investigation plan con-
stitutes a risk factor is dependent on its more specific content, and also on 
its nature. If, for example – as Morten Bergsmo suggested at the New 
Delhi conference on which this anthology is based – the investigation plan 
is a dynamic, online knowledge-base for the investigation team, it may 
evolve on a daily basis and not be a one-off document early in an investi-
gation. 
                                                                                                                        
ICC-01/09-3 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c63dcc). This was after the Kenyan government, 
in breach of the so-called ‘complementarity contract’, failed to establish a special tribunal. 
For more on the different phases of these investigations see, for example, Lionel Nichols, 
The International Criminal Court and the End of Impunity in Kenya, Springer, London, 
2015, pp. 69–86. 
42 Ibid., pp. 69–70, see above note 41, and information obtained through personal communi-
cation with current and former ICC officers at the CILRAP conference “Quality Control in 
Criminal Investigation”, 22–23 February 2019, New Delhi, India. After the Parliament 
voted against establishing the proposed special tribunal in February 2009 and subsequent 
revised proposals were rejected, the Prosecutor responded by using the proprio motu pow-
ers, and findings and materials from the Waki commission were delivered to the OTP. This 
led to the identification of the so-called ‘Ocampo Six’ (which then became the ‘Ocampo 
Four’ and the ‘Ocampo Three’, one of which had been elected President, Uhuru Kenyatta, 
and one Vice President, William Ruto). The second commission, the National Commission 
on Human Rights, named Kenyatta, saying, for example, that he repeatedly “attended 
meetings to plan for retaliatory violence by the Kikuyus”, and also “contributed funds for 
the attacks”, see Peter Leftie, “Poll violence was well planned: report”, Daily Nation, 4 
March 2010 (available on its web site). 
43 Arie W. Kruglanski and Donna M. Webster, “Motivated Closing of the Mind: “Seizing” 
and “Freezing””, in Psychological Review, 1996, vol. 103, no. 2, pp. 263–83. 
44 Leslie C. Griffin, “The Prudent Prosecutor”, in Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 2001, 
vol. 14, no. 249, pp. 259–307. 
45 Ivar Fahsing and Karl Ask, “Decision Making and Decisional Tipping Points in Homicide 
Investigations: An Interview Study of British and Norwegian Detectives”, in Journal of In-
vestigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2013, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 155–65. 
46 Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns and Peter Juslin, “The Presumption of Guilt in Suspect Interro-
gations: Apprehension as a Trigger of Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques”, in 
Law and Human Behavior, 2018, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 336–54; Fahsing and Ask, 2013, pp. 
155–65, see above note 45. 
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The soundness of the hypothesis that someone is guilty will of 
course depend on the quality of the prior investigation leading up to the 
identification of the suspect(s).47 It can be argued that developing a con-
firmation bias in relation to a guilt hypothesis that is correct is less of a 
problem. Although this seems reasonable in respect to a conviction, it can 
be noted that the duty to investigate incriminating and exonerating cir-
cumstances in the context of the ICC applies equally in all situations, and 
that the soundness of a guilt hypothesis can usually only be properly eval-
uated after finalising an investigation. 
In comparison to investigation plans, the focus on the most respon-
sible perpetrators,48 is more unambiguously linked to suspect identifica-
tion and, as such, a more potent risk factor.49 Such a focus on one or a few 
responsible individuals may make prosecutors downgrade exculpatory 
evidence, for instance by categorising it as irrelevant.50 This, in turn, can 
                                                   
47 In this regard, it is relevant to evaluate how initial case hypotheses are developed during 
preliminary examinations and then tested during the subsequent investigations. For more 
on this topic see Carsten Stahn, “From Preliminary Examination to Criminal Investigation”, 
CILRAP Film, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-stahn/). 
48 For more about the origins and definition of this concept as well as a review of the practice 
of different international tribunals on this matter, see Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “Prosecuting 
the Most Responsible for International Crimes: Dilemmas of Definition and Prosecutorial 
Discretion”, in Joaquín González (ed.), Protección Internacional de Derechos Humanos y 
Estado de Derecho, Grupo Editorial Ibañez, Bogotá, 2009, pp. 381–404. Even if elements 
to identify the most responsible perpetrator (formal position, actual role, and so on) have 
been proposed (for example, by Pre-Trial Chamber I in their review of the Prosecutor’s 
application to issue arrest warrants against Lubanga and Ntaganda, see ICC, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Public Re-
dacted Version of Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, Article 
58, 10 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red (https://legal-tools.org/doc/af6679)), 
one cannot state in general terms when precisely someone is to be considered as ‘most re-
sponsible’. 
49 It can be noted that this focus is mandated at the ICC by, inter alia, the reference to ‘de-
gree of participation’ as a sentencing factor, see ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 
September 2002, Rule 145(1)(c) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f) (‘ICC RPE’); Agirre 
Aranburu, 2010, pp. 222–23, see above note 10. 
50 Alafair S. Burke, “Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science”, in William and Mary Law Review, 2006, vol. 47, no. 5, pp. 1588–631; Randolph 
N. Jonakait, “The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct”, in Criminal Law Bulletin, 1987, vol. 
23, no. 6, pp. 550–67; James McCloskey, “Convicting the Innocent”, in Criminal Justice 
Ethics, 1989, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 140–41; Colin Wastell, Nicole Weeks, Alexander Wearing 
and Piers Duncan, “Identifying Hypothesis Confirmation Behaviors in a Simulated Murder 
Investigation: Implications for Practice”, in Journal of Investigative Psychology and Of-
fender Profiling, 2012, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 184–98; Ellen Yaroshefsky, “Cooperation with 
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influence their judgments of whether to press charges, what charges, what 
sentence to seek upon conviction, and so on.51 Other research implies that 
this psychological shift only happens when the guilt hypothesis has be-
come more consolidated, for example, with a charging decision.52 This is 
manifested in that the charging decision in itself (ceteris paribus), seems 
to make prosecutors less likely to conduct additional investigation and if 
such investigation is undertaken, it is more often aimed at confirming the 
suspect’s guilt. 53 Possibly, this is because they then anticipate the pro-
spects of a conviction54 and become more focused on proving the sus-
pect’s guilt at Court.55 
Although it is impossible to say exactly at what point the hypothesis 
becomes consolidated enough to produce a confirmation bias, there are 
some specifics of investigations into core international crimes that may 
indicate an early onset. To begin with, often, the suspects are not any in-
dividuals but heads of State that enjoy diplomatic immunities in their na-
tional jurisdictions and towards whom popular opinions may be that of 
                                                                                                                        
Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment”, in Fordham Law 
Review, 1999, vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 917–64. 
51 Angela J. Davis, “The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny”, in Iowa Law Review, 2001, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 393–465; Bruce A. Green, “Pros-
ecutorial Ethics as Usual”, in University of Illinois Law Review, 2003, vol. 2003, no. 5, pp. 
1573–604. 
52 Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns and Peter Juslin, “From Devil’s Advocate to Crime Fighter: 
Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques in Prosecutorial Decision Making”, in Psy-
chology, Crime and Law, 2019, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 1–33. See also Burke, 2006, pp. 1588–
631, see above note 50. 
53 Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, pp. 1–33, see above note 52. 
54 Emelie Ernberg, Inga Tidefors and Sara Landström, “Prosecutors’ Reflections on Sexually 
Abused Preschoolers and Their Ability to Stand Trial”, in Child Abuse and Neglect, 2016, 
vol. 57, pp. 21–29; Denise Lievore, “Prosecutorial Decisions in Adult Sexual Assault Cas-
es”, in Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 2005, no. 291, pp. 1–6; Åsa Wet-
tergren and Stina Bergman Blix, “Empathy and Objectivity in the Legal Procedure: The 
Case of Swedish Prosecutors”, in Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and 
Crime Prevention, 2016, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 19–35. 
55 Eric M. Freedman, “Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two Legislative Pro-
posals for Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty Cases”, in New 
York University Review of Law and Social Change, 1990, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 315–23; Ben-
nett L. Gershman, “The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth”, in Georgetown Journal of Legal Eth-
ics, 2001, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 309–54. 
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strong support or dissent. Also, there is the more general historical56 and 
contemporary57 context and the associated controversy in relation to the 
proprio motu powers58 as well as the critique that certain countries are 
being targeted, or even that twenty-first century neo-colonialism is at 
play.59 The claim of neo-colonialism was put forward, for example, after 
the arrest warrant against President Al-Bashir had been issued over al-
leged criminal conduct in the Darfur conflict.60 This context is important 
                                                   
56 See, for example, Michael Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule, Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, Evanston, 1968; Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 
Shelley L. Frisch trans., Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, 2005. 
57 See, for example, Res Schuerch, The International Criminal Court at the Mercy of Power-
ful States: An Assessment of the Neo-Colonialism Claim Made by African Stakeholders, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2017. 
58 Schabas, 2017, pp. 16–22, see above note 39. 
59 This term first became popular in the post-colonial period to describe continuing political 
and economic dependency of African States to their former colonial masters. For more on 
this and neo-colonialism allegations in relation to the ICC, see, for example, Schuerch, 
2017, pp. 2–6, see above note 57; Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “The African Union and 
the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis”, in International Affairs, 2016, 
vol. 92, no. 6, pp. 1319–42. 
60 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, ICC-
02/05-01/09-1 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/814cca). The critique is addressed in detail by 
Schuerch, 2017, see above note 57. For instance, Schuerch cites the Rwandan President 
Paul Kagame, who commented that: 
With ICC all the injustices of the past including colonialism, imperialism, keep coming 
back in different forms. They control you. As long as you are poor, weak there is al-
ways some rope to hang you. The ICC is made for Africans and poor countries. 
A statement found in David Kezio-Musoke, “Kagame tells why he is against ICC charging 
Bashir”, Daily Nation, 3 August 2008 (available on its web site). Similarly, Mahmood 
Mamdani, a respected Ugandan scholar of anthropology and political science has de-
scribed the ICC as “a Western Court to try African crimes against humanity” whose ‘re-
sponsibility to protect’ is being turned into an assertion of neocolonial domination, see 
Mahmood Mamdani, “Darfur, ICC and the new humanitarian order”, Pambazuka News, 17 
September 2008 (available on its web site). These statements were made after the Court 
had opened investigations into four situations, all of which were African countries, more 
specifically concerning the situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC, The Of-
fice of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation”, 23 
June 2004, ICC-OTP-20040623-59 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/b68535)); Northern Uganda 
(ICC, “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into North-
ern Uganda”, 29 July 2004, ICC-OTP-20040729-65 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/cfe941)); 
Central African Republic (ICC, “Prosecutor Opens Investigation in the Central African 
Republic”, 22 May 2007, ICC-OTP-20070522-220 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/7c1d44)); 
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provided the Court’s dependency on State co-operation to investigate and 
prosecute suspects.61 Despite the general obligations of State parties to co-
operate fully with the Court,62 there is a risk of non-co-operation63 result-
ing in difficulties with executing arrest warrants, 64  seizing evidentiary 
material,65 and so on, sometimes even to the extent that the prospects of 
conducting a proper investigation seem very low.66 The described context, 
                                                                                                                        
and Darfur, Sudan (ICC, “The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur”, 6 
June 2005, ICC-OTP-0606-104 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/99180f)). 
61 As pointed out by La Haye, the lack of own enforcement agencies has the overall effect 
that the Court is dependent on national authorities to, for example, execute arrest warrants, 
to seize evidentiary material or to compel witnesses to give testimony, Eve La Haye, War 
Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 349. 
62 ICC Statute, Articles 86, 87, 89, 93, see above note 8. 
63 As well as documented situations of non-co-operation, for example, in Sudan, see OTP, 
“Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, to the 
United Nations Security Council on the situation in Darfur, the Sudan, pursuant to UNSCR 
1593 (2005)”, 13 December 2012, para. 7 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/rzcsx6). In 2012, a 
report from the Court showed overall compliance rates of 72 per cent, see Report of the In-
ternational Criminal Court: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/67/308, 14 August 
2012, para. 9 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f0ahnn). 
64 See, for example, Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 
An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 450–51. These authors perceive of the absence of any coer-
cive means (although referral to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council is 
possible) as particularly worrying since this will leave the Court toothless if the State party 
where the internal conflict took place does not co-operate (through, for example, military 
or police forces) and the Security Council chooses to not take any coercive measures. They 
also point out that evidence obtained in contravention of the Statute or internationally rec-
ognised human rights may be declared inadmissible, which applies also to items seized by 
national authorities or international peacekeepers. 
65 See, for example, La Haye, 2008, p. 349, see above note 61. 
66 This is explicit in ICC, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Inves-
tigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 12 April 2019, ICC-
02/17-33 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2fb1f4). In its determination on the interests of justice 
of such investigation, the Chamber states that it is “extremely difficult to gauge the pro-
spects of securing meaningful cooperation from relevant authorities” (ibid., para. 94), that 
“[…] suffice it to say that nothing in the present conjuncture gives any reason to believe 
such cooperation can be taken for granted” (ibid.) and that the investigation “[…] far from 
honouring the victims’ wishes and aspiration that justice be done, would result in creating 
frustration and possibly hostility [vis-à-vis] the Court and therefore negatively impact its 
very ability to pursue credibly the objective it was created to serve” (ibid., para. 96). In 
popular media this decision has been linked to a US refusal to give the Court’s staff the 
necessary visas, see, for example, Marlise Simons, Rick Gladstone and Carol Rosenberg, 
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combined with the explicit investment of investigative and prosecutorial 
efforts and resources into a certain line of inquiry, are relevant for the risk 
of confirmation bias primarily for two reasons. 
Firstly, having to justify a view publicly, or even anticipating hav-
ing to justify that view, increases commitment to that view.67 This, in turn 
increases defence motivation, that is, the desire to defend one’s existing 
beliefs, behaviours, and so on, rather than accuracy motivation, the desire 
to form accurate appraisals of stimuli. 68 This distinction between how 
people strive to feel validated, rather than to be correct, is crucial, espe-
cially since the distinction is not necessarily represented in the conscious-
ness of individual decision makers.69 More specifically, defence motiva-
tion is a strategy to relieve or avoid discomfort stemming from the pres-
ence of hypothesis inconsistent information (cognitive dissonance).70 This 
discomfort can arise from the mere presence of cognitive conflict71 like a 
perceived self-threat stemming from a fear that one is poorly informed.72 
                                                                                                                        
“Hague Court Abandons Afghanistan War Crimes Inquiry”, The New York Times, 2019 
(available on its web site). 
67 Hart, Albarracín, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg and Merrill, 2009, pp. 555–88, see above note 
3. 
68 Ibid., p. 557. 
69 The distinction was made in a meta-analysis comprising 67 reports, which contained 91 
studies incorporating 300 statistically independent groups with a total of just under 8,000 
participants, see ibid., p. 559. 
70 The theory of cognitive dissonance was first presented by Leon Festinger in 1957, see 
Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1957. Since then, the theory has gained substantial support and become one of the most in-
fluential and extensively studied theories in, for example, social psychology. For more on 
this, see, for example, Roope Oskari Kaaronen, “A Theory of Predictive Dissonance: Pre-
dictive Processing Presents a New Take on Cognitive Dissonance”, in Frontiers in Psy-
chology, 2018, vol. 9, pp. 1–15. 
71 Jean-Léon Beauvois and Robert-Vincent Joule, A Radical Dissonance Theory, Taylor and 
Francis Group, Bristol, 1996; Eddie Harmon-Jones, “Cognitive Dissonance and Experi-
enced Negative Affect: Evidence that Dissonance Increases Experienced Negative Affect 
Even in the Absence of Aversive Consequences”, in Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 2000, vol. 26, no. 12, pp. 1490–501; Eddie Harmon-Jones, Jack W. Brehm, Jeff 
Greenberg, Linda Simon and David E. Nelson, “Evidence that the Production of Aversive 
Consequences is not Necessary to Create Cognitive Dissonance”, in Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 1996, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 5–16. 
72 Elliott Aronson, “Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems”, in Robert P. Abelson, 
Elliott Aronson, William J. McGuire, Theodore M. Newcomb, Milton J. Rosenberg and 
Percy H. Tannenbaum (eds.), Theory of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook, Rand 
McNally, Chicago, 1968, pp. 5–27; Anthony, G. Greenwald and David L. Ronis, “Twenty 
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Thus, experiencing or anticipating cognitive dissonance motivates people 
to defend themselves by seeking more hypothesis-consistent than hypoth-
esis-inconsistent information. 
In investigations into core international crimes, this is likely to be 
manifested in the search for linkage evidence, as linking the crime to the 
alleged perpetrator is often more determinative for the outcome of the 
case than crime-based evidence which may be less disputed at trial.73 The 
crimes in question are usually quite blatant due to their massive scale.74 
Hence, linkage issues and theories of liability such as superior and com-
mand responsibility, and aiding and abetting as a form of complicity in 
crime,75 may be important outlets for confirmation bias. Thus, it is crucial 
that hierarchical structures are dealt with as the hypotheses they are.76 
Hierarchical structures are rarely well-defined and meticulously docu-
mented, but instead vague and complex, for example, because there are 
differences between formal and informal leaderships, responsibilities may 
be shared horizontally and vary from time to time.77 As such, hierarchical 
                                                                                                                        
Years of Cognitive Dissonance: Case Study of the Evolution of a Theory”, in Psychologi-
cal Review, 1978, vol. 85, no. 1, pp. 53–57; Barry R. Schlenker, “Self-Presentation”, in 
Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (eds.), Handbook of Self and Identity, The Guilford 
Press, New York, 2003, pp. 492–518; Claude M. Steele, “The Psychology of Self-
affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self”, in Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experi-
mental Social Psychology, Academic Press, San Diego, 1988, pp. 261–302. 
73 Elinor Fry, “The Nature of International Crimes and Evidentiary Challenges”, in Pluralism 
in International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 264; Mark 
Klamberg, Evidence in International Criminal Procedure: Confronting Legal Gaps and the 
Reconstruction of Disputed Events, Stockholm University Press, Stockholm, 2012, p. 97. 
This can also be related to the acknowledgement that some investigations had been insuffi-
ciently thorough, as expressed by that the objective of conducting ‘focused investigations’ 
in the OTP’s Strategic Plan was replaced by a principle of ‘in-depth, open-ended investiga-
tions while maintaining focus’ when a new strategic plan for 2012–15 was adopted, see the 
report Guénaël Mettraux, Shireen Avis Fisher, Dermot Groome, Alex Whiting, Gabrielle 
McIntyre, Jérôme de Hemptinne and Göran Sluiter, Expert Initiative on Promoting Effec-
tiveness at the International Criminal Court, December 2014, p. 51 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/3dae90). 
74 Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “Methodology for the Criminal Investigation of International 
Crimes”, in Alette Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice, 
Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010, p. 353. 
75 Fry, 2014, pp. 264–65, see above note 73. 
76 Agirre Aranburu, 2010, p. 234, see above note 10. 
77 Ibid. 
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structures do not necessarily fit theoretical notions.78 A prediction from 
dissonance theory is that, when faced with such complex information, 
decision makers tend to interpret it in a hypothesis-consistent way as to 
avoid cognitive dissonance. It deserves to be said again, this ‘goal-
oriented’ interpretation happens more or less subconsciously. As such, the 
warning from an ICC officer in 2010 to “beware of the risk of confirma-
tion bias in suspect-driven investigations and take measures to control 
it”,79 should be emphasised. 
Secondly, the manifest investment of time, efforts and resources in-
to a specific line of investigation (or suspect), comes with the associated 
risk of so-called escalation of commitment and the sunk cost effect, 
tendencies that overlap and fuel confirmation bias.80 Escalation of com-
mitment is a tendency to adhere to a prior course of action, even when 
there are indications that the previous action was wrong.81 This means 
that people prefer retroactive information that speaks to the decision al-
ready made, rather than prospective information about the decision to be 
made and that they interpret incoming information in a distorted manner 
that serves to justify previous decisions.82 Similarly, the sunk cost effect 
refers to a tendency to continue an investment or take an action after a 
previous investment in money, effort or time has been made, even though 
                                                   
78 Ibid., pp. 228–34. 
79 Ibid., p. 234. 
80 This relationship is discussed more closely in Hart, Albarracín, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg 
and Merrill, 2009, p. 558, see above note 3; Lidén, 2018, pp. 106–08, see above note 2. 
81 This was first described by Staw in 1976, see Barry M. Staw, “Knee-Deep in the Big Mud-
dy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action”, in Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance, 1976, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 27–44. The tendency has been 
noted, for example, in managers rating of employees they originally hired in which they 
tended to inflate the ratings of the employees effectiveness, likelihood of improvement and 
potential for promotion, see David F. Schoorman, “Escalation Bias in Performance Ap-
praisals: An Unintended Consequence of Supervisor Participation in Hiring Decisions”, in 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1988, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 58–62. Another example is that 
bank managers tend to be committed to bad loans that they themselves had approved, see 
Barry M. Staw, Sigal G. Barsade and Kenneth W. Koput, “Escalation at the Credit Window: 
A Longitudinal Study of Bank Executives’ Recognition and Write-Off Problem Loans”, in 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1997, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 130–42. 
82 Jesse D. Beeler and James E. Hunton, “The Influence of Compensation Method and Dis-
closure Level on Information Search Strategy and Escalation of Commitment”, in Journal 
of Behavioral Decision Making, 1997, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 77–91. 
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the investment has higher future costs than benefits.83 It has also been 
described as “throwing good money after bad”.84 The risk of such tenden-
cies should be seen in the light of the usually very high costs of investiga-
tions into core international crimes, which have not only been widely 
acknowledged but also often criticised.85 Hence, investing in a certain line 
of inquiry is likely to generate a will for the investment to become suc-
cessful, perhaps primarily defined by whether it results in a conviction or 
not, because if not, then the investment may be even more criticised.86 
Taken together, these factors may result in a suspect-driven investi-
gation and more specifically, that the investigation only or primarily fo-
cuses on finding hypothesis-consistent evidence. It should also be noted 
that the discussion so far has examined the potential consequences of 
identifying a ‘suspect’, whereas the term ‘target’ is sometimes used in 
investigations of core international crimes.87 One could argue that this is a 
purely terminological difference. However, this is unlikely to be the case 
as the term ‘target’ is not only more assertive in relation to an individual’s 
guilt, but also, to a greater extent than the term ‘suspect’, it implies that 
the individual in question is dangerous and/or blameworthy. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to expect that the identification of a ‘target’, can, poten-
tially, triggers an even more hypothesis-confirming mindset. 
                                                   
83 This term was first used by Arkes and Blumer in 1985. See, for example, Hal R. Arkes and 
Catherine Blumer, “The Psychology of Sunk Cost”, in Organizational Behavior and Hu-
man Decision Processes, 1985, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 125–40; Elmer Anita Thames, “The 
Sunk Cost Effect: The Importance of Context”, in Journal of Social Behavior and Person-
ality, 1996, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 817–26. 
84 Hal R. Arkes, “The Psychology of Waste”, in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
1996, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 124. 
85 For more on this topic see for example, Osvaldo Zavala, “The Budgetary Efficiency of the 
International Criminal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2018, vol. 18, no. 3, 
pp. 461–88; Jonathan O’Donohue, “Financing the International Criminal Court”, in Inter-
national Criminal Law Review, 2013, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 269–96. 
86 This can be related to criticism according to which the costs of the ICC are disproportion-
ate in relation to its conviction rates, see for example, Tom Mbakwe, “ICC gets first con-
viction after 10 years in existence”, New African, 1 April 2012 (available on its web site); 
David Davenport, “International Criminal Court: 12 years, $ 1 Billion, 2 Convictions”, 
Forbes, 12 March 2014 (available on its web site). 
87 See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), OTP Charging 
and Indictment Guidelines, sect. 3, which deals with ‘selection of targets’, including, for 
example, ‘personal characteristics of the target’, sect. 3.1. 
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Apart from that ‘target’ identification is likely to generate a stronger 
guilt hypothesis and therefore a greater risk of confirmation bias, an added 
effect can also be predicted from research into the so-called framing ef-
fect88 as well as the anchoring effect.89 The framing effect is an effect of 
how a decision problem is framed, that is, presented, labelled or de-
scribed.90 For instance, frames presented by the media seem to effect in-
dividuals’ attitudes about crime as well as their support for the criminal 
justice system.91 Furthermore, the anchoring effect is an effect of an initial 
piece of information, an anchor, upon which decision makers seem to rely 
heavily as they only make small adjustments in relation to the introduced 
anchor. 92 To exemplify, judges’ sentencing decisions seem to be influ-
                                                   
88 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice”, in Science, 1981, vol. 211, no. 4,481, pp. 453–58 
89 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias-
es”, in Science, 1974, vol. 185, no. 4157, pp. 1124–30. 
90 Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, pp. 453–58, see above note 88. Most of this research has 
compared decision problems in which alternatives are framed either as potential gains or 
losses. However, there is also research looking into the effect of frames in, for example, 
negotiations. See YAO Shuguang, WANG Yanhua, PENG Jiaxi and SONG Lei, “The 
Framing Effect of Negation Frames”, in Journal of Risk Research, 2018, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 
800–08, and frames introduced by the media, see Wayne R. Dunham, “Framing the Right 
Suspects: Measuring Media Bias”, in Journal of Media Economics, 2013, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 
122–47. Also, gradually more research is looking into situational and individual factors in-
fluencing the susceptibility to framing effects, see, for example, Paul M. Miller and Nancy 
S. Fagley, “The Effects of Framing, Problem Variations, and Providing Rationale on 
Choice”, in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1991, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 517–22; 
Takemura Kazuhisa, “The Effect of Decision Frame and Decision Justification on Risky 
Choice”, in Japanese Psychological Research, 1993, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 36–40; Shoshana 
Shiloh, Efrat Salton and Dana Sharabi, “Individual Differences in Rational and Intuitive 
Thinking Styles as Predictors of Heuristic Reponses and Framing Effects”, in Personality 
and Individual Differences, 2002, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 415–29. 
91 Lisa A. Kort-Butler and Patrick Habecker, “Framing and Cultivating the Story of Crime: 
The Effects of Media Use, Victimization, and Social Networks on Attitudes About Crime”, 
in Criminal Justice Review, 2018, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 127–46. 
92 Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, pp. 1124–30, see above note 89. Tversky and Kahneman 
asked participants about the percentage of African nations in the UN. In a first comparative 
question, participants indicated whether the percentage was higher or lower than an arbi-
trary number (the anchor) that had been determined by spinning a wheel of fortune (show-
ing 10 per cent or 65 per cent). In a subsequent absolute anchoring question, participants 
gave their best estimate of this percentage. Results showed that the absolute judgments 
were assimilated to the explicitly random anchor values. For more on this, see, for example, 
Birte Englich, “Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the Court-
room Based on Given Numerical Representations”, in Law and Policy, 2006, vol. 28, no. 4, 
pp. 497–514. 
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enced by demands (anchors) that are not only non-binding 93  but also 
completely irrelevant and determined at random, like the toss of a dice.94 
Similar anchors have been found in relation to, for example, damage 
awards.95 Thus, this research implies that the more specific presentation 
of an individual as a ‘suspect’ or a ‘target’ can set different frames for the 
investigation and also, to different degrees, anchor the investigators’ 
mindsets to the guilty hypothesis. Presumably, such stronger tendencies 
can be further fuelled if also other assertive language apart from ‘target’ is 
used. For instance, when describing crimes and responsibilities, these may 
be presented as established facts (‘the crimes committed’, ‘target Y was 
responsible for’) rather than allegations under investigation (‘the alleged 
crimes’, ‘according to source X, target Y was responsible for’). Yet, it 
should be noted that neither the potential differences between using the 
terms ‘target’ and ‘suspect’ nor the effect of using assertive language in 
relation to crimes and responsibilities have been systematically and em-
pirically evaluated.96 This appears to be an important task for future re-
                                                   
93 See, for example, Birte Englich and Thomas Mussweiler, “Sentencing Under Uncertainty: 
Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom”, in Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2001, vol. 
31, vol. 7, pp. 1535–51; Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack, “The Last 
Word in Court – A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense”, in Law and Human Behavior, 
2005, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 705–22. These studies used real judges, prosecutors or junior law-
yers as participants. Also, analyses of actual court files show similar data patterns, see for 
example, Eugenio Garrido Martin and Carmen Herrero Alonso, “Influence of the Prosecu-
tor’s Plea on the Judge’s Sentencing in Sexual Crimes: Hypothesis of the Theory of An-
choring by Tversky and Kahneman”, in Santiago Redondo, Vicente Garrido and Jorge Pe-
rez (eds.), in Advances in Psychology and Law: International Contributions, Walter de 
Gruyter, Berlin, 1997. 
94 Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack, “Playing Dice with Criminal Sentenc-
es: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making”, in Person-
ality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2006, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 188–200. 
95 See, for example, Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade and John W. Payne, “Juror Judgments in 
Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage 
Awards”, in Law and Human Behavior, 1999, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 445–70; John Malouff and 
Nicola S. Schutte, “Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage 
Amounts in Personal Injury Trials”, in Journal of Social Psychology, 1989, vol. 129, no. 4, 
pp. 491–97. 
96 However, several scholars have noted that language is an important part, for example, in 
constructing blame. See James Murphy, The Discursive Construction of Blame: the Lan-
guage of Public Inquiries, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2019; Lawrence M. Solan and 
Peter M. Tiersma, Speaking of Crime: The Language of Criminal Justice, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005; Mason Marianne, “The ‘Preparatory’ and ‘Argumentation’ 
Stages of Police Interrogation: A Linguistic Analysis of a Criminal Investigation”, in Lan-
guage and Communication, 2016, vol. 48, pp. 79–87. There is also research into the effect 
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search, as it would help answering whether it is motivated to speak not 
only of suspect-driven investigations but also of target-driven investiga-
tions, and the potentially more specific and/or larger problems associated 
with the latter type of investigation. 
Whereas the research on suspect-driven investigations taps in well 
with the search component of confirmation bias, it is largely silent about 
another equally, or sometimes even more important component, namely 
the evaluative component. Thus, the next section deals with how hypothe-
ses can make also the evaluation of evidence one-sided. 
7.2.2. Asymmetrical Scepticism 
Day after day, document by document, witness after witness, 
the ‘Prosecutor’s case’ has been revealed and exposed as a 
fragile, implausible theorem relying on shaky and doubtful 
bases, inspired by a Manichean and simplistic narrative of an 
Ivory Coast depicted as a ‘polarised’ society […] a carica-
tured ‘one-sided’ narrative […].97 
An effective mechanism that enables criminal investigators to maintain 
their hypothesis, even in the face of hypothesis inconsistent information, 
is so-called asymmetrical scepticism. 98 As implied by the terminology, 
this refers to how decision makers tend to uncritically approve of hypoth-
                                                                                                                        
of so-called ‘distorted terminology’ on closure of investigations into alleged torture and in-
human treatment, see Elizabeth Stubbins Bates, “Distorted Terminology: The UK’s Clo-
sure of Investigations into Alleged Torture and Inhuman Treatment in Iraq”, in Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2019, vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 719–39. 
97 Judge Cuno Tarfusser describing his observations in the Courtroom. See ICC, Situation in 
Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, 
Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 16 July 2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263-AnxA, para. 12 
(‘Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f6c6f3). 
98 Asymmetrical scepticism has been documented in a range of settings but in the legal con-
text the Swedish researchers Ask and Granhag were the first to use it in 2005. See, for ex-
ample, Karl Ask and Pär-Anders Granhag, “Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators 
Judgments of Witness Reliability”, in Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2007, vol. 37, 
no. 3, pp. 561–91. Marksteiner and colleagues summarise research examining investiga-
tors’ cognitive processing of criminal evidence, see Tamara Marksteiner, Karl Ask, Marc-
André Reinhard and Pär-Anders Granhag, “Asymmetrical Scepticism Towards Criminal 
Evidence: The Role of Goal- and Belief-Consistency”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
2011, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 541–47. For a review of this research see for example, Karl Ask 
and Laurence Alison, “Investigators’ Decision Making”, in Pär-Anders Granhag (ed.), Fo-
rensic Psychology in Context: Nordic and International Perspectives, Cullompton, Willan, 
2010, pp. 35–55. 
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esis-consistent information, whereas they critically scrutinise hypothesis 
inconsistent information.99 This happens even though the only difference 
between the pieces of information is their content (implications) rather 
than differences when it comes to, for example, source reliability or other 
factors that may, objectively, influence whether and to what extent the 
information should be trusted. In investigations where asymmetrical scep-
ticism is at play, the result can be one-sided narratives formed on the basis 
of insufficient evidence, similar to how Judge Tarfusser, in his concurring 
opinion, described the narrative presented by the prosecution in the ICC 
case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé.100 In 
its acquittal, the majority also presented criticism in relation to this narra-
tive,101 although to a lesser extent, while Judge Herrera Carbuccia consid-
ered the evidence sufficient for a conviction. 102 As manifested by the 
Prosecutor’s notice of appeal, the OTP disagrees with the majority on 
issues of substance and procedure and the case is currently in the appeal 
phase.103 
To illustrate the characteristics of asymmetrical scepticism as well 
as the research methodology used to study it, an example study is de-
scribed in the following.104 Criminal investigators were presented with a 
case vignette regarding a murder. The vignette indicated a certain female 
perpetrator but also opened up for the possibility of a male perpetrator (as 
implied by the statement of the suspected female perpetrator). The inves-
                                                   
99 Ask and Granhag, 2005, pp. 561–591, see above note 98. 
100 Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, para. 12, see above note 97. 
101 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo 
and Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Reasons for oral decision of 15 January 2019 on 
the Requête de la Défense de Laurent Gbagbo afin qu’un jugement d’acquittement portant 
sur toutes les charges soit prononcé en faveur de Laurent Gbagbo et que sa mise en liberté 
immédiate soit ordonnée, and on the Blé Goudé Defence no case to answer motion, 16 July 
2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/440017). 
102 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia, 10 
December 2018, ICC-02/11-01/15-1229-Anx (https://legal-tools.org/doc/39a71d). 
103 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo 
and Charles Blé Goudé, Appeals Chamber, Corrected version of “Prosecution Notice of 
Appeal”, 16 September 2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1270 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2d15e0). 
See also Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Time Extension for 
the Notice of Appeal and the Appeal Brief, 19 July 2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1268 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/949945). 
104 Ask and Granhag, 2005, pp. 561–91, see above note 98. 
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tigators were then informed about a witness who, at the time of the inci-
dent, had heard two loud voices from the apartment in which the female 
murder victim had been found. Without the investigators’ knowledge, they 
had been divided into two groups, one which received the incriminating 
version of the witness testimony, stating that the loud voices came from 
two females, and the other which received the exonerating version, stating 
that the loud voices came from one female and one male. Then, investiga-
tors were asked to rate how reliable and credible the witness was, as well 
as how favourable the background and witnessing conditions were. Even 
though all these factors were exactly the same for both groups, the inves-
tigators who received the incriminating version perceived of the witness 
as significantly more reliable and credible and also thought that the back-
ground and witnessing conditions were more favourable. 
There is no doubt that accurate assessments of witness reliability 
and credibility, both for insider witnesses and other witnesses, are often 
crucial in investigations of core international crimes,105 and the most re-
cent example of this is the ICC case of The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da. 106  Thus, the risk of asymmetrical scepticism in these assessments 
                                                   
105 For an empirical study on the assessments of insider witnesses specifically, see Gabriele 
Chlevickaite and Barbora Hola, “Empirical Study of Insider Witnesses’ Assessments at the 
International Criminal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol. 16, no. 4, 
pp. 673–702. 
106 ICC, Situation in The Democratic Republic of Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 8 July 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
80578a). In this case 102 witnesses were called by the prosecution, the defence and on be-
half of the victims (as well as the victims who testified as witnesses), regarding the situa-
tion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, also earlier cases highlight the 
need for accurate assessment of witness credibility. See, for example, Situation in the Cen-
tral African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musam-
ba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, ICC-
01/05-01/13. On 19 October 2016, Trial Chamber VII found the five accused guilty of var-
ious offences against the administration of justice related to the false testimonies of de-
fence witnesses in another case before the ICC: ICC, Situation in the Central African Re-
public, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 19 October 2016, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-
Red (https://legal-tools.org/doc/fe0ce4). On 8 March 2018, the Appeals Chamber rejected 
the appeals submitted by the five accused against their conviction. It confirmed the convic-
tions in respect of most of the charges. However, it acquitted Mr. Bemba, Mr. Kilolo and 
Mr. Mangenda of the charge of presenting evidence that a party knows is false or forged 
(ICC Statute, Article 70(1)(b), finding that this provision only applies to the presentation of 
documentary evidence, not to the calling of witnesses, as in the case at hand, see above 
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should be noted. More specifically, this constitutes a risk that criteria used 
for reliability and credibility assessments are differently applied depend-
ing on whether the witness statement is consistent or inconsistent with a 
case hypothesis. For a hypothesis-consistent witness statement, factors 
such as the time that has passed since the incident, whether the witness 
has suffered trauma, the relationship to the accused, possible bias against 
the accused and motives for telling the truth or lying107 would be per-
ceived as less problematic, compared to a hypothesis inconsistent witness 
statement. 108 Just like in the example study outlined above, this could 
happen even if the hypothesis-consistent and inconsistent statements were 
identical save for, for example, whom the witness identified as the perpe-
trator. 
The example study, together with replications in other legal set-
tings109 and for other types of assessments,110 suggest that asymmetrical 
scepticism is more pronounced in relation to so-called elastic evidence, 
that is, evidence in relation to which there is a wide range of possible sub-
jective interpretations that can be justified.111 For instance, witness evi-
                                                                                                                        
note 8). The convictions and acquittals in relation to the accused are now final, see ICC, 
Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Nar-
cisse Arido, Case Information Sheet, September 2018, ICC-PIDS-CIS-CAR-02-
014/18_Eng (https://legal-tools.org/doc/33n2us). 
107 These factors were applied in for example, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 106 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/677866); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. 
Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial Chamber, Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 
21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, paras. 202, 229 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
edb0cf); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3436-tENG, 7 March 2014, para. 85 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f74b4f); ICC, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial 
Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Court, 18 December 2012, ICC-01/04-
02/12-3-tENG, para. 51 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2c2cde). 
108 What more specific criteria are being used to assess reliability and credibility can of course 
vary between investigation and trial phases. 
109 Rassin, Eerland and Kuijpers, 2010, pp. 231–46, see above note 30. 
110 Lauren Alison, Matthew Smith and Keith Morgan, “Interpreting the Accuracy of Offender 
Profiles”, in Psychology, Crime and Law, 2003, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 185–95. 
111 Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius and Pär-Anders Granhag, “The ‘Elasticity’ of Criminal Evidence: 
A Moderator of Investigator Bias”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2008, vol. 22, no. 9, 
pp. 1245–59. See also Karl Ask, Marc-Andre Reinhard, Tamara Marksteiner and Pär-
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dence is on average more elastic than DNA evidence. However, it can be 
noted that also DNA evidence and other types of forensic evidence, re-
gardless of their scientific foundation, do have relatively strong elastic 
elements when it comes to the formulation of criminal responsibility (for 
example, because DNA on a crime scene can have many other explana-
tions than a criminal act). 
Thus, apart from witness evidence, the research regarding asymmet-
rical scepticism may also have implications for other types of evidence, 
which are assessed after the formulation of a case hypothesis. Clearly, re-
evaluating the case hypothesis in the light of new evidence is an important 
part of the investigation cycle.112 However, if decision makers are asym-
metrically sceptical in relation to evidence that contradicts the case hy-
pothesis, this would make them unwilling to make the necessary updates. 
Certainly, not any single piece of hypothesis inconsistent evidence will 
justify that a case hypothesis is changed. This is in line with reactions to 
anomalous data in scientific research, where the usual strategy is to first 
challenge the data (for example, by explaining it with methodological 
flaws) because it contradicts lots of other data. This approach may be ra-
tional at the outset, but can soon become irrational if theories are main-
tained even in the face of accumulated anomalous data. 
Thus, in line with Kuhn’s suggestion, when a scientist faces anoma-
lies, that is, evidence that are inconsistent with a paradigm (basic beliefs 
about entities in the world), the initial reaction is not to abandon the para-
digm but rather to view the anomalies as problems to be solved or some-
how accommodate within the paradigm.113 It is only when anomalies ac-
cumulate over time that they may come to be seen as counter-instances, 
which in the long run may lead to a paradigm shift. In scientific research, 
finding more anomalous data, which may eventually lead to a ‘paradigm 
shift’, is not necessarily dependent on the workings of one single individ-
ual or group of individuals, as virtually any researcher or group of re-
                                                                                                                        
Anders Granhag, “Elasticity in Evaluations of Criminal Evidence: Exploring the Role of 
Cognitive Dissonance”, in Legal and Criminological Psychology, 2011, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 
289–306; Marksteiner, Ask, Reinhard and Granhag, 2011, pp. 541–47, see above note 98. 
112 Markus Eikel, “Nature and Use of Investigation Plans at the International Criminal Court”, 
CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190223-
eikel/). 
113 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1962. 
7. Confirmation Bias in Investigations of Core International Crimes: 
Risk Factors and Quality Control Techniques 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 487 
searchers may decide to conduct studies with the potential of obtaining 
such data.114 Yet, if an inquiry leader or a group of criminal investigators 
decide that the anomalous data does not render any further inquiry neces-
sary, it is unlikely that someone else will. The exception from this is if the 
defence has both a procedural right to insight into the investigation and 
sufficient resources to undertake its own investigation. In this regard it 
can be noted that many defence counsels have commented that: 
[W]hatever their legal background and professional experi-
ence, they are often insufficiently equipped to meet the chal-
lenges posed by Defence investigations, in both practical and 
ethical terms.115 
This, in turn, may mean that not enough anomalous data will be 
presented to justify an update of the case hypothesis, even if such anoma-
lous data exists. In line with this, and the prosecutor’s duty to investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally, it seems appropriate 
to set the threshold for changing case hypotheses in criminal investiga-
tions lower than a ‘paradigm shift’. Even if it is unreasonable to change 
case hypothesis on the basis of any hypothesis inconsistent evidence, it is 
vital that such evidence is evaluated in a balanced manner as this may 
result in the allocation of investigative resources into another or supple-
mentary line of inquiry. This can, in due time, give reason to update (or 
maintain) the original case hypothesis. Apart from promoting accuracy, 
this is also in the interest of procedural fairness. Any evidence discovered 
                                                   
114 However, since scientific journals are sometimes unwilling to publish null results, it is not 
certain that such anomalous data will be communicated to other researchers, which high-
lights another potential type of bias. For more on this topic see, for example, Robert 
Rosenthal, “The ‘File Drawer Problem’ and Tolerance for Null Results”, in Psychological 
Bulletin, 1979, vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 638–41; Hannah Rothstein, Alexander J. Sutton and Mi-
chael Borenstein, Publication Bias in Meta-Analysis, Wiley, 2005, pp. 1–7; Lidén, 2018, p. 
63, see above note 2. 
115 Defence Office of STL (ed.), Practitioner’s Handbook on Defence Investigations in Inter-
national Criminal Trials, Leidschendam, 2017, p. 9. A related problem, that suspects of 
rape have insufficient assistance from legal counsel has been addressed in the documentary 
“Justice for Sale”, by Ilse van Velzen and Femke van Velzen, which deals with struggles 
for fair trials and due process of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the doc-
umentary, this problem is explained by that ‘the struggle against sexual violence’ has large-
ly favoured the plaintiffs who, unlike the suspects, do receive adequate legal representation. 
This is believed to result in rape convictions without concrete evidence, like in the case of 
the soldier Masamba. For more on this documentary see IFproductions, “Justice for Sale”, 
2011 (available on its web site). 
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at a late point in time (which could have been discovered earlier) and 
which, due to its nature, requires a change of a case theory, can make the 
defence perceive of the allegations as ‘radically altered’116. This was the 
situation in the Kenyatta case, where the defence reacted in relation to the 
large number of witnesses identified only after the confirmation hear-
ing.117 Thus, there is a reciprocal action between a suspect-driven investi-
gation and asymmetrical scepticism. If investigators primarily search for 
and find hypothesis-consistent information, this will make any hypothesis 
inconsistent evidence appear less important and therefore met with more 
scepticism. If such evidence is met with more scepticism, it is unlikely 
that alternative lines of inquiries will be carefully examined, with the re-
sult that the original case hypothesis is maintained. 
Since logical consistency between a hypothesis and evidence does 
not necessarily exclude the possibility that the evidence can also be con-
sistent, or even more consistent, with other hypotheses, it is difficult or 
even logically impossible to evaluate a theory in isolation. In any context 
where there is a limit to the number of hypotheses that are being tested, 
there will always be some uncertainty.118 This issue is sometimes referred 
to as underdetermination. 119  In essence, this means that perhaps it is 
                                                   
116 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Defence, Observations on the Conduct, Extent and Impact of the 
Prosecution’s Investigation and Disclosure on the Defence’s Ability to Prepare for Trial, 20 
February 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-655-Corr, para. 11 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c8c5e9). 
117 Although the Chamber in large part rejected this assertion since the prosecution is not 
required to rely on the same evidence at trial that it had already during the confirmation 
process, it nevertheless expressed concern regarding the “substantial volume of new evi-
dence that was gathered by the Prosecution” after confirmation. See ICC, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial Chamber, Decision on 
Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, 26 April 2013, ICC-
01/09-02/11-728, para. 112 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/da5089). The Chamber also intro-
duced the requirement that all investigations that reasonably could have been completed 
before confirmation must be and that the Defence will have remedies available in respect 
to failures to do so. See, ibid., para. 121. 
118 This was pointed out already by Karl Popper who suggested that, logically speaking, con-
firmation of deductive inferences merely establishes that the hypothesis is not rejected, not 
that it is confirmed, see Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson & Co, 
Vienna, 1959. In other words, consistency with a hypothesis does not establish the truth of 
the hypothesis. 
119 Whereas some refer to this as underdetermination, others refer to it as the fallacy of affirm-
ing the consequent. For more on this see for example, Robert W. Proctor and John E. Ca-
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equally likely that some other hypothesis or several hypotheses in combi-
nation better explain the result. A given body of data (or evidence) can in 
fact be compatible with an infinite number of theories and therefore be 
explained in many ways. The acknowledgment of this issue and the fact 
that it is usually impossible to evaluate all alternative hypotheses, have, in 
scientific research, resulted in attempts to ensure that a chosen hypothesis 
explains the evidence better than other propositions, a way of reasoning 
referred to as inference to the best explanation (‘IBE’).120 The IBE has 
clear similarities with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and 
the criminal investigation should, preferably, contribute to the testing of 
alternative hypotheses required for the application of this standard. 121 
Importantly, and as implied by the usage of reasonable in the standard of 
proof, this does not entail pure speculation but fair or rational hypotheses. 
As explained by The ICC Appeals Chamber in the al-Bashir decision 
(concerning the arrest warrant), the “requiring that the existence of geno-
cidal intent must be the only reasonable conclusion amounts to requiring 
the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to elimi-
nate any reasonable doubt”. 122 Thus, even though there is no inherent 
contradiction between working on the basis of a case hypothesis and re-
maining open to alternative hypotheses, it is crucial to be attentive to the 
risk that the case hypothesis spell-bounds the investigators without them 
being aware of it, and thereby also dictates the investigation. 
So far, the potential influence of a hypothesis has been discussed in 
relation to how information is sought and evaluated, on a general level, 
during criminal investigations. In practice, these general trends will inter-
act with the results of more specific investigative measures, such as foren-
                                                                                                                        
paldi, Why Science Matters: Understanding the Methods of Psychological Research, 
Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2005, pp. 65–66, 122–25. 
120 The IBE is a basic point of scientific reasoning, stemming from Popper, 1959, see above 
note 118. Since then it has been developed by several authors within theory of science such 
as Gilbert G. Harman, “The Inference to the Best Explanation”, in The Philosophical Re-
view, 1965, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 88–95. 
121 The connection between the IBE and the beyond all reasonable doubt standard has been 
pointed out by several legal scholars for example, Klamberg, 2011, pp. 2–3, see above note 
34; Lidén, 2018, p. 38, see above note 2. 
122 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Ap-
peals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, 
3 February 2010, ICC-02/05-01/09-73, para. 33 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/9ada8e). 
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sic investigation and analyses, and this interaction is particularly interest-
ing provided that such investigations can also be tainted by case hypothe-
ses. 
7.2.3. Specific Investigative Settings 
7.2.3.1. Forensic Investigation and Analyses 
Justice will only reach the highest level of effectiveness if it 
relies on the best scientific evidence.123 
Although forensic evidence is usually considered the ‘gold standard’ in 
criminal cases,124 a growing body of research illustrates the risk of con-
firmation bias in the information processing of both crime scene investi-
gators (‘CSIs’) and forensic analysts. For instance, some studies suggest 
that a case hypothesis can dictate how a crime scene investigation is con-
ducted and therefore also its results.125 CSIs who, before entering a mock 
crime scene where a deceased woman was found, received different kinds 
of prior information (history of domestic violence or documented suicide 
risk or no information at all) secured different types and numbers of traces 
and also made different assessments regarding the most likely scenario.126 
More specifically, CSIs in the respective groups secured evidence and 
made assessments that were consistent with the prior information they 
received. For instance, CSIs who received information about a document-
ed suicide risk were more likely to miss that the deceased victim had a 
hair from another person on her body. Thus, the CSIs ways of working 
were influenced by their expectations of what they would find. This influ-
ence can, in turn, result in that only or primarily evidence which confirms 
a hypothesis is secured and sent off for forensic analyses, whereas evi-
                                                   
123 Professor Duarte Nuno Vieira, cited in ICC OTP, “The Scientific Advisory Board of the 
Office of the Prosecutor holds its 5th Annual Meeting”, 8 August 2018, ICC-OTP-
20180808-PR1401 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c6d45e). 
124 See, for example, Michael Lynch, “God’s Signature: DNA Profiling, the New Gold Stand-
ard in Forensic Science”, in Endeavour, 2003, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 93–97. 
125 Claire A.J. van den Eeden, Christianne J. de Poot and Peter J. van Koppen, “Forensic 
Expectations: Investigating a Crime Scene with Prior Information”, in Science and Justice, 
2016, vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 475–81. See also Claire A.J. van den Eeden, Christianne J. de Poot 
and Peter J. van Koppen, “From Emergency Call to Crime Scene: Information Transfer-
ence in the Criminal Investigation”, in Forensic Science Policy and Management: An In-
ternational Journal, 2017, vol. 8, nos. 3–4, pp. 79–89. 
126 van den Eeden, de Poot and van Koppen, 2016, pp. 475–81, see above note 125. 
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dence likely to disconfirm or challenge the hypothesis remains undetected 
or un-prioritised. 
When forensic analysts conduct their examinations, they may have 
more or less knowledge of what the case hypothesis is and the associated 
contextual information, for example, what other evidence is available. 
Research into the so-called forensic confirmation bias127 has highlighted 
the need to carefully evaluate what information is made available to the 
analysts. This is because contextual information, for example, that a sus-
pect confessed or was identified by a witness, seems to bias the analysts’ 
judgments so that they are more likely to confirm the conclusion implicat-
ed by the contextual information. The forensic confirmation bias has been 
documented in relation to fingerprint analysis, 128  comparisons of shoe 
prints,129 bite marks,130 bullets131 and handwriting samples.132 It has also 
been noted in bloodstain pattern analysis (BPA), 133 dog detection evi-
dence,134 evaluations of skeletal remains,135 arson investigations,136 foren-
                                                   
127 Saul Kassin, Itiel E. Dror and Jeff Kukucka, “The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, 
Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions”, in Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 2013, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 42–52. 
128 Nikola K. Osborne and Rachel Zajac, “An Imperfect Match? Crime-related Context Influ-
ences Fingerprint Decisions”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2016, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 
126–34. 
129 José H. Kerstholt, Roos Paashuis and Marjan Sjerps, “Shoe Print Examinations: Effects of 
Expectation, Complexity and Experience”, in Forensic Science International, 2007, vol. 
165, no. 1, pp. 30–34. 
130 Nikola K. Osborne, Sally Woods, Jules Kieser and Rachel Zajac, “Does Contextual Infor-
mation Bias Bitemark Comparisons?”, in Science and Justice, 2014, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 
267–73. 
131 José H. Kerstholt, Aletta Eikelboom, Tjisse Dijkman, Reinoud Stoel, Rob Hermsen and 
Bert van Leuven, “Does Suggestive Information Cause a Confirmation Bias in Bullet 
Comparisons?”, in Forensic Science International, vol. 198, nos. 1–3, pp. 138–42. 
132 Jeff Kukucka and Saul Kassin, “Do Confessions Taint Perceptions of Handwriting Evi-
dence? An Empirical Test of the Forensic Confirmation Bias”, in Law and Human Behav-
ior, 2014, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 1–15. 
133 Nikola K. Osborne, Rachel Zajac and Michael C. Taylor, “Bloodstain Pattern Analysis and 
Contextual Bias”, in Allan Jamieson and Andre Moenssens (eds.), Wiley Encyclopedia of 
Forensic Science, John Wiley & Sons, 2015, pp. 1–8. 
134 Lisa Lit, Julie B. Schweitzer and Anita M. Oberbauer, “Handler Beliefs Affect Scent De-
tection Dog Outcomes”, in Animal Cognition, 2011, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 387–94. Also, since 
the ultimate determination that an alert has been signalled by the dog rests solely with the 
human handler, the process is highly dependent on human judgments and therefore also 
potentially fallible in this regard, see Sherri Minhinnick, “Statistical Reliability Confound-
ers and Improvement in Advanced Dog Training: Patterns, Routines, Targets, Alerts, Dis-
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sic pathology137 and a range of forensic reconstructions.138 Furthermore, 
early research outlines risks of bias in digital forensics,139 that is, how 
contextual information such as inferences made by others 140  or infor-
mation found on a digital device (for example, Internet search logs),141 
influence the digital forensics practitioners’ (DFP) perceptions of images, 
documents or chat conversations found on the same digital device. This, 
as well as other research,142 also points to the importance of so-called 
                                                                                                                        
tractors, Reinforcement, and Other Issues”, in Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, L.E. 
Papet (eds.), Canine Olfaction Science and Law: Advances in Forensic Science, Medicine, 
Conservation, and Environmental Remediation, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2016, pp. 197–
212. 
135 Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, Ian Hanson and Nathalie Dozzi, “The Power of Contextual Effects 
in Forensic Anthropology: A Study of Biasability in the Visual Interpretations of Trauma 
Analysis on Skeletal Remains”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2014, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 
1177–83; Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, Ruth M. Morgan, Carolyn Rando and Itiel E. Dror, “Cas-
cading Bias of Initial Exposure to Information at the Crime Scene to the Subsequent Eval-
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403–11. 
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64, no. 2, pp. 342–52. 
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adversarial allegiance, that is, that forensics’ observations and conclu-
sions may be influenced by whether they work for (or believe they work 
for) the prosecution or the defence.143 
Interestingly, contextual information seems to result in both within 
expert biasability, that is, the same experts make different assessments in 
relation to the same evidence when provided with different contextual 
information at different points in time, and between expert biasability, that 
is, different experts assessing the same evidence make different assess-
ments when they have different contextual information.144 When it comes 
to within expert biasability specifically, experts that in the past had con-
cluded that fingerprints matched, were presented with the same finger-
prints again, now within the context that “someone else confessed to the 
crime” or that “the suspect has a solid alibi”.145 These experts changed 
their conclusions between 17 per cent and 80 per cent of the time. Similar-
ly, in another study, experts were shown fingerprints and told that the 
prints were from a highly publicised erroneous identification, suggesting 
that the fingerprints in front of them were an exclusion.146 However, the 
fingerprints were, in fact, not only matches but also matches made by the 
same experts that were now being tested. Although the experts were in-
structed to ignore all the contextual information and to focus solely on the 
actual prints, most of the experts (80 per cent) seem to have been affected 
                                                                                                                        
Expert Witnesses”, in Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2015, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 
37–55. 
143 Murrie, Boccaccini, Turner, Meeks, Woods and Tussey, 2009, pp. 19–53, see above note 
142. It also occurred when experts’ beliefs about for whom they were working (defence or 
prosecution) were manipulated, see Daniel C. Murrie, Marcus T. Boccaccini, Lucy A. 
Guarnera and Katrina A. Rufino, “Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side that Retained 
Them?”, in Psychological Science, 2013, vol. 24, no. 10, pp. 1889–97. 
144 These terms stem from Itiel Dror’s so-called ‘hierarchy of expert performance’, a frame-
work for systematically evaluating the biasability as well as reliability of experts, primarily 
forensic experts, see Itiel E. Dror, “A Hierarchy of Expert Performance”, in Journal of Ap-
plied Research in Memory and Cognition, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 121–27. This framework has 
also been used, for example, for forensic psychological assessments, see Itiel E. Dror and 
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Assessments”, in Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 2018, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 11–23. 
145 Itiel E. Dror and David Charlton, “Why Experts Make Errors”, in Journal of Forensic 
Identification, 2007, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 600–16; Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton and Alisa E. 
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by the contextual information, as they made decisions that were incon-
sistent with their own previous decisions regarding the same prints. Fur-
thermore, between expert biasability has been noted for instance when 
two DNA experts assessed a DNA-mixture in an actual adjudicated gang 
rape case, knowing that one of the assailants testified against another sus-
pect as part of a plea bargain and that, without corroborating evidence, the 
plea bargain would be deemed inadmissible in Court.147 These two ex-
perts concluded that the suspect in question could not be excluded from 
being a contributor to the DNA mixture. Their conclusion was later on 
contradicted by 16 out of 17 experts who examined the same DNA mix-
ture, but without the biasing information.148 Later research suggests that 
the noted differences are due to that the observations leading up to the 
conclusions varied in relation to the previous examination.149 Similarly, 
fingerprint analysts examining the same fingerprints mark different minu-
tia (characteristics such as enclosures, ridge endings and bifurcations) as 
relevant and also come to different conclusions regarding their clarity.150 
This highlights how the bias drives the experts to selectively attend to 
hypothesis confirming features of the evidence. These findings are con-
sistent with decades of psychological research on selective visual atten-
tion151 and the drive for cognitive coherence,152 that is, to make sense of 
information, which is sometimes both complex and ambiguous, by mak-
ing it coherent. The results also draw attention to the more specific per-
ceptual processes involved in making visual comparisons, where studies 
suggest that variables such as low image quality (for example, low inten-
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sity or contrast information and low information quantity, for example, the 
total fingerprint area), are important predictors of error.153 
The above-described findings highlight the necessity to take human 
factors into account also in forensic sciences that are often portrayed as 
objective and immune to bias.154 Although information that someone con-
fessed or has a solid alibi clearly is relevant in relation to an overall case 
hypothesis, it obviously does not change the characteristics of the finger-
prints to be compared or the DNA-mixture to analyse. Although such in-
formation is logically separated from the forensic evidence, it is clear that 
this separation is difficult to maintain in practice. This highlights the risks 
of so-called bias cascade effects155 and bias snowball effects.156 The bias 
cascade effect is when bias arises as a result of irrelevant information cas-
cading from one stage to another, for example, from the initial evidence 
collection to the evaluation and interpretation of the evidence. For in-
stance, in some jurisdictions, the CSIs are the same people who also do 
the forensic work back in the laboratory. In such cases, the analysis, eval-
uations, interpretations, and conclusions at the forensic laboratory may be 
influenced by irrelevant contextual information that analysts or CSIs may 
have been exposed to at the crime scene (and which may have biased 
them already during the crime scene investigation). With the bias snow-
ball effect, bias is not only cascading from one stage to another, but bias 
increases as irrelevant information from a variety of sources is integrated 
and influences each other.157 The issue is not only that forensic work can 
be biased by other sources (for example, that a suspect has confessed) but 
also that it can bias other lines of evidence. For instance, a DNA match 
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Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2017, vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 541–47. 
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can bias a forensic analyst who is examining a bite mark. Also, an eyewit-
ness may be influenced by knowing about forensic evidence implicating 
the suspect, and in turn, then the eyewitness can influence the interpreta-
tion of other evidence.158 
The research discussed above has not taken into account the specif-
ics of forensic evidence in investigations of core international crimes. It is 
unknown whether such forensic assessments or analyses are associated 
with other types of cognitive errors, but this possibility deserves more 
attention, not the least considering that such evidence has to be interpreted 
in the light of the very complex legal elements (material as well as mental) 
required for criminal responsibility. 159  The existing research points to 
some possible risk factors, for example, when it comes to analyses which 
fundamentally depend on visual judgments and which are conducted by 
analysts with contextual knowledge. In these situations, the contextual 
information is likely to steer analysts’ attention to some aspects of an item 
or document, and so on, rather than others. This, in turn, makes them per-
ceive of it differently than what would have been the case if they had no 
information at all, or information indicating something else. Possible out-
lets for this could be crime pattern analysis used most commonly in in-
vestigations of large-scale killings, mass destruction and displacement.160 
Such pattern analysis is essential since international crimes often com-
prise a large number of incidents that can only be characterised as a pat-
tern if they share certain common features (relating to the perpetrators, 
victims, geographical and chronological distribution, and so on).161 This 
stems from the material constructions of the crimes, for example, for gen-
ocide by killing, that the “conduct took place in the context of a manifest 
pattern of similar conduct”.162 In this aggregation of multiple incidents 
into a (potential) pattern, there is, just like with other complex cognitive 
                                                   
158 Ibid. 
159 See, for instance, Werle Gerhard and Florian Jeßberger, Principles of International Crimi-
nal Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2005, pp. 165–286. 
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dence and Analysis for International Cases”, in Law and Social Inquiry, 2010, vol. 35, no. 
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tasks, ample room for bias.163 This is because human cognition is driven 
by expectations in so-called top down processes164 and also strives to-
wards cognitive coherence.165 Some related tendencies are the clustering 
illusion, that is, how people tend to perceive of random clusters in small 
samples as non-random,166 and pareidolia, a tendency to project some-
thing not actually present onto a vague object.167 Such tendencies influ-
ence the perception of whether there is a pattern at all, and also what that 
pattern is, with a good head start for what the analyst expects to see. Rea-
sonably, this risk should be considered both in relation to data collection, 
that is, crime mapping used to identify ‘hot spots’ or areas with highest 
concentrations of crime168 and in relation to the actual analysis of the da-
ta,169 including, for example, analysis of satellite imagery.170 
Furthermore, other types of assessments in investigations of core in-
ternational crimes, which resemble those already studied, are, for example, 
the testing of the authenticity of documents using chemical tests,171 and 
                                                   
163 For more on this research see the previous section in this chapter and Lidén, 2018, pp. 
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physical evidence from exhumations of mass graves.172 Based on previous 
research, the most reasonable prediction is that also these assessments are 
sensitive to contextual information. Hence, it is motivated to do a critical 
analysis of the flow of information, focusing on what analysts need to 
know to conduct their analyses as well as what information may potential-
ly bias their assessments. In this regard, it can be noted that international 
investigations are often preceded by inquiries made by fact-finding com-
missions or bodies,173 which are potential sources of biasing contextual 
information.174 Although the prevalence of confirmation bias in forensic 
analyses is, by far, the most well-researched area, there are also studies 
regarding confirmation bias in other specific investigative settings, name-
ly identifications and interviews, which are summarised below. 
7.2.3.2. Identifications and Interviews 
The most common purpose of conducting a line-up identification is to test 
whether a witness can identify a suspect as the perpetrator. In other words, 
the line-up aims to test the guilt hypothesis and the validity of this test is 
strongly related to how it is carried out. One of the most notorious cases 
of mistaken identity in legal history is that of ‘Ivan the Terrible’ of Tre-
blinka.175 There are also more recent examples of line-up identifications 
that national courts have considered more or less void of evidentiary value 
due to how they were conducted, including the identification of a suspect-
                                                   
172 Exhumations of mass graves were conducted for instance for the Srebrenica and Kosovo 
ICTY investigations, see ibid., p. 360. 
173 For instance, this was the case with ICTY and the previous fact-finding UN Commission 
of Experts, see MICT, “The Tribunal – Establishment” (available on its web site) and the 
ICC investigation in Darfur (The UN Commission of Inquiry), see for example, Samuel 
Totten, “The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: New and Disturbing 
Findings”, in Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2009, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 354–78. 
174 See also Jason M. Chin, Gianni Ribeiro and Alicia Rairden, “Open Forensic Science”, in 
Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 2019, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1–34. Chin and colleagues 
emphasise the need for transparency in how forensic analyses are conducted. Furthermore, 
they point to communication problems between scientific experts and legal experts for ex-
ample, because legal experts lack the scientific training that they would need in order to 
appropriately question forensic practices. 
175 Lawrence Douglas, The Right Wrong Man: John Demjanjuk and the Last Great Nazi War 
Crimes Trial, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016, pp. 36–38. 
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ed murderer of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme.176 Although there 
are lots of possible psychological explanations of this, 177 confirmation 
bias seems to have an important role. For instance, studies suggest that 
when an administrator of a line-up is aware of the suspect’s identity this 
information seems to be subtly transferred to the witness who is more 
likely to identify the suspect as the perpetrator, compared to when the 
administrator is unaware of the suspect’s identity.178 This so-called hy-
pothesis leakage 179  happens without the administrator’s awareness of 
communicating any information to the witness. Its impact varies with the 
witness’ susceptibility to leading information,180 and whether the adminis-
trator also uses verbal cues like leading questions that direct attention to a 
certain person in the line-up181 and/or non-verbal cues like facial gestures 
(rolling the eyes, smiling) or body movements (moving toward or away 
from the witness, nodding the head).182 
Furthermore, research implies that confirmation bias may be at play 
in suspect interviews, as a result of expectations that the suspect is 
                                                   
176 For more on this, see the Swedish Government Official Reports, Brottsutredningen efter 
Mordet på Statsminister Olof Palme: Granskningskommissionens Betänkande, Stockholm, 
1999, SOU 1999:88, pp. 727–37. 
177 There is a range of factors that potentially can bias the outcome of a line-up identification 
including for example, improperly chosen foils and simultaneous rather than sequential 
presentation formats. For more on this see, for example, Roderick Cameron L. Lindsay, 
Harold Wallbridge and Daphne Drennan, “Do Clothes Make the Man? An Exploration of 
the Effect of Lineup Attire on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy”, in Canadian Journal 
of Behavioural Science, 1987, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 463–78; Nancy Steblay, Jennifer Dysart, 
Solomon Fulero and Roderick Cameron L. Lindsay, “Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Se-
quential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison”, in Law 
and Human Behavior, 2001, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 459–73. 
178 See, for example, Mark R. Philips, Bradley D. McAuliff, Margaret Bull Kovera and Brian 
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Bias”, in Journal of Applied Psychology, 1999, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 940–51; Ryann M. Haw 
and Ronald P. Fisher, “Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identifica-
tion Accuracy”, in Journal of Applied Psychology, 2004, vol. 89, no. 6, pp. 1106–12. 
179 Sarah M. Greathouse and Margaret Bull Kovera, “Instruction Bias and Lineup Presentation 
Moderate the Effects of Administration Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification”, in Law 
and Human Behavior, 2009, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 71. 
180 See, for example, Gillian Murphy and Clara M. Greene, “Perceptual Load Affects Eyewit-
ness Accuracy and Susceptibility to Leading Questions”, in Frontiers in Psychology, 2016, 
vol. 7, 2016, pp. 1–10. 
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guilty,183 for example, due to a previous apprehension.184 The bias is here 
manifested in that the interviewer asks more guilt-presumptive questions 
and perceives of the suspect’s statement as less credible. Guilt expecta-
tions seem to set in motion a process of behavioural confirmation influ-
encing not only the interviewers’ behaviours but also those of the sus-
pects.185 For outside observers, suspects who were interviewed by inter-
viewers with guilt expectations appeared to be more nervous, more defen-
sive, less plausible and therefore more likely to be guilty. Furthermore, 
guilt expectations potentiate the risk of confrontational or manipulative 
interrogations186 and nonstrategic use of evidence.187 In this regard, it can 
be noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber, when declining to confirm the charg-
es against Callixte Mbarushimana in the Democratic Republic of the Con-
go situation, expressed concern regarding interview techniques that 
“seem[ed] utterly inappropriate when viewed in the light of the objective 
set out in Article 54 (1)(a) ICC Statute, to establish the truth by “investi-
gating incriminating and exoneration circumstances equally””.188 Similar-
ly, in witness interviews, when the interviewer believes that the suspect is 
guilty, this belief is more or less subtly transferred to witnesses, for exam-
ple, through disclosure of suggestive information (such as a suspect’s con-
                                                   
183 Guilt expectations were manipulated by providing different base rates of guilt and inno-
cence, see Saul M. Kassin, Christine C. Goldstein and Kenneth Savitsky, “Behavioral Con-
firmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt”, in Law and 
Human Behavior, 2003, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 187–203; Carol Hill, Amina Memon and Peter 
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tion”, in Legal and Criminological Psychology, 2008, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 357–71. 
184 Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, pp. 336–54, see above note 46. 
185 Hill, Memon and McGeorge, 2008, pp. 357–71, see above note 183. 
186 Deborah Davis and Richard A. Leo, “Strategies for Preventing False Confessions and their 
Consequences”, in Mark R. Kebbell and Graham M. Davies (eds.), Practical Psychology 
for Forensic Investigations and Prosecutions, Wiley & Sons, San Francisco, 2006, pp. 
121–49; Richard A. Leo and Steven A. Drizin, “The Three Errors: Pathways to False Con-
fession and Wrongful Conviction”, in Daniel Lassiter and Christian A. Meissner (eds.), Po-
lice Interrogations and False Confessions: Current Research, Practice, and Policy Rec-
ommendations, American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., 2010, pp. 9–30. 
187 Maria Hartwig, Pär-Anders Granhag, Leif A. Strömwall and Aldert Vrij, “Detecting De-
ception via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence”, in Law and Human Behavior, 2005, vol. 29, 
no. 4, pp. 469–84; Saul M. Kassin, “On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence 
Put Innocents at Risk?”, in American Psychologist, 2005, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 215–28. 
188 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 
2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, para. 51 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/63028f). 
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fession) or leading questions that may make the witness (including alibi 
witnesses) adjust his or her account making it consistent with the police’s 
belief.189 Suggestibility may be more pronounced in vulnerable victims.190 
7.3. Explanations of Confirmation Bias and Possible Debiasing 
Techniques 
The term confirmation bias is descriptive, that is, a name of a behaviour, 
not an explanation of that behaviour.191 This is a crucial distinction since 
only studying the behaviour will not provide information about why it 
occurs. Yet, understanding why confirmation bias occurs is an essential 
step in understanding how it, potentially, can be prevented. In the follow-
ing, the explanations of confirmation bias identified through empirical 
research have been categorised into three main groups: 1) cognitive ex-
planations, 2) emotional and motivational explanations, and 3) social and 
organisational explanations. Since humans do not only have cognitive 
limitations but are also emotional creatures that work within social groups 
as well as organisational settings, these explanations are to be considered 
mutually supportive rather than mutually exclusive. 
7.3.1. Cognitive Explanations 
Over the course of 248 days of hearing, the Chamber heard 
102 witnesses called by the Prosecution, the Defence and on 
behalf of the victims. 1791 items were admitted into evi-
                                                   
189 See, for example, Lisa E. Hasel and Saul M. Kassin, “On the Presumption of Evidentiary 
Independence: Can Confessions Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications?”, in Psychological 
Science, 2009, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 122–26; Saul M. Kassin, Daniel Bogart and Jacqueline 
Kerner, “Confessions that Corrupt: Evidence from the DNA Exoneration Case Files”, in 
Psychological Science, 2012, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 41–45; Martine Powell, Maryanne Garry 
and Neil Brewer, “Eyewitness Testimony”, in Ian Freckelton and Hugh Selby (eds.), Ex-
pert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy, Law Book Co., North Ryde, 2009, 
pp. 1–42; Amanda H. Waterman, Mark Blades and Christopher Spencer, “Indicating When 
You Do Not Know the Answer: The Effect of Question Format and Interviewer 
Knowledge on Children’s ‘Don’t Know’ Responses”, in British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 2004, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 335–48; Jessica Sparling, David A. Wilder, Jennifer 
Kondash, Megan Boyle and Megan Compton, “Effects of Interviewer Behavior on Accu-
racy of Children’s Responses”, in Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 2011, vol. 44, no. 
3, pp. 587–92. 
190 Although individual differences should not be disregarded, see for example, Kim Drake 
and Ray Bull, “Individual Differences in Interrogative Suggestibility: Life Adversity and 
Field Dependence”, in Psychology, Crime and Law, 2011, vol. 17, no. 8, pp. 677–87. 
191 For more on this see Lidén, 2018, pp. 106–08, see above note 2. 
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dence and 2129 victims have been authorised to participate 
in this trial, and in addition to several victims testifying as 
witnesses before the Chamber, five further victims presented 
their views and concerns in person.192 
Cognition refers to human information processing, including perception, 
memory, thought and language.193 Decision making primarily falls within 
the subcategory of thought, but is also closely related to other subcatego-
ries since humans, for instance, have to use information stored in memory 
to make decisions.194 All humans have limitations in cognitive capacities 
(for example, in working memory capacity and attention), and these limi-
tations can separately or together influence the susceptibility to confirma-
tion bias.195 This is because the limitations simply make it too cognitively 
demanding to seriously consider more than one hypothesis at the time.196 
Thus, studies suggest that confirmation bias is stronger in relation to cog-
nitively more demanding tasks.197 
As exemplified by the citation from the Ntaganda case at the begin-
ning of this section, investigations into core international crimes regularly 
                                                   
192 Judge Robert Fremr giving a procedural overview in the Judgment of Trial Chamber VI in 
the Ntaganda case, see ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Pros-
ecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 8 July 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-T-
265-ENG, p. 4 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/fa8f8f). 
193 Lars-Gunnar Lundh, Henry Montgomery and Yvonne Wærn, Kognitiv Psykologi, Student-
litteratur, Lund, 1992; Michael W. Passer and Ronald Edward Smith, Psychology: The Sci-
ence of Mind and Behavior, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, Boston, 2009, p. 16. 
194 Lundh, Montgomery and Wærn, 1992, see above note 193. 
195 Michael E. Doherty and Clifford R. Mynatt, “Inattention to P(H) and to P(D|~H): A Con-
verging Operation”, in Acta Psychologica, 1990, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 1–11. 
196 Ibid., pp. 1–11. 
197 Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns and Peter Juslin, “‘Guilty, No Doubt’: Detention Provoking 
Confirmation Bias in Judges’ Guilt Assessment and Debiasing Techniques”, in Psychology, 
Crime and Law, 2019, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 219–47; Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns and Peter 
Juslin, “The Presumption of Guilt in Suspect Interrogations: Apprehension as a Trigger of 
Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques”, in Law and Human Behavior, 2018, vol. 42, 
no. 4, pp. 336–54; Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, “The Heuristic-Analytic Theory of Reasoning: 
Extension and Evaluation”, in Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 2006, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 
378–95; Wim De Neys, “Dual Processing in Reasoning: Two Systems but One Reasoner”, 
in Psychological Science, 2006, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 428–33. See also Clifford R. Mynatt, 
Michael E. Doherty and William Dragan, “Information Relevance, Working Memory, and 
the Consideration of Alternatives”, in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
1993, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 759–78; Clifford R. Mynatt, Michael E. Doherty and James A. 
Sullivan, “Data Selection in a Minimal Hypothesis Testing Task”, Acta Psychologica, 1991, 
vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 293–305. 
7. Confirmation Bias in Investigations of Core International Crimes: 
Risk Factors and Quality Control Techniques 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 503 
encompass enormous amounts of information. 198 It is therefore not an 
exaggeration to claim that cognitive load, that is, the efforts used by work-
ing memory to actively process the case relevant information,199 is sky-
high. In fact, even the connotation sky-high seems quite modest consider-
ing that the average digit span that humans can actively process and re-
member is 7.200 This is fewer digits than what most phone numbers have. 
The large quantity of information is of course related to the complex con-
struction of crimes under the ICC Statute, for example, because a single 
specific charge is often assessed as one part of a much wider criminal 
charge, like that of genocide. It is also related to the pronounced need for 
corroboration to prevent a case from collapsing due to, for example, unre-
liable witness testimony.201 This generally high cognitive load will proba-
bly always be present in investigations into core international crimes. Ev-
identiary rules – such as rules on agreed facts202 and facts of common 
knowledge203 – are likely to only have a marginal limiting effect. 
Since the risk of confirmation bias is stronger in relation to cogni-
tively more demanding tasks, a reasonable conclusion, which has been 
confirmed by empirical research, is that reducing cognitive load can be 
effective as a debiasing technique. The effectiveness of reducing cognitive 
load has been tested in relation to, for example, suspect interviews, which 
can be made less cognitively demanding by employing a standardised 
interview model.204 Using such a model means that the interviewer does 
not constantly have to come up with new open-ended questions but can 
instead use standardised phrases to direct the interrogation, such as 
                                                   
198 Simon de Smet also deals with the topic of information overload or cognitive load in rela-
tion to holistic assessments of evidence, see Simon de Smet, “Enhancing the Quality of 
Reasoning about the Link Between Evidence and Factual Propositions”, CILRAP Film, 
New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-smet/). 
199 John Sweller, Paul Ayres and Slava Kalyuga, Cognitive Load Theory, Springer, 2011. 
200 For adults without cognitive impairments, the average digit span that can be hold in work-
ing memory is 7 (± 2), see George A. Miller, “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus 
Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information”, in Psychological Review, 
1955, vol. 101, no. 2, pp. 81–97. 
201 Fry, 2014, p. 266, see above note 10. The difficulty of finding and holding on to reliable 
witnesses is illustrated by, for example, the ICC acquittal of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui in the 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
202 ICC RPE, Rule 69, see above note 49. 
203 ICC Statute, Article 69(6), see above note 8. 
204 Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, pp. 336–54, see above note 46. 
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“Please tell me everything you remember about”.205 Such phrases are not 
only inherently less guilt presumptive but also make the interrogation less 
cognitively demanding for the interrogator.206 An associated benefit is that 
the interrogation becomes more cognitively demanding for the suspect, 
who therefore has less cognitive resources available for, for example, 
making untrue statements appear credible. Furthermore, continuous edu-
cation and training in asking open-ended questions reduces cognitive load 
in the applied setting.207 
When it comes to reducing cognitive load in the evaluation or as-
sessment of evidence, conducting structured evaluations rather than un-
structured evaluations seems to function as a debiasing technique.208 More 
specifically, with a structured evaluation, decision makers rate or assess 
each piece of evidence separately before assessing the total evidence (ra-
ther than just conducting one total assessment).209 This appears to make 
them more resistant to confirmation bias, a finding in line with the so-
called Divide and Conquer principle, that is, that complex decision prob-
lems should be decomposed into smaller, more manageable parts, to im-
prove decision quality.210 Reducing cognitive load in this way makes dif-
ferences in the implications of the different pieces of evidence more sali-
                                                   
205 John Yarbrough, Hugues F. Hervé and Robert Harms, “The Sins of Interviewing: Errors 
Made by Investigative Interviewers and Suggestions for Redress”, in Barry S. Cooper, 
Dorothee Griesel and Marguerite Ternes (eds.), Applied Issues in Investigative Interview-
ing, Eyewitness Memory, and Credibility Assessment, Springer Science, New York, 2013, p. 
87 
206 See Gisli H. Gudjonsson and John Pearse, “Suspect Interviews and False Confessions”, in 
Current Direction in Psychological Science, 2011, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 33–37; Christian A. 
Meissner, Maria Hartwig and Melissa B. Russano, “The Need for a Positive Psychological 
Approach and Collaborative Effort for Improving Practice in the Interrogation Room”, in 
Law and Human Behavior, 2010, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 43–45; Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, 
pp. 336–54, see above note 46. 
207 See Martine B. Powell, Carolyn H. Hughes-Scholes and Stefanie J. Sharman, “Skill in 
Interviewing Reduces Confirmation Bias”, in Journal of Investigative Psychology and Of-
fender Profiling, 2012, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 126–34. 
208 Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, see above note 197. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Nils Kolling and Laurence Hunt, “Divide and Conquer: Strategic Decision Areas”, in 
Nature Neuroscience, 2015, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 616–18; Osvaldo F. Morera and David V. 
Budescu, “A Psychometric Analysis of the ‘Divide and Conquer’ Principle in Multicriteria 
Decision Making”, in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1998, vol. 
75, no. 3, pp. 187–206. 
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ent to decision makers.211 It is therefore more likely that their assessments 
become more nuanced compared to when they only conduct one overall 
assessment. 
A context in which it is particularly important that diversity and nu-
ances in the evidence are not overlooked, is when analysts try to ‘make 
sense’ of the evidence that an investigation has resulted in so far. The out-
come of such analyses will be the basis for strategic directions to investi-
gators in charge of collecting the evidence. 212 As this entails the pro-
cessing of large volumes of data, a best recommendation is to first divide 
the data into smaller pieces and only thereafter attempt to conquer it. This 
can be done, for example, through the usage of so-called case evaluation 
tables, which help to produce a synopsis matching the elements of the 
hypothesis with the different sources of the evidence and case evaluation 
charts, that link suspects, criminal actions, victims, witnesses, and so 
on.213 This is likely to reduce cognitive load in similar ways as other types 
of structured evaluations and thereby make the implications of different 
types of evidence more salient to analysts. However, the tables and charts 
only ask the analysts to evaluate and link in relation to one hypothesis, 
whereas the soundness of a hypothesis is better determined in the light of 
also other hypotheses.214 Thus, whereas the tables and charts do a good 
job in improving the evaluation of a single hypothesis, they do not logi-
cally exclude that the data is also compatible, perhaps even better compat-
ible, with other hypotheses. This highlights the need to combine different 
debiasing techniques. For instance, the use of tables and charts can effec-
tively be combined with comparative tests such as the analysis of compet-
ing hypotheses (‘ACH’), a method developed from intelligence studies, 
with the aim to help systematic comparison of multiple causal hypothe-
                                                   
211 For more on the relationship between cognitive salience and cognitive load, see, for exam-
ple, Rimvydas Rukšėnas, Jonathan Back, Paul Curzon and Ann Blandford, “Verification-
guided Modelling of Salience and Cognitive Load”, in Formal Aspects of Computing, 2009, 
vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 541–69. 
212 For more on the role of analysts see Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “On How Analysis Can 
Enhance the Quality of Investigation and Case Preparation”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 
February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-agirre/). 
213 Ibid. 
214 For more on this, see above Section 7.2.2. about underdetermination and inference to the 
best explanation, as well as the Baconian Approach to Probability in Klamberg, 2011, pp. 
4–5, see above note 34. 
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ses.215 ACH requires an analyst to explicitly identify all the reasonable 
alternatives and have them compete against each other, rather than evalu-
ating their plausibility one at a time.216 
The cognitive explanations can also be used to understand the ef-
fects of exposure to contextual information, for example, when it comes 
to the forensic confirmation bias.217 As illustrated by the cited research, 
the subconscious influence of contextual information is well established. 
Given that this influence is subconscious, it is insufficient to try and pre-
vent it using instructions to disregard the contextual information and only 
focus on the evidence. Although such disregard instructions are often 
trusted in other legal contexts, research systematically shows that they are 
not only inefficient but possibly also counterproductive.218 Disregard in-
structions are a bit like saying: “Whatever you do, do not think about a 
large pink elephant”, which is likely to lead the instructed person to do 
just that, that is, think about the elephant, and quite stubbornly so. This is 
because in order for the individual to check his or her status, that is, to 
monitor whether he or she is thinking about the elephant, he or she in fact 
has to think about the elephant. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, such in-
structions can make individuals pay even greater attention to the infor-
mation they are supposed to disregard. Another strategy with better odds 
of success is to never tell the individual about the elephant, or if that in-
formation is considered relevant, then delay the disclosure of the infor-
mation. This is also referred to as contextual information management 
                                                   
215 Richard J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
1999, pp. 95–110. 
216 Ibid. 
217 However, there are also explanations of this found in social psychology and motivational 
psychology and their relevance are likely to depend on what the nature of the contextual 
information is. For more on this, see Joel D. Lieberman and Jamie Arndt, “Understanding 
the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of 
Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence”, in Psychol-
ogy, Public Policy and Law, 2000, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 677–711; Nancy K. Steblay, Harmon 
M. Hosch, Scott E. Culhane and Adam McWethy, “The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judi-
cial Instructions to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis”, in Law and Hu-
man Behavior, 2006, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 469–92. 
218 The possibility of such instructions becoming counterproductive is also referred to as the 
backfire effect, Lieberman and Arndt, 2000, see above note 217; Steblay, Harmon, Hosch, 
Culhane and McWethy, 2006, pp. 469–92, see above note 217. 
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(‘CIM’).219 The main objective of CIM is to shield individuals from po-
tentially biasing irrelevant information, while still allowing access to task-
relevant (but potentially biasing) information. In the literature, three main 
CIM procedures have been reported which can be effectively combined. 
These are: 1) the context-manager model, 220 2) (linear) sequential un-
masking, and 3) blind peer review. 
A context-manager, previously used in, for example, forensic doc-
ument and firearm examinations, has access to all of the contextual infor-
mation, but only passes on to the analyst the information that is relevant 
for the analysis.221 This enables the analyst to conduct the analysis in the 
absence of potentially biasing information. Simultaneously, the context-
manager can determine the type of examination that might be necessary 
and also choose to disclose potentially biasing (but relevant) information 
at a later stage, after the analysis has been conducted. This is directly con-
nected to (linear) sequential unmasking, which specify the optimal order 
in which to examine forensic material.222 For instance, fingerprint analysts 
                                                   
219 See, for instance, Kassin, Dror and Kukucka, 2013, pp. 42–52, see above note 7; Gary 
Edmond, Alice Towler, Bethany Growns, Gianni Ribeiro, Bryan Found, David White, 
Kaye Ballantyne, Rachel A. Searston, Matthew B. Thompson, Jason M. Tangen, Richard I. 
Kemp and Kristy Martire, “Thinking Forensics: Cognitive Science for Forensic Practition-
ers”, in Science and Justice, 2017, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 1–27; Simon A. Cole, “Implementing 
Counter-Measures Against Confirmation Bias in Forensic Science”, in Journal of Applied 
Research in Memory and Cognition, 2013, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 386–401; William C. Thomp-
son, “What Role Should Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of Scientific Evi-
dence?”, in Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2011, vol. 43, nos. 2–3, pp. 123–34; 
Nikola K.P. Osborne and Michael C. Taylor, “Contextual Information Management: An 
Example of Independent-Checking in the Review of Laboratory-Based Bloodstain Pattern 
Analysis”, in Science and Justice, 2018, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 226–31; Sunde and Dror, 2019, 
see above note 127. 
220 For example, see Erwin Mattijssen, Wim Kerkhoff, Charles E. Berger, Itiel E. Dror and 
Reinoud Stoel, “Implementing Context Information Management in Forensic Casework: 
Minimizing Contextual Bias in Firearms Examination”, in Science and Justice, 2016, vol. 
56, no. 2, pp. 113–22; Bryan Found and John Ganas, “The Management of Domain Irrele-
vant Context Information in Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework”, in Science 
and Justice, 2012, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 154–58. 
221 Nikola K. Osborne and Michael Taylor, “Contextual Information Management: An Exam-
ple of Independent-Checking in the Review of Laboratory-Based Bloodstain Pattern Anal-
ysis”, in Science and Justice, 2018, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 226–31. 
222 Dan E. Krane, Simon Ford, Jason R. Gilder, Keith Inman, Allan Jamieson, Roger Koppl, 
Irving L. Kornfield, D. Michael Risinger, Norah Rudin, Marc Scott Taylor and William C. 
Thompson, “Sequential Unmasking: a Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic 
DNA Interpretation”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2008, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 1006–07; 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 508 
would first examine the fingerprint from the crime scene and only thereaf-
ter be exposed to the suspect’s fingerprint. This can promote that they 
work from the evidence to the suspect, rather than the other way around. 
Linear sequential unmasking also requires analysts to state levels of con-
fidence in their opinion regarding the material under examination and to 
be transparent about how contextual information has been incorporated 
into the analysis.223 To further check the validity of the analyst’s findings, 
the process can be complemented with a blind peer review, where the 
peer-reviewer,224 preferably assigned by the context-manager rather than 
the analyst, functions as a control in relation to the original assessment. If 
there, despite the previous control mechanisms, are reasons to believe that 
the prior analysis has been biased, then the peer-reviewer should conduct 
his or her analysis without the biasing information, in order to allow con-
clusions about its effects.225 To effectively safeguard the co-ordination of 
these control mechanisms, it is advisable to create protocols that can be 
implemented with a minimal impact on the current workflow, while still 
effectively preventing bias. Clearly, such protocols have to be tailor-made 
for the context in which they are supposed to be used. 
7.3.2. Emotional and Motivational Explanations 
For these crimes no punishment is severe enough. It may 
well be essential to hang Göring, but it is totally inadequate. 
That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps 
and shatters all legal systems […]. We are simply not 
                                                                                                                        
Itiel E. Dror, William C. Thompson, Christian Meissner, Irv Kornfield, Dan Krane, Mi-
chael Saks and Michael Risinger, “Letter to the Editor: Context Management Toolbox: A 
Linear Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for Minimizing Cognitive Bias in Forensic 
Decision Making”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2015, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 1111–12. 
223 Dror, Thompson, Meissner, Kornfield, Krane, Saks and Risinger, 2015, pp. 1111–12, see 
above note 222. 
224 For an example, see Bradford T. Ulery, Austin Hicklin, JoAnn Buscaglia and Maria Anto-
nia Roberts, “Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions”, in Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2011, vol. 
108, no. 19, pp. 7733–38. 
225 Thus, this debiasing technique can benefit from more specific knowledge about between 
expert biasability for specific types of assessments. For more on this topic, see above Sec-
tion 7.2.3.1. 
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equipped to deal, on a human level, with a guilt that is be-
yond crime.226 
Although the words ‘emotions’ and ‘motivation’ are better known than 
‘cognition’, the everyday uses of these words differ in important ways 
from how they are used in the field of Emotion and Motivation Psycholo-
gy. The subjective feeling such as anger, fear or joy, is only one of four 
parts of an emotion,227 and emotions are held to be strongly associated 
with motivation.228 According to these explanations of confirmation bias, 
humans reason in one-sided ways in order to maintain control and self-
esteem.229 The specific emotions that have been linked to increased levels 
of confirmation bias are anger,230 fear,231 anxiety and worry.232 Although 
there are methodological challenges with studying the impact of emotions 
on information processing233 and some of these findings concern contexts 
                                                   
226 Hannah Arendt writing about the Nuremberg trials, cited in Douglas, 2016, p. 7, see above 
note 175. Originally published in Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil, The Viking Press, New York, 1963. 
227 See, for instance, Carroll E. Izard, “Four Systems for Emotion Activation: Cognitive and 
Noncognitive Development”, in Psychological Review, 1993, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 68–90; 
John Marshall Reeve, Understanding Motivation and Emotion, John Wiley & Sons, Hobo-
ken, 2018, p. 299. Emotions also encompass biological reactions, agents of purpose and a 
social phenomenon. 
228 Izard, 1993, pp. 68–90, see above note 227 and Reeve, 2018, p. 299, see above note 227. 
229 Tom Pyszczynski and Jeff Greenberg, “Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motiva-
tional Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model”, in Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, 1987, vol. 20, pp. 297–340. 
230 Karl Ask and Pär-Anders Granhag, “Hot Cognition in Investigative Judgments: The Dif-
ferential Influence of Anger and Sadness”, in Law and Human Behavior, 2008, vol. 31, no. 
6, p. 547. 
231 See, for instance, Peter J. de Jong, Marie-Anne Haenen, Anton Schmidt and Birgit Mayer, 
“Hypochondriasis; The Role of Fear-Confirming Reasoning”, in Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 1998, vol. 36, no. 1. pp. 65–74; Peter J. de Jong, Birgit Mayer and Marcel van 
den Hout, “Conditional Reasoning and Phobic Fear: Evidence for a Fear-Confirming Rea-
soning Pattern”, in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1997, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 507–16. 
232 See, for instance, Peter Muris, Suradj Debipersad and Birgit Mayer, “Searching for Danger: 
on the Link between Worry and Threat-related Confirmation Bias in Children”, in Journal 
of Child and Family Studies, 2014, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 604–09; Lourdes Suarez and Debora 
Bell-Dolan, “The relationship of Child Worry to Cognitive Biases: Threat Interpretation 
and Likelihood of Event Occurrence”, in Behavior Therapy, 2001, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 425–
42. 
233 For instance, there is likely to be a discrepancy between experimentally induced emotions 
and emotions as experienced in real life criminal cases. However, if effects are found with 
experimentally induced emotions, it is unlikely that these effects will be weaker in real life. 
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relatively distinct from the legal context, the studies do highlight the risk 
of such an impact. 
The described risk appears to be relevant for investigations into 
core international crimes since these investigations, by necessity, concern 
crimes of extreme gravity, such as genocide. This is evident already in the 
requirement of ‘sufficient gravity’ for case selection and admissibility234 
as well as the qualifiers of gravity in the legal definitions of the core 
crimes, for example, ‘grave breaches’ that are differentiated from “other, 
presumably less grave violations” in relation to war crimes235 or the “in-
tent to destroy one of the protected groups” for genocide.236 The gravity 
of the crimes can be expressed both in quantitative terms, for example, the 
number of victims or deaths, 237 and in qualitative terms, for example, 
abuse of power, victim vulnerability and particular cruelty.238 Also, the 
general context of the alleged crimes is often that of public unrest and 
polarisation (post-electoral violence, armed conflict or other political con-
flict). Furthermore, media reports often focus on the suffering of the vic-
tims239 or portray the suspect(s) in ways that are likely to elicit emotions 
like anger. An associated specific issue is that the extreme gravity of these 
crimes may – due to, inter alia, the emotional components – completely 
turn the priorities of the criminal investigations around.240 This notion of 
changed priorities due to crime severity has not been systematically and 
                                                   
234 ICC Statute, Article 17(1)(d), see above note 8. 
235 Ibid., Article 7. 
236 Ibid., Articles 2; Agirre Aranburu, 2010, pp. 208–09, see above note 10. 
237 ICC RPE, Rule 145(2)(b)(ii)–(iv), see above note 49. 
238 Ibid.; Agirre Aranburu, 2010, pp. 216–17, see above note 10. 
239 Agirre Aranburu, 2010, p. 358, see above note 74. 
240 See, for instance, Agirre Aranburu, 2010, p. 356, see above note 74; Peter A. Joy, “The 
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping 
Remedies for a Broken System”, in Wisconsin Law Review, 2006, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 399–
405; Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction, Stanford University Press, Stan-
ford, 1968, p. 237; Stuart MacDonald, “Constructing a Framework for Criminal Justice 
Research”, in New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 
2005, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 257. In a similar vein, J. Vincent Aprile II argues that American cit-
izens tend to view investigative and charging decisions by the police and prosecution as 
the equivalent of a verdict of guilt. As a result, the function of the jury trial is simply to 
rubber stamp the conclusions of law enforcement and the prosecution. This results in a 
presumption of guilt, rather than that of innocence, among the public. For more on this, see 
J. Vincent Aprile II, “Presumption of Innocence Now an Assumption of Guilt”, in Criminal 
Justice, 1995, vol. 10, no. 4, p. 32. 
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empirically evaluated, but is in line with the so-called signal detection 
theory.241 According to this theory, the cost of making a mistake (a false 
positive or a false negative) will influence a decision maker’s way of rea-
soning, as to avoid the mistake that costs the most.242 More specifically, 
this may lead the decision maker to perceive that there is a ‘hit’ (a signal) 
when there, in fact, is none.243 Although the legal doctrine prescribes that 
the costs of false positives (wrongful convictions) outweigh the cost of 
false negatives (wrongful acquittals), there are no guarantees that this 
maxim is reflected in legal actors’ reasoning and decision making. If, on 
the contrary, it is true that the costs of allowing “the real Ivan to go 
free”244 by far outweighs the cost of convicting an innocent person, then 
criminal investigators may in practice abide by a presumption of guilt.245 
                                                   
241 Thomas D. Wickens, Elementary Signal Detection Theory, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2002. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid., pp. 36–37. 
244 Agirre Aranburu, 2010, p. 356, see above note 74, citing Willem A. Wagenaar, Identifying 
Ivan: A Case Study in Legal Psychology, Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1988, p. 170. 
245 See also Thijs Bouwknegt, Cross-Examining the Past – Transitional Justice, Mass Atrocity 
Trials and History in Africa, Faculty of Humanities, Amsterdam School for Heritage and 
Memory Studies, 2017, p. 210. However, this possibility should, be seen in the light of so-
called ‘vicarious trauma’ which has been noted in asylum cases and means that decision 
makers who suffer psychological distress from exposure to evidence they sometimes use 
coping strategies involving rejecting the evidence as unimaginable, see the UNHCR, Be-
yond Proof – Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems, pp. 79–82. If also applicable 
in criminal cases, it could mean that the gravity of the crime does not contribute to confir-
mation bias but rather a type of sceptical bias. A more specific manifestation of vicarious 
trauma in asylum cases is that examiners may seek to avoid exposure to evidence causing 
further distress and this may distort their questioning of the applicant during interview 
and/or their pursuit of further relevant supporting evidence, see Diana Bogner, Jane Herli-
hy and Chris R. Brewin, “Impact of Sexual Violence on Disclosure during Home Office 
Interviews”, in The British Journal of Psychiatry, 2007, vol. 191, no. 1, pp. 75–81. This is 
also related to research into so-called ‘compassion fatigue’, suggesting that encounters 
with multiple victims or persons in need, compared to single individuals, changes valua-
tion processes during decision making, see Marcus M. Butts, David C. Lunt, Traci L. 
Freling and Allison S. Gabriel, “Helping One or Helping Many? A Theoretical Integration 
and Meta-Analytic Review of the Compassion Fade Literature”, in Organizational Behav-
ior and Human Decision Processes, 2019, vol. 151, pp. 16–33. Furthermore, prolonged 
exposure to persons in need may lead to permanent deficits in emphatic capacities, known 
as ‘compassion fade’. It may become increasingly difficult to “approach each case afresh 
and avoid creating hierarchies of persecution which demand ever higher levels of suffering 
to incite sympathy”, see Helen Baillot, Sharon Cowan and Vanessa E. Munro, “Second-
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Importantly, such a presumption does not necessarily mean that a person 
will in fact be wrongfully convicted, but can also mean that the investiga-
tors, due to their strong belief that the person in question is guilty, tend to 
evaluate the evidence against the defendant as stronger than someone 
without the belief would, and/or that they even downgrade or overlook 
exonerating information.246 As a result, the suspected person may go free, 
rightly or wrongly, and in the former case it may be too late to try and find 
and prosecute the real perpetrator. This is particularly important consider-
ing the high expectations raised on getting a person convicted for a hide-
ous crime and the disappointment or critique that can result when this is 
not fulfilled. 
This raises the question whether emotional content of criminal in-
vestigations or proceedings can be reduced in ecologically valid ways? In 
other words, even if removing emotional content has a debiasing potential 
in controlled experiments, what meaning do such results have for a reality 
in which emotional content, often of a strong kind, is ever-present? Regu-
larly, information that carries emotional content is also information that 
legal actors will have to be exposed to because it is relevant to their work. 
Although it can be debated whether relevant and irrelevant emotional 
content can be separated (and if so, this would be the job for a context 
manager), it is probably better to consider the emotional content an inher-
ent characteristic of these investigations, that is, a baseline from which all 
debiasing attempts have to be made. However, this does not render re-
search findings on this topic superfluous, rather the contrary, as it may 
draw decision makers’ attention to situations in which these risks are at 
play. A finding that may be of particular interest provided the rather com-
plex legal constructions in question, is that emotions seem to play a role 
not only in the fact-finding process but also in how legal actors chose to 
legally classify acts. For instance, American judges’ assessments of 
whether an act – pasting a false US entry visa into a genuine foreign pass-
port – constituted “forging an identification card” under Ohio Statutes 
varied significantly depending on the level of sympathy elicited by the 
                                                                                                                        
hand Emotion? Exploring the Contagion and Impact of Trauma and Distress in the Asy-
lum-Law Context”, in Journal of Law and Society, 2013, vol. 40, no. 4, p. 532. 
246 This clearly relates to asymmetrical scepticism, see above Section 7.2.2. 
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description of the defendant.247 The defendant was either described as a 
hired killer who had sneaked into the US to track down and kill someone 
who had stolen drug proceeds from a cartel (killer condition) or a father 
trying to earn money for a liver transplant for his critically ill nine-year-
old daughter (father condition). Of the judges in the killer condition, 60 
per cent ruled that the act constituted forgery as compared to 44 per cent 
in the father condition, and the average sentence was also higher for the 
killer than the father. Thus, this study suggests that emotions can influ-
ence also the interpretation and application of the law (apart from fact-
finding). It is likely, although not systematically and empirically evaluated, 
that this influence is often difficult to detect as legal actors are likely to 
argue in conventionally relevant terms such as the language of the statute, 
the legislative history, and so on. The reasons why they choose one inter-
pretation of the law rather than another, are not necessarily clear, neither 
to the legal actors themselves nor for outside observers. Often both, or 
several, interpretations can be justified using the same sources but empha-
sising different aspects of the sources. This notion is in line with research 
on so-called motivated reasoning or motivated cognition, where affective 
preferences trigger the operation of cognitive processes that shifts reason-
ing to reach the desired conclusion.248 There is no doubt that the legal 
classification, and the potential emotional influence on it, are relevant at 
many stages of investigations into core international crimes. For instance, 
the question of whether an act constitutes a certain crime is not only deci-
sive for the question of jurisdiction,249 but is also a requirement, inter alia, 
for the Pre-Trial Chamber to, for example, issue an arrest warrant or a 
summons to appear250 as well as for the confirmation of charges and the 
trial on the charges as confirmed.251 
                                                   
247 Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Chris Guthrie, “Heart versus Head: Do Judg-
es Follow the Law or Follow their Feelings?”, in Texas Law Review, 2015, vol. 93, no. 4, 
1993, pp. 856–911. 
248 Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”, in Psychological Bulletin, 1990, vol. 
108, no. 3, pp. 480–98. 
249 ICC Statute, Articles 5–8, see above note 8. 
250 Ibid., Article 58. 
251 Ibid., Article 61. 
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7.3.3. Social and Organisational Explanations 
When men wish to construct or support a theory, how they 
torture facts into their service!252 
Social psychologists aim to understand and explain how the thought, feel-
ing and behaviour of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or 
implied presence of others. 253 The social explanations of confirmation 
bias essentially hold that humans do not reason to find the truth but in-
stead to convince others that they are right.254 Consequently, research in 
this area implies that confirmation bias is stronger in relation to self-
generated hypotheses than hypotheses generated by others. 255 This has 
resulted in a notion of confirmation bias as a self-enhancement or ego 
enhancement bias.256 In the context of criminal investigations and pro-
ceedings this means that police officers who themselves have previously 
apprehended a suspect ask more guilt presumptive questions and perceive 
of the suspect as less credible during a subsequent interrogation, as com-
pared to police officers who only conduct the interrogation.257 Similarly, 
judges who themselves have detained a suspect prior to the main hearing, 
perceive of the suspect’s credibility as lower, the evidence against the 
suspect as stronger and are 2.79 times more likely to convict, as compared 
                                                   
252 Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, Bentley, 
1852, p. 552. 
253 This influential definition was provided by Allport in 1954, see Gordon Willard, The Na-
ture of Prejudice, Anchor Books, Abridged, 1958, p. 3. The term ‘implied presence’ refers 
to the many activities the individual carries out because of his or her position (role) in 
complex social structures and because of his or her membership in a cultural group. 
254 Hugo Mercier, “The Argumentative Theory: Predictions and Empirical Evidence”, in 
Trends in Cognitive Science, 2016, vol. 20, no. 9, pp. 689–700; Hugo Mercier and Dan 
Sperber, “Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory”, in Behav-
ioral and Brain Sciences, 2011, vol. 34, no, 2, pp. 57–111. 
255 Kevin Dunbar and David Klahr, “Developmental Differences in Scientific Discovery 
Processes”, in David Klahr and Kenneth Kotovsky (eds.), Complex Information Pro-
cessing: The Impact of Herbert A. Simon, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1989, 
pp. 109–43; David Klahr, “Designing Good Experiments to Test ‘Bad’ Hypotheses”, in 
The Artificial Intelligence and Psychology Project, 1989, pp. 355–402; Christian D. 
Schunn and David Klahr, “Self vs. Other-Generated Hypotheses in Scientific Discovery”, 
in Songer W. Kintsch (ed.), Proceedings of the 15th Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, 2013; Beth E. Haverkamp, “Confirmatory Bias in Hypothesis Testing for 
Client-Identified and Counselor Self-Generated Hypotheses”, in Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 1993, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 303–15. 
256 For more on this, see Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, pp. 336–54, see above note 46. 
257 Ibid. 
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to judges who are only in charge of the main hearing (ceteris paribus).258 
This is, and has been, connected to rules on disqualification of judges as 
well as the defendants right to an impartial tribunal, for example, in the 
case Hauschildt v. Denmark259 (concerning pre-trial detentions as a basis 
for non-competence). However, in practice, the same legal actor often 
makes several decisions in relation to the same suspect for efficiency rea-
sons, for example, that this specific legal actor already knows the case as 
opposed to a colleague who would have to take time and resources to 
learn about the case specific circumstances.260 
Apart from the notion of confirmation bias as a self-enhancement 
bias, social psychological research also provides other perspectives that 
are important for understanding why confirmation bias occurs. These per-
spectives come from research examining group decision making. Intui-
tively, it seems reasonable to believe that the group setting261 would pre-
vent confirmation bias, for example, because the bias is more or less sub-
conscious and therefore easier to detect in others than in oneself.262 How-
                                                   
258 Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, pp. 1–29, see above note 197. 
259 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Hauschildt v. Denmark, Judgment, 24 May 
1989 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/ee1c41). 
260 Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2018, pp. 1–29, see above note 197. 
261 A commonly accepted definition of a group is people who are interdependent and have at 
least potential for mutual interaction, see Shelley E. Taylor, Letitia Anne Peplau and David 
O. Sears, Social Psychology, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 2006, p. 345. Also, in 
most groups, people have regular face-to-face contact. However, the studied groups have 
varied in many respects, such as the group size. Most group research has focused on 
groups ranging from 3 to 20 people, although 2 people (a couple) is also included in the 
definition. As such, the definition of a group is narrower and more technical than in every-
day language where the term is used to refer to all kinds of social units. Yet, in accordance 
with research using an experimental methodology called the minimal group paradigm (the 
minimal conditions required for group behaviour to occur), merely being arbitrarily cate-
gorised into groups using random criteria such as ‘blue team’ and ‘red team’ is sufficient 
for group members to display group behaviours, see Henri Tajfel, “Experiments in Inter-
group Discrimination”, in Scientific American, 1970, vol. 223, no. 5, pp. 96–102; Henri 
Tajfel, “Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice”, in Journal of Social Issues, 1969, vol. XXV, no. 
4, pp. 79–97; Marilynn B. Brewer and Rupert J. Brown, “Intergroup Relations”, in Daniel 
Todd Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psy-
chology, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998, pp. 554–94. For instance, such categorisation 
makes group members show more favourable attitudes and behaviours towards members 
of the own group than toward members of another group. 
262 See, for example, Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich and Lee Ross, “Objectivity in the Eye of 
the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others”, in Psychological Re-
view, 2004, vol. 111, no. 3, pp. 781–99. 
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ever, contrary to these expectations, research suggests that biases may 
even be produced or exacerbated in groups,263 as groups often fail to suc-
cessfully pool the information held by different members264 and can have 
very restricted information-processing patterns. 265  The more specific 
mechanisms that can produce or exacerbate confirmation bias in groups 
are, for instance, the emergence of group norms, conformity and role-
induced bias, mechanisms that were identified already in early social psy-
chology studies. 266  Although their relationship to confirmation bias as 
well as the applicability to the legal setting needs to be further evaluated, 
these findings, together with more recent replications, highlight potential 
risk factors. These are, for example, group polarisation, that is, when a 
group of like-minded people discusses an issue and the average opinion of 
                                                   
263 Susan M. Houghton, Mark Simon, Karl Aquino and Caren B. Goldberg, “No Safety in 
Numbers: Persistence of Biases and their Effects of Team Risk Perception and Team Deci-
sion Making”, in Group and Organization Management, 2000, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 325–53; 
Norbert L. Kerr and Scott Tindale, “Group Performance and Decision Making”, in Annual 
Review of Psychology, 2004, vol. 55, pp. 623–55; R.S. Tindale, Decision Errors Made by 
Individuals and Groups, pp. 109–24. 
264 Garold Stasser and Dennis Stewart, “Discovery of Hidden Profiles by Decision-making 
Groups: Solving a Problem versus Making a Judgment”, in Journal of Personality and So-
cial Psychology, 1992, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 426–34. 
265 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink; Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
Houghton Miffin, Boston, 1982. 
266 See, for instance, Muzafer Sherif’s (1936) pioneering studies demonstrating that in uncer-
tain and ambiguous situations, people tend to conform to group norms, Muzafer Sherif, 
The Psychology of Social Norms, Harper, Oxford, 1936. See also Solomon Asch’s (1952) 
subsequent studies which illustrated conformity in stimulus situations where the correct 
answers were as plain as day, Solomon Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure”, in Scientific 
American, 1952, vol. 193, no. 5, pp. 31–35, as well as Stanley Milgram (1963) who criti-
cized Asch’s studies of conformity because he believed that Asch used trivial tasks in 
which there were no significant consequences for the participants or for others, Stanley 
Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience”, in The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-
chology, 1963, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 371–78. Influenced by a wider social issue, namely Nazi 
officials’ obedience to Hitler’s orders, he used a famous task were participants (‘teachers’) 
were told to apply electric shocks of increasing strength (75–450 V) to another person (a 
‘learner’) when this person erred in a word association assignment. Overall, 100 per cent 
of the participants exceeded 180V and 65 per cent continued obeying all the way to 450V. 
Both Milgram and other have replicated these findings in a range of settings, groups of 
participants and also using other types of tasks, see, for example, Michael A. Hogg and 
Graham M. Vaughan, Essentials of Social Psychology, Pearson, New York, 2010, pp. 141–
50. 
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group members tend to become more extreme.267 Possibly, this is because 
group interaction enables each individual to feel less personally responsi-
ble for the consequences of the decisions and they therefore become more 
daring.268 It can also be because group members provide each other with 
persuasive arguments supporting a certain preferred alternative, and con-
tradicting a non-preferred alternative, resulting in a bargaining-like pro-
cess where group members continuously bid above each other with hy-
pothesis-consistent arguments. 269 Thus, the advantages of the preferred 
alternative are emphasised and disadvantages downplayed, increasing the 
individual members’ previous beliefs and simultaneously decreasing the 
likelihood of anyone presenting opposing ideas, because of the fear of 
making a fool of oneself in front of the group majority.270 This means that 
the group comes to function as one large individual with a very strong 
confirmation bias. Similarly, groups sometimes display a way of thinking 
where the will to reach consensus overshadows the motivation to use ra-
tional decision making procedures, which is referred to as group-think.271 
                                                   
267 See Serge Moscovici and Marisa Zavalloni, “The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes”, in 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 124–35; Daniel J. 
Isenberg, “Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis”, in Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 1986, vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 1141–51. 
268 Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969, p. 126, see above note 267. This is also aligned with the 
theory of diffusion of responsibility, see Michael A. Wallach and Nathan Kogan, “The 
Roles of Information, Discussion, and Consensus in Group Risk Taking”, in Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–19. 
269 See, for instance, Choong-Ling Sia, Bernard Tan and Kwok-Kee Wei, “Group Polarization 
and Computed Mediated Communication: Effects of Communication Cues, Social Pres-
ence, and Anonymity”, in Information Systems Research, 2002, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 70–90; 
Craig McGarthy, John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg, Barbara David and Margaret S. Weth-
erell, “Group Polarization as Conformity to the Most Prototypical Group Member”, in 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 1992, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 1–20. Yet another explana-
tion is that individuals who are attracted to a group may be motivated to adopt a more ex-
treme position to gain the group’s approval. 
270 Sia, Tan and Wei, 2002, pp. 70–90, see above note 269; McGarthy, Turner, Hogg, David 
and Wetherell, 1992, pp. 1–20, see above note 269. 
271 The term ‘group-think’ was first used by Irving Janis in 1982 to describe a series of politi-
cal decisions that had been made by groups and which according to Janis were fiascos, 
since the groups failed to realise the moral and practical consequences of their decisions, 
see Janis, 1982, see above note 265. An example is Kennedy and his advisors’ decision to 
invade the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961. Since 1982, group-think has been studied experi-
mentally in a variety of settings and meta-analysed in 1994, see Brian Mullen, Tara Antho-
ny, Eduardo Salas and James E. Driskell, “Group Cohesiveness and Quality of Decision 
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This mindset results in, for example, that decision alternatives are not 
adequately considered and that the group fails to consult outside exper-
tise.272 According to a meta-analysis from 1994, the two strongest con-
tributing factors to group-think are strong group cohesiveness and di-
rective leadership.273 As such, research on group-think challenge the no-
tion that group members point out errors in one another’s reasoning and 
instead suggest that such errors might be consolidated in groups. Although 
the risks of group polarisation and group-think are dependent on group 
specific factors (such as group cohesion), this research implies that a dis-
regard of alternative hypothesis on an individual level may be reinforced 
by the will to reach consensus on a group level. 
As a response to findings of group polarisation and groupthink, re-
searchers have examined so-called ‘devil’s advocate’ (‘DA’) procedures as 
potential debiasing techniques. However, these findings have been mixed 
as the success of the procedures seem to be dependent on how devilish the 
DA really is, 274  for example, whether the dissent is genuine or con-
trived.275 Thus, for a DA to have the intended effect, rather than become a 
pointless ritual, the DA should actively research and advocate a contrary 
position, not just pose rhetorical questions and make insincere or unsub-
stantiated comments before slipping back into the mainstream of conven-
tional thought. Some suggestions on how to do this, which have not yet 
been empirically evaluated, are, for example, to rotate the DA role among 
the members of the group and/or assigning the role to more than one 
group member.276 Another way to avoid that the DA is at a numerical dis-
                                                                                                                        
Making: An Integration of Tests of the Groupthink Hypothesis”, in Small Group Research, 
1994, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 189–204. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. 
274 This was hypothesized already by Irving L. Janis, Crucial Decisions, Leadership in Poli-
cymaking and Crisis Management, The Free Press, 1989, p. 248 but has also been 
acknowledged more recently by for example, Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit, 14 
Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving, Crown Business, 1995, p. 218. 
275 Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Marc Jochims and Dieter Frey, “Productive Conflict in Group Deci-
sion Making: Genuine and Contrived Dissent as Strategies to Counteract Biased Infor-
mation Seeking”, in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2002, vol. 
88, no. 2, pp. 563–86. 
276 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions 
and Fiascoes, Houghton Mifflin, Oxford, 1972, p. 216; Randall Kiser, Beyond Right and 
Wrong, The Power of Effective Decision Making for Attorneys and Clients, Springer, Ber-
lin, 2010, p. 389. 
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advantage is to instead have a red team or similar unit, although this is 
more demanding in terms of resources.277 
The cited research seems relevant, for example, for the choice be-
tween a ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ model of investigation and prosecution. 
With the horizontal model, a crime moves through different sections of a 
prosecution office depending on the stage of proceedings, resulting in, for 
example, that different prosecutors make the charging decision and act as 
the defendant’s counter party in court.278 This is different from the vertical 
prosecution model, in which a prosecutor is assigned at the start of the 
process and remains with the case until the trial is completed.279 
In 2013, the ICC-OTP announced the implementation of a vertical 
model giving the direction of its teams at all stages of investigation and 
prosecution to the prosecutions division, hence appointing a senior trial 
lawyer as the most senior officer in charge of each team starting from the 
investigation and the same person would also lead the case in court.280 In 
2014, a group of experts further recommended to the ICC-OTP to adopt 
the vertical model, considering jointly investigations and prosecutions 
under the concept of ‘processing cases’, 281 so that “once an incoming 
complaint has been preliminary screened it is assigned to a core team of 
qualified prosecutors, investigators and analysts who remain constant and 
make recommendations to the chief prosecutor at each stage of the 
case”.282 Furthermore, the core team would remain in charge of the case 
all through the proceedings.283 In 2015, the ICC-OTP confirmed that “sen-
                                                   
277 For more on this see, for example, Gary Adkins, “Red Teaming the Red Team: Utilizing 
Cyber Espionage to Combat Terrorism”, in Journal of Strategic Security, 2013, vol. 6, no. 
3, pp. 1–9. 
278 Mettraux, Fisher, Groome, Whiting, McIntyre, de Hemptinne and Sluiter, 2014, p. 63, see 
above note 73. 
279 Ibid., p. 64. 
280 See ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, para. 54 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/954beb). 
281 Mettraux, Fisher, Groome, Whiting, McIntyre, de Hemptinne and Sluiter, 2014, see above 
note 73. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid., pp. 64–65. 
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ior trial lawyers were placed in charge of the integrated teams”284 con-
cerning both investigations and prosecutions.285 
Although the vertical model is considered advantageous, for exam-
ple, because it promotes continuity and limits the number of different 
people that victims encounter through the court process, 286 it entails a 
substantial risk that prosecutors and investigators, who have been working 
with the hypothesis already from the outset of a case, fail to reason inde-
pendently of it. This is implied by the notion of confirmation bias as a 
self-enhancement bias, research of group polarisation and group-think, as 
well as emotional explanations of confirmation bias. As suggested by the 
research cited in Section 7.2.1., a guilt hypothesis is likely to become con-
solidated, in a subjective sense, at the latest with the charging decision, 
and possibly before that.287 The consolidation of the hypotheses can be 
manifested in that the prosecutor is less likely to initiate additional inves-
tigation, and if such investigation is undertaken, it is more often aimed at 
confirming the defendant’s guilt.288 Also, since confirmation bias is exac-
erbated by an individual’s will to convince others that he or she is right, 
this is likely to be fuelled by a confirmation of the charges on which the 
prosecutor intends to seek trial by the Pre-Trial Chamber.289 
                                                   
284 See ICC OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 16 November 2015, p. 9 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/2dbc2d). 
285 Ibid., pp. 40–41. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Lidén, Gräns and Juslin, 2019, pp. 494–526, see above note 24. 
288 Ibid. 
289 ICC Statute, Article 61, see above note 8. In this regard it is interesting to note that prose-
cutors, pursuant to Article 42(7) of the ICC Statute, are disqualified from participating in 
cases if they have previously been involved, in any capacity, in proceedings against the 
suspected person, for example, criminal cases against the same person at the national level 
or in other international jurisdictions, see Yvonne McDermott, in Mark Klamberg, Com-
mentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, TOAEP, Brussels, 2017 p. 361 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa0e2b/). However, this does not refer to any previous ac-
tion which the OTP has taken pursuant to the Statute. It seems reasonable to ask why prior 
involvement on a national level would make prosecutors less capable of remaining impar-
tial than when it comes to involvement based on the Statute. Rule 34 of the ICC RPE sets 
out four additional grounds that may give rise to disqualification: the existence of a per-
sonal or professional relationship that might call their impartiality into question; the in-
volvement with legal proceedings involving the suspect or the accused; the existence of a 
prior employment that may have led him or her to form opinions about the case, the ac-
cused, or counsel; or the expression of opinions that suggest a lack of impartiality, see 
above note 49. 
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Furthermore, the findings that self-generated hypotheses are ‘sticki-
er’ than hypotheses generated by others, may have implications for appro-
priate ways to work with, for example, investigation plans or techniques 
such as the ACH. When reassessing whether an investigation plan needs 
to be updated in the light of new evidence, it is probable that an individual 
who has not been part of formulating the initial case hypothesis is better 
capable of reasoning independently of it. Therefore, such a person, or 
groups of persons (for example, evidence review panels), are less likely to 
be asymmetrically sceptical in relation to the new evidence and conse-
quently, also more likely to update the investigation plan when this is 
mandated by the evidence. Similarly, the ACH distinguishes between gen-
eration of hypotheses and evaluation of the hypotheses. If the same indi-
vidual both formulates and evaluates the hypotheses, the risk of confirma-
tion bias is larger than if two different individuals are assigned these 
tasks.290 
The organisational explanations of confirmation bias stem from or-
ganisational psychology, where an essential finding is that organisational 
values reinforce certain behaviours that promote goal fulfilment.291 Thus, 
a primary defining characteristic of an organisation is patterned human 
behaviour,292 which means that a structure, typically derived from formal 
job descriptions and organisational policies, is imposed. In the context of 
criminal investigation, organisational efficiency demands as well as exter-
nal expectations to be ‘tough on crime’, can result in a guilt presumptive 
                                                   
290 For instance, it can be noted that the ACH did not seem to constitute an effective remedy 
against serial position effects or confirmation bias in a study by Martha Whitesmith, “The 
Efficacy of ACH in Mitigating Serial Position Effects and Confirmation Bias in an Intelli-
gence Analysis Scenario”, in Intelligence and National Security, 2019, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 
225–42. Of the participants that exhibited confirmation bias, half were in the non-ACH 
condition (did not use the ACH) and half were in the ACH condition (did use the ACH). 
There are many possible explanations of this. One possible explanation is that the partici-
pants, when using the ACH both generated and evaluated their own hypotheses. Another 
explanation is that the ACH simply is not as effective as it is believed to be, a topic which 
needs further empirical evaluation. It should also be noted that the participants in this study 
were staff and students from King’s College London (n=32) as well as staff from multiple 
departments within the British Government (n=7), who were asked to role-play the part of 
an intelligence analyst. 
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mindset.293 The presence of external expectations in relation to investiga-
tions of core international crimes is evident from, for example, the ICTY 
case of Vojislav Šešelj294 and the ICC case of Laurent Gbagbo.295 For 
instance, media reports that Gbagbo is “now widely regarded as a leader 
who was willing to destroy his country by refusing to accept defeat at the 
ballot box”.296 The potentially biasing effects as well as source memory 
errors stemming from pre-trial publicity (‘PTP’) are well researched.297 
Also, demands and/or expectations to respond effectively and promptly 
are likely to create time pressure, which, in turn, increases selectivity in 
information processing, illustrated in a range of decision making situa-
tions, 298  including criminal investigations. 299  Furthermore, being per-
                                                   
293 See, for example, Karl Ask, Pär-Anders Granhag and Anna Rebelius, “Investigators under 
Influence: How Social Norms Activate Goal-Directed Processing of Criminal Evidence”, 
in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2011, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 548–53. 
294 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, IT-03-67. Media reported on, for example, the 
behaviour of Mr. Šešelj including, for example, hunger strikes, dismissive language in pre-
trial hearings, that he remained the figurehead of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) while 
awaiting trial; for a summary, see “Serb Accused at War Crimes Trial”, BBC, 7 November 
2007 (available on its web site). Mr. Šešelj also filed a motion for contempt against mem-
bers of the Office of the Prosecutor claiming that they had resorted to threats, intimidation 
and bribes in order to ensure the testimony of certain witnesses, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Vojislav Šešelj, Trial Chamber, Decision on Vojislav Šešelj’s Motion for Contempt Against 
Carla Del Ponte, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff and Daniel Saxon and on the Subsequent Re-
quests of the Prosecution, 22 December 2011, IT-03-67-T, p. 2 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
686cc1). The Chamber concluded that sufficient grounds did not exist to instigate proceed-
ings for contempt against any members of the Prosecution. 
295 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15. 
296 See “Laurent Gbagbo Profile: Ivory Coast’s Defiant ‘Cicero’”, BBC News, 15 January 
2019 (available on the web site). 
297 Although primarily in relation to jurors. For a summary see Christine Ruva, Cathy 
McEvoy and Judith Becker Bryant, “Effects of Pre-Trial Publicity and Jury Deliberation 
on Juror Bias and Source Memory Errors”, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2007, vol. 21, 
pp. 45–67. According to the authors, measures to prevent biasing effects of PTP, such as 
judicial instruction, voir dire and deliberation are largely ineffective but measures such as 
change of venue (which reduces the PTP) and bench trial (which eliminates the jury) may 
be effective, although they have not yet been studied by experimenters. 
298 The effects of time pressure on human decision making are well-researched. Apart from 
selectivity in information processing (so-called ‘filtering’), time pressure seems to de-
crease flexibility, which deteriorates the ability to generate alternative hypotheses and 
strategies and also make people rely more heavily on their previous views and stereotypes 
and less likely to assimilate new information. For literature on selectivity in information 
processing see, for example, Anne Edland and Ola Svensson, “Judgment and Decision 
Making under Time Pressure”, in Ola Svensson and John Maule (ed.), Time Pressure and 
Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making, Plenum Press, 1993, pp. 27–40; Rik Pie-
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ceived as an effective criminal investigator or similar can help fulfil ca-
reer goals, which is desirable for individuals with high needs to realise 
their potential and maximise capability, so-called self-actualisation. 300 
Although efficiency demands as well as career goals will probably always 
be present, better time management can prevent time pressure and, as 
such, function as a debiasing technique. 
7.4. Concluding Remarks 
In investigations of core international crimes there are some inherent 
structural issues that exacerbate the risk of confirmation bias. These are, 
for example, the historical as well as contemporary context and the explic-
it and often large investments into specific lines of inquiry, as well as sus-
pects, which increase, for example, commitment and defence motivation. 
The risk of confirmation bias is also enhanced by that, in these investiga-
tions, cognitive load is regularly sky-high, the emotional components are 
strong, ways of working such as the vertical prosecution model may trig-
ger self-enhancement aspects and the organisational as well as external 
efficiency demands are pronounced. Depending on to what extent an in-
vestigation plan is closed or open, it entails different levels of risk of con-
firmation bias, while the focus on the most responsible perpetrators is a 
                                                                                                                        
ters, Luk Warlop and Michel Hartog, “The Effect of Time Pressure and Task Motivation on 
Visual Attention to Brands”, in Advances in Consumer Research, 1997, vol. 24, pp. 281–
87; Takeo Tsuji and Shigeru Watanabe, “Neural Correlates of Belief-Bias Reasoning Under 
Time Pressure: A Near-Infrared Spectroscopy Study”, in NeuroImage, 2010, vol. 50, no. 3, 
pp. 1320–26. For literature on the decreased ability to generate alternative hypotheses, see, 
for example, Jerome Seymour Bruner and George Allen Austin, A Study of Thinking, 
Transaction Publishers, 1986, pp. 1091–97; and literature on stereotypes, see Galen V. Bo-
denhausen, “Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of Circadian Variations in 
Discrimination”, in Psychological Science, 1990, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 319–22; John S. Hul-
land and Don M. Kleinmunts, “Factors Influencing the Use of Internal Summary Evalua-
tions versus External Information in Choice”, in Behavioral Decision Making, 1994, vol. 
7, no. 2, pp. 79–102; Martin F. Kaplan, Tatian Wanshula and Mark P. Zanna, “Time Pres-
sure and Information Integration in Social Judgment: The Effect of Need for Structure”, in 
Ola Svensson and John Maule (eds.), Time Pressure and Information Integration in Social 
Judgment, Springer, 1993, pp. 255–67; Abraham Tesser and Mary C. Conlee, Some Effects 
of Time and Thought on Attitude Polarization, in Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 1975, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 262–70. 
299 See, for example, Ask and Granhag, 2007, pp. 561–91, see above note 98; Fahsing and  
Ask, 2013, pp. 155–65, see above note 45. 
300 See, for example, Steve M. Jex and Thomas W. Britt, Organizational Psychology: A Scien-
tist-Practitioner Approach, John Wiley & Sons, 2015, p. 294. 
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more unambiguous risk factor. Such case hypotheses can trigger suspect-
driven investigations as well as asymmetrical scepticism in relation to 
hypothesis-inconsistent evidence, which, in turn, can result in case hy-
potheses not being challenged enough. This is further emphasised by the 
risk of hypothesis-consistent searching and securing of evidence on crime 
scenes, forensic analyses biased by hypotheses, or contextual information 
as well as line-ups and interviews that are largely driven by case hypothe-
ses. 
Yet, formulating and working on the basis of a case hypothesis is 
usually inevitable. Possibly, even if a case hypothesis was not made ex-
plicit, the drive for cognitive coherence would probably make investiga-
tors formulate such a hypothesis in their minds anyways. Clearly, an ex-
plicit formulation of a case hypothesis will make the hypothesis more 
open to scrutiny. This in itself does not mean that the hypothesis will also 
be scrutinised, as this requires that investigators are capable of reasoning 
independently of the hypothesis. Like the research cited in this chapter 
illustrates, this is indeed challenging. An aspect of confirmation bias that 
strongly contributes to this, is its largely subconscious nature. Since it is 
unlikely that decision makers will detect confirmation bias when it occurs, 
especially not in their own reasoning, preventing it by using proactive 
debiasing techniques is necessary and an important part of quality control. 
The above-described inherent structural issues in investigations of 
core international crimes are to be considered risk factors of confirmation 
bias. However, many of these issues are difficult to address in other ways 
than making structural changes, which may be impossible or undesirable 
for other reasons. It is therefore better to focus on those risk factors that 
can be addressed more effectively. These risk factors are summarised in 
Table 1 together with corresponding debiasing techniques identified 
through cognitive, social or organisational as well as emotional or motiva-
tional psychology. 
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Table 1. Risk Factors and Corresponding Debiasing Techniques. 
Risk Factor Debiasing Technique 
Information overload 
(cognitive explanations) 
3. Structured analytical techniques 
4. Models for suspect interviews 
Access to contextual biasing information 
(cognitive, emotional or motivational ex-
planations) 
5. Contextual information management 
(CIM) 
 
Vertical models of investigation and prose-
cution 
(social and emotional or motivational 
explanations) 
6. Changing decision makers 
7. Evidence review panels 
Group polarisation and group-think 
(social explanations) 
8. Genuine, substantiated dissent 
through, for example, Devil’s advo-
cate procedures or red teams 
Time-pressure 
(organisational explanations) 
9. Better time management, longer 
timelines 
Multiple 
(cognitive, emotional or motivational, 
social or organisational explanations) 
10. Specific training on confirmation bias 
and cognitive, emotional or motiva-
tional, social or organisational expla-
nations 
11. Combining debiasing techniques, for 
example, structured analytical tech-
niques, contextual information man-
agement and changing decision maker 
As illustrated by Table 1, when it comes to identifying debiasing 
techniques, the explanations of confirmation bias can be helpful to differ-
ent extents and in different ways. The cognitive explanations provide ra-
ther specific guidelines. Since confirmation bias is enhanced in relation to 
cognitively more demanding tasks, reducing cognitive load can prevent 
the bias. More specifically, this can be done by using structured analytical 
techniques, such as case evaluation tables and charts. Such techniques 
break down a large and difficult decision or assessment task into smaller 
components, which, in line with the divide and conquer principle, reduces 
cognitive load. In the specific context of suspect interviews, cognitive 
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load is reduced by using an accepted model for how to conduct these in-
terviews, together with continuous training and education in asking open-
ended questions. 
Cognitive psychological research also suggests that it is very diffi-
cult or even impossible to disregard known contextual information. For 
instance, the research into forensic confirmation bias systematically 
shows biasing effects of analysts’ knowledge of case hypothesis, other 
evidence, and so on. As such, confirmation bias can also be prevented by 
implementing protocols for management of contextual information. In 
teams of investigators that have been working on the same case continu-
ously throughout the proceedings, the access to or knowledge of contex-
tual information is likely to be large. A context-manager or similar is as-
signed the role to decide what information is necessary and relevant for 
decision makers to know, and also when they have to know of it (sequen-
tial linear unmasking). To avoid that such techniques interrupt the work-
flow more than necessary, it is advisable to use protocols that establish, 
step by step, how such context management should be conducted. Ideally, 
this protocol should be tailor-made for the context in question. 
The explanations stemming from Emotion and Motivation Psychol-
ogy highlight the potentially biasing influence of emotions not only in the 
fact-finding process, but also in legal interpretation. As this may greatly 
impact investigations into core international crimes, knowledge of the risk 
factor is in itself important. Although mere knowledge of this risk factor is 
insufficient for preventing confirmation bias, such knowledge can be 
helpful in identifying situations where the bias might be at play, which in 
turn can be informative of appropriate decision structures. For instance, a 
context manager can help in the process of avoiding exposure to irrelevant 
emotional information (or ensuring that relevant but potentially biasing 
emotional information is only disclosed at a later point in time). Also, 
knowledge of emotional risk factors, can help identify situations in which 
a change of decision maker is appropriate, even if these situations as such 
do not fall within the frames of the non-competence provisions. 
Apart from that decision makers who have already been involved in 
an investigation might have formed emotional ties to a hypothesis, also 
the social explanations of confirmation bias imply that changing decision 
maker is a plausible debiasing technique. This is because confirmation 
bias seems to be stronger in relation to self-generated hypotheses than 
hypotheses generated by others. This research highlights that vertical 
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models for investigation and prosecution are risk factors of confirmation 
bias, as these models require that the same individuals remain on the case 
through all stages. Being involved at several stages of an investigation 
increases the risk of self-enhancement issues (of which the subconscious 
types are of interest here). More specifically, this means that decision 
makers become less interested in the truth and more interested in proving 
to others that their hypothesis is right. As such, they may fail to see the 
relevance of hypothesis inconsistent information. This risk should not be 
underestimated, especially not in investigations of core international 
crimes, in which the large amounts of complex crime relevant information 
can result in a strong (subconscious) temptation to take cognitive 
shortcuts. Changing decision maker between different situations or stages 
triggers more of a critical stance and is therefore a possible debiasing 
technique. This debiasing technique can also be considered in relation to 
more specific tasks such as working with an investigation plan or using 
methods such as the ACH. It is preferable that the generation of hypothe-
ses and the subsequent evaluation of the hypotheses are conducted by 
different individuals or teams of individuals. Similarly, evidence review 
panels consisting of individuals who have not previously been involved in 
the investigation are likely to be more critical and therefore better capable 
at providing alternative perspectives. Yet, the overall effect of having such 
panels is also dependent on how the presented alternative perspectives are 
received by those working with the investigation. Furthermore, social 
psychological research looking into group decision making highlights 
how group processes such as group polarisation and group-think can be-
come risk factors of confirmation bias. Although more research is still 
needed, genuine and substantiated dissent, for example, through devil’s 
advocate procedures or red teams can function as potential debiasing 
techniques. 
When it comes to the organisational explanations of confirmation 
bias, these are relatively complex to convert into plausible debiasing tech-
niques, primarily because organisational values such as efficiency de-
mands are unlikely to change in practice. Yet, since there is a close rela-
tionship between time pressure and narrow searches for information, bet-
ter time management and longer timelines can function as a debiasing 
technique. 
Since humans do not only have cognitive limitations, but are also 
emotional creatures that work within social groups as well as organisa-
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tional settings, the outlined explanations are, as pointed out in Section 7.3., 
to be considered mutually supportive rather than mutually exclusive. Un-
derstanding this complex interplay between different factors in producing 
the bias can be better understood through training on the nature of the bias. 
Furthermore, the identified debiasing techniques should be combined to 
provide effective quality control from a wider perspective. For instance, 
case evaluation tables and charts only ask decision makers to evaluate the 
evidence in relation to one hypothesis (under-determination), and it is 
therefore necessary to combine such methods with, for example, compara-
tive methods such as the ACH. Additionally, methods such as contextual 
information management and changing decision maker should also be 
used simultaneously to address risk factors in other parts of the investiga-
tion. 
Although previous research provides a good foundation for as-
sessing what types of debiasing techniques will function, it is crucial that 
any implementation of debiasing techniques in a specific context is pre-
ceded by tailor-making the debiasing techniques for that context. To begin 
with, this entails practical considerations – that is, what techniques or 
methods would be practically feasible to implement, considering, for ex-
ample, current workflows and mandatory decision structures. It also en-
tails careful empirical evaluation, usually using experimental methods, of 
the techniques directly in the context where they are intended to be used. 
Such evidence-based prevention, that is both practically informed and 
oriented, is the best remedy available against confirmation bias. 
The time that has passed since Nickerson introduced the currently 
most influential work on confirmation bias, has resulted in the realisation 
among researchers that there is no single fool-proof method to prevent 
confirmation bias. Yet, since the understanding of its context-specificity 
as well as its explanations have improved and become more nuanced, it is 
fair to say that we today know more about how to prevent it. To continue 
this work into specific contexts is important, not the least when it comes 
to the context of investigation of core international crimes. This is because, 
inspired by the quotation from Nickerson at the beginning of the chapter, 
if one were to attempt to identify a single problematic context in which all 
the risk factors of confirmation bias are pronounced, criminal investiga-
tion of core international crimes must be a leading candidate. 
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8.International Criminal Investigative Collection 
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and Evidence Review 
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8.1. Introduction 
The January 2019 collapse of the prosecution cases against Mr. Laurent 
Gbagbo, the erstwhile President of Côte d’Ivoire, and his co-accused, Mr. 
Charles Blé Goudé, constituted the latest in a series of debacles befalling 
the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) of the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’). In looking at the rather thin docket compiled since the establish-
ment of the Court in 2003, even the casual observer will note the substan-
tial number of ignominious OTP breakdowns. In four instances to date, 
ICC pre-trial chambers have refused to confirm any of the prosecution 
charges.1 In two further instances, pre-trial chambers confirmed some of 
                                                   
* Ewan Brown is Senior Analyst at the Commission for International Justice and Accounta-
bility (‘CIJA’); his prior service includes appointments as head of the Military Analysis 
Team at the ICTY-OTP, as Darfur Team Leader at the ICC-OTP and as an officer in the 
British Army. William H. Wiley is the Executive Director of the CIJA; he has also served 
variously as an intelligence analyst, investigator and legal advisor with the Canadian war-
crimes programme, the ICTY-OTP, the ICTR-OTP and the Iraqi High Tribunal, additional 
to his service as a Canadian Army officer. 
1 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-
243-Red (https://legal-tools.org/doc/cb3614); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, 16 December 2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/63028f); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Mohammed 
Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/4972c0); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prose-
cutor v. Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-
01/09-01/11-373 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/96c3c2). 
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the OTP charges, only to see the Prosecutor formally withdraw the cases – 
including that brought against the President of Kenya – on the grounds 
that the OTP lacked sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.2 In another 
case, Mr. Mathieu Ngudjolo was acquitted of all charges by Trial Cham-
ber II at the conclusion of his trial,3 after he had spent nearly five years in 
custody; and, it will be recalled, in mid-2018 the ICC Appeals Chamber 
vacated the conviction of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba on all charges arising 
from his alleged perpetration of core international crimes, after Mr. Bem-
ba had spent ten years in custody.4 Against this record, the OTP has suc-
cessfully prosecuted only four individuals for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, one of whom pleaded guilty.5 Similarly, the Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’) have registered just 
three convictions since the first judges were sworn in during July 2006.6 
For its part, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’) has not (at January 
2020) issued a single judgement on a criminal charge; the investigative 
body which gave rise to the Tribunal commenced its work in 2005.7 In a 
similar vein, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s 
Office (‘KSC’) have not brought any charges, the investigations inform-
ing that body having commenced in 2011.8 
                                                   
2 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, OTP, 
Prosecution notification of withdrawal of the charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 11 
March 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-687 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/4786c1); ICC, Situation in 
the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, Notice of with-
drawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 2014, ICC-01/09-
02/11-983 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/b57a97). 
3 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 18 De-
cember 2012, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2c2cde). 
4 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 June 2018, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red (https://legal-tools.org/doc/40d35b). 
5 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi and Bosco Ntaganda. 
6 See ECCC’s web site. 
7 The United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (‘UNIIIC’) was 
established in April 2005 pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1595 
(2005), UN Doc. S/RES/1595 (2005), 7 April 2005 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/4a0623). 
8 The Special Investigative Task Force (‘SITF’), established in 2011, evolved into the Spe-
cial Prosecutor’s Office in 2016; see KSC’s web site. 
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Factors unique to any given casefile will explain why (i) an investi-
gation does not give rise to a prosecution and, where allegations are 
brought before a panel of judges, (ii) the prosecution fails to secure a con-
viction. This chapter is concerned primarily with the second phenomenon; 
and it will be noted that a consistent set of shortcomings invariably in-
forms unsuccessful prosecutions. The principal problems identified by 
pre-trial (at the ICC) and trial chambers more generally are summarised 
here as being an insufficiency of evidence as well as the failure of prose-
cutors to assess properly such prima facie evidence which an OTP choos-
es to adduce. By way of example, the reasons given by ICC Trial Cham-
ber I for the dismissal of the charges against Messrs. Blé Goudé and 
Gbagbo  are representative. In the relevant decision, the trial panel noted 
the lack of evidence supporting the contextual narrative advanced by the 
prosecution as well as the paucity of evidentiary support for many of the 
key assertions made by the OTP. In particular, the trial chamber pointed to 
insufficiently-supported OTP allegations concerning, inter alia, the devel-
opment of a common plan, the existence of an inner circle and the shared 
intent underlying the alleged common plan formulated by the ostensible 
members of the said inner circle.9 Taken as a whole, the written reasons 
offered by the majority of the trial panel for the dismissal of the charges 
against both accused were withering – and justifiably so, given the palpa-
ble weakness of the prosecution case as well as the fact that Mr. Blé Gou-
dé and Mr. Gbagbo had spent, respectively, roughly five and seven years 
in custody. As things stand, it is difficult to rebut the arguments of those 
who hold that ICC-OTP expenditures since 2003, along with the paucity 
of convictions relative to collapsed cases, together point to a record of 
prosecutorial failure. 
It is undoubtedly the case that the underlying reasons for the unde-
sirable state of affairs set out in the prior paragraph do not all lie with the 
ICC-OTP. For instance, any international chief prosecutor charged with 
the investigation of complex crimes in politically unstable environments 
which present significant physical-security challenges will encounter dif-
ficulties in securing sufficient evidence to warrant formal allegations of 
individual criminal responsibility for the perpetration of core international 
                                                   
9 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Reasons of Judge Geoffrey Henderson, 16 July 2019, 
ICC-02/11-01/15-1263-AnxB-Red, paras. 66–77 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/j0v5qx). 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 532 
crimes. Transcending the obstacles posed by political instability and phys-
ical risk will always prove to be especially difficult where an international 
court or tribunal lacks a United Nations Security Council Chapter VII 
mandate. These mitigating factors having been noted, it is nonetheless to 
be recalled that it is the ethical obligation of prosecutors – domestic and 
international – to refrain from bringing to trial any suspect where there is 
not a reasonable prospect of conviction. The limited collective caseload of 
the ECCC, STL and KSC would suggest that the chief prosecutors who 
have served in those institutions understand this ethical requirement. Ms. 
Fatou Bensouda, the ICC chief Prosecutor, presumably does as well, inso-
far as most of the cases which have collapsed on her watch were initiated 
by her predecessor, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo. 
Given the wide-ranging responsibilities of any chief prosecutor 
charged with overseeing operations of significant scope, it follows that he 
or she will only be effective where subordinate investigators, analysts and 
counsel conform collectively to the highest standards of evidence collec-
tion, analysis and case management. Indisputably, it is the first duty of a 
chief prosecutor to ensure that such standards are upheld by his or her 
subordinates. This truism aside, the fact that the ICC-OTP has lost (or 
otherwise seen collapse) more cases than it has won would suggest to 
some that there is disconnect between the threshold for a conviction set by 
the ICC judges and the standard prevailing within the OTP. What is more 
likely is that the OTP grasps in theory the burden of proof established by 
the judicial chambers of the Court whereas in practice the OTP is, as a 
body, unable to determine consistently whether it holds sufficient evi-
dence to meet the requisite evidentiary standards for a conviction on a 
particular charge. 
If the latter assertion is correct – and the litany of OTP failures at 
the pre-trial, trial and appellate levels would suggest that it is – this delete-
rious situation points to three overlapping sets of problems. First, the OTP 
has experienced difficulties on a consistent basis in collecting information 
of prima facie evidentiary value which, in turn, might be transformed into 
relevant evidence through analytical processes. The suspicion of the au-
thors of this chapter is that, more often than not, the obstacles encountered 
by the OTP where it has sought to collect high-quality prima facie evi-
dence have led, in a misguided attempt to demonstrate internal progress, 
to the over-collection of more easily accessible forms of information, in 
particular, crime base testimony. Secondly, there is apparently an inability 
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on the part of a plurality of OTP investigators, analysts and lawyers to 
grasp fully the depth, quality and quantities of evidence required to ensure 
a reasonable prospect of conviction where a decision is taken to send a 
case to trial. Thirdly, the evidence-review processes of the ICC-OTP are 
often not functioning properly. Were this not the case, convictions rather 
than prosecutorial failure would be the norm. Absent these three consider-
ations, there is no logical explanation for the fact that the OTP chief and 
senior prosecutors have so often found themselves buried in the rubble of 
cases which have collapsed atop them. 
Notwithstanding these introductory remarks, this chapter should not 
be seen as an indictment of the ICC-OTP, the evidence collection efforts 
of which have been undermined not infrequently by political chicanery 
and seemingly insurmountable physical risk. Rather, it takes certain of the 
shortcomings of that institution only as its starting point, offering, as the 
ICC-OTP performance does, an object lesson in the fate which awaits any 
prosecutor, appearing before an independent judiciary, where he or she 
proceeds to trial in a complex case armed with insufficient evidence. The 
policy brief of Mr. Morten Bergsmo, which informs this entire volume, 
serves as an important guide, not least through its reference to the indis-
pensability of effective evidence collection and review as well as the pit-
falls of collecting too much evidence – or, rather, the wrong sorts of evi-
dence. 10  To these ends, what follows places particular emphasis upon 
planning for the collection of crime base as well as linkage evidence 
whilst making a case for innovation in the gathering of contextual evi-
dence. The substantive discussion closes with a call for more robust evi-
dence review processes. 
8.2. Evidentiary Challenges 
The building of prosecution cases against senior leadership personnel 
within the framework of international criminal and humanitarian law 
(‘ICHL’), or domestic variants thereof, is time consuming, resource inten-
sive and requires considerable attention to detail on the part of the investi-
gators, analysts and counsel assigned to a given file. It is worth recalling 
that the focus of ICHL investigations and prosecutions frequently falls 
                                                   
10 Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019 (https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). 
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upon individuals well removed from the underlying physical acts of a 
criminal nature; and, whether the suspects are of low or high rank, they 
will invariably be operating (or have operated) in the midst of military 
conflicts which often give rise to extreme levels of societal breakdown. 
The presence of an array of belligerent parties, including those foreign to 
the territory on which a conflict takes place, further complicates the chal-
lenges facing those tasked with the building of prosecution cases. 
As a rule, investigative and prosecutorial bodies – particularly those 
operating internationally – find themselves grappling with an array of 
perpetrating structures of a political, military, police, security-intelligence, 
paramilitary and, occasionally, commercial nature. In the post-ad hoc Tri-
bunal era, domestic and international investigations are in the main under-
taken in and around ongoing armed conflicts; this reality complicates sig-
nificantly the challenges inherent in the collection of high-quality, prima 
facie evidence, most especially by public authorities with their necessarily 
limited capacity to adapt to the physical risks presented by theatres of war. 
What is more, international criminal investigative teams are invariably 
compelled to take into account broad temporal parameters and wide geo-
graphical areas, within which multiple offences have taken place. Not-
withstanding these challenges, there is (and can be) no lessoning of the 
requirement that, where a case is brought to trial, the prosecutor must 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the elements of the 
crimes alleged as well as the legal requirements of the modes of liability 
alleged in the prosecution complaint. 
It was the early practice of the OTPs of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) and the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) to 
collect key evidence during trial; that is, after the accused had habitually 
spent significant periods of time in pre-trial custody and hard-pressed 
senior trial attorneys came to realise, time and again, that they were argu-
ing cases which, absent significant additional evidence collection, would 
collapse. For the most part, both OTPs got away with this risky approach 
to case building insofar as the number of acquittals witnessed at the ICTY 
and the ICTR was remarkably few. At these institutions, prosecutorial 
disaster was consistently averted only because they both operated with 
Chapter VII mandates in secure, post-conflict environments characterised 
by levels of domestic-political interference which, in the main, did not 
present competent investigative efforts with insurmountable difficulties. 
These relative advantages have rarely made themselves available in such 
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abundance to the OTPs established since 2000 – and, most especially, not 
to the ICC-OTP. Given the ethical requirement to investigate incriminat-
ing and exonerating evidence related to all the elements of every offence 
and mode of liability alleged prior to trial, investigators, analysts and 
counsel are today routinely confronted with potentially overwhelming 
evidentiary challenges. 
During the investigative phase of ICHL cases, it has become com-
monplace for investigative and prosecutorial authorities to distinguish 
between crime base and linkage evidence. While there is at times a degree 
of important overlap between these categories, the distinction, which has 
gained traction in the practice of ICHL over the last 15 years, serves to 
focus the minds of investigators, analysts and counsel upon the relevance 
and value of every specific piece of evidence as well as its place within 
the overall case. The authors of this chapter suggest that the time has 
come to add a third category of evidence to those of crime base and link-
age – that of contextual evidence. These three classifications of evidence 
shall now be considered in turn. 
8.2.1. Crime Base Evidence 
Defined in purely legal terms, crime base evidence is used to satisfy the 
physical elements of the offences alleged; as such, it does not concern 
itself with the mental elements of crimes nor the mental and material legal 
requirements of the modes of liability set out in ICHL. The collection of 
crime base information is designed to establish that acts of a criminal na-
ture have been perpetrated and the context in which they were committed; 
to this end, crime base collection generally involves the identification of 
victims, eyewitnesses to physical acts and the institutional affiliation of 
the physical perpetrators of those acts. Additionally, crime base inquiries 
will frequently address the broader actions of perpetrating structures, not 
least prior to and following key incidents. 
The focus of crime base inquiries upon the details pertaining to un-
derlying physical acts of a potentially criminal nature, gleaned principally 
from witnesses to such events (that is, crime base witnesses), has come to 
be well understood by the investigators, analysts and counsel employed 
by national as well as international investigative bodies. However, indi-
vidual investigative teams demonstrate at times an insufficient grasp of 
the multiple sub-themes of crime base collection – that is, the finding of 
material pertaining to selected incidents, including that which pre- and 
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post-dates the key events – all of which require highly detailed, unique 
and demanding collection activities. For instance, it is invariably advisa-
ble that investigative teams secure location and geospatial data; identify 
all targets attacked during the key incident(s); obtain details regarding the 
weapons (or weapon systems) employed during the perpetration of of-
fences; prepare a detailed account – including the full biographical de-
tails – of casualties and bystanders; establish the wider patterns of combat 
activity at the time of the relevant incident(s); secure information regard-
ing the presence in the vicinity, if any, of armed groups hostile to the sus-
pected perpetrating structures; determine whether ranking personnel were 
present at the incident location(s) prior to, during or after the key event(s); 
establish whether any threats or warnings were issued by the suspected 
perpetrating structure(s) prior to the incident(s); and identify any post-
incident inquiries undertaken by officials associated with the said perpe-
trating structure(s). 
These and other questions need to be explored systematically and 
exhaustively in order to arrive at a comprehensive and objective account 
of any suspected criminality. At times, it is relatively easy to establish, at 
least to a prima facie standard of evidence, that criminal acts were perpe-
trated, for example, in instances where military forces appeared in a vil-
lage and, in the absence of armed opposition, proceeded to execute some 
or all of the civilians found in the settlement. However, in other instances 
the loss of civilian life, in and of itself, cannot reasonably give rise to a 
working hypothesis that one or another party to the fighting perpetrated 
criminal acts. This is most especially the case where sizeable opposing 
forces engaged one another in built-up areas in which large numbers of 
civilians were present. To conclude solely upon the basis of the loss of 
civilian life in the midst of battle that a criminal offence was perpetrated 
is to forget that international humanitarian law makes considerable allow-
ance for such losses where civilians have not been targeted directly. 
8.2.1.1. Crime Base Collection Planning 
It is essential that crime base information-cum-evidence should be sought 
in accordance with a properly prepared and detailed collection plan. The 
undertaking of crime base collection activities in the absence of such a 
plan – which was almost uniformly the practice at the ad hoc Tribunals 
and remains a distressingly common practice – will invariably lead to the 
diversion of finite investigative resources from more pressing evidentiary 
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requirements whilst serving to bury an investigative team in superfluous 
information. Material collected in the field is not, strictly speaking, evi-
dence or even prima facie evidence; rather, what is collected is infor-
mation which becomes evidence only after it has been analysed in the 
context of the applicable substantive law. What is more, analytical re-
sources are invariably limited within investigative teams, which is to note 
that they should not be redirected from significant evidentiary questions 
towards the assessment of mountains of information which may, upon 
analysis, turn out to have the evidentiary value of mattress stuffing. 
There is no fixed format for a crime base collection plan; such doc-
uments are organic in nature in that they are subject to ongoing amend-
ment in accordance with the findings of the investigation as the latter 
evolves. In producing the first iteration of a collection plan, the investiga-
tive team will invariably turn to reports coming from the human rights 
world, for instance, those issued by non-governmental organisations and 
United Nations fact-finding missions. Although human rights reports are 
habitually produced for advocacy purposes – and conform to standards of 
evidence falling well below those demanded by criminal courts – they 
nonetheless tend to identify with reasonable accuracy the simple fact of 
critical incidents. As such, human rights reports offer something in the 
way of initial guidance to a criminal investigation at its outset. That noted, 
criminal investigative teams should look to open sources of this nature as 
guides rather than as gospel. For this reason, the leads taken from human 
rights reports will, in the first draft of a collection plan, be supplemented 
by lengthy lists of questions appropriate to the likely challenges identified 
at the outset by properly led investigative teams. 
It is critical that such questions are posed from the outset of an in-
vestigation where, amended as necessary, they must remain at the heart of 
the collection plan, not least in order to focus the minds of investigators, 
analysts and counsel on to the key evidentiary requirements. Each theme 
and sub-theme in a crime base collection plan should generate detailed 
questions which, as they are answered, will facilitate the building of an 
objective as well as complete picture of what might be termed the what, 
where, when and how of an incident or incidences. For instance, an inves-
tigation concerned with one or more security-intelligence structures sus-
pected of perpetrating ICHL offences in static locations (for instance, de-
tention facilities) will pose to an extent different questions than an inquiry 
focused upon ground forces suspected of having violated the principles of 
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distinction and the law of proportionality in the context of otherwise law-
ful military operations. Nonetheless, every crime base collection plan will 
set out clearly a number of key themes, not least: the identification of the 
chronology of the key incident(s); the establishment of the pertinent ac-
tions, along with the details of the physical perpetrators of the incident(s) 
as well as the units, formations and organisations with which the suspect-
ed physical authors of the prima facie criminal acts served; the material 
elements of the suspected prima facie offences; and the identification of a 
comprehensive contextual narrative taking into account key events which 
occurred prior to, during and following the relevant incident(s). 
It is worth reiterating that collection plans take the form of a large 
number of specific questions to be answered with critical detachment; 
concomitantly, these questions are matched with potential sources – hu-
man and material – which are to be exploited to this end. This practice 
might be illustrated with reference to a single example, in particular, tor-
ture as a crime against humanity as this is set out in the Rome Statute at 
Article 7(1)(f) and, more specifically, the physical element of the offence 
which requires proof that the person was in the custody of the perpetrator. 
The questions arising during any effort to satisfy what is only one of the 
numerous elements of this offence necessarily revolve around when, 
where and how the person was taken into custody; an extremely detailed 
physical description of the relevant holding, detention and interrogation 
facilities used for the duration of the detention; the feeding, sanitary and 
medical arrangements; the allowance (if any) for prison visits, not least by 
international monitors such as representatives of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross; the nature of the prisoner routine, if a routine of 
sorts was imposed upon the detainees by the administration of the facility; 
the precise process of interrogation, questioning and detainee processing; 
the questions put to person(s) during interrogation sessions and the nature 
of any physical as well as mental suasion brought to bear during these 
sessions or at any other time; and the more general conduct and routines 
of the facility staff, whether guards, interrogators or persons in positions 
of higher authority. Each one of these themes and sub-themes demands a 
set of detailed (and different) questions to be asked if the whole story is to 
be ascertained. The potential sources of answers to these and other perti-
nent questions should be identified alongside each query and might in-
clude other persons incarcerated in the relevant facilities; persons who 
served in any capacity in the facilities; imagery (in all its forms); electron-
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ic and primary documentation, particularly that generated contemporane-
ously to the key incident(s) by the institution(s) and organisation(s) ulti-
mately responsible for the detention of the person(s) subjected to prima 
facie acts of torture. 
The aforementioned – though by no means complete – selection of 
questions to be answered in order to satisfy only one of the elements of a 
commonly perpetrated offence points to the complexity and indeed the 
typical length of crime base collection plans. Under the circumstances, the 
drafting and maintenance of collection plans is very time consuming giv-
en the demand for forensic attention to detail in a situation where investi-
gators, analysts and counsel must collaborate closely. As such, an investi-
gation manager who fails to ensure the utmost rigour in collection plan-
ning is remiss in the execution of one of his or her core duties and corre-
spondingly runs the risk of failing to meet detailed collection require-
ments. 
8.2.1.2. Excessive Crime Base Collection 
It is the experience of the authors of this chapter that ICHL investigations 
have, on various grounds, oftentimes been blighted by the serious over-
collection of crime base evidence. The reasons for this tendency reflect 
the relative (to linkage evidence collection) ease of securing crime base 
evidence; the generally emotive nature of crime base materials; a belief 
that any form of evidence collection constitutes a demonstration of pro-
gress; the widespread understanding of basic crime base collection re-
quirements combined with a lack of awareness of the varied nature and 
critical importance of linkage evidence; and the mistaken belief that cases 
must necessarily be built from the ground up, that is, from crime scene to 
perpetrator. As a rule of thumb, properly conducted international-criminal 
investigations ultimately giving rise to the prosecution of high-level ac-
cused need to invest only a small amount (for instance, 10 per cent) of 
their resources to the establishment of the crime base. The investigation of 
lower-ranking suspects is principally the domain of national war-crimes 
units which invariably find themselves dealing with suspects who are 
alleged to have been the physical perpetrators of criminal acts. It logically 
follows that during the investigation of low-ranking perpetrators within 
domestic jurisdictions a great deal more emphasis is placed upon the es-
tablishment of the crime base, given the general absence of a requirement 
to collect linkage evidence. 
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The establishment of crime bases is very much the forte of police 
officers who have developed their skills in a non-international setting; this 
observation reflects the fact that the investigation of serious domestic 
criminality – most especially, murders and physical assaults where the 
perpetrator and victim had a relationship of some sort – place a great deal 
of emphasis upon the satisfaction of the physical elements of the offences. 
As such, when domestic police officers migrate to the international, crim-
inal-investigative domain, their existing skills are, in the main, well suited 
to crime base work, where these investigators are managed properly in 
accordance with a detailed collection plan. More specifically, domestic 
practitioners are skilled at identifying, and interviewing with considerable 
attention to detail, the victims, eyewitnesses and the perpetrators of physi-
cal acts of a criminal nature. Police officers likewise tend to be adept at 
exploiting photographic and other forms of imagery as well as handling 
forensic, medical and other technical sources. Whereas these same people 
are generally unfamiliar with documentary analysis, unless they have 
worked domestically within specialised teams addressing allegations of 
complex fraud and transnational crime, this shortcoming can (or ought to) 
be addressed by investigative team analysts. 
The system of international-criminal justice has learned through tri-
al and a great deal of error that it is likely that difficulties will arise where 
police officers with insufficient international experience seek to execute 
complex international-criminal investigations without substantial input or 
management from analysts and trial counsel. Such is the lesson drawn by 
a great many informed observers who have engaged in the dissection of 
the formative investigations undertaken by the OTPs of the ICTY and 
ICTR. The majority of these early investigations were characterised by 
the massive over-collection of crime base information-cum-evidence – 
and little, if any, corresponding collection of the sort of linkage evidence 
required to secure the conviction of persons alleged to share criminal re-
sponsibility for offences perpetrated at oftentimes considerable physical 
and temporal distances from the headquarters and offices from which they 
directed their subordinates. 
On the face of it, such over collection of crime base materials might 
be characterised as largely harmless – if, and only if, investigative team 
resources were not finite and the challenges posed by linkage evidence 
collection not a great deal more complicated than those presented when 
seeking to establish a crime base. In the event, the over-collection of 
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crime base witness testimony will frequently serve to create witness-
protection issues to a degree incommensurate with institutional capacity. 
Furthermore, the excessive collection of crime base witness evidence 
tends to raise the expectations of the victims of war that the sort of justice 
they seek will be realised, with concomitant reputational damage to the 
judicial institution concerned where such expectations are not met – 
which is generally the case. More immediately, excessive crime base col-
lection will tend to overwhelm team analysts and counsel with large vol-
umes of information which, even where it has evidentiary value, is super-
fluous to requirements. If the failings of the ICC-OTP are indicative, what 
is still more certain is that international judges are sufficiently savvy that 
they cannot be tricked into registering a conviction where an OTP adduces, 
in the hope of securing a conviction, a tsunami of crime base material as 
an alternative to linkage evidence specific to the accused. Given the fore-
going, it must be reiterated that careful collection planning throughout the 
course of an investigation is the key to avoiding any tendency towards 
crime base over-collection. 
8.2.2. Linkage Evidence 
Linkage evidence can be defined in legal terms as that which is required 
to meet the mental and material elements of the alleged modes of liability 
as well as the mental elements of the offences. Put in layman’s terms, 
linkage evidence collection seeks to connect acts of a criminal nature to 
individuals operating as part of institutions and like structures; this objec-
tive is realised through the analysis of the actions as well as inactions of 
the suspects and their subordinates in the context of their formal (that is, 
institutional) responsibilities. Given that international criminal investiga-
tions are not (or ought not to be) individual-target driven, the bulk of the 
collection and analytical effort within a given investigative team must 
necessarily be assigned to ensuring a comprehensive understanding of key 
linkage themes, including: the relevant military, security, political and 
paramilitary structures and their activities; the commanders, staff officers 
and other key personalities operating within these structures; the com-
mand, control and communications (‘C3’) apparatus linking command 
and staff headquarters to deployed units; and the disciplinary procedures 
at the disposal of the command, both de jure and de facto. As might be 
imagined, the building of linkage cases against high-ranking suspects 
requires considerable collection and analytical capacity. However, once 
the functioning of the relevant structures has been understood in signifi-
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cant detail – an effort which should absorb the overwhelming majority of 
the resources assigned to a complex criminal investigation – it is a rela-
tively straightforward matter to identify the top leaders of the said struc-
tures and, in turn, link them through the C3 arrangements to the underly-
ing criminal acts. 
Whereas the crime base of any given case is invariably established 
to the requisite standard, notwithstanding the previously discussed ten-
dency towards over-collection of crime base information, the same cannot 
often be said of the linkage component of international investigations. The 
problems which OTPs have experienced (and continue to experience) in 
establishing effective linkage cases would appear to stem from an insuffi-
cient understanding by many within the profession of ICHL investigations 
of: (i) the legal requirements of the modes of liability; (ii) how political, 
military, security-intelligence and paramilitary bodies function during 
operations; and, in particular, (iii) the detailed and oftentimes technical 
nature of the evidence needed to satisfy the legal requirements of a win-
ning case. It is very difficult to understand – at least for the authors of this 
chapter – why international-criminal investigators, analysts and counsel, 
taken together, remain so deficient in these crucial respects. Redressing 
this shortcoming once and for all is a matter of the utmost urgency if the 
international practice of ICHL is not to be called into further and ultimate-
ly irreparable disrepute. 
8.2.2.1. Linkage Case Collection Planning 
As the above legal definition of linkage evidence would suggest, the start-
ing point for all linkage collection efforts must be a consideration of the 
legal requirements of the modes of liability which are most likely to be 
alleged at the juncture that one or more suspects is identified. The collec-
tion planning process should be built around the relevant legal require-
ments, ideally with reference to the commentary built into easily accessi-
ble platforms such as the Case Matrix, where the legal requirements as 
well as a great many sub-themes of the legal requirements are hyperlinked 
in a user-friendly manner to relevant international jurisprudence. Armed 
with an understanding of how evidence and law have come together in 
prior litigation, investigators, analysts, counsel and investigations manag-
ers should be able at once to formulate and amend detailed collection 
plans whilst seeing to their proper execution. Why such practice has not 
emerged as a profession-wide standard operating procedure constitutes yet 
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another mystery of the study of the practice of ICHL – albeit one in which 
the ramifications of failure could not be clearer. 
Just as with crime base collection, the core linkage themes (for in-
stance, structures, chains of command, commanders, communications 
systems and disciplinary processes) will each generate detailed lists of 
questions which need to be answered if a complete picture of the institu-
tional context, and ultimately the actions of key actors, is to be built. By 
way of an example designed to illustrate the complexity of linkage collec-
tion planning, one might consider a single legal requirement relevant to 
Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, which is concerned with command and 
superior responsibility, that is, the requirement that the prosecution 
demonstrate that an alleged perpetrator had effective command and con-
trol, or effective authority and control, over the forces which committed 
the crime. A review of the wealth of jurisprudence addressing the evi-
dence which supports allegations of effective command and control 
makes it clear that this element might be demonstrated in numerous ways; 
and, if the requisite evidence is to be collected, it is essential that an inves-
tigative team grasp fully the approaches which have worked in the past. It 
follows that where such an understanding is absent, so too will be the 
ability of the team to generate the necessary questions during the collec-
tion-planning process; in turn, critical linkage evidence pertaining to the 
legal requirement shall not be gathered, leading to prosecutorial claims 
with respect to effective command and control remaining unproven. 
Efforts to establish the existence of effective command and control 
should at the outset seek evidence concerning, amongst other matters: the 
identity of all relevant commanders and staff; the superior as well as sub-
ordinate structures; the types and functioning of the communications sys-
tems used by these structures; the operational as well as administrative 
relationships between the superior and subordinate structures; and the 
operational, administrative, disciplinary and logistical activity of the rele-
vant structures. Each of the foregoing themes should be explored through 
the identification of several sub-themes, each of which require detailed 
questioning. For instance, the issue of discipline can be broken down into 
questions regarding contemporaneous notice of alleged criminal activity 
within one or more subordinate units, the investigation of the latter and 
the punishment (if any) of miscreants. In looking at the matter of commu-
nications, the investigative team should consider the communication sys-
tems and processes of every subordinate formation and unit within a given 
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chain of command as well as that of the higher headquarters. These col-
lection questions should encompass, not least: an examination of the 
communications procedures and their form (for instance, radio, e-mail, 
hard-copy documentation, meetings and briefings); a consideration of 
which key personnel utilised which systems; the capability and limitations 
of the communications systems; the frequency of communications and 
their formal regulation; a consideration of any redundancies built into the 
systems; and the security features of the latter, including callsigns and 
codewords. As with crime base collection planning, the various themes 
and sub-themes should be linked to potential sources of information and 
evidence which, in the assessment of the investigative team, might be 
exploited by OTP analysts. 
Collection and analysis during the investigative phase should target 
as much primary source documentation as exists, specifically documenta-
tion generated by the structures suspected of having engaged in the perpe-
tration of the core international crimes which constitute the crime base. 
Such materials can take the form of hard-copy documents or, as is increas-
ingly common, materials in electronic form, such as email and databases. 
In this context, it will be recalled that the sources of crime base evidence 
are rarely of any use to efforts to establish individual criminal responsibil-
ity. The sort of witness testimony which is sought to establish a linkage 
case is that of insiders (one category of linkage witness), these being indi-
viduals who themselves served in some capacity within the perpetrating 
structures, ideally at the same time as the targets of the investigation. As 
individual investigative targets of higher rank are identified only relative-
ly late in the investigative cycle – at least where an investigative team 
knows what it is doing and is consequently keen not to overlook exculpa-
tory information and evidence – linkage witnesses of any sort should be 
interviewed only following the careful study of the primary documenta-
tion and well into the life of an investigation, in particular, once suspects 
have been identified, however tentatively, with an eye to their prosecution. 
8.2.2.2. Linkage Collection Staffing in the Context of Evidentiary 
Requirements 
The collapse of the ICC-OTP cases against Messrs. Gbagbo and Kenyatta, 
amongst others, suggests that (i) the accused were not criminally culpable, 
in which case these investigations should not have given rise to prosecu-
tions or (ii) the OTP did (and does) not possess sufficient numbers of 
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skilled personnel to build solid prosecution files against high-ranking sus-
pects. The investigation of top-level suspects is best approached with hu-
mility as well as a realisation that the volume and variety of linkage fac-
tors to be considered in building cases rooted in ICHL shall invariably 
render daunting any given collection effort even before it has commenced. 
As Gbagbo and Kenyatta have shown, this is most especially the case 
where it is envisioned that an investigation shall ultimately lead to charges 
being brought against senior leaders operating at considerable physical 
and temporal distance from the underlying criminal acts, that is, suspects 
controlling numerous subordinate entities which, for senior most leaders, 
will frequently encompass military, security-intelligence, police and polit-
ical structures. 
Securing enough inculpatory evidence to warrant the prosecution of 
high-level suspects is highly challenging, even where an institution is 
adequately skilled to commence an investigation on the basis of a proper-
ly-structured collection plan – particularly where the investigative body is 
confronted with a need to operate in and around an ongoing armed con-
flict whilst dealing additionally (or alternatively) with substantial politi-
cal-diplomatic resistance. Challenges of this nature constitute a chronic 
problem for public-sector authorities, not least the ICC-OTP. Recent non-
public sector initiatives, especially the CIJA, are designed to execute suc-
cessful criminal investigations rooted in ICHL and domestic variants 
thereof by overcoming the obstacles presented by physical risk as well as 
political difficulties. However, the private criminal-investigative sector 
remains very much in its infancy. As such, it is necessary to ask what the 
public sector might do on its own to strengthen its ability to build effec-
tive linkage cases in a timely as well as cost-effective manner. Answering 
this question is an exceptionally pressing matter for international crimi-
nal-investigative bodies such as the ICC-OTP, given the demands being 
placed upon them by Western donors who are anxious to see more cost-
effective investigations and successful prosecutorial output. 
The position taken here is that public-sector, international criminal-
investigative bodies would do well to look at their current approach to 
recruitment. First, it will be observed that, as a rule, the relevant interna-
tional institutions employ too many investigators and too few analysts. 
While the distinction between these two disciplines has, over the last 15 
years, improved to the extent that investigators are often trained to engage 
in analytical work and vice-versa, a great many investigators and analysts 
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continue to enter the international system (or otherwise move between 
international bodies) with a mind-set which holds that investigators ought 
to do little more than collect prima facie evidence in the field whilst ana-
lysts should remain chained to their computers collating material at head-
quarters. Analysts have the critical function of giving meaning to the ma-
terial collected, although this primary purpose is frequently inappropriate-
ly subordinated to information-management tasks assigned by more sen-
ior personnel. When it comes to linkage evidence collection, it is essential 
that investigators and analysts have a detailed understanding of the entire 
case file, with analysts needing to be prepared to deploy alongside inves-
tigators to participate in, amongst other activities, the interviewing of in-
sider witnesses and the exploitation at the point of acquisition of physical 
materials. In order to break down further the distinction between the in-
vestigator-collector and analysis roles, it is recommended in the strongest 
possible terms that investigator recruitment should in every case target the 
ranks of police officers with backgrounds in the fields of serious fraud and 
transnational crime. Bearing in mind the thematic core of most ICHL in-
vestigations, it remains surprising to the authors of this chapter just how 
few ICHL practitioners are possessed of prior military experience. Stated 
simply, more investigators as well as analysts with military- and security-
intelligence backgrounds need to be taken into the international OTPs. 
Secondly, it is the assessment of the authors of this chapter that the 
ranks of international trial counsel have come to be filled to an unhealthy 
degree with lawyers who have a brilliant understanding of ICHL which is 
not accompanied by a corresponding degree of excellence when it comes 
to matters of evidence. Whereas the ranks of international investigators 
and analysts do include the occasional professional with a legal education, 
it is rare that any of the people with such qualifications have practiced law, 
either domestically or internationally. As such, it falls to trial counsel – for 
reasons of crucial quality control – to take ultimate responsibility for the 
marrying of fact to law, that is, to ensure that the elements of the offences 
as well as the legal requirements of the modes of liability alleged are al-
ways properly supported by sufficient evidence. The lead trial attorneys 
employed at the remaining international bodies are, with very few excep-
tions, highly skilled in this respect. However, the complexity of any inves-
tigation and prosecution which encompasses a substantial linkage compo-
nent is such that lead trial counsel are necessarily dependent upon subor-
dinate attorneys in determining whether the marriage of fact to law is suf-
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ficient in every respect. The international OTPs have come to employ 
substantial numbers of counsel who have never practiced law outside of 
the international domain and, as a result, are unfamiliar with the culture of 
domestic criminal practice, where immense attention must be paid to 
questions of evidence, with legal niceties constituting a relevant, albeit 
secondary, matter. Finally, it will be noted that whilst there is absolutely 
no requirement for the hiring of more lawyers to international OTPs, the 
preponderance of international investigations involving military and par-
amilitary actors generates an immense need within these institutions for 
more counsel with military experience, secured as legal officers or 
through other military occupations. 
8.2.3. Contextual Evidence 
Crime base and, most especially, linkage evidence together rest at the 
heart of all international criminal cases brought against suspects of any 
substantive rank. However, the view taken here is that the field of interna-
tional-criminal investigations and prosecutions – and, more to the point, 
the demands which trial judges now place upon prosecutors – has evolved 
to the point that it is necessary to consider a third category of evidence, 
that being of a contextual nature. Whereas contextual evidence has long 
been collected in the course of international-criminal inquiries, it has 
tended to be afforded insufficient priority by investigative teams and 
prosecutors. This absence of prioritisation reflects their general failure to 
grasp its relevance or, more simply, the tendency to fold the collection of 
contextual evidence into the building of the crime base and linkage cases. 
8.2.3.1. The Dual Importance of Detailed Case Narratives 
Contextual evidence collection can be used to formulate and inform de-
tailed case narratives, in particular, prosecutorial narratives setting out the 
wider background, development and description of events within which 
the criminality and more general conduct of the alleged perpetrator(s) is 
assessed as having taken place. In formal allegations (for instance, in-
dictments) as well as trial briefs, it is the practice of prosecutors to offer 
trial panels, by way of introduction to core prosecutorial arguments, what 
are purported to be comprehensive contextual narratives touching upon, as 
prosecutors deem relevant, questions of ethnicity, religion, political-
geography and military matters. Such narratives will invariably (or ought 
to) address matters relating to the general context within which a conflict 
or crisis unfolded, and the relevant organisational structures involved, for 
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instance, political parties as well as military, security-intelligence, para-
military and police organs. 
Notwithstanding the importance of this contextual argumentation, it 
is the practice of investigative-cum-prosecutorial teams to prepare only at 
the last minute those aspects of the case narrative which stand metaphori-
cally furthest from the alleged misconduct of the accused. Often, the 
drafting of these components of formal allegations and trial briefs comes 
to rely upon secondary-source information collected haphazardly from the 
public domain, with a correspondingly slipshod critical engagement by 
the trial team with much of the source material. Equally problematic is the 
oft-seen folly which involves the building of contextual narratives from 
what is termed (by those engaging in such practices) the victim perspec-
tive. In international cases replete with highly charged political, ethnic, 
religious and historical elements, this flawed approach can (and frequently 
does) give rise to highly subjective contextual narratives. To cite a single 
example, it was the practice of the ICTR-OTP to allege in the preamble to 
its indictments that a pre-planned genocide was triggered when Hutu ex-
tremists shot down the aircraft carrying the then-President of Rwanda, 
killing all aboard. Incredibly, this feature of the standard OTP case narra-
tive persisted well after elements of the OTP had collected substantial 
evidence which pointed to the killing of the said President by Tutsi-led, 
armed-opposition forces. Likewise, to be noted in this context is the fact 
that at no time did the OTP possess convincing evidence that the genocide 
had been pre-planned. The latter canard featured prominently in the then-
available secondary literature concerning the Rwandan genocide, one 
piece of which was regarded widely as being sacrosanct and correspond-
ingly not engaged with critically by the OTP as a whole.11 
International trial panels – or at any rate, the ICC trial chamber 
which heard Gbagbo and Blé Goudé – are a good deal less tolerant than 
those of the ICTR when presented with shoddy or otherwise misleading 
contextual narratives. In Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, one of the majority on 
the trial panel was withering in his critique of the flawed OTP contextual 
narrative in his written reasons for ordering the acquittals of the ac-
                                                   
11 Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights 
Watch, New York, 1999. 
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cused.12 This critique begs the question of whether the OTP viewed and 
packaged its core information-cum-evidence in the context of a flawed 
narrative developed at the commencement of the investigation. More like-
ly, the narrative was cobbled together at the eleventh hour, on the basis of 
long-held, team-wide assumptions, in a manner designed to lend weight to 
assertions more immediately germane to the alleged criminal culpability 
of the accused. In either event, there is a high probability that the flawed 
narrative had been dictated, at least in part, to OTP personnel by partial 
witnesses without sufficient (or any) objective scrutiny on the part of 
those taking the said testimony. The more important assertion, which 
transcends the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé debacle, is this: there is metaphori-
cal profit to be made where, at the outset of an inquiry, the investigative 
team commences the process of crafting a contextual narrative supported 
by properly analysed evidence. 
8.2.3.2. Contextual Evidence Collection Planning 
For the reasons above, contextual evidence which supports the prosecu-
tion narrative matters a great deal; it needs to be collected, rigorously ana-
lysed and presented in a thoroughly objective manner, that is, in the same 
way as prima facie crime base and linkage evidence. Contextual evidence 
should be collected from the outset of an investigation, not least for rea-
sons of quality control within the investigative team. In particular, it is 
imperative that a team committed to a criminal investigation for a pro-
longed temporal period avoid backing itself into a conceptual corner. It is 
                                                   
12 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 16 July 2019, ICC-
02/11-01/15-1263-AnxA, noted how the “level of ‘overall disconnect’ […] between the 
Prosecutor’s narrative and the facts as progressively emerging from the evidence, kept in-
creasing”, para. 5. Judge Tarfusser added that: 
Day after day, document by document, witness after witness, the ‘Prosecutor’s case’ 
has been revealed and exposed as a fragile, implausible theorem relying on shaky and 
doubtful bases, inspired by a Manichean and simplistic narrative of an Ivory Coast de-
picted as a ‘polarised’ society where one could draw a clear-cut line between the ‘pro-
Gbagbo’, on the one hand, and the ‘pro-Ouattara’, on the other hand, the former from 
the South and of Christian faith, the latter from the North and of Muslim faith; a cari-
catured, ‘one-sided’ narrative, ‘built around a unidimensional conception of the role of 
nationality, ethnicity, and religion (in the broadest sense) in Côte d’Ivoire in general 
and during the post-electoral crisis in particular’, progressively destroyed by the innu-
merable elements to the contrary emerging from the testimonies. 
Ibid., para. 12 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f6c6f3). 
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the experience of the authors of this chapter that investigative teams, 
working from the outset of an investigation on the basis of flawed as-
sumptions (that is, those unsupported by evidence) with respect to the 
overall context will, after a prolonged period, find themselves trapped by 
these same assumptions because prima facie crime base and linkage evi-
dence has been gathered in accordance with insufficient (or no) regard to 
exculpatory materials – to the point that an accused has been indicted or, 
worse, the trial has commenced. To cite a single example, such a situation 
was witnessed within the investigative-cum-prosecutorial team assembled 
to handle the Croatia phase of Milošević at the ICTY. In this instance, the 
team in question built its case upon the unsupported conclusion that mili-
tary operations launched by federal forces from Serbia and Montenegro 
into Dalmatia during 1992 did so in the context of a grand strategic plan, 
formulated in Belgrade, to annex large chunks of the Croatian coast to 
what remained at that time of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Concomitantly, the investigative-cum-prosecutorial team dealing with 
Jokić, et al., which was concerned with the siege of Dubrovnik by these 
same federal forces, rejected this contextual narrative. As might be imag-
ined, the ICTY-OTP leadership concluded that it was inadvisable for the 
OTP to present conflicting contextual narratives in distinct cases which 
nonetheless were concerned in large part with the same underlying event 
(that is, Yugoslavian military operations in Dalmatia during 1992). The 
situation was ultimately resolved at the OTP leadership level through the 
negotiation of a plea deal with Jokić and the timely (from an OTP per-
spective) death of Milošević during the trial of the latter. 
As far as the authors of this chapter are aware, no international in-
stitution has yet formulated a contextual evidence collection plan at the 
outset (or near to the outset) of an investigation. Precisely how this might 
be done effectively must, therefore, be a matter of some speculation. That 
noted, it can be stated with confidence that the elements of offences and 
the legal requirements of modes of liability which lend backbone to crime 
base and linkage collection planning are not going to be as immediately 
relevant to contextual evidence collection plans. Indeed, the collection of 
contextual evidence will, at least at the outset, be approached from the 
perspectives of a criminal investigation as well as scholarly inquiry. By 
way of a start, investigative teams building a contextual evidence collec-
tion plan would do well to study previous prosecutions – be they success-
ful or, most especially, where they were not – to get a sense of how trial 
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panels have responded to prima facie contextual evidence adduced by 
both prosecution and defence advocates. This has been the approach taken 
by students of ICHL in order to understand how crime base and, most 
especially, linkage cases should best be constructed. 
Whereas analysts working in the field of ICHL usually possess 
graduate degrees in the humanities which at one time exposed these per-
sonnel to academic research on matters of politics, military affairs, an-
thropology, sociology or comparative religion, academic backgrounds of 
this nature are less often seen within the ranks of investigators and trial 
counsel. What is more, analysts employed by international institutions are 
often possessed of a great deal of specialised knowledge regarding the 
States upon whose territory an investigation is concentrated. It logically 
follows that the crafting of contextual narratives should, at least in the 
first instance, be left to analysts rather than investigators and counsel. 
What is more, there is no reason that the modus operandi of criminal in-
vestigations and scholarly inquiry should not be reconciled. For instance, 
where at the outset of an investigation the prima facie crime base is sug-
gestive of the mass killing of members of one ethnic group by another, the 
contextual evidence collection plan would logically seek (i) to document 
to a high standard previous outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence of a like 
nature and (ii) to identify lingering societal tensions following earlier pog-
roms which may have persisted until the point of the perpetration of the 
prima facie offences more immediately relevant to the investigative team. 
In a similar vein, if an investigation is centred at the start upon the con-
duct of security-intelligence structures during, for instance, the period 
since 2011, the investigative team would do well to examine the profes-
sional culture of those same structures during the decade or more preced-
ing 2011. In taking contextual questions of this nature as a starting point, a 
skilled and well-led investigative team will, not least through reference to 
whatever secondary sources are found, identify with relative ease a wide 
range of sub-questions, the answers to which must ultimately be secured 
from primary sources. 
8.3. Collection Management 
The size of international criminal-investigative teams dealing with cases 
involving complex linkage components can be considerable. In the expe-
rience of the authors of this chapter, such teams will range in size from 
eight to ten persons, not all of whom might be assigned full-time to the 
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team (for instance, in the case of early ICC-OTP investigation of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga and his associates), to several dozen personnel (for ex-
ample, during the prosecution of Mr. Slobodan Milošević, when a great 
deal of investigative work was undertaken in the midst of trial). Within 
even small investigative teams, there tends to be a great deal of division of 
labour, for instance, between those assigned to crime base work and the 
personnel dealing with building the linkage case. From the point at which 
suspects are identified during an investigation, counsel will frequently 
find their attention diverted from evidentiary to procedural matters, even 
where there remain significant evidentiary gaps in the casefile. For vari-
ous reasons, the explanation of which lies beyond the scope of this chapter, 
effective command and control over complex international-criminal in-
vestigations was frequently lacking at the ad hoc Tribunals and, in the 
main, uneven levels of investigative management remain a problem with-
in the international OTPs operating at the present time. Investigative man-
agement practices are altogether better within domestic war-crimes units, 
principally owing to the relative simplicity of building prosecutable cases 
against low-level perpetrators insofar as such cases are invariably charac-
terised by the absence of a linkage component. 
The sheer volume of crime base, contextual and, most especially 
linkage evidence required to mount a successful prosecution against a 
high-level suspect constitutes an immense challenge which the majority of 
those employed within international OTPs as investigators, analysts and 
counsel – assigned as most are only to specific parts of a casefile – would 
appear to fail to recognise. For this reason, investigative team managers, 
be they formally employed as counsel or in another capacity, would do 
well to remind themselves as well as their charges of the high stakes in-
volved for an OTP where insufficient evidence is collected in support of a 
given prosecution – or, indeed, the negative ramifications for an OTP 
where there is a paucity of prosecutions notwithstanding tens of millions 
of dollars in annual investigative expenditures. It is here held that the ad-
dition of collection managers, seated metaphorically at the right hand of 
investigative team leads, would go a considerable way towards keeping 
investigative teams abreast of their shared progress whilst at the same 
time rectifying the twin problems of unfocussed as well as superfluous 
information-cum-evidence collection. 
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8.3.1. Defining Collection Management 
Collection management is not to be confused with investigative manage-
ment. Investigative management has a far wider scope than collection 
management. The former is concerned with, amongst other matters, the 
establishment of the overall direction of a case; the tasking of investiga-
tors; the work of team analysts, language and support staff; the general 
monitoring and direction of the collection effort; mission planning and 
execution; security and witness-protection issues; the production of re-
ports and updates for higher OTP management and leadership cadres; and 
personnel-management issues. Collection management has a far narrower 
focus. More specifically, collection management deals with the production 
and maintenance of detailed collection plans, including the generation of 
key themes and questions, and the matching of these collection require-
ments to potential sources of information and evidence. Most critically, 
collection management involves responsibility for monitoring the overall 
collection effort through an ongoing review of whether the themes, issues, 
elements of offences and the legal requirements of the modes of liability 
set out in the collection plan are being addressed adequately in evidentiary 
terms. In this regard, effective collection management will identify (i) 
what precisely needs to be collected; (ii) how these needs might best be 
met in a timely manner; (iii) the remaining evidentiary gaps as they ap-
pear during the course of an investigation; and (iv) the filling of these 
gaps. In realising these objectives, effective collection management will 
concomitantly ensure the avoidance of over-collection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the establishment of collection 
management as an explicit, stand-alone function within investigative 
teams in not currently a feature of complex international-criminal investi-
gations. This is not to say that collection management within investigative 
teams does not exist. Manifestly, such practice does exist to some degree; 
were this not the case, no investigative dossier would ever reach a court-
room. The problem at the present time is that professional, centralised 
collection management arrangements have not been put into place – or, 
where an OTP convinces itself that such arrangements do exist, they are 
patently ineffective. The fact of the matter is that, as a general rule, collec-
tion management has been approached as an afterthought by international 
OTPs, that is, as something to be taken seriously only where suspects 
have been taken into custody and the awareness dawns upon senior prose-
cutors that they are about to proceed to trial armed with a great many alle-
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gations for which they possess insufficient evidence. What is more, inter-
national OTPs frequently confuse collection management with data (or 
evidence) management; the latter has been fetishised within OTPs for 
roughly twenty years, which explains their tendency to purchase ever-
more-expensive software systems whilst improperly using relatively sim-
ple platforms such as CaseMap – where CaseMap is used at all. To take 
but one example, collection management at the ICTY-OTP was so delete-
rious during the first decade or more of the life of the ICTY that, when a 
chief of Prosecutions sought to redress this shortcoming by decreeing that 
all open files should be put into CaseMap, this task was assigned by in-
vestigative and trial teams to the most junior personnel available, includ-
ing a great many interns. What was and remains required is a disciplined 
approach to collection management which is rooted in a systematic and 
professional consideration of this key function. 
8.3.2. The Role of Collection Managers and Their Subordinates 
Whilst the position of a dedicated collection manager remains unknown in 
the field of ICHL, professionalised collection management is a well-
recognised and respected endeavour in many other professions. For in-
stance, civilian as well as military security-intelligence organisations in 
Western States have, for a generation, routinely employed specialised 
collection managers during the course of large-scale collection opera-
tions. 13  This practice is instructive insofar as a good many security-
intelligence operations seek to address questions of a nature very similar 
to those which confront international-criminal investigative teams, not 
least, those concerned with collecting large and diverse amounts of infor-
mation on the command and control of political, military, security-
intelligence, paramilitary and police structures. To this end, security-
intelligence services seek, in a manner not dissimilar to complex criminal-
investigative teams, to collect, collate, analyse and disseminate high-
quality information. Within security-intelligence services, raw information 
is collected and, in turn, transformed by analytical processes into intelli-
gence product. An investigative team, where it is working effectively, 
follows similar processes designed to transform information into admissi-
                                                   
13 See, for instance, Major Carl Grebe, “Intelligence Collection Management Process”, in 
ARRC Journal, 2003, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 16–17; Clyde R. Heffter, “A Fresh Look at Collec-
tion Requirements”, in Studies in Intelligence, 1960, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 43–61; US Depart-
ment of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Washington, 2006. 
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ble evidence. Indeed, analytical training within international OTPs has, 
for a decade and more, been based upon the intelligence cycle, the latter 
expression characterising the process by which information is rendered as 
intelligence product. 
Since the 1980s, Western military and security-intelligence organs 
have developed, refined and professionalised the function of collection 
management in accordance with their specific needs. This evolution has 
seen the training and deployment of specialised personnel, known as col-
lection managers. The focus of the latter falls upon the three distinct com-
ponents of collection management: (i) requirements management, (ii) 
mission management and (iii) asset management. During larger collection 
operations, each of these three areas will have its own manager. 
Requirements management is the most important of the three sub-
fields of collection management and, arguably, that which is most relevant 
to international-criminal investigations. In particular, the requirements 
manager determines which information needs to be acquired by what 
temporal juncture. To cite one example, in a military context specific in-
formation and intelligence needs are generated by a military commander 
in accordance with the operational orders which he has received from 
higher echelons. In turn, the said requirements are assessed within an in-
telligence cell in the context of what is known as the commander’s intent. 
Priority information and intelligence requirements (in the form of ques-
tions which require answering) are identified during this process and these 
requirements are updated and amended during the ongoing collection and 
analysis operations. At the outset of an intelligence operation, require-
ments managers disseminate internally the information-cum-intelligence 
requirements to analytical staff and database managers in order to deter-
mine what information is already in their custody. This step reduces the 
likelihood that sources will be tasked with the collection of information 
which is already to hand. Additionally – and indeed, critically – require-
ments managers draft, maintain and amend collection plans. That noted, it 
is military or intelligence commanders who approve collection plans be-
fore they are implemented in the first instance; commanders initiate col-
lection processes and assume something akin to ownership over same. In 
so doing, commanders take responsibility, just as would an investigative 
team leader, for any failure of an operation. Once a collection plan has 
been formulated, it falls to a given requirements manager to task the mis-
sion manager (see below), receiving in due course confirmation that a 
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particular source has been activated and, in turn, product produced. How-
ever, it does not fall to the requirements manager to analyse or action the 
information which comes back. These functions are performed elsewhere, 
although evaluation reports concerning source product make their way to 
the requirements manager in order that he might update and amend the 
collection plan. 
For their part, mission managers set out plans for the direct tasking 
of sources and asset managers, the latter being responsible for the execu-
tion of specific collection and exploitation tasks. In a nutshell, collection 
management as it is implemented by Western security-intelligence organs 
fosters a comprehensive identification of requirements; the matching of 
these requirements to clearly identified sources; the tasking as well as 
exploitation of these sources; the ongoing amendment of the collection 
plan; the tracking of what has been collected (that is, the questions an-
swered that no longer need additional collection); and the identification of 
remaining or newly-identified gaps during the collection process. 
One is left to wonder why the approach to collection management 
which has long been employed by Western military and security-
intelligence organs has never been adopted by OTPs in order to lend 
structure and coherency to the collection of prima facie evidence during 
complex criminal investigations. The absence of any such initiative in the 
field of ICHL is presumably a function of the fact that lawyers and to a 
lesser degree police officers – rather than erstwhile intelligence officers – 
have without exception controlled the investigative arms of all the OTPs 
established since 1993. Whilst the engagement of counsel in investigative 
processes is to be welcomed, given the debacles that were witnessed at the 
ICTY and ICTR OTPs during their formative years when counsel were 
kept at arm’s length from case files until the eve of trial by former police 
officers, it must be recalled that very few international lawyers are pos-
sessed of experience in the realm of field collection. Put another way, 
(good) lawyers understand evidence; it does not follow from this truism 
that they are particularly skilled in its collection. As such, the leader of 
any investigative team, and counsel most especially, would benefit from 
having situated at their right hand a collection specialist whose sole mis-
sion is to manage (as opposed to lead) the collection effort. Where there is 
no specialist to design a collection plan and monitor the execution of the 
same in a holistic manner, it follows that gaps in the evidentiary record, 
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over-collection and the inefficient tasking of collection resources are sure 
to follow. 
8.4. Evidence Review 
The authors of this chapter commenced their careers in the field of ICHL 
in 1997 (Wiley) and 1999 (Brown); one, the other or both have served 
with the Canadian war-crimes programme, the ICTY, the ICTR, the ICC, 
the Iraqi High Tribunal and the CIJA. Of these institutions, only the CIJA 
has ever implemented – in accordance with standing policy – a robust 
process of evidence review commencing at an early phase of every inves-
tigation. Where there was any evidence review of which to speak at the 
other bodies named here, this invariably took place after it was deemed – 
by whom, it was never quite clear – that the investigation was concluded 
and indictments (or a like instrument) were warranted. Such reviews were 
left to the team which had assembled the file, perhaps encompassing the 
briefing of more senior managers and leaders; in other cases (for instance, 
at the ICTY-OTP), a general invitation was sent around the OTP inviting 
personnel from other teams to wade through voluminous case files and, 
were individuals so inclined, to comment thereupon at something akin to 
a public meeting. Unsurprisingly, few took up these offers, engaged as 
they were with their own investigations and prosecutions. The sort of im-
perfect (or non-existent) evidence review procedures cited here have had 
two principle effects upon most of the OTPs established from 1993: (i) the 
initiation of a great deal of investigative work during trial, that is, once 
trial counsel have become aware of the paucity of linkage evidence rele-
vant to the accused; and (ii) the dismissal of cases, or findings of criminal 
non-culpability, by pre-trial, trial and appellate chambers. The first of 
these problems bedevilled the ICTY and the ICTR; the second phenome-
non has proved to be distressingly commonplace at the ICC. 
It is essential that evidence review procedures should be put into 
place OTP wide and applied from the commencement of any given inves-
tigation. By way of a start, it would be immensely helpful if individual 
investigative teams encouraged devil’s advocacy, that is, a culture where 
ostensible prima facie evidence was subjected to ongoing challenge by all 
team personnel, without regard to professional rank. What is more, the 
sort of robust collection planning and management which has formed the 
core of the foregoing discussion would, if implemented as a matter of 
course during complex criminal investigations, lay the groundwork for 
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effective review within investigative teams as well as by external experts. 
The latter could be assigned from within OTPs themselves, albeit from 
ranks external to the investigative team whose evidence is being reviewed. 
Conversely, outside parties subjected to standard non-disclosure agree-
ments and possessed of the requisite experience of complex ICHL inves-
tigations and prosecutions, could be retained for this purpose. On the 
question of outside expertise, it will be recalled that there are a great many 
highly-skilled, erstwhile investigators, analysts, prosecutors, trial clerks 
and judges languishing in semi-retirement, having been determined by the 
international system to be, in their early sixties, no longer fit for full-time 
work. This pool of immense talent is drawn upon by the CIJA as part of 
its evidence review arrangements; international OTPs would do well to 
proceed in a like manner. 
8.5. Concluding Remarks 
International OTP investigative practices remain insufficient, despite sev-
eral important methodological advances made since the establishment of 
the ICTY in 1993. The strong prosecutorial records of the ICTY and the 
ICTR have served to hide from the casual ICHL observer a great many of 
the investigative shortcomings witnessed at those institutions, not least, 
shoddy investigative management leading to the over-collection of crime-
base materials at the expense of linkage evidence gathering. In the event, 
the OTPs of both ad hoc Tribunals proved sufficiently resilient – if only 
just – to address evidentiary imbalances when these were identified by 
senior trial counsel on the eve of trial owing to the Chapter VII mandates 
which these institutions enjoyed along with the fact that what might be 
termed emergency investigative activities could be undertaken in physi-
cally-secure, post-conflict environments. 
The prosecutorial records of the courts and tribunals established 
from 2002 relative to financial expenditure and prosecutorial output, with 
the arguable exception of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’), 
have proven to be altogether less admirable. By way of example, the in-
vestigative cadres of the ICC, ECCC, STL and KSC have had to contend 
with not-insignificant levels of political-diplomatic resistance to their 
work, this obstacle being compounded in certain instances by the presence 
of physical risk in the respective operational areas far and away higher 
than that faced by the ICTY and the ICTR. Necessarily, challenges be-
yond the control of international OTPs have served to retard the quality 
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and quantity of investigative output. The post-2002 institutions – again, 
with the arguable exception of the SCSL – have compounded the difficul-
ties faced by their investigative teams through a collective failure to im-
plement consistently several sorely-lacking yet fundamental improve-
ments to their modus operandi. Put another way, various investigative 
divisions have replicated many of the most serious deficiencies witnessed 
at the OTPs of the ad hoc Tribunals. One refers here, most especially, to 
persistent failings in the areas of collection planning, collection manage-
ment and evidence review. Until these long-term shortcomings are re-
solved, the practice of ICHL shall continue to fall into disrepute in the 
eyes of conflict-affected societies, the victims of armed conflict, the States 
which fund the relevant international bodies and a great many of those 
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9.Prioritisation of Suspected Conduct and Cases: 




Quality of criminal investigation in fact-rich core international crimes 
cases can be enhanced by selecting and prioritising cases that are best 
suited for the allocation of the limited resources of the prosecution. Some 
of the systemic bottle-necks1 hindering criminal investigations, as identi-
fied by the ‘Quality Control in Criminal Investigation’ project, can be pre-
empted by case selection and prioritisation strategies. 
In this chapter, the evolution of the case prioritisation strategies for 
core international crimes will be discussed and its future prospects and 
challenges highlighted. The chapter starts with an explanatory background 
to the case prioritisation strategies (Section 9.2.), and then proceeds to 
discuss the early beginnings of the concept (Section 9.3.), its gradual em-
brace by national and international prosecution services (Section 9.4.), 
challenges in the implementation of case prioritisation strategies in na-
tional jurisdiction (Section 9.5.), and concludes with reflections on its 
future (Section 9.6.). At the end of the chapter, there is a table chronologi-
cally listing the development of case prioritisation strategies for core in-
ternational crimes. 
                                                   
* Devasheesh Bais is Advocate at the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, India, and Fellow at 
the Centre for International Law Research and Policy (‘CILRAP’). The author wishes to 
thank Morten Bergsmo for his comment on the draft of this chapter. 
1 a) the long duration and high cost of many investigations of core international crimes; 
b) loss of overview of information and potential evidence; c) lack of clear focus in the 
building of the case; d) vague formulation of criminal responsibility even after the or-
ganisation has in its possession enough potential evidence […]. 
See the web page of the CILRAP research project ‘Quality Control in Criminal Investiga-
tion’, with links to multiple resources (https://www.cilrap.org/events/190222-23-delhi/). 
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While the chapter is about prioritisation, it is often used in conjunc-
tion with selection, as prioritisation usually follows once cases to be in-
vestigated have been selected. Thus, the chapter refers to case selection at 
various points. However, this is not to say that a prioritisation exercise 
cannot exist without a selection process. 
9.2. Background 
An armed conflict, civil war, or other events where mass crimes are com-
mitted involve a large number of instances of crimes and a complex factu-
al narrative. Consider the Syrian situation, which is now in its ninth year, 
having started in 2011; it involves multiple States, multiple non-State ac-
tors, with serious crimes committed, including intentionally directing at-
tacks against a civilian population, also by means of chemical weapons, 
sexual slavery, persecution and torture.2 Imagine the difficult task of any 
accountability mechanism that may be set up to address the criminal con-
duct involved in the Syrian situation. 
Prosecuting and adjudicating all those numerous crimes in a fair 
manner and without undue delay would be an overwhelming task. This 
will be true even for a jurisdiction with a well-functioning criminal justice 
system. However, the reality is that the judicial capacity of the State 
where these crimes were committed may have been destroyed, or severely 
impaired by conflict. 
Given this context, with instances of alleged crimes exceeding judi-
cial capacity, a significant backlog of opened or potential case-files may 
emerge. Years would have passed before most of these cases reach the 
trial stage, if ever. This challenge raises two important questions: 
1) How to select the cases that will actually be investigated and tried? 
2) How to rank the selected cases in an order of priority according to 
which they will be investigated and tried? 
That is, how does a prosecution service select the cases or conduct that are 
to be investigated, and then amongst the selected cases and conduct iden-
tify those that should be prioritised? 
                                                   
2 See, for instance, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/72, 1 February 2018 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/b01552). 
 
9. Prioritisation of Suspected Conduct and Cases: From Idea to Practice 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 565 
The reality is that a decision on prioritisation of cases is inevitable 
for any prosecution service, be it national or international, as it is likely 
that there will always be more cases to prosecute than what the concerned 
prosecution service can handle simultaneously while deploying its finite 
resources. Thus, it is likely that any prosecutor would have to take a deci-
sion on the order in which the cases are rolled out. 
In the absence of formal criteria for prioritising cases, a decision on 
prioritisation would be done on an informal basis, which could not only 
lack transparency but also consistency.3 A prosecution service is also more 
susceptible to being influenced by governments, powerful organisations 
and individuals, and media coverage if it is not bound by formal prioriti-
sation criteria. 4 A formalised set of criteria, designed according to the 
circumstances of the jurisdiction it serves, not only protect the prosecution 
service from political pressure or accusation of bias, but could also, with a 
right set of criteria, increase its effectiveness and efficiency. 
9.3. The Idea 
The idea started in a nascent manner with the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), progressed with the preparato-
ry work on the International Criminal Court’s (‘ICC’) Office of the Prose-
cutor (‘OTP’), however, the real progress happened in the domestic con-
text aided by international justice professionals and non-governmental 
organisations. 
9.3.1. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
The Statute of the ICTY gave a general mandate “to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991”.5 Case selec-
tion and prioritisation criteria were not addressed. However, the ICTY’s 
                                                   
3 CMN, Guidelines: Case Mapping, Selection and Prioritisation of Conflict and Atrocity-
Related Crimes, Brussels, June 2018, p. 1 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/fd5f42). 
4 Ibid., p. 9. 
5 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 
May 1993, amended 17 May 2002, Article 1 (‘ICTY Statute’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
b4f63b). 
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OTP formally adopted case selection and prioritisation criteria in October 
1995.6 
These criteria were organised in five different thematic groups: 
(a) the person to be targeted for prosecution:7 
• position in the hierarchy under investigation; 
• political, military, paramilitary or civilian leader; 
• leadership at a municipal, regional or national level; 
• nationality; 
• role or participation in policy or strategy decisions; 
• personal culpability for specific atrocities; 
• notoriousness or responsibility for particularly heinous acts; 
• the extent of direct participation in the alleged incidents; 
• authority and control exercised by the suspects; 
• the suspect’s alleged notice and knowledge of acts by subordi-
nates; 
• arrest potential; 
• evidence or witness availability; 
• media or government or non-governmental target; and 
• potential role-over witness or likelihood of linkage evidence. 
(b) the serious nature of the crime:8 
• number of victims; 
• nature of acts; 
• area of destruction; 
• duration and repetition of the offence; 
• location of the crime; 
• linkage to other cases; 
                                                   
6 See Morten Bergsmo, Kjetil Helvig, Ilia Utmelidze and Gorana Žagovec (eds.), The Back-
log of Core International Crimes Case Files in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Torkel Opsahl 
Academic EPublisher (‘TOAEP’), Oslo, 2nd edition, 2010, p. 99 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/688146). 
7 Ibid., p. 99. 
8 Ibid., p. 100. 
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• nationality of perpetrators or victims; 
• arrest potential; 
• evidence or witness availability; 
• showcase or pattern crime; and 
• media or government or non-governmental target. 
(c) policy considerations:9 
• advancement of international jurisprudence (reinforcement of 
existing norms, building precedent, clarifying and advancing 
the scope of existing protections); 
• willingness and ability of national courts to prosecute the al-
leged perpetrator; 
• potential symbolic or deterrent value of prosecution; 
• public perception concerning the effective functioning of Tri-
bunal; 
• public perception concerning immediate response to ongoing 
atrocities; and 
• public perception concerning impartiality or balance. 
(d) practical considerations:10 
• available investigative resources; 
• impact that the new investigation will have on an ongoing in-
vestigation and on making existing indictments trial-ready; 
• the estimated time to complete the investigation; 
• timing of the investigation (for example, the impact initiating a 
particular investigation will have on the ability to conduct fu-
ture investigations in the country); 
• possibility or likelihood of arrest of the alleged perpetrator; 
• consideration of other work carried out in relation to the case 
(including a check against Rules of Road cases); 
• completeness of evidence; 
• availability of exculpatory information and evidence; and 
                                                   
9 Ibid., pp. 101–02. 
10 Ibid., pp. 102–04. 
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• consideration of other prosecution’s investigations in the same 
geographical area, particularly those of opposite ethnicity per-
petrators and victims. 
(e) other relevant considerations:11 
• The particular statutory offence or parts thereof, that can be 
charged; 
• the charging theories available; 
• potential legal impediments to prosecution; 
• potential defences; 
• theory of liability and legal framework of each potential sus-
pect; 
• the extent to which the crime base fits in with current investi-
gations and overall strategic direction; 
• the extent to which a successful investigation or prosecution of 
the case would further the strategic aims; 
• the extent to which the case can take the investigation to higher 
political, military, police and civil chains of command; and 
• to what extent the case fits into a larger pattern-type of ongoing 
or future investigations and prosecutions. 
The thematic groups and their constitutive lists of factors, arranged 
at random, seemingly without any hierarchy, were to be considered as a 
set of relevant considerations informing the decision to start investigations 
and prosecutions.12 However, implementing a focused case selection and 
prioritisation policy on the basis of this diffused list is a difficult proposi-
tion.13 It is not surprising that these criteria were not adhered to in practice 
by the ICTY, as apparent in indictments against many low-level perpetra-
tors despite a stated policy to focus on the higher-level perpetrators.14 
                                                   
11 Ibid., pp. 104–05. 
12 Ibid., p. 99. 
13 Claudia Angermaier, “Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria in the Work of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for 
Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes Case, TOAEP, Oslo, 2nd edition, 
2010, pp. 33–34 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f5abed). 
14 Bergsmo et al., 2010, p. 109, see above note 6. 
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The failure of this prosecution-led case selection and prioritisation 
effort has led Bergsmo et al. to observe that the development and imple-
mentation of case selection prioritisation criteria is difficult to achieve by 
a prosecution service.15 
It would have been difficult to implement a focused policy based on 
this catalogue of criteria.16 
9.3.2. Early Efforts at the International Criminal Court 
The preparatory team17 for the establishment of ICC-OTP, led by Morten 
Bergsmo as its co-ordinator, was the first to suggest the use of a case se-
lection and prioritisation approach within the context of the ICC. This 
approach was born out of the concern that exercise of discretion by the 
OTP could be seen as “biased or lacking in independence”. 18  It was 
thought that formal criteria for selection and prioritisation could shelter 
OTP’s decision-making from such risks.19 
An expert group convened by the preparatory team to present some 
reflections “on measures available to the Court to reduce the length of 
trials as well as pre-trial and trial preparation stage” found it “highly de-
sirable” to have such criteria in place from the start of the Court’s opera-
tions.20 
                                                   
15 Ibid., p. 111. 
16 Angermaier, 2010, pp. 33–34, see above note 13. 
17 The preparatory team for the ICC Office of the Prosecutor was instituted by the Advance 
Team for the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The preparatory team’s 
work spanned from August 2002 to November 2003. The preparatory team identified sev-
eral topics on which it formed expert groups to prepare non-binding reports “for the bene-
fit of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ICC judges, and for those building relevant investi-
gation and prosecution capacity in national jurisdictions”. See Morten Bergsmo, “Institu-
tional History, Behaviour and Development”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and 
SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, 
TOAEP, Brussels, 2017, pp. 1–3 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/09c8b8). 
18 Ibid., p. 12. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Morten Bergsmo and Vladimir Tochilovsky, “Measures Available to the International 
Criminal Court to Reduce the Length of Proceedings”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rack-
witz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 
5, TOAEP, Brussels, 2017, pp. 651, 653 (the report, which was submitted to ICC judges, 
Registry and Prosecutor, is annexed to the chapter) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/09c8b8). 
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In its report, the expert group, in the section on investigation strate-
gy, began its rationale for case selection and prioritisation with the need to 
effectively allocate the limited resources of the OTP: 
Given the limited investigative and prosecutorial resources 
of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the broad scope of 
investigations under Article 54(1)(a), the Prosecutor may not 
be able to investigate each and every incident arising from a 
single situation or to prosecute every perpetrator. It is essen-
tial to review each potential new investigation by a set of ra-
tional standards that will allow the effective marshalling of 
OTP resources.21 
In addition, it considered that “[a] clear pronunciation of the prose-
cution policy, given in the abstract, could prevent the public from har-
bouring unrealistic expectations and also avoid any appearance of politi-
cal bias in particular cases”.22 Importantly, the expert group suggested that 
such a prosecution policy could prevent a “backlog of non-priority sus-
pects”.23 
The report goes on to suggest that in order to limit the number of 
cases before the Court, the policy should set out priorities, such as focus-
ing on suspects in leadership positions or those accused of crimes of a 
particular gravity.24 Underscoring the fact that lower threshold crimes and 
low-level suspects should not be of concern to the Court, but instead to 
the domestic jurisdictions, it said, material from ICC investigations on 
these other suspects can be made available for domestic accountability 
mechanisms.25 
Similarly, in terms of charging, the expert group considered that an 
excessive charging policy will lead to lengthy trials and extensive evi-
dence and thus questioned whether the OTP should avoid charging of-
fences of relatively minor importance.26 However, it considered reasons 
                                                   
21 Ibid., pp. 668–69. 
22 Ibid., p. 653. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 669. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., pp. 674–75. 
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which may support an excessive charging policy, such as the wish to ad-
dress “the totality of crimes committed and the degree of victimisation”.27 
The report of the expert group on the length of proceedings was cir-
culated to the judges of the Court, its Registrar and Prosecutor in 2003, 
however, it does not seem to have had an immediate impact on the Court 
in terms of its case selection and prioritisation suggestions.28 
The draft Regulations for the ICC-OTP, prepared by an expert 
group appointed by the preparatory team, enumerated case selection and 
prioritisation criteria in its section on a draft investigation plan.29 A draft 
investigation plan, as per the draft Regulations, was to be prepared at the 
end of the preliminary examination phase to aid the OTP’s decision to 
start an investigation pursuant to Article 53(1) or request authorisation for 
commencing investigations under Article 15(3).30 In case of a positive 
decision, an investigation plan is developed from the draft investigation 
plan.31 
The draft investigation plan was to include, inter alia, “an explana-
tion why the alleged offences warrant a full investigation against the 
backdrop of other alleged offences where such a step might not be rec-
ommendable”.32 This element of the draft investigation plan brings forth 
the basic step necessary in a prioritisation exercise: drawing comparisons 
with other conduct and cases and prioritising some over others. The other 
elements of the draft plan are also of relevance in guiding a prioritisation 
exercise, such as the position of the suspect in the relevant chain of au-
thority, likelihood of arrest, and time or resources needed to complete the 
investigation.33 
While an abridged version of the draft Regulations was adopted as 
Regulations ad interim of the ICC-OTP, draft investigation plans were not 
                                                   
27 Ibid., p. 675. 
28 Ibid., p. 652. 
29 Carlos Vasconcelos, “Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor”, in Morten 
Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International 
Criminal Law: Volume 5, TOAEP, Brussels, 2017, Annex 1 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
09c8b8). 
30 Ibid., p. 865. 
31 Ibid., p. 869. 
32 Ibid., p. 861. 
33 Ibid. 
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part of it.34 There was no immediate outcome of the early meticulous ef-
forts made at the ICC for case selection and prioritisation criteria. Howev-
er, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the ICC-OTP adopted a policy 
paper on case selection and prioritisation in 2016. 
9.3.3. Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Turning Point 
One of the major turning points of the concept of case selection and prior-
itisation happened not in an international context, but domestically. In 
2004, the Bosnia and Herzegovina (‘BiH’) Collegium of Prosecutors 
adopted the “Orientation Criteria for Sensitive Rules of the Road cases” 
(‘Orientation Criteria’), annexed to the Book of Rules on Internal Organi-
zation and Operations of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH.35 The purpose of 
the Orientation Criteria was to select cases to be “heard before Section I 
for War Crimes of the Criminal and Appellate Divisions of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”.36 Amongst the selected cases, the Orientation 
Criteria served as a means of prioritising the order in which they are in-
vestigated.37 
The factors in the Orientation Criteria related to the general criteri-
on of gravity, with its focus on the nature of the crimes alleged and the 
circumstances of the perpetrator.38 Cases where the mode of liability was 
command responsibility, or which involved crimes committed by law 
enforcement or incumbent public officials, were to take priority.39 Other 
factors included practical considerations such as general readiness to pro-
ceed and issues of witness security.40 
The co-ordinator of the preparatory team for the establishment of 
ICC-OTP, Morten Bergsmo, working in 2007 as a consultant for Organi-
sation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (‘OSCE’) in Bosnia-
                                                   
34 Bergsmo, 2017, p. 19, see above note 17. 
35 Bergsmo et al., 2010, p. 81, see above note 6. 
36 OTP of BiH, Book of Rules on the Review of War Crimes Cases, 28 December 2004, 
Article 10(1). 
37 Bergsmo et al., 2010, p. 84, see above note 6. 
38 Ibid., pp. 85–87. 
39 Ibid., p. 84. 
40 Ibid., p. 87. 
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Hercegovina, wrote a report on the back-log of open case files in BiH.41 
The report included commentary on the case selection and prioritisation 
criteria at the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH, ICTY and the ICC. The OSCE 
report and its follow-up had a lasting impact in BiH and the overall devel-
opment of case prioritisation strategies. 
The OSCE report was followed by an expert conference ‘Criteria 
for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes Cases’ in Oslo on 
26 September 2008. This was the first time the issue of case selection and 
prioritisation was put on the agenda in a conference anywhere. An anthol-
ogy of conference papers from Oslo was published on 26 March 2009, 
forming one of the most valuable resources on the topic.42 
The OSCE report was widely circulated in BiH and the Oslo con-
ference also invited wide West Balkan representation.43 By the end of that 
year, on 28 December 2008, the BiH Council of Ministers adopted the 
National War Crimes Strategy. Its Annex A, titled “Criteria for the review 
of war crimes cases”, listed criteria for case selection and prioritisation for 
the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH. The National War Crimes Strategy was 
motivated and influenced by the OSCE report.44 
One of the objectives of the Strategy document was to assist the 
prosecution of most responsible perpetrators of war crimes before the 
Court of BiH through a case selection and prioritisation criteria.45 The 
case selection and prioritisation criteria, though in an annex, were a ‘con-
stituent part’ of the National War Crimes Prosecution Strategy.46 
The “Criteria for the review of war crimes cases” were formulated 
using the Orientation Criteria and the practice of ICTY and ICC as refer-
ence.47 It classified the criteria in three categories of (a) Gravity of crimi-
                                                   
41 Jared O. Bell, “The Bosnian War Crimes Justice Strategy a Decade Later”, FICHL Policy 
Brief Series No. 92 (2018), TOAEP, Brussels, 2018, p. 1 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/
92-bell/). 
42 Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes 
Cases, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2009. A second edition was published 
on 23 July 2010 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/4-bergsmo-second). 
43 Bergsmo et al., 2010, p. 116, see above note 6. 
44 Bell, 2018, p. 1, see above note 41. 
45 BiH Council of Ministers, National Strategy for Processing of War Crimes Cases, 28 De-
cember 2008, Section 1.2 d., reproduced in Bergsmo et al., 2010, p. 168, see above note 6. 
46 Ibid., “Annex A: Criteria for the review of war crimes cases”. 
47 Ibid. 
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nal offenses; (b) Capacity and role of the perpetrator; and (c) Other cir-
cumstances. 
The gravity criteria considered, logically foremost, whether the 
qualifications of one of the core international crimes (that is, genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes) have been fulfilled.48 The fac-
tors guiding the gravity assessment considered whether the offence in-
volved: widespread and systematic killings; persecution; forced disap-
pearance; serious forms of rape, torture, unlawful detention, or inflictions 
of sufferings on a civilian population; large number of victims or severe 
consequences for the victims; and particularly insidious means and meth-
ods of perpetrating the offence.49 
The capacity and role of the perpetrator criteria included factors 
such as the position of the perpetrator in the hierarchy of military, police 
or paramilitary establishment; whether the perpetrator holds a political 
office or a judicial office, such as that of a judge, prosecutor, public attor-
ney, or attorney at law; whether the perpetrator was in charge of a camp or 
detention centre; and modalities of participation in the perpetration of the 
offence, like involvement in planning and ordering the crime, manner of 
perpetration and the degree of intent.50 
The third residual criteria included factors such as: relation to other 
cases and potential perpetrators; interests of victims and witnesses such as 
whether the witnesses are protected or need protection, or are insider wit-
nesses; and a third factor considering the impact of the offence or its pros-
ecution on the local community, such as demographic changes, societal 
trauma and disturbance in public order.51 
9.4. The Idea in the Mainstream 
The OSCE report, the Oslo conference, and the efforts in Bosnia-
Hercegovina heralded the dawn of case prioritisation criteria. The Oslo 
conference and its anthology constitute the knowledge-base pursuant to 
which further progress has been made on several fronts, both internation-
ally and domestically. It brought together cross-cutting research on priori-
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tisation from domestic and international courts and established case pri-
oritisation as a topic in international criminal justice. 
Among its most significant impact is the ICC-OTP’s policy paper 
on case selection and prioritisation. But it has also formed the intellectual 
basis of efforts made in domestic jurisdictions by CILRAP’s Case Matrix 
Network (‘CMN’) department. 
9.4.1. ICC-OTP’s Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation 
On 15 September 2016, the ICC-OTP released its Policy Paper on Case 
Selection and Prioritisation.52 While it is an internal policy document of 
the OTP, it was subjected to wide public consultation and published to 
increase transparency regarding the criteria guiding OTP’s decisions on 
case selection and prioritisation.53 
The OTP Policy Paper lists considerations that guide the OTP in se-
lecting cases to be investigated and prosecuted within a situation and pri-
oritising the selected cases both within and across the situations.54 
As the concept of prioritisation is not in the Rome Statute, the OTP 
used Article 54(1)(b) that allows it to take appropriate measures to ensure 
the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes to articulate prioriti-
sation criteria.55 
In order to aid the prioritisation exercise, the OTP Policy Paper es-
tablishes a master document, titled the Case Selection Document, which 
lists potential cases across all situations that meet the case selection crite-
ria of the OTP Policy Paper.56 The prioritisation criteria are used to de-
termine the order in which cases listed in the Case Selection Document 
are “rolled-out over time”.57 Cases that are not prioritised still remain part 
                                                   
52 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016 (‘OTP 
Policy Paper’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/182205). 
53 ICC-OTP, Report on the Implementation of the OTP Strategic Plan (2016 – 2018): Final 
Analysis and Evaluation of the Results, 23 August 2019, p. 14 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
5siv5j). 
54 OTP Policy Paper, para. 1, see above note 52. 
55 Ibid., para. 49. 
56 Ibid., paras. 10–11. 
57 Ibid., para. 48. 
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of the Case Selection Document and could still be investigated and prose-
cuted when the circumstances permit such action.58 
The OTP Policy Paper divides prioritisation criteria into two cate-
gories: strategic and operational criteria. There is no hierarchy between 
the two categories and the weight to be given to each constituent criterion 
will depend on the circumstances of each case.59 This gives broad discre-
tion to the OTP to prioritise cases. 
The strategic criteria include: 
a) The gravity of crimes alleged, involving both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. The factors that guide the assessment of gravity 
include the scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact of the 
crimes;60 
b) Degree of responsibility of alleged perpetrators, highlighting the 
need to prosecute those most responsible. The extent of responsibil-
ity of an accused will be determined by the nature of the unlawful 
behaviour; the degree of their participation and intent; the existence 
of discriminatory motive; and any abuse of power or official capaci-
ty.61 
c) Representativity: The office will prioritise cases where charges rep-
resent the true extent of the criminality which has occurred within a 
given situation, to constitute, whenever possible, a representative 
sample of the main types of victimisation and involving the main 
types of victim communities.62 
Beyond representative crimes, it will also prioritise investigation of 
crimes against or affecting children, sexual and gender-based crimes, and 
attacks against cultural, religious, historical and other protected objects as 
well as against humanitarian and peace-keeping personnel.63 
                                                   
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., para. 52. 
60 Ibid., para. 37. 
61 Ibid., para. 43. 
62 Ibid., para. 45. 
63 Ibid., para. 46. 
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d) “whether a person, or members of the same group, have already 
been subject to investigation or prosecution either by the Office or 
by a State for another serious crime” ;64 
e) “the impact of investigations and prosecutions on the victims of the 
crimes and affected communities” ;65 
f) “the impact of investigations and prosecutions on ongoing criminal-
ity and/or their contribution to the prevention of crimes”;66 and 
g) “the impact and the ability of the Office to pursue cases involving 
opposing parties to a conflict in parallel or on a sequential basis”.67 
The operational criteria explore whether there are reasonable pro-
spects of securing conviction by reviewing the quantity and quality of the 
available evidence, international co-operation and judicial assistance to 
the OTP, ability to conduct required investigations in a timely manner, 
security situation in the place of investigation, protection of persons co-
operating with the court, ability to secure the presence of the accused.68 
In the OTP’s annual reports on preliminary examination activities, 
one can get a glimpse of the implementation of the case prioritisation cri-
teria. For instance, in Ukraine, the OTP seeks to “prioritise certain types 
of alleged conduct believed to be most representative of the patterns of 
alleged crimes”. 69  While in Gaza, it seeks to prioritise “incidents for 
which there is a range of sources and sufficient information available to 
enable an objective and thorough analysis”.70 
In the Strategic Plan for 2019–2021, the OTP has set a strategic goal 
of increasing “the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of preliminary ex-
aminations, investigations and prosecutions” which it aims to achieve by 
implementing, inter alia, a strategy of “further prioritising amongst inves-
                                                   




68 Ibid., para. 41. 
69 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018, 5 December 2018, p. 27 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/39c2c1). 
70 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, p. 58 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/lq7j94). 
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tigations and prosecutions”.71 Recognising the expectations of stakehold-
ers to deliver more and better results while using the existing resources, 
the OTP plans to stringently apply case prioritisation criteria to cases 
identified across all situations under investigation which it warns could 
delay non-prioritised cases.72 The OTP considers it necessary to undertake 
these ‘difficult decisions’ on prioritisation, in order to build viable cases 
while working with limited resources.73 
The ICC-OTP should perhaps, as a means to ascertaining the effec-
tiveness of case prioritisation, conduct a qualitative and quantitative anal-
ysis of the results delivered by implementing its case prioritisation criteria. 
Such a study could help ascertain the best manner and degree of imple-
mentation of case prioritising strategies at the ICC. 
9.4.2. Colombia 
Colombia’s Office of the Attorney General adopted a directive on case 
selection and prioritisation criteria in 2012, and is one of the early 
adopters of this strategy.74 The directive categorises prioritisation criteria 
in three groups: 1) Objective: The objective criterion of prioritisation ex-
amines the criminal conduct in terms of severity and its representativeness. 
Thus, combining considerations of gravity and representativity in the 
same cluster;75 2) Subjective: this criterion considers the qualities of the 
victim such as their gender, age, membership of an ethnic group or pro-
fession such as human rights defender, journalist or judicial officer. It also 
considers the degree of responsibility of the accused;76 3) Other comple-
mentary considerations: such as practical feasibility of prosecution, 
whether the conduct in question is being investigated by an international 
court, and the region or location of the crime.77 
                                                   
71 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–2021, 17 July 2019, paras. 18–19 (‘Strategic Plan 2019–
2021’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/raba4c). 
72 Ibid., para. 22. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Colombia Office of the Attorney General, Por medio de la cual se adoptan unos criterios de 
priorización de situaciones y casos, y se crea un nuevo sistema de investigación penal y de 
gestión de aquéllos en la Fiscalía General de la Nación, 4 October 2012, Directiva No. 
0001 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/e93910). 
75 Ibid., pp. 30–31. 
76 Ibid., pp. 28–30. 
77 Ibid., pp. 31–32. 
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9.4.3. The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
In 2018, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) adopted Practice 
Direction for the Selection and Prioritisation of Crimes Against Peace and 
Security of Mankind, in Particular Sexual Violence at the Investigation 
Stage (‘Practice Direction’).78 CILRAP’s CMN department assisted the 
DRC with methodology and technical support for the development of the 
Practice Direction. 79  The case selection and prioritising criteria in the 
Practice Direction were themselves heavily influenced by a CMN report 
published in 2015.80 
As a prerequisite of the case selection and prioritisation exercise, it 
calls for a centralised statistical database on the number of open cases, 
number of suspects in those cases, nature of the offence and the number of 
victims.81 
The case selection and prioritisation criteria are divided into two 
broad sections: formal criteria, and policy and practical considerations. 
Formal criteria include consideration of the factual context of the com-
mission of the crime on the basis of indicators that assess gravity, such as 
the number of victims, area of destruction, duration and repetition of the 
offence, modus operandi of the criminal conduct, discriminatory motive, 
defencelessness of victims and impact of crimes.82 The factual context is 
also enriched by the location of the crime and ethnicity, tribe or nationali-
ty of the alleged perpetrators or victims, factors that are relevant in a do-
mestic context.83 
                                                   
78 DRC Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, Circulaire n°02/PCC-PCSM/2018 relative a la 
sélection et à la priorisation des affaires de crimes contre la paix et la sécurité de 
l’humanité, en particulier celles liées aux violences sexuelles, au stade de l’instruction pré-
juridictionnelle (Memo No. 02/PCC-PCSM/2018 on the Case Selection and Prioritisation 
of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind, in Particular Those Relating to Sexual 
Violence at the Preliminary Stage), 19 March 2018 (‘DRC Practice Direction’) (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/bf85a3). 
79 CMN, “Examples of Country-Work Undertaken by the CMN” (available on its web site). 
80 CMN, Prioritising International Sex Crimes Cases in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo: Supporting the national justice system in the investigation and prosecution of core 
international crimes with a sexual element, Brussels, November 2015 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/2ee277). 
81 DRC Practice Direction, Chapter III – Mapping: prerequisite of prioritisation, see above 
note 78. 
82 Ibid., Chapter IV, Section 1, Criterion 1. 
83 Ibid. 
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The formal criteria in the Practice Direction also include assessment 
of the degree of responsibility of the accused and a victim-centric repre-
sentativity approach that focuses on the scale and nature of the victimisa-
tion rather than the political, ethnic or religious affiliation of the accused 
or victims.84 
Practical considerations for prioritising cases include strategic and 
practical indicators to make an “early assessment of the effectiveness and 
efficiency” of prosecuting a given case.85 
9.4.4. The Central African Republic 
In December 2018, the Special Criminal Court (‘CPS’) of the Central 
African Republic (‘CAR’), that exercises jurisdiction over core interna-
tional crimes, launched an investigation and prosecution strategy that pro-
vides selection and prioritisation criteria.86 Its prioritisation criteria have 
been localised extensively and they include: 
1) Feasibility of investigation in terms of security: recognising the 
safety and security issues persisting in the CAR, this criterion re-
quires the prosecutor to consider the security issues, including wit-
ness and victim protection, the safety of investigators, judicial ac-
tors and all other persons who may be at security risk due to the 
prosecutor’s activities.87 
2) Representativity: the CPS uses a broad criterion of representativity. 
The cases to be prioritised should be representative of the a) victims 
including from different religious, ethnic and geographic groups; b) 
alleged perpetrators from various armed groups or State apparatus 
taking into account their ethnic and religious affiliations; c) geogra-
phy – the incidents selected must, wherever possible, represent the 
different regions affected by the crisis in the CAR; d) different time 
periods of conflict in the CAR lasting from 2003 until the time of 
writing.88 As is clear here, the CPS’s use of the term representativity 
hints towards diversity in prosecution. 
                                                   
84 Ibid., Chapter IV, Section 1, Criteria 2 and 3. 
85 Ibid., Chapter IV, Section 2. 
86 CAR Cour Pénale Spéciale, Stratégie d’enquêtes, de poursuites et d’instructions, 4 
December 2018 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/61skr0). 
87 Ibid., para. 64. 
88 Ibid., para. 65. 
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3) Possibility of identification, location and arrest of the suspect.89 
4) Availability, credibility and reliability of evidence.90 
5) Strategic considerations such as availability of resources, the time 
required to complete investigation, and the potential of developing 
future case files.91 
6) Public interests,  such as developing trust in the CPS, emblematic 
value of certain incidents and crimes, and impact of prosecution in 
creating a deterrence to criminality.92 
9.4.5. Representativity as a Case Prioritisation Criteria: A Missed 
Opportunity 
The OSCE report, referenced earlier, was also published as the mono-
graph The Backlog of Core International Crimes Case Files in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by Morten Bergsmo et al.93 This book enunciated a unique 
concept of representativity that has not yet been fully captured by the dis-
course on prioritisation. 
In the words of Bergsmo et al., the idea of representativity is: 
[T]hat at the end of a process of war crimes prosecutions, the 
accumulated case portfolio should reflect – or be representa-
tive of – the overall victimisation caused by the crimes in the 
conflict or situation at hand. The most serious crimes and the 
crimes that the most senior leaders are suspected of being 
most responsible for should have been prosecuted at the end 
of the day. The areas and communities most affected by the 
crimes should have seen more of these crimes or crime base 
prosecuted than in less affected communities. The most af-
fected victim groups should have more of the crimes that 
caused the victimisation prosecuted than other groups. Or-
ganizations or structures causing the most serious crimes 
should have more of its responsible members – or more of 
the crimes caused by them – prosecuted than other such or-
ganizations or structures.94 
                                                   
89 Ibid., para. 66. 
90 Ibid., para. 67. 
91 Ibid., para. 68. 
92 Ibid., para. 69. 
93 Bergsmo et al., 2010, see above note 6. 
94 Ibid., p. 125. 
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As per that text, this approach towards representativity is born out 
of the concerns for the interests of the victims and the ability of criminal 
justice to contribute to reconciliation and deterrence, while commanding 
trust of all its stakeholders.95 
However, the use of the superlative ‘most’ (most affected areas, 
communities and victim groups, most serious crimes, and so on) in the 
formulation of Bergsmo et al. exudes a utilitarian approach. From this 
perspective, representativity does not have victims at its core – if that 
were the case it would not differentiate between the most affected victims 
and lesser affected victims. This idea is all about efficiency – bringing out 
the maximum benefits from the criminal justice institution. This idea of 
representativity embodies the rationale of prioritisation like no other crite-
ria, that is, to have an efficient criminal justice machinery. In a way, repre-
sentativity is what law intends to do: to maintain order and to do so in a 
way where benefits far outweigh the costs. To do it in a way that has the 
maximum impact is really about hammering the nail that sticks out the 
most.  
The idea is not to seek shelter behind the poster incident or accused, 
which could be guided by popular media, but to tackle head-on what rep-
resents quantitatively the most serious form of victimisation. 
Donors, the international community, victims, and the general popu-
lace would surely recognise the effectiveness of a criminal justice system 
when those who faced the greatest suffering, the incidents which caused 
the greatest suffering, and those who caused the greatest suffering are 
processed by it. 
The ICC-OTP has missed the opportunity to embrace the concept of 
representativity fully in its Policy Paper published in 2016. When making 
reference to representativity, the Policy Paper talks about representing the 
true extent of criminality in a situation and selecting charges that consti-
tute a representative sample of main types of victimisation and affected 
communities. The ICC-OTP’s approach appears to be ensuring diversity 
and not effectiveness. As the institution that sits at the pinnacle of efforts 
to end impunity for mass crimes, a case prioritisation strategy that ensures 
effective delivery of justice through representativity could bring larger 
benefits to the international community. 
                                                   
95 Ibid. 
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9.5. Challenges 
In the implementation of prioritisation criteria in domestic jurisdictions, 
one important factor to consider is the operation of the principle of com-
plementarity vis-à-vis the prioritisation criteria in the domestic jurisdiction. 
Should the implementation of prioritisation criteria in a domestic jurisdic-
tion fall foul of the ICC standard of unable and unwilling, there is a possi-
bility of those cases reaching the ICC. While prioritising a case does not 
entail non-prosecution of the non-prioritised cases, realistically there are 
bound to be delays in managing the non-prioritised caseload. Under the 
ICC Statute, unjustified or undue delays could be considered as the un-
willingness or inability of the domestic judicial system to carry out inves-
tigation and prosecution, and could invite the attention of the ICC-OTP.96 
Similarly, a broadly-worded, practical-considerations criterion could give 
wide discretion to the prosecutor, and if that discretion is used to de-
prioritise certain cases with the intent of shielding the accused from pros-
ecution, it is likely to be treated as unwillingness to genuinely investigate 
or prosecute.97 
The key to designing the domestic prioritisation criteria is that they 
not be inconsistent with the ICC prioritisation criteria: the gravity of of-
fences and degree of responsibility of the accused should remain relevant, 
but the main types of victimisation and affected communities should also 
be considered for prioritisation. 
While the ICC-OTP’s Policy Paper is treated as an internal docu-
ment not giving rise to any rights and obligations, it remains to be seen 
how the ICC-OTP will treat non-compliance by a domestic prosecution 
service of the relevant domestic criteria of prioritisation.98 Could the ICC-
OTP consider such non-compliance as proof that the case has not been 
prioritised with a view to shielding the accused from criminal responsibil-
ity? It certainly can, as the ICC is likely to take into account all infor-
mation available to it in order to assess the State’s unwillingness and ina-
bility to prosecute core international crimes. 
Thus, an ideal prioritisation criterion in a domestic jurisdiction will 
not only address the local needs, but also be mindful of the ICC Statute, 
                                                   
96 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 17(2)(b) and 17(3) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9). 
97 Ibid., Article 17(2)(a). 
98 OTP Policy Paper, para. 2, see above note 52. 
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its prioritisation criteria, and the operation of the principle of complemen-
tarity. 
As a corollary to the ICC-aware or -sensitive domestic prioritisation 
criteria, the ICC itself needs to design its prioritisation criteria so that 
there is no impunity gap. That is, its prioritisation criteria need to be spe-
cifically designed to cover cases, in line with the Rome Statute, that are 
not adequately covered by the domestic prioritisation criteria, so that the 
operation of prioritisation criteria at the domestic level and by the ICC-
OTP complement each other and there is no impunity gap for the perpe-
trators of the most serious crimes. 
9.6. The Future 
As is evident in the adoption of case prioritisation strategies in domestic 
jurisdictions, the idea of case prioritisation is gaining wider acceptance 
due to its ability to meaningfully navigate bloated mass crimes case port-
folios of States with stretched criminal justice systems. 
Case prioritising could also be a useful strategy for countries that 
suffer from judicial pendency. For instance, the Indian judicial system 
suffers from a massive backlog of civil and criminal cases.99 In a recent 
Delhi High Court judgment on mass violence directed against the Sikh 
community in the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi, the Court lamented the fact that it had taken 34 years to 
bring the perpetrators to justice: 
In India, the riots in early November 1984 in which in Delhi 
alone 2,733 Sikhs and nearly 3,350 all over the country were 
brutally murdered (these are official figures) was neither the 
first instance of a mass crime nor, tragically, the last. The 
mass killings in Punjab, Delhi and elsewhere during the 
country’s partition remains a collective painful memory as is 
the killings of innocent Sikhs in November 1984. There has 
                                                   
99 Law Commission of India, Arrears and Backlog: Creating Additional Judicial 
(Wo)manpower, July 2014, Report No. 245, p. 1 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/jwxv5v): 
[T]he judicial system is unable to deliver timely justice because of huge backlog of 
cases for which the current judge strength is completely inadequate. Further, in addi-
tion to the already backlogged cases, the system is not being able to keep pace with the 
new cases being instituted, and is not being able to dispose of a comparable number of 
cases. The already severe problem of backlogs is, therefore, getting exacerbated by the 
day, leading to a dilution of the Constitutional guarantee of access to timely justice and 
erosion of the rule of law. 
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been a familiar pattern of mass killings in Mumbai in 1993, 
in Gujarat in 2002, in Kandhamal, Odisha in 2008, in Muzaf-
farnagar in U.P. in 2013 to name a few. Common to these 
mass crimes were the targeting of minorities and the attacks 
spearheaded by the dominant political actors being facilitat-
ed by the law enforcement agencies. The criminals responsi-
ble for the mass crimes have enjoyed political patronage and 
managed to evade prosecution and punishment. Bringing 
such criminals to justice poses a serious challenge to our le-
gal system. As these appeals themselves demonstrate, dec-
ades pass by before they can be made answerable. This calls 
for strengthening the legal system.100 
Countries like India that suffer from inexplicable judicial delays due 
to massive backlogs of cases can benefit from prioritising mass crimes 
cases. The criteria for prioritising mass crimes need to be suited to the 
particular needs of the domestic jurisdiction. There can hardly be boiler-
plate prioritisation criteria for domestic jurisdictions. As the case selection 
and prioritising strategy from the CAR shows, States should design case 
prioritising strategies that are best suited to their needs and realities. 
As per the ICC-OTP’s Strategic Plan for 2019–2021, the resources 
available to it are “unlikely to significantly increase”, while it expects an 
increase in the number of situations under investigation.101 In order to 
manage a larger caseload with existing resources, the ICC-OTP has aimed 
to increase “the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of preliminary exami-
nations, investigations and prosecutions” through a stringent application 
of case prioritisation criteria. Thus, we are likely to witness a more proac-
tive approach on case prioritisation at the ICC, the method and results of 
which could be quite instructive for national jurisdictions that suffer from 
large backlogs of cases and limited resources. 
                                                   
100 Delhi High Court, State through CBI v. Sajjan Kumar and others, Judgment, 17 December 
2018, Criminal Appeal No. 1099/2013 and Connected Matters, para. 367.6 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/b08482). 
101 Strategic Plan 2019–2021, para. 9, see above note 71. 
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Annex 1 
Date Development 
October 1995 ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor formally adopts case selection and 
prioritisation criteria.  
August 2002 to 
November 2003 
Expert groups appointed by the preparatory team for the ICC Office 
of the Prosecutor prepares report “on measures available to the 
Court to reduce the length of trials as well as pre-trial and trial 
preparation stage” and draft Regulations for the OTP.  
28 December 2004 BiH Collegium of Prosecutors adopted the “Orientation Criteria for 
Sensitive Rules of the Road cases”. 
2007 OSCE report on the backlog of open case files in BiH. 
26 September 2008 CILRAP expert conference on ‘Criteria for Prioritizing and Select-
ing Core International Crimes Cases’ held in Oslo. 
28 December 2008 The BiH Council of Ministers adopted the National War Crimes 
Strategy with Annex A, titled “Criteria for the review of war crimes 
cases”. 
26 March 2009 Anthology of conference papers from Oslo expert conference ‘Cri-
teria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes Cases’ 
published by TOAEP. 
17 September 2009 The OSCE report published as the monograph The Backlog of Core 
International Crimes Case Files in Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
TOAEP. 
4 October 2012 Colombia’s Office of the Attorney General adopts the directive on 
case selection and prioritisation criteria. 
November 2015 CILRAP’s CMN releases Prioritising International Sex Crimes 
Cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Supporting the 
national justice system in the investigation and prosecution of core 
international crimes with a sexual element. 
15 September 2016 The ICC-OTP releases the Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation. 
19 March 2018 The DRC adopts “Practice Direction for the Selection and Prioriti-
sation of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind, in Particu-
lar Sexual Violence at the Investigation Stage”.  
4 December 2018 The Special Criminal Court of Central African Republic launches 
the investigation and prosecution strategy with case selection and 
prioritisation criteria. 
A timeline on the development of the case prioritisation criteria 
for core international crimes. 
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10.Enhancing the Quality of Investigations: What 
Role Can the In-Depth Analysis Charts Play? 
Olympia Bekou* 
 
A number of cases before the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’ or ‘the 
Court’) have collapsed in recent years, owing to inadequate evidence. 
This brought to the fore the quality of investigations.1 The decision to 
drop the charges against Laurent Gbagbo,2 albeit not unique, led to the 
issue surrounding the quality of investigations receiving closer attention 
and the Office of the Prosecutor being brought under the spotlight for 
their working practices. Improving the quality of investigations is key for 
the success of an institution such as the ICC insofar as building successful 
cases begins already at the investigation stage. 
Starting with the premise that putting emphasis on the investiga-
tions should not be taken as advocating for convictions, the focus of this 
chapter will be on how to improve the quality of the cases that are ulti-
mately brought before the Court. What this chapter seeks to explore is one 
of the many areas where a (modest) change in practice might improve the 
quality of investigations so as to reduce the risk of cases failing – cases 
that would have otherwise succeeded. It goes without saying that an insti-
tution such as the ICC ought to always strive to improve the way it oper-
ates, starting already with investigations. 
                                                   
* Olympia Bekou is Professor of Public International Law and Head, International Criminal 
Justice Unit, Human Rights Law Centre, School of Law, University of Nottingham. 
1 See Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019 (https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). 
2 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Reasons for oral decision of 15 January 2019 on the 
Requête de la Défense de Laurent Gbagbo afin qu’un jugement d’acquittement portant sur 
toutes les charges soit prononcé en faveur de Laurent Gbagbo et que sa mise en liberté 
immédiate soit ordonnée, and on the Blé Goudé Defence no case to answer motion, 16 July 
2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/440017). 
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Given that core international crimes are not only factually rich but 
also very complex, an examination of the key challenges linked to the 
investigation of such crimes is necessary. Comprehending the specific 
legal requirements and maintaining an overview of facts and evidence 
already at the start of investigations is required, as insufficient under-
standing of such complexity can affect the quality of justice delivered 
further down the line. As will be seen in the sections that follow, a precise 
and structured approach will have a positive effect on the efficiency and 
precision of the criminal justice process, ensuring that fair trial guarantees 
are upheld throughout. 
Discussion in this chapter will then turn on how existing practices, 
namely, the use of in-depth analysis charts which had been utilised in 
some of the ICC’s cases, can contribute towards tackling some of the 
challenges in preserving an overview of facts and evidence. The main 
argument put forward in this chapter is that adopting a similar methodolo-
gy would help improve the quality of investigations. Irrespective of the 
typology used, means or technology employed, it will be argued that 
maintaining such an overview of facts and evidence is the crux of the is-
sue at hand and constitutes a concrete way of improving the quality of 
investigations. 
10.1. Difficulties in Linking Law to Facts in Core International 
Crimes Cases 
One of the difficulties in relating law to facts in core international crimes 
cases, is the increased volume of facts. It is not uncommon to lose the 
overview of the facts and evidence in such cases. Applying the law to the 
facts, so-called ‘subsumption’, is more difficult. Preserving both factual 
and evidentiary oversight throughout the different stages of the criminal 
justice process constitutes a further challenge. Although the facts of a case 
should be seen as a single coherent knowledge-base, this frequently ends 
up being broken up, not least because different teams of people work on 
the case from one stage to another. Although inevitable, the reality of this 
practice is that a lot of effort ends up being duplicated with increasing 
costs as a result. 
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10.1.1. Understanding the Legal Requirements for the Prosecution of 
Core International Crimes 
The crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC,3 namely, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression, encompass numerous con-
stituting elements and legal requirements. These are elaborated upon in 
both the ICC Statute as well as the Elements of Crimes document which 
aids in their interpretation. Furthermore, depending on the crime in ques-
tion, certain contextual elements may also need to be established.4 It is 
also necessary to satisfy one of the necessary modes of liability – perpe-
tration, ordering, command responsibility, planning, and so on.5 
To secure a conviction, evidence must be presented to support each 
of the individual elements above. In addition to the legal requirements, 
appreciating whether adequate evidence exists, and the type of evidence 
needed to prove that each legal requirement has been satisfied to the req-
uisite standard, is necessary. 
Investigating and bringing charges against high level individuals – 
be they rebel leaders, military leaders, or Heads of State, requires estab-
lishing the evidential chain necessary to link such an individual to the 
criminal acts carried out by others, which can potentially be a complex 
endeavour.6 
The complexity of the legal requirements of the core international 
crimes, together with the modes of liability and the nature of the factual 
situations to which these must be applied, and in order to understanding 
the evidence available, it is important to adopt a clear and precise struc-
ture to cases. Lack of such understanding and overview may cause delays 
in the justice process, negatively impacting on the precision and quality of 
cases, and may also lead to the erosion of the Court’s credibility. 
                                                   
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 5 (‘ICC Statute’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9). 
4 For instance, genocide must be committed “in the context of a manifest pattern of similar 
conduct”, whereas the attack in crimes against humanity must be “widespread or systemat-
ic”. ICC, Elements of Crimes, 11 June 2010, Articles 6, 7 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
3c0e2d). 
5 ICC Statute, Articles 25 and 38, see above note 3. 
6 Frederik Harhoff, “It is all in the Process: Reflections on the Relation between Internation-
al Criminal Trials and International Humanitarian Law”, in Nordic Journal of International 
Law, 2009, vol. 78, no. 4, p. 478. 
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10.1.2. Applying the Legal Requirements to Large Quantities of 
Evidence 
Investigators, prosecutors and judges must be able to process vast quanti-
ties of data efficiently and accurately. This includes also matching it to the 
specific legal requirements of a case. For, it is not just the legal aspects of 
a case that pose challenges. Facts and evidence commonly challenge both 
the legal analysis and established work practices in complex cases. Such 
cases rely on a wide range of documents and witness statements. They are 
inherently fact-rich. Analysing and organising materials and determining 
their relevancy and weight in terms of the legal aspects of the case are, 
therefore, necessary. Organising evidence effectively is critical to the suc-
cess of the case, affecting different stages of the process, from case selec-
tion and prioritisation, to the quality of the case, to fairness and judicial 
economy. 
To select strong cases, prosecutors must both comprehend the legal 
requirements and the strength of the available evidence to prove them. 
Maintaining a well-organised overview of the case is also important for 
the development of a clear prosecutorial or defence strategy by counsel, 
particularly where larger teams are involved who may be working on dif-
ferent areas of the same case. 
The problem of handling large quantities of facts and evidence is by 
no means unique to core international crimes.7 It is also an issue in serious 
fraud and organised crime cases, including human trafficking. The diffi-
culties faced in the prosecution of core international crimes closely re-
semble those encountered in serious fraud cases in respect of linking lots 
of facts to specific legal requirements.8 International criminal justice insti-
tutions may benefit from the experience of serious fraud agencies in that 
respect. 
                                                   
7 See Bergsmo, 2019, see above note 1. 
8 Jack A. Blum, “Enterprise Crime: Financial Fraud in International Interspace”, in Trends in 
Organized Crime, 1998, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 39. See also report of the Fraud Advisory Panel, 
Bringing to Book: Tackling the Crisis in the Investigation and Prosecution of Serious 
Fraud, 2006. 
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10.2. Applying the Law to the Facts in an Informed, Efficient and 
Precise Manner 
10.2.1. Pursuing Justice and the Quality of the Process 
The quality of the justice process also depends on the efficiency of the 
overall process and the adherence to protecting the rights of the accused. 
These are challenges that arise in respect of core crimes cases as well and 
will, therefore, be examined next. 
10.2.2. The Efficiency of the Criminal Justice Process and the Fight 
Against Impunity 
The practical challenges associated with the application of the law to the 
facts in core international crimes cases and the manner in which they are 
dealt with, influences the ability of criminal justice institutions to pursue 
justice efficiently and effectively, and to contribute to the fight against 
impunity. 
One such challenge is the sheer number of potential perpetrators. In 
the aftermath of mass atrocity, there may be a large number of individuals 
suspected of having been involved in the commission of core international 
crimes, which may even amount to a significant part of the population.9 
Moreover, international trials are both costly and resource intensive. This 
in turn means that only a small number of individuals can be brought be-
fore an international court or tribunal and the process is likely to be ex-
pensive. Such low number of perpetrators being brought to justice interna-
tionally and the associated costs, is also a common source of criticism of 
international criminal justice institutions. If this is coupled with inefficient 
practices and the lack of precision, it becomes harder to meet the demand 
for justice, particularly where many perpetrators exist. The result of this is 
that cases which are being pursued may later fail owing to a lack of evi-
dence or weaknesses that were not foreseen at an earlier stage of the pro-
cess. It may also lead to handling unnecessary evidence, making the pro-
cess more cumbersome for all involved, including counsel and judges. 
                                                   
9 Scott Straus, “How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Esti-
mate”, in Journal of Genocide Research, 2004, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 85. Morten Bergsmo, Kjetil 
Helvig, Ilia Utmelidze and Gorana Žagovec, The Backlog of Core International Crimes 
Case Files in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2010 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/3-bergsmo-helvig-utmelidze-zagovec-second). 
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Organising evidence in such a manner so as to have an up-to-date 
overview of the case at all times, is an important way of ensuring efficien-
cy. For example, where evidence is weak or missing, it is counter-
productive to pursue a case which is not supported by sufficient evidence. 
Maintaining a clear overview also aids in developing a clear prosecutorial 
strategy and avoids having counsel prepare for cases to progress in a 
number of different directions or presenting evidence with little or no 
relevance to the charges. Developing a precise and structured approach to 
the handling of evidence also avoids the duplication of work, both within 
teams of investigators, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges, and be-
tween different teams or stages of the process, enhancing the efficiency as 
a whole and reducing the overall length of the process as well as the asso-
ciated costs. 
10.2.3. Promotion of the Rights of the Accused 
The inability of the prosecution to outline a clear strategy for the prosecu-
tion of cases may also affect the fair trial rights of the accused. The right 
of the accused to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause 
and content of the charge, and the right to have adequate time and facili-
ties for the preparation of his or her defence are two aspects of the right to 
fair trial.10 The ICC Statute guarantees these rights to accused persons 
appearing before the ICC.11 However, in practice,12 how evidence is or-
ganised and presented by the prosecution will affect how the criminal 
justice process is carried out. Handling evidence in precise manner and 
being clear as to the way in which such evidence will be linked to the 
legal requirements of the crime can contribute to the observation of the 
fundamental rights of the accused. This in turn will also ease the burden 
of the defence who, becoming aware of the prosecutorial strategy, would 
be able to channel their (modest) resources to the specific charges, in-
                                                   
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Articles 14(3)(a), 
14(3)(b) (‘ICCPR’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2838f3); European Convention on Human 
Rights, 4 November 1950, Article 6(3)(a), 6(3)(b) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/8267cb); 
American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, Articles 8(2)(b), 8(2)(c) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/1152cf). 
11 ICC Statute, Articles 67(1)(a), 67(1)(b), see above note 3. 
12 Jacob Katz Cogan, “International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Pro-
spects”, in Yale Journal of International Law, 2002, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 111. 
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forming the accused from the outset of the detailed nature of the charges 
against them. 
Ensuring that accused persons are tried without undue delay is also 
aided by an increase in precision and efficiency.13 This right afforded to 
the accused is yet another important aspect of the right to fair trial. Having 
an efficient, precise and informed methodology can help the ICC to over-
come these difficulties and ensure the application of the rights of the ac-
cused in practice. 
10.3. The ‘In-depth Analysis Charts’: An Overview of the Relevant 
Case-Law 
Having outlined some of the challenges associated with core international 
crimes cases, the chapter will now provide an overview of the in-depth 
analysis charts which had been introduced by the ICC’s Chambers as part 
of a broader engagement with questions of pre-trial disclosure. This was 
done whilst discussing how evidence should be disclosed, what should be 
disclosed, to whom, and when.14 By exploring the merits and perceived 
drawbacks of the in-depth analysis charts, the chapter will argue that ex-
panding their use also to cover investigations, will both improve the quali-
ty of investigations and will be of benefit to the judicial process as a 
whole. 
Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) III explained the rationale for the devel-
opment of the in-depth analysis charts. In reflecting on the Chamber’s 
functions, it held that they help ensure “the efficient organisation of the 
confirmation hearing, in determining whether or not to send the case to 
trial and in facilitating the conduct of the trial if the charges are con-
firmed”.15 
                                                   
13 ICCPR, Article 14(3)(c), see above note 10. 
14 On ‘who, what, when, why’ characterisation of the disclosure theme, see Helen Brady, 
“Disclosure of Evidence”, in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Ele-
ments of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, 
2001, p. 404. For background information on the introduction of in-depth analysis charts, 
see Olympia Bekou and Morten Bergsmo, “The In-depth Evidence Analysis Charts at the 
International Criminal Court”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Active Complementarity: Legal 
Information Transfer, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2011, pp. 313–47 (http://
www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/8-bergsmo); and Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou and Annika 
Jones, “Preserving the Overview of Law and Facts: The Case Matrix”, in ibid., pp. 43–66. 
15 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a 
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In order to improve the efficiency of the proceedings, PTC III pre-
scribed in Bemba a specific method of presenting the evidence disclosed 
prior to the confirmation hearing, and communication to the Chambers. 
The so-called ‘analytical disclosure’, required that all evidence disclosed 
by either party at the pre-confirmation stage be presented in the form of 
an ‘in-depth analysis chart’. Therefore, “each piece of evidence [is pre-
sented] according to its relevance in relation to the constituent elements of 
the crimes presented by the Prosecutor”. Moreover, the Chamber required 
that each “piece of evidence must be analysed – page by page or, where 
required, paragraph by paragraph […] with one or more of the constituent 
elements of one or more of the crime with which the person is charged”.16 
In the two Kenyan disclosure Decisions, the Single Judge specifically 
directed the parties to follow the disclosure regime established in the De-
cision in Bemba.17 
Similarly, Trial Chamber II in Katanga required that evidence be 
disclosed using a ‘Table of Incriminating Evidence’ that follows a similar 
logic, and which: 
breaks down each confirmed charge into its constituent ele-
ments – contextual circumstances as well as material and 
mental elements – as prescribed by the Elements of crimes. 
For each element, the Prosecution shall set out the precise 
factual allegations which it intends to prove at trial in order 
to establish the constituent element in question. For each fac-
tual allegation, the Prosecution shall specify which item(s) of 
evidence it intends to rely on at trial in order to prove the al-
legation. Within each item of evidence, the Prosecution shall 
                                                                                                                        
Timetable for Disclosure between the Parties, 31 July 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-55, para. 6 
(‘Bemba Pre-Trial Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable 
for Disclosure between the Parties’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/15c802). 
16 Ibid., para. 69. 
17 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Setting the Regime 
for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, 6 April 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-44, pa-
ras. 21–23 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/351827); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and 
Other Related Matters, 6 April 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-48, paras. 22–24 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/12b91f). 
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identify the pertinent passage(s), which are directly relevant 
to the specific factual allegation.18 
In subsequent case-law, Trial Chamber II substantively adopted the 
same methodology of the ‘in-depth analysis charts’ as outlined in Bemba, 
even if this Chamber did not use the term itself. 
Whilst the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba, and the Trial Chamber in 
Katanga, have prescribed the precise format in which evidence must be 
disclosed to the other party, and communicated to the Chamber, the Pre-
Trial Chamber Abu Garda19 and also Banda and Jerbo,20 adopted a less 
rigorous regime of analytical disclosure. The Chamber confirmed that the 
appropriate system of disclosure to be adopted was that developed at the 
confirmation of charges stages in the Lubanga Case21 and the Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Case,22 models that predate the comprehensive regime out-
lined in Bemba.23 
Having said that, the Chamber in Abu Garda required that the Pros-
ecutor provide the “Charging Document and the List of Evidence […] in a 
language which the person fully understands and speaks. In doing so, the 
Prosecution shall further ensure that this is organised in such a manner 
that: i) each item of evidence is linked to the factual statement it intends to 
                                                   
18 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Order Concerning the Presentation of 
Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court Protocol, 13 March 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-956, 
para. 13 (‘Katanga Trial Order Concerning the Presentation of Incriminating Evidence and 
the E-Court Protocol’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/ad5c46). 
19 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Second Decision on Issues Relating to Disclosure, 15 July 2009, ICC-02/05-
02/09-35 (‘Abu Garda Pre-Trial Second Decision on Issues Relating to Disclosure’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/b57860). 
20 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourainand 
and Saleh Moahmmed Jerbo Jamus, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on Issues Relating to 
Disclosure, 29 June 2010, ICC-02/05-03/09-49 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2a3bac). 
21 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the 
Establishment of a Timetable, 15 May 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-102 (‘Lubanga Pre-Trial 
Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable’) (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/052848). 
22 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber, Transcript, 14 December 2007, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-12-ENG (https://legal-tools.org/doc/03aafc). 
23 Abu Garda Pre-Trial Second Decision on Issues Relating to Disclosure, para. 12, see above 
note 19. 
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prove; and ii) each factual statement is linked to a specific element of 
crime, a mode of liability, or both”,24 reflecting the same direction as in 
the Lubanga disclosure decision.25 A similar direction was also given, in 
the Mbarushimana case.26 Despite the Chamber not prescribing a particu-
lar format in which that information ought to be conveyed, the underlying 
rationale of analytical disclosure is clearly present. 
The obligation of analytical disclosure using in-depth analysis does 
not extend to the disclosure of Article 67(2) or Rule 77 evidence, that is, 
exculpatory evidence. This was confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber I27 and 
II.28 Pre-Trial Chamber II highlighted that it only demanded in-depth ana-
lytical disclosure for incriminating evidence, whilst Pre-Trial Chamber I 
in Mbarushimana considered that contrary to the Prosecutor’s interpreta-
tion of the “Decision on Issues Relating to Disclosure”, that Decision only 
required “a concise summary of the content of each item”, not a ‘detailed 
summary’.29 
However, a shift in the ICC’s approach occurred in the Ongwen 
case where the Appeals Chamber in its judgment on the disclosure regime 
                                                   
24 Ibid., pp. 17–18. 
25 Lubanga Pre-Trial Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a 
Timetable, Annex 1, para. 59, see above note 21. 
26 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on Issues Relating to Disclosure, 30 March 2011, 
ICC-01/04-01/10-87, p. 18 (‘Mbarushimana Pre-Trial Decision on Issues Relating to Dis-
closure’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/aee80d). 
27 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application for Leave to 
Appeal the ‘Decision on Issues relating to Disclosure’ (ICC-01/04-01/10-87)”, 21 April 
2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-116 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c803fc). 
28 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecu-
tion’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Dis-
closure and Other Related Matters’ (ICC-01/09-01/11-44)”, 2 May 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-
74 (‘Ruto and Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Ap-
peal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 2011 Decision’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/7ea8aa); ICC, 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prose-
cution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence 
Disclosure and Other Related Matters’ (ICC-01/09-02/11-48)”, 2 May 2011, ICC-01/09-
02/11-77 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c25cf8). 
29 Mbarushimana Pre-Trial Decision on Issues Relating to Disclosure, para. 11, see above 
note 26. 
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found that the Single judge was “unfair and unreasonable” in exercising 
her discretion when she “ordered the production and submission of in-
depth analysis charts”.30 However, the Chamber did not pronounce on the 
value of the charts in terms of enhancing the overall efficiency and fair-
ness of the proceedings, as this would exceed the scope of the review.31 
Between 2015 and 2018, no in-depth analysis charts were requested 
by the Pre-Trial Chambers. However, the issue was ‘revived’ by the Sin-
gle Judge in the Al Hassan case who asked in one of his earlier decisions 
whether the use of such charts was a good idea.32 The Office of the Prose-
cutor again protested vociferously33 and analytical disclosure was again 
halted.34 Following that decision, in-depth analysis charts have not been 
utilised in subsequent cases. 
The 2019 version of the Chambers Practice Manual, states that 
submission of any in-depth analysis charts or similia of the evidenced 
disclosed, cannot be imposed on either party35 and that “there is no basis 
for the Chamber to impose on the parties a particular modality or format 
to argue their case and present their evidence” such as the ‘in-depth analy-
                                                   
30 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Appeals Chamber, Judg-
ment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II entitled 
“Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters”, 17 
June 2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-251, para. 46 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/0052a2). 
31 Ibid., para. 45. 
32 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure Protocol 
and Other Related Matters, 16 May 2018, ICC-01/12-01/18-31-tENG-Corr (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/89d69e). In paras. 44–47, the Single Judge summarises the advantages of us-
ing in-depth analysis charts, and in para. 51 it requests the prosecution to file its observa-
tions on this issue. 
33 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abduoul Aziz Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, OTP, Public redacted version of the “Prosecution’s observations 
regarding the «Décision relative au système de divulgation et à d’autres questions connex-
es» (ICC-01/12-01/18-31)”, 24 May 2018, ICC-01/12-01/18-38-Conf-Exp, 25 May 2018, 
ICC-01/12-01/18-38-Red2 (‘Al Hassan Prosecution’s observations regarding Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s 16 May 2018 Decision’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f53b45). 
34 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the In-Depth Analysis Chart of 
Disclosed Evidence, 29 June 2018, ICC-01/12-01/18-61-tENG, para. 23 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/d35cef). 
35 ICC, Chambers Practice Manual, 2019, para. 24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/dh0zyq). 
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sis chart’, or similia, “of the evidence relied upon for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing can be imposed on either of the parties”.36 
Regardless of the form analytical disclosure takes, for example, 
whether in-depth analysis charts are used, utilising the underlying meth-
odology and not its form is what matters. It is concerning that the practice 
appears to have been put on the backburner for now, for the advantages it 
offers outweigh the perceived disadvantages, both of which will be exam-
ined in turn. 
10.4. Advantages of Adopting In-depth Analysis Charts 
The advantages of adopting in-depth analysis charts in the investigations 
and prosecutions of core international crimes cases fit in two broad cate-
gories: They offer distinct clarity and enhance fair trial. 
10.4.1. Enhancing Clarity in Complex Cases 
As seen already, core international crimes cases are, by definition, fact-
rich and complex. Therefore, applying the law to the facts requires a 
structured approach which can be greatly facilitated by the use of the in-
depth analysis charts. Such charts provide both a clear structure as well as 
precision in every step of the process. 
Structuring and presenting the Prosecution case using the in-depth 
analysis charts is beneficial to all parties to the proceedings, including 
also the Prosecution. The emphasis of the ICC case-law has been on the 
benefits of the in-depth analysis charts for the Defence and the Chambers. 
However, the Office of the Prosecutor would also benefit from using them. 
Structuring the prosecution case according to a clear format, increases the 
understanding of the parties who have not been privy to the detailed in-
vestigations, for example, by other teams within the Office of the Prose-
cutor or within other members of the same team. The use of such charts 
helps maintain an overview of the case, and assists, when presenting the 
case, in developing the argument in a clear and logical fashion, to improve 
its strength. 
10.4.2. Ensuring Fair Trials 
Moreover, given that the “disclosure of evidence goes to the heart of the 
accused’s right to a fair trial”,37 ensuring that the Defence has a sound 
                                                   
36 Ibid., para. 43. 
10. Enhancing the Quality of Investigations: 
What Role Can the In-Depth Analysis Charts Play? 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 599 
grasp of the case against it, lies at the heart of this right and the principle 
of equality of arms. In-depth analysis charts make the case clearer and 
easier to understand, facilitating the development of a more viable de-
fence strategy, and thus enhancing fair trial. 
Expecting the Prosecutor to search for and disclose all evidence, in-
criminating and (potentially) exculpatory,38 in contrast to the obligation to 
merely disclose “any material which in the actual knowledge of the Pros-
ecutor” may be exculpatory or mitigatory,39 goes a long way towards re-
balancing the interaction between the parties. 
However, an enhanced duty to disclose may lead to a substantial in-
crease in the volume of evidence that needs to be processed, analysed, and 
disclosed. Where efficient modalities of evidence handling and transfer 
are absent, the increased workload on the prosecutorial side may cause 
delays which in turn may reduce the benefits of the defence whose burden 
is eased through gains in expediency. 
10.5. Concerns Surrounding the Use of In-Depth Analysis Charts 
It is true that in-depth analysis charts challenge established work process-
es. Despite their many merits, the Office of the Prosecutor has been reluc-
tant to use them and raised a number of concerns which will be discussed 
next. 
10.5.1. Lack of Legal Basis 
One of the key objections to the model put forward in Bemba regarding 
evidence disclosure was that the system advanced by the Decision was not 
requested by any party nor was it envisaged in the ICC Statute.40 Moreo-
                                                                                                                        
37 Brady, 2001, p. 404, see above note 14. 
38 ICC Statute, Articles 67(2) and 54(1)(a), see above note 3. 
39 ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 July 2015, Rule 68(i) (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/30df50). 
40 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, OTP, Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 31 
July 2008 “Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable for Dis-
closure between the Parties”, 6 August 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-63, paras. 3, 4 (‘Bemba 
Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 31 July 2008 Decision’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/992213). See also, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, OTP, 
Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Order Concerning the Presentation of 
Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court Protocol”, 23 March 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-982, 
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ver, it also moves away from the procedure adopted in Lubanga and Ka-
tanga. Furthermore, the implementation without previously consulting 
any of the parties was presented as being problematic. The Office of the 
Prosecutor argued that given that an in-depth analysis chart was not a re-
quirement in the Lubanga disclosure regime, it was not necessary for a 
fair trial, since the duty to make full and sufficiently timely disclosure 
does not include the preparation of an explanatory analytical chart.41 
The alleged lack of legal basis for prescribing in-depth analysis 
charts as a modality for disclosure under Article 61(3) of the ICC Statute 
as well as Rule 121(2) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘ICC 
RPE’), it should be noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber has the power to 
issue orders in order to ensure the proper conduct of disclosure. In the 
case of disclosure, once the case has proceeded to the Trial Chamber, the 
legal basis for the prescription of disclosure procedure lies firmly in Arti-
cle 64(3)(a) of the ICC Statute.42 
                                                                                                                        
paras. 24–35 (‘Katanga Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Trial Chamber’s 13 
March 2009 Order’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/a7ba71); ICC, Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Moham-
med Hussein Ali, OTP, Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal “Decision Setting the 
Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters” (ICC-01/09-02/11-48), 13 
April 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-55, para. 4 (‘Kenyatta Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to 
Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 2011 Decision’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/94db9c); 
ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, OTP, Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Ap-
peal the “Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters” 
(ICC-01/09-01/11-44), 13 April 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-50, para. 4 (‘Ruto and Sang Prose-
cution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 2011 Decision’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/a34575); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, OTP, Prosecutor’s Application for 
Leave to Appeal the “Decision on Issues Relating to Disclosure” (ICC-01/04-01/10-87), 5 
April 2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-93, para. 4 (‘Mbarushimana Prosecutor’s Application for 
Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 30 March 2011 Decision’) (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/b97718). 
41 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, OTP, Prosecution’s Submissions on the Trial Chamber’s 8 December 2009 Oral 
Order Requesting Updating of the In-Depth-Analysis Chart, 15 December 2009, ICC-
01/05-01/08-656, paras. 7, 8 (‘Bemba Prosecution’s Submissions on the Trial Chamber’s 8 
December 2009 Oral Order’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/5218ca). 
42 Article 64(3)(a) provides: “Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with this 
Statute, the Trial Chamber assigned to deal with the case shall: Confer with the parties and 
adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the 
proceedings”, see above note 3. See for discussion of the Trial Chamber’s discretion, 
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The concern that the analytical disclosure obligations conflict with 
the work product rule under Rule 81(1) of the ICC RPE, has been coun-
tered by Trial Chambers II and III which clarified that the order does not 
compel the Prosecutor to provide a subjective analysis of the evidence; 
they only require that the relevant areas be identified. The Prosecution is 
therefore, under no obligation to provide the Chamber or defence with any 
internal work product relating to the internal analysis by the Prosecutor of 
the evidence.43 Given that the obligation is based on the material that has 
been filed as part of the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations alone, and 
taking into account that the burden of proof lies with the Prosecutor, the 
only purpose of the table is to guarantee the transparency of the Prosecu-
tor’s case, enabling the Defendant to know the precise case against him or 
her sufficiently in advance.44 
10.5.2. Specific Grounds for Appeal 
For the purposes of establishing the grounds for appeal pursuant to Article 
82(1)(d) of the ICC Statute, it has been argued that the contested provi-
sions pertaining to the system of disclosure affect both the fairness and 
expeditiousness of proceedings. The Prosecutor cited decisions of the Ap-
peals Chamber to claim that “fairness requires that the procedural and 
substantive rights and obligations of all parties be respected, which has 
been held to include fairness to the Prosecution”.45 The Prosecutor has 
                                                                                                                        
Reinhold Gallmetzer, “The Trial Chamber’s Discretionary Power to Devise the Proceed-
ings Before It and Its Exercise in the Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”, in Carsten Stahn 
and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, pp. 501–24. 
43 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Appli-
cation for Leave to Appeal the ‘Order concerning the Presentation of Incriminating Evi-
dence and the E-Court Protocol’” and the “Prosecution’s Second Application for Extension 
of Time Limit Pursuant to Regulation 35 to Submit a Table of Incriminating Evidence and 
related material in compliance with Trial Chamber II ‘Order concerning the Presentation of 
Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court Protocol’”, 1 May 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1088, 
para. 33 (‘Katanga Trial Decision on 1 May 2009’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/1a6508), 
and reiterated in Bemba Prosecution’s Submissions on the Trial Chamber’s 8 December 
2009 Oral Order, para. 24, see above note 41. 
44 Katanga Trial Decision on 1 May 2009, para. 34, see above note 43. 
45 Bemba Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 1 July 2008 
Decision, para. 14, see above note 40, referring to ICC, Situation in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for 
Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 17 January 2006 on the Applications for Par-
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further submitted that “the guarantee of a fair and expeditious trial cannot 
require the Prosecution to undertake an onerous task” not otherwise pro-
vided for in the ICC Statute.46  
The concerns relating to the increased workload imposed upon the 
Office of the Prosecutor as a result of the prescribed analytical modality 
of disclosure are valid. However, if the analytical methodology were to be 
adopted as standard Prosecutorial practice from the start of the process, 
the additional burden upon the Prosecution at the disclosure stage should 
be minimal. In essence, if a case would have been built upon following 
this analytical logic it would lead to the fewer activities being duplicated. 
Arguably, whilst the work of the Prosecutor might be increased and thus 
has the potential for slowing down the progression of proceedings, the 
benefits and expediency gains enjoyed by the Chambers and the Defence 
would outweigh any delays. Consequently, the net benefits of the adoption 
of the analytical system to the judicial process as a whole would mitigate 
any drawbacks. 
10.5.3. Fairness 
Owing to the burden associated with analytical disclosure upon the Office 
of the Prosecutor at the time of fulfilling those requirements, it has been 
argued that the fairness of proceedings vis-à-vis the Prosecution is im-
pacted.47 It has been submitted that not only is the burden not envisaged 
by the Court’s instruments, but it is an “exorbitant duty” which “cannot 
reasonably be complied with”. Moreover, the requirement fails to appreci-
                                                                                                                        
ticipation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 
31 March 2006, ICC-01/04-135-tEN, paras. 38–39 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/902494); 
ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on Prosecutor’s Applications for Leave to Appeal dated the 15th Day of March 2006 
and to Suspend or Stay Consideration of Leave to Appeal dated the 11th day of May 2006, 
10 July 2006, ICC-02/04-01/15-64, para. 24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/601704). Also 
raised in Kenyatta Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 
April 2011 Decision, paras. 19–20, see above note 40; Ruto and Sang Prosecution’s Appli-
cation for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 2011 Decision, see above note 40. 
46 Katanga Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Trial Chamber’s 13 March 2009 
Order, para. 26, see above note 40 (emphasis in original). 
47 Ibid., para. 30; Mbarushimana Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s 30 March 2011 Decision, paras. 12–15, see above note 40; Al Hassan Prosecu-
tion’s observations regarding Pre-Trial Chamber’s 16 May 2018 Decision, paras. 51–53, 
see above note 33. 
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ate the scale of the material involved, and the implications for the Prose-
cution’s workload and functioning.48 
Having applied this concept of fairness to the issue of analytical 
disclosure obligations, the Chamber swiftly determined that this was not a 
valid ground for appeal. Moreover, the Chamber questioned the extent to 
which the impugned Decision imposed novel burdens upon the Prosecutor, 
asserting that: 
the Prosecutor, having investigated in the situation of CAR 
since May 2007, has an in-depth knowledge of his own file. 
It is assumed that the Prosecutor conducts the analysis of the 
material collected on a continuous basis in order to prepare 
and present properly his case.49 
Pre-Trial Chamber II further held that the required document is a 
“necessary and proportionate procedural tool that assists in revealing the 
prosecution’s case against the accused, notwithstanding the resources that 
will be necessary for its completion”.50 
10.5.4. Expeditiousness 
Another objection to the use of in-depth analysis charts relates to the ex-
peditiousness of the proceedings. The Prosecutor argued that, given the 
already limited resources of the Office of the Prosecutor, the scale of the 
exercise involved in the in-depth analysis charts would move resources 
                                                   
48 Bemba Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 31 July 2008 
Decision, paras. 26–28, see above note 40; Kenyatta Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to 
Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 2011 Decision, para. 19, see above note 40; Ruto and 
Sang Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 2011 De-
cision, para. 19, see above note 40. 
49 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal 
Pre-Trial Chamber III’s decision on disclosure, 25 August 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-75, para. 
66 (‘Bemba Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal Pre-Trial 
Chamber III’s decision on disclosure’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/76ef50). See also Ka-
tanga Trial Order Concerning the Presentation of Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court 
Protocol, para. 15, see above note 18. 
50 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Submissions on the Trial Cham-
ber’s 8 December 2009 Oral Order Requesting Updating of the In-Depth-Analysis Chart”, 
29 January 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-682, para. 26 (‘Bemba Trial Decision on the Prosecu-
tion’s Submissions on Trial Chamber’s 8 December 2009 Oral Order’) (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/fb0bb9). 
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away from securing timely disclosure and inspection of material thus de-
laying the performance of these core statutory obligations.51 
Deciding the appropriateness of such a time and labour-intensive 
analysis at the pre-confirmation hearing stage of proceedings when there 
is no guarantee that the charges will be confirmed by the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber and the case sent to trial is a valid concern. 
‘Expeditiousness’ has been interpreted by the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
be akin to the concept of judicial proceedings “within a reasonable 
time”.52 Employing efficient working practices is also important for the 
rights of the accused.53 Articles 67(1)(c) and 60(4) of the ICC Statute, as 
well as all the international and regional human rights instruments, pro-
vide that the accused is entitled to an expeditious trial with undue delay.54 
The length, cost and bureaucracy of international judicial proceed-
ings are commonly criticised.55 Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chambers have 
                                                   
51 Ruto and Sang Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 
2011 Decision, para. 25, see above note 40; Kenyatta Prosecutor’s Application for Leave 
to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber’s 6 April 2011 Decision, para. 25, see above note 40; Al Has-
san Prosecution’s observations regarding Pre-Trial Chamber’s 16 May 2018 Decision, para. 
42, see above note 33. 
52 Bemba Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal Pre-Trial 
Chamber III’s decision on disclosure, para. 17, see above note 49. 
53 ICC Statute, Article 67, see above note 3. The text of which is drawn from ICCPR, Article 
14(3), see above note 10. 
54 At the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), see on the length of pre-trial detention, 
Wemhoff v. Germany, Judgment, 27 June 1968, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1968:0627JUD000212
264 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/e8ac3d), and the two pronged-test: 1) was it reasonable to 
refuse bails; 2) was the time period given the complexities of the case reasonable? This has 
also been applied in Kalashnikov v. Russia, Judgment, 15 July 2002, ECLI:CE:ECHR:
2002:0715JUD004709599 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/d5919c). 
55 On the length of proceedings generally in international criminal justice see William A. 
Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007, pp. 209–10; Jean Galbraith, “The Pace of International Criminal Jus-
tice”, in Michigan Journal of International Law, 2009, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 79; O-Gon Kwon, 
“The Challenge of an International Criminal Trial as Seen From the Bench”, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2007, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 362–63; Patrick L. Robinson, “En-
suring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia”, in European Journal of International Law, 2000, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 569; 
Morten Bergsmo and Vladimir Tochilovsky, “Measures Available to the International 
Criminal Court to Reduce the Length of Proceedings”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rack-
witz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 
5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 651–93 (http://www.toaep.org/
ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). For an innovative approach that should be considered 
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been keen to stress the need to focus upon the evidence that is necessary 
to substantiate the criminal charges, to avoid “the disclosure of a bulk of 
evidence by excluding those pieces extraneous to any of the counts and 
useless for the purposes of the confirmation hearing and of the trial”.56 
The need to address issues of both the expeditiousness of proceed-
ings and the vindication of the rights of the accused is real.57 Whilst expe-
ditious proceedings are inextricably linked to the rights of the accused, 
caution must be taken when judicial efforts are made to improve the effi-
ciency of proceedings, as there is a risk that when trying to speed up pro-
ceedings the rights of the accused may be undermined.58 The adoption of 
the analytical method of disclosure, under which the primary obligation to 
expedite proceedings is placed on the Prosecutor, strikes the right balance 
on both. 
10.5.5. Impact on Prosecutorial Discretion 
A further concern raised by the Prosecutor in providing the requisite de-
gree of analysis and linking evidence to the precise elements of crimes 
and modes of liability was that, since disclosure is an ongoing process and 
should occur as soon as possible, it would deprive the Prosecutor of the 
flexibility to build and adapt the case if new circumstances arise before 
the trial commences and would require the Prosecution to present its case 
in a particular mode, “even if the Prosecution determines that that mode is 
                                                                                                                        
more closely in the coming years, see Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Abbreviated Criminal Proce-
dures for Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/9-bergsmo). 
56 Ekaterina Trendafilova, “Fairness and Expeditiousness in the International Criminal 
Court’s Pre-Trial Proceedings”, in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, p. 444. See 
also ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Defence, Defence Observations Concerning Prose-
cution Table of Disclosure, 23 January 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-845, para. 6(iii) (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/9c6086). 
57 Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 117. 
58 See also Robert Heinsch, “How to Achieve Fair and Expeditious Trial Proceedings before 
the ICC: Is It Time for A More Judge-Dominated Approach?”, in Carsten Stahn and Göran 
Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, pp. 479–80. 
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not the most effective means of assembling and presenting its case”.59 The 
appropriateness of including witness statements in the in-depth analysis 
charts, was questioned, since such statements are not typically classed as 
evidence, and given that witnesses may produce different evidence when 
testifying at the trial.60 
The Chambers responded to the Prosecutorial submission that the 
tabular format of disclosure unduly restricts the Prosecutor’s discretion to 
adapt the case in response to changing circumstances or the unearthing of 
further evidence by emphasising that they are fully appreciative of the 
organic nature of trials, and to that end, there is nothing to prevent the 
Prosecutor from submitting further evidence or asserting that the proba-
tive value of a piece of evidence has changed, providing that any devel-
opments are charted in an updated in-depth analysis chart.61 Similarly, the 
concern raised in respect of the inclusion of witness statements was found 
to be ill founded, since “it is self-evident that a witness’s evidence at trial 
may not coincide with his or her pre-trial statements or interviews”.62 
The concerns presented above, albeit legitimate, can be countered 
with equally valid arguments which do not detract from the fact that 
adopting in-depth analysis charts for the investigation and prosecution of 
core international crimes cases more broadly continues to be desirable. 
10.6. In-Depth Analysis Charts and Investigations 
The above analysis has demonstrated the advantages and perceived draw-
backs of the adoption of the in-depth analysis charts. The logic underpin-
ning the analytical framework, if adopted from the beginning of an inves-
tigation, could provide a valuable tool in structuring the investigation and 
building a solid case. Were such a framework to be adopted from the out-
                                                   
59 Katanga Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Trial Chamber’s 13 March 2009 
Order, para. 32, see above note 40. Also, Bemba Prosecution’s Submissions on the Trial 
Chamber’s 8 December 2009 Oral Order, para. 13, see above note 41. 
60 Katanga Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Trial Chamber’s 13 March 2009 
Order, para. 27, see above note 40. 
61 Bemba Trial Decision on the Prosecution’s Submissions on Trial Chamber’s 8 December 
2009 Oral Order, para. 27, see above note 50. 
62 Ibid., para. 28. 
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set, it would signal a step-change in the way the Court operates and would 
render the ICC more efficient as a result.63 
The proposition put forward in this chapter is that the benefits of 
adopting the in-depth analysis charts can be seen irrespective of the stage 
of proceedings, be it at investigation or at pre-trial stage. The scale, com-
plexity of the factual situation and the high number of perpetrators, the 
main challenges associated with core international crimes make their in-
vestigation complex. The adoption of an analytical framework from the 
beginning, enables the prosecution team to easily identify those areas that 
require further investigation or require more evidence to support the legal 
assertion. This in turn, strengthens the case that goes to trial which, to-
gether with properly equipped defence, improves the overall quality of 
justice delivered, which can then aid the Chamber to base its decision on 
higher quality submissions. 
Should the logic be applied a stage earlier, that is, when mapping 
serious human rights violations which may give rise to core international 
crimes, any criminal investigations that may ensue would also benefit, not 
least because of the importance of fact-finding missions to subsequent 
investigations and prosecutions.64 
                                                   
63 This seems to be the implicit intention of the Chamber, given that which seems to be im-
plicitly intended given its declared presumption that the Office of the Prosecutor will have 
scrutinised all evidence in its possession in order to determine its worth both in terms of 
establishing the prosecution case, and in terms of assisting the Prosecutor it its duty to “es-
tablish the truth” under Article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, see above note 3. See Bemba 
Pre-Trial Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable for Disclo-
sure between the Parties, see above note 15, reinforced by Bemba Trial Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Submissions on Trial Chamber’s 8 December 2009 Oral Order, see above 
note 50; and Katanga Trial Order Concerning the Presentation of Incriminating Evidence 
and the E-Court Protocol, see above note 18. 
64 Lyal S. Sunga, “How can UN Special Procedures Sharpen ICC Fact Finding?”, in Interna-
tional Journal of Human Rights, 2011, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 189–90: 1) taking ‘facts’ out of 
their proper context is highly misleading therefore great care must be taken; 2) Human 
Rights fact-finding tends to focus on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts 
in order to pressure governments to comply fully with their human rights and international 
humanitarian law obligations, whereas criminal investigations focus on individual criminal 
responsibility – therefore type of evidence collected is different; 3) respective burdens of 
proof; special procedural requirements in criminal investigations – preservation of pre-
sumption of innocence and confidentiality of evidence and preserving the chain of custody. 
In particular, distinguishing the fact-finding experiences of the ICTY and the ICTR from 
the technological context that now exists, Sunga discusses the possibility of drawing upon 
information technology and applications that utilise the same logic as that underpinning 
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10.7. Conclusion 
The chapter has sought to demonstrate challenges faced in the application 
of the law on core international crimes and modes of liability to fact-rich 
cases. The additional problems raised by the large quantities of facts and 
evidence that must be organised and related to the specific legal require-
ments have also been explored. 
The introduction and use of in-depth analysis charts by the ICC as a 
modality of disclosure and communication of evidence within the Court 
was explored in order to advance the expediency and efficiency of judicial 
activities, but also to ensure that the rights of the accused are being 
properly respected. Getting the balance right by streamlining the process 
may help ensure a better future for investigations by providing an efficient 
and logical methodology upon which to structure a case. 
The introduction of in-depth analysis charts constitutes one of those 
mechanisms which, if consistently adopted, will improve the efficiency of 
judicial proceedings before the Court. Of course, on their own, they can-
not be a panacea for all the challenges presented by the complexities of 
prosecuting the serious incidents of international criminality. However, 
the adoption of the in-depth analysis charts as a modality for the presenta-
tion and disclosure of evidence represents a step in the right direction. 
By breaking down the crimes and modes of liability into their con-
stituent parts, and linking each piece of factual evidence to those specific 
parts, the analytical logic not only helps the prosecution to present and 
communicate the prosecution case in the clearest and most logical manner 
for establishing international criminal responsibility, but it also helps the 
other parties to the proceedings, as well as the Chambers, to process the 
vast amount of information that a core crimes case involves. It is this im-
provement in the quality of communication between the parties that will 
enhance the proper respect for the rights of the accused, and which in turn 
will strengthen the integrity and legitimacy of the judicial process before 
the Court. As the ICC’s courtrooms are seen as ‘judicial laboratories’ 
where the Court’s procedural system is tested,65 the impact the adoption 
of the in-depth analysis charts has on other fora, be it international or na-
                                                                                                                        
the analytical disclosure regime, specifically referring to the manner in which those appli-
cations offer a “highly logical and systematic and pertinent means by which to hone raw 
empirical data on mass violations into a sharp case against the accused”. Ibid., p. 200. 
65 Harhoff, 2009, p. 472, see above note 6. 
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tional, should not be underestimated. The innovative stance taken by the 
ICC in that respect constitutes an important breakthrough and it is hoped 
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11.Controlling the Quality of Reasoning About the 
Link Between Evidence and Factual Findings 
Simon De Smet* 
 
11.1. Introduction 
Establishing facts is one of the core functions of the judicial process. This 
is especially true in criminal trials. No criminal trial can be considered fair 
and just if the fact-finding is of bad quality. Perhaps counter-intuitively, 
the key criterion to determine the quality of fact-finding is not whether or 
not the findings the fact-finder has made are true. Rather, the central crite-
rion is whether or not the fact-finding process was rational. For the pur-
poses of this discussion, a factual finding will be considered rational if it 
is based on conscious reflection about the available evidence.1 This im-
plies that findings that are formed on the basis of, for example, intuition 
are not appropriate in the judicial context. Another implication is that 
what the fact-finder may or may not believe is not the appropriate criteri-
on for judicial findings of fact.2 What counts is what the fact-finder can 
rationally accept.3 
The reason for putting such a premium on rationality over truth is 
not epistemic scepticism. Finding the truth remains the ultimate aim. 4 
                                                   
* Simon De Smet is Affiliate Lecturer at the University of Cambridge, from where he holds 
a doctorate, and has worked for many years in international criminal justice. The views ex-
pressed herein are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the Internation-
al Criminal Court. The author is grateful to Xabier Agirre for helpful comments and sug-
gestions. 
1 Douglas Walton, Methods of Argumentation, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
2 Simon De Smet, “The International Criminal Standard of Proof at the ICC—Beyond Rea-
sonable Doubt or Beyond Reason?”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
3 L. Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Clarendon Press, 1992. 
4 It has been argued that ‘judicial truth’ is not necessarily the same as ‘historical truth’. 
Giorgio Resta and Vincenzo Zeno Zencovich, “Judicial ‘Truth’ and Historical ‘Truth’: The 
Case of the Ardeatine Caves Massacre”, in Law and History Review, 2013, vol. 31, no. 4, p. 
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However, it is not sufficient for judicial findings of fact to be true. The 
parties and the public must see and have confidence that they are true. In 
this sense, judicial fact-finding is as much (if not more) concerned with 
certainty as it is concerned with truth. Certainty, in this context, is not a 
measure of the strength of the subjective feeling of a given fact-finder. 
Rather, certainty is a rational determination about the absence of doubt. 
Viewed in this regard, the central focus of judicial fact-finding is the iden-
tification of all potential sources of doubt concerning the relevant factual 
propositions.5 
In order to identify potential sources of uncertainty, it is necessary 
to understand the different cognitive processes of fact-finding. In essence, 
fact-finding involves three steps. In the initial phase, the fact-finder tries 
to generate plausible explanations about what might have happened. This 
can be referred to as the abductive phase, which is the most creative part 
of the fact-finding process.6 The purpose of the abductive process is to 
                                                                                                                        
843. It is certainly true that procedural rules can have a significant influence on the epis-
temic activities of judicial fact-finders. However, for the purposes of this chapter, the focus 
is on best practices for finding the ‘historical truth’. 
5 It is stressed that this chapter is concerned with the judicial fact-finding process as a whole. 
It makes no claims about whose responsibility it is to do what in criminal proceedings. In 
other words, it is not necessarily the job of the judges to identify all sources of doubt. In-
deed, in many systems of criminal adjudication, it is the role of the parties to raise doubts 
and the judges’ task is mainly to evaluate them. However, the overall proposition, that the 
central activity of judicial fact-finding is (or ought to be) the identification and evaluation 
of uncertainty, stands. Furthermore, it should also be stressed that no suggestion is made 
that judicial findings are only possible if there is no doubt. How much uncertainty is al-
lowed is determined by the applicable standard of proof, which is not the subject of the 
current chapter. However, regardless of which standard of proof is applied, it will always 
be necessary to identify all major sources of doubt in order to allow the adjudicator to 
evaluate the strength of the evidence and measure this against the relevant threshold as de-
fined in the standard of proof. 
6 The concept of ‘abduction’ was coined by Charles Peirce at the turn of the twentieth centu-
ry: Charles Peirce, in Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weis (eds.), Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce: Volume 5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, Harvard University 
Press, 1978. Although Peirce wrote about abduction more than a century ago, until recently 
there have been relatively few attempts to expand on his theory of abduction. One notable 
exception is Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Concep-
tual Foundations of Science, Cambridge University Press, 1958; Stathis Psillos, “An Ex-
plorer Upon Untrodden Ground: Peirce on Abduction”, in Dov M. Gabbay, Stephan Hart-
mann and John Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic: Volume 10: Inductive 
Logic, North Holland, 2011, pp. 117–51. Tomas Kapitan, “Peirce and the Autonomy of 
Abductive Reasoning”, in Erkenntnis, 1992, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 1–26; more recently, Doug-
las Walton, Abductive Reasoning, University of Alabama Press, 2005; Iddo Tavory and 
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identify all reasonable hypotheses that can explain the fact(s) of interest. 
Abducing hypotheses requires the fact-finder to use his or her imagination 
and draws heavily on his or her understanding of how the world ‘normal-
ly’ operates. For example, if a dead body is found and the cause of death 
is not obvious, the fact-finder will try to formulate a number of possible 
scenarios that explain why the person is dead and that are compatible with 
the known facts. In the judicial context, such hypotheses normally take 
the form of explanation-narratives.7 Simply stated, explanation-narratives 
are stories that are structured in a causal or chronological manner and 
which include the relevant fact(s). In the example, one explanation-
narrative might be that the person was murdered by a jealous partner. An-
other explanation-narrative could be that the person committed suicide. 
Each explanation-narrative will ‘predict’ a certain number of facts. For 
example, the murder-explanation ‘predicts’ that the killer must have been 
near the victim at the time of death. The fact-finder can use these predic-
tions to look for evidence that could confirm or deny them. 
In the second phase, the fact-finder tests and compares the different 
explanation-narratives. Comparison of different explanation-narratives 
essentially involves looking at the internal coherence and general plausi-
bility of the different explanation-narratives. It also involves comparing to 
which extent different explanation-narratives are supported or contradict-
                                                                                                                        
Stefan Timmermans, Abductive Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research, University of 
Chicago Press, 2014; Atocha Aliseda, Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into 
Discovery and Explanations, Springer, 2006; John R. Josephson and Susan G. Josephson, 
Abductive Inference: Computation, Philosophy, Technology, Cambridge University Press, 
1994; Igor Douven, “Abduction”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, Summer 2017 edition, 2017 (available on its web site). 
7 Paul Roth, “Narrative Explanations: The Case of History”, in History and Theory, 1988, 
vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 1–13; Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, “Explanation-Based Decision 
Making: Effects on Memory Structure on Judgement”, in Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology, Learning and Memory and Cognition, 1988, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 521–33; Nancy 
Pennington and Reid Hastie, “Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making”, in 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1986, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 242–58; Michael 
Pardo and Ronald Allen, “Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation”, in Law and Philoso-
phy, 2008, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 223–68; Doron Menashe and Mutal E. Shamash, “The Narra-
tive Fallacy”, in International Commentary on Evidence, 2005, vol. 3, no. 1 ; Ronald J. Al-
len and Michael S. Pardo, “Relative Plausibility and its Critics”, in International Journal 
of Evidence and Proof, 2019, vol. 23, nos. 1–2, pp. 5–59; Reid Hastie, “The Case for Rela-
tive Plausibility Theory: Promising, but Insufficient”, in International Journal of Evidence 
and Proof, 2019, vol. 23, nos. 1–2, pp. 134–40. 
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ed by the available evidence. This involves verifying how many (if any) 
predicted facts can be confirmed by evidence. 
In the third and final phase, the fact-finder decides which of the ex-
planation-narratives is the best and infers this one to be true. There is no 
standardised list of criteria to determine what makes one explanation-
narrative better than another. 8  However, one key consideration in this 
regard is undoubtedly the extent to which the explanation-narrative co-
heres with the available evidence. 
Based on this process, it is possible to identify four different types 
of doubt a fact-finder may identify in relation to a particular factual find-
ing. The first is that the correct explanation-narrative may not have been 
identified. The second is that the evidential data-set is incomplete.9 Third, 
the fact-finder may assess the trustworthiness of the available evidence 
incorrectly. Finally, a lot of uncertainty may arise at the level of drawing 
inferences from the available evidential data. The remainder of this chap-
ter will focus on the last two sources of uncertainty. 
11.2. Logical Argumentation and Evidence-Mapping 
11.2.1. The Two Basic Resources of the Fact-Finder 
The two basic sources of information that fact-finders have available to 
them to assess factual claims are evidence10 and generalisations. Evidence 
is information that comes in many shapes and forms. It constitutes the link 
between the fact-finder and the fact or event about which he or she has no 
first-hand knowledge, but is expected to make findings. Generalisations 
are essential for every step in the reasoning of the fact-finding process 
because they provide the warrant that allows the fact-finder to draw infer-
ences from the evidence. Roughly speaking, generalisations are general-
ised statements about how ‘we’ believe or know or suppose the world 
always or mostly or sometimes works.11 Sometimes generalisations have 
                                                   
8 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, Routledge, 2004. 
9 See, on this crucial and often overlooked aspect of fact-finding, Dale A. Nance, The Bur-
dens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence and Tenacity of Belief, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2016. 
10 The term ‘evidence’ is used here in its non-technical sense and refers to any source of 
information tending to establish facts in the context of a legal investigation, regardless of 
whether it has been formally introduced by the parties and/or admitted by the court. 
11 Terence Anderson, David Schum and William Twining, Analysis of Evidence, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005; William Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays, 2nd 
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a firm scientific or empirical basis. In those cases, it will often be known 
fairly precisely when the generalisation applies and with what frequency 
the stated rule is true. For example, recent research has shown that drink-
ing two alcoholic drinks every day increases the risk of having a stroke by 
10–15 per cent.12 More often, generalisations do not have such a firm 
empirical basis and lack precision. 
Many generalisations that people routinely apply – often without 
being conscious of it – are based on what can be generously described as 
‘common sense’ or ‘practical knowledge’. For example, it is often as-
sumed that a weaker party will not act aggressively towards a much 
stronger one. In some cases, people may apply generalisations that find 
their origin in prejudice. For example, some may believe that all Swiss 
persons are extremely punctual. Apart from having widely varying de-
grees of objectivity, generalisations also differ in terms of universality, 
applicability, and acceptance. Universal generalisations are always true. 
For example, it is always the case that elephants are heavier than mice, for 
even the fattest mouse will be considerably lighter than a new-born ele-
phant-calf. However, universal generalisations are relatively uncommon 
and rarely play a significant role in most real-life cases. A different ques-
tion is whether a generalisation is applicable to the case at hand. For ex-
ample, the generalisation ‘all Belgians drink a lot of beer’ is clearly not 
applicable to Belgian infants.13 Finally, while some generalisations may 
                                                                                                                        
edition, Cambridge University Press, 2006; Terence Anderson, “Generalisations and Evi-
dential Reasoning”, in Philip Dawid, William Twining and Mimi Vasilaki, (eds.), Evidence, 
Inference and Enquiry, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
12 BBC News, “Even one drink a day increases stroke risk, study finds”, 5 April 2019 (availa-
ble on its web site). 
13 This is the so-called ‘reference-class problem’. Most individual entities, such as human 
beings, belong to many different reference classes, for which generalisations are available 
that could serve as a warrant for inferential reasoning. The difficulty is knowing which the 
relevant reference class is for the inference of interest. The problem is studied mostly in 
the context of statistical evidence, but it applies to every sort of generalisation. See, for ex-
ample, Paul Roberts, “From Theory into Practice: Introducing the Reference Class Prob-
lem”, in International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 2007, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 243; Dale A. 
Nance, “The Reference Class Problem and Mathematical Models of Inference”, in Interna-
tional Journal of Evidence and Proof, 2007, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 259; Michael S. Pardo, “Ref-
erence Classes and Legal Evidence”, in International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 2007, 
vol. 11, no. 4, p. 255; Robert Rhee, “Probability, Policy and the Problem of Reference 
Class”, in International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 2007, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 286; Ed-
ward Cheng, “A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem”, in Columbia Law Re-
view, 2009, vol. 109, no. 8, pp. 2081–105. 
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be universally accepted, others may be limited to certain cultures or social 
groups. For example, a 2010 Gallup showed that more than half of the 
population in 18 Sub-Saharan countries believed in witchcraft. 14  Such 
culture-specific generalisations often relate to social mores and human 
behaviour and may be highly significant in the context of criminal pro-
ceedings.15 
Generalisations thus come in many different forms of varying quali-
ty and validity. To a very large extent, the quality of reasoning depends on 
the quality of the generalisations that are used. One of the most important 
steps a fact-finder can take to improve the quality of his or her work is to 
critically evaluate the applicability and quality of the generalisations he or 
she is relying on. Evaluating the quality of the generalisations one is ap-
plying presupposes that one is aware that one is applying them. However, 
in general, people rarely reflect upon which generalisations they are ap-
plying as part of their thinking process. Part of the reason for this is prob-
ably that the significance of generalisations is not fully comprehended. 
But there are also practical reasons: it turns out that making express the 
generalisations one relies upon is a lot more difficult than one might ini-
tially think. Moreover, it really slows down the thinking process and adds 
a level of complexity that is generally unwanted. Yet, allowing generalisa-
tions to remain unarticulated entails the risk that serious errors may be 
made and invalid conclusions reached. This risk is unacceptable in the 
judicial context. There is therefore a need to develop a method that assists 
fact-finders in understanding the role of generalisations in their thinking. 
One such method is argumentation theory.16 In essence, logical ar-
gumentation is a method for articulating and analysing defeasible argu-
                                                   
14 Bob Tortora, “Witchcraft Believers in Sub-Saharan Africa Rate Lives Worse: Belief Wide-
spread in Many Countries”, Gallup, 25 August 2010 (available on its web site). 
15 In the context of international criminal proceedings, it may be difficult for international 
fact-finders to be aware and fully understand culture-specific generalisations. They may 
need the assistance of anthropologists or sociologists to develop their understanding of the 
local context. See Tim Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
16 Argumentation theory has been developed mainly by logicians and computer scientists. 
Bart Verheij, “Dialectical Argumentation with Argumentation Schemes: An Approach to 
Legal Logic”, in Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2003, vol. 11, nos. 2–3, pp. 167–95; 
Douglas Walton, Methods of Argumentation, Cambridge University Press, 2013. However, 
the method described here has a precursor in the legal field in Wigmore’s charting method. 
See, John Henry Wigmore’s The Principles of Judicial Proof, or, the Process of Proof: As 
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ments. The basic premise is that for every uncertain proposition, there are 
arguments in favour and arguments against. The fundamental idea behind 
argumentation theory is that all these arguments are mapped out in a se-
quential manner. This is achieved by conceiving of an argument as a dia-
logue between a proponent and an opponent of the proposition of interest. 
In practice, this will often be one and the same analyst. The proponent of 
the proposition starts by articulating an argument in support of it. Then the 
opponent has an opportunity to point out any perceived problems or 
weaknesses of the proponent’s argument. After that, the proponent gets 
another opportunity to defend his or her argument by pointing out prob-
lems and weaknesses of the counter-arguments of the opponent. And so 
forth, until all arguments are exhausted and the dialogue ends. At this 
point, the totality of the arguments are evaluated to determine whether or 
not the proposition can be accepted. This depends on how much uncer-
tainty is acceptable, which can be expressed as a standard of proof. 
                                                                                                                        
Given by Logic, Psychology and General Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials, 
2nd edition, Little Brown, 1931. For a contemporary take from a lawyer’s perspective, see 
Yvonne McDermott, “Inferential Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal Trials: The 
Potentials of Wigmorean Analysis”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2015, vol. 
13, no. 3, pp. 507–33; Yvonne McDermott, “Strengthening the Evaluation of Evidence in 
International Criminal Trials”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2017, vol. 17, no. 4, 
pp. 682–702. John Fox, “Arguing about the Evidence: A Logical Approach”, in Philip 
Dawid, William Twining and Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry, Ox-
ford University Press, 2011; Paul Krause, Simon Ambler, Morten Elvang-Gøransson and 
John Fox, “A Logic of Argumentation for Reasoning Under Uncertainty”, in Computation-
al Intelligence, 1995, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 113–31. 
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Argumentation theory can help fact-finders pierce the natural lan-
guage barrier by making explicit the premises that are implicit in most 
arguments that are expressed in ordinary language. This is done by ‘re-
constructing’ the argument in a structured and graphic format. The main 
tool is a so-called ‘argumentation map’. This is a graphical representation 
of all arguments that are relevant when conducting an evidentiary analysis 
in which each individual evidential data-point, factual proposition and 
generalisation is reflected as a separate node. In the model suggested here, 
there are three types of nodes: (1) nodes representing factual propositions, 
(2) nodes representing evidence, and (3) nodes representing generalisa-
tions. 
 
Figure 1. Argumentation map. 
Nodes can be connected in two ways: supporting and attacking. 
Such connections are denoted by different arrows (edges), which repre-
sent logical relations between the different nodes. 
 
Figure 2. Logical relations between the different nodes. 
In the context of evidentiary arguments, the edges usually represent 
the application of a particular generalisation. Most models of argumenta-
tion mapping leave the generalisation implicit. However, the main argu-
ment in this chapter is that it is important to make generalisations explicit. 
This can be achieved by introducing a generalisation node in the middle 
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Figure 3. Generalisation node. 
These are the only ‘building blocks’ that are required to map out 
any evidentiary argument. 
11.2.2. Two Types of Arguments 
In the context of fact-finding, there are two types of arguments. The first 
is at the level of the explanation-narrative, that is, the story of which the 
proposition of interest forms a part.17 Arguments of this type are essential-
ly linear, in the sense that they represent a chronological chain of events 
that are causally linked. To illustrate, let us consider the following hypo-
thetical case. 
In the context of an armed conflict, 20 civilians have been killed by 
gunfire at a checkpoint manned by a platoon belonging to one of the par-
ties to the conflict. There is forensic evidence establishing the cause of 
death to be bullet wounds from a calibre that corresponds to a common 
type of assault rifle. The existence of these twenty civilian deaths is the 
explanandum that must be explained. 
According to the prosecutor, the platoon fired on the civilians with-
out provocation because the soldiers were executing a policy to attack the 
civilians. The captain of the platoon, on the other hand, testifies that his 
troops were manning the checkpoint until a group of ± 1,000 demonstra-
tors arrived, chanting aggressive slogans and demanding to cross the 
checkpoint. When the platoon refused to allow the demonstrators to pass, 
the latter started throwing heavy stones and Molotov cocktails. When one 
of his soldiers caught fire, the captain ordered his troops to open fire on 
                                                   
17 Floris J. Bex, Arguments, Stories and Criminal Evidence: A Formal Hybrid Theory, 
Springer, 2011; Floris J. Bex and Douglas N. Walton, “Taking the Dialectical Stance in 
Reasoning with Evidence and Proof”, in International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 
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the assailants. According to the captain, the killing of the 20 civilians was 
thus the result of an act of legitimate self-defence. 
 
Figure 4. Hypothetical case. 
In order to decide between the two explanation-narratives, the fact-
finder can compare them on the basis of three criteria. The first is the in-
herent plausibility of each narrative, based on the fact-finder’s under-
standing of the situation, relevant context, and the world in general. The 
second is to analyse the internal coherence of each narrative. A key aspect 
that must be considered, in this regard, is whether the causal links be-
tween the different episodes of the explanation-narratives can be verified. 
In a simple narrative, as in the example, this is rather straightforward, but 
as narratives become more intricate and extensive, a detailed coherence 
analysis may be quite revealing. Finally, narratives must be compared in 
terms of evidential coverage. Evidential coverage is a reflection of how 
many of the nodes in the explanation-narrative are supported by evidence, 
how many are unsupported (that is, gaps in the evidential coverage) and 
































11. Controlling the Quality of Reasoning About the 
Link Between Evidence and Factual Findings 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 621 
 
Figure 5. Evidential coverage of the hypothetical case. 
As is shown in this argumentation map, the nodes representing the 
prosecution’s explanation-narrative are less well covered by the available 
evidence than the ones representing the Captain’s version of events. How-
ever, the only evidence supporting the relevant nodes comes from the 
defendant himself. This raises the question whether the better evidentiary 
coverage is really decisive in this case. The mere fact of there being evi-
dence in support of a particular factual proposition does not mean that this 
proposition is therefore proved. The remainder of this chapter will deal 
with how to determine whether or not – and, if so, to what extent – a par-
ticular node is supported by evidence. 
11.3. Direct Evidence Does Not Exist 
It is common to make a distinction between direct and circumstantial evi-
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ately, circumstantial evidence requires the fact-finder to make an infer-
ence to arrive at the proposition of interest. For example, a witness who 
has seen the suspect shoot the victim is considered direct evidence of kill-
ing, whereas a witness who saw the suspect leaving the scene of the crime 
with a gun in his hand only provides circumstantial evidence of the killing. 
Yet, it is a mistake to think that in the first case the testimony proves the 
probandum directly, without needing inferences to be made. When a wit-
ness asserts a particular fact, be it during the investigation or in the wit-
ness box, the only certainty the fact-finder has is that the witness made 
this assertion. In order to conclude from the fact that a witness made a 
factual assertion that the asserted fact is also true requires at least one 
inferential step. In the case of testimony, the inference would be based on 
the generalisation that ‘If a trustworthy witness says that P, then P is true’. 
Schematically, the simplest possible relation between evidence and a fac-
tual proposition looks as follows: 
 
Figure 6. Relation between evidence and a factual proposition. 
In reality, most factual arguments will be more complex and often 
involve catenate inferences. In the example, the Captain’s claim of self-
Civilians threw 
Molotov cocktails 
If a trustworthy 
witness says that 
P, then P is true 
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defence is premised on the proposition that the civilians who were shot 
were trying to harm the soldiers. This argument could be formulated like 
this: 
 
Figure 7. Captain’s claim. 
If a trustworthy 
witness says that P, 
then P is true 
Civilians threw 
Molotov cocktails 




If someone hurls a dan-
gerous object at you, that 
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you 
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Each inferential step is liable to three different forms of ‘attack’.18 
First, the premise may be attacked. In the example, a possible attack could 
be that it is claimed that the witness did not say that he actually saw the 
civilians throwing Molotov cocktails, but that he simply assumed the 
Molotov cocktails must have been thrown by the civilians from the fact 
that one of his soldiers caught fire. Such an attack can be called an un-
dermining attack. Second, the generalisation that supports the inference 
may be attacked. This is called an undercutting attack. In the case of wit-
ness testimony, a possible counter-argument could be that the Captain had 
a reason to lie because he was being accused of a crime. Finally, the con-
clusion itself may be attacked as well in what is called a rebutting attack. 
In the example, a possible counter-argument could be that there never was 
any fire. 
 
Figure 8. Three forms of attack. 
                                                   
18 Henry Prakken, “An Abstract Framework for Argumentation with Structured Arguments”, 
in Argument and Computation, 2010, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 7–22. 
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The fact that one of the elements of an argument is subject to attack 
is not necessarily the end of the story. An attack is just another argument, 
which must be evaluated for plausibility and validity. Moreover, an attack 
can itself be counter-attacked. However, if no counter-argument is formu-
lated, then the initial attack ‘succeeds’ and the proponent’s argument fails. 
In case a counter-attack can be formulated, then the fact-finder will need 
to make a determination as to whether or not it succeeds in ‘neutralising’ 
the initial attack. If it does, then the initial attack no longer has any effect 
on the original argument. However, then the opponent still has the oppor-
tunity to formulate a further argument in an attempt to neutralise the coun-
ter-attack. In the example, the opponent has made an undercutting attack, 
arguing that the Captain is not a trustworthy witness because he has an 
interest in not incriminating himself in the killing of civilians. This is a 
cogent argument, which, if left unaddressed, would prevent the fact-finder 
from concluding that the testimony of the Captain proves that civilians 
actually threw Molotov cocktails. However, the proponent of the argu-
ment might counter-attack by arguing that the Captain actually does not 
have an interest in concealing the truth because he was given immunity 
from prosecution. This is again a cogent and plausible argument, which, if 
left unanswered, succeeds in neutralising the initial attack. 
 
Figure 9. Attack and counter-attack. 
If a trustworthy wit-
ness says that P, 
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11.4. Argumentation Schemes 
While it is possible and useful to manually formulate all relevant argu-
ments, this may be time-consuming and if the fact-finder has to process a 
lot of material, she may not give every step in the reasoning sufficient 
attention. To assist fact-finders, scholars have formulated a number of 
‘standardised’ argumentation schemes, which apply to typical arguments 
that are frequently relied upon in judicial fact-finding.19 Argumentation 
schemes are conceived as a list of critical questions that must be answered 
in relation to a particular generalisation. These questions help the fact-
finder with determining whether or not the generalisation is applicable in 
the case at hand. They also point the fact-finder to potential sources of 
doubt and forces him or her to actively look for evidence in order to de-
termine whether the generalisation can be safely applied or not. 
Argumentation schemes are customisable and fact-finders may in-
dividualise them in order to match their understanding of the relevant 
generalisation. As an illustration, the example of the warrant for testimo-
nial evidence will be discussed in some detail. 
As a generalisation, ‘If a trustworthy witness says that P, then P is 
true’ is unassailable, but not very informative. In particular, it does not 
provide any indicators for when a specific testimony qualifies as trustwor-
thy.20 There is no universally accepted standard for when testimony is 
trustworthy; but it is fairly uncontroversial that a witness must be at least 
competent, not be unduly influenced by biases, and honest in order to be 
worthy of any trust. Any application of the warrant for testimonial evi-
dence therefore presupposes that the fact-finder can confirm that the wit-
ness meets these three basic criteria.21 Schematically, this looks as follows: 
                                                   
19 Douglas Walton, Chris Reed and Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008; Floris Bex and Bart Verheij, “Solving a Murder Case by Asking 
Critical Questions: An Approach to Fact-Finding in Terms of Argumentation and Story 
Schemes”, in Argumentation, 2012, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 325–53. 
20 The term ‘trustworthiness’ refers to all factors that determine whether testimony can be 
relied upon, including credibility and reliability. 
21 The proposed model is inspired by David Schum and Jon Morris, “Assessing the Compe-
tence and Credibility of Human Sources of Intelligence Evidence: Contributions from Law 
and Probability”, in Law, Probability and Risk, 2007, vol. 6, nos. 1–4, pp. 247–74. For a 
more empirical discussion of the evaluation of testimonial evidence by international courts, 
see Gabriele Chlevikaite and Barbora Hola, “Empirical Study of Insider Witnesses’ As-
sessments at the International Criminal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 
2016, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 673–702; Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, Cambridge 
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Figure 10. Three basic components of trustworthiness. 
The three basic components of trustworthiness can each be un-
packed further. For example, the requirement that a witness must have 
been competent to observe the event being testified about and capable of 
understanding what she observed. There are three aspects to compe-
tence.22 First, there is the question whether the witness was physically in a 
position to observe the event. This requires information about where the 
                                                                                                                        
University Press, 2010. For a more scientific approach, see, for example, Bella M. DePau-
lo, James J. Lindsay, Brian E. Malone, Laura Muhlebruck, Kelly Charlton and Harris 
Cooper, “Cues to Deception”, in Psychological Bulletin, 2003, vol. 129, no. 1, pp. 74–118; 
Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and the Implications for 
Professional Practice, Wiley, 2000; Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and 
Opportunities, Wiley, 2008. 
22 Competence can be defined as asking whether the witness was “in a position to know” the 
relevant information. See, Douglas Walton, Witness Testimony Evidence: Argumentation, 
Artificial Intelligence, and Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
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witness was located relative to the event and whether she was able to have 
a ‘good look’. This aspect can be called external material competence. 
Second, the fact-finder must assess the witness’s internal material compe-
tence. This aspect raises questions about the witness’s sensory and cogni-
tive abilities. The questions range from general information about the 
witness, such as whether she has adequate or impaired vision, to what his 
or her state of consciousness was at the time she purportedly witnessed 
the event. Finally, witnesses must also have substantive competence. This 
relates to the witness’s intellectual ability to understand what is being 
witnessed. This may not always be an issue when the facts testified to are 
very basic, such as where someone was at a given time. But in some cases, 
the events witnessed may not be fully understandable to an average wit-
ness. For example, recognising a particular type of vehicle or weapon may 
require some prior familiarity with this sort of objects. Similarly, if a wit-
ness does not understand the language in which a conversation she hears 
is being conducted, she is unlikely to be able to reliable testify about the 
content thereof.  
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Figure 11. Three basic components of trustworthiness expanded. 
A similar exercise can be done for the other two trustworthiness fac-
tors. Depending on how granular the fact-finder wishes to be, the number 
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of critical questions can be more or less extensive. Fact-finders may also 
wish to apply different argumentation schemes depending on the type of 
witness. For example, the most relevant critical questions for a crime-base 
witness may be different from those for expert witness. 
Once all critical questions have been defined, the fact-finder can 
start looking for answers. For each of the critical questions, the fact-finder 
needs to determine whether the available information favours the relevant 
trustworthiness factor or not. When there is no information available for a 
particular critical question or the available information is inconclusive, 
this constitutes a source of uncertainty. The fact that a critical question 
yields a negative result or no result at all does not necessarily mean that 
the relevant generalisation cannot be applied. Whether or not this is the 
case depends on two factors. The first and most important factor is how 
much uncertainty the fact-finder is able to accept. This depends, to a large 
extent, on the applicable standard of proof. However, even if the highest 
standard of proof in criminal proceedings – beyond reasonable doubt – is 
applicable, this still does not automatically mean that the warrant does not 
obtain if some of the critical questions are not answered favourably. 
Whether or not this is the case depends on the second factor, which is how 
much weight the fact-finder attributes to the individual critical questions 
and how negative the available information is. If the witness was uncon-
scious at the time of the events she testifies about, this will obviously 
have a greater negative impact than if the evidence concerning his or her 
vision is ambiguous. 
In cases when there is no evidence in relation to a particular critical 
question, or when the evidence is ambivalent or uncertain, the fact-finder 
may decide to assume that if better evidence were available, this would be 
favourable. In such a case the fact-finder accepts a certain risk, but this 
may be entirely reasonable, depending on the context. For example, if 
there is no specific information about the critical question whether or not 
the witness was conscious at the time of the event, it may be reasonable to 
assume that she was, based on the fact that she was able to provide infor-
mation in the first place. Such arguments are obviously not free from risk, 
but it may be a risk that the fact-finder does not find disproportional in 
light of the significance of the factual proposition to which the warrant 
applies and the relevant context. 
In any event, even if the available information is favourable in rela-
tion to a particular critical question, it is still incumbent upon the fact-
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finder to assess its value. Ideally, the information should come from 
sources other than the witness him- or herself. However, in many cases 
the witness will be the only source of information. This gives rise to the 
interesting situation where a witness is testifying about his or her own 
trustworthiness, which creates a ‘short-circuit’ in the argumentation 
scheme, because the information provided by the witness can only consti-
tute a useful answer if he or she is trustworthy about this information as 
well. Schematically, this looks as follows. 
Figure 12. Witness testifying about his or her own trustworthiness. 
Such ‘circularity’ does not denote an error in the argumentation. It 
simply means that in cases where there is only a single witness for a par-
ticular proposition, everything stands or falls with the fact-finder’s as-
sessment of the witness’s honesty and sincerity. This is often the most 
difficult part of the assessment of witness testimony, where fact-finders 




that P, then 













says he was 









says that P, 






















Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 632 
why having only one single witness is often not a strong basis for proving 
important factual propositions.23 
11.5. Application of Logical Argumentation in Practice 
Although this chapter has so far been limited to giving a short outline of 
how argument mapping and argumentation schemes can be applied for 
analysing witness testimony, the method can be used for most other as-
pects of evidentiary analysis as well. In principle, every argument that 
involves inferential reasoning, including analysis of causal links, can ben-
efit from being mapped. 
It will be noted that argumentation theory, even when using argu-
mentation schemes, is extremely flexible and can fully adapt to each indi-
vidual fact-finder’s thinking. Indeed, it must be stressed that argumenta-
tion theory does not impose anything on the fact-finder in terms of what 
to think. In a very real sense, argumentation theory is just an alternative 
notation method for natural language, which allows the fact-finder to set 
out his or her reasoning with greater precision. By providing a structured 
and methodical approach, argument mapping can help the fact-finder to 
notice potential flaws or weak points in his or her reasoning, but it cannot 
safeguard against errors. 
One great advantage of argumentation theory is that it is possible to 
automate part of the analytical process. In particular, it is possible to keep 
track of all the logical connections that are symbolised by the edges con-
necting the nodes.24 This may not be of great value in relatively simple 
arguments like the ones discussed here. However, in cases with large 
quantities of evidence and especially cases with a lot of circumstantial 
evidence and complex catenate inferences, mapping an evidentiary argu-
ment out in its entirety may be the only way for the fact-finder to ensure 
that he or she does not overlook anything that is important. It also assists 
                                                   
23 For the avoidance of doubt, this is a purely epistemic observation. It is well accepted that, 
from a legal point of view, a single witness can suffice and that there is no requirement of 
corroboration. See, for example, ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 September 2002, 
Rule 63(4): “Without prejudice to article 66, paragraph 3, a Chamber shall not impose a 
legal requirement that corroboration is required in order to prove any crime within the ju-
risdiction of the Court, in particular, crimes of sexual violence” (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
8bcf6f). 
24 Phan Min Dung, “On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Fundamental Role in Non-
monotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person Games”, in Artificial Intelligence, 
1995, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 321–57. 
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fact-finders to better understand the importance and logical implications 
of details in the overall argument. By helping the fact-finder to keep an 
overview of the available evidence and how it all fits together in a possi-
ble argument, it is easier for fact-finders to identify possible gaps in the 
available evidential data-set as well as potential counter-arguments. Ar-
gumentation mapping is thus not only a tool that can help in analysing an 
existing argument, it can also assist fact-finders with building better ar-
guments. Crucially, mapping evidentiary arguments can support fact-
finders in assessing the relative strength and (potential) weaknesses of 
their available evidence and guide the search for additional evidence. 
11.6. Need for a Practical Tool 
Although there are many significant benefits associated with using argu-
mentation theory, it may currently be difficult to implement this method 
systematically in practice. The reason for this is that, whilst the theoretical 
framework and technology are all available, there is currently no tool that 
is suitable for practical use in real cases. The main challenge in develop-
ing such a tool is to design a user-friendly interface that fits on a regular 
computer screen and that allows the fact-finder to map very complex ar-
guments with minimal time and effort. This requires that it must be possi-
ble for the fact-finder to zoom in and out of the argumentation map and to 
break down complex arguments into smaller constituent elements without 
losing any of the logical connections with the entirety of the argument 
map. 
While a useful tool must include the most common argumentation 
schemes, it must be possible for fact-finders to customise them easily. The 
‘standard’ argumentation schemes should be based on contemporary in-
sights from research in the relevant field. This presupposes that those who 
design such a tool must be familiar with cognitive psychology, legal epis-
temology, and certain scientific disciplines that are recurrently relevant in 
criminal proceedings. For example, it may be useful to develop argumen-
tation schemes for specialised evidence concerning DNA, ballistics, wit-
ness identification, and so on. The research relied upon in designing the 
argumentation schemes must be made available to the fact-finder so that 
he or she can fully understand the reasons behind each of the critical ques-
tions. Existing argumentation schemes should be regularly updated in 
light of developments in the relevant fields. In this manner, the fact-finder 
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can be confident that he or she is always applying the most up-to-date 
generalisations. 
To facilitate the work of the fact-finder, a user-friendly argumenta-
tion tool should be compatible with the relevant databases containing evi-
dence or transcripts, filing, and so on. In particular, it should be simple for 
the fact-finder to link the propositions contained in the evidence nodes to 
the content contained in the databases holding the actual evidence and/or 
transcripts. 
Finally, in order to allow teams of fact-finders to work together, it is 
important that argument maps can be opened and edited by multiple users 
at the same time. To facilitate communication between team members 
over time, the tool should also indicate changes made by other users. 
11.7. Conclusion 
Using argumentation maps does not require fact-finders to change the way 
they think, but it does require a certain change in mind-set. The most im-
portant change relates to shifting from natural language to a more sche-
matic way of notating one’s thoughts. Changing how to do something one 
is used to doing in a particular manner is not always easy. Especially law-
yers, whose reliance on expressing their arguments in carefully crafted 
prose is deeply ingrained, may find the transition challenging at first. 
However, the benefits of using a more structured method for articulating 
evidentiary arguments are numerous. Perhaps the most significant ad-
vantage over natural language is that using argumentation maps obliges 
fact-finders to reflect upon the assumptions that underpin their reasoning. 
This may be challenging at first, but it is a price worth paying for lifting 
the fact-finding process out of the realm of subjective impressions and 
intuitions. In the end, whether one is comfortable with applying logical 
argumentation depends on how prepared one is to discipline oneself to 
restrict evidentiary analysis to arguments that can be clearly and cogently 
articulated. This should go some way in tackling the second bottleneck – 
Factual analysis – detailed in the concept note for the research project of 
which this anthology is a result.25 
                                                   
25  See Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019, pp. 2-3 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). 
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Another key advantage of using argumentation mapping in eviden-
tiary analysis is that it makes it a lot easier for fact-finders to keep an 
overview of all the relevant evidence that is available to them. As such it 
directly addresses the first bottleneck – Overview of information.26 One of 
the biggest challenges fact-finders in complex criminal investigations face 
is keeping track of what evidence has already been collected and, most 
importantly, what can be proved with it. By disciplining oneself to put 
each piece of information into a structured argument, the fact-finder will 
have a better chance of identifying potential gaps in the evidential data-set 
early on. This will help in guiding the investigation and to focus limited 
resources to finding evidence that can really make a difference. 
Mapping evidentiary arguments also greatly facilitates accurate 
communication between fact-finders. One of the greatest causes of mis-
communication lies in the unarticulated assumptions that are implicit in 
natural language. By trying to eliminate such hidden assumptions as much 
as possible, it will be easier for every member of a fact-finding team to 
share the same level of knowledge and understanding. This facilitates 
debating the strengths and weaknesses of particular arguments and allows 
team members to contribute much more effectively. Expressing arguments 
in a structured manner also makes it easier to follow how an argument 
evolves over time. Every change in the argument, no matter how small or 
nuanced, can be clearly visualised and its exact implications on the rest of 
the argument are immediately apparent to every user of the argumentation 
map. Ensuring better communication is essential to making the most ef-
fective use of the available resources, both human and evidentiary. It may 
help to avoid duplication of efforts and should alert co-ordinators much 
sooner when a certain investigatory avenue is proving unfruitful. As such, 
argumentation mapping can contribute to addressing the third bottleneck – 
Evidence review.27 
Crucially, argumentation mapping can be an invaluable tool for the 
identification of possible sources of doubt. This may help fact-finders to 
limit the effects of confirmation bias and coherence shifting. Human be-
ings are inherently uncomfortable with uncertainty and instinctively aspire 
to clear and unambiguous conclusions. Whereas this tendency is natural 
and, to some extent, corresponds with the desired outcome of judicial 
                                                   
26  Ibid., p. 2. 
27  Ibid., p. 3. 
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proceedings,28 it is not always rational. Mapping an argument cannot pre-
vent the fact-finder from being influenced by biases, but it should make it 
more difficult for such tendencies to prevail as it will force the fact-finder 
to confront the weaknesses of his or her arguments. 
This leads to an important point that cannot be stressed enough, 
namely that the process of argumentation mapping, also when it is assist-
ed by software tools, is a hundred percent controlled by the individual 
fact-finder(s). As a methodology, it provides a framework for articulating 
and evaluating evidentiary arguments. However, it is incapable of replac-
ing the human fact-finder, because it is incapable of generating arguments 
by itself. Even when argumentation schemes are used, the input of the 
system is limited to posing a list of critical questions. It is incumbent upon 
the individual fact-finder to decide whether or not to pursue finding an-
swers to all of the questions and, crucially, how to weigh the impact of 
those answers or the lack thereof. It therefore cannot be argued that reli-
ance on argumentation theory impinges upon the autonomy of the fact-
finder. 
Still, it would be naïve to expect that a novel approach such as the 
one proposed in this chapter will be universally welcomed by all practi-
tioners. As with any innovation, the method will have to go through a 
period of testing during which it will have to prove its added value. This 
is both natural and desirable. Yet, it is important to anticipate some re-
sistance, probably mostly from lawyers, who may fear that adopting ar-
gumentation methods may infringe their ‘monopoly’ of framing eviden-
tiary arguments in the context of legal proceedings. Moreover, it is proba-
bly not realistic to expect that legal proceedings will abandon the use of 
natural language as the main form of communication between parties and 
adjudicators. However, it is suggested that the quality of written and oral 
evidentiary submissions can greatly benefit from being based upon a duly 
developed and detailed argumentation map. Not only will this facilitate 
clarity in the exposition of the main arguments, it will also inform the 
drafter which details he or she must emphasise in his or her submissions. 
Structuring written or oral submissions on the basis of argumentation 
maps also has the advantage of avoiding repetition and may make it easier 
to divide the drafting process. While it may seem rather inefficient to 
                                                   
28 Charles Nesson, “The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts”, in Harvard Law Review, vol. 98, no. 7, 1985, pp. 1357–92. 
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‘translate’ arguments from natural language into argumentation maps only 
to have to translate them back to natural language again in the end, it 
should be considered that using an argumentation map as a working tool 
can obviate the need for drafting many intermediate documents, which are 
much harder to keep track of, and which involves a much greater risk of 
information being lost in the process. Moreover, given the inherent limita-
tions of natural language, it is not an ideal tool for evidentiary analysis 
anyway. This is implicitly recognised by practitioners, who frequently 
make use of more or less advanced spreadsheet technology to organise the 
available evidence. Argumentation mapping can perform a similar role, 
but at a much higher level of sophistication and with many analytical ben-
efits that are simply not attainable with ordinary techniques. 
Although the last word has undoubtedly not been said in the debate 
about how to improve the quality of fact-finding in complex criminal in-
vestigations, it is probably safe to conclude that the time is ripe for intro-
ducing new ways of thinking about evidence and what it means to be a 
rational fact-finder. If this chapter has been able to contribute to this de-
bate, it will have achieved its main objective. However, the real hope is, 
of course, that the ideas and methods introduced here will find application 
in practice sooner rather than later. To that end, practitioners and academ-
ics from a number of fields must join forces to develop a tool that makes 
logical argumentation techniques available and usable in real complex 
cases.29 This will not happen overnight. Developing a tool that can handle 
the amount of information that is usually associated with core internation-
al criminal cases will require time and perseverance. But just like Rome 
was not built in a day or by one person; fulfilling the promise and hope of 
the Rome Statute relies on the sustained efforts and energy of countless 
individuals. It is time to get the ball rolling. 
                                                   
29 It is noted that there are commercially available tools to help lawyers and analysts organise 
and analyse evidence (for example, Casemap, Relativity, Atlas.ti, and so on). However, to 
this author’s knowledge, there is currently no programme that is powerful enough to map 
out and analyse evidentiary arguments with informal logic on the scale required by cases 
involving large-scale international crimes. The Case Matrix application – an outstanding 
tool to correlate evidence and elements of core international crimes – does not in its cur-




Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 639 
12.Investigations of Criminal Responsibility by the 




With the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) operating in its seventeenth 
year, it is time to pause, look back and analyse its Office of the Prosecu-
tor’s (‘OTP’) record of investigating criminal responsibility of suspects, 
formulating it in the Documents containing the Charges (‘DCC’) and de-
fending it in subsequent court proceedings. 
The following analysis is independent, stems from a non-staff 
member outside the ICC’s OTP and therefore centres on inferences drawn 
from publicly accessible legal filings, such as the OTP’s arrest warrant 
applications, DCC’s, Defence counsel submissions, and ICC judges’ deci-
sions. The reviewed filings discussed how formulations of criminal liabil-
ity should be undertaken, confirmed, amended and/or why allegations of 
criminal responsibility advanced by the OTP had to be dismissed. 
The picture emerges that at the end of its investigations, the OTP 
usually alleges several modes of criminal liability which, if confirmed by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, sometimes were upheld by judges of the Trial and 
Appeals Chambers in the same variant as initially proposed. However, 
often the judiciary on the level of the Pre-Trial Chamber1 or Trial Cham-
ber,2 and rarely the Appeals Chamber,3 at least significantly reduced the 
                                                   
* Matthias Neuner is Trial Counsel, Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’), Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (‘STL’). The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessari-
ly reflect the views of the STL. 
1 The Pre-Trial Chamber has the power to dismiss a mode of liability and to ask the Prosecu-
tion to consider filing an amended DCC. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
17 July 1998, Article 61(7)(b) and 61(7)(c)(ii) (‘ICC Statute’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
7b9af9). 
2 The Trial Chamber has the authority to modify the legal characterisation of facts by issuing 
a notice to the trial’s participants. ICC, Regulations of the Court, 26 May 2004, ICC-
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number of the OTP’s proposed modes of liability or modified the legal 
characterisation of facts initially alleged, or dismissed all liability of the 
accused. The latter occurred in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
by the Appeals Chamber and twice when the Pre-Trial Chamber was una-
ble to confirm any of the formulations of criminal responsibility proposed 
by the OTP.4 Both latter cases ended at the confirmation stage with signif-
icant investigation resources spent until then. 
Non-confirmations and frequent changes of the modes of liability 
initially proposed by the Prosecution indicate that the OTP had submitted 
to the judiciary a case with allegations of criminal liability which it either 
was unable to defend once scrutiny by the Defence and judiciary began, 
or which needed changes in the formulations of criminal responsibility to 
correctly reflect the facts established during an investigation. 
In 12 cases analysed, the OTP had initially proposed one or more 
mode(s) of liability which it could not defend during the various stages of 
criminal proceedings: the Pre-Trial Chambers refused to confirm the 
OTP’s allegation of criminal liability of four suspects and refrained to 
elevate their status to accused persons, thereby dismissing either the entire 
proposed DCC or relevant sections thereof.5 Further, though the Pre-Trial 
Chamber had confirmed the OTP’s allegations of criminal liability against 
two accused, the cases ended after the Prosecution withdrew the charges 
before the trial could begin.6 Against four other persons, the Trial Cham-
ber vacated all charges after the Prosecution’s case had ended with deci-
sions on the ‘no case to answer’ (‘NCTA’) motions.7 Based on reasons 
relating to criminal liability, two cases resulted in an acquittal: the case 
                                                                                                                        
BD/01-01-04, Regulation 55 (‘Regulations of the Court’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
05fd20). 
3 The Appeals Chamber can overturn a Trial Chamber’s finding regarding a mode of liability 
by dismissing it. ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bem-
ba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 
June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, paras. 194, 196–98 (‘Bemba Appeals Judgment’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/40d35b). 
4 Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana. 
5 Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Prosecutor v. Mohammed Hussein Ali, Prosecutor v. Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana. 
6 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigau Kenyatta. 
7 Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Prosecutor v. Joshua Arap Sang, Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Koudou Gbagbo and Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé. 
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against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ended with a trial judgment and the case 
against Bemba with an Appeal judgment, both containing acquittals. 
By contrast, the Prosecution managed to consistently maintain its 
initial allegation of criminal responsibility by securing convictions for the 
mode of liability initially alleged in three cases.8 In the additional case of 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, months after the deliberation process had 
begun, the Trial Chamber provided notice pursuant to Regulation 55 of a 
possible re-characterisation of criminal liability (other than the mode of 
responsibility initial alleged by the OTP) and then convicted the accused 
based on this new form of participation.9 A fifth case, Prosecutor v. Ong-
wen, is in the deliberation phase at the time of writing of this analysis and 
therefore is not considered for this statistical evaluation. 
The ratio of 4 cases in which the OTP secured convictions10 com-
pared to 12 cases not leading to any conviction of the suspects or accused 
persons based on the initial allegation of criminal responsibility indicate 
that the OTP’s investigations into modes of responsibilities often resulted 
in identification of facts and advancement of assertions which, upon scru-
tiny by the Defence and the judiciary, the Prosecution could not defend to 
obtain a conviction. 
This begs questions: where did it go wrong? Already during the in-
vestigative phase? And/or during the phase when the results of an investi-
gation were turned into a draft DCC? If the OTP is more often than not 
unable to defend its allegations on criminal responsibility has this a mere 
factual background, as the discovered facts were insufficient? Or is it the 
result of erroneous interpretation of these facts? Or a combination of both? 
                                                   
8 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Prose-
cutor v. Bosco Ntaganda. 
9 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Decision on the implementation of reg-
ulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused 
persons, 21 November 2012, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, p. 29 (‘Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 and Severing the 
Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f5cbd0). 
10 Three cases (see above note 8) in which the OTP secured convictions based on the same 
mode of liability initially alleged. In the fourth case (Prosecutor v. Katanga), the OTP had 
pleaded facts which secured a conviction, but only after the Trial Chamber invoked Regu-
lation 55 and re-characterised the mode of liability. The fifth case, the case against Domi-
nic Ongwen, is not considered in this comparison, as the judges’ deliberation in this case is 
still ongoing. 
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12.2. Individualisation of Guilt 
Centre piece of any investigation, prosecution, trial and verdict is to iden-
tify and analyse criminal wrongdoing, meaning to attribute guilt to an 
individual or, if this cannot be done beyond reasonable doubt, to acquit. 
Thus, in the course of investigation and prosecution, the objective is to 
identify and define the offence(s) committed, suspects for these and to 
determine their individual criminal responsibility. Regarding the latter, the 
main question to answer is: what is the correct mode of responsibility 
which describes the wrongdoing most accurately? The ICC Statute distin-
guishes between positive or negative acts in Article 25(3): a principal 
‘commits’ these acts by directly perpetrating, acting as direct or indirect 
co-perpetrator.11 By contrast, an accomplice orders, solicits or induces,12 
aids or abets13 in any other way contributes.14 Further, the ICC Statute 
provides liability for omission: if a superior or commander omits to fol-
low certain duties, he can be held responsible due to Article 28. 
12.3. Legal Environment in Which the OTP Conducts Its 
Investigations 
As a treaty-based organisation, the ICC has weaker powers compared to 
its precursors. The International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo had vertical powers exercised in the environment of an occupation 
of the German Reich and Empire of Japan. The International Criminal 
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were created by the Security Coun-
cil which exercised its vertical powers under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter.15 
12.3.1. Powers Vested into the ICC 
Part 9 of the ICC Statute provides powers to the Court and the OTP as its 
organ,16 but only those which the States Parties have before voluntarily 
transferred to the ICC. In addition, the ICC treaty allows States Parties to 
                                                   
11 ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(a), see above note 1. 
12 Ibid., Article 25(3)(b). 
13 Ibid., Articles 25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d). 
14 Ibid., Article 25(3)(d). 
15 Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/dc079b); Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), UN Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f5ef47). 
16 ICC Statute, Articles 54(2)(a), 55(2), 57(3)(d), 58(5), 86, see above note 1. 
 
12. Investigations of Criminal Responsibility by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 643 
withdraw.17 That the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute does 
not mean that the OTP and the Court automatically get full co-operation 
in investigations. For example, even though the Pre-Trial Chamber issued 
two warrants of arrest against Omar Al Bashir,18 the former President of 
the Sudan, he was not arrested by three States Parties19 and non-States 
Parties of the ICC while staying on their territory.20 Volatile security situa-
tions in (post-)conflict areas further complicate the investigations21 as not 
only experiences in relation to Darfur and Libya show. Warring factions 
have competing interests and agendas if it comes to the OTP conducting 
an investigation. The result is that the OTP’s access to relevant areas in 
                                                   
17 Ibid., Articles 121(6), 127. 
18 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, ICC-
02/05-01/09-1 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/814cca); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber, Second Warrant of Ar-
rest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 12 July 2010, ICC-02/05-01/09-95 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/307664). 
19 For example, Al-Bashir travelled to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of South 
Africa and the Kingdom of Jordan, and the ICC though finding that the last two States had 
failed to comply with their obligations under the ICC Statute, refrained to refer both occur-
rences to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council, because both States had 
commenced consultation procedures with the ICC before these visits occurred. ICC, Situa-
tion in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, 6 May 2019, ICC-02/05-01/09-397-
Corr, paras. 208–12, 215 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/0c5307); ICC, Situation in Darfur, 
Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the 
request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, 6 July 2017, ICC-
02/05-01/09-302, paras. 123, 139–40 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/68ffc1). For Nigeria, ICC, 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Trial Cham-
ber, Decision Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Visit to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 15 Ju-
ly 2013, ICC-02/05-01/09-157 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f97665). This visit occurred be-
tween 14 and 16 July 2013. 
20 An overview of all States visited by Al-Bashir following his arrest is provided in the web 
site “BashirWatch”. 
21 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 
2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, paras. 154–64 (‘Lubanga Trial Judgment’) (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/677866); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Pros-
ecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, 18 December 2012, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, paras. 115, 121 (‘Ngudjolo Chui 
Trial Judgment’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2c2cde). 
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certain countries, its field presence22 there, and its powers of investigation 
are far from being vertical, but fluid, subject to political will, sometimes 
depend on access to and willingness to co-operate with intermediaries23 
and thus occasionally have to contain horizontal elements. 
Further, the OTP’s investigations may suffer from a shortcoming of 
direct evidence. The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui ob-
served an absence of forensic findings crucial to the identification of vic-
tims, failure of the Prosecution to visit the localities where the accused 
lived and where preparations for the attack on Bogoro allegedly took 
place, failure to interview the accused and certain commanders who 
played a key role before the attack and to obtain civil status documents of 
the OTP’s witnesses to more precisely determine the age of alleged child 
soldiers.24 Trial Chamber II observed a “more thorough investigation […] 
would have resulted in a more nuanced interpretation of certain facts 
[…]”.25 
The legal environment in which the OTP investigates applicable 
modes of criminal responsibility needs to be further considered. Article 
61(4) of the ICC Statute in connection with Rule 121(4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’) allow the OTP to unilaterally withdraw 
formulations of responsibility until 15 days before the confirmation of 
charges hearing. After the confirmation decision, two additional criteria 
have to be met before the Prosecution can amend or withdraw an alleged 
                                                   
22 Christian M. De Vos, “Investigating from Afar: the ICC’s Evidence Problem”, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2013, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 1016–19. 
23 The OTP argued in the Lubanga case that “due to the difficulties in the DRC and the 
OTP’s lack of a police force, it was necessary to rely on intermediaries”. Lubanga Trial 
Judgment, para. 181, text accompanying fn. 457, see above note 21. ICC, Guidelines Gov-
erning the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs and Units of the 
Court and Counsel working with intermediaries, March 2014, p. 2 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/e0f990): 
To facilitate activities in the field, the Court uses different forms of field presence. The 
effectiveness of the Court’s activities also depends to a large extent on the cooperation 
it receives from the community, regional national (governmental) organizations and 
individuals operating in the country where the Court functions. 
See ICC, Code of Conduct for Intermediaries, March 2014, sect. 5 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/eac2f0); Elena Baylis, “Outsourcing investigations”, in University of California Los 
Angeles Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 2009, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 121 ff. 
24 Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment, paras. 118–21, see above note 21. 
25 Ibid., para. 123. 
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mode of liability: the Defence has to be notified and the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber needs to grant leave.26 
12.3.2. Regulation 55 
In practice, the formal amendment procedure provided by Article 61(9) to 
alter initial pleadings of modes of liability is rarely used. Often Regula-
tion 55 is used. This provision allows, if the facts remain the same, a Trial 
Chamber to modify the legal characterisation of a pleaded mode of liabil-
ity. The usage of this provision effectively reduces the Prosecution’s need 
to pursue formal amendments of liability to those situations where it 
wishes to introduce other modes of liability based on new facts. 
12.3.2.1. Diplomatic Negotiations for the ICC Could Not Identify 
Sufficient Common Ground 
The approach adopted by Regulation 55 is based on the Latin notion iura 
novit curia, meaning the court knows the law while it is left to the parties 
to bring the facts. Thus, it is the judges’ authority to re-characterise the 
pleaded modes of liability after having provided legal notice to the ac-
cused person in order to enable him to prepare and adjust his defence.27 
Common law countries disagree with this interpretation of the law. Em-
phasising the right of the accused to get timely informed, they argue that 
the Prosecutor either has to formally amend the DCC otherwise the court 
is bound by the legal qualifications advanced by the Prosecutor. Failing 
such a formal amendment, it is only possible that the accused gets con-
victed for a lesser mode of liability than the one he or she was charged 
with, but not to a higher one.28 
Sixteen months after the ICC Statue had been adopted, ICTY Trial 
Chamber II ruled in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić that: 
[I]nternational criminal rules are still in a rudimentary state. 
[…] In this state of flux the rights of the accused would not 
                                                   
26 ICC Statute, Article 61(9), see above note 1. 
27 Regulation 55(3)(b) expressly refers to the accused right to effectively prepare his defence 
as enshrined by ibid., Article 67(1)(b). 
28 Gilbert Bitti, “Two Bones of Contention Between Civil and Common Law: The Record of 
the Proceedings and the Treatment of a Concursus Delictorum”, in Horst Fischer, Claus 
Kreß and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes un-
der International Law: Current Developments, Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, Berlin, 2001, p. 
282 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/b7b81a). 
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be satisfactorily safeguarded were one to adopt an approach 
akin to that of civil law countries. The task of the Defence 
would become exceedingly onerous […]. On the other hand, 
the other requirement relating to the efficient discharge of 
the Tribunal’s function in the interest of justice warrants the 
conclusion that any possible errors of the Prosecution should 
not stultify criminal proceedings whenever a case neverthe-
less appears to have been made by the Prosecution and its 
possible flaws in the formulation of the charge are not such 
as to impair or curtail the rights of the Defense.29 
Four years before this judgment, in 1996, the French delegation had 
submitted a proposal relating to the ICC Statute according to which the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may “confirm only part of the indictment and amend it 
[…] by giving some facts another characterization”.30 This proposal was 
neither included into the Preparatory Committee’s draft statute for an 
ICC,31 nor by the ICC Statute adopted in Rome. On the level of the ICC 
RPE, the issue introducing the iura novit curia principle was touched up-
on several times in informal discussions during the fourth session of the 
Preparatory Commission. One informal proposal originating from ICTY’s 
OTP was based on the ruling in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić and its relevant 
part stated:  
(1) Provided that the parties are duly notified by the Trial 
Chamber and given appropriate opportunity to make 
submissions before the conclusion of the trial, the 
Chamber may 
[…] 
(b) classify the particular form of participation in an of-
fence in a different manner under Article 25(3) than that 
contained in the indictment.32 
Portugal and Spain added to the excerpt of the OTP’s proposal the 
words highlighted in italics: 
                                                   
29 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), The Prosecutor v. 
Kupreškić et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement, 14 January 2000, IT-95-16-T, paras. 740–41 
(Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgment) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/5c6a53). 
30 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court: Working paper submitted by France, UN. 
Doc. A/AC.249/L.3, 6 August 1996, Article 48(5)(b) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/4d28ee). 
31 Carsten Stahn, “Modification of the Legal Characterization of Facts in the ICC System: A 
Portrayal of Regulation”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2005, vol. 16, no. 1, p. 10. 
32 This informal proposal is reprinted in Bitti, 2001, p. 284, see above note 28. 
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(2) Provided the parties are duly notified by the Trial 
Chamber and given appropriate opportunity to make 
submissions before the conclusion of the trial, the 
Chamber, bearing in mind the facts included in the in-
dictment, may: 
[…] 
(b) classify the particular form of participation in an of-
fence in a different manner under Article 25(3) than that 
contained in the indictment.33 
Displaying disagreement, the common law countries informally ta-
bled Rule 6-22bis which stated in its relevant part: 
Relationship between the charges and the decision of the 
Trial Chamber, in particular with regard to concurrences 
of offences 
(a) The Trial Chamber […] decision shall, in accordance 
with Article 74(2), not exceed the facts and circum-
stances described in the charges and any amendment to 
the charges. 
(b) In accordance with Article 61(9) the Prosecutor may not 
amend the charges after the commencement of the Trial. 
This shall not prevent the Prosecutor from: 
[…] 
(ii) with the permission of the Trial Chamber and after no-
tice to the accused, substituting less serious charges 
under Article 25(3).34 
The French delegation tabled another proposal: 
Provided all those who participate in the proceedings are du-
ly notified by the Trial Chamber and given opportunity to 
make submissions before the conclusion of the trial, the Trial 
Chamber may, without adding to the facts described in the 
charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, change the 
qualification of the facts: […] b. regarding the particular 
form of participation in the crime, according to Article 25(3) 
of the Statute.35 
                                                   
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 285 (emphasis added). 
35 Ibid., p. 286. 
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As insufficient common ground could be identified, it was impossi-
ble to reconcile disagreement between the approaches favoured by the 
ICTY representative, Spain, Portugal and France on the one hand and the 
common law countries on the other.36 Failing consensus, it was decided to 
not regulate this issue, but to leave it to the ICC to decide, if necessary, 
according to its inherent powers.37 
12.3.2.2. Approach Adopted by the ICC Judges: Regulation 55 of the 
Court 
The judges were aware that legal uncertainty about the power of judges to 
correct erroneous modes of liability charged in the DCC could affect the 
Prosecutorial strategy, resulting in the Prosecutor listing multiple modes 
of liability in order to avoid the risk of acquittal. Thus, investigations like-
ly resulted in DCC’s loaded with multiple modes of liability which could 
ultimately affect judicial economy as the judges would need to rule on 
each variant of criminal responsibility presented. 
Cognisant of the lack of common ground preventing the drafters of 
the ICC Statute and RPE to address the situation in which a trial chamber 
realises during the presentation of the evidence at trial that an accused is 
liable according to a different mode of liability than the one charged in the 
DCC, the judges deliberated on what would be a fair solution taking into 
consideration the rights of the accused to be promptly and in detail in-
formed as well as to an effective defence. The judges had three options: (1) 
to accept that the criminal liability is ‘frozen’ with the confirmation of the 
DCC, except for a formal amendment according to Article 61(9);38 (2) to 
furnish the trial chamber with broader powers to have the Prosecutor at 
trial amend the facts and legal components within the DCC, including the 
liabilities charged within it; or (3) to furnish the trial chamber with limited 
powers, staying within the facts as pleaded by the Prosecutor and con-
firmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the DCC, but to grant the Trial Cham-
                                                   
36 Håkan Friman, “The Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the Investigative Stage”, in Horst 
Fischer, Claus Kreß and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution 
of Crimes under International Law: Current Developments, Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, Ber-
lin, 2001, p. 209; Bitti, 2001, p. 286, see above note 28. 
37 Ibid. 
38 However, the last sentence of this paragraph prohibits any adding of charges by the Prose-
cutor after the commencement of the trial, but allows for withdrawals only. 
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ber the right to re-characterise the charges. Favouring the third option, the 
ICC judges adopted in May 2004 Regulation 55 of the Court which stated:  
Authority of the Chamber to modify the legal characteri-
sation of facts 
1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may 
change the legal characterisation of facts to accord 
with […] the form of participation of the accused under 
articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the facts and cir-
cumstances described in the charges and any amend-
ments to the charges. 
This approach excludes the power of a Trial Chamber to deviate 
from the facts pleaded in the DCC39 and its auxiliary documents produced 
by the OTP,40 but provides for the possibility to change the legal charac-
terisation of these facts.41 Regulation 55 refers expressly to the distinction 
introduced in Regulation 52(b) and 52(c) by allowing the Trial Chamber 
to only change the legal characterisation of the facts, including the form 
of participation under Articles 25 and 28. 
With this judge-made law, the ICC’s judiciary attempted to over-
come the legal divide existing between common law and civil law coun-
tries about the best approach. With Regulation 55, the ICC’s judges accept 
that the final authority to describe the scope of the statement of facts lies 
with the Prosecutor. However, the Trial Chamber is authorised to give the 
facts which the Prosecutor submitted at the conclusion of his or her inves-
tigation and which the Pre-Trial Chamber accepted in its confirmation 
decision, a different legal interpretation which may ultimately amount to a 
re-characterisation of a mode of liability. By providing notice of a possi-
ble new legal characterisation to the parties, the Trial Chamber warns the 
accused and thereby provides him or her with the possibility to adjust the 
defence accordingly. Issuing such notice indicates to the Prosecution that 
                                                   
39 See Regulations of the Court, Regulation 52(b), see above note 2. 
40 The Appeals Chamber found that “[a]ll documents that were designed to provide infor-
mation about the charges, including auxiliary documents, must be considered to determine 
whether an accused was informed in sufficient detail of the charges”. ICC, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, 1 
December 2014, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, para. 128 (‘Lubanga Appeals Judgment’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/585c75); see ibid., para. 134. 
41 See Regulations of the Court, Regulation 52(c), see above note 2. 
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the Trial Chamber is not fully convinced on the theory of liability ad-
vanced following its investigation and/or confirmation decision issued by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
12.4. Indicia of Shortcomings During the Investigation into Criminal 
Responsibility 
Indicia of shortcomings during the investigation are that (1) a negative 
judicial decision regarding the mode of liability pleaded by OTP is ren-
dered; (2) the liability language proposed by the Prosecution is vague; (3) 
the DCC contains too many variants of criminal responsibility, including 
liabilities of principal and accessory; (4) the Pre-Trial Chamber invoked 
Article 61(7)(c) to adjourn the confirmation hearing; and (5) the invoca-
tion of Regulation 55 at trial by either the Trial Chamber or the Prosecu-
tion. Each of the above indicia is discussed in the following sections. 
12.4.1. Negative Judicial Decision About Mode of Liability 
The rendering of a negative decision on the mode of liability by the judg-
es is an indicator that the OTP had problems during its investigation, or at 
least in pleading the results thereof in its DCC. In two cases, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I refused to grant suspects the status of an accused by not con-
firming the DCC based on the OTP’s inability to prove the alleged crimi-
nal responsibility to an evidentiary standard required for confirmation.42 
In Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber I was “not satisfied that 
there are substantial grounds to believe that Mr. Abu Garda can be held 
criminally responsible as either direct or indirect co-perpetrator”, and 
declined to confirm the charges.43 
In Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
found that: 
[T]he evidence submitted by the Prosecution is not sufficient 
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspect 
encouraged the troops’ morale through his press releases and 
radio messages, and, therefore, he could have not provided 
through his radio communications and press releases a sig-
                                                   
42 Prosecutor v. Abu Garda and Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana. 
43 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-
243-Red, para. 232 (‘Abu Garda Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/cb3614); see ibid., paras. 233, 236. 
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nificant contribution to the commission of crimes by the 
FDLR within the meaning of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute. 
[…] For these reasons, the Chamber, by majority […] de-
clines to confirm the charges against Mr. Callixte Mba-
rushimana.44 
After the OTP had closed its case in Prosecutor v. Gbagbo and Blé 
Goudé, Trial Chamber I granted the Defence’s NCTA-motions.45 Similarly, 
in Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang,  the majority of Trial Chamber V vacated 
the charges, as the Prosecution had at the end of its own case not proven 
any of the alleged modes of liability.46 
In Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, the accused was acquitted because the 
Trial Chamber 
could not determine beyond reasonable doubt that Mathieu 
Ngudjolo was, as alleged by the Prosecution, the leader of 
the Lendu combatants who participated in the attack on Bo-
goro. Therefore in the Chambers view, the Prosecution has 
not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Mathieu Ngudjolo 
committed the alleged crimes under article 25(3)(a) of the 
Statute, insofar as his role within Bedu-Ezekere groupement, 
as it emerges from the evidence examined, in no way allows 
the Chamber to accept or even contemplate the notion of in-
direct perpetration adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber, re-
gardless of how article 25(3)(a) of the Statute is construed.47 
                                                   
44 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 
2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, para. 339, p. 149 (‘Mbarushimana Pre-Trial Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/63028f). 
45 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo 
and Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Reasons for oral decision of 15 January 2019 on 
the “Requête de la Défense de Laurent Gbagbo afin qu’un jugement d’acquittement 
portant sur toutes les charges soit prononcé en faveur de Laurent Gbagbo et que sa mise en 
liberté immédiate soit ordonnée”, and on the Blé Goudé Defence no case to answer motion, 
16 July 2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263 (‘Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Reasons for Oral De-
cision’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/440017). 
46 ICC, Situation on the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of 
Acquittal, 5 April 2016, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, paras. 133–34, 136–38, 143 
(‘Ruto and Sang Trial Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/6baecd). 
47 Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment, para. 110, see above note 21 (emphasis added). 
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In Prosecutor v. Bemba, the majority of the Appeals Chamber held 
that 
one element of command responsibility under article 28(a) of 
the Statute was not properly established and Mr. Bemba can-
not be held criminally liable under that provision for the 
crimes committed by MLC troops during the 2002-2003 
CAR Operation.48 
12.4.2. Vague Formulation of Criminal Responsibility 
Imprecision in use of language regarding one aspect of criminal responsi-
bility may be a deliberate choice of the OTP, as sometimes it is impossible 
to fully clarify one specific, but minor point, if otherwise the overall evi-
dence overwhelmingly points to the accused being criminally liable. 
However, when such imprecision on one factual element is additionally 
combined with usage of multiple modes of liability in arrest warrant ap-
plications and DCCs, it is more problematic; because it indicates that, 
despite all efforts, the investigation could not clarify substantial aspects of 
the criminal responsibility. Certain omissions and misconceptions may 
have occurred, making it difficult for the OTP to identify the exact mode 
of liability of the prohibited conduct. Imprecision may also indicate that 
during its investigation, the OTP faced challenges in identifying and in-
terpreting material facts. Ultimately, imprecision and inconsistency con-
tained in arrest warrant applications and DCCs are indicative that the 
OTP’s alleged mode of liability may suffer from misunderstandings. 
In Prosecutor v. Bemba, the Prosecution used in its initial and 
amended DCCs the formulation of the Prosecutor does not exclude “any 
other applicable mode of liability” beside Article 25. 49  Noting such 
vagueness and evidence indicating a different liability, namely superior 
responsibility, Pre-Trial Chamber III adjourned the confirmation of charg-
                                                   
48 Bemba Appeals Judgment, para. 194, see above note 3. 
49 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, OTP, Document containing the charges, 1 October 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-136-
AnxA, para. 56 (‘Bemba OTP DCC’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/94e5fb); ICC, Situation 
in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, OTP, 
Amended Document containing the charges, 17 October 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-169-
Anx3A, para. 57 (‘Bemba OTP Amended DCC’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/bb881b). 
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es hearing and requested the Prosecutor to consider amending the charg-
es.50 
In Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber I observed the fol-
lowing imprecisions in usage of language and multiple modes of liability 
in the DCC: 
While charging Mr Abu Garda with criminal responsibility 
as a co-perpetrator or as an indirect co-perpetrator, the Pros-
ecution in the DCC does not exclude any other applicable 
mode of liability. The Chamber recalls however that in ac-
cordance with article 67(1)(a) of the Statute and rule 121(1) 
of the Rules, Mr Abu Garda must be informed in detail of the 
nature, cause and content of the charges brought against him. 
In addition, Regulation 52(c) of the Regulations of the Court 
requires the Prosecution to indicate in its DCC the precise 
form of participation.51 
Regulation 52(c) expects the DCC shall include a “precise form of 
participation under articles 25 and 28”. 
In the situation in Kenya, the OTP’s application for a summons to 
appear alleged against Ruto, Kosgey and Sang the following formulations 
of criminal responsibility: “the requirements of direct/indirect 
co‐perpetration […] pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) […] have been met”.52 
However, the counts listed in the same application omitted to clarify 
whether the Prosecution intended to see the three perpetrators as indirect 
co-perpetrator or direct co-perpetrators, or both. Instead, Ruto, Kosgey 
and Sang were simply qualified “as co‐perpetrators”.53 Having charged 
the three men in an imprecise manner with principal liability as co-
                                                   
50 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 
61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 3 March 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-388, paras. 41, 46, 49, p. 
19 (letters a)–b)) (‘Bemba Pre-Trial Decision Adjourning the Hearing’) (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/81d7a9). 
51 Abu Garda Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 158, see above note 
43 (emphasis added). 
52 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, OTP, Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 
58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 15 Decem-
ber 2010, ICC-01/09-01/11-26-Red2, para. 27 (‘Ruto, Kosgey and Sang OTP Article 58 
Application’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c6cf4c). 
53 Ibid., sect. F (counts 1–4). 
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perpetrators, meaning with liability as a principal, the Prosecution also 
charged the same men in the alternative with accessory liability pursuant 
to Article 25(3)(d).54 Pre-Trial Chamber II noted that: 
In his application, the Prosecutor inconsistently presented 
different modes of liability. […] Although the Prosecutor 
may generally charge in the alternative, he should be con-
sistent throughout his Application about the actual mode(s) 
of liability […]. [T]he Chamber is not persuaded it is best 
practice to make simultaneous findings on modes of liability 
presented in the alternative. A person cannot be deemed con-
currently as a principal and an accessory to the same crime.55 
12.4.3. DCC Contains Too Many Variants of Criminal Responsibility 
Including of Principal and Accessory 
International Tribunals concur that alternative charging is permissible.56 
Alternative charging means that the Prosecutor is permitted to charge an 
accused person with more than one mode of responsibility.57 
                                                   
54 Ibid., para. 27, sect. F (counts 1–4). 
55 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang, 8 March 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-1, paras. 35–36 (‘Ruto, Kosgey and 
Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear’) (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/6c9fb0). 
56 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion on 
the Form of the Indictment, 14 November 1995, IT-94-1-T, para. 17 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/8d598a); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Appeals Chamber, Decision on Application 
for Leave to Appeal by Hazim Delić (Defects in the Form of the Indictment), 6 December 
1996, IT-96-21-A, para. 35 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/96e661); International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’), The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Chamber, 
Judgement, 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 468 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
b8d7bd); STL, The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Appeals Chamber, Interlocutory Decision 
on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charg-
ing, 16 February 2011, STL-11-01/I, para. 298 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/ceebc3); ICC, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, 
para. 100, fn. 421 (‘Ntaganda Pre-Trial Decision on the Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/5686c6); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al 
Mahdi, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Ahmad Al 
Faqi Al Mahdi, 24 March 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-84-Red, para. 22 (‘Al Mahdi Pre-Trial 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/bc8144); ICC, Situ-
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12.4.3.1. Charging in the Alternative 
In favour of charging in the alternative speaks the scope of criminality 
occurring in the field of international humanitarian law: to prosecute sys-
tematic wrongdoing on a large scale, some DCC’s need to list more than 
one form of criminal liability to capture the entire systemic wrong. Cases 
may span over time periods of more than one, sometimes several years. 
Hence, Prosecutors appreciate the possibility to charge alternative modes 
of liability as a safeguard to capture the entire criminal conduct identified 
during an investigation and thereby to avoid impunity gaps,58 future de-
lays at trial, 59  and to provide early notice to the Defence. 60  Pre-Trial 
Chamber I declared it 
appropriate that the charges be confirmed with the various 
available alternatives, in order for the Trial Chamber to de-
termine whether any of those legal characterisations is estab-
lished to the applicable standard of proof at trial. […] con-
firming all applicable alternative legal characterisations on 
the basis of the same facts is a desirable approach as it may 
                                                                                                                        
ation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, 12 June 
2014, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, para. 227 (‘Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/5b41bc). 
57 Ibid. 
58 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled “Decision giv-
ing notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be 
subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”, 8 
December 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, para. 17 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/40d015); ICC, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the decision of 
Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled “Decision on the implementation of regu-
lation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused per-
sons”, 27 March 2013, ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, para. 22 (‘Katanga Appeals Judgment on 
the Implementation of Regulation 55 and Severing the Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/9d87d9). 
59 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 23 March 2016, ICC-02/04-
01/15-422-Red, para. 35 (‘Ongwen Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/74fc6e); Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, para. 228, see above note 56; Al Mahdi Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, para. 22, see above note 56. 
60 Ibid. 
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reduce future delays at trial, and provides early notice to the 
defence of the different legal characterisations that may be 
considered by the trial judges. This more flexible approach is, 
of course, without prejudice to the possibility that trial judg-
es, following the applicable procedure, consider other alter-
natives as well.61 
On the other hand, charging too many modes of liability alternative-
ly in a DCC blurs distinctions and opens the door for a prosecutor to re-
main vague regarding the ultimate issue of the accused’s liability. By 
charging multiple modes of liability in the alternative, a prosecutor avoids 
settling early on a specific case theory and remains flexible until all evi-
dence has been presented in court. This appears not fair to the accused 
person and the defence. Judges when faced with multiple alternative 
modes of liability, are not obliged to evaluate and enter findings on each 
and every mode of liability charged in the alternative. Rather, in their 
judgment, they have discretion to examine only the mode of liability that 
most accurately describes that conduct of the accused.62 
12.4.3.2. Principal Versus Accomplice Liability 
Article 25(3) distinguishes whether a person commits a crime63 or con-
tributes to it.64 One who commits a crime is liable as a perpetrator and in 
all other variants as an accessory only.65 This distinction is not merely 
terminological. Rather, the Appeals Chamber has explained that 
a person who is found to commit a crime him- or herself 
bears more blameworthiness than a person who contributes 
to the crime of another person or persons.66 […] in circum-
stances where a plurality of individuals are involved in the 
                                                   
61 Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, paras. 227–28, see above note 
56. 
62 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Trial Chamber, Judgement: Volume 1 of 4, 26 
February 2009, IT-05-87-T, para. 76 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/9eb7c3); ICC, Situation in 
the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, 
Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion Judge Herrera Carbuccia, 16 July 2019, ICC-02/11-
01/15-1263-AnxC-Red, para. 485 (‘Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Herrera Carbuccia’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/6ak9rf). 
63 ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(a), see above note 1. 
64 Ibid., Articles 25(3)(b)–25(3)(d). 
65 Lubanga Appeals Judgment, para. 462, see above note 40. 
66 Ibid. 
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commission of a crime, it becomes necessary to determine 
on what basis an individual’s role is assessed to amount to 
that of a perpetrator or that of an accessory.67 
Pre-Trial Chamber III held that 
[t]he crimes and the mode of liability correlate to each other. 
Depending on the mode of participation as set out in articles 
25 and 28 of the Statute, the material (objective) elements of 
the crime are shaped differently. It does have a bearing on 
the structure of the crime whether the person held liable for 
committing the crime acted as a principal, as an accomplice 
or as a superior.68 
This suggests that charging a suspect with principal and accomplice 
liability, and liability as a military or civilian superior has a bearing on the 
structure of the crime(s) charged. Further, it would allow prosecutors to 
interpret the same evidence in multiple ways. 
That however triggers the question whether this may be incompati-
ble with the right of the accused to get informed, promptly and in detail,69 
of the nature of the criminal responsibility alleged. 
In Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber II held 
that it is 
not persuaded that it is best practice to make simultaneous 
findings on modes of liability presented in the alternative. A 
person cannot be deemed concurrently as a principal and an 
accessory to the same crime. Thus, it is the Chamber’s view 
that an initial decision has to be made on the basis of the ma-
terial provided, as to whether there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that Ruto, Kosgey and Sang bear criminal responsi-
bility for the crimes against humanity that occurred in the 
specific locations in the Republic of Kenya […] either as co-
perpetrators, indirect co-perpetrators, or any other form of li-
ability presented or that the Chamber finds appropriate.70 
                                                   
67 Ibid., para. 463. 
68 Bemba Pre-Trial Decision Adjourning the Hearing, para. 26, see above note 50. 
69 ICC statute, Article 67(1)(a), see above note 1; Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgment, para. 725, 
see above note 29; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, Article 14(3) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2838f3); European Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 6(3)(a), 4 November 1950 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/8267cb). 
70 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons 
to Appear, para. 36, see above note 55. 
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Thus, if the Prosecutor omits to decide whether to consider a sus-
pect as a principal or an accessory or (military) superior in his DCC, but 
charges the suspect with multiple alternative modes of liability, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II sees its role in deciding whether the defendant is deemed to 
be a principal or an accomplice. This reduces the number of modes of 
liability the accused has to defend himself against at trial. However, this 
approach is neither followed by Pre-Trial Chamber I nor adopted consist-
ently by Pre-Trial Chamber II. 
In Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, the DCC contained seven concurrent 
modes of liability: three as a principal (direct perpetration, direct co-
perpetration and indirect co-perpetration, each pursuant to Article 
25(3)(a)), three modes of accessorial liability (ordering and inducing, each 
pursuant to Article 25(3)(b) and contributing in any other way pursuant to 
Article 25(3)(d)), and the liability of superior responsibility (acting as 
military commander pursuant to Article 28(a)). 71 Pre-Trial Chamber II 
reduced the principal liabilities from five to four (direct participation, 
indirect co-perpetration, ordering and inducing), but also confirmed the 
accessory liability contributing and, parallel thereto, liability as military 
commander.72 
In Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, the Prosecutor charged four modes of li-
ability concurrently in the DCC and qualified the accused as a principal 
(direct co-perpetration pursuant to Article 25(3)(a)) and accessory (further 
soliciting and inducing pursuant to Article 25(3)(b), aiding and abetting, 
or otherwise assisting the commission of a crime under Article 25(3)(c), 
and contributing in any other way to the commission of a crime by a 
group with a common purpose under Article 25(3)(d)).73 Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I confirmed all modes of liability advanced by the Prosecution.74 
                                                   
71 Ntaganda Pre-Trial Decision on the Charges, paras. 98–99, 101, 136, 145, 153, 158, 164, 
see above note 56; ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecu-
tor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Annex to the Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Nta-
ganda, 9 June 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-309-Anx (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f8ba64). 
72 Ntaganda Pre-Trial Decision on the Charges, para. 97, p. 63 (letter b)), see above note 56. 
73 Al Mahdi Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, paras. 2, 23, see above note 
56. 
74 Ibid., para. 23. 
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12.4.4. Pre-Trial Chamber Invokes Article 61(7)(c) to Adjourn the 
Confirmation Hearing 
Article 61(7)(c) demonstrates the power of the Pre-Trial Chamber. It can 
order the Prosecution to consider providing further evidence and conduct-
ing further investigation and/or amending a charge contained in the DCC. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber can then confirm the amended charge, if it so 
chooses. Usage of this provision usually demonstrates that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber spotted during the confirmation hearing a deficiency in the 
OTP’s investigation and/or in the draft DCC. The invocation of this provi-
sion further demonstrates that the Pre-Trial Chamber assesses the defi-
ciency as not incurable and, by adjourning, the judges provide the Prose-
cution time and opportunity to correct its omission(s) resulting from the 
investigation and/or initial pleading. 
For example, in Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, the majority of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I identified six issues and asked the Prosecution “to consider 
providing, to the extent possible, further evidence or conduct further in-
vestigation”.75 The first three issues identified by Pre-Trial Camber I re-
lated to modes of liability. 
In Prosecutor v. Bemba, the initial and amended DCC contained in-
direct liability under Article 25(3)(a), adding that other modes of liability 
would not be excluded.76 Pre-Trial Chamber III adjourned the ongoing 
confirmation hearing, requesting the OTP to submit and amended DCC 
which also included a possible liability under Article 28.77 
12.4.5. Use of Regulation 55 
Reliance on Regulation 55 to re-characterise the initially proposed mode 
of liability indicates that the OTP may have – during its investigation and 
in its DCC (as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber after a cursory con-
firmation of charges hearing) – interpreted the facts relevant to criminal 
responsibility differently than the Trial Chamber, which hears at trial the 
                                                   
75 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3 June 2013, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, para. 44 
(‘Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision Adjourning the Hearing’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8). 
76 Bemba OTP DCC, para. 56, see above note 49; Bemba OTP Amended DCC, para. 57, see 
above note 49. 
77 Bemba Pre-Trial Decision Adjourning the Hearing, paras. 46, 48–49, see above note 50. 
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entire volume of evidence. In six cases, parties to the proceedings re-
quested usage of or the Trial Chamber invoked Regulation 55 to notify the 
parties of a possible modification of criminal responsibility of seven ac-
cused persons.78 
For example, in Prosecutor v. Muthaura and Kenyatta, the Prosecu-
tor alleged criminal liability as principal based on Article 25(3)(a) which 
the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed.79 Before trial, the OTP attempted to 
move the Trial Chamber V to re-characterise the principal liability to now 
also include accessory liabilities under Article 25(3)(b), 25(3)(c) and 
25(3)(d).80 Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang,  the OTP’s DCC 
contained mainly principal liability, meaning allegations of indirect co-
perpetration pursuant to Article 25(3)(a).81 Invoking Regulation 55, the 
Trial Chamber V(A) expanded this notion to also include accessory liabil-
ity under Article 25(3)(b), 25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d) for Ruto.82 
In Prosecutor v. Gbabgo, the Prosecutor had charged the former 
President of Ivory Coast with five modes of liability: principal liability 
(indirect co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a)), two accessory liability 
                                                   
78 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Prosecutor v. Kenyat-
ta, Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda and Prosecutor v. Ruto. 
79 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 Jan-
uary 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, paras. 398–419 (‘Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Pre-
Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/4972c0). 
80 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, Prosecution’s Submissions on the law of indirect co-
perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute and application for notice to be given un-
der Regulation 55(2) with respect to the accused’s individual criminal responsibility, 3 July 
2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-444, para. 49 (‘Muthaura and Kenyatta Prosecution’s Submissions 
on the Law of Indirect Co-perpetration and Application for Notice’) (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/19dd29). 
81 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, 
ICC-01/09-01/11-373, paras. 283, 285 (‘Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/96c3c2). 
82 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber, Decision on Applications for Notice of Possibility of 
Variation of Legal Characterisation, 12 December 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-1122, p. 20 
(‘Ruto and Sang Trial Decision on Applications for Notice’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
49ec33). 
 
12. Investigations of Criminal Responsibility by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 661 
modes under Article 25(3)(b) and 25(3)(d), and two modes of superior and 
command responsibility under Article 28(a) and 28(b).83 Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I only confirmed liabilities based on Article 25(3) and otherwise dis-
missed any liability of superior and command responsibility (pursuant to 
Article 28(a) and 28(b)).84 Based on the OTP’s suggestion, Trial Chamber 
I re-characterised the alleged criminal responsibility to also include supe-
rior and command responsibility pursuant to Article 28(a) and 28(b) of the 
ICC Statute.85 
12.5. Review of All Investigations Which Resulted in Decisions After 
a Confirmation Hearing 
This section reviews the performance and consistency of the OTP in 
pleading and defending the modes of liability following an investigation 
which resulted in suspects appearing in front of a Pre-Trial Chamber at 
confirmation of charges hearings pursuant to Article 61. The presentation 
of 17 cases follows for each case a chronological approach, listing the 
mode(s) of liability the OTP advanced at the end of its investigation when 
it filed its application for an arrest warrant or summons to appear, compar-
ing these with the DCC and, if applicable, amended DCC. Further, the 
rulings of the Pre-Trial Chambers on the DCC and any Trial Chamber 
litigation regarding Regulation 55 is observed. If a Chamber issued a 
NCTA-decision and/or judgment, the mode(s) of liability confirmed or 
dismissed in these decisions are compared with the OTP’s initial positions 
on modes of liability. 
The presentation commences with cases resulting at least in Trial 
Chamber judgments. Then cases are presented which ended after a trial 
formally opened, meaning at least after the Prosecution had presented its 
                                                   
83 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, OTP, 
Version publique expurgée du Document amendé de notification des charges du 13 janvier 
2014, ICC-02/11-01/11-Conf-Anx2-Corr2, notifié le 20 janvier 2014, 3 February 2014, 
ICC-02/11-01/11-592-Anx2-Corr2-Red, paras. 211, 232–35 (‘Gbagbo OTP Amended 
DCC’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/5c5f60). 
84 Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, paras. 230, 241, 244, 251,  
259, 265, see above note 56. 
85 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Decision giving notice pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of 
the Regulations of the Court, 19 August 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15-185, para. 15.i), p. 11 
(‘Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Decision Giving Notice Pursuant to Regulation 55(2)’) 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/984739). 
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case. Then cases are presented which ended after confirmation had oc-
curred and before the trial opened due to the OTP withdrawing its case. 
Finally, cases are presented which ended at the Pre-Trial stage because the 
Pre-Trial Chamber could not confirm any charges. 
The focus of the presentation lies on detecting whether the Prosecu-
tion managed to defend the mode(s) of liability it had identified during 
and immediately after its investigation. 
12.5.1. Cases Ending with a Judgment 
12.5.1.1. Convictions 
In three cases, the Prosecutor succeeded in having the initially advanced 
modes of liability confirmed by the Trial Chamber by way of judgment 
convicting the accused. 
12.5.1.1.1. Lubanga, Co-Perpetrator 
Based on the OTP’s request, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant 
against Lubanga for (indirect) co-perpetration (Article 25(3)(a)).86 Con-
sistently the Prosecution’s DCC charged Lubanga with indirect co-
perpetration. 87  Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed co-perpetration liability 
under Article 25(3)(a).88 Finally, Trial Chamber I convicted Lubanga as 
co-perpetrator.89 The Appeals Chamber upheld this conviction, rejecting 
Lubanga’s appeal against co-perpetration.90 
12.5.1.1.2. Al Mahdi 
Following its investigation, the Prosecution requested an arrest warrant 
against Al Mahdi relying on three different modes of liability, namely co-
perpetration (Article 25(3)(a)), aiding and abetting or otherwise assisting 
                                                   
86 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant 
of arrest, Article 58, 10 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red, para. 96 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/af6679). 
87 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, OTP, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3)(a), 28 August 2006, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-356-Anx2, para. 20, 22, p. 24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/e2fa01). 
88 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 29 January 
2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, para. 410, p. 156 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/b7ac4f). 
89 Lubanga Trial Judgment, paras. 1351–52, 1354, 1358, see above note 21. 
90 Lubanga Appeals Judgment, paras. 473, 499, see above note 40. 
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(Article 25(3)(c)), and contributing in any other way (Article 25(3)(d)).91 
The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed these three modes.92 
The Prosecution then charged Al Mahdi with four modes of liability, 
including the new mode ‘soliciting or inducing’ (Article 25(3)(b)),93 and 
the judges confirmed the DCC accordingly.94 Particularly, the Prosecution 
charged him with being perpetrator and co-perpetrator, both pursuant to 
Article 25(3)(a).95 Following the accused’s admission of guilt, the Trial 
Chamber convicted him as direct co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 
25(3)(a). 96 Regarding the other modes of liability, Trial Chamber VIII 
referring to the Appeals Chamber, noted that 
the Statute differentiates between principal (Article 25(3)(a)) 
and accessorial (Article 25(3)(b) to (d)) liability, with princi-
pals bearing more blameworthiness ‘generally speaking and 
all other things being equal’. In accordance with this general 
rule, given that the Chamber has decided that all the ele-
ments of co-perpetration are met, there is no need to make 
any further findings on the accessorial liability alternatives.97 
12.5.1.1.3. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
The cases against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui resulted in a twofold out-
come. Trial Chamber II acquitted Ngudjolo Chui. Also, the OTP failed to 
                                                   
91 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, OTP, 
Requête urgente du Bureau du Procureur en vue de la délivrance d’un mandat d’arrêt à 
l’encontre d’Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 7 September 2015, ICC-01/12-31-US-Exp; ICC, 
Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre d’Ahmad AL FAQI AL MAHDI (Warrant of Arrest 
for Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi), 18 September 2015, ICC-01/12-01/15-1-Red, pp. 3, 6 (para. 
9), 8 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c5ea5e). 
92 Ibid. 
93 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, OTP, 
Chef d’accusation retenu par l’Accusation contre Ahmad AL FAQI AL MAHDI (Charge 
brought by the Prosecution against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi), 17 December 2015, ICC-
01/12-01/15-62, paras. 23–24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/a83616). 
94 Al Mahdi Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, paras. 2, 23–24, pp. 22 
(paras. 2–3), 26 (para. 23), 27 (para. 24), see above note 56. 
95 Ibid., para. 23. 
96 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Trial 
Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 27 September 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, paras. 55–
56, 59, 63 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/042397). 
97 Ibid., para. 58. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 664 
secure a conviction of Katanga as co-perpetrator which the OTP had ini-
tially advanced. Instead, the judges re-characterised his liability as princi-
pal down towards accessory liability and convicted Katanga on this basis. 
The OTP had initially applied for arrest warrants against Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui qualifying both as principals (co-perpetration, Article 
25(3)(a)) and, in the alternative, as accessories (ordering, Article 25(3)(b)), 
and the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued the warrants based on both alternative 
modes.98 
The OTP then submitted a DCC for both modes of liability and the 
Pre-Trial Chamber partially unanimously and partially by majority con-
firmed the principal liability as co-perpetrator through other persons.99 
Judge Ušacka dissented from the confirmation of counts six to nine, argu-
ing that the evidence presented by the Prosecution was insufficient to link 
the suspects to the commission of the crimes and further contesting Ka-
tanga’s knowledge of rape in one instance.100 The dissenting judge would 
have adjourned the confirmation hearing on these charges pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(c)(i).101 
Following the confirmation of the DCC and the Prosecution’s Pre-
Trial Brief, both advancing co-perpetration liability, 102 the trial against 
                                                   
98 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, OTP, Request for arrest warrant, 25 June 2007, ICC-
01/04-350-US-Exp; ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prose-
cutor v. Germain Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, 2 
July 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-1-tENG, pp. 5–6 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/4a8301); ICC, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 6 July 2007, ICC-
01/04-01/07-260-tENG, p. 6 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/d03d7a). 
99 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of 
charges, 30 September 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, paras. 574–76, pp. 210–12 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/67a9ec). 
100 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, in ibid., paras. 23, 27. 
101 Ibid., paras. 29, 36. 
102 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, OTP, Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief on the Interpretation 
of Article 25(3)(a), 19 October 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1541 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
76ec0a); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Ger-
main Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, OTP, Document Containing the Charges as 
Confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in accordance with the “Décision relative au dépôt 
d’un résumé des charges par le Procureur”, 28 October 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1568, para. 
60 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/47197f). 
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Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui opened in late November 2009. Both Katan-
ga and Ngudjolo Chui testified and after the presentation of evidence as 
well as closing statements, Trial Chamber II retreated into deliberations in 
May 2012. About half a year into the deliberations, the Trial Chamber II 
unanimously issued a decision severing the case of Ngudjolo Chui. 103 
Trial Chamber II acquitted Ngudjolo Chui because the judges could not 
determine that he was the leader of the Lendu combatants participating in 
the attack on Bogoro and his role “in no way allows the Chamber to ac-
cept or even contemplate the notion of indirect co-perpetration […] re-
gardless of how article 25(3)(a) of the Statute is construed”.104 
By contrast, in relation to Katanga, the majority of Trial Chamber II 
contemplated accessory liability, thereby re-characterising according to 
Regulation 55 the mode of responsibility to ‘contributing in another way 
to the commission of crimes’ pursuant to Article 25(3)(d)(ii).105 Relying 
on case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the majority of Trial 
Chamber II argued that re-characterisation would be mostly decided at the 
deliberation stage, and further noted that “deliberations on the Accused’s 
initial mode of liability under Article 25(3)(a) is already well under 
way”.106 Judge Van den Wyngaert dissented, arguing that the majority’s 
approach would go beyond the facts and circumstances described in the 
DCC, and would be otherwise unequal.107 
The Appeals Chamber observed that at the time of invocation of 
Regulation 55, the trial was still ongoing, meaning at the deliberations 
stage with no judgment having been rendered under Article 74.108 Regard-
                                                   
103 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 and 
Severing the Charges, paras. 59, 62, p. 30, see above note 9. 
104 Ngudjolo Chui Trial Judgment, para. 110, see above note 21. 
105 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 and 
Severing the Charges, para. 24–34, p. 29, see above note 9. Subsequently, the OTP submit-
ted the ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Ger-
main Katanga, OTP, Prosecution’s observations on Article 25(3)(d), 8 April 2013, ICC-
01/04-01/07-3367 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/e903e4). 
106 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 and 
Severing the Charges, paras. 16, 18–19, see above note 9. 
107 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, in ibid., pp. 11, 21 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/b0367a). 
108 Katanga Appeals Judgment on the Implementation of Regulation 55 and Severing the 
Charges, paras. 17, 23, see above note 58; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, in 
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ing the Defence’s ground of appeal that the contemplated change in legal 
characterisation of the facts would exceed the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges, the majority of the Appeals Chamber observed 
that 
[a]ny change from, for example, being alleged to be a princi-
pal to being alleged to have in fact been an accessory will 
always necessarily involve a change in the characterisation 
of the role. Were such a change not be permissible, it would 
defeat the purpose of regulation 55 […]. The Trial Chamber 
would be constrained exclusively to using the precise charac-
terisations established by the Pre-Trial Chamber at a much 
earlier stage of the proceedings and with a necessarily more 
restricted view of the case as a whole.109 
Judge Tarfusser argued in his dissent that Regulation 55 should only 
apply to a shift from liability in Article 25 to Article 28, and vice versa.110 
He further argued that any “possible legal re-characterisation must be as 
specific and precise as feasible as to both legal and factual boundaries” 
and failing that in the present case “it is not clear what meaningful sub-
missions could now be made by Mr. Katanga”.111 
Following the Appeals Chamber’s majority upholding the invoca-
tion of Regulation 55, the Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution has 
not established that Katanga committed the crimes as a co-perpetrator, and 
modified the legal characterisation from indirect co-perpetration to Ka-
tanga contributing in any other way to the commission of a crime by a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose pursuant to Article 
23(3)(d), and convicted the accused accordingly.112 
                                                                                                                        
ibid., para. 2 (‘Tarfusser Dissenting Opinion in Katanga Appeals Judgment on the Imple-
mentation of Regulation 55 and Severing the Charges’). 
109 Katanga Appeals Judgment on the Implementation of Regulation 55 and Severing the 
Charges, para. 57, see above note 58. 
110 Tarfusser Dissenting Opinion in Katanga Appeals Judgment on the Implementation of 
Regulation 55 and Severing the Charges, sect. II.B., see above note 58. 
111 Ibid., para. 25. 
112 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74, 7 March 2014, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3436-tENG, paras. 1383–421, 1596–619, pp. 658–59, annexes (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
f74b4f). 
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12.5.1.1.4. Ntaganda 
While two arrest warrant applications only contained one mode of liability, 
the Prosecution charged Ntaganda in the DCC with at least four different 
modes of liability, including under Article 25(3)(a). Based on this provi-
sion, the Trial Chamber convicted Ntaganda for several modes of liability 
(direct perpetration, direct and indirect co-perpetration) and did not en-
gage in further findings based on the other modes of liability charged. 
In January 2006, the Prosecution requested issuance of an arrest 
warrant against Ntaganda which Pre-Trial Chamber I issued based on Ar-
ticle 25(3)(a) liability.113 In May 2012, the Prosecution using the phrase 
“without excluding any other applicable mode of liability” again, quali-
fied Ntaganda as co-perpetrator, requesting an arrest warrant which Pre-
Trial Chamber II issued, considering him as indirect co-perpetrator.114 The 
DCC and its updated version both contained this same mode of liability in 
the variants direct perpetrator, direct and indirect co-perpetrator.115 Further, 
the Prosecution added three alternative liabilities, namely ordering and 
inducting (Article 25(3)(b)), contributing to commission of crimes by a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose (Article 25(3)(d)) and 
command responsibility (Article 28(a)). 116  Pre-Trial Chamber II found 
substantial grounds that Ntaganda pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) acted as 
                                                   
113 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest, 22 August 2006, ICC-01/04-02/06-2-tENG, pp. 2, 
4 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/e73e38); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest, 7 March 
2007, ICC-01/04-02/06-2-Corr-tENG-Red, p. 4 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/2547da). 
114 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, 13 July 
2012, ICC-01/04-02/06-36-Red, paras. 5, 62, 66, 68, 70, 72–73, 75, 78, 82, 83, pp. 9, 20 
(para. 44), 21, 36 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/18c310). 
115 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, OTP, Prosecution request for notice to be given of a possible re-characterisation pursu-
ant to regulation 55(2), 9 March 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-501, para. 3 (‘Ntaganda OTP Re-
quest for Notice’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/9032ca). 
116 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, OTP, Document Containing the Charges, 10 January 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-203-
AnxA, paras. 111, 133, 147, pp. 36–49, 56–60 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/9aa3d9); ICC, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 
OTP, Updated Document Containing the Charges, 14 November 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-
402-AnxA, paras. 111, 133, 147 and pp. 60–65 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c1913a). 
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direct perpetrator 117  and indirect co-perpetrator, pursuant to Article 
25(3)(b) ordered and induced, pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) contributed to 
the commission of crimes by a group acting with common purpose and 
pursuant to Article 28(a) acted as a military commander and thus con-
firmed the updated DCC.118 
Trial Chamber VI ordered the Prosecution to produce an updated 
version which reflected the confirmation decision.119 Before the trial be-
gan, the Prosecution suggested the Trial Chamber may reclassify the 
charges to add direct co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) “for all 
counts”.120 The Trial Chamber did not react. 
The Trial Chamber convicted Ntaganda under Article 25(3)(a) as di-
rect perpetrator,121 as indirect perpetrator and as indirect co-perpetrator 
(Article 25(3)(a)).122 The Chamber observed: 
a person’s conduct may be capable of satisfying elements of 
one or more modes of liability [and] does not find it appro-
priate or necessary, having found Mr Ntaganda’s principal li-
ability to have been established for each of the counts 
charge[d], to reach any further finding on the remaining lia-
bility alternatives.123 
Ntaganda issued a notice of appeal, challenging the Trial Chamber 
findings on indirect co-perpetration as flawed and further elaborated his 
                                                   
117 The judges confirmed the proposed mode direct perpetration for counts 1–3, 10–11 and 
15–17, but not in relation to count 12. Ntaganda OTP Request for Notice, text accompany-
ing fn. 7, see above note 115. 
118 Ntaganda Pre-Trial Decision on the Charges, para. 97, see above note 56. 
119 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, Trial Chamber, Order instructing the Prosecution to prepare an updated document con-
taining the charges, 30 October 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-390, para. 7 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/550454). 
120 Ntaganda OTP Request for Notice, para. 1, see above note 115. 
121 For counts 1, 2 and 10, see ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 8 July 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-
2359, pp. 535, 537 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/80578a). 
122 Ibid., para. 11, pp. 535–38. 
123 Ibid., para. 1200. 
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argument in grounds 13 to 15 of his Appeal.124 At the time of writing, the 
Appeals Chamber had not issued its judgment yet. 
12.5.1.2. Acquittals 
The acquittal of Ngudjolo Chui was covered in the previous section al-
ready. Further, the Bemba case demonstrates flaws in the Prosecution case: 
the evidence generated during the investigation had led the OTP to charge 
the suspect with principal liability, as co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 
25(3)(a). This was the liability with which the Prosecution categorised 
Bemba in its application for an arrest warrant and the DCC.125 The Pre-
Trial Chamber then adjourned the confirmation proceedings, ordering the 
Prosecution to consider superior responsibility under Article 28. The 
Prosecution complied and the Trial Chamber convicted under this mode in 
the trial judgment. This conviction did not stand on appeal where the ma-
jority of the Appeals Chamber reversed it and acquitted Bemba. 
Following the Prosecution’s request, Pre-Trial Chamber III con-
firmed the arrest warrant alleging indirect co-perpetration of Bemba 
“jointly with another person or through other persons under article 
25(3)”.126 The Prosecution inserted this same liability in its initial and 
amended DCC,127 adding that the Prosecutor does not exclude “any other 
                                                   
124 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, Defence, Mr. Ntaganda’s Notice of Appeal against the Judgment pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, 9 September 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-2396, ground 
13 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/a7d68d). In essence, it is alleged that Ntaganda was held lia-
ble on the basis of a common plan for which he was not charged and for which no direct 
evidence would exist (ibid., p. 14). Otherwise, the Defence contests certain elements of the 
mens rea of Ntaganda (ibid., grounds 14–15). 
125 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 23 May 
2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-1-tENG-Corr, para. 21 (‘Warrant of Arrest for Bemba’) (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/fb0728); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecu-
tor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, OTP, Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58, 
9 May 2008, ICC‐01/05‐01/08-26-Red (https://legal-tools.org/doc/a57940). 
126 Warrant of Arrest for Bemba, paras. 4, 21, see above note 125. 
127 Bemba OTP DCC, para. 56, see above note 49; Bemba OTP Amended DCC, para. 57, see 
above note 49; ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, OTP, Prosecution’s Written Submission Regarding the Confirma-
tion Hearing Held on 12–15 January 2009, 26 January 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-377, para. 5 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/7f299d). 
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applicable mode of liability” beside Article 25(3)(a).128 During the con-
firmation hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber III observed the parties and partici-
pants had referred implicitly or explicitly to Article 28 and gained the 
impression “that the legal characterisation of the facts of the case may 
amount to a different mode of liability under article 28 of the Statute”.129 
Adjourning the confirmation hearing, the judges requested the OTP to 
submit an amended DCC “containing the charges addressing article 28 of 
the Statute as a possible mode of criminal liability”.130 
After the resumption of the confirmation hearing, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber III dismissed the liability as co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 25(3)(a), 
Article 28(b) and partially confirmed his liability for superior responsibil-
ity pursuant to Article 28(a).131 Specifically, the Pre-Trial Chamber con-
cluded that substantial grounds existed that Bemba acted with dolus direc-
tus 2, meaning the evidence clearly indicated that Bemba was ‘aware’ of 
the occurrence of certain crimes.132 The dismissal of principal liability as 
co-perpetrator combined with confirmation of charges of command re-
sponsibility meant that the Prosecution now had to argue its case at trial 
with a new and rather complex mode of liability. The Pre-Trial judges’ 
decision set aside Article 25(3)(a) and the Prosecution’s initial assessment 
following its own investigation. 
Five weeks after the Defence had opened its case, Trial Chamber III 
gave notice pursuant to Regulation 55: though command responsibility 
under Article 28(a)(i) was still the only mode of liability envisaged, the 
judges hinted they may re-characterise the mens rea of ‘awareness’ to the 
alternate form of “owing to the circumstances at the time should have 
known”.133 In its trial judgment, the Chamber found that Bemba ‘knew’ 
                                                   
128 Bemba OTP DCC, para. 56, see above note 49; Bemba OTP Amended DCC, para. 57, see 
above note 49; Bemba Pre-Trial Decision Adjourning the Hearing, para. 4, see above note 
50. 
129 Ibid., paras. 46, 48. 
130 Ibid., para. 49. 
131 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute and the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 
2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, para. 344, pp. 184 (letters b)–d)), 185 (letter d)) (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/07965c). 
132 Ibid., paras. 478, 485–89. 
133 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Trial Chamber, Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal 
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forces under his command were committing or about to commit crimes134 
and argued it was therefore unnecessary to consider that re-
characterisation of the charges pursuant to Regulation 55 to include the 
‘should have known’ mental element is warranted.135 Accordingly, Trial 
Chamber III convicted Bemba under Article 28(a) in the awareness vari-
ant.136 However, the majority of the Appeals Chamber held that the third 
element of command responsibility, namely that Bemba failed to take 
reasonable measures, was not properly established and reversed Bemba’s 
conviction.137 Addressing the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber empha-
sised it being axiomatic that an accused person be informed promptly and 
in detail of the nature, cause and content of a charge, meaning prior to the 
start of trial. The judges emphasised that Bemba had suffered prejudice as 
the OTP’s second DCC did not specifically identify the redeployment of 
troops as a necessary and reasonable measure which Bemba should have 
taken.138 The Presiding Judge pointed out that Pre-Trial Chambers face 
challenges because the “Prosecution was not fully prepared when it initi-
ated confirmation proceedings”.139 
12.5.1.3. Cases Awaiting Judgment 
Responding to the OTP’s application, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued in 
2005 an arrest warrant against Ongwen for ordering (Article 25(3)(b)) 
certain crimes.140 About 10 years later, the OTP submitted its DCC, charg-
ing Ongwen with 70 counts, again referring to the liability of ordering; 
                                                                                                                        
characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) 
of the Regulations of the Court, 21 September 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08-2324, para. 5 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/248406). 
134 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, para. 717 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/edb0cf). 
135 Ibid., paras. 196, 718. 
136 Ibid., para. 752. 
137 Bemba Appeals Judgment, para. 194, see above note 3. 
138 Ibid., paras. 187–88. 
139 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Appeals Chamber, Separate Opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge 
Howard Morrison, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2, para. 28 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/c13ef4). 
140 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, War-
rant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen, 8 July 2005, ICC-02/04-01/15-6, para. 30, pp. 9–10 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/8bf236). 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 672 
alternatively, the OTP charged Ongwen as indirect perpetrator and indirect 
co-perpetrator (Article 25(3)(a)), as in any other way contributing to the 
commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common pur-
pose (Article 25(3)(d)) and for command responsibility (Article 28(a)).141 
In its pre-confirmation brief, the Prosecution stated: 
When multiple legal characterisations of the same facts are 
established by the evidence, it is appropriate that the charges 
be confirmed with all of the various modes of liability avail-
able, in order for the Trial Chamber to determine whether 
any of those legal characterisations is established to the ap-
plicable standard of proof at trial.142 
Pre-Trial Chamber II found substantial grounds to believe that 
Dominic Ongwen committed certain crimes jointly with others and 
through others (Article 25(3)(a)); alternatively, it qualified Ongwen’s con-
tribution to certain crimes may be legally qualified under Articles 25(3)(b), 
25(3)(d)(i) and 25(3)(d)(ii).143 Alternatively, the judges confirmed Ong-
wen’s liability under command responsibility (Article 28(a)).144 
However, Judge Perrin de Brichambaut criticised that, apart from 
counts 50 to 61, in its reasoning, Pre-Trial Chamber II only referred to a 
small amount of evidence in support of Ongwen’s five to six modes of 
liability regarding attacks on certain camps and to no evidence regarding 
the attack on Pajule camp.145 The judge wrote that as 
regards the other modes of liability, the decision fails to 
demonstrate how each constituent element of the mode of li-
ability charged can be proved on the available evidence. For 
the mode of liability under article 28(a) of the Statute, the 
Chamber […] restricts itself to a very general reference to 
                                                   
141 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, OTP, Document Contain-
ing the Charges, 22 December 2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-375-AnxA-Red, paras. 9–13, pp. 
12–14, 18–21, 25–28, 32–34, 43–48 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/1fd4ed). 
142 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, OTP, Pre-confirmation 
brief, 21st December 2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-375-Conf-AnxC, 15 February 2016, ICC-
02/04-01/15-375-AnxC-Red, para. 5 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/5b9cce). 
143 Ongwen Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 145, pp. 76–77, 80–81, 
84–85, 88–89, 97–99, 101–03, see above note 59. 
144 Ibid., para. 149, pp. 76–77, 80–81, 84–85, 88–89, 97–99, 101–03. 
145 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Sepa-
rate opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, 23 March 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15-422-
Anx-tENG, paras. 23–24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/a84fed). 
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the available evidence, without specifying any testimony or 
any other evidence that would enable the constituent ele-
ments of command responsibility to be established. It would 
have been desirable for the Chamber’s decision to have spec-
ified, for each mode of liability, the evidence relied on in 
support of each constitutive element of a given mode of lia-
bility. That would have involved a great deal of work, given 
the Prosecution’s aim to have 70 charges taken into consid-
eration according to six modes of liability. By circumventing 
that systematic analysis, the Chamber has undermined its de-
cision and failed to hold the Prosecution to account for its 
highly ambitious goal.146 
The trial against Ongwen commenced in December 2016 and the 
Prosecution closed its case in April 2018. Before the Defence opened its 
case in September 2018, it requested leave to file a NCTA-motion, ad-
vancing reasons similar to the ones expressed in Judge Perrin de 
Brichambaut’s separate opinion, namely the Pre-Trial Chamber’s duty to 
set out, clearly and precisely, definitions and supplement each definition 
with succinct description of the main evidence it considers relevant to 
make out each of the modes of liability ascribed to the accused.147 The 
Defence complained about the “voluminous number of modes of liability”, 
emphasising the need to “streamline the proceedings by weeding out un-
necessary charges and modes of liability that Mr Ongwen need not defend 
against” because “with such a multitude of crimes and modes of liability 
charged, a NCTA-motion will guard against violations of Mr Ongwen’s 
right not to be compelled to testify and to remain silent”.148 
The Trial Chamber stated: “when the same acts and conduct of an 
accused are charged under alternative modes of liability, the additional 
burden on the defence would typically stem from longer legal submis-
sions at the end of trial rather than from having a larger ‘case to answer’. 
Noting that the confirmed charges in this case rely extensively on alterna-
tive modes of liability and characterise discrete incidents under a variety 
of crimes, the Chamber does not consider that the number of charges and 
                                                   
146 Ibid., paras. 25–26. 
147 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Defence, Defence Request 
for Leave to File a No Case to Answer Motion and Application for Judgment of Acquittal, 
5 July 2018, ICC-02/04-01/15-1300, para. 23 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/36e8de). 
148 Ibid., paras. 21, 26. 
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modes of liability lend any greater impetus to pursue a NCTA procedure”. 
It denied the request.149 
During its own case, the Defence then filed a motion alleging de-
fects in the pleading of the modes of liability, but this claim was dismissed 
by Trial and the Appeals Chamber as untimely without any sufficient jus-
tification, including no exceptional circumstances for its late timing.150 
12.5.2. Cases Ending at the NCTA Stage 
Two cases, against Gbagbo and Blé Goudé and Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, 
ended at the NCTA stage, resulting in acquittals of four accused persons. 
12.5.2.1. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
In its arrest warrant applications, the OTP considered Gbagboand Blé 
Goudé as indirect co-perpetrators pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) and the Pre-
Trial Chamber III issued two warrant of arrest based on this liability.151 
In its DCC’s, the Prosecutor expanded the modes of liabilities 
against both men: it charged Blé Goudé in the alternative with four modes 
of liabilities under Article 25(3), namely with indirect co-perpetration 
(Article 25(3)(a)), ordering, soliciting and inducing (Article 25(3)(b)), 
                                                   
149 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Trial Chamber, Decision 
on Defence Request for Leave to File a No Case to Answer Motion, 18 July 2018, ICC-
02/04-01/15-1309, para. 14, p. 8 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/90bb4d). 
150 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Defence, Defence Motion 
on Defects in the Confirmation of Charges Decision: Defects in the Modes of Liability 
(Part II of the Defects Series), 1 February 2019, ICC-02/04-01/15-1431, paras. 8–12, 19–
31 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/c69922); ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dom-
inic Ongwen, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Motions Alleging Defects in the Con-
firmation Decision, 7 March 2019, ICC-02/04-01/15-1476, paras. 14, 24–30, 36 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/30688a); ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ong-
wen, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Dominic Ongwen against Trial 
Chamber IX’s ‘Decision on Defence Motions Alleging Defects in the Confirmation Deci-
sion’, 17 July 2019, ICC-02/04-01/15-1562, paras. 142, 146–53, 163.ii), 163.iv), 163.vi)–
163.vii) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/56a5cc); at ibid., para. 146: “Mr Ongwen did not ad-
vance any reasonable justification for raising challenges to the Confirmation Decision be-
fore the Trial Chamber more than three years after that decision was issued and after the 
Prosecutor presented her case at trial”. 
151 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for 
Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, 23 November 2011, ICC-02/11-26, para. 10, p. 7 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/12e4cc); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. 
Charles Blé Goudé, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of Arrest for Charles Blé Goudé, 21 De-
cember 2011, ICC-02/11-02/11-1, paras. 2, 9, p. 8 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/de90c7). 
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aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting (Article 25(3)(c)), and contributing 
in any other way (Article 25(3)(d)).152 The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed 
all these modes of liability.153 The Prosecutor charged Gbagbo with five 
modes of liability in the alternative: principal liability of indirect co-
perpetration under Article 25(3)(a), two accessory liability modes under 
Article 25(3)(b) and 25(3)(d) and two modes of superior and command 
responsibility under Article 28(a) and 28(b).154  
In the course of Gbagbo’s confirmation hearing, the majority of Pre-
Trial Chamber I emphasised the Appeals Chambers jurisprudence that an 
investigation should be “largely completed” at the confirmation hearing 
stage.155 Addressed to the OTP, the judges considered the Prosecutor’s 
evidence, viewed as a whole, as apparently insufficient, but emphasised 
that “when the evidence is insufficient”, it does not need to reject the 
charges, but may adjourn the hearing to request the Prosecutor to provide 
further evidence.156 The majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I then requested 
the Prosecution to consider providing further evidence or conducting fur-
                                                   
152 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, 
OTP, Version corrigée du Document de notification des charges, 22 août 2014, ICC-02/11-
02/11-124-Anx1, 27 August 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-124-Anx1-Corr, pp. 125–27 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/006258); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecu-
tor v. Charles Blé Goudé, OTP, Version publique expurgée de la Version corrigée du Doc-
ument de notification des charges, 27 août 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-124-Conf-Anx2-Corr, 
10 December 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-124-Anx2-Corr-Red, pp. 226–28 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/a4d02e). 
153 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé, 11 
December 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-186, paras. 158, 166, 171, 181 (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/0536d5). 
154 Gbagbo OTP Amended DCC, paras. 211, 232–35, see above note 83. 
155 Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision Adjourning the Hearing, para. 25, see above note 75, referring 
to ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Mbarushimana, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirma-
tion of charges”, 30 May 2012, ICC-01/04-01/10-514, para. 44 (‘Mbarushimana Appeals 
Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber of 16 
December 2011’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/6ead30). Critical regarding the interpretation 
of the Appeals Chamber’s ruling in Mbarushimana is Judge Eboe-Osuji. ICC, Situation in 
the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial Chamber, Corri-
gendum of Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, 2 May 2013, ICC-01/09-
02/11-728-Anx3-Corr2-Red, paras. 89–90 (‘Kenyatta Trial Concurring Separate Opinion 
of Judge Eboe-Osuji’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/d1cf87). 
156 Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision Adjourning the Hearing, paras. 15, 37, see above note 75. 
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ther investigation with respect to six issues, three of them relating to the 
mode of liability presented by the OTP in its DCC.157 The majority further 
ordered the OTP to provide within about five months’ time a new amend-
ed DCC. 158  Judge Fernández de Gurmendi dissented, arguing that the 
request to the Prosecutor relating to issues or questions to answer would 
be,  as well as the request for an amended DCC, ultra vires.159 She also 
criticised to “allocate more time to the Prosecutor to adapt […] comes 
rather late in the process”.160 
Finally, the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed three alter-
native modes of liability for Gbago, each based on Article 25(3), but dis-
missed his liability based on superior responsibility. 161  Judge van den 
Wyngaert dissented, arguing that the evidence presented by the OTP on 
the three modes of liability confirmed by the majority would in her view 
be “still insufficient” and would thus fall “below the threshold of article 
61(7)”.162 
After the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I had confirmed three al-
ternative modes of liability and when Trial Chamber I was seized with 
case, the OTP suggested that the new judges give notice to the defence 
before the start of trial that the legal characterisation of the three con-
firmed modes of liability could change in order to also include liability 
under Article 28 against Gbagbo.163 Five months before the trial began, 
                                                   
157 Ibid., para. 44.1.–44.3. (emphasis added). 
158 Ibid., p. 23 (letter (ix)). 
159 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Dissenting opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, 3 June 2013, 
ICC-02/11-01/11-432-Anx-Corr, para. 5 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/9a3b94). The judge ar-
gues: 
[a]n expansive interpretation of the Pre-Trial Chambers role is not only unsupported by 
law. It affects the entire architecture of the procedural system of the Court […] en-
croach upon functions of the trial Judges, generate duplications, and end up frustrating 
the judicial efficiency that Pre-Trial Chambers are called to ensure. 
Ibid., para. 26. 
160 Ibid., para. 8. 
161 Gbagbo Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, paras. 230, 241, 244, 251,  
259, 265, see above note 56. 
162 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 12 June 2014, 
ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Anx, paras. 1, 4–8 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f715a5). 
163 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, OTP, Prosecution request for notice to be given of a possible re-
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the judges gave pursuant to Regulation 55 notice about a possible reclassi-
fication of the liability to Article 28(a) and 28(b) and ordered the OTP to 
file an amended Pre-Trial Brief, identifying the facts and circumstances 
relating to this added liability. 164  An Appeal of the Gbagbo defence 
against this reclassification decision was dismissed by the Appeals Cham-
ber five weeks before trial commenced.165  
Following a two years long Prosecution case, Trial Chamber I or-
dered the parties to file mid-term briefs. The Prosecutor argued that all 
initially charged modes of liability, namely four of Blé Goudé and five 
including superior and command responsibility of Gbagbo, were prov-
en.166 
However, the majority of Trial Chamber I confirmed that there was 
no case to answer for Gbagbo and Blé Goudé and thereby acquitted both 
men. The majority found that 
there is no need for the defence to submit further evidence as 
the Prosecutor has not satisfied the burden of proof in rela-
tion to several core constitutive elements of the crimes as 
charged. In particular, the majority finds that the Prosecutor 
(i) [h]as failed to demonstrate that there was a “common 
plan” to keep Mr Gbagbo in power, which included the 
commission of crimes against civilians; 
[…] 
(iv) [h]as failed to demonstrate that public speeches by Mr 
Gbagbo or Mr Blé Goudé constituted ordering, solicit-
ing or inducing that alleged crimes or that either of the 
                                                                                                                        
characterisation pursuant to regulation 55(2), 24 April 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15-43, para. 38 
(https://legal-tools.org/doc/07167e). 
164 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Decision Giving Notice Pursuant to Regulation 55(2), para. 
15(i), p. 11, see above note 85. 
165 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Laurent Gbagbo 
against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision giving notice pursuant to Regu-
lation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”, 18 December 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15-369, 
paras. 57, 73 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f08152). 
166 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, OTP, Public Redacted Version of “Corrected version to Annex 1 of 
Prosecution’s Mid-Trial Brief”, 19 March 2018, ICC-02/11-01/15-1136-Conf-Anx1-Corr, 
29 March 2018, ICC-02/11-01/15-1136-Anx1-Corr-Red, pp. 178–255 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/b25eea). 
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accused otherwise knowingly or intentionally contribut-
ed to the commission of such crimes.167 
Judge Tarfusser observed “shortcomings affecting the performance 
of the OTP, both at the investigative and at the prosecutorial stage”.168 
Judge Herrera Carbuccia dissented, finding sufficient evidence upon 
which a chamber could convict so that the defence should have presented 
its case. 169  She held a reasonable Trial Chamber could conclude that 
Gbagbo was liable pursuant to Article 28(a) and Blé Goudé for inducing 
and soliciting (Article 25(3)(b)) for certain crimes.170 
12.5.2.2. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang 
The case against Kosgey was not confirmed. Against Ruto and Sang the 
DCC was confirmed and trial opened, but it ended without conviction 
after the Defence’s NCTA-motion was upheld by the Trial Chamber. 
In mid-December 2010, the OTP requested Pre-Trial Chamber II to 
issue a summons to appear against Ruto, Kosgey and Sang as principals, 
referring inconsistently to direct or indirect co‐perpetration under Articles 
25(3)(a) or just to co-perpetration.171 Further, in the alternative, the Prose-
cution alleged against all men accessory liability, namely contributing ‘in 
any other way’ to a common purpose under Article 25(3)(d).172 Pre-Trial 
Chamber II found reasonable grounds to qualify Ruto and Kosgey as indi-
rect co-perpetrators, but explicitly dismissed this form of liability for Sang 
                                                   
167 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Reasons for Oral Decision, para. 28, see above note 45. 
168 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 16 July 2019, ICC-
02/11-01/15-1263-AnxA, para. 90 (‘Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Opinion of Judge Cuno 
Tarfusser’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f6c6f3). 
169 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion to the Chamber’s Oral Decision of 
15 January 2019, 15 January 2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1234, para. 48 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/bd0ffc); Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Dissenting Opinion Judge Herrera Carbuc-
cia, para. 648, see above note 62. 
170 Ibid., paras. 557, 646. 
171 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang OTP Article 58 Application, para. 27, sect. F, counts 1–4, see 
above note 52. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
for Summons to Appear, paras. 35–36, see above note 55. 
172 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang OTP Article 58 Application, para. 27, sect. F, counts 1–4, see 
above note 52. 
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against whom the judges found reasonable grounds to qualify him as an 
accessory pursuant to Article 25(3)(d).173 
In August 2011, the Prosecution filed its DCC and, later, an amend-
ed version.174 Regarding the way the OTP had pleaded the mode of liabil-
ity, the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber II observed: 
In paragraph 98 of the amended DCC, the Prosecutor alleges 
that Mr. Ruto and Mr. Kosgey are criminally responsible as 
‘co-perpetrators’ pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) […]. Later, in 
presenting its charges in paragraphs 133 and in particular in 
counts 1, 3 and 5, the Prosecutor avers that Mr. Ruto and Mr. 
Kosgey “committed or contributed […] in violation of Arti-
cle […] 25(3)(a)”. The same holds true in relation to counts 
2, 4 and 6 concerning Mr. Sang where the Prosecutor charges 
him under Article 25(3)(d) […], but still claims in these 
counts that Mr. Sang, “as part of a group of persons, includ-
ing [Mr. Ruto and Mr. Kosgey], acting with a common pur-
pose, committed or contributed to the crimes”.175 
Recalling its earlier decision on summonses to appear in this case, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber continued that: 
although such inconsistency or lack of precision may raise 
an issue of deficiency of the amended DCC, the Prosecutor’s 
clarification that the two suspects are charged under article 
25(3)(a) […] by way of presenting the elements of underly-
ing indirect co-perpetration cures the apparent inconsistency. 
The same reasoning applies to the situation of Mr. Sang 
since the Prosecutor actually developed the legal elements of 
article 25(3)(d).176 
                                                   
173 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons 
to Appear, paras. 37–38, 57, see above note 55. 
174 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, OTP, Prosecution’s Document Containing the 
Charges and List of Evidence submitted pursuant to Article 61(3) and Rule 121(3), 1 Au-
gust 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-242 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/209a4b); ICC, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang, OTP, Document Containing the Charges, 15 August 2011, ICC-01/09-
01/11-261-AnxA (https://legal-tools.org/doc/0e74d7). 
175 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 283, see 
above note 81. 
176 Ibid., para. 285. 
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Regarding the modes of liability proposed by the Prosecution in its 
amended DCC, the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the prin-
cipal liability of Ruto as indirect co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 
25(3)(a)177 and accessory liability of Sang as intentionally contributing to 
a crime of others led by Ruto, acting with common purpose pursuant to 
Article 25(3)(d)(i).178 
However, the judges declined to confirm any charges and any mode 
of criminal liability against Mr. Kosgey.179 The judges based their refusal 
to confirm the charges on the fact that the OTP had only presented one 
uncorroborated and anonymous witness to detail the liability of Kosgey 
and otherwise alleged the suspects’ presence at four meetings planning the 
post-election violence, but had then out of security reasons chosen to re-
dact the dates of these meetings and revealed two of the withheld dates to 
the defence late, meaning only in its final written observations.180 The 
judges ruled: 
in view of the prejudice experienced by the Defence, the 
Chamber finds that the Prosecutor has not met the eviden-
tiary standard required at this stage of the proceedings. It fol-
lows that the Chamber needs neither to engage with the De-
fence challenges related to Mr. Kosgey’s involvement, nor to 
proceed with an examination of the elements concerning his 
alleged criminal responsibility as provided in the Amended 
DCC.181 
As a result, from the three suspects whom the OTP had in its appli-
cation for a summons to appear qualified as principals, meaning as ‘co-
perpetrators’, the Pre-Trial Chamber only confirmed Ruto as indirect co-
perpetrator and downgraded Sang to accessory liability according to Arti-
cle 25(3)(d)(i) and otherwise refused to confirm any (liability) charges 
against Kosgey. 
About six months later, the OTP even suggested the Trial Chamber 
to make use of Regulation 55, thereby effectively also downgrading Ruto, 
                                                   
177 Ibid., paras. 299, 301–49. 
178 Ibid., paras. 353, 355–364, 366–67. 
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180 Ibid., paras. 293–95. 
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the only accused charged with responsibility as a principal, to liability of 
an accessory.182 The Prosecution argued for the first time that: 
Ruto’s criminal acts lend themselves to multiple legal char-
acterizations. This is a function of the nature of the accused’s 
conduct during the P[ost] E[lection] V[iolence] which be-
cause of its various aspects may be characterized any of the 
modes of liability encompassed by Article 25(3).183 
Though the Prosecution had already submitted its DCC and amend-
ed DCC, it then argued: 
even if providing notice under Regulation 55(2) could some-
how be equated to alternative charging – and it cannot – 
nothing in the Court’s legal framework prevents the consid-
eration of alternative modes of liability. On the contrary, […] 
Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed that “the Prosecutor may 
generally charge in the alternative”; the inclusion of Regula-
tion 55 in the Court’s legal framework demonstrates that al-
ternative legal characterizations may be considered where 
appropriate on the facts of the case.184 
Before the trial began, the Prosecution asked the Trial Chamber to 
provide notice under Regulation 55(2) that Ruto’s form of individual 
criminal responsibility charged may be subject to legal re-characterisation 
under Articles 25(3)(b), 25(3)(c) or 25(3)(d) before or on the first day of 
trial. 
So instead of using the formal procedure of amending the amended 
DCC under Article 61(9), the OTP asked the Trial Chamber to provide a 
legal notice based on Regulation 55. The requested downgrading of Ru-
to’s liability as a principal to mere accessory liability occurred without 
any evidence having been led. In other words, after having completed its 
investigation, having issued two amended DCC’s and after leading some 
evidence in the confirmation hearing, only then the OTP must have real-
                                                   
182 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, OTP, Prosecution’s Submissions on the law of indirect co-perpetration 
under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute and application for notice to be given under Regula-
tion 55 with respect to William Samoei Ruto’s individual criminal responsibility, 3 July 
2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-433, paras. 24, 49 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/d90763). 
183 Ibid., para. 38. 
184 Ibid., para. 44. 
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ised during its trial preparations that it should have charged Ruto’s liabil-
ity in the alternative, referring to almost all liabilities Article 25(3) offers. 
Three months into the Prosecution’s case, Trial Chamber V issued 
notice to Ruto that the possibility existed to re-characterise his liability to 
Articles 25(3)(b), 25(3)(c) or 25(3)(d).185 
16 months later and responding to a Defence request for NCTA, the 
majority of Trial Chamber V declared a mistrial, vacated the charges and 
discharged Ruto and Sang after the Prosecution had led its case.186 Decid-
ing on the defence’s no-case to answer motion, Judge Fremr wrote: 
[i]n relation to Mr Ruto, I have found insufficient evidence 
to support a possible conviction for ordering any of the 
crimes […] [or] on the basis of soliciting or inducing the 
commission of any of the crimes charged under Article 
25(3)(b).187 
Fremr continued that regarding Article 25(3)(c) liability, 
none of the alleged contributions, such as the obtaining of 
weapons, organisation of transport, distribution of food, etc., 
for which there is evidence in the record, can be sufficiently 
clearly linked to the alleged Network. The same is true with 
regard to Mr Ruto’s alleged personal contributions. Equally 
importantly, even if certain alleged contributions could be 
linked to Mr Ruto, there is insufficient evidence to show that 
any such contributions were made ‘for the purpose of facili-
tating the commission’ of one of the charged crimes.188 
Equally, “the available evidence would not allow a reasonable Trial 
Chamber to find that there was a common plan to commit the charged 
crimes, it is not possible to re-characterise under Article 25(3)(d)”. 189 
Judge Fremr also denied responsibility for Mr. Sang under Articles 
25(3)(b) or 25(3)(c).190 Judge Fremr concluded that “the available evi-
                                                   
185 Ruto and Sang Trial Decision on Applications for Notice, p. 20, see above note 82. 
186 Ruto and Sang Trial Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, paras. 
464.i.–464.ii., see above note 46. 
187 Reasons of Judge Fremr, in ibid., paras. 133–34. 
188 Ibid., para. 136. 
189 Ibid., para. 137. 
190 Ibid., para. 138. 
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dence does not sufficiently support any of the alternative forms of crimi-
nal responsibility to warrant the continuation of the trial on this basis”.191 
Judge Herrera Carbuccia dissented. Concerning Ruto, she concurred 
that for indirect co-perpetration, prima facie the Prosecution has not pro-
vided enough evidence.192 However, in view of judge Herrera Carbuccia, 
there is evidence upon which a reasonable Chamber could 
convict Mr Ruto under Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute – or-
dering, soliciting or inducing –, or under Article 25(3)(c) – 
aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting –, or under Article 
25(3)(d) – in any other way contributing to the commission 
of the crime.193 
Regarding Mr. Sang, Judge Herrera Carbuccia found “the Prosecu-
tion has presented enough evidence upon which a reasonable Chamber 
could conclude” that he “contributed to the commission of the crimes 
charged” pursuant to Article 25(3)(d).194 
The majority of Trial Chamber V vacated the charges against Ruto 
and Sang and discharged them without prejudice to their prosecution 
afresh in future.195 
12.5.3. Cases Ending Before the Commencement of Trial 
Three cases ended before trial could commence. Of these three persons 
did not need to face more than the Pre-Trial Chamber, while proceedings 
against Kenyatta and Muthaura’s moved in front of the Trial Chamber but 
the case ended before the trial opened. 
12.5.3.1. Kenyatta, Ali and Muthaura 
This case never went to trial because the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to 
confirm any charges against one suspect, Ali , and because the Prosecu-
tion withdrew all charges against Kenyatta and Muthaura, the remaining 
two accused persons, before the beginning of trial. 
                                                   
191 Ibid., para. 143. 
192 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia, 5 April 
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Nearing the end of its investigation, the Prosecution encountered al-
ready the first problems in convincing the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue a 
summons to appear against Kenyatta, Ali and Muthaura. Against Ali, the 
Prosecutor had applied for summons to appear based on principal liability 
(co-perpetration, Article 25(3)(a)) and accessory liability (contributing in 
any other way, Article 25(3)(d)).196 However, the majority of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II found that the material submitted by the OTP was not suffi-
cient to qualify Ali as a co-perpetrator and only issued the summons based 
on the lesser variant, meaning liability of an accessory (‘contributing in 
any other way’).197 Further regarding two crime scenes in Kisumu and 
Kibera, the majority of judges failed to see reasonable grounds that these 
events could be attributed to Ali, Muthaura and Kenyatta.198 However, 
regarding other events and allegations, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s majority 
issued the summonses against Muthaura and Kenyatta199 based on indirect 
co-perpetration,200 though the Prosecution had against both men also al-
leged accessory liability under Article 25(3)(d).201 
However, already at the confirmation stage, all judges from Pre-
Trial Chamber II declined to confirm any liability of Ali under Article 
25(3)(d)(i). Thus, without ever acquiring the status of an accused, Ali had 
not to stand trial. Pre-Trial Chamber II explained that in order to hold Ali 
                                                   
196 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhururu Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 8 March 2011, ICC-
01/09-02/11-1, para. 13 (counts 1–5) (‘Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Pre-Trial Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
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197 Ibid., paras. 38, 46, 51. 
198 Ibid., para. 32. 
199 Judge Kaul dissented, arguing the ICC lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae and therefore 
declined to issue any summons to appear against any of the three suspects. ICC, Situation 
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200 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Pre-Trial Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Sum-
monses to Appear, paras. 39–45, see above note 196. 
201 Muthaura and Kenyatta Prosecution’s Submissions on the Law of Indirect Co-perpetration 
and Application for Notice, para. 4, see above note 80. 
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responsible for crimes allegedly committed through the Kenya police, it is 
essential that it first be determined that this force indeed carried out the 
crimes as alleged. The judges argued no substantial grounds were provid-
ed to believe that the Kenya police participated in an attack around Naku-
ru and Naivasha and without being satisfied about the occurrence of this 
historical event as alleged by the OTP, it was “not possible to entertain 
further attribution of any conduct of the Kenya police to Mr. Ali and, a 
fortiori, his individual criminal responsibility”. 202 Accordingly, Mr. Ali 
was never committed for trial, despite the OTP having alleged his crimi-
nal liability in five counts of crimes against humanity at the conclusion of 
its investigation. 203  Regarding Kenyatta and Muthaura, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber confirmed their liability as indirect co-perpetrators pursuant to 
Article 25(3)(a).204 
About five months after this confirmation of liability as indirect co-
perpetrators, the OTP filed own observations on Article 25(3)(a) and sug-
gested that the judges provide, before the trial had begun, notice under 
Regulation 55 to both remaining accused that also other liabilities, namely 
under Article 25(3)(b) or 25(3)(c) could be applicable.205 
This OTP motion based on Regulation 55 meant a change of course. 
First, the OTP had filed a DCC in which it had alleged principal liability 
(indirect co-perpetration) against Kenyatta and Muthaura. Then the OTP 
asked the Trial Chamber to reclassify and thereby downgrade its initial 
allegation (of liability as principals) to also include accessory liabilities. 
Procedurally, after confirmation and before the commencement of the trial, 
the Prosecution chose not to formally amend its DCC pursuant to Article 
61(9), but to suggest instead to the Trial Chamber to consider invoking 
Regulation 55. 
First, the wording of Regulation 55 does not provide any party or 
participant to a trial the right to suggest that a Trial Chamber invokes 
Regulation 55. Yet this is exactly what the Prosecution did. Secondly, 
                                                   
202 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, paras. 
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when at the conclusion of its investigation, it was possible for the prose-
cution to freely formulate the applicable mode(s) of liability, including to 
propose several of them in the alternative, then the Prosecution had cho-
sen not do that, but to plead one mode of liability only, namely indirect 
co-perpetration. 
Bearing this in mind, it is instrumental to read the application which 
stated “the Prosecution charged a form of individual criminal responsibil-
ity that, in its view, appropriately captures the accused’s contributions to 
the crimes”.206 The Prosecution emphasising that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
confirmed its pleaded theory of indirect co-perpetration under Article 
25(3)(a), then acknowledged: 
However, the specific facts of this case reflect that indirect 
co-perpetration is not the sole manner in which the accused’s 
criminal responsibility can be characterized. The Prosecution 
acknowledges [sic] that the accused’s criminal responsibility 
could equally be characterized as: 
• Ordering, soliciting or inducing under Article 25(3)(b); 
• Aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting under Article 
25(3)(c); or 
• Contributing “[i]n any other way” […] under Article 
25(3)(d).207 
Implicitly, the OTP thereby acknowledged that at the end of its own 
investigation, it had too narrowly charged the then suspects in its own 
DCC. Trial Chamber V did not entertain the suggestion to issue a notice 
pursuant to Regulation 55, but scheduled a date for trial. 
Then the Prosecution referred to serious investigative challenges, 
including that several witnesses died or were killed and to limited co-
operation of the government of Kenya, and asked the Trial Chamber to 
withdraw all charges against Muthaura as the available evidence would 
not support the charges to the beyond reasonable doubt standard required 
for a conviction and therefore at this present time there would be no rea-
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sonable prospect of conviction; the Trial Chamber granted the request 
regarding Muthaura.208 
In April 2013, Trial Chamber V ordered the Prosecution to submit 
an updated DCC regarding Kenyatta. The reasoning of this decision re-
flects the dissatisfaction of the judges regarding the OTP’s investigation. 
All judges concurred that the “Prosecutor should not seek to have the 
charges against a suspect confirmed before having conducted a full inves-
tigation in order to have sufficient overview of the evidence and the theo-
ry of the case”.209 Judge van den Wyngaert went as far as observing: 
there are serious questions as to whether the Prosecution 
conducted a full and thorough investigation of the case 
against the accused prior to confirmation. […] the facts show 
that the Prosecution had not complied with its obligations 
under article 54(1)(a) at the time when it sought confirma-
tion and that it was still not even remotely ready when the 
proceedings before this Chamber started.210 
By contrast, Judge Eboe-Osuji assessed it would be unjustifiable, if 
a limitation would crystallise that would forbid post-confirmation investi-
gations generally and only allow these in exceptional circumstances.211 
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber ruled in Prosecutor v. Lubanga: 
The duty to establish the truth is not limited to the time be-
fore the confirmation hearing. Therefore, the Prosecutor 
                                                   
208 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial Chamber, OTP, Prosecution notification of withdrawal of 
the charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 11 March 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-687, paras. 
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ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and 
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209 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber, Decision on defence application pursuant to Article 64(4) and related requests, 
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211 Kenyatta Trial Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, para. 87, see above note 
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must be allowed to continue his investigation beyond the 
confirmation hearing, if this is necessary in order to establish 
the truth. This is confirmed by article 61(9) of the Statute, 
which stipulates inter alia that the charges may be amended 
before the trial has begun. As the Prosecutor rightly pointed 
out, this indicates that the investigation does not have to stop 
before the confirmation hearing.212 
All judges of Trial Chamber V concurred that the specific investiga-
tion regarding the post-election violence in Kenya “the circumstances 
under which the Prosecution was operating were difficult and may have 
affected its ability to conduct a fuller investigation prior to confirma-
tion”.213 
Indeed, the OTP had twice requested adjournments of the provi-
sional trial date to undertake additional investigative steps.214 Trial Cham-
ber V observing that investigations into the Kenya situation has been on-
going for almost five years, acknowledged that certain unique circum-
stances beyond the Prosecutions control, including unexplained delay on 
the part of the Kenyan government facilitated loss of evidence, but identi-
fied also concerns regarding the OTP’s timeliness, vigorousness and thor-
oughness of its investigations and ruled this alone does not provide a basis 
for open-ended investigations.215 The judges noticed the OTP’s admission 
regarding the insufficiency of its current evidence and rejected any further 
                                                   
212 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgement on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the deci-
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Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence”, 13 October 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, para. 52 (https://legal-tools.
org/doc/7813d4). 
213 Kenyatta Trial Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related 
Requests, para. 124, see above note 209. 
214 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, 
Notification of the removal of a witness from the Prosecution’s witness list and application 
for an adjournment of the provisional trial date, 19 December 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-875, 
paras. 17–22, 24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/f017e7); ICC, Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, Prosecution notice regarding the 
provisional trial date, 5 September 2014, ICC-01/09-02/11-944, paras. 4, 6 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/5d9c72). 
215 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber, Decision on Prosecution’s application for a further adjournment, 3 December 
2014, ICC-01/09-02/11-981, paras. 44–45, 49–51, 54 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/731d89). 
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adjournment. 216 Two days after this decision, the OTP provided notice 
that it had withdrawn all charges against Kenyatta, pointing out that this 
step is without prejudice to bring new charges based on the same or simi-
lar factual circumstances.217 
12.5.3.2. Abu Garda 
In its arrest warrant application, the Prosecution qualified Abu Garda as 
co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 25(3)(a), but added it would do so 
“[w]ithout excluding any other applicable mode of responsibility”.218 Pre-
Trial Chamber I interpreted this vague phrase to mean that the Prosecution 
alleged principal liability as co-perpetrator or as indirect co-perpetrator.219 
Pre-Trial Chamber issued a summons to appear based on co-perpetration 
(Article 25(3)(a)).220 
The Prosecution’s DCC then charged Abu Garda with principal lia-
bility as co-perpetrator or indirect co-perpetrator and otherwise contained 
again the formulation “[w]ithout excluding any other applicable mode of 
liability”.221 
Pre-Trial Chamber I criticised the Prosecution had not excluded any 
other applicable mode of liability and, referring to applicable laws includ-
ing Regulation 52(c) which requires the pleading of a precise form of 
participation, restricted itself to analyse only the mode specifically 
                                                   
216 Ibid., para. 61, p. 26. 
217 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, 
Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 2015, 
ICC-01/09-02/11-983, paras. 1, 3 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/b57a97). 
218 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain,  
OTP, Public Redacted Version of Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58 filed on 20 
November, 20 November 2008, ICC-02/05-03/09-20-Red, pp. 10–11, para. 140 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/95138b). 
219 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, 7 May 2009, ICC-
02/05-02/09-1, para. 24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/126792). 
220 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Summons to Appear for Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, 7 May 2009, ICC-02/05-02/09-
2, paras. 6, 18–19 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/9a4a9e). 
221 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, OTP, Public 
Redacted Version of Prosecution’s “Document Containing the Charges Submitted Pursuant 
to Article 61(3) of the Statute” filed on 10 September 2009, 24 September 2009, ICC-
02/05-02/09-91-Red, para. 117, pp. 32–33 (counts 1–3) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/4ac1f8). 
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charged by the OTP.222 Regarding the OTP’s precision in the DCC, the 
judges noted: 
because of the inconsistencies in the allegations contained in 
the DCC, it is unclear whether or not the Prosecution is 
claiming that Mr Abu Garda directly participated in the at-
tack […]. At the confirmation hearing, the Prosecution con-
tinued to claim both that Mr Abu Garda directly participated 
in the attack and that he did not.223 
Further, the judges found insufficient grounds to establish the exist-
ence of a common plan and lack of sufficient evidence substantiating the 
allegations of Abu Garda responsibility as either direct or indirect co-
perpetrator or under any other liability contemplated in Article 25(3).224 
Judge Tarfusser observed a “flimsy, inconsistent or otherwise inad-
equate” body of evidence which would not allow establishing a proper 
link between the attack as a historic event and the alleged perpetrator in 
terms of either direct or indirect involvement.225 The Prosecution request-
ed leave to appeal the decision which did not confirm the DCC, including 
the judges analysis of criminal liability of Abu Garda. Due to the absence 
of substantial grounds to believe that a common plan to the attack existed, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber found the OTP’s challenge not essential for the 
determination of matters arising from judicial cause and rejected the re-
quest.226 
12.5.3.3. Mbarushimana 
In its arrest warrant application, the Prosecution qualified Mbarushimana 
as principal, co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) and, in the alterna-
                                                   
222 Abu Garda Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 158, see above note 
43. 
223 Ibid., paras. 218, 220. 
224 Ibid., paras. 231–32. 
225 Separate Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, in ibid., paras. 4, 6. 
226 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges’”, 23 April 2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-267, para. 18, p. 15 (https://
legal-tools.org/doc/840d58). 
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tive, as accessory for having contributed in any other way to crimes by a 
group with a common purpose under Article 25(3)(d).227 
Pre-Trial Chamber I dismissed Mbarushimana’s liability as a prin-
cipal, meaning as co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a) because of no rea-
sonable grounds existed establishing that his contribution was essential.228 
However, the judges found reasonable grounds for his liability as accesso-
ry under Article 25(3)(d) .229 
In its DCC and oral arguments, the Prosecution emphasised Mba-
rushimana’s position of Executive Secretary of the Forces Démocratiques 
de Libération du Rwanda (‘FDLR’), arguing he would be the ‘linchpin’ of 
his rebel group, accentuating “his ability to transform the FDLR’s crimes 
on the ground into political capital” and thus he knowingly and intention-
ally contributed in any other way under Article 25(3)(d).230 
Following the confirmation of charges hearing, the majority of Pre-
Trial Chamber I declined231 to confirm the charges, holding that: 
the evidence submitted by the Prosecution is insufficient to 
substantiate the finding […] that the Suspect’s role as a lead-
er of the FDLR qualifies a significant contribution to the 
commission of crimes by the FDLR in accordance with arti-
cle 25(3)(d).232 
The majority disagreed with the dissenting judge on the requirement 
that the FDLR leadership constituted a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d). 
In his dissent Judge Monageng endorsed the Prosecution’s position 
that the FDLR had a specific leadership consisting out of President, two 
vice presidents and Mbarushimana as executive secretary and a leader of 
                                                   
227 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, OTP, Prosecution’s Application 
under Article 58, 20 August 2010, ICC-01/04-573-Red, paras. 21, 115, 129 (https://legal-
tools.org/doc/f9b78d). 
228 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Callixte Mbarushimana, 28 September 2010, ICC-01/04-01/10-1, paras. 30–
36 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/04d4fa). 
229 Ibid., paras. 38–44. 
230 Mbarushimana Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 8, see above note 
44. 
231 Ibid., p. 149. 
232 Ibid., para. 303. 
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the military wing. 233 He further argued with the occurrence of certain 
meetings from the FDLR’s steering committee and High Command, add-
ing that Mbarushimana closely co-operated with certain persons, all of 
which was evidence of structure and activities of a group of persons with 
a common purpose. 234 Thus, he would have accepted Mbarushimana’s 
liability as contributing to a group with a common purpose pursuant to 
Article 25(3)(d).235 By contrast, the majority noted that the common pur-
pose pursued by the group “must have at least an element of criminality” 
and substantial grounds lacked to be satisfied that the FDLR pursued the 
policy of attacking the civilian population.236 The majority further held 
that not just any contribution would have sufficed, but that a contribution 
pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) would need to be significant.237 The majority 
held that there was no link between the Mbarushimana’s conduct and the 
alleged crimes of the FDLR.238 
The majority emphasised that the evidence presented was insuffi-
cient to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspect denied 
crimes committed by the FDLR and therefore, through radio communica-
tions, radio and press releases, which among others encouraged the troops 
morale, he could not make a significant contribution to the commission of 
crimes by the FDLR pursuant to Article 25(3)(d).239 The chamber unani-
mously agreed that the suspect functioning as a point of contact for exter-
nal actors and his involvement in peace negotiations was no contribution 
to the commission of crimes pursuant to Article 25(3)(d).240 
On 23 December 2011, the ICC released Mbarushimana who left 
for France.241 
                                                   
233 Dissenting opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, in ibid., para. 51. 
234 Ibid., paras. 52–54. 
235 Ibid., paras. 64, 134–35. 
236 Mbarushimana Pre-Trial Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 291, see above 
note 44. 
237 Ibid., paras. 283–84. 
238 Ibid., paras. 293–339. 
239 Ibid., paras. 315, 339. 
240 Ibid., para. 320. 
241 “Rwandan rebel leader in France after ICC release”, France24, 23 February 2011 (availa-
ble on its web site). 
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The Prosecution appealed the Pre-Trial Chambers decision not to 
confirm any charges, but the Appeals Chamber upheld the decision of the 
majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber.242 Regarding the Prosecution’s third 
ground of appeal that an error of law had occurred as any (and not only a 
substantial) contribution to a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) was sufficient, the Appeals 
Chamber decided that such an alleged error would not have materially 
affected the impugned decision as the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
had found one fundamental element of this liability, namely the existence 
of a group acting with a common purpose, had not been established.243 
In a separate opinion, Judge Fernandéz de Gurmendi emphasised 
that the phrase “in any other way” in Article 25(3)(d) would indicate there 
should not be a minimum threshold or level of contribution as required by 
the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I.244 
12.6. Emerging Picture 
Regarding 17 cases at the ICC, this contribution has whether the OTP 
could maintain consistency in advancing one or several mode(s) of crimi-
nal liability which it had determined towards the end of its investigation. 
This analysis is not about the performance of the ICC’s OTP in confirma-
tion and trial proceedings. Rather, it is about inferences drawn from public 
filings produced at these procedural stages about the quality of the OTP’s 
earlier investigation into modes of liability. 
12.6.1. Stage at Which Judicial Proceedings Coming Out of an 
Investigation End 
Inferences on the thoroughness of each investigation can be drawn from 
the procedural stage which each ensuing judicial proceeding reached and 
how a pleaded criminal liability ended procedurally. That cases end in 
front of the Pre-Trial Chamber already, or Trial Chamber or Appeals 
Chamber is indicative of an investigation’s strength (or lack thereof). That 
cases end after confirmation hearings, or before trial, or at the no-case to 
answer stage, or upon judgments being rendered provide insights about 
                                                   
242 Mbarushimana Appeals Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber of 16 December 2011, paras. 69, 70, see above note 155. 
243 Ibid., para. 66. 
244 Separate Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, in ibid., paras. 9, 15. 
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the quality of investigations which occurred earlier: convictions to prison 
sentences indicate that the OTP’s investigation was thorough. However, at 
the ICC, only few cases resulted in convictions while the majority of cas-
es ended in earlier stages (with the suspects or accused being released): 











Abu Garda Muthaura Ruto Ngudjolo Chui Bemba 
Mbarushimana Kenyatta Sang Katanga Lubanga 
Ali  Gbagbo Ntaganda  
Kosgey  Blé Goudé Al Mahdi  
Table 1: Procedural stages where cases ended. 
A white background in the table marks the 12 cases in which a re-
lease of the suspect or accused occurred. The 4 cases against a grey back-
ground mark cases which ended in convictions. The case arising out of the 
investigation against Ongwen is not listed in this graphic as the trial was 
at the time of writing in the deliberation phase, meaning after the closure 
of the defence case and when this contribution was submitted for publica-
tion the parties still awaited the Trial Chamber to issue its judgment. 
12.6.2. Interpreting and Pleading Modes of Liability Consistently 
After an Investigation 
Certain public filings245 allow drawing of inferences on the thoroughness 
of the OTP’s investigation which preceded applications under Article 58, 
the confirmation hearing and trial proceedings. They also demonstrate 
whether the results of an investigation into the modes of liability was con-
sistently interpreted by the OTP in its pleadings: 
                                                   
245 For example, request for arrest warrant/summons to appear, the DCC, decision on confir-
mation of charges, notice for re-characterisation of facts, no-case to answer decisions, trial 
and appeal judgments. 
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The bolded entries indicate that a liability change occurred in the 
judicial proceedings or was suggested by the OTP. Indicative of the strug-
gle of the Prosecution to realistically assess the results of its investigation 
are the cases against Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ruto. Shortly before these 
cases resulted in withdrawal of or vacating of all charges, the Prosecution 
tried to suggest to the Trial Chamber to re-characterise the liability it had 
initially determined during its ongoing investigations. This suggested use 
of Regulation 55 would have resulted in a downgrading of liability from 
principal to accessory. Similarly, in the Katanga case, the judges realised 
at the deliberation stage that the alleged principal liability was not proven 
and, based on the same facts, re-characterised the allegation to accessory 
liability (Article 25(3)(d)). In the Bemba case, the Prosecution had misin-
terpreted the facts determined during its own investigation by charging 
principal liability under Article 25(3)(a) so the Pre-Trial Chamber had to 
adjourn the confirmation hearing to ‘guide’ the Prosecution to the correct 
liability: command responsibility (Article 28(a)). However, an investiga-
tion into command responsibility is complex and has a rather different 
dimension than an investigation into Article 25(3)(a) charges. The Prose-
cution finally lost its case due to failure to prove one element of command 
responsibility, as Bemba had taken certain measures. 
12.6.3. Alternative Charging 
The above table shows that nearing the conclusion of its investigation in 
10 out of 17 cases, the Prosecution advanced multiple modes of liability in 
its applications for an arrest warrant or summons to appear.246 The Pre-
Trial Chambers reduced this approach by only issuing three warrants for 
arrests with multiple modes of liability,247 and otherwise authorising arrest 
warrants and summons to appear with one mode of liability only. The 
Prosecution, appearing in front of the same Pre-Trial Chamber, attempted 
to (re-)introduce its wider approach on modes of liability by producing 7 
out of 17 DCC’s with multiple modes of liability.248 In 4 of these 7 cases, 
                                                   
246 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Prosecutor v. Ali, Prosecutor v. Kosgey, Prosecutor v. 
Muthaura, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Prosecutor v. Ruto, Prosecutor v. Sang, Prosecutor v. 
Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi and Prosecutor v. Katanga. 
247 Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi and Prosecutor v. Katanga. 
248 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Prosecutor v. 
Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda and Prosecutor v. Katan-
ga. 
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the Prosecution had initially applied only for an arrest warrant based on 
one mode of liability and then expanded the DCC to contain multiple 
modes.249 In the Ongwen case, multiple liabilities may have been the re-
sult of further investigations, but such an expansion of modes of liability 
may have otherwise more reflected the OTP’s charging practice and the 
aim to put the defendant on early notice which modes of liability he will 
face. However, in the Blé Goudé and Gbagbo cases, there was no reason 
for the Prosecution to re-assess its investigation by switching from one 
liability mode, as pleaded in the motion for an arrest warrant, to four 
modes of liability against each suspect in the DCC, because the majority 
of Trial Chamber held in its decision on the NCTA-motion that none of 
these liabilities had been proven to the required evidentiary standard.250 
12.6.4. The Elephant in the Room 
This analysis has referred to several judges expressing concern, some-
times even frustration about the way the ICC OTP conducted its investiga-
tion into the modes of liability. Unlike the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, the 
ICC employs the notion of iura novit curia. However, even Regulation 55 
(meaning a re-characterisation of the mode of liability) did not always 
enable the judges to cure earlier deficiencies in the way the OTP has con-
ducted its investigation. 
Simply put, the cases analysed in this chapter support the conclu-
sion that in several cases, the OTP moved to have charges confirmed at a 
point in time when its investigation into the modes of liability was not yet 
ready to face judicial scrutiny. This resulted not infrequently in cases not 
passing the confirmation of charges hearing, or simply ending before a 
judgment could be issued, because the determinations of liability and the 
cases overall were too weak. Thus, it is time to consider a paradigm 
change. Judge Tarfusser was right in pronouncing that investigations con-
stitute 
the bedrock of any criminal case; as a consequence, flaws 
and shortcomings at the investigative stage are not suitable 
                                                   
249 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, Prosecutor v. Ongwen and Prosecutor v. 
Ntaganda. 
250 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Reasons for Oral Decision, para. 28, see above note 45. 
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to be remedied in the courtroom and will inevitably com-
promise the chances of success of any resulting case.251 
12.7. Solutions 
Within each investigation, a preference should be put on establishing one 
mode of liability in a solid way. An intermediate step in an investigation is 
therefore the fundamental decision whether the target is liable as a princi-
pal or accessory. While it is always possible to charge a suspect in the 
alternative, this option should not be used excessively, but rather sparing-
ly.252 In other words: if the investigation division can only conclude that a 
suspect is liable for three or more possible modes of liability, then it is 
proposed that a request for an arrest warrant or a document containing the 
charges should generally not yet be entertained. Rather, investigations 
focused on determining the applicable mode of liability should continue 
as long as sufficient evidence creates more certainty and a maximum of 
two alternative modes of liability remain. It is proposed to entertain the 
charging with more than two modes of liability in exceptional cases and, 
if so, with hesitation and caution. One may argue that charging multiple 
modes of liability is sometimes the only way to reflect the totality of 
wrongdoing.253 But experience at the ICC shows that the OTP had often 
not fully concluded its analysis or investigations, and has thus exposed 
itself to the risk of losing its cases in court. Requesting an arrest warrant 
and confirmation of charges without having settled on the most applicable 
modes of liability means that the approach was, simply put, to ‘keep all 
options open’. Such an approach leaves the risk of not fully understanding 
one’s own case. By contrast, identifying the right mode of liability is go-
ing to the core of any case – that is, to individualise guilt, to attribute 
wrong to one specific person. 
                                                   
251 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, para. 95, see above note 
168. 
252 In 2016, the OTP had advanced that it strives to “explore and present the most appropriate 
range of modes of liability to legally qualify the criminal conduct” (emphasis added). ICC-
OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, para. 44 
(‘OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation’) (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
182205). By contrast, the OTP’s recent strategic plan introduced the new objective of de-
veloping a “more narrow case in terms of crimes and criminal liability” (emphasis added). 
ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2019–2021, 17 July 2019, para. 24 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/
7ncqt3). 
253 Ibid., referring in para. 24 to a “broad case representing the totality of the crimes”. 
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Consideration should be given to quality-control mechanisms in or-
der to adopt a different approach: to have independent teams review the 
results of an investigation and test the case on criminal liability for suffi-
ciency. The ‘review team’ could consist of persons from within or outside 
the OTP, but these persons should, apart from the review itself, not have 
had exposure to the previous investigation in order to be able to form an 
independent and unbiased assessment of the status and sufficiency of the 
investigation.254 
Another option is for the OTP to ‘over deliver’: that is, already be-
fore entering a new procedural stage, the OTP should strive to meet the 
evidentiary threshold required for the next, higher stage. For example, 
before the OTP issues a draft document containing the charges for a con-
firmation hearing which requires “substantial grounds”,255 it should have 
prepared its case to meet the threshold required for the NCTA stage, 
meaning to have identified enough “evidence on which a reasonable Trial 
Chamber could convict”.256 
                                                   
254 See OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, para. 23, see above note 252. 
255 ICC Statute, Article 61(5), see above note 1. 
256 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber, Decision No. 5 on the Conduct of Trial Proceedings 
(Principles and Procedure on ‘No Case to Answer’ Motions), 3 June 2014, ICC-01/09-
01/11-1334, para. 32 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/128ce5). 
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13.Challenges in Charge Selection: 
Considerations Informing the Number of Charges 




There is no other discretion singularly more important to whether an in-
ternational criminal tribunal fulfils its mandate than a prosecutor’s deci-
sion of who to charge, and what to charge them with. Prosecutors are the 
‘gatekeepers’ to international courts,1 tasked with determining what con-
duct does and does not merit prosecution. It is no exaggeration to say that 
in setting a court’s agenda, they have the life of international criminal law 
in their hands. 
Yet the charging discretion is also one of the most complex deci-
sions prosecutors are called upon to make. It is marked by a plethora of 
pragmatic, legal, evidential, and policy considerations that need to be as-
sessed and weighed. Prosecutors must carefully exercise their professional 
judgement to determine the most appropriate course of action in each case. 
Rarely will they be confronted with a scenario that sufficiently mirrors a 
previous case from which they can draw a direct historical comparison. 
                                                   
* Cale Davis (LL.M. (Adv), LL.B. (Hons), BIR, GDLP) is a Ph.D. candidate at Leiden 
University. He was previously a Prosecutor at the Northern Territory DPP and a Judge’s 
Associate at the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Australia. He has held teach-
ing positions at Bond University and Charles Darwin University. This chapter is derived 
from research the author has conducted for his Ph.D. research. A very early version of this 
chapter was presented at the Quality Control in Criminal Investigations Conference in 
Delhi on 22 February 2019 (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-davis/). The author 
wishes to thank Dr. Vanessa Newby for pointing him in the direction of Thomas Risse. 
1 Lovisa Bådagård and Mark Klamberg, “The Gatekeeper of the ICC: Prosecutorial Strate-
gies for Selecting Situations and Cases at the International Criminal Court”, in 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2017, vol. 48, no. 5, p. 639; Héctor Olásolo, 
“The Prosecutor of the ICC Before the Initiation of Investigations: A Quasi-Judicial or a 
Political Body?”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2003, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 89. 
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Moreover, they must make these decisions in the knowledge that the path 
they choose will have consequences not only for the potential defendant, 
but also an innumerable number of actors with an interest in the court’s 
work. 
Perhaps for this reason, deontological, rule-based approaches to an-
alysing and guiding the charging discretion have their attractions. Yet at-
tempts to provide normative guidance to prosecutors on how to navigate 
the discretion have inevitably failed to placate critics. For example, de-
spite the ICC-OTP’s efforts to produce policy papers and strategic plans 
(a practice largely ignored by the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL), Darryl Robin-
son has observed that “[f]or any position the Court can possibly take, per-
fectly plausible and powerful criticisms can inevitably be made”.2 Martti 
Koskenniemi’s famous apology – utopia duopoly remains relevant.3 Wil-
liam Schabas has argued that the policy papers fail to explain why some 
cases were selected while others were cast aside. 4  Deontological ap-
proaches to analysing the charging discretion have so far failed to provide 
sufficient nuance to be useful in any concrete sense. A different focus is 
required to better understand how the quality of the exercises of the charg-
ing discretion can be ensured. 
It should be noted at the outset that it is misleading to speak of the 
‘charging discretion’ as a single choice. It is not. The charging discretion 
is a collective of smaller discretionary choices, such as who to charge, 
when to charge them, and what to charge them with. The question of what 
to charge can again be broken down into the issues of the types of charges 
someone should face and the number of charges they should face. This 
may lead to the practice of cumulative charging, one of the seven bottle-
necks identified by the Quality Control in Criminal Investigations team as 
being pertinent to improving the speed and cost of international criminal 
processes.5 For reasons of brevity, it is this last issue concerning the num-
ber of charges that a defendant should face that this chapter shall focus on. 
                                                   
2 Darryl Robinson, “Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win”, 
in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 324. 
3 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 16. 
4 William A. Schabas, “Feeding Time at the Office of the Prosecutor”, International Crimi-
nal Justice Today, 23 November 2016 (available on its web site). 
5 Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2019 
(https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). 
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This chapter has three broad purposes. First, it attempts to highlight 
the weaknesses of deontological approaches in analysing or guiding the 
charging discretion by demonstrating that the factors that affect how the 
discretion is exercised do not lend themselves to normative constraint. 
Second, it represents an attempt to turn the discussion regarding charge 
selection towards the views of the people exercising the discretion by 
drawing heavily upon the author’s own interviews with international 
prosecutors. Third, it hopes to encourage the quality of choices to be as-
sessed by reference to the willingness of the actor who made the decision 
to engage in debate and discussion regarding why the choice was made. 
This chapter is divided into five core sections. Section 13.2. pre-
sents descriptive statistics to place the exercise of the charging discretion 
in its historical context. It reveals that the issue of how many charges to 
allege against individual accused is marked by both consonance and dis-
sonance. From a purely numerical perspective, historical practice is wide-
ly varied. Section 13.3. goes on to explore the factors international prose-
cutors have relied upon in describing how many charges to allege. It 
demonstrates that these factors are numerous and context-specific. Section 
13.4. posits that attempts to ensure the quality of the exercise of the charg-
ing discretion need to accept that prosecutors are trying to achieve numer-
ous goals through their charging practices and that the charging discretion 
is steeped in subjectivity. Section 13.5. argues that Thomas Risse’s logic 
of arguing provides a conceptual framework through which we can assess 
the quality of exercises of the charging discretion. It aims to demonstrate 
the importance of sharing practitioners’ experiences in exercising the 
charging discretion and the reasons they have relied upon to justify the 
decisions that they have made. The voices of practitioners who work at 
the proverbial coalface are not given sufficient prominence in the litera-
ture. It is important their experiences be shared. By drawing these voices 
into the conversation, we can hope to develop a more complete picture of 
the challenges they face in charge selection, as well as accelerate the de-
velopment of collective knowledge about desirable and undesirable con-
duct. 
13.1.1. Interview Methodology 
This chapter is based in part on a subset of thirty personal, anonymous 
interviews the author conducted between March and September 2018. 
With only two exceptions, the interview subjects held or hold the rank of 
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Senior Trial Attorney (or its equivalent) and above at the ICC, ICTY, 
ICTR, and SCSL.6 These individuals were selected because of their senior 
positions within trial teams and the organisational structure of the various 
OTPs, allowing them to speak with authority regarding discretionary 
choices. 
Interviews were conducted in person, via video-conference, or on 
the phone. To encourage the interviewees to speak openly, they were in-
formed at the start of the interview that they would not be quoted directly 
by name or in a manner that identifies them personally. The open inter-
views were structured around two broad questions: what discretionary 
choices did the interviewee consider to be important in their work, and 
what did they consider relevant when exercising them. At the conclusion 
of the interviews, the recordings were transcribed by the author. The tran-
scripts of the recordings are stored on file with the author. 
Importantly, the views presented in this chapter are not offered as 
being universally held. Nor are they claimed to be widely held, or even 
held by more than one person. The point of discussing these views is 
simply to demonstrate that the views are held, and this is important in 
order to develop a picture regarding the factors that have influenced the 
decision of how many charges a defendant should be faced with. 
13.2. Charging in Numbers 
Before proceeding to analyse the rationales that have informed the ques-
tion of how many charges to allege against an accused, it is useful to re-
flect on historical charging practice. This section presents descriptive sta-
tistics that contextualise this issue, while contrasting the variations in 
charging practices across, and within, the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL’s 
prosecution offices. 
The descriptive statistics presented in this section are based on the 
charges alleged against individual accused contained in the final charging 
documents filed against each individual defendant at the ICC, ICTY, 
ICTR, and SCSL up to December 2018. The final charging documents are 
                                                   
6 Of the 30 interviewees, 26 came from a common law background and 4 came from a civil 
law background. The predominance of common law practitioners reflects the reality that 
most individuals who fall into this class come from common law systems. The author is 
thankful for the co-operation and assistance of all the interviewees who spoke on a volun-
tary basis, as well as the OTPs of the MICT and the ICC for making current staff available. 
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the most recent official filings regarding the charges a defendant is ac-
cused of. They may be indictments, ‘documents containing the charges’, 
warrants of arrest, or summonses to appear. While some accused were 
never prosecuted (they may have died, or the charges may have been later 
withdrawn), the final charging documents are nevertheless useful because 
they are the ones in which the prosecutor ‘nails their colours to the mast’. 
They represent the final assessment of what the prosecutor considers to be 
the charges on which there are grounds for a conviction. 
Between 1995 (the year the first final charging document was is-
sued) to December 2018, international criminal prosecutors at the four 
courts within the framework of this study have seen 195 final charging 
documents issued, accusing 298 defendants of 2,774 core international 
crimes. On average, defendants charged by the prosecutors of these courts 
will face 9.3 charges. The average number of charges alleged against de-
fendants at the ICTY is 10; at the ICTR is 6; at the SCSL is 13; and at the 
ICC is 12. 
Figure 1 presents the average number of charges alleged against in-
dividual accused for each year across the four courts. As depicted by the 
dotted regression line, the average number of charges alleged against de-
fendants each year has remained largely flat. There is only a minor up-
ward trend. 
On a year-to-year basis, the averages have also remained largely 
consistent at the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL. There is only minimal 
variation. The averages never exceed 20 charges. ICC-OTP practice, how-
ever, has been far less consistent. Periods of relative stability – such as 
between 2008 and 2014 – contrast sharply against the periods 2004-2007 
and 2015-2018. Significantly higher averages are reported in 2004, 2007, 
and 2015. These were the years in which final charging documents con-
taining a large number of charges were issued for Otti, Harun, Kushayb, 
and Ongwen. In these years, the averages spiked respectively to 30, 32, 
and 46 charges – roughly five times the average across all courts. 
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Figure 1. 
One might be tempted to explain away the spikes in the ICC-OTP’s 
averages by claiming that each case is unique and that past practice cannot, 
therefore, be used as a reliable benchmark against which to assess charg-
ing practices. This is undoubtedly correct. However, the explanation is not 
entirely satisfying, for two reasons. First, each case is always unique. 
Therefore, over a quarter of a century of charging practice, it would be 
reasonable to expect that in at least some of those years, at some other 
court, similar fluctuations would have been seen. They have not. Second, 
for this explanation to be convincing, we would expect to see similar 
spikes in other courts. Yet the ICC-OTP is the only prosecution office to 
demonstrate such significant fluctuations on a year-to-year basis. 
The data in Figure 1 can be presented differently to provide addi-
tional insights into charging practices. Figure 2 is a box plot. Box plots 
are constructed by listing the number of charges per each individual de-
fendant in order from lowest to highest. The ‘whiskers’ – the lines extend-
ing from either end of the central boxes – represent the top 25 per cent 
and bottom 25 per cent of observations. The boxes are the middle 50 per 
cent of observations. The vertical line dissecting each box represents the 
median observation. Box plots therefore demonstrate how observations 
are distributed over the range between the lowest score and the highest 
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The Total plot is derived from all 298 observations. It represents the 
‘state of the art’ of charging across the four courts. Twenty-five per cent of 
all defendants that have ever been prosecuted by the OTPs of ICTY, ICTR, 
SCSL, and ICC faced between 1 and 4 charges each. Fifty per cent faced 
between 5 and 12 charges. Twenty-five per cent faced between 13 and 66 
charges. These figures show that the number of charges faced by all de-
fendants are not normally distributed. They do not depict a neat, symmet-
rical ‘bell curve’ in which the middle 50 per cent of observations lie equi-
distant from the highest and lowest scores, and the top 25 per cent and 
bottom 25 per cent of observations cover the same range of data. Instead, 
the data is skewed, with the top 25 per cent of observations covering a 
much higher range than the bottom 75 per cent of observations. A similar 
skewness is evident at the ICC and the ICTY. The SCSL and the ICTR 
display more normal distributions.7 
What Figure 2 demonstrates is that there have been divergent prac-
tices regarding the number of charges prosecutors have alleged against 
individual accused. While 75 per cent of defendants have faced between 1 
and 12 charges, history has revealed that 25 per cent of the time an OTP 
                                                   
7 The SCSL-OTP only charged 11 defendants, so the number of observations was signifi-
cantly lower than the ICTY (165); ICTR (85); and ICC (37). 
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charges someone, they will allege a far greater number of charges against 
them than the 75 per cent of other cases would suggest. 
The figures presented in Figures 1 and 2 require reflection. They 
raise important questions concerning what goals international criminal 
prosecutors hope to achieve through the prosecutions they commence. 
More charges mean prosecutors need to invest more money and more 
resources to prove them. It also means that defence needs to invest similar 
resources in casting reasonable doubt over them. With this in mind, it 
could be suggested that the further the proposed number of charges 
against an individual strays upwards from the mean figure of 9.3, the 
greater consideration should be given to what is hoped to be achieved by 
the prosecution. 
13.3. Charging Rationales 
The figures presented in Section 13.2. invite an inquiry into why there has 
been such varied practice with respect to the number of charges alleged 
against individual defendants. The purpose of this section is to begin this 
inquiry. Section 13.3.1. discusses four factors that appear to have operated 
to increase the number of charges faced by individual defendants. Yet one 
should not view these in isolation. As discussed in Section 13.3.2., there 
are other factors that appear to have operated to reduce the number of 
charges faced by individual defendants. 
13.3.1. Factors Justifying More Charges 
There appear to be at least four factors that have operated in favour of 
defendants facing more, rather than fewer, charges: the desire to obtain 
convictions; the aspiration of advancing the law; recording history; and 
finally a hope that the prosecution of the defendant will be representative 
of other uncharged – allegedly criminal – acts. 
13.3.1.1. A Desire for Convictions 
The fact that a desire to obtain convictions has militated in favour of de-
fendants facing more charges should not come as a surprise. While Rich-
ard J. Goldstone once argued that “[w]hether there are convictions or 
whether there are acquittals will not be the yardstick” against which the 
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success of international criminal justice will be assessed,8 there is cause 
for scepticism as to whether this is universally accepted. Schabas has rec-
ognised that international criminal law ‘thrives on conviction’ – a hunger 
that has driven international criminal law and procedure “into a more re-
pressive mode”.9 Mirjan Damaška  went further, arguing that international 
criminal courts possessed a ‘libido puniendi’ unlike those of their domes-
tic counterparts, driven by the famous desire to ‘end impunity’ – on his 
account, “[h]igh acquittal rates could easily augur failure of their mis-
sion”.10 
While this sort of narrowly-focussed consequentialist reasoning 
might appear unrefined in light of recent turns towards expressivist ac-
counts of international prosecutions that draw legitimacy from the broader 
effects criminal justice mechanisms have on society, it is difficult to deny 
them some visceral attraction. A conviction is a vindication of the time, 
effort, and resources expended on the prosecution. It validates the suffer-
ing of the victims. And given the relentless barrage of commentary about 
just how few convictions the ICC-OTP has obtained, it could be used to 
justify a court’s very existence. 
There is an additional reason why prosecutors have seen convic-
tions as important: some defendants are seen to fall into a unique category 
of extraordinary maliciousness. Completely aside from any lofty desire to 
fulfil the aims of international criminal justice, this itself has, in some 
instances, warranted charging a defendant with numerous crimes in order 
to increase the likelihood that a conviction will be entered against them. 
One prosecutor recalled that in the Prosecution’s Final Trial Brief in Galić, 
Mark Ierace SC submitted that Galić’s crimes were not “committed in the 
heat of battle, or with little time to reflect on their consequences. Rather, 
they were continuing crimes, in which his mens rea was refreshed on a 
                                                   
8 Richard J. Goldstone, “Address Before the Supreme Court of the United States”, speech 
delivered at the 1996 CEELI Leadership Award Dinner, Washington, D.C., 2 October 1996, 
quoted in Mark Ellis, “Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal: 
Challenges for the Defence Counsel”, in Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law, 1997, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 526 (fn. 37). 
9 William A. Schabas, “Balancing the Rights of the Accused with the Imperatives of Ac-
countability”, in Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent (eds.), From Sovereign Impunity to 
International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States, United Nations 
University Press, 2004, p. 165. 
10 Mirjan Damaška, “Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice”, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2012, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 613. 
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daily basis”.11 In this light, the prosecutor recalled that Galić’s conduct 
“almost [fell] in a special category”, and on their assessment, the Prosecu-
tion was justifiably “out to get him”.12 While they reflected that it would 
not be appropriate to “double up on war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity” in every prosecution, the alleged maliciousness of Galić “war-
ranted using everything in our armoury to get him” and that “on that basis 
alone, it was appropriate to use all relevant crimes in the Statute that ap-
plied to what he’d done”.13 
There is another reason why a desire to obtain convictions has led 
to defendants facing an inflated number of charges: ambiguity. This takes 
two forms: ambiguity as to what the law requires to be proved for a con-
viction to be entered; and ambiguity as to what evidence will emerge at 
trial. One prosecutor recalled questioning a “very prominent member of 
the OTP” regarding why comparatively low-level offenders were being 
faced with a large number of charges. The response, they recollected, was 
“because we don’t know what we are going to be able to prove”.14 The 
prosecutor recalled saying (perhaps words to the effect of) “that’s good, 
that’s really good. So if you get four counts conviction and the other fifty-
six [are] acquittals, that’s a win?”, and worried that the practice of over-
charging would raise unrealistic expectations in the community.15 
13.3.1.2. Advancing the Law 
A desire to advance the law has also arguably influenced considerations of 
how many charges a defendant should face. International criminal law is 
in a constant state of development and transformation. Since 1993, practi-
tioners have been ‘discovering’ new crimes that were not necessarily en-
visaged a quarter of a century ago. While judges are given most of the 
credit for this – Joe Powderly has correctly noted that judicial creativity 
involves “the sculpting of the relatively featureless granite of existing law 
                                                   
11 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Trial Chamber, Prosecution’s Final Trial Brief, 28 
April 2003, IT-98-29-T, para. 644 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8263bd). 
12 Interview with P19. 
13 Interview with P19. 
14 Interview with P29. 
15 Interview with P29. 
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in order to give it form, effect, and reason”16 – the role of prosecutors 
cannot be understated. After all, prosecutors provide courts with the de-
fendants who serve as vehicles for important jurisprudential developments. 
It is similarly important not to understate the willingness of prosecutors to 
engage in the process of law development. 
The historical context in which prosecutorial discretion has been 
exercised sheds some light on why this is the case. “Apart from Nurem-
berg […] and Tokyo for that matter”, remarked one prosecutor, “there had 
been no real attempt to develop the international criminal law”.17 Prior to 
the creation of the ICTY, they observed, international criminal law “had 
been more academic than an enforceable body of law”.18 Prosecutors had 
before them a blank canvas, and could hand the judiciary the brushes 
through which modern international criminal law could be painted. 
In part, a desire to advance the law can be attributed to pressure 
from the broader international community that enforced upon prosecutors 
a sense of duty to ensure the ICTY was a success. This sense of duty was 
felt at the highest levels of the ICTY-OTP. One prosecutor reflected that 
prior to Graham T. Blewitt travelling to The Hague to take up the role of 
Deputy Prosecutor, he travelled to the United Nations in New York and 
met with high-profile NGOs, members of the US State Department, inter-
national media, and others. The prosecutor recalled that Blewitt felt that 
all those with whom he met were “trying to impress on [him] the im-
portance of the ICTY and what it meant for international humanitarian 
law”, and that they were impressing on him the belief that the ICTY 
should not be allowed to fail.19 
The sense of duty felt by prosecutors was accompanied by a desire 
to ensure that the jurisprudence that was developed by the Chambers was 
of a quality that would withstand legal scrutiny. An ICTY prosecutor de-
scribed that they “had the responsibility of making sure that the judgments 
that came out of the trial chambers, but more particularly out of the Ap-
                                                   
16 Joseph Powderly, “Judicial Interpretation at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: Method from Chaos?”, 
in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 18. 
17 Interview with P4. 
18 Interview with P4. 
19 Interview with P4. 
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peals Chamber, would withstand international scrutiny”.20 They wanted 
the jurisprudence to be consistent, and saw it as a “major responsibility to 
put up good, sound legal arguments”.21 The prosecutor noted that the pro-
duction of good jurisprudence would aid the survival of the ICTY, and 
that “if the Tribunal succeeded, then the creation of a permanent court had 
more chance of […] being achieved than if we failed”, conceding that 
their eye was trained on the future of international humanitarian law.22 
Prosecutors seized the opportunity to advance the law with an en-
thusiastic sense of duty. One SCSL prosecutor, noting that international 
law contains many rules that have never been enforced, noted “you really 
want to build the law and you want to use the opportunity to do it”.23 An-
other reflected that the undeveloped state of international humanitarian 
law meant that its development “needed to be pursued” and saw the de-
velopment of the law as part of their mandate (although, when questioned 
further about the sense of being mandated to advance the law, they ex-
plained that this was “putting it too high” and that they misspoke).24 
The desire to advance the law had practical consequences for how 
the charging discretion was exercised. One ICTY prosecutor reflected that 
Blewitt introduced a “policy” for all investigators, and “in particular, the 
Senior Trial Attorneys”, under which “they should not be afraid to ad-
vance legal arguments and legal theories in prosecuting the cases”. 25 
There are several examples of where charges appear to have been affected 
by this policy. In the prosecution of Stanislav Galić, the ICTY-OTP was of 
the view that “there was an international crime of terror and that it came 
within the jurisdiction of ICTY”, despite there being no on-point jurispru-
dence to clearly justify this position.26 The charge of inflicting terror was 
a “discretionary additional charge” in the indictment. 27 One prosecutor 
recalled that “we thought it was important to nail [the infliction of terror 
                                                   
20 Interview with P4. Emphasis added. 
21 Interview with P4. 
22 Interview with P4. 
23 Interview with P9. 
24 Interview with P4. Emphasis added. 
25 Interview with P4. 
26 Interview with P19. 
27 Interview with P19. 
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upon civilians as] an express crime”, explaining that they saw this as a “a 
responsible exercise of our power”.28 
The ICTY and ICTR-OTP was also prolific in the development of 
the law surrounding sexual violence in armed conflict. Several members 
of the Office wanted to prove the criminality of certain sexual conduct.29 
The ‘dearth’ of jurisprudence regarding this category of crime allowed the 
Office to be creative in the formulation of charges.30 “I think it was prob-
ably always recognised that plundering and raping and pillaging was part 
of the process of conquering the enemy”, remarked one prosecutor, add-
ing that “it was nothing that was previously prosecuted, and the Tribunal 
had been urged to examine this aspect of the conflict, and of course we 
did that”.31 The OTPs charged sexual violence as “cruel treatment, torture, 
persecution, enslavement, and genocide”, which led to the “rapid devel-
opment of sexual violence jurisprudence”.32 
Despite the clear path the OTPs had before them to push forward 
novel charges and arguments, constraint needed to be exercised. Even 
though Blewitt had introduced the policy that Senior Trial Attorneys 
should not be afraid to advance “novel” legal arguments, this was on the 
proviso that “they had a fall-back position of a more traditional posi-
tion”.33 The arguments justifying the novel position should also be rea-
sonable. “[W]e were going to be asking the judges to make rulings that 
were unique”, one senior ICTY prosecutor noted, “I certainly felt the ob-
ligation to ensure that what we were putting up to the judges was sound 
and would enable them to bring rulings that would […] withstand interna-
tional scrutiny and withstand the test of time”.34 
Another prosecutor described that they were constrained by the 
“spirit” that animated the provisions in the Rome Statute, describing the 
need to adhere to processes “that will look to be fair in the light of day”.35 
                                                   
28 Interview with P19. 
29 Interview with P29. 
30 Michelle Jarvis and Kate Vigneswaran, “Challenges to Successful Outcomes in Sexual 
Violence Cases”, in Serge Brammertz and Michelle Jarvis (eds.), Prosecuting Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 58. 
31 Interview with P4. 
32 Jarvis and Vigneswaran, 2016, p. 58, see above note 30. 
33 Interview with P4. 
34 Interview with P4. 
35 Interview with P24. 
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While they recognised that the nature of the ICC’s cases required prosecu-
tors to be “aggressive and forward-leaning” and “creative”, they explained 
that the Court was “not a place to be cute or clever with the rights of the 
accused” and it was “not a place where you’re clever with the law”.36 
Similarly, another prosecutor described that the law should be de-
veloped carefully. They explained their view that “it was fine for us to 
stretch the envelope, but there’s no ruddy way in which we should be rip-
ping the edges off”.37 They described that this philosophy affected the 
charges laid against Duško Tadić, explaining that there were some mem-
bers within the Office who wanted to argue that grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions applied to non-international armed conflicts. The 
prosecutor described that, in their view, this was “just not so” and that the 
only way those arguments would be advanced was going to be “over 
[their] dead body”.38 
At the ICC-OTP, the policy decisions to focus on sexual and gen-
der-based crimes and crimes against children has been further explained 
by a desire to, in the words of one prosecutor, “do what we can to protect 
the most vulnerable populations”. 39 The prosecutor explained that this 
approach affected the charges laid against Bosco Ntaganda. Ntaganda was 
the first defendant charged by the ICC-OTP for alleged sexual offences 
committed against ‘child soldiers’ within the Forces Patriotiques pour la 
Libération du Congo, by members of that same armed group. “[P]eople 
think of the law of armed conflict as essentially focussed on the so-called 
enemy population or the opponents in the conflict”, the prosecutor ex-
plained, “[b]ut we said no […] children don’t lose those protections simp-
ly because they’d been conscripted into armed forces”.40 
13.3.1.3. Recording History 
A desire to record history may also have militated in favour of defendants 
being charged with more, rather than fewer, charges. Remarkably, while 
all international criminal tribunals record history through the taking and 
                                                   
36 Interview with P24. 
37 Interview with P13. 
38 Interview with P13. 
39 Interview with P14. 
40 Interview with P14. 
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recording of evidence, only the ECCC has this stated as one of its express 
goals.41 
One prosecutor advanced the argument that the benefits of setting 
an historical record warranted charging a potential defendant with all pos-
sible crimes that it was believed they committed. “I think starting at the 
beginning there was an unspoken policy that you should charge them with 
pretty much everything you could prove against them”, they observed.42 
They added, “I don’t think you can say that that approach was wrong. And, 
on the contrary, I think it is probably right”.43 The rationale for this belief, 
they explained, is that war crimes trials, certainly in cases where the lead-
ership is being prosecuted, “do have a role in telling a full story even 
though [prosecutors are] not there to write history”.44 
The prosecutor was also in favour of laying charges that are at least 
arguable. They argued this by positing that if a prosecutor did not “try” to 
prove an arguable charge, revisionist historians could reflect on the con-
duct and deny the unalleged arguable charge ever occurred.45 The prose-
cutor observed that “history will look back and say there was no genocide 
in Kosovo” due to the OTP not including that charge in the Kosovo in-
dictment against Milošević, suggesting that such a charge – in their 
view – should have been included for this reason.46 
13.3.1.4. Representation 
Perhaps the most significant factor that has informed the number of 
charges a defendant will be faced with is the desire for prosecutors to lay 
representational charges. Representative charging is a necessary ancillary 
                                                   
41 In their request for assistance to the United Nations, the two Cambodian Prime Ministers 
hoped that the United Nations would “assist the Cambodian people in establishing the 
truth”: Identical letters dated 23 June 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/1997/488, 24 June 1997 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/kcnjj4). The United Nations 
General Assembly hoped that the UN would assist Cambodia in investigating its ‘tragic 
history’: Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia: Resolution Adopted by the General As-
sembly, UN Doc. A/RES/52/135, 27 February 1998 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
6e9a5f). 
42 Interview with P11. 
43 Interview with P11. 
44 Interview with P11. 
45 Interview with P11. 
46 Interview with P11. 
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to the fact that international prosecutors must be selective in their charg-
ing decisions. Prosecutors “can’t charge every crime that was committed, 
every murder, every act of sexual violence or mutilation”.47 There are not 
the resources to do so, nor the motivations. The charging discretion has 
therefore been used to curate a selection of charges that best represent 
“the overall picture” of what occurred in a situation,48 being in “broad 
terms reflective of what had happened”.49 Prosecutors have identified five 
ways that charges can be representative. 
The first is to represent criminality. There are two ways prosecutors 
have attempted to ensure that they exercise their charging discretion in 
way that is representative of criminality. The first is to represent the crim-
inality of any given situation. Representing the criminality of a situation 
means that prosecutors endeavour to capture the “essence of what hap-
pened on the ground”50 through a curated set of charges that can be said to 
be representative of other uncharged acts.51 “I ensured”, remarked one 
prosecutor, “that we had forcible transfer, deportation, crimes of sexual 
violence, murders […] [I] wanted to make sure that every crime was rep-
resented somehow in that indictment”.52 Another noted that if investiga-
tions revealed incidences of “severe torture”, then “the right thing to do 
would be to add it [to the indictment] because those victims suffered it”.53 
A more self-reflective approach was offered by a different prosecutor 
which highlights the importance of personal satisfaction with how they 
are doing their job. The prosecutor conceded that it was impossible to 
satisfy even an objective observer “that you got [the charges] absolutely 
correct”, but they personally needed to “have at least some sense of confi-
dence that you were depicting at least a bona fide approximation of what 
had happened”.54 
At the ICC, the principle of representing criminality been enshrined 
in regulatory and policy documents. Regulation 34(2) of the Regulations 
                                                   
47 Interview with P12. 
48 Interview with P12. 
49 Interview with P7. 
50 Interview with P14. 
51 Interview with P5; Interview with P8. 
52 Interview with P8. 
53 Interview with P20. 
54 Interview with P7. 
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of the Office of the Prosecutor obliges the ‘joint team’ to select incidents 
in its provisional case hypothesis that are “reflective of the most serious 
crimes and the main types of victimisation”.55 The Policy Paper on Case 
Selection and Prioritisation purports to commit the Prosecutor to “[repre-
senting] as much as possible the true extent of the criminality which has 
occurred within a given situation, in an effort to ensure, jointly with the 
relevant national jurisdictions, that the most serious crimes committed in 
each situation do not go unpunished”.56 
One of the ways through which prosecutors have attempted to satis-
fy themselves that they are representing a situation’s criminality is 
through a focus on those they believe to be the ‘most responsible’. The 
rationale for this is that persons who are purportedly the ‘most responsi-
ble’ are likely “responsible for a wider range of crimes over a wider area”, 
allowing charges against them to “reflect crimes against thousands, tens 
of thousands of people”57 without spending resources on multiple prose-
cutions of lower-ranked individuals to achieve the same intended repre-
sentative effect. 
Of course, successfully prosecuting those apparently ‘most respon-
sible’ requires evidence that is probably difficult to come by. The long-
standing practice of pyramidal prosecutions targets lower-ranked perpetra-
tors with the intention of using their evidence (or the investigation into 
them) to develop evidence that might lead to the successful prosecution of 
individuals higher up a chain of command (which may or may not exist). 
This approach was notably adopted (although not without controversy) at 
the ICTY.58 At the ICTR, it was not so relevant as “the perpetrator[s] 
[were] actually on the ground”.59 The ICC-OTP has expressly stated the 
importance of a ‘build upwards strategy’ in the 2012-2015 Strategic 
Plan,60 which was a change from the original (and criticised) policy artic-
ulated in 2009 of ‘focused investigations and prosecutions’ under which 
                                                   
55 ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, Regulation 34(2) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226). 
56 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, September 2016, para. 45 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/182205). 
57 Interview with P12. 
58 Interview with P12; Interview with P10. 
59 Interview with P16. 
60 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan: June 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, para. 43 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/954beb). 
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prosecutors would “select for prosecution those situated at the highest 
echelons of responsibility”.61 The policy of engaging in pyramidal prose-
cutions has also been established in the Policy Paper on Preliminary Ex-
aminations and the Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation.62 
The principle of representing criminality through the exercise of the 
charging discretion is also arguably relevant to the prosecution of individ-
ual accused. In this respect, one prosecutor noted that they tried to craft 
their indictments so that they were representative “in terms of being re-
flective of the totality of the criminal conduct of the accused”.63 An expe-
rienced ICC prosecutor reflected that “it would be wrong to use your dis-
cretion to only charge somebody […] [with] […] forcible transfer if 
they’ve killed and tortured people, even if it might be easier”,64 reflecting 
the belief that a proper exercise of the charging discretion should not arti-
ficially represent the criminality of the conduct that the prosecution rea-
sonably believes to have been committed. Under this approach, greater 
emphasis is placed on the individual accused’s conduct in the laying of 
charges, as prosecutors seek to ensure that they represent the crimes they 
were allegedly responsible for. In practice, and in particular with respect 
to those individuals allegedly ‘most responsible’ for crimes, the distinc-
tion between representing the criminality of a situation and the criminality 
of an accused may not be significant. 
Consistent with a desire to represent the criminality of a situation or 
an accused, a comparatively limited amount of evidence regarding alleged 
crimes of sexual violence or crimes against children – or evidence sug-
gesting such crimes occurred comparatively rarely – does not necessarily 
mean they will receive less attention in the exercise of a prosecutor’s 
charging discretion. One prosecutor, reflecting on their experiences at the 
ICTY, recalled that “if I put all of the […] evidence that I had on the table 
that was developed during the course of the investigation, and categorised 
it into […] piles according to crime, probably the smallest stack of evi-
dence, statements and the like, would have been crimes of sexual vio-
                                                   
61 ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy: 2009-2012, 1 February 2010, p. 6 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/6ed914). 
62 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, fn. 72 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906); ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioriti-
sation, September 2016, p. 14 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/182205). 
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lence”.65 Similarly, another prosecutor recalled that a decision was “cer-
tainly” made in the early days of the ICTY and ICTR to “in a sense privi-
lege the investigation of sexual offences”, “[b]ecause left to just a normal 
unfolding of events, the massive numbers of homicides, of murders, 
would have dwarfed the appearance of severity of sexual crimes”.66 Had 
that decision not been taken, the same prosecutor remarked, sexual vio-
lence “might not have featured as prominently as I believed it should 
[have], considering the impact that it had on the level of criminality in 
these countries”.67 The ICC adopted a similar approach in its Policy Pa-
per on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, where it committed itself to 
laying charges for sexual and gender-based crimes “wherever there is 
sufficient evidence to support such charges”,68 irrespective of the number 
of alleged offences. The same applies to crimes directed against children 
or disproportionately affecting them.69 
But, of course, the assessment of what is ‘representative’ of crimi-
nality is subjective and underpinned by a raft of personal factors. To take 
the charging of sexual and gender-based violence as an example, one need 
only point to the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice challenging the 
ICC-OTP’s ‘failure’ to prosecute a raft of crimes (including crimes of 
sexual violence and gender-based crimes);70 the general criticism levelled 
against the ICTY-OTP to do the same; and Cecily Rose’s criticism that the 
SCSL-OTP failed to properly plead forced marriage and crimes of sexual 
violence.71 With this in mind, the ICTY prosecutor’s comment that prose-
                                                   
65 Interview with P8. 
66 Interview with P7. 
67 Interview with P7. 
68 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, p. 6 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ede6c). 
69 ICC-OTP, Policy on Children, November 2016, p. 2 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c2652b). 
70 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Request 
submitted pursuant to rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for leave to par-
ticipate as amicus curiae with confidential annex 2, 10 November 2006, ICC-01/04-316 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ceb093). ‘Failure’ is put in inverted commas for the pur-
poses of indicating that something can only be assessed as a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ if there 
is some binding standard to assess it by, which there is not. 
71 Cecily Rose, “Troubled Indictments at the Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Pleading of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise and Sex-based Crimes”, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 2009, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 368. 
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cutors should “have at least some sense of confidence” that their charges 
represent the criminality of the situation is particularly poignant72 as that 
is the most that can ever be achieved in what is ultimately a subjective 
exercise. 
The second category is representing the geographical spread of al-
leged crimes. Prosecutors have attempted to represent this through the 
exercise of the charging discretion. 73 In this respect, prosecutors have 
tried to exercise the charging discretion in such a way that the locations in 
which alleged crimes have been committed are, they believe, reflected in 
the charges laid or incidents scheduled. There are three reasons for this. 
The first reason is that representing the geographic spread of al-
leged criminal offences may show the existence of a plan or policy, which 
may in turn prove that the conduct was part of a ‘widespread or systemat-
ic’ attack constituting a crime against humanity.74 A ‘plan or policy’ or 
‘large-scale’ requirement is also included in the Rome Statute with respect 
to war crimes under Article 7. In that respect, representing the geographic 
spread of alleged offences is not so much a discretionary choice, but ra-
ther a tool used to prove beyond reasonable doubt a defendant’s guilt. 
The second reason is that a failure to represent the geographic 
spread of alleged offences has been considered (in what is again a subjec-
tive assessment) unfair. One prosecutor recounted that the ICTY-OTP 
deployed the historian András Reidlmayer and the demographer Ewa 
Tabeau to Bosnia, in part, so as not “to leave out the municipalities” the 
prosecutors were not going to lead detailed evidence on, because it was 
considered “important to show that they too were impacted by the 
crimes”.75 The same prosecutor considered that “it would have been un-
fair just to pick” a limited number of areas on which to focus.76 In this 
light, ‘fairly’ representing the geographical spread of alleged offences was 
considered to outweigh the time gained to spend on other matters should 
less areas be pursued at trial.77 At the ICTR, Hassan Jallow recognised the 
                                                   
72 Interview with P7. Emphasis added. 
73 Interview with P5; Interview with P12; Interview with P9. 
74 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, 
IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, para. 65 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/029a09). 
75 Interview with P8. 
76 Interview with P8. 
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need for indictments to cover all of Rwanda’s administrative regions on 
the basis that a failure to do so could be seen as discriminatory, biased, or 
flush with favouritism.78 
The third reason is a desire on the part of a prosecution office to 
properly respond to the public’s perception about where offences have 
taken place. With respect to the work of the ICTR, one prosecutor noted 
that the Office wanted to cover “each of the […] regions of Rwanda” as 
well as “the major killing sites that everyone thinks of if you know Rwan-
dan topography”.79 
The third category of representation concerns structural commission. 
Some prosecutors have attempted to represent the structural means 
through which alleged offences were committed in the exercise of their 
charging discretion. The need for such an approach was expressly adopted 
at the ICTR, where Jallow thought it important to prosecute members of 
different social organisations to demonstrate the breadth of societal partic-
ipation on the Rwandan atrocities. “The Prosecutor [Jallow] consciously 
decided”, Alex Obote-Odora notes, “to include all of the various groups 
represented in the atrocities to ensure that different types of involvement 
were covered”.80 As such, the ICTR-OTP pursued cases concerning the 
government, military, clergy, and the media; as well as lower-level territo-
ry administration officials such as the bourgmestres and mayors.81 
ICTY prosecutors also attempted to represent the structural means 
through which alleged offences were committed through their charging 
decisions. The Milošević indictments, for example, were drafted in such a 
way that they “fairly and appropriately reflected each of those avenues of 
perpetration that he engaged in”, including his alleged use of the Ministry 
of the Interior, paramilitaries, and political leaders.82 
                                                   
78 Hassan Jallow, “Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice”, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 153. 
79 Interview with P9. 
80 Alex Obote-Odora, “Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting 
Core International Crimes Cases, 2nd edition, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 
2010, p. 56 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f5abed). 
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The fourth category of representation is temporal spread. There is 
some minor evidence to support the proposition that prosecutors may also 
attempt to represent the time over which alleged offences were committed 
in the exercise of the charging discretion. An SCSL prosecutor noted that 
they tried to ensure their indictments represented the alleged crimes “in 
tempore” (in addition to representing their criminality and geographic 
spread).83 This approach suggests prosecutors may wish to ensure that the 
alleged offences that are the subject of the charging discretion cover their 
respective court’s temporal jurisdictional mandate. 
The fifth category of representation is alleged victims. Prosecutors 
have also attempted to represent the types of alleged victims in the exer-
cise of the charging discretion.84 As one prosecutor pondered, “[a]re we 
responding to what the affected community suffered?”85 
A desire to represent the alleged victims has prompted prosecutors 
to creatively employ the charging discretion where it was unclear whether 
the law covered the harms the alleged victims were alleged to have suf-
fered. In the Galić indictment,86 the Prosecutor charged the offence of 
‘unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians’. Cryer termed the Prosecu-
tion’s characterisation of this crime ‘novel’, as it had not been established 
before by an international criminal tribunal that such a crime existed.87 As 
one prosecutor recalled, “what was important from our perspective in 
making that allegation was that the victims are different […] [b]y killing 
and wounding some civilians, you terrorise not just those who were 
wounded, but the rest of the civilian population”.88 In this light, the Pros-
ecution recognised that harm had been suffered by a class of persons 
where it was ambiguous whether such harm gave rise to criminal liability. 
The prosecutor additionally observed that this expansion of the law – al-
                                                   
83 Interview with P5. 
84 Interview with P12; Interview with P14; Interview with P19. 
85 Interview with P14. 
86 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, OTP, Indictment, 26 March 1999, IT-98-29-I (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/527ac8). 
87 Robert Cryer, “Prosecutor v. Galić and the War Crime of Terror Bombing”, in Israeli 
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beit in a slightly different way to what the Prosecution intended89 – served 
the objective of general deterrence.90 
13.3.2. Or Fewer Charges? 
While the above factors can generally be classed as encouraging an in-
crease in the number of charges faced by individual accused, some of 
them – and many others – also militate in favour of defendants facing a 
fewer number of criminal allegations. 
13.3.2.1. The Likely Sentence 
Prosecutors have, for example, considered excluding charges if they be-
lieve the alleged offender is likely to receive a fair sentence, with fewer 
counts, taking into account the uncharged conduct. One prosecutor ques-
tioned whether it was necessary to spend time proving additional charges 
and additional elements if they believed that the alleged offender would 
nevertheless receive a “fair sentence”.91 The prosecutor also noted that 
they did “not at all favour the kitchen sink approach of charging every 
single possible charge you can” in circumstances where more serious 
conduct also involved “relatively mild mistreatment”, wondering aloud 
whether “is it really necessary if you’re charging the person with murder, 
and that’s […] your prime case, to charge every little possible act you 
could? I don’t think so”.92 Similarly, prosecutors have considered exclud-
ing charges if they believe the alleged offender is likely to receive a 
lengthy sentence, with fewer counts, taking into account the uncharged 
conduct. This approach has a greater punitive element than the first identi-
fied approach, however it is entirely plausible that a fair sentence would 
be a lengthy sentence. One prosecutor demonstrated the relevance of this 
consideration by reflecting on the Milošević indictments. “Why did you 
bother with these huge indictments?”, they recalled people wondering, 
                                                   
89 The Chamber rejected the argument that “that actual infliction of terror is an element of the 
crime of terror”, observing instead that “the Prosecution is required to prove not only that 
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“[w]hy decide to cover three wars in ten years? Wouldn’t it have been 
enough simply to decide to prosecute Milošević for some single event, 
and have him sent away to prison for life for that, and then use the time, 
the resources, the money, to do more cases?”.93 This, they believed, would 
have been an “entirely plausible, entirely satisfactory argument” and a 
“perfectly proper approach”, yet added that this was not to say it would 
have been the correct approach.94 
13.3.2.2. Macro Managerial Considerations 
One can also not disregard macro managerial considerations. External 
demands to complete the work of tribunals expediently fall into this cate-
gory, as do budgetary and resource limitations. The discretion prosecutors 
have is how to work within them. At the ICTY, these restrictions and pres-
sures became a significant influencing factor post the mid-2000 recogni-
tion by Carla Del Ponte that the OTP’s prosecutorial policy needed to be 
revised, and the accompanying pressure from President Pillay and the 
Security Council to expedite the work of the Tribunal. In addition, the 
amendments to Rule 73bis(d) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence in July 2003 allowed the Trial Chamber to “fix a number of crime 
sites or incidents comprised in one or more of the charges in respect of 
which evidence may be presented by the Prosecutor”95 and, in May 2006, 
“invite the Prosecutor to reduce the number of counts charged in the in-
dictment”.96 
These developments “placed further pressure on the OTP in terms 
of determining which charges to proceed with”97 and made one prosecutor 
wonder “how I was going to […] get justice for the most victims with the 
limited time that I would have”.98 Reflecting on the prosecutions of Ivan 
Čermak and Ante Gotovina, a prosecutor remarked that the Trial Cham-
ber’s clear policy of trimming prosecutions “so as to wrap up the opera-
tion of ICTY as quickly as possible” meant the Office “had to be fairly 
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prudent in terms of the number of charges that we alleged against an in-
dictee”. 99 This meant that they were not charged with “every possible 
crime and in relation to every possible incident”, and the prosecution team 
was “quite selective in the drafting of the indictment as to what [they] 
would set out to prove”.100 
Similarly, after the arrest of Radovan Karadžić, the OTP’s decision 
to trim the indictment against him was made in part because “the OTP had 
been criticised by the judges in the past” and they “had, in a number of 
other cases, asked the OTP to reduce by a certain percentage the indict-
ments”.101 In the Karadžić and Mladić prosecutions, the OTP decided to 
“reduce the number of municipalities” in the indictment, “because if you 
can prove the criminal intent in 10 municipalities about a widespread and 
systematic attack against a civilian population, you don’t need to prove it 
in all areas”.102 The decision about which municipalities to exclude from 
the indictment was based on the strength of the evidence and “gravity in 
terms of numbers of victims”, noting that incidents with direct evidence 
linking the crime to the alleged perpetrator would be prioritised, even 
when they involved less victims (the prosecutor also observed that “you 
would, of course, never take a massive crime out with hundreds of vic-
tims”).103 
With the ICTR under comparable pressure to wind up its operations, 
Hassan Jallow started filing what he termed ‘lean and mean indict-
ments’.104 These indictments, he claimed, contained fewer charges than 
their predecessors and would presumably take less time to prove. 
At the SCSL, a looming completion date was one of the factors mil-
itating against the prosecution of Benjamin Yeaten. As described by one 
prosecutor, “we were expected to get everything done at that point by the 
end of 2009”, and that, in culmination with other factors, meant that it was 
not possible to join a trial of Yeaten to the trial of Charles Taylor.105 The 
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same prosecutor later observed that “if you’re a temporary court, which is 
now well-beyond its shelf life according to the sponsors, and you still 
don’t have your major suspects, that’s difficult”.106 
13.3.2.3. Trial Management 
Trial management also falls into this category of considerations. One 
prosecutor recalled that, in the preparation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
indictment against Slobodan Milošević, Senior Trial Attorney Dermot 
Groome “set an arbitrary line that any criminal event where there were 
less than ten people killed, unless there was something uniquely important 
about that”, would not be included in the indictment.107 This “shocked” 
the staff, however the prosecutor could not recall how rigorously the poli-
cy was applied.108 In any event, the prosecutor recalled that roughly the 
same number of witnesses would be required to prove one person was 
killed or ten people were killed, and that by focusing on the latter charges 
they “could get justice for more victims” in the time that was allocated for 
the trial.109 
Another ICTY prosecutor, reflecting on the Karadžić indictment, 
bore in mind the collapse of the Milošević trial when determining how to 
abbreviate the indictment. They noted that the decision to abbreviate the 
indictment was driven in part by a desire “to have a manageable trial”, 
recalling that “we thought that […] we don’t want an eight-year trial and 
we want this to be under control”.110 
13.3.2.4. Judicial Reaction 
The prosecution’s relationship with the bench has also militated in favour 
of there being a limited number of charges. One prosecutor described how 
they could “almost feel the judge wince” when they filed “eighty-eight 
counts” for “about a three-day course of conduct that’s basically mur-
der”.111 This, the prosecutor suggested, indicated that laying comparative-
ly minor charges when the course of conduct alleged involved more seri-
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ous offences would be an inappropriate use of judicial resources. There is 
a clear interest in prosecutors having a good, professional, working rela-
tionship with the bench. Laying an unreasonable number of charges risks 
reflecting poorly on a prosecutor’s professional judgement and creating an 
uncomfortable working environment. 
13.4. The Challenges of Charge Selection 
Section 13.3. has demonstrated that the decision of how many charges to 
allege against a defendant is deeply context-specific and open to subjec-
tive interpretation. There appear to be two factors that need to be consid-
ered when deciding, in light of the above, on how to best ensure the quali-
ty of these decisions. 
The first factor that appears to be relevant in understanding the 
challenges of charge selection is that international criminal prosecutors 
are hoping to achieve numerous goals through their charging practices. In 
2008, Damaška criticised international criminal courts for self-imposing a 
gargantuan number of objectives. Unlike Atlas, he argued, these courts are 
not “bodies of titanic strength, capable of carrying on their shoulders the 
burden of so many tasks”.112 
One can see this multiplicity of goals reflected in the ways that 
prosecutors have navigated the issue of how many charges to allege 
against potential defendants. Should prosecutors be trying to obtain con-
victions? Should they be attempting to advance the law or record history? 
Should they be considering the representative effect of their charging de-
cisions, and attempt to reflect the criminality, geographical spread, means 
of structural commission, temporal spread, or classes of alleged victims? 
Or all of the above? It is incorrect to proceed on the assumption that these 
questions have answers. 
This leads into the second, and more pragmatic issue. The charging 
discretion is one that is steeped in subjectivity. To again quote and appro-
priate Schabas, there is no ‘iPhone app’ that tells prosecutors what is rele-
vant and the weight to be given to any one particular factor.113 People are, 
quite simply, going to have different ideas about what are or are not rele-
vant considerations in any given situation. 
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In light of the two challenges identified above, it is evident that 
quality control cannot be simply a question of identifying and applying 
normative benchmarks. As Jan Klabbers has argued, “[i]t is tempting to 
give in to the kneejerk deontological reflex and devise ethical codes for 
experts, a set of rules that would apply to experts, whether they render 
advice, participate as decision makers or act as gate-keepers between ex-
pert knowledge and political decision making”.114 Yet any rules will al-
ways be simultaneously over-inclusive or under-inclusive, need to be ap-
plied by humans, and be incapable of assigning weights to different con-
siderations while maintaining a necessary level of flexibility. “Important 
as rules are (legal or otherwise)”, argues Klabbers, “they are, eventually, 
better seen as signposts than as absolutes. They offer guidance and ought 
to be followed, but not blindly or at all costs”.115 
13.5. Quality Control and the Value of Argument 
So then what can be said for ensuring the quality of exercises of the 
charging discretion? As an alternative to a normative approach, it may be 
that quality control over the charging discretion can be understood 
through Thomas Risse’s ‘logic of arguing’ – itself an advancement of Jür-
gen Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Historically, two main-
stream theories have attempted to explain why actors engage in the con-
duct they do. The ‘logic of consequentialism’, which focusses on rational 
choice, posits that actors will engage in conduct that complies with norms 
until such point that it is no longer in their best interests to do so. On the 
other hand, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ essentially claims that actors 
engage in conduct that complies with norms because the norm forms part 
of their social identity, even though it may not be in their best interests to 
do so.116 
Yet Risse was dissatisfied that neither theory appropriately account-
ed for those situations in which there was ambiguity surrounding the 
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norms that applied to a given problem (if any), or indeed how actors iden-
tified the methods through which this ambiguity would be resolved. As 
such, he claimed, it was necessary to emphasise the argumentative process 
in which actors engage for the purpose of “truth seeking with the aim of 
reaching a mutual understanding based on reasoned consensus”.117 The 
process of communication through argument “is motivated by the desire 
to find out the “truth” with regard to the facts in the world or to figure out 
“the right thing to do” in a commonly-defined situation”.118 It is this latter 
motivation that is relevant to prosecutorial discretion. 
Risse identified four preconditions that should be conducive to 
achieving the desires he described. First is the “existence of a common 
lifeworld provided by a high degree of international institutionalisation in 
the respective issue-area”. The ‘common lifeworld’ that Risse referred to 
“consists of a shared culture, a common system of norms and rules per-
ceived as legitimate, and the social identity of actors being capable of 
communicating and acting”.119 It is the environment in which actors have 
been socialised and determines the limits of their understandings. The 
lifeworld establishes “the forms of the intersubjectivity of possible under-
standing”, something in which actors move within but can never leave.120 
Second, there should be “conscious efforts by actors to construct such a 
common lifeworld through narratives that enable them to communicate in 
a meaningful way”; third, “[u]ncertainty of interests and/or lack of 
knowledge about the situation among the actors”; and fourth, the presence 
of “[i]nternational institutions based on nonhierarchical relations enabling 
dense interactions in informal network-like settings”.121 Risse’s conclu-
sion was that arguments are more likely to occur in a sphere of interaction 
the greater the degree of uncertainty actors hold about their own interests 
and identities; the less common knowledge they possess “about the situa-
tion in which they find themselves”; and the “more apparently irreconcil-
                                                   
117 Thomas Risse, ““Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics”, in Internation-
al Organization, 2000, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 1–2. 
118 Ibid., p. 12. 
119 Ibid., p. 11. 
120 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume Two: Lifeworld and 
Systems: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Thomas McCarthy trans., Polity Press, 1991, 
p. 111. 
121 Risse, 2000, p. 19, see above note 117. 
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able differences prevent them from reaching an optimal rather than a 
merely satisfactory solution for a widely perceived problem”.122 
It is apparent that Risse’s four preconditions are met in the context 
of international prosecutors exercising the charging discretion. The com-
mon lifeworld that international prosecutors occupy is evident through 
their engagement in the post-1993 efforts to develop systems through 
which international and hybrid organisations can legitimately usurp the 
State’s monopoly over the use of coercive measures against the subjects 
of their jurisdiction with respect to the prosecution of genocide, aggres-
sion, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They work in the same 
cities, crossing paths at conferences, professional gatherings, and social 
events. Their concerns lie not just with the tribunal in which they work, 
but the success of international criminal justice more broadly. They are 
guided by integrity and a desire to do what is best in the circumstances 
they are confronted with. International prosecutors seek to strengthen the 
corpus of international criminal law and procedure for the purposes of 
ending impunity and doing ‘justice for the victims’. Yet at the same time, 
the discretionary power they wield is exercised in, at best, a vague norma-
tive framework that provides little to no clear practical guidance. There is 
ambiguity about the relevant considerations and the weight to be afforded 
to any of them. Finally, all international prosecutors act within interna-
tional criminal courts, giving rise to a horizontal structure in which they 
can communicate and argue with each other on equal footing. 
When seen in this light, discretionary choices are not seen as ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ in a normative sense. Instead, they can be seen as an attempt 
by prosecutors to determine the most appropriate conduct in the circum-
stances in a never-ending cycle of interpretation in which social identities 
are expressed and constructed, and opinions about what is ‘appropriate’ 
come and go.123 The practice of exercising discretion is better seen as an 
argument between prosecutors themselves and the broader epistemic 
community, rather than one in which rules are applied or interests are ad-
vanced. 
                                                   
122 Ibid., p. 33. 
123 Yet, in contrast to Risse, it is unlikely that ‘norms’ develop through this process. For a 
powerful attack on the idea that something can be right or wrong (from a moral perspec-
tive), see Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, in Philosophy, 1958, vol. 33, 
no. 124, p. 1. 
13. Challenges in Charge Selection: Considerations Informing the 
Number of Charges and Cumulative Charging Practices 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 733 
Importantly, for this collective attempt to identify the right course of 
action in a circumstance to succeed, the arguments must be “open to other 
participants and be public in nature”.124 This is critical for the purposes of 
quality control. If prosecutors do not engage with the broader epistemic 
community, or even each other, regarding the reasons why they took par-
ticular decisions, the quality of future decisions cannot be bettered. As 
such, when prosecutors do make discretionary choices, it is essential from 
a quality control perspective that they are willing to openly discuss the 
reasons why they took these decisions. Only then is it possible to fully 
embrace and learn from the collective knowledge and experience present 
among the broad international prosecutorial college. Under this approach, 
quality is not assessed by reference to normative standards, but rather by 
the willingness of prosecutors to openly discuss the motivations under-
pinning their decisions and persuade others as to their appropriateness 
while remaining open to reassessing their position based on what they see 
as better arguments. 
13.6. Conclusion 
The charging discretion is complex. This chapter has focussed on merely 
one aspect of it: the assessment of how many charges to allege against an 
individual accused. Through the empirical statistical and qualitative sur-
veys in Sections 13.2. and 13.3., this chapter has attempted to reveal the 
fragmented practices and subjective rationales that have historically in-
formed how the charging discretion has been exercised. Specifically, Sec-
tion 13.4. argued that attempts to develop normative frameworks through 
which the quality of these decisions can be assessed are likely to be 
thwarted by a need for flexibility and context-specificity. In this light, 
Section 13.5. argued in favour of a new approach to assessing the quality 
of the charging discretion. When the exercise of discretion is seen as part 
of a process of argumentation, it becomes possible to see the quality of 
decisions by the extent to which prosecutors are willing to debate the mo-
tivations behind their choices with the broader epistemic community, en-
gage with criticisms, and accept them if they are persuaded by their ap-
propriateness. 
Finally, it should be remembered that international prosecutions 
take place in a lifeworld with a relatively short history. International pros-
                                                   
124 Risse, 2000, p. 11, see above note 117. 
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ecutors do not have hundreds of years of domestic experience, collective 
knowledge, and a well-refined lifeworld to draw upon when exercising 
the charging discretion. The lifeworld that does exist needs to be devel-
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14.1. Introduction and General Proposition 
A fair trial requires the disclosure to an accused person of incriminating 
evidence to be used against them at trial, plus exculpatory material, and 
anything that is ‘material’ to defence preparation for trial. These, in a nut-
shell, are the long-established legal principles governing disclosure. 
The consequences of violating these principles – intentionally or 
otherwise – are also well settled; after a declaration of a violation, witness 
testimony or the trial could be adjourned, or in extreme cases temporarily 
or permanently stayed. Potentially, the evidence could be excluded from 
use at trial. Personal sanctions could even be ordered against an ‘offend-
ing’ prosecution official. On appeal, a conviction could be overturned, or 
a mistrial declared. 
Despite specific rules of procedure and evidence (‘RPE’), and nu-
merous decisions and judgments of international criminal courts and tri-
bunals compelling the prosecution to disclose this material to the defence, 
the system is far from perfect. Enormous unnecessary prosecution, de-
fence and judicial resources are expended in resolving disclosure issues 
                                                   
* David Re is the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(since 2013). Previously, he was an international judge of the Court of Bosnia and Herze-
govina in Sarajevo and a senior prosecuting trial attorney at the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) in The Hague. In Australia he worked as a bar-
rister, a prosecutor and a solicitor in private practice, and also as a research officer for the 
New South Wales Attorney General’s Department. He was an NGO observer at the negoti-
ations for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. This chapter is 
based on a presentation at the Indian Law Institute, see David Re, “Rethinking Disclosure 
in Core International Cases”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (https://www.
cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-re/). The author thanks those who provided comments on the 
draft, and in particular, Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova, President, Kosovo Specialist Cham-
bers. 
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and disputes. The contention here is that solutions lie in rethinking how 
disclosure is handled rather than in revising the fundamental principles. 
Writing critically about the consequences of late or non-disclosure, 
and particularly from the defence perspective, is not particularly difficult; 
finding workable solutions is more challenging. This chapter therefore 
tries to propose a practical resolution that builds on existing precedents 
and also conforms with the courts’ and tribunals’ statutory instruments 
and international human rights law. 
To understand why requires an appreciation of the systemic ‘block-
ages’ in the existing disclosure structures and practices. 
The starting point is that international prosecutors are both the pri-
mary investigator and a party to proceedings. In investigating crimes or 
situations, they collect an enormous quantity of material – in documentary 
and digital form. But very little of it will be used as evidence at trial. 
Due to the conditions often confronting investigators on the ground 
in conflict or post-conflict situations, the collection or seizure of material 
may be more sweeping than targeted. The ICTY is a case in point as in 
some cases it took many years for its Office of the Prosecutor to gain ac-
cess, in the former Yugoslavia, to military and governmental records nec-
essary for case presentation in court.1 As a consequence, its officials often 
gathered – or seized – large ‘collections’ of documents, when they could, 
some of which took some years to catalogue.2 
A legitimate fear may exist that the material must be collected if 
possible, then and there, using the principle of take now and sift later. 
Another more mundane reality of international criminal investigations is 
that inevitably more material than can ever be used in a trial is gathered, 
including that used for investigative leads and indeed the statements of 
potential witnesses. This is especially acute in the preliminary investigato-
ry stages in which its ultimate direction is understandably unknown, in-
cluding who if anyone may eventually be indicted. 
                                                   
1 Based on the author’s personal knowledge – from working in the ICTY’s Office of the 
Prosecutor between 2002 and 2008 – that some States subject to the ICTY’s jurisdiction 
had motives not to co-operate with the Tribunal and to provide access to specified docu-
ments, or classes of documents or witnesses. 
2 This too comes from the author’s first-hand experience of the ICTY prosecution’s evidence 
collection and vault. 
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Equally immense collections of digital material now supplement, or 
substitute for, these vast quantities of physical documents. Prosecutors 
acting as investigators now amass enormous digital evidence collections. 
The predictable consequence is the accumulation of far too much infor-
mation, in multiple formats; greatly exceeding what could ever be of use 
either to an investigation or a prosecution.3 This is accentuated by the 
time taken to get cases before courts, especially where accused persons 
may not be apprehended for years after arrest warrants are issued, which 
may in turn have occurred some years after the prosecution first collected 
the material. And additionally, perhaps without it having made a connec-
tion between the eventual accused and the material viewed in the investi-
gation’s initial stages. 
One of the main challenges facing investigators in obtaining docu-
ments ‘in the field’ – and indeed in receiving digital evidence – is linguis-
tic. Investigators and lawyers might not speak, read or understand the 
language of a situation under investigation. 4  Obtaining qualified and 
trusted language assistants who can review documents in the field – or 
even in the office – is very challenging if the language of the information 
found or sought is not widely spoken. Ideally, potential evidence should 
be reviewed before it is collected or catalogued.5 But this may prove to be 
impossible. 
                                                   
3 The author’s experience is that, unfortunately, this does not necessarily restrain parties – 
and in particular, prosecutors – from ‘dumping’ extraneous ‘just in case’ material on exhib-
it and even witness lists, causing them to balloon beyond realistic judicial case manage-
ment control. See, for example, STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Judgment, 18 August 
2020, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3839/20200818/R331945-R334626/EN/dm, Annex A, Procedural 
History, paras. 61–80; see also, Separate Opinion of Judge David Re, paras. 170–220 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/gcoqu8). 
4 At the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), information provided to the prosecution at the 
preliminary examination stage may later become disclosable to the defence if an investiga-
tion and charges against an accused person eventuate. 
5 The author had personal experience of this in leading ICTY prosecution missions to exam-
ine military and government document archives in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
the 2000s, using analysts, investigators and lawyers – some utilising language assistants – 
and copying relevant documents in situ in the archives and then electronically entering 
them into the relevant evidence collection while there ‘in the field’. This is more expensive 
and time-consuming as it requires an on the spot screening assessment of material for rele-
vance, and hence more personnel are needed, but in the author’s view, it is far preferable – 
where it is feasible – to simply ‘grabbing’ as many documents as possible and taking them 
all back to the office. Wholesale seizures may represent a false economy when the time 
and resources spent later examining them and searching them for disclosable material is 
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Having collected the information, in whatever form, the prosecution 
is obliged to store and catalogue it, and additionally, to search it for mate-
rial disclosable to the defence. This is a labour intensive, time-consuming 
and potentially fruitless exercise, which is frequently delegated to junior 
staff.6 
The material collected can be divided into several categories: open 
source material, or that which is publicly available to anyone (namely, 
who is motivated enough to find it); witness generated material such as 
‘statements’ taken by prosecution officials and material provided by these 
witnesses; information from fact-finding bodies which can include that 
from the two previous categories; ‘public’ records, for example, govern-
ment and military records; and material provided with conditions attached, 
such as that its existence cannot be disclosed, that is usually used to gen-
erate leads and other evidence. The conditionally provided information 
typically comes from governments, their specialised agencies, such as 
intelligence or diplomatic, and inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations (‘NGOs’). Another category is of artefacts and forensic ma-
terial, like blood samples, and ballistic fragments and human remains 
recovered from graves. 
The prosecution must store and manage this material. Some will be 
received in an electronic form – making it easier to catalogue – while oth-
er material will be in hard copy, meaning that it must be converted into an 
electronic form before storing. Artefacts and biological material also have 
to be securely stored and electronically catalogued, usually by photo-
graphing. 
The main issue here is how to ensure that the defence of an accused 
person has access to the things that are necessary for their trial prepara-
tion – either inculpatory, exculpatory, or ‘material’ to defence preparations. 
                                                                                                                        
calculated and compared to a more targeted and contemporaneous extraction of infor-
mation. 
6 It can also be described as a soul-destroying task, and consequently in the author’s experi-
ence it has been delegated to the most junior employees, including interns. But as tedious 
as this can be, such a delegation decision could be misguided; sometimes only the most 
experienced lawyers have the skills needed to make judgment calls about what should be 
disclosed. The corollary of this would be experienced prosecution staff expending valuable 
time on this task rather than on trial preparation. Both are necessary, but arguably their 
time is far better spent on the latter; hence the plea to rethink how mass disclosure is done. 
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The most sensitive categories are those relating to witness state-
ments and witness generated material and information conditionally pro-
vided to a prosecutor’s office with non-disclosure stipulations. The disclo-
sure of open source material – with some caveats – should not trouble a 
prosecutor’s office; it should be available in an easily accessible and 
searchable format. 
‘Public’ documents – such as those from military and government 
archives – should fall into the same category. Artefacts are available for 
inspection, and where necessary, independent testing by experts engaged 
by the defence. 
Disclosing fact-finding material, for example, from non-
governmental organisations such as Human Rights Watch, or inter-
governmental organisations like United Nations bodies with fact-finding 
or humanitarian assistance mandates, may present some complexities. It 
often contains sensitive witness-related material, the unconditional disclo-
sure of which might potentially endanger witnesses or providers. These 
documents may fall into either category. 
As prosecutors’ offices have either collected or been given this ma-
terial, they become its custodian. This imposes a colossal burden on them 
to search the collections to find material that is legally disclosable. A fail-
ure to search, or having searched, either not disclosing it or disclosing it 
late, can result in sanctions, or worse. 
The prosecution – in the broadest sense of ‘the office’, which is of 
course composed of humans7 – may not always know what is ‘material’ to 
the defence of an accused person. Appreciating what is potentially excul-
patory, or may discredit a prosecution witness or evidence, is usually easi-
er. But expecting prosecution personnel to try and find all of this ‘materi-
al’ information is both impractical and unreasonable in circumstances 
where the information is voluminous, and in particular where the extent of 
a defence is unknown. 
Moreover, in what could be seen as a ‘disclosure paradox’, the de-
fence may react to prosecution disclosure by modifying an existing in-
tended defence. The prosecution disclosure could of itself therefore trig-
ger a defence alteration in strategy (but one that was already unknown to 
the prosecution). So, by virtue of one disclosure that causes the defence to 
                                                   
7 With all our non-algorithmic searching imperfections and frailties of judgment. 
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change its defence strategy, the prosecution could extend its own disclo-
sure obligations further by making more things in its possession potential-
ly material to the defence. But how is the prosecution to know this? 
This burden should therefore be shifted from the prosecution to the 
defence to search the large bulk of information currently held in prosecu-
tion evidence collections for information material to defence preparations. 
Of course, anything that the prosecution intends to use as evidence at trial 
or has been submitted to a judge or chamber to confirm an indictment 
must be disclosed. But ascertaining what is material to the preparation of 
the defence for trial should not be solely the prosecution’s role. The de-
fence should inform the prosecution, and if necessary, the chambers, of 
what is potentially material. Equally important is ensuring that accused 
persons have the necessary resources, in other words funding and staffing 
of their defence teams, to search this material. 
This role should also not be transferred to the judiciary; the cham-
bers are not parties to adversarial proceedings and should only be brought 
into inter-parties disclosure disputes as a last resort in unresolvable situa-
tions. 
Since 2003 the ICTY, and thereafter the International Residual 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (‘IRMCT’), has used an ‘electronic 
disclosure suite’ (‘EDS’), managed by the tribunal’s registry, for disclo-
sure. All defence counsel have access to the EDS, which is where most 
prosecution material has been placed. The prosecution retains responsibil-
ity for searching its own restricted witness and otherwise sensitive materi-
al. This model should be followed in other international criminal law in-
stitutions. Open source, government archival and most fact-finding mis-
sion material should be replicated and placed in a separate evidence col-
lection maintained by the court or tribunal’s registry, thus creating a ‘neu-
tral’ custodian. This allows a form of objective third-party oversight of 
part of the process. 
Under this model, the prosecution would retain responsibility for 
maintaining its own database of witness-generated and other sensitive 
material, and for searching this and disclosing any relevant material. The 
prosecution would also retain its statutory obligation to search and to dis-
close anything that it found in its entire collection that was disclosable. 
Consequently, the prosecution would have no positive obligation to search 
the registry’s (replicated) electronic disclosure suite collection for disclos-
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able material. This is the essence of the proposal. However, the prosecu-
tion, naturally, should comprehensively review whatever it has in-house. 
Chambers, in ensuring a fair trial, obviously retain an overall re-
sponsibility for supervising this process, including, if needed, examining 
disputed material for themselves (ex parte the other party) to determine 
whether it should be disclosed in whole, in part, or in some redacted form. 
But the primary responsibility should rest with the parties. Judges should 
not attempt to micro-manage disclosure between the parties. 
For context, it is necessary to understand the legal principles gov-
erning disclosure. Placing it in its historical framework also assists. The 
basic principles, it must be emphasised, are not that complicated; the sting 
in the tail is in their application. The quantity of international decisions on 
disclosure since 1994 is vast; and a smattering is referenced below. Addi-
tionally, in writing this chapter, some experienced senior prosecution and 
defence lawyers were informally interviewed in an attempt to obtain the 
litigant’s perspective; some of their views are referenced in the text and 
footnotes. 
14.2. Disclosure Principles 
Like most of the modern international criminal procedural rules, those 
regulating the disclosure of material to the defence derive from the Inter-
national Military Tribunal (‘IMT’) at Nuremberg8 and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo,9 and their rules and practices. 
One fair trial right for accused persons before these tribunals was timely 
access to prosecution material10 in what at each was admittedly a very 
expeditious trial. 
                                                   
8 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Europe-
an Axis, 8 August 1945 (‘London Agreement’), reprinted in IMT, Trial of the Major War 
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg: 14 November 1945–1 
October 1946: Volume 1: Official Documents, Nuremberg, 1947, pp. 8–9 (‘Trial of the Ma-
jor War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Volume 1’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/844f64); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Part of the 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/64ffdd). 
9 Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
19 January 1946 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/242328); Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946 (‘Tokyo Charter’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/a3c41c). 
10 See, for example, Fergal Gaynor, Dov Jacobs, Mark Klamberg and Vladimir Tochilovsky, 
“Law of Evidence”, in Göran Sluiter, Håkan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev 
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To these now are added the expanded principles of international 
human rights law, originating in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Hu-
man Rights and thereafter developed in the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)11 and numerous other statutory 
instruments, the case law and opinions of relevant courts and advisory 
bodies. 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters12 specified that the prosecutors 
had to provide relevant translated material to the defence in advance of 
the opening of the trial, including the indictment. The Nuremberg Rules 
mandated the pre-trial disclosure within 30 days of the start of the trial of 
the documents accompanying the indictment, but translated.13 When the 
prosecution case closed, the IMT directed the defence counsel to submit 
the evidence they intended to rely upon, including witness names, and to 
what they would testify. The prosecution had no statutory right of access 
to the defence material and the Tribunal did not direct the defence to pro-
vide it.14 
Under long standing international human rights law principles, ac-
cused persons have a right to be informed of the charges against them.15 
                                                                                                                        
and Salvatore Zappalà (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 1085. 
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Article 14 pro-
vides that “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law” (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
2838f3). The ICCPR entered into force in 1976. See also Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 10 December 1948, Article 10: “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights 
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him” (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
de5d83). 
12 London Agreement, Article 16, see above note 8; while in Article 9(b) of the Tokyo Char-
ter, the indictment was to be provided to the accused “in adequate time for defense”, see 
above note 9. 
13 IMT Rules of Procedure, 29 October 1945, Rules 2(a) and 3, reprinted in Trial of the Ma-
jor War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Volume 1, pp. 19–23. 
14 See Gaynor, Jacobs, Klamberg and Tochilovsky, 2013, p. 1099, see above note 10. 
15 See, for example, Article 6(3)(a) of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 No-
vember 1950 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8267cb) and Article 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR, 
see above note 11, which provide the right “to be informed promptly, and in detail in a lan-
guage which he understands of the nature and cause of the accusation against him”; see al-
so Article 8(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1152cf), which provides the right to “prior notification in 
detail to the accused of the charges against him”. The case-law of the European Court of 
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International human rights law instruments and case law also mandate an 
accused person having adequate time and facilities to prepare their de-
fence. 
Article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR provides: 
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, eve-
ryone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, 
in full equality: 
[…] 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own 
choosing.16 
The UN Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 32 has 
interpreted this, finding that: 
“Adequate facilities” must include access to documents and 
other evidence; this access must include all materials that the 
prosecution plans to offer in court against the accused or that 
are exculpatory. Exculpatory material should be understood 
as including not only material establishing innocence but al-
so other evidence that could assist the defence (e.g. indica-
tions that a confession was not voluntary). In cases of a 
claim that evidence was obtained in violation of article 7 of 
the Covenant, information about the circumstances in which 
such evidence was obtained must be made available to allow 
an assessment of such a claim. If the accused does not speak 
the language in which the proceedings are held, but is repre-
sented by counsel who is familiar with the language, it may 
be sufficient that the relevant documents in the case file are 
made available to counsel.17 
                                                                                                                        
Human Rights (‘ECHR’) holds that a fair trial requires that indictments include the charges 
and form of liability alleged; see, for example, ECHR, Penev v. Bulgaria, Judgment, 7 
January 2012, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0107JUD002049404, para. 44 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/989a14); ECHR, Varela Geis v. Spain, Judgment, 5 March 2013, ECLI:CE:
ECHR:2013:0305JUD006100509, para. 42. 
16 See above note 11. 
17 General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a 
fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, para. 33 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/17c458); citing Views: Communication No. 451/1991, Harward v. Norway, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/451/1991, 18 August 1994, para. 9.5 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
syb36n). 
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Security Council Resolution 808 in 1993 established the ICTY, and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) was established 
by Resolution 955 in 1994. The Statutes of both essentially replicate the 
right to a fair trial set out in the ICCPR’s Article 14.18 
The Secretary-General’s report on Resolution 808, stated that it was 
axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect 
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of 
the accused at all stages of its proceedings. In the view of the 
Secretary-General, such […] standards are, in particular, 
                                                   
18 ICTY Statute, 25 May 1993, Article 21 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b4f63b): 
1. All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal. 
2. In the determination of charges against him, the accused shall be entitled to a 
fair and public hearing, subject to article 22 of the Statute. 
3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the 
provisions of the present Statute. 
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present 
Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in 
full equality: 
(a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he under-
stands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and 
to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
(c) to be tried without undue delay; 
(d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through le-
gal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have 
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to 
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to 
pay for it; 
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him; 
(f) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in the International Tribunal; 
(g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
See also ICTR Statute, 8 November 1994, Article 20 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
8732d6); IRMCT Statute, 22 December 2010, Article 19 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
30782d); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’), 16 January 2002, Article 
17 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa0e20); and Statute of the Residual Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (‘RSCSL’), 16 January 2002, Article 17 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
4768bc). 
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contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.19 
This implicitly included its interpretation and application. And the 
statutes of all international courts and tribunals contain these fair trial 
guarantees.20 The International Law Commission’s 1994 Draft Statute for 
an international criminal court also replicated Article 14 of the ICCPR.21 
The ICC Statute also mirrors these and specifies the presumption of inno-
cence.22 
Prosecutor’s offices and defence counsel have distinct statutory 
roles. This cannot be emphasised enough in the context of adversarial 
proceedings. The Prosecutor’s is to investigate and prosecute. The others’, 
by contrast, is far more limited – confined to defending an accused person 
against charges of having committed specific crimes. This could of course 
also involve defence investigations.23 
                                                   
19 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 106 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c12981). 
20 ICTY Statute, Article 20(1) “Commencement and conduct of trial proceedings”: “The Trial 
Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conduct-
ed in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights 
of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses”, see above note 
18; ICTR Statute, Article 19(1), see above note 18; IRMCT Statute, Article 18(1), see 
above note 18; STL Statute, 30 May 2007, Articles 16(2), 16(4)(c) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/da0bbb); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 
64(2): “The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted 
with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims 
and witnesses” (‘ICC Statute’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9). The SCSL Statute 
has no equivalent except in Article 17(4)(c) “to be tried without undue delay” under 
“Rights of the Accused”, which mirrors the same provisions in Article 21 of the ICTY 
Statute and Article 20 of the ICTR Statute. 
21 Additionally, Article 41(2) “Rights of the accused”, provided that “Exculpatory evidence 
that becomes available to the Procuracy prior to the conclusion of the trial shall be made 
available to the defence. In case of doubt as to the application of this paragraph or as to the 
admissibility of the evidence, the Trial Chamber shall decide” (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/17ad09). 
22 ICC Statute, Articles 66 and 67, see above note 20. 
23 See, for example, STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision Denying 
Merhi Defence Motion Seeking Disclosure of Material Relating to Potential Users of Pur-
ple Phone 231, 13 September 2017, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3320/20170913/R299893-
R299913/EN/dm, para. 33 (‘Ayyash et al. Trial Decision Denying Merhi Defence Motion’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e16ae3). 
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The right to prosecution disclosure is not unlimited. The ICC’s Ap-
peals Chamber has held that material “while not directly linked to exoner-
ating or incriminating evidence, may otherwise be material to the prepara-
tion of the defence”.24 However, this should not be read too broadly as 
“the right to disclosure is not unlimited” as what it material to defence 
preparations “will depend upon the specific circumstances of the case”.25 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’), for example, has held that the 
rules regulating disclosure therefore cannot be interpreted as allowing the 
defence an absolute right of access to all information just because it is in 
the prosecution’s possession.26 
Another core principle is that prosecutors are presumed to be acting 
in good faith in making their disclosure decisions.27 The mere fact that a 
chamber, after itself inspecting undisclosed prosecution material, may 
disagree with a prosecutorial decision not to disclose and orders disclo-
sure, does not of itself equate to bad faith. 
                                                   
24 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dylo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo against the Oral 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18 January 2008, 11 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1433, pa-
ra. 77 (‘Lubanga Appeals Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo Against the Oral 
Decision of Trial Chamber I’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f5bc1e); ICC, Situation in 
Uganda, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Request for 
Disclosure and Remedy for Late Disclosure, 28 September 2018, ICC-02/04-01/15-1351, 
para. 18 (‘Ongwen Trial Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/555655). 
25 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and 
Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdallah 
Banda Abakaer Nourain and Mr Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus against the decision of 
Trial Chamber IV of 23 January 2013 entitled “Decision on the Defence’s Request for Dis-
closure of Documents in the Possession of the Office of the Prosecutor”, 28 August 2013, 
ICC-02/05-03/09-501, para. 39 (‘Banda and Jerbo Appeals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/26d917). 
26 Ayyash et al. Trial Decision Denying Merhi Defence Motion, paras. 32–33, see above note 
23; STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Disclosure of List of Stu-
dent Information, 9 April 2014 STL-11-01/T/TC/F1490/20140409/R258118-R258126/EN/
dm, para. 13 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0173b1). 
27 See, for example, ICTR, Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Mo-
tion for Disclosure, 4 March 2010, ICTR-99-54A-R68, para. 14 (‘Kamuhanda Appeals 
Decision on Motion for Disclosure’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e61411). ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Bicamumpaka’s Motion for 
Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence (MDR Files), 17 November 2004, ICTR-99-50-T, pa-
ra. 14 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3f54ee); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 17 December 2004, IT-95-14/2-A, para. 183 (‘Kordić and 
Čerkez Appeals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/738211). 
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The defence may be prejudiced by the prosecution either failing to 
disclose something that was subject to disclosure, or by its late disclosure. 
Generally, before a chamber will provide a remedy for this, a party must 
demonstrate material prejudice.28 If the remedy sought is disclosure, the 
defence “has to describe clearly and comprehensively what it requests 
from the Chamber when formulating its relief sought”.29 
14.2.1. Exculpatory Material 
The statutory instruments of the ICTY, ICTR, IRMCT and the STL re-
quire the prosecution, as soon as practicable, to disclose to the defence 
any exculpatory or mitigating information in its “possession or actual 
knowledge”. At the SCSL and its residuary mechanism the RSCSL this is 
expressed as “evidence known to the Prosecutor”.30 Article 67(2) of the 
ICC Statute, by contrast, confines this to “evidence in the Prosecutor’s 
possession or control”. These principles derive from the need to ensure a 
fair trial under international human rights law. 
Accordingly, at the ICTY the “significance of the fulfilment of the 
duty placed upon the Prosecution by virtue of Rule 68 [to disclose excul-
patory material] has been stressed by the Appeals Chamber, and the obli-
                                                   
28 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 19 April 2004, IT-98-33-A, para. 
153 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/86a108); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgement, 23 May 2005, ICTR-98-44A-A, para. 262 (‘Kajelijeli Appeals 
Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2b7d1c); STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., 
Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion Seeking Interim Relief for Late Disclosure, 25 No-
vember 2014, STL-11-01/T/TC/F1766/20141125/R270154-R270159/EN/dm, para. 11 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0c549c). 
29 See, for example, Ongwen Trial Decision, para. 7, see above note 24. 
30 ICTY RPE, 11 February 1994, Rule 68(i) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/30df50); ICTR 
RPE, 29 June 1995, Rule 68(A) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a7c6); and IRMCT 
RPE, 8 June 2012, Rule 73(A) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/n7lau1): “the Prosecutor 
shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the Defence any material which in the actual 
knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the ac-
cused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence”; Rule 113(A) of the STL RPE re-
fers to “any information in his possession or actual knowledge”, 20 March 2009 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/lc66t7). Under Rule 68(B) of the SCSL RPE and Rule 68(B) of 
the RSCSL RPE, the Prosecutor must make a statement “disclosing to the Defence the ex-
istence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest the inno-
cence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of prosecution evi-
dence. The Prosecutor shall be under a continuing obligation to disclose any such exculpa-
tory material”, 16 January 2002 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4c2a6b, https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/lt008t). 
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gation to disclose under Rule 68 has been considered as important as the 
obligation to prosecute”.31 However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has held 
that: 
The Prosecution is under no legal obligation to consult with 
an accused to reach a decision on what material suggests the 
innocence or mitigates the guilt of an accused or affects the 
credibility of the Prosecution’s evidence. The issue of what 
evidence might be exculpatory evidence is primarily a facts-
based judgement made by and under the responsibility of the 
Prosecution.32 
While true, it must be emphasised that when making such an inter-
nal and hence ex parte decision, the prosecution must exercise particular 
care to ensure due process. 
In relation to the ICTR equivalent of the EDS, the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber in 2008 found that the prosecution’s obligation to disclose for 
Rule 68 material “extends simply beyond making available its entire evi-
dence collection in a searchable format. A search engine cannot serve as a 
surrogate for the Prosecution’s individualized consideration of the materi-
al in its possession”.33 
Regarding ‘internal work product’, the STL Appeals Chamber de-
termined that what may be considered as the prosecution’s internal work 
product may be exculpatory. It held that there “has been general ac-
ceptance that, although characterized as internal, a document may none-
theless be subject to disclosure to an accused if it suggests the innocence 
or mitigates the guilt of the accused or if it affects the credibility of the 
Prosecutor’s evidence”.34 
                                                   
31 Kordić and Čerkez Appeals Judgment, para. 183, see above note 27; citing ICTY, Prosecu-
tor v. Blaškić, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 29 July 2004, IT-95-14-A, para. 264 (‘Blaškić 
Appeals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/88d8e6). 
32 Kordić and Čerkez Appeals Judgment, para. 183, see above note 27; citing Blaškić Appeals 
Judgment, para. 264, see above note 31. 
33 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Disclosure Obligations, 23 January 2008, ICTR-98-44-
AR73.11, para. 10 (‘Karemera et al. Appeals Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory 
Appeal’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f13f94). 
34 STL, In the Matter of El Sayed, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Partial Appeal by Mr. El 
Sayed of Pre-Trial Judge’s Decision of 12 May 2011, 19 July 2011, CH/AC/2011/01, para. 
97 (‘El Sayed Appeals Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d3da38); STL, Prose-
cutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision Denying the Sabra Defence Application for 
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Before a Chamber can order the disclosure of exculpatory material 
under the applicable Rule, the Party seeking disclosure must: (i) specifi-
cally identify the material sought, (ii) present a prima facie showing of the 
probable exculpatory nature of the material, and (iii) prove that the mate-
rial is in the custody or control of the Prosecution.35 
On its face, as noted above, this may present a problem to defence 
counsel who may only suspect that the prosecution is holding material 
that may be exculpatory. No matter how well motivated prosecution offi-
cials are, the possibility always exists of undisclosed exculpatory infor-
mation remaining in the prosecution’s possession. 36  This possibility is 
amplified by assigning the searching of holdings for disclosable infor-
mation to junior staff. And it is further magnified by the challenges of 
finding this information in collections of evidence in languages not spo-
ken or read by the reviewing officials, including in videos, evidence on 
CDs or other electronic forms. It may also be delegated – with instruc-
tions of what to look for – to language assistants. Inevitably things may be 
overlooked. This is another reason for an electronic disclosure suite. 
The obligation to disclose may be lifted if the evidence is both 
known to and is accessible to the Defence.37 An example is open session 
                                                                                                                        
Disclosure of a UNIIIC Internal Memorandum on Mr. Wissam Al-Hassan (Witness 
PRH680) Under Rules 110(B) and 113, 7 February 2018, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3562/
20180207/R306883-R306898/EN/dm, para. 12 (‘Ayyash et al. Trial Decision re Wissam 
Al-Hassan’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ce9a0f); STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., 
Trial Chamber, Reasons for the Trial Chamber’s Decision Dismissing the Sabra Defence 
Application to Order Prosecution Disclosure of Documents Related to Mr. Michael Taylor, 
13 July 2018, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3710/20180713/R311213-R311231/EN/dm, para. 32 
(‘Ayyash et al. Trial Decision re Michael Taylor’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
e8b492). 
35 See, for example, ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Appeals Chamber, Decision on 
“Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal from Decision on Tenth Rule 68 Motion”, 14 May 2008, 
ICTR-98-44-AR73.13, para. 9 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a849fd); Kamuhanda Ap-
peals Decision on Motion for Disclosure, para. 14, see above note 27; Kordić and Čerkez 
Appeals Judgment, para. 179, see above note 27. 
36 This is shown by the disclosures of such information common to international trials that 
continue into appellate proceedings and sometimes beyond. 
37 See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Appel-
lant’s Motion for the Production of Material, Suspension or Extension of the Briefing 
Schedule, and Additional Filings, 26 September 2000, IT-95-14-A, para. 38 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/8ff583); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Bralo, Appeals Chamber, Decision on 
Motions for Access to Ex Parte Portions of the Record on Appeal and for Disclosure of 
Mitigating Material, 30 August 2006, IT-95-17-A, para. 30 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
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testimony of a witness in another case, but if that testimony may become 
exculpatory in combination with undisclosed closed session testimony, the 
prosecution must disclose the open session testimony.38 
14.2.2. Information that Is ‘Material’ to Defence Preparations for 
Trial 
The general principle, as noted in the introduction above, is that the Pros-
ecution must disclose evidence it intends to use at trial, or information 
that is material to defence preparations for trial. 39  What is ‘material’, 
however, may not always be obvious. The key is of materiality to defence 
preparations as opposed to relevance to the prosecution’s case.40 The in-
ternational case law has interpreted this as requiring the defence to 
demonstrate prima facie that the material sought is “material to the prepa-
ration of the defence”.41 
                                                                                                                        
doc/e97b7c); ICTR, Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Request for 
Review, 30 June 2006, ICTR-96-14-R, para. 51 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f70249). 
38 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Appellant’s Notice and 
Supplemental Notice of Prosecution’s Non-Compliance with its Disclosure Obligation un-
der Rule 68 of the Rules, 11 February 2004, IT-95-14/2-A, para. 20 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/5da353). 
39 The accused shall have access to books, documents, photographs and tangible objects in 
the Prosecutor’s custody or control, which are material to the preparation of the defence, or 
are intended for use by the Prosecution as evidence at trial; ICTY RPE, Rule 66(B), see 
above note 30; ICTR RPE, Rule 66(B), see above note 30; SCSL RPE, Rule 66(B), see 
above note 30; IRMCT RPE, Rule 71(B), see above note 30; ICC RPE, 9 September 2002, 
Rule 77 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e1b3f5); STL RPE, Rule 110(B), see above note 
30. 
40 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Call Data Rec-
ords and Disclosure to Defence (On Remand from Appeals Chamber), 4 December 2013, 
STL-11-01/PT/TC/F1252/20131204/R250347-R250361/EN/djo, para. 13 (‘Ayyash et al. 
Trial Decision on Call Data Records’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8d7200); STL, 
Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Appeals Chamber, Public Redacted Version of 19 September 
2013 Decision on Appeal by Counsel for Mr. Oneissi against Pre-Trial Judge’s “Decision 
on Issues Related to the Inspection Room and Call Data Records”, 2 October 2013, STL-
11-01/PT/AC/AR126.4/F0004-AR126.4/PRV/20131002/R000068-R000086/EN/af, para. 
19 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a64cd6). 
41 See, for example, Karemera et al. Appeals Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory 
Appeal, paras. 12, 14, see above note 33; ICTR, Karemera et al. v. Prosecutor, Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal from Decision on Alleged Rule 66 Viola-
tion, 17 May 2010, ICTR-98-44-AR73.18, paras. 12–13 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
00a88f); Banda and Jerbo Appeals Judgment, para. 42, see above note 25; ICTR, Prosecu-
tor v. Bagosora et al., Appeals Chamber, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Relating to 
Disclosure under Rule 66(B) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 25 Sep-
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Before disclosing evidence, the Prosecution is responsible for de-
termining whether it is material to the Defence.42 In doing so, the Prose-
cution should consider, among other things, “whether the material could 
reasonably lead to further investigation by the Defence and the discovery 
of additional evidence”.43 But the courts have also held that “[p]reparation 
is a broad concept” and what is material to the defence does not need to 
be limited to being ‘directly linked exonerating or incriminating evidence’ 
or “related to the Prosecution’s case-in-chief”.44 It refers to “all objects 
that are relevant for the preparation of the defence” and must be interpret-
ed broadly.45 
                                                                                                                        
tember 2006, ICTR-98-41-AR73, para. 9 (‘Bagosora et al. Appeals Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3d937e); Lubanga Appeals Judgment on 
the Appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I, para. 77, 
see above note 24; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion to 
Compel Inspection of Items Material to the Sarajevo Defence Case, 8 February 2012, IT-
95-5/18-T, paras. 6–9 (‘Karadžić Trial Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
6ab104). 
42 See, for example, SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence 
Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68 of the Rules, 9 July 2004, SCSL-2004-
15-T, para. 28 (‘Sesay Trial Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/d154fc); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on 
the Motion by the Accused Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, 26 September 
1996, IT-96-21-T, , para. 11 (‘Mucić et al. Trial Decision on the Motion by the Accused 
Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/100f7a); 
ICTR, ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ndayambaje, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Disclosure, 25 September 2001, ICTR-96-8-T, para. 11 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/049d4e). 
43 See, for example, ICTR, Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Decision on 
Motions Relating to the Appellant Hassan Ngeze’s and the Prosecution’s Request for 
Leave to Present Additional Evidence of Witnesses ABC1 and EB, 27 November 2006, 
ICTR-99-52-A, para. 16 (‘Nahimana et al. Appeals Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/f076c8), citing to ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Appeals Chamber, Confidential De-
cision on the Prosecution’s Motion to be Relieved of Obligation to Disclose Sensitive In-
formation Pursuant to Rule 66(C), 27 March 2003, IT-98-33-A, p. 4, which held that the 
prosecution on the request of the defence “has to permit the inspection of any material 
which is capable of being admitted on appeal or which may lead to the discovery of mate-
rial which is capable of being admitted on appeal” (This ICTY Appeals Chamber decision 
appears not to be publicly available). 
44 See, for example, Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 9, see above note 41; Karemera et al. 
Appeals Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal, para. 14, see above note 33; 
Bagosora et al. Appeals Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, para. 9, see above note 41. 
45 Lubanga Appeals Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo Against the Oral Deci-
sion of Trial Chamber I, paras. 77–78, see above note 24. 
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The defence, the ICC Appeals Chamber held in Lubanga, does not 
need to provide 
advance revelation of his or her defences in order to receive 
full prosecution disclosure. The lack of any correlation be-
tween the right to receive prosecution disclosure and any 
disclosure obligations of the Defence is evident in that the 
Prosecutor is duty-bound to provide full disclosure even if an 
accused elects to remain silent or does not raise a defence.46 
If the defence believes that the prosecution has failed to disclose or 
has withheld material information, it may seek judicial intervention, but it 
cannot rely on unspecific or unsubstantiated allegations or general de-
scriptions in so doing. 47  International case law has consistently held 
against defence disclosure ‘fishing expeditions’.48 In lay terms, a so-called 
‘fishing expedition’ could equate to a general Internet search for, say, a 
nice new washing machine. 
The practical and logical difficulty with the application of this in-
ternational case law, however, is that defence counsel may often only sus-
pect that the prosecution has information in a class that they seek. And 
without providing a basis for asserting that the prosecution has this infor-
mation they will be denied an order for disclosure. This conundrum has 
been revealed by judicial, ex parte to the defence, inspection of materials 
in the prosecution’s possession that the prosecution has not found to be 
material to defence preparations. 
Unfortunately, the results of these inspections, have gone both ways, 
as judicial review has sometimes resulted in orders to the prosecution to 
disclose withheld information. Other judicial reviews have produced the 
opposite result. The word ‘unfortunately’ is used here, because preferably, 
(a) the chambers should not have to do this and (b) should not – even ac-
cepting that reasonable minds could differ as to the meaning of ‘material 
to the defence’ – come to a different view as to whether something hither-
to undisclosed should be handed over. A number of these decisions, with 
                                                   
46 Ibid., para. 50. 
47 See, for example, Sesay et al. Trial Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure, paras. 26–
27, see above note 42; Mucić et al. Trial Decision on the Motion by the Accused Zejnil 
Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, para. 9, see above note 42. 
48 See, for example, Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 8, see above note 41; Nahimana et al. 
Appeals Decision, para. 11, see above note 43. 
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divergent results, are footnoted below – illustrating the burden placed on a 
chamber in having to review such material itself.49 
                                                   
49 For example, just at the STL, in Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on 
Sabra Motion to Lift Redactions and Disclosure of United Nations Fact-Finding Mission 
Documents, 9 December 2013, STL-11-01/PT/TC/F1256/20131209/R250391-R250401/
EN/af (‘Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on Sabra Motion to Lift Redactions and Disclosure of 
United Nations Fact-Finding Mission Documents’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
d42cdf), the Trial Chamber – on a defence application – ordered the Prosecution to provide 
it with two unredacted witness statements and an undisclosed UN fact-finding document to 
ascertain whether the redactions were properly made. Upon review of the documents, the 
Trial Chamber decided that they had been; see, STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial 
Chamber, Second Decision on Sabra Motion to Lift Redactions and Disclose United Na-
tions Fact-Finding Mission Documents, 28 February 2014, STL-11-01/T/TC/F1436/
20140228/R255770-R255773/EN/af (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/42fe47). Conversely, 
see also STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on the Oneissi Defence 
Motion for Disclosure of Requests for Assistance, 7 November 2014, STL-11-01/T/TC/
F1739/20141107/R269752-R269757/EN/dm (‘Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on the Oneissi 
Defence Motion for Disclosure of Requests for Assistance’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/8f1dbd), where the Trial Chamber on a defence application examined 38 Prosecution 
undisclosed requests for assistance to Lebanon, and decided that they contained nothing 
material to defence preparations for trial. Upon a further defence application – but based 
upon different reasons for requiring the material, namely that the defence needed the doc-
uments to challenge the legality of the transfer of Lebanese telecommunications data to the 
United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (‘UNIIIC’) – the Trial 
Chamber reconsidered this decision and ordered the Prosecution to disclose these docu-
ments, STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision Reconsidering ‘Decision 
on the Oneissi Defence Motion for Disclosure of Requests for Assistance’, 7 November 
2014, 6 March 2015, STL-11-01/T/TC/F1875/20150306/R272340-R272349/EN/dm 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b524a3). On a defence application, the Trial Chamber or-
dered the Prosecution to provide it with draft statements and reports of a prosecution ana-
lyst witness, STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Order on Merhi Defence 
Request for Disclosure of Documents Concerning Witness PRH230 (Andrew Donaldson), 
20 April 2017, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3094/20170420/R294760-R294761/EN/dm (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a24a6), and after examining them ordered their immediate dis-
closure to the Defence, STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on 
Merhi Defence Request for Disclosure of Documents Concerning Witness PRH230, 2 June 
2017, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3171/20170602/R296549-R296581/EN/dm (‘Ayyash et al. Trial 
Decision on Merhi Defence Request for Disclosure of Documents Concerning Witness 
PRH230’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5ac961); STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Tri-
al Chamber, Corrected Version of the ‘Decision on Oneissi Defence Urgent Motion for an 
Order to Compel Disclosure of Requests for Assistance Relevant to the Attribution of Mo-
bile Number 3598095’ of 13 October 2017, 24 October 2017, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3359/
COR/20171024/R302308-R302326/EN/dm (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc9bbb), in 
which the Trial Chamber after reviewing, ex-parte the defence, Prosecution requests for 
assistance to Lebanon, ordered the Prosecution to disclose 12 of the 13 that it reviewed. 
Other examples include Ayyash et al. Trial Decision re Wissam Al-Hassan, see above note 
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The chambers as the ultimate guardian of ensuring a fair trial are 
placed in the same position as defence counsel in not knowing whether 
anything else in the prosecution’s holdings requires disclosure. Some ju-
dicial decisions ordering additional disclosure are based on a view differ-
ent to the prosecution’s of what is ‘material’. As chambers must ensure a 
fair trial to an accused, they should generally take the most generous and 
liberal view of what is material to defence preparations for trial, even 
where the decision may be delicately balanced and may impose burdens 
on a prosecutor’s office, over its protestations. 
Also problematic is that the defence bears the onus both of showing 
the existence of the material sought and its materiality. The difficulty with 
this principle is illustrated by the very fact that judges in examining pros-
ecution material, ex parte the defence, may discover additional material 
which in their view should be – or should have been – disclosed. This 
raises the issue of whether a court should act as a general disclosure filter, 
by examining prosecution disclosure, either intended or actual. The sim-
ple answer to this is ‘no’. 
The court, on a practical basis, cannot do this, and as one of public 
policy should not have to. To perform this task, it would have to have 
access to the prosecution’s databases and search them for itself seeking 
material that is ‘material’ to defence preparations. This would blur the 
lines between judicial impartiality and the role of the prosecutor as both 
investigator and party to proceedings before a chamber. This is another 
reason why non-restricted prosecution material should be placed in a reg-
istry-controlled electronic disclosure suite. 
As a matter of practicality, it would also be infeasible. At the ICC 
and STL, for example, the judges have access to material disclosed be-
tween the parties in what are termed ‘disclosure batches’; at the STL the 
disclosure is made through the Tribunal’s electronic case management 
system ‘Legal Workflow’. This is party controlled disclosure that a cham-
ber may examine for itself. Some of the material in these innocently 
termed ‘batches’ relates to evidence to be used at trial (witness and docu-
mentary) while other disclosed material concerns documents the prosecu-
tion considers material to defence preparations, including exculpatory 
information. Another category, sometimes voluminous, is of material that 
                                                                                                                        
34, and Ayyash et al. Trial Decision re Michael Taylor, see above note 34. This list is ex-
tracted to give an illustrative overview. 
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might be used in cross-examining opposing witnesses. But much of it will 
not be. This surely cannot be the most efficient way to conduct litigation 
on this important issue. 
Hence, the scale of the exercise and its often-abstract nature – as the 
disclosures may be large and lacking in context – would make it impracti-
cal and an inefficient use of chamber resources, both judicial and staff. 
The challenge, it appears, is less one of involving the judges in the 
day-to-day work of disclosure but rather their better understanding how 
the information is stored, managed, searched and retrieved. Moreover, 
making blanket orders to the prosecution, for example, to provide better 
details in disclosing material will not necessarily solve the problem of 
trying to make sense of some of the disclosures, given the work that 
would be needed to provide this level of detail. This may be beyond the 
resources of the prosecutor’s office, and chambers must carefully balance 
overall institutional resources in making orders that are unnecessarily 
onerous to a party. 
Implicit in saying this of course is that fundamental to the right to a 
fair trial is the defence receiving all exculpatory material and information 
that is material to trial preparation. This principle trumps resource consid-
erations. But in any event, the documents should contain comprehensible 
metadata, preferably entered when the material is logged, which would 
facilitate its understanding. 
14.2.3. Witness Statements and Related Information 
The prosecution must disclose witness statements of the witnesses who 
will provide evidence at trial.50 However, no one set definition for a ‘wit-
ness statement’ exists. 51  Witness statements evolve and may comprise 
formally recorded question and answer style interviews, whether audio or 
video recorded or written, statements written in a prescribed or habitual 
form, notes of the utterances of witnesses recorded in note or other form, 
drafts of formal statements, or any combination of these. 
                                                   
50 ICTY RPE, Rule 66(A)(ii), see above note 30; ICTR RPE, Rule 66(A)(ii), see above note 
30; SCSL RPE, Rule 66(A)(ii), see above note 30; ICC RPE, Rule 76, see above note 39; 
STL RPE, Rule 110(A)(ii), see above note 30. 
51 Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on Merhi Defence Request for Disclosure of Documents Con-
cerning Witness PRH230, paras. 45–47, see above note 49. 
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Courts have grappled with the boundaries of what can be described 
as a witness statement and hence what must be disclosed. The ICC’s Ap-
peals Chamber, for instance, has held that witness statements within the 
meaning of Rule 76 are made only when witnesses “are questioned about 
their knowledge of [a] case”.52 
The ICTR’s and ICTY’s Appeals Chambers have found that 
“[r]ecords of questions put to the witness and answers given constitute 
witness statements”, and “it is necessary to disclose the questions put to 
witnesses in order to make the statements intelligible”.53 One ICTY Trial 
Chamber broadened the definition to “[a]nything that a witness says or 
writes which is relevant to an indictment”.54 
The STL Appeals Chamber has said that its usual meaning “is an 
account of a person’s knowledge of a crime, which is recorded through 
due procedure in the course of an investigation into the crime”. Further, as 
witness statements may go through a number of drafts, all stages of the 
preparation of a ‘witness statement’ can be important, as they enable the 
Chamber and the opposing party to know how a witness statement has 
evolved.55 Thus, the courts and tribunals have decided, it is not only the 
final signed witness statement that is subject to disclosure; question and 
answers, investigator’s notes and emails can also constitute witness state-
ments.56 
                                                   
52 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Bosco Ntaganda Against the “Decision on De-
fence Request Seeking Disclosure Orders and a Declaration of Prosecution Obligations to 
Record Contacts with Witnesses”, 20 May 2016, ICC-01/04-02/06-1330, para. 16 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/7790c5). 
53 ICTR, Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 9 July 2004, ICTR-96-14-
A, para. 33 (‘Niyitegeka Appeals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/35cd4f). 
54 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Haradinaj Motion for 
Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials in Respect of Witness 81, 18 November 2011, IT-04-
84bis-T, paras. 27, 32 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/680c8f). 
55 El Sayed Appeals Decision, paras. 83–89, see above note 34. 
56 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Disclosure of Witness 
Statements and Cross-Examination, 16 July 2004, SCSL-04-14-PT, paras. 8–10 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/85781e); Niyitegeka Appeals Judgment, paras. 33–35, see above 
note 53; El Sayed Appeals Decision, paras. 83–87, see above note 34; Ayyash et al. Trial 
Decision on Merhi Defence Request for Disclosure of Documents Concerning Witness 
PRH230, para. 12, see above note 49; STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, 
Decision Denying Merhi Defence Request Relating to Prosecution Disclosure Obligations, 
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Moreover, witness statements are the witness’ product and therefore 
must be disclosed and do not fall under the protections of work product,57 
even if contained in a larger document which is work product. Similarly, 
drafts of expert reports should be disclosed.58 
As a miscellaneous example, the payment of normal witness ex-
penses to prosecution witnesses, such as travel and accommodation, is not 
necessarily disclosable as material to defence preparations for trial.59 Ad-
ditional benefits or payments are;60 the test is whether they could go to the 
motivation of a witness to provide evidence and hence their credibility or 
reliability. 
                                                                                                                        
23 March 2018, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3607/20180323/R308136-R308149/EN/dm, para. 18 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5d3790). 
57 El Sayed Appeals Decision, para. 78, see above note 34. 
58 See, for example, Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on Merhi Defence Request for Disclosure of 
Documents Concerning Witness PRH230, paras. 80–81, see above note 49, declining to 
follow a decision of the STL’s Pre-Trial Judge which held that these were only disclosable 
if the expert referred to the draft, STL, Ayyash et al., Pre-Trial Judge, Decision on Sabra’s 
Seventh Motion for Disclosure – Experts, 24 May 2013, STL-11-01/PT/PTJ/F0913/
20130524/R143164-R143183/EN/af, paras. 30–33 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f91c
2a). 
59 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Trial Chamber, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion 
for Records of All Payments Made Directly or Indirectly to Witness D, 28 September 2006, 
ICTR-99-50-T, para. 13 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d8043c); STL, Prosecutor v. Ay-
yash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Prosecution Witness Expenses, 9 May 2014, STL-
11-01/T/TC/F1519/20140509/R258860-R258867/EN/dm (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
6188bb). 
60 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for Full 
Disclosure of Payments to Witnesses and to Exclude Testimony from Paid Witnesses, 23 
August 2005, ICTR-98-44-PT, para. 7 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/482aea); ICC, Sit-
uation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Trial Chamber, Public re-
dacted version of “Decision on ‘Defence Request for Disclosure and Investigative Assis-
tance concerning Witnesses 169 and 178’”, 11 December 2014, ICC-01/05-01/08-3077-
Red, para. 2 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c86b31/), referring to its Decision on the 
prosecution’s ‘Information on contacts of Witnesses 169 and 178 with other witnesses lo-
cated […]’ (ICC-01/05-01/08-2827-Conf-Exp)”, 25 October 2013, ICC-01/05-01/08-2845-
Conf-Exp. 
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14.2.4. Witnesses Called by Chamber 
Some international criminal courts and tribunals, such as the IRMCT and 
the STL, may call their own witnesses.61 While the Rome Statute is silent 
on this, its trial chambers have done so. 
Given the adversarial nature of international proceedings – after all, 
they are entitled Prosecutor v. Defendant/Accused, as opposed to Trial 
Chamber v. Defendant/Accused/Prosecutor – the discretion to ‘step into 
the ring’ and call witnesses must be exercised with extreme caution. This 
may raise tangential disclosure issues. 
Trial and appellate chambers are mandated only with determining 
whether an accused person is guilty of the crimes charged – in a fair trial 
conducted according to law – rather than with attempting to determine 
some ‘objective truth’ that is possibly ascertainable by conducting an in-
quiry extending beyond this framework. This is of course the fundamental 
difference between a fact-finding mission or a truth and reconciliation 
commission and a criminal trial.62 
The danger is that the chamber may decide to call a witness that the 
parties for good reasons have decided not to. The chamber cannot know 
the full ‘back-story’ to a witness’s involvement with a party, including 
communications between the two. If a chamber decides to call its own 
witnesses its actions in doing so are disclosable to the parties and any 
participating victims. This includes its methodology in ‘preparing’ wit-
nesses for their testimony. 
                                                   
61 IRMCT RPE, Rule 120, see above note 30; STL RPE, Rule 165, but only after first ‘hear-
ing the Parties’, see above note 30. 
62 Article 69(3) ICC Statute provides: “The parties may submit evidence relevant to the case, 
in accordance with article 64. The Court shall have the authority to request the submission 
of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth”. In an adver-
sarial criminal trial this can only extend to examining the available evidence, and deter-
mining the ‘truth’ on that available evidence in the sense of whether the Prosecutor has es-
tablished the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused on the charges pursuant to Arti-
cle 66(2). The question of ‘who really did it?’ if the court acquits and hence, ‘the truth’ is 
beyond the chamber’s statutory function. This does not conflict with the Prosecutor’s statu-
tory duty under Article 54(1)(a): “In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to 
cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal respon-
sibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating cir-
cumstances equally”, as the chambers and prosecution have different roles in an adversari-
al trial. Nor would it impede the Trial Chamber’s ability to request the parties to call addi-
tional evidence. 
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Thus, the STL Trial Chamber, in deciding to call one witness – on a 
defence application to do so – held that it had the same disclosure obliga-
tions as the prosecution, and that the prosecution’s obligation to disclose 
exculpatory or mitigating information also applies, as it is a requirement 
independent of whoever calls the witness.63 Further, when required by the 
interests of justice, a chamber may order the prosecution to inform it of 
the existence of witness statements by the chamber’s witnesses – where 
legally permitted – or to provide them to the chamber or the parties.64 
Again, it is emphasised that chambers do not have access to internal 
prosecution (or defence) work product or evidence holdings to search 
them. Judges and their staff must therefore rely on the parties to provide 
information to them that is relevant to any witnesses called by chambers. 
The ICTY’s Krajišnik Trial Chamber, for example, decided to call six 
witnesses itself after the close of the defence case, but according to a 
complicated formula involving its legal officers contacting the witnesses, 
conducting recorded preliminary interviews, compiling witness statements 
based on these, and providing the parties with the witness statements, 
while also requiring the parties to provide relevant material to the cham-
ber.65 
The Blaškić Trial Chamber made the process even more complex in 
calling eight witnesses itself. It required the witnesses to make ‘spontane-
ous’ in-court statements – but they could consult notes – on specified sub-
jects, including their “perception of the accused’s personality both profes-
sionally and personally”.66 It allowed the parties equal time to question 
                                                   
63 Ayyash et al. Trial Decision re Michael Taylor, para. 15, see above note 34. 
64 Ibid., para. 21; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Trial Chamber, Procedure on Calling and 
Examining Chamber Witnesses, 7 April 2006, IT-00-39-T, Annex, paras. 3, 7, 10 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/wl8kca); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Trial Chamber, Finalized 
Procedure on Chamber Witnesses; Decisions and Orders on Several Evidentiary and Pro-
cedural Matters, 24 April 2006, IT-00-39-T, para. 14 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
ik1mey). A chamber could use Article 69(3) of the ICC Statute to do this, see above note 
20. 
65 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 27 September 2006, IT-00-39-T, 
para. 1255 (‘Krajišnik Trial Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/62a710). One of 
the (reluctant) witnesses was Krajišnik’s former (and sentenced) co-accused, Biljana 
Plavšić (IT-00-39 & 40/1), who had pleaded guilty to persecutions as a crime against hu-
manity charged on the same indictment. 
66 See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber, Decision of Trial Chamber I 
Summoning Mr. Robert Stewart as a Witness of the Trial Chamber, 19 May 1999, IT-95-
14-T, no. 3 on the list (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dbc860). 
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the witnesses – two of whom were subsequently indicted – but only on the 
basis of their spontaneous statements, and before the chamber itself ques-
tioned the witnesses. 67 The parties were also ordered to confidentially 
provide the chamber with their own statements from these witnesses and 
related material.68 
What occurred in that case starkly illustrates the policy reasons for 
the restraint that a chamber must exercise in deciding whether to call its 
own witnesses. In attempting to – as the Trial Chamber explained – “as-
certain the truth in respect of the crimes with which the accused has been 
charged”,69 it could not have been expected to know that at that time 
Colonel Amir Kubura and General Enver Hadžihasanović – officers serv-
ing in the military on the opposing side to the conflict – were themselves 
the subjects of a prosecution investigation, and two years later would be 
indicted by the ICTY.70 The ICTY Trial Chamber’s statutory function was 
to conduct a criminal trial on whether the charged accused person was 
guilty of the charges on the indictment before it, rather than to conduct an 
inquiry to ascertain the ‘truth’ of whatever transpired, in the manner of a 
truth and reconciliation commission. But this occurred in the late 1990s 
and, undoubtedly, lessons will have been drawn from it. 
14.2.5. Witnesses Called by Participating Victims 
The ICC and STL allow victims to participate in the proceedings. At the 
STL they may receive “all documents filed by the parties and the case file 
submitted by the Pre-Trial Judge to the Trial Chamber before commence-
ment of the trial, except for confidential and ex parte material or for other 
restrictions imposed in the interest of justice”. The STL Rules provide for 
the Trial Chamber to determine the disclosure obligations of the Legal 
Representatives of Victims if they have been authorised to call evidence.71 
                                                   
67 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 3 March 2000, IT-95-14-T, para. 
57 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e1ae55). It also “made a Defence witness appear”. 
68 See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber, Decision of Trial Chamber I 
in Respect of the Appearance of General Enver Hadžihasanović, 25 March 1999, IT-95-14-
T, p. 3 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/635aa7). 
69 Ibid., p. 2. 
70 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Alagić and Kubura, Prosecutor, Indictment, 5 July 
2001, IT-01-47 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/db0960). 
71 STL RPE, Rules 87(A), 87(B) and 112bis, see above note 30. See also, STL, Prosecutor v. 
Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on the Legal Representatives of Victims’ Applica-
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Obvious practical difficulties would exist in allowing disclosure to 
all participating victims, as opposed to their legal representatives. The 
potential victims may be numerous, numbering in the thousands in some 
ICC proceedings, thus presenting real logistical and security issues. How-
ever, the participating victims have no standing giving them a procedural 
right to disclosure. 
At the STL, participating victims may request the Trial Chamber to 
call witnesses and to authorise them to tender evidence,72 while the cham-
ber must decide on their disclosure obligations.73 In allowing the partici-
pating victims to call witnesses and present evidence the STL Trial 
Chamber in Ayyash decided that they had to disclose to the parties the 
statements of all intended witnesses.74 The ICC has also permitted partici-
pating victims to present evidence and has held that this may extend to 
evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused.75 
                                                                                                                        
tion to Call Evidence, Schedule the Presentation of Evidence and Directions on Disclosure 
Obligations, 31 July 2017, STL-11-01/T/TC/F3260/20170731/R297955-R297984/EN/dm, 
para. 98 (‘Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on LRV Application and Directions on Disclosure 
Obligations’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/23a9e6). 
72 STL RPE, Rule 87(B), see above note 30. The ICC Appeals Chamber has ruled that, in 
order to allow victims to participate meaningfully in the trial, the Trial Chamber may, 
where appropriate, authorise them to tender evidence, ICC, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I’s 
Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, 11 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1432, paras. 97–99 (‘Lubanga Appeals Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the 
Defence Against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/75cf1a). 
73 STL RPE, Rule 112bis “Disclosure by Victims Participating in the Proceedings” provides 
that “where the Trial Chamber grants a victim participating in the proceedings the right to 
call evidence, the Chamber shall decide on the corresponding disclosure obligations that 
shall be imposed”, see above note 30. 
74 Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on LRV Application and Directions on Disclosure Obligations, 
para. 98, see above note 71. 
75 Lubanga Appeals Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence Against 
Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation, paras. 93–97, see above note 72. 
Judges Pikis and Kirsch dissented, stating that victims cannot adduce evidence on the guilt 
of the accused and that their participation is confined to the expression of their views and 
concerns, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge G.M. Pikis, in Lubanga Appeals Judgment 
on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence Against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on 
Victims’ Participation, paras. 4–6, 15, see above note 72; ICC, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Part-
ly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Philippe Kirsch, 23 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432-Anx, 
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14.2.6. Material Conditionally Provided to Prosecutor’s Offices 
Another problematic issue is of material provided confidentially to prose-
cutor’s offices that cannot be disclosed to the defence without the provid-
er’s consent. Often it is provided for lead investigative purposes. It could 
also come from fact-finding operations – NGO or governmental or inter-
governmental – and contain information that is highly relevant to bringing 
charges. The information may be very sensitive and present security con-
cerns to potential witnesses and providers. There could be issues of State 
security. Such material potentially may also contain information that is 
either exculpatory, impacts upon the credibility of the prosecution’s evi-
dence or is material to defence preparations for trial. If it cannot be dis-
closed – for example, the provider will not permit it – the Prosecutor must 
decide whether the case can continue. 
Article 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute allows the prosecution to obtain 
material and agree not to disclose at any stage of the proceedings, “docu-
ments or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of con-
fidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless 
the provider of the information consents”. In its early investigations the 
ICC prosecution, to its eventual regret, relied heavily on such agreements. 
Its inability to disclose to the defence information obtained in this manner 
in the Lubanga trial almost led to its collapse when the Trial Chamber 
twice stayed the proceedings.76 
                                                                                                                        
paras. 4–5, 23–24, 39, referring to the ICC Statute envisaging that the accused is faced by 
one Prosecutor, “rather than, potentially, multiple accusers” (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/6fe269). In Katanga, the Appeals Chamber revisited this issue, ICC, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Appeals Cham-
ber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 
22 January 2010 Entitled “Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial”, 16 
July 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, para. 116, reaching the same decision as in Lubanga 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e58575). It held that the Trial Chamber could permit the 
victims to testify on matters “including the role of the accused in the crimes charged 
against them, grounded on the Trial Chamber’s authority to request evidence necessary for 
the determination of the truth, is not per se inconsistent with the rights of the accused and 
the concept of a fair trial”. Ibid., para. 114. 
76 The second was, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent 
Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Al-
ternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, 8 July 2010, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cd4f10). The Appeals Cham-
ber reversed the stay in ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The 
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In Lubanga the Appeals Chamber held that a chamber must first de-
termine – in ex parte proceedings open only to the Prosecutor – whether 
the material would have to be disclosed to the defence if it had not been 
obtained under that Article. If so, the Prosecutor should seek the provid-
er’s consent to disclose the material. If that is not forthcoming, the cham-
ber must then determine whether and if any counter-balancing measures 
can be taken to ensure the rights of the accused to a fair trial, in spite of 
the non-disclosure.77 In some instances a provider may permit the disclo-
sure of some information or documents with appropriate redactions, may-
be for reasons of State security or to protect the identity of sources.78 
At the STL, for example, if the material to be disclosed is redacted, 
the following principles apply: first, the prosecution must decide whether 
the information it wishes to redact would ordinarily be subject to disclo-
sure.79 Then, if the material is to be disclosed, the application for redac-
tion must satisfy one of the three criteria under its Rule 116(A), namely if 
                                                                                                                        
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled “Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of 
Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with 
the VWU”, 8 October 2010, ICC-01/04-01/06-2582 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
8f3b61). The Appeals Chamber held the Trial Chamber had erred in not determining, at pa-
ra. 61, “that a fair trial had become irreparably impossible” and consequently there was 
“no obstacle to imposing sanctions and allowing them [the prosecution] a reasonable op-
portunity to induce compliance, and, therefore, too change the very circumstances which 
made a fair trial prospectively impossible”. 
77 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber 
I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials cov-
ered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the ac-
cused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”, 
21 October 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, para. 48 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
485c2d). Trial Chambers have followed this approach, for example, in ICC, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Trial Chamber, Decision 
on Prosecution request for authorisation of non-disclosure of five documents, 11 June 2015, 
ICC-01/04-02/06-637, para. 12 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/25cec7). 
78 There is also an abundance of case law at the ICTY and ICTR on disclosure related to 
information obtained under Rule 70 of the ICTY RPE and Rule 70 of the ICTR RPE which 
applies to both prosecution and defence, see above note 30. 
79 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Prosecution’s Application to 
Authorise Necessary Redactions Pursuant to Rule 116 Dated 18 October 2013, 8 Novem-
ber 2013, STL-11-01/PT/TC/F1212/20131108/R248503-R248506/EN/af (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/38de81). 
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disclosure: may prejudice ongoing of future investigations, cause a grave 
risk to the security of a witness or their family, or for any other reason 
may be contrary to the public interest or the rights of third parties. The 
Prosecution must also support its application with a statement relating to 
the proposed redactions.80 
Article 72 of the ICC Statute, “Protection of national security in-
formation” provides at first blush an absolute bar to disclosing infor-
mation where a State is of the view that disclosure of such information 
would “prejudice its national security interests”.81 There follows a com-
plicated statutory regime of requests, co-operation, consultations and so 
on, which may, by implication, eventually lead to an acquittal if the in-
formation is not disclosed to the defence.82 
The ensuing result may be the disclosure to the defence of redacted 
material. This can again raise further issues of the extent of the redactions, 
and some ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have required the prosecution to seek 
its approval for each redaction. This could conflict with the principle that 
prosecutor’s offices are deemed to be acting in good faith, but furthermore, 
it is difficult to see how this is an efficient use of judicial resources. 
14.2.7. Extended Disclosure – In-Depth Analysis Charts 
For some years, the ICC entertained what has become termed ‘In-Depth 
Analysis Charts’ or ‘IDACs’ prepared by the prosecution. The principle, it 
                                                   
80 Ibid., paras. 6–7; see also ICTY RPE, Rule 69, see above note 30; ICTR RPE, Rule 69, see 
above note 30; SCSL RPE, Rule 69, see above note 30; and ICC RPE, Rule 81(4), see 
above note 39. 
81 Article 72(1) starts, with “This article applies in any case where the disclosure of the in-
formation or documents of a State would, in the opinion of that State, prejudice its national 
security interests”, see above note 20. Article 72(6) provides: 
Once all reasonable steps have been taken to resolve the matter through cooperative 
means, and if the State considers that there are no means or conditions under which the 
information or documents could be provided or disclosed without prejudice to its na-
tional security interests, it shall so notify the Prosecutor or the Court of the specific 
reasons for its decision, unless a specific description of the reasons would itself neces-
sarily result in such prejudice to the State’s national security interests. 
See above note 20. 
82 The STL has a similar provision, although less complicated, in STL RPE, Rule 118 “In-
formation never Subject to Disclosure without Consent of Provider”, see above note 30. 
See also ICTY RPE, Rule 70 and IRMCT RPE, Rule 76(B) “Matters not Subject to Disclo-
sure”, see above note 30. There is no need to examine in any detail the litigation on these 
Rules here. 
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appears, was that the defence – and by extension the chambers – needed 
to be properly informed of the particulars of the prosecution’s case, in-
cluding the evidence supporting each count on an indictment. However, 
they took the form of gargantuan charts containing many boxes and sub-
headings and links. This could be viewed as an extended form of court-
ordered prosecution disclosure, perhaps of information material to the 
defence of an accused. 
The Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the prosecution and defence 
to file their evidence through the registry accompanied by a chart linking 
each piece of evidence to the elements of the crimes charged.83 The deci-
sion also set out a regime for managing disclosure between the parties, 
and the chamber’s access to this material. In Katanga, the Trial Chamber 
held that by providing the defence with a clear and comprehensive over-
view of the evidence and how it related to the crimes, the analysis charts 
would ensure the accused adequate time and facilities to prepare their 
defence.84 It could also conceivably assist the chamber in trial preparation 
and judgment drafting. 
However, this practice is far from uncontroversial,85 as other ICC 
chambers have ruled that they were either not necessary,86 not useful,87 or 
                                                   
83 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable for Disclosure be-
tween the Parties, 31 July 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-55, para. 69 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/15c802); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Bemba, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Submission of an Updated, Consolidated Version of 
the In-depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, 10 November 2008, ICC-01/05-
01/08-232 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/842374). 
84 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Katanga and 
Ngudjolo, Trial Chamber, Order concerning the Presentation of Incriminating Evidence 
and the E-Court Protocol, 13 March 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-956, para. 6 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/ad5c46). 
85 See, for example, ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidele 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Defence request 
for an in-depth analysis chart” submitted by the Defence for Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gom-
bo, 28 January 2014, ICC-01/05-01/13-134, para. 5 (‘Bemba et al. Pre-Trial Contempt De-
cision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/596c75). 
86 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Muthaura and Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the schedule leading up to trial, 9 July 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-451, 
paras. 11, 16 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3b7bdc). 
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that the Pre-Trial Judge had no authority to order the creation of such a 
document.88 Chambers that ordered IDACs did so well in advance of the 
hearing on the confirmation of charges or the commencement of trial. In 
2015, the Appeals Chamber in Ongwen overturned the pre-trial decision 
of a Single Judge to order the prosecution to submit an IDAC but without 
first having sought submissions on the matter, given that this could “place 
a disproportionate burden on the parties and may ultimately lead to delays 
in the proceedings”.89 By 2017, the ICC Chambers Practice Manual em-
phatically stated that “[n]o submission of any “in-depth analysis chart”, or 
similia, of the evidence disclosed can be imposed on either party”.90 In 
2018, after initially considering whether to order the prosecution to file an 
IDAC with its disclosure, the Single Judge in Al-Hassan, declined to or-
der one.91 
The STL’s Trial Chamber declined a defence application to order 
the prosecution to file a ‘table of incriminating evidence’ in respect of a 
fifth accused joined to an existing indictment after the trial of the initial 
                                                                                                                        
87 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, Trial Chamber, 
Transcript, 11 June 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-T-15-ENG, p. 32 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/623461). 
88 Bemba et al. Pre-Trial Contempt Decision, paras. 5, 7, see above note 85. 
89 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II entitled “Deci-
sion Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters”, 17 June 
2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-251, para. 42 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0052a2). 
90 ICC, Chambers Practice Manual, 2017, p. 10 (‘ICC Chambers Practice Manual 2017’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0ee26). Ibid., p. 14: 
It is up to the parties to determine the best way to persuade the Chamber: there is no 
basis for the Chamber to impose on the parties a particular modality/format to argue 
their case and present their evidence. For example, no submission of any “in-depth 
analysis chart”, or similia, of the evidence relied upon for the purposes of the confir-
mation hearing can be imposed on either of the parties. 
This is repeated in the Chambers Practice Manual, 2019, para. 24 (‘ICC Chambers Prac-
tice Manual 2019’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dh0zyq/). As an aside, it is unclear 
why a document whose stated intention is to inform would use an obscure Latin term like 
‘similia’ – defined in English dictionaries as the plural of ‘simile’. Presumably, it is intend-
ed to mean ‘similar documents’. 
91 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mo-
hamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the In-Depth Analysis Chart of Dis-
closed Evidence, 29 June 2018, ICC-01/12-01/18-61-tENG, paras. 21–23, accepting the 
prosecution’s submissions and deciding that it would impose a disproportionate burden on 
the prosecution to prepare such a chart and possibly delay the proceedings by a year 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d35cef). 
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four accused had already commenced. It found that it had the discretion-
ary power to order such a table but that at that stage of the proceedings the 
time needed to prepare the report was outweighed by its minimal practical 
utility, given that it would take months to prepare and divert substantial 
resources from the prosecution’s pre-trial preparation.92 
The prosecution’s witness lists must also “list the points in the in-
dictment as to which each witness will testify, including specific reference 
to counts and relevant paragraphs in the indictment”.93 As a result some 
chambers have required the prosecution to prepare charts linking witness-
es and exhibits to evidence in addition to the information in prosecution 
pre-trial briefs.94 In Gbagbo the Trial Chamber, at the close of the Prose-
cution’s case, “invited” the Prosecutor to submit within thirty days, “a 
trial brief illustrating her case and detailing the evidence in support of the 
charges”.95 The Prosecution submitted a 256-page brief plus annexes, yet 
strangely qualified this by stating that “[i]n a case of this magnitude, and 
consistent with the present stage of the trial, it is not possible to recite in 
this Mid-Trial Brief all the relevant evidence before the Chamber”.96 To 
the contrary, one would have thought that this was precisely the place to 
                                                   
92 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Merhi Defence Request for a 
‘Table of Incriminating Evidence’, 9 May 2014, STL-11-01/T/TC/F1524/20140509/
R259005-R259016/EN/dm, para. 27 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/37e63b). The Trial 
Chamber noted that the IDACs ordered at the ICC were of 1,000 pages in Katanga, 6,600 
pages in Kenyatta, and exceeded 12,000 pages in Ruto and Sang. 
93 For example, ICTY RPE, Rule 65ter(E), see above note 30. Rules 70(M) of the IRMCT 
RPE, Rule 73bis(B) of the ICTR RPE and RSCSL RPE have no requirement to list points 
“including specific reference to counts and relevant paragraphs in the indictment”, see 
above note 30. The ICC’s RPE have no similar requirement, see above note 39. 
94 Linked to ICTY RPE, Rule 65ter(E), see above note 30. See, for example, ICTY, Prosecu-
tor v. Prlić et al., Trial Chamber, Revised Version of the Decision Adopting Guidelines on 
Conduct of Trial Proceedings, 28 April 2006, IT-04-74-PT, para. 9 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/47ef0e); SCSL, Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Trial Chamber, Transcript, 30 April 
2004, SCSL-04-16-T, pp. 24–25: a “proofing-chart […] to focus on the count system indi-
cating specifically for every count, paragraph, the testimonial or primary documentary evi-
dence that supports those counts”. 
95 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Order on the further conduct of the proceedings, 9 February 2018, 
ICC-02/11-01/15-1124, p. 9 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/66a934/). 
96 ICC, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, OTP, Prosecution’s Mid-Trial 
Brief submitted pursuant to Chamber’s Order on the further conduct of the proceedings 
(ICC-02/11-01/15-1124), 19 March 2018, ICC-02/11-01/15-1136, para. 7 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/155267/). 
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“recite” all the relevant evidence. Where else, if not in what could turn out 
to be in effect the Prosecution’s closing brief? 
Evidence charts may be advantageous, but on the other hand, they 
could also be utterly useless, confusing and unmanageably large and ob-
tuse. Thematic summaries of evidence, linked to the relevant source mate-
rial such as the witness statements and the exhibit, could be more useful. 
This works for both the prosecution and defence presentation of their cas-
es. But it is essential that they are prepared only under the supervision of 
senior lawyers who will appear in the case in court. It is imperative that 
the prosecution thoroughly knows its own case well before it gets to 
court – pre-trial or trial – and can present it in a manner that is easily un-
derstood. This is fundamental to a fair trial. Thus, how forcing a party to 
prepare – or alternatively a party itself submitting – a complicated IDAC 
of thousands of pages can be in the interest of justice is highly questiona-
ble. 
14.3. Material Exempt from Disclosure – A Party’s Internal Work 
Product 
A party’s internal work product is exempt from disclosure to an opposing 
party. This is something that the chambers obviously cannot access with-
out a specific order. As it is not disclosed no one but the party itself would 
normally know that it exists – short of a leak, a tip-off, an accidental dis-
closure or a reference to it somewhere else. 
An internal document is “an in-house product of a party created for 
its own internal use”.97 But what falls within this category may be very 
much in the ‘eye of the beholder’. As an example, in the same way as the 
ICTY, in 1994, received hefty UN Commission of Experts witness materi-
al,98 the STL’s Office of the Prosecutor inherited numerous records from 
                                                   
97 See, for example, El Sayed Appeals Decision, para. 78, see above note 34; Ayyash et al. 
Trial Decision on Sabra Motion to Lift Redactions and Disclosure of United Nations Fact-
Finding Mission Documents, para. 14, see above note 49. 
98 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Reso-
lution 780 (1992), in Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/3a3ae2). It transferred its data-base to the ICTY Prosecutor in April 1994, see Re-
port of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. A/49/342 and S/1994/1007, paras. 157–58 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/cacdb7). The Commission’s last of three Chairs, Professor M. Cherif 
 
14. Rethinking Disclosure: Embrace the Electronic Disclosure Suite 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 769 
the UNIIIC, many of which would either be used in court proceedings or 
otherwise disclosable to the defence. 
An issue under judicial adjudication was the width of the definition 
of ‘internal work product’ in the STL’s Rule 111 that specifically provides 
an exemption from prosecution disclosure of “internal documents pre-
pared by the UNIIIC or its assistants or representatives in connection with 
its investigative work”. In El-Sayed, the STL’s Appeals Chamber found 
that “internal memoranda of the UNIIIC containing legal analysis, re-
search, or investigatory strategies” fell outside of the prosecution’s disclo-
sure obligations. But ‘investigator notes’, by contrast, contain the 
thoughts and original work of investigators, most often in an incomplete 
form.99 
Further, it held that although the prosecution is responsible for cate-
gorising documents, ensuring compliance with the Rules – including clas-
sifying and disclosing documents – is ultimately a judicial function, and 
judges may have to engage in a sampling exercise if there are numerous 
documents, rather than rubber-stamping the prosecution’s contentions.100 
In exercising this function, a chamber may need to establish criteria to 
facilitate evaluation such as the document’s contents, its function and pur-
pose and its author.101 However, it need not inspect every document po-
tentially falling under the Rule.102 And this Rule does not oblige a party to 
inform the other parties that it is not disclosing a document, information 
in a document, or the existence of a document that is a report, memoranda, 
or other internal document.103 It is the contents, function, purpose and 
source of the document, and not the title, that is important in determining 
whether it is considered work product.104 
Another consideration is that once a question is put to a witness or 
disclosed outside the prosecutor’s office, the information can no longer be 
                                                                                                                        
Bassiouni, described a data-base of close to 80,000 documents and 300 hours of video tape. 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions”, in Wash-
ington University Journal of Law and Policy, 2001, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 46. 
99 El Sayed Appeals Decision, paras. 95–96, see above note 34. 
100 Ibid., paras. 74, 117. 
101 Ibid., para. 78; Ayyash et al. Decision on Sabra Motion to Lift Redactions and Disclosure 
of United Nations Fact-Finding Mission Documents, para. 14, see above note 49. 
102 Ibid., para. 13. 
103 Ibid., para. 10. 
104 El Sayed Appeals Decision, paras. 74, 117, see above note 34. 
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considered as internal work product.105 A party also may implicitly waive 
its claim for non-disclosure of material that would otherwise be consid-
ered as internal work product, for example, by a witness revealing its con-
tent in court. However, this does not automatically extend to waiving the 
privilege attached to not disclosing the document itself. This will depend 
upon the circumstances.106 
International criminal courts and tribunals, lacking their own inter-
nal enforcement mechanisms, rely upon State co-operation, mainly 
through official requests for assistance. Prosecutor’s offices generate most 
of these, although the defence, registry and victim participants can also 
send international requests for assistance. The prosecution need disclose 
requests for assistance only if the defence can demonstrate that they are 
material to its preparation for trial.107 But the difficulty with this is that 
the defence has to know that the request was made. This includes the re-
quest and any response. Sometimes it will be obvious, but at other times, 
not. 
14.4. Defence Disclosure Obligations 
Defence disclosure obligations are far less onerous. An alibi notice must 
be notified, as must a ground for excluding criminal responsibility, such 
as a special defence. At the ICC, the defence shall permit the Prosecutor 
to inspect material intended for use as evidence in confirmation proceed-
ings or at trial.108 Privileged material, such as communications between a 
client and a lawyer, is also generally immune from disclosure.109 
                                                   
105 Niyitegeka Appeals Judgment, para. 34, see above note 53. 
106 Ayyash et al. Trial Decision re Michael Taylor, paras. 53–57, see above note 34. 
107 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on the Oneissi Defence Motion 
for Disclosure of Documents Referred to in the Report Related to the Hard Drive of Mr. 
Ahmed Abu Adass, 14 October 2014, STL-11-01/T/TC/F1697/20141014/R269080-
R269084/EN/dm, para. 7 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/22843d); Ayyash et al. Trial De-
cision on the Oneissi Defence Motion for Disclosure of Requests for Assistance, para. 36, 
see above note 49. 
108 ICC RPE, Rules 78 and 79, see above note 39. Rules 67(A) and 67(B) of the ICTY RPE 
had similar requirements, see above note 30. Rules 67(A) and 67(B) of the ICTR RPE only 
required “reciprocal disclosure” by the defence if it had sought the same inspection rights 
to prosecution material, see above note 30. Rule 72 of the IRMCT RPE requires the de-
fence to allow prosecution inspection and copying of defence material to be used at trial 
and to provide copies to the prosecution of the statements of all proposed trial witnesses, 
see above note 30. Rule 112 of the STL RPE has similar requirements for alibi and special 
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14.5. Relief for Disclosure Violations 
The relief that a court may grant for late or non-disclosure varies.110 The 
overriding principle is that the defence must show some prejudice. The 
consequences could be existential for the prosecution of an accused. The 
result could be an adjournment, a recall of a witness, a stay of proceed-
ings – temporary or permanent – and on appeal, admitting new evidence, 
an acquittal, an order for a retrial or a declaration of a mistrial. A reduc-
tion in sentence could also result.111 A court could also order sanctions 
against a prosecution office or an individual prosecution lawyer for dis-
closure violations. Another possibility could be the exclusion of the evi-
dence, in not permitting a party to tender it into evidence.112 The latter 
could apply equally to breaches of defence disclosure obligations.113 
14.6. The Current Practices 
The disclosure practices vary between the international institutions but 
each follows the basic model outlined above of a prosecutorial custodian 
of all that it has gathered, but with strong disclosure obligations as out-
lined above – from which it is obvious that there are some grey areas, 
such as the definition of witness statements, internal work product and 
what may be material to defence trial preparations. The most fair, efficient 
and sensible is that employed by the IRMCT which comes from the 
ICTY’s long-established practice. 
                                                                                                                        
defence notifications, prosecution inspection of material for use at trial and disclosure of 
defence witness statements, see above note 30. 
109 Some exceptions are in Rule 73 of the ICC RPE, see above note 39. 
110 Rule 68bis of the ICTY RPE and Rule 74 of the IRMCT RPE “Failure to Comply with 
Disclosure Obligations” allows a chamber to impose sanctions on a party that fails to com-
ply, see above note 30. The ICC Statute and ICC RPE contain nothing to this effect. 
111 Kajelijeli Appeals Judgment, para. 255, see above note 28 – if found on an interlocutory 
appeal that “an accused’s rights have been violated, but not egregiously so, it will order the 
Trial Chamber to reduce the accused’s sentence if the accused is found guilty”. 
112 There is an enormous body of case law on this topic, as each motion alleging a disclosure 
violation generally seeks specific relief in the form of an order rectifying the situation; 
there is therefore no need to refer to specific cases. 
113 A comprehensive overview of the subject is in Kelly Pitcher, Judicial Responses to Pre-
Trial Procedural Violations in International Criminal Proceedings, Asser Press, Springer, 
The Hague, 2018, pp. 397–435. 
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14.6.1. IRMCT – Including the ICTY and ICTR 
The prosecution at the IRMCT generally follows the practice of the for-
mer ICTY whose evidence collection and that of the ICTR it inherited. 
The IRMCT, for ICTY related proceedings, has an electronic dis-
closure system or ‘suite’ (EDS) that contains a general collection of evi-
dence that is made available to the relevant defence. It is a large volume 
of evidence, including documents, redacted witness statements and so on. 
In addition, case or accused specific disclosure can be made via the sys-
tem. 
The EDS was a prosecution initiative from around 2003 that was 
accepted by the ICTY President, the Registrar, and its Association of De-
fence Counsel. Until then the prosecution electronically searched its col-
lection but disclosed its documents to the defence either in hard copy or 
on compact disc. 
From December 2003, the ICTY moved to compulsory electronic 
disclosure. In that month the ICTY judges amended Rule 68, “Disclosure 
of exculpatory and other relevant material”, to mandate that “the Prosecu-
tor shall make available to the defence, in electronic form, collections of 
relevant material held by the Prosecutor, together with appropriate com-
puter software with which the defence can search such collections elec-
tronically”. This was without prejudice to the prosecution’s obligation to 
disclose exculpatory material, or to take reasonable steps to obtain the 
consent of a provider if obtained under the obligation not to disclose it 
without its consent.114 
This did not relieve the prosecution from searching its evidence col-
lection. The ICTY’s Appeals Chamber held that 
while Rule 68(ii) of the Rules allows the Prosecutor to make 
disclosure materials available on the EDS, it is well-
established that the EDS cannot be used a substitute for posi-
tive disclosure. In this regard, the Prosecution may satisfy its 
disclosure obligations by creating a case-specific file, 
providing an index of disclosed materials, or providing some 
notice to the Defence when materials are added to the file.115 
                                                   
114 Under the ICTY’s RPE Rule 70, now the IRMCT’s RPE Rule 76 “Matters Not Subject to 
Disclosure”, see above note 30. 
115 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Interlocutory Appeal 
against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on EDS Disclosure Methods, 28 November 2013, IT-
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And further: 
Similarly, the jurisprudence does not designate the EDS or 
any other form of electronic disclosure as the official method, 
nor does it support a conclusion that one method of electron-
ic disclosure is to be used to the exclusion of other methods. 
On the contrary, the Appeals Chambers of the Tribunal and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as well as 
various trial chambers have found that the provision of non-
EDS resources, such as descriptive indices and written notic-
es of disclosed material, are precisely the types of assistance 
that make EDS materials reasonably available and accessible 
to the Defence, thereby helping to meet the Prosecution’s 
disclosure obligations.116 
The EDS contains prosecution evidence, so in that sense its content 
is prosecution controlled, but it is managed by the Registry. The prosecu-
tion has no access to the system to change anything, this goes through the 
Registry. The Registry also manages access to the system. 
It was a pioneering international disclosure suite that was in use 
when the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor started its own document collec-
tion in 2004. In its 2009 developed practices manual, the ICTY said of 
disclosure: 
Given the complex nature of war crimes cases, disclosure is 
a major undertaking that is extremely resource-intensive. 
Because the ICTY’s OTP seized many original documents 
from government archives in the former Yugoslavia, the De-
fence is especially reliant on the disclosure process. Disclo-
sure in these massive cases is quite unlike disclosure in a 
domestic criminal trial where all the relevant evidence can 
be readily assembled and inspected.117 
                                                                                                                        
09-92-AR73.2, para. 25 (internal footnotes omitted; emphasis added) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/c42827). 
116 Ibid., para. 27 (internal footnotes omitted). 
117 ICTY and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (‘UNICRI’), 
ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, UNICRI Publisher, Turin, 2009, p. 61 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/0cc55d). It also noted, at p. 62, that, “[w]hile the Prosecutor remains 
subject to the underlying obligation to disclose exculpatory information within the Prose-
cutor’s actual knowledge, the new EDS represents a move towards “open book” disclo-
sure”. 
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The ICTY’s criminal defence manual, which followed in 2011, said 
of the EDS: 
an Electronic Disclosure System (EDS) was instituted at the 
ICTY which provides the Defence access via the internet to 
evidentiary materials in electronic format collected by the 
Prosecution. This is an important means for the Defence to 
conduct its own independent research into matters for prepa-
ration of the case.118 
The ICTY’s prosecution document collection eventually contained 
over 9.3 million pages.119 The IRMCT inherited it. 
Prosecution officials would collect (or seize) documents, sometimes 
pursuant to search warrants issued by chambers that could be enforced in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo and either copy the documents on site 
or take them back to The Hague to enter them into the evidence collection. 
Each collection was given its own unique name, generally identifying its 
source, as examples, the Drina Corps or 1st Krajina Corps, referring to 
two distinct seized and copied Bosnian Serb Army archives. Another was 
entitled “Exhumations”. There was an index for a collection of miscella-
neous material titled “Evidence day forward”. 
Each document was scanned and entered into the system. In doing 
this it was given metadata, known as a ‘MIFF’, which listed the source, 
the type of document – such as whether it was an order, video, photograph, 
an exhumation report – the name of the person entering it. It also received 
a unique ‘ERN’ (or electronic registration number). Any associated ERNs 
were also noted. The language of the original and any translations were 
also recorded. Searching was through optical character recognition, or 
OCR, of scanned documents, however, this technology was imperfect 
                                                   
118 UNICRI, Association of Defence Counsel Practising Before the ICTY (ADC-ICTY) and 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR OSCE), Manual on International Criminal Defence: ADC-
ICTY Developed Practices Within the framework of the War Crimes Justice Project, 
UNICRI Publisher, 2011, p. 47. 
119 The information in the following paragraphs comes from a combination of the author’s 
own experience and an interview on 30 October 2019 with Robert Reid, the former ICTY 
and IRMCT Chief of Operations in the Office of the Prosecutor, who worked in that office 
between 1994 and 2018. His view is that generally the defence should get everything, and 
electronically, except restricted material which should be carefully searched by the prose-
cution for disclosable information. 
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especially with handwritten, coloured or Cyrillic documents. With im-
proved technology these problems diminished greatly. 
Separate indexes were maintained for witness related material, re-
stricted witness material, restricted material, and confidentially provided 
Rule 70 documents – namely, those provided with confidentiality re-
strictions meaning that its existence could not be disclosed without the 
provider’s consent. 
In searching the collections for disclosable material, the prosecution 
could search across combinations of indexes, with the exception of the 
restricted indexes in combination with the non-restricted, to guard against 
accidental disclosure. According to the prosecution official responsible for 
implementing and overseeing the system, it reached a level of accuracy of 
94.6 per cent in hits in searches.120 
A dedicated prosecution information support unit, using experi-
enced language staff, would perform searches on the indexes on specified 
search terms, provided by either prosecution staff or the defence. Prosecu-
tion legal teams had case management staff who would prepare docu-
ments for disclosure, namely, those containing hits on the search terms. 
The prosecution would, at the request of defence counsel, do searches on 
specified terms in the non-EDS collections described above. Lawyers 
would review the material before disclosing it. It would be disclosed elec-
tronically in batches, as Rule 68(B), referred to above, required. 
All defence counsel had access to the EDS. It contained a general 
collection of all indexes, with the exception of the four prosecution re-
stricted indexes, and for each case a new case-specific index was created 
to which assigned defence teams had access. The defence thus had unfet-
tered access to the prosecution’s document collection with the exception 
of the restricted indexes. The ICTY’s information technology section, 
under the Registrar, maintained the EDS and had two dedicated staff. The 
philosophy was to provide as far as possible a level playing field pursuant 
to the principle of equality of arms. 
The former ICTY prosecution’s Chief of Operations 121 described 
hard-copy disclosure as labour and time intensive and generally unhelpful 
to the defence, as it was unsearchable. Defence counsel had to scan the 
                                                   
120 Robert Reid, interview on 30 October 2019. 
121 Ibid. 
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documents before searching. He also described the effort involved in 
searching and compiling the disclosure of around 80 hard-copy boxes of 
documents to Slobodan Milošević who was self-represented during pre-
trial and the trial.122 When Milošević died in March 2006 the official was 
seconded to a judicial investigation into his death and went to the UN 
Detention Unit in The Hague. Milošević had been allocated a second cell 
for his legal work. The 80 disclosure boxes were sitting unopened in the 
second cell; the exercise had been futile. 
A senior defence lawyer who assisted the self-represented accused 
Radovan Karadžić in the ICTY and IRMCT proceedings had a less san-
guine view of the EDS’s efficacy from a defence searching perspective. 
He described receiving maybe 1,500 separate disclosure batches – result-
ing from the prosecution’s searches of its defence restricted indexes, of 
possibly two million pages. He was unable to search across the material 
and had to do it by individual CD. For material placed on the EDS, the 
prosecution segregated it into several folders, requiring a search across 
several folders. In his view, it became unmanageable. He described at-
tempting to find material as ‘a nightmare’. During the proceedings he also 
filed 108 motions alleging disclosure violations by the prosecution, suc-
ceeding in 84. They mostly concerned the late disclosure of witness 
statements.123 
The ICTR had its own version of the ICTY’s EDS but it was main-
tained by the prosecution. It was much smaller, containing ‘only’ over 
200,000 documents.124 It was an archive of general information relating to 
the genocide and its background, for example, of Rwandan Government 
and military documents, UNIMIR and diplomatic documents, and numer-
ous media material such as speeches, radio publications. It also had spe-
cific case related folders. Both contained witness statements. Rwandan 
Gacaca trial documents were later added to it, thus providing material that 
at times contradicted witness statements already in these archives. 
                                                   
122 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, IT-02-54. 
123 Peter Robinson, interview on 29 October 2019. He helpfully numbered each motion – from 
one all the way to 108. The final one, filed on 14 March 2016, was titled “108th motion for 
finding of disclosure violation and for remedial measures”. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan 
Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-T. 
124 Peter Robinson, interview on 29 October 2019. The figure is imprecise. 
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Of it, the same experienced defence counsel said it was “rudimen-
tary but it worked”.125 The main problem in his experience had been of 
information systems management, namely, how the prosecution had 
stored the information, giving examples of investigators storing relevant 
witness related material on their personal drives and folders rather than 
logging it into the central system. There was also a lack of metadata. 
Another senior lawyer who had worked at the ICTR as defence 
counsel126 was of the view the system did not work that well considering 
that the information essentially related to one event which was far more 
limited in time than the conflicts under investigation at the ICTY or ICC. 
14.6.2. Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
At the STL the prosecution searches its archives and discloses material in 
batches through the STL’s own in-house developed litigation software, 
Legal Workflow. The STL judges, like the ICC’s, also have access to 
some disclosure batches. An email notification is sent with each fresh 
disclosure to everyone who has access to it. Prosecution disclosure is 
specified according to the relevant Rules together with a brief description 
of the batches’ contents.127 
14.6.3. International Criminal Court 
The ICC, before the referral of the first situation, that of Uganda, to the 
Court in 2004 – and hence the collection of evidence – was a tabula rasa 
in respect of prosecution document management, and hence disclosure. 
                                                   
125 Ibid., who was lead counsel for Joseph Nzirorera in ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., 
ICTR-98-44-T. 
126 And at another international court as a senior prosecutor. 
127 As of the date of judgment, 18 August 2020, 879 electronic disclosure batches were in 
Legal Workflow in relation to the Ayyash et al. case. This included prosecution disclosure 
of evidence to be used at trial and of exculpatory material and that which is material to de-
fence preparation, and defence disclosure of documents intended to be used in questioning 
prosecution witnesses (so it contains some overlap of information that was disclosed more 
than once). The Prosecution filed pre-trial disclosure reports in late 2012 which revealed 
that at that stage it had disclosed 101,117 pages of witness statements and related material, 
and 211,632 pages of exhibits on its exhibit list, contained in 19,530 files released in 62 
disclosure batches. Any suggestion that a Trial Chamber of three judges plus an alternative 
judge, with four staff, could have familiarised itself with this material in the two and half 
months between becoming seized of the case in October 2013 and the trial starting in mid-
January 2014, is unrealistic. The Trial Chamber had access to around 444 (random) disclo-
sure batches. The disclosure batches were by August 2020 numbered up to 3,590. 
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The ICTY prosecutor’s office by that stage had an enormous evi-
dence collection of millions of pages of documents in different languages 
and was already using its EDS for defence disclosure. It was generally 
seen to be efficient and was a massive improvement on hard copy disclo-
sure and a prosecutor’s office keeping for itself its entire evidence collec-
tion. It was the obvious international example to study and from which 
lessons could be gleaned and learned. 
The ICC as an institution collectively, however, appears not to have 
adequately learned from this and has neither attempted to replicate nor 
improve on it. In saying this, the fundamental differences between the two 
institutions are of course recognised. The ICC has many more ‘unique’ 
situations under investigation, as well as preliminary investigations, as 
opposed to the different but related conflicts confined to the former Yugo-
slavia from 1991 to 1995, 1998 to 1999 and in 2001. In this respect there 
was some obvious evidentiary overlap.128 However, it is never too late. 
The ICC Prosecution stores its document collection in litigation 
software called Ringtail where evidence is stored according to the relevant 
situation. Metadata concerning documents is entered when the material is 
registered, including its source and date of collection. Whether it can be 
disclosed is also indicated in the metadata. Ringtail can be configured to 
run searches by actors, field, location or name. It also has a field that can 
be filtered as ‘disclose’ or ‘do not disclose’. 
A part of the material collected and categorised is open source. The 
prosecution must search this database for material that is disclosable; only 
then does the defence get access to it. It is disclosed to the defence 
through e-court. The judges also have access to this material. This disclo-
sure occurs in Ringtail. 
The informal views of several ICC prosecution senior trial lawyers 
were sought in relation to the efficacy of the current disclosure system; 
                                                   
128 The predominant languages at the ICTY were its two working languages, English and 
French, and the languages of the former Yugoslavia, namely, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, 
Albanian and Macedonian. The ICC has collections in many more languages. The sole 
case from what was then called the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ICTY, Prose-
cutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, IT-04-82, related to an internal armed conflict in that 
country in August 2001, which was unrelated to the other earlier armed conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
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some had had experience at other international tribunals, all had extensive 
domestic litigation experience.129 
One described the current system as imposing a ‘tremendous bur-
den’ upon limited prosecution resources especially in the lead-up to con-
firmation proceedings and trial. This lawyer unfavourably compared the 
ICC’s practices in lacking an EDS, meaning that the sometimes-
voluminous open source material had to be thoroughly scrutinised for 
potential disclosure. 
To demonstrate the dimension of the disclosure issue, in one recent 
case four months of legal work was required to review around 80,000 
documents, amounting to an estimated 80 per cent of the time of the pros-
ecution lawyers’ work during the pre-trial period. 
In another, a case specific document collection contained about 
100,000 documents of which only around one hundred were witness 
statements. There were about 500 screening interviews with witnesses. 
Most of the material – an estimated 80 per cent or so – was open-source; 
radio, television, video, news reports and so on. A lawyer described the 
legal team becoming bogged down in redacting material according to a 
pre-trial chamber order requiring a motion for each proposed redaction to 
witness related material. 
A lawyer also referred to an unfortunate atmosphere of distrust de-
veloping between prosecution and defence legal teams on disclosure and 
redactions. 
An ICC defence counsel, who has also worked as defence counsel 
at the ICTY and for its prosecution, also unfavourably compared the 
ICC’s disclosure regime to the ICTY’s.130 In his experience, the ICTY’s 
was better developed – although he conceded that many of the ICTY cas-
es were sub-sets of a larger whole – and consequently defence counsel 
had greater confidence that they had access to the information that could 
be material to defence preparation. The ICTY disclosure case-law was 
also more consistent but by contrast “at the ICC we don’t know what we 
                                                   
129 Their views are described here with their permission but without specific attribution. 
130 Interview with Christopher Gosnell, 24 October 2019, who has been co-counsel in the 
Ntaganda case (ICC-01/04-02/06), and the Article 70 Bemba et al. case (ICC-01/05-01/13) 
at the ICC; in the Hadžić case (IT-04-75) at the ICTY , and also worked in the ICTY’s Of-
fice of the Prosecutor (including with the author on the case of Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et 
al.). 
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haven’t got”. Also, the ICTY prosecution seemed to have had a better 
appreciation of its Rule 70 obligations (similar to the ICC’s Article 54(3)), 
and hence what needed to be disclosed. This is most probably because of 
its years of doing it. His overall view, however, was that the ICC’s disclo-
sure metadata, although basic, and generally lacking commentary, was of 
a sufficient basic quality. 
A particular issue, in this defence lawyer’s view, was the ICC’s 
prosecution’s practice of disclosing summaries of investigator’s notes of 
early encounters or interviews with witnesses,131 rather than the original 
document itself, which could, if necessary, be disclosed in a suitably re-
dacted form. He believed that this was time-consuming for the prosecu-
tion. (The prosecution’s response to this was that this was actually the 
most efficient way to do it because the security interviews were not sup-
posed to contain evidentiary material.) Moreover, investigators, rather 
than prosecution lawyers prepared the summaries. The defence lawyer 
believed that wherever possible, the prosecution should disclose that it has 
information in its possession from a named source, as the source itself 
could be exculpatory information. 
A senior prosecution lawyer, by contrast, could not see how 
knowledge of the source of itself could generally be exculpatory. Further, 
the prosecution’s general Rule 77 disclosure could contain information 
falling within other categories such as exculpatory information under Ar-
ticle 68(2).132 
That lawyer felt that the current disclosure methodology is extreme-
ly time-consuming; it absorbs lawyer resources that could be better used 
for trial preparation. The most efficient approach is to identify redactions 
as early as possible in the process, while recognising that these early deci-
sions may need reconsideration closer to the time of pre-trial disclosure. 
Over 60,000 documents, for example, had to be reviewed in one trial, 
which imposed an enormous burden on the prosecution lawyers in the 
                                                   
131 Interview with Christopher Gosnell, 24 October 2019, by this he was probably referring to 
the ICC’s basic security questionnaire used to screen all witnesses. 
132 Referring to disclosure of information in the prosecution’s possession which is material to 
defence preparation, intended for use in confirmation proceedings or at trial, or that con-
tain information that is either potentially exonerating, mitigating, or that affects the credi-
bility of Prosecution evidence. It states that the Prosecutor “shall permit the defence to in-
spect any books, documents, photographs and other tangible objects in the possession or 
control of the Prosecutor”. 
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pre-trial period. A possible solution could be to use highly trained parale-
gals for this task, as occurs in large domestic civil cases. 
Another senior prosecution lawyer took the view that searching the 
prosecution’s potential evidentiary holdings should not be viewed as for 
the purposes of defence disclosure, but rather to find out what is in it, to 
understand the prosecution case. It is while doing this that disclosable 
material is found. 
The time that can elapse between investigation and arrest can also 
create enormous internal challenges, especially given that staff are moved 
from inactive to active cases. As an illustration, in one case the investiga-
tion ceased and lay dormant until the arrest of the accused eight years later, 
by which time only two prosecution staff remained who had worked on 
the original investigation. This necessitated all prosecution lawyers re-
viewing the entirety of the evidence collection for themselves, both for 
inculpatory and exculpatory information. In this lawyer’s view this work 
should be done by the most senior, rather than the most junior, lawyers. 
The quality of the metadata, which could have been described before as 
‘patchy’, had improved over the years. 
An issue going directly to the efficiency of the current disclosure 
practices is the role of the judiciary in managing disclosure. This includes 
whether a chamber should actively oversee prosecution disclosure by, for 
example, positively approving proposed redactions of material for disclo-
sure, or should trust the prosecution to do it. And how far, if at all, a 
chamber should involve itself in reviewing the massive quantity of mate-
rial passing between the parties, while knowing that much, if not almost 
all of it will never be used in confirmation proceedings or at trial. ICC 
judges have access to all such material. 
A review of the practices of the ICC chambers shows that the 
chambers, and particularly the pre-trial chambers, have struggled in at-
tempting to manage the massive quantity of disclosed material passing 
between the parties – generally from the prosecution to the defence. The 
pre-trial chambers have issued numerous orders establishing disclosure 
regimes that have included timetables, IDACs, redaction protocols and a 
degree of realistic judicial supervision. 
A central issue here is the meaning of the term ‘evidence’ in the 
context of inter-parties disclosure. Neither the Rome Statute nor the ICC’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence define what ‘evidence’ is. The use of the 
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term in both documents is therefore contextual. ‘Evidence’ is normally 
understood to mean the material (namely, the proof) that is used to sup-
port a case in proceedings, and depending upon the context, may include 
that collected in an investigation.133 
In the context of court proceedings, Article 69(3) provides that the 
“parties may submit evidence relevant to the case”, while Article 69(4) 
contains the standard provision that the court 
may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, 
taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of the evi-
dence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a 
fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
For confirmation hearings, Article 61(3)(b) requires that the accused 
is “informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the 
hearing” (emphasis added). This can only be referring to the material – 
namely to the proof, being the documents and, if necessary, witness testi-
mony – that will be adduced at a confirmation hearing. The words “in-
tends to rely” could have no other meaning in that context. In the hearing, 
the Prosecutor presents a positive case supporting the charges, and does 
not produce evidence that is neither relevant nor probative of this case. 
Likewise, the defence may also produce such evidence in support of a 
case. 
Significantly, Article 61(3)(b) regulates disclosure of evidence to 
the defence, not to the chambers. It does not regulate what the chambers 
should have access to. And it neither states nor implies that “evidence” 
includes every document passing between the parties before the confirma-
tion hearing, in the broader disclosure sense of Article 67(2) or Rule 77. 
These two provisions have different purposes and operate separately to 
Article 61(3)(b). Under Rule 121(2)(c) all “evidence” disclosed between 
the parties “for the purpose of the confirmation hearing” is communicated 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber. The rule, however, defines neither what is 
                                                   
133 Black’s Law Dictionary, 19th edition, defines it as “1. Something (including testimony, 
documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged 
fact; anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of 
a fact”; “3. The collective mass of things, esp. testimony and exhibits, presented before a 
tribunal in a given dispute”; and “4. The body of law regulating the admissibility of what is 
offered as proof into the record of a legal proceeding”. 
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meant here by “evidence” nor the words “for the purpose of the confirma-
tion hearing”. 
The most rational interpretation would confine that communication 
to material that the parties intend to use in presenting their cases in the 
hearing before the Pre-Trial Chamber. Namely, of “evidence” as it is nor-
mally understood, that is, the exhibits and testimony (including witness 
statements) received by a court in determining the issues before it. Logi-
cally, this is done by submitting witness and exhibit lists, even if no hear-
ing eventuates, as this precisely identifies the material the parties intend to 
use “for the purpose of the confirmation hearing”. This is consistent with 
Rule 121(3) which requires the Prosecutor to present “the list of the evi-
dence which he or she intends to present at the hearing”. Documents fall-
ing outside of those categories cannot, reasonably, be relevant “for the 
purpose of the confirmation hearing”, so far as a pre-trial chamber is con-
cerned. 
An expansive interpretation of the words “for the purpose of” could 
conceivably extend to documents that the defence uses as part of its gen-
eral strategy, as opposed to those actually put before a pre-trial chamber 
in confirmation proceedings. However, the narrower and more coherent 
interpretation is far more consistent with Article 67(2) which requires the 
Prosecutor to disclose to the defence 
evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control which he 
or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the 
accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which 
may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. 
It is important to emphasise Article 67(2)’s purpose, namely, of cod-
ifying the Prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under international human 
rights law, rather than defining what material a pre-trial chamber or a trial 
chamber should view. The term “evidence” is used, albeit somewhat 
loosely, but only in this context of inter-parties disclosure. This narrower 
interpretation is also far more consistent with Rule 77’s requirement that 
the Prosecution discloses information that may be material to the defence 
preparation for trial. 
The ICC’s 2017 and 2019 Chambers Practice Manuals, however, at-
tempted to interpret Rule 121(2)(c) – but without defining the concept of 
“evidence” – by stating: 
This should be understood as encompassing all evidence dis-
closed between the parties during the pre-trial proceedings, 
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i.e. between the person’s initial appearance (or, in particular 
circumstances, even before) and the issuance of the confir-
mation decision.134 
The manuals do not explain how this “understanding” is consistent 
with Article 61(3)(b). According to the manuals, this material – or “evi-
dence” – forms part of the record of the case irrespective of whether it 
eventually appears on a party’s evidence list.135 Or, by extension, is ever 
received into evidence in a court hearing. 
An example of a pre-trial chamber’s view of its role in relation to 
the vast quantity of documents passing between the parties is of the Single 
Judge in Abd-Al-Rahman embracing the manual’s over-expansive defini-
tion of “evidence” and ordering the Registry to register any “evidence 
disclosed between the parties and make it available to the Chamber”. He 
held that it was of the “utmost importance” that the “parties provide all 
required metadata”.136 
The order, however, did not attempt to explain why the Pre-Trial 
Chamber needed access to every document exchanged between the par-
ties – and in particular those that could be material to defence preparations 
for trial – and how having such access could expedite the proceedings. 
Nor did it define “evidence”.137 
These types of orders, however and unfortunately, misconceive the 
pre-trial chambers’ role as a filtering body that decides whether a case 
moves forward to trial. The Court’s statutory instruments do not give the 
pre-trial chambers an investigatory function, yet providing them with ac-
cess to this material implicitly bestows this role on them. Even if the pre-
trial chambers have some form of supervisory role in ensuring that the 
                                                   
134 ICC Chambers Practice Manual 2017, p. 10, see above note 90; ICC Chambers Practice 
Manual 2019, para. 26, see above note 90. 
135 ICC Chambers Practice Manual 2017, p. 10, see above note 90; ICC Chambers Practice 
Manual 2019, para. 27, see above note 90. 
136 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali-Abd-Al-Rahman 
(‘Ali Kushayb’), Pre-Trial Chamber, Order on disclosure and related matters, 17 August 
2020, ICC-02/05-01/20-116, para. 11 (Judge Aitala) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
l59vj1/). 
137 The order then went into micro-management mode on inter-parties disclosure by ordering 
the Prosecution to provide “detailed” fortnightly reports “to keep the Chamber abreast of 
any progress made with regard to the evidence review, translation and disclosure process”, 
ibid., para. 17. 
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Prosecution is adhering to its disclosure obligations, they do not have an 
investigatory function. 
The role of the trial chamber, however, is very different. Even if it is 
accepted – and only for arguments sake – that the pre-trial chambers 
should have access to vast swathes of material that the parties will not put 
before the chamber in the confirmation proceedings (perhaps as part of an 
expanded filtering function), a trial chamber cannot, as part of its statutory 
function require access to this irrelevant material. It is therefore essential 
to distinguish their different functions in assessing whether they should 
view the “evidence” disclosed between the parties – especially that which 
will not be used in hearings. Experience shows that most of the material 
falls into this category. 
The Chambers Practice Manuals, however, state that the transmis-
sion of the record to the Trial Chamber, after confirmation of a case, “in-
cludes all evidence which has become part of the record by way of its 
communication to the Pre-Trial Chamber following inter partes disclo-
sure”.138 
But this too is flawed. Providing the Trial Chamber with this mate-
rial goes well beyond the function of the fact-finding body charged with 
determining whether an accused person is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 
A trial chamber should not view material that will not become part of the 
trial record, except to decide whether it will upon the application of a par-
ty, or in the limited circumstances when it may require “the submission of 
all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth” 
pursuant to Article 69(3). Having access to all of material passing between 
the parties is tantamount to an impermissible fishing expedition into the 
Prosecutor’s evidentiary holdings to ascertain whether anything is missing 
from the trial record. Trial chambers are conducting criminal trials not 
inquiries. 
In taking this position the Chambers Practice Manuals are taking an 
overly broad interpretation of the concept of “evidence”. A stricter and 
more realistic reading would confine it to that which a chamber receives 
and examines and uses in its deliberations concerning whether an accused 
person is guilty or not guilty of the charges. In other words, the eviden-
tiary record of what is proposed for receipt into evidence, rather than eve-
                                                   
138 ICC Chambers Practice Manual 2017, p. 19, see above note 90; ICC Chambers Practice 
Manual 2019, para. 69, see above note 90. 
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ry document (in the broadest sense of the term) passing between the par-
ties, regardless of its pertinence or eventual use in court. This interpreta-
tion would also better coincide with the international human rights law 
requirement of a fair trial which guarantees that accused persons have the 
right to challenge the evidence used against them. The manual, however, 
goes on further to assert that: 
Considering that the evidence would then be individually 
considered for formal admission during trial, its inclusion in 
the record of proceedings before professional judges is not 
problematic. The transmission of the complete record with 
all its contents is also the preferred solution because of its 
simplicity.139 
It is not easy to comprehend the policy rationale for this. Interna-
tional criminal proceedings, in accordance with international human rights 
law, are adversarial. The ICC has neither an investigating judge nor 
chamber nor a dossier. The Prosecutor prepares an indictment in the form 
of a ‘document containing the charges’, and a case to present before a pre-
trial chamber and then a trial chamber. The parties are responsible for 
their own investigation and case strategies. And crucially, many thousands 
of documents will normally have passed from the prosecution to the de-
fence during the pre-trial phase, during which time the opposing legal 
teams will have familiarised themselves with this material. This is some-
thing a chamber, with a small support staff, often composed (at least in 
part) of junior lawyers having little if any prior domestic, criminal, litiga-
tion or even court experience, could never do.140 It is implicitly inviting a 
trial chamber to rummage through thousands of irrelevant documents – 
most of which, sitting in their disclosure batches, will lack context – but 
without stating why it should do this. 
Moreover, it is hard to see how transferring tens of thousands of 
documents en masse to a Trial Chamber – most of which will doubtless be 
irrelevant to determining the charges – has more ‘simplicity’ than confin-
ing the Trial Chamber’s role to examining those that the parties actually 
                                                   
139 ICC Chambers Practice Manual 2017, p. 19, see above note 90; ICC Chambers Practice 
Manual 2019, para. 69, see above note 90. 
140 These same legal assistants could also be tasked with obtaining statements from witnesses 
called by the chambers. This actually occurred in the Krajišnik trial. Krajišnik Trial Judg-
ment, see above note 65. 
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rely upon as part of their cases, after investigating their respective cases. 
This can only complicate rather than simplify a trial chamber’s task. 
It also neglects to distinguish between two essential but different 
concepts. One is ‘the record of the proceedings’ – which is undefined in 
the Court’s statutory instruments – but in reality is the case record. This 
could be considered to include all potential evidentiary material uploaded 
into Ringtail, either for disclosure or for use in court, and additionally 
motions, responses, decisions and orders and so on, and the judgment 
itself. The other is the trial evidentiary record. This is the material that a 
chamber either receives into evidence – normally when a party tenders it – 
or examines in deciding whether to receive it into evidence. It does this in 
exercising its statutory function of determining whether an accused is 
guilty or not guilty. 
The manual does not explain how a Trial Chamber examining inter-
party disclosure documents – most of which will not be used at trial and 
hence will not form part of the trial evidentiary record – is either an effi-
cient use of judicial and chambers staff resources, or is in the interests of 
justice. It also fails to consider that the prosecution will have spent many 
years investigating and preparing the case, the defence less time, and their 
resources collectively dwarf those of a chamber of three judges and a 
small team of legal assistants. A Trial Chamber logistically cannot do the 
work of the prosecution or defence; its role is to adjudicate rather than 
investigate, search prosecution disclosure batches or to second-guess what 
the parties are doing. But the manual is appearing to invite the Trial 
Chamber to examine all of this material itself. 
Writing in 2001, nineteen years before the Single Judge’s order in 
Abd-Al-Rahman referred to above, a member of the French delegation 
involved in negotiating the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence fur-
nished a possible relatively contemporaneous policy explanation for Rule 
121, which derives from a French proposal. In fairness to its author, the 
publication was of course written well before the ICC had any cases, and 
had actually started collecting potential evidence, and hence was yet to be 
confronted with the reality rather than the mere theory of disclosure and 
conducting expeditious proceedings. 
In essence, according to the French delegate, its aim was to reduce 
the length of trials by giving the chambers access to all possible material, 
thus allowing the judges to decide for themselves what was relevant to the 
case. At the time particular concern was expressed at the average of 16 
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months then apparently being taken for ICTY trials. ICTR and ICTY trials, 
it was suggested, were being delayed by lengthy pre-trial disclosure mo-
tions, and this could be eliminated by providing the confirmation chamber 
with all the material, so that it could examine it for itself.141 
Putting to one side the magical thinking inherent in supposing that 
inserting an extra judicial layer in the form of pre-trial confirmation pro-
ceedings into the proceedings would accelerate rather than slow cases,142 
the case statistics of the first ICC trial, Lubanga, reveal (quite predictably) 
that this ‘initiative’ did nothing to cure the ‘problem’ of these apparently 
excessively lengthy sixteen-month ‘common-law’ trials. The Lubanga 
trial took three years between its opening and the verdict, which was pre-
ceded by a 24-month delay between the confirmation decision and the 
trial’s opening. It was also plagued by disclosure problems – mainly 
stemming from the prosecution’s overuse of Article 54(3)(e) agreements – 
with the Trial Chamber twice staying the proceedings.143 Moreover, the 
                                                   
141 Gilbert Bitti, “Two Bones of Contention Between Civil and Common Law: The Record of 
the Proceedings and the Treatment of a Concursus Delictorum”, in Horst Fischer, Claus 
Kreß, Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under 
International Law: Current Developments, Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, Berlin, 2001, p. 276 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b7b81a). A member of the Australian delegation to the 
negotiations countered these arguments in the same book: Helen J. Brady, “Setting the 
Record Straight: A Short Note on Disclosure and “the Record of the Proceedings””, in ibid., 
pp. 262–72, pointing out that a number of delegations viewed the confirmation proceed-
ings as a very short procedure – as a ‘filter’ that was “designed to ensure that only cases 
reaching a certain standard or significance go to trial – namely, those where the Prosecu-
tion puts forward sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the 
person committed the crime or crimes charged” (ibid., p. 264). The difference in principle 
between the two views is that in the latter the confirmation proceedings are not concerned 
with the pre-trial chamber examining all inter-parties disclosure, instead concentrating on 
the evidence that the parties say is relevant to determining whether the case should proceed 
to trial and on what charges. 
142 This is of course premised on the Prosecutor filing a document containing the charge only 
in cases that have solid evidence against the accused persons that should survive confirma-
tion proceedings. 
143 The first ICC situation was referred to the Court by the Ugandan government in January 
2004 and investigations commenced in July 2004. The ICC case sheet reveals of its first 
case, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, ICC-01/04-01/06, the following case sta-
tistics: Warrant of arrest issued: 10 February 2006; Transfer to The Hague: 16 March 2006; 
Confirmation of charges hearing: 9–28 November 2006; Decision on the confirmation of 
charges: 29 January 2007; Opening of the trial: 26 January 2009; Verdict: 14 March 2012; 
Sentence: 10 July 2012; Appeal judgment: 1 December 2014; Final Appeals Chamber rep-
arations judgment: 18 July 2019. 
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Lubanga case could objectively be viewed as less factually and legally 
complex than many of its ICTY equivalents.144 
The next trial, Katanga, was no better with six years and seven 
months passing between Germain Katanga’s transfer to The Hague in 
October 2007, and his sentencing in May 2014; there was no appeal. The 
reparations litigation was completed only in March 2017. There was also 
a fourteen-month gap between the confirmation decision in September 
2008 and the trial’s opening in November 2009. The verdict was issued 
four years and four months later in March 2014.145 
The third trial, Bemba, was worse as 10 years passed between Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo’s arrest, in June 2008, and his acquittal on appeal 
(by a three-two majority) in June 2018. Seventeen months had also passed 
between the confirmation decision in June 2009 and the trial’s opening in 
November 2010. The Trial Chamber’s verdict was issued five years and 
four months later, in March 2016, with the sentence following in June 
2016. 
Of the role of the Trial Chamber in relation to this ‘record of pro-
ceedings’, the French official wrote: 
But here we see that the problem is in fact the role of the 
judges during the trial. If the presiding judge is going to be 
the one to question the witnesses and to conduct the trial, it 
is a sheer necessity for him or her to consult the Record of 
proceedings, otherwise it will simply be impossible to con-
duct the trial. But if the Judge is only here to watch the fight 
between the Prosecutor and the Defence, there is no necessi-
ty for him or her to consult the Record, even if it could be 
useful to understand more what’s going on.146 
This approach, however, seems to be grounded in supposing the use 
of the procedures of domestic systems that feature an investigating judge 
                                                   
144 Sixty-seven witnesses were called and the Trial Chamber received 1373 exhibits over 204 
trial days between January 2009 and May 2011. ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursu-
ant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 11 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/677866). Compared to ‘normal’ domestic trials, it is of course 
enormous, but comparatively not so in international proceedings. 
145 See ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, Case Information Sheet, 20 March 2018, ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-03-014/18_Eng 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7649d0). 
146 Bitti, 2001, p. 278, see above note 141. 
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and a dossier. But the experience of international trials since the first 
ICTY proceedings in 1994 has revealed few similarities between interna-
tional and domestic criminal proceedings,147 which moreover use hybrid 
procedures. 
Article 64(8) of the ICC Statute permits the presiding judge to give 
directions on the conduct of a trial. If the presiding judge does not, the 
prosecution and defence shall agree on the order and manner in which the 
evidence shall be submitted to the Trial Chamber. Whichever is chosen, 
Rule 140(2) ensures that the party putting forward a witness has the right 
to question that witness and those of the opposing party. The Trial Cham-
ber may question witnesses before or after the parties, and the defence has 
the right to question a witness last. 
Each Trial Chamber to date, in the eight completed trials, and the 
one plea of guilty sentence hearing has conducted its proceedings by per-
mitting the parties to call their own evidence and to question their own 
witnesses first.148 That is what could be described as a ‘party-driven’ order 
of proceedings. In fact, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise at 
trial, even with the chambers having access to the enormous ‘case record’ 
of actual evidence to which is added copious additional prosecution dis-
closure. In doing this the chambers have also at least implicitly recognised 
that the parties – having investigated and prepared their own cases – have 
distinct ‘cases’.149 
However, despite this, the Chambers Practice Manual, which pre-
sumably is intended to reflect perceived best judicial case management 
practice, suggests a form of micro-management of prosecution disclosure, 
                                                   
147 ICTY and UNICRI, 2009, see above note 117. 
148 This includes all benches of civil law or mixed civil law or common law origin, including 
a bench of three judges in the Article 70 contempt case of Bemba et al., ICC-01/05-01/13, 
in which one of the trial judges was Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut who led the French 
delegation in the negotiations for the ICC Statute and thereafter for its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. In that case the Accused were arrested in November 2013, the confirmation 
decision followed a year later in November 2014, the trial opened in September 2015 with 
a verdict in October 2016, followed by sentencing in March 2017 (and some resentencing 
in September 2018 after appellate proceedings for some accused), meaning that 22 months 
passed between arrests and the start of the trial, including the confirmation proceedings. In 
Lubanga the Trial Chamber called four expert witnesses and started the questioning itself; 
in Katanga it called two witnesses, and in Bemba one. 
149 The procedures employed in confirmation proceedings have varied; some have been live 
witness-free, with the parties submitting written evidence and making submissions. 
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even at the trial stage. In writing this, it is of course recognised that it is a 
manual rather than a statutory instrument and chambers are free to modify 
it or to disregard it entirely. 
Moreover, one can only envisage with horror the adverse effects on 
the statistics in the Lubanga, Katanga and Bemba trials had the presiding 
judges (and the other Trial Chamber judges) elected to do as the French 
delegate suggested, namely, to trawl through thousands of pages of docu-
ments – mostly irrelevant – while forging ahead with questioning the wit-
nesses. 
Another important issue which goes to blockages in the system of 
disclosure and hence the trial schedule is of redacting material for defence 
disclosure, or in lay terms, blacking out information. The prosecution may 
redact information under Rules 81(2) and (4) – which relates to not preju-
dicing further or ongoing investigations or the protection and safety of 
witnesses, victims or members of their families or other third parties. The 
ICC Chambers Practice Manual states, sensibly, that this can be done 
without a chamber’s authorisation unless the defence challenges it. In the 
event of a defence challenge, however, the prosecution must justify the 
redactions and specify how they fall into 1 of 13 enumerated catego-
ries.150 
The ICTY/ICTR/IRMCT/STL judges did not and do not do any of 
the things described above. The parties were permitted to do their job and 
the chambers intervened when required. In these tribunals the judges do 
not (generally) examine or micro-manage inter-party disclosure. 
From the above it can be safely concluded that the current ICC dis-
closure systems compare unfavourably to those used at the ICTY and 
IRMCT, even taking into account the fundamental differences between 
these institutions. 
The ICC judicial approach in some cases has tended towards over-
supervising prosecution disclosure, while the prosecution, on the other 
hand, has yet to embrace the relatively successful ICTY/IRMCT EDS 
experience of putting its open source and non-restricted witness materials 
into a ‘neutral’ Registry database. These two methodologies employed at 
the ICC appear to combine some of the least efficient approaches to man-
                                                   
150 This seems excessively bureaucratic. ICC Chambers Practice Manual 2017, pp. 29–30, see 
above note 90; ICC Chambers Practice Manual 2019, para. 101, see above note 90. 
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aging the inter-parties disclosure of information in complex international 
criminal proceedings. 
A reform suggested by some prosecutors was to ensure that the de-
fence is required to state, and as early as possible, its contentions with the 
prosecution case, or to put it more simply, to state its case. This, it was felt, 
would facilitate informed disclosure of material to the defence from the 
prosecution’s restricted evidence collections. A defence lawyer was re-
laxed with the suggestion, but only if the defence were required to set out 
its case after prosecution disclosure was complete, explaining (quite rea-
sonably) the difficulty of advising a client in the absence of complete dis-
closure of all potentially exculpatory material or that material to defence 
preparations.151 This has some merit and could be part of trial judicial 
case management. 
It would also require the court to make a declaration of an ‘end of 
essential disclosure date’ for this purpose. In so doing, the chamber would 
have to acknowledge, tacitly or expressly, that in international criminal 
law proceedings disclosure never seems to end, and can even continue 
past an appellate judgment. 
14.6.4. Judicial Familiarity with Prosecution Evidence Collections, 
Searching and Disclosure 
Another issue for consideration is that of judicial familiarity in the inter-
national system with how international prosecutors’ offices collect, store, 
catalogue and search their evidence collections.152 And, further, how de-
fence counsel do it. At the ICTY judicial ‘buy-in’ was required before the 
prosecution could move to mandatory electronic disclosure, as in its Rule 
68(B), now replicated in the IRMCT Rule 73(B). 
Historically, few international judges have had first-hand experi-
ence of large and complicated domestic criminal investigations, much less 
international ones, before assuming international judicial office. Those 
who have attained international judicial office through an academic or 
diplomatic route, or who have no criminal law background, could not be 
                                                   
151 Peter Robinson, interview on 29 October 2019. 
152 For example, the STL’s Trial Chamber, before the commencement of the trial of Prosecu-
tion v. Ayyash et al., convened a meeting of the parties to receive a judicial demonstration 
of searching the Prosecution’s databases of telephonic call data records and how it is stored; 
see Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on Call Data Records, para. 8, see above note 40. 
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expected to be familiar with the more complex and technical details of the 
workings of criminal justice systems. This of course includes evidence 
gathering and storage, and as a corollary, disclosure. 
But obtaining this knowledge or experience is essential to under-
standing the challenges of ensuring that disclosable material gets to the 
defence and hence to guarantee a fair trial to accused persons. Internation-
al judges must familiarise themselves with how international prosecutors 
go about their business of collecting and storing information. It is sug-
gested that they must delve into prosecution evidence and information 
systems – meaning in demonstrations – and, further in these demonstra-
tions, attempt themselves to perform sample targeted or general searches 
in the systems. Without having gained some familiarity with the prosecu-
tion’s evidence and information systems, it is difficult to understand how 
a chamber can make informed decisions on alleged disclosure breaches 
and hence remedies – except of course in the most obvious cases. 
Overcoming this obstacle to judicial understanding, whatever its ba-
sis, is central to rethinking disclosure. Put another way, an informed judi-
ciary that understands from the inside the challenges of disclosure is more 
likely to sponsor or support reform. 
Relevant to this is the compilation and publication of the ICC 
Chambers Practice Manuals that set out guidelines for best practice on 
numerous matters that affect the parties, including disclosure. Best prac-
tice would suggest a period of significant consultation with all interested 
and affected parties – prosecution, defence, registry, victims’ representa-
tives – before finalising such a document. 153  Ironically, the opposite 
seems to have occurred, meaning that no consultation occurred.154 
                                                   
153 “Introduction to the third edition of the Manual, May 2017”, in ICC Chambers Practice 
Manual 2017, see above note 90: 
This update of the Chambers Practice Manual adds a new section governing issues re-
lated to the preparation phase of trial proceedings before the commencement of trial 
(Section B). The new section is the result of discussions held at the second Judges’ re-
treat that took place in Limburg, the Netherlands, from 28 to 29 October 2016. Similar-
ly to the rest of the Manual, this section is not intended as a binding instrument on ICC 
trial judges. Rather, it contains general recommendations and guidelines reflecting best 
practices. These best practices are based on the experience and expertise of judges 
across trials at the Court. 
Two years later nothing had changed in this respect. The ‘Introduction to the fourth edition 
of the Manual, November 2019’, states: 
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14.6.5. Prosecution Record Keeping 
Also historically, a large part of the problem concerns Prosecution record 
keeping. 155 In the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals their temporary nature, 
which itself causes a turnover of personnel and a loss of corporate 
memory, exacerbates this.156 And this problem is aggravated if the docu-
ments do not contain proper searchable metadata. 
Prosecution offices must maintain their internal databases in a man-
ner conducive to searching for disclosable material. This includes draft 
reports of any proposed in-house witnesses, whether expert or not. Corre-
spondence with witnesses could also be disclosable. Problematically, 
prosecution officials may do this by emails that remain only in that per-
son’s own inbox or sent folder. There is no reason why these emails, 
                                                                                                                        
This update of the Chambers Practice Manual is the result of discussions held at the 
Judges’ retreat that took place in Arnhem, the Netherlands, from 3 to 4 October 2019. 
New content has been added in relation to deadlines for key judicial decisions and in-
ternal guidelines on trial judgment drafting and structure have been incorporated’.  
Again, this occurred without consultation with or notification to anyone who would be af-
fected by decisions taken at the judicial retreat. 
154 The ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, by contrast, was the result of collaboration 
between the ICTY and UNICRI. Its introduction stated at p. 1, that 
this Manual is aimed at preserving the legacy of the ICTY in the form of a blueprint of 
its practices for use by other international and domestic courts. This Manual was pre-
pared with assistance and contributions from a number of ICTY staff members from 
each of the Tribunal’s organs. 
See above note 117. The author had some involvement in this project in its initial stages. 
155 Again, this statement comes from the author’s own experience, which the interviewees for 
this chapter have confirmed. 
156 For example, the STL Trial Chamber in Ayyash et al. Trial Decision on Merhi Defence 
Request for Disclosure of Documents Concerning Witness PRH230, held, at para. 102, 
On the other side, this litigation has revealed that the Prosecution’s record-keeping is 
inadequate in significant aspects with regard to its disclosure obligations. The Prosecu-
tion has admitted that, for the thousands of documents it classifies as internal work 
product, it has not gathered them into a central database. Instead, these documents are 
scattered across various computer drives, including the personal drives of Prosecution 
employees. As a result, searching for and identifying documents responsive to the cat-
egory of records of questions and answers would have required the Prosecution to 
manually review around 70,000 computer files and around 60,000 emails, a process 
that would have taken weeks or months to complete and would have delayed Mr Don-
aldson’s testimony in the meantime.  
Internal footnotes omitted. See above note 49. 
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which may after all contain disclosable material, should not be centrally 
stored. 
Thought must be given, and hence discipline exercised, in internally 
filing documents. This could include keeping electronic correspondence 
logs. Whichever, it should be centralised, organised and contain proper 
metadata.157 
The enormous quantity of open source digital material gathered dur-
ing international investigations presents challenges for prosecution offices 
not just in storing and searching but also in disclosing it. In cases in their 
early stages, especially where arrests are either a long way off or unlikely, 
the material should certainly be collected but it should be kept in a man-
ner in which it can be disclosed as a whole once defence counsel become 
involved. 
In general, the defence should be given access to it. 
One lawyer interviewed raised possible privacy and security con-
cerns for personal data found on social media platforms and other areas of 
the internet.158 She considered that even if such information is ‘open’ in 
the normal sense of it being publicly accessible, its collection and pro-
cessing by an international organisation may nevertheless raise some data 
protection issues. This is so even while recognising that the ICC and other 
international institutions have immunity in the execution of their functions, 
preventing the enforcement of privacy data protection regulations such as 
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 159 
And, additionally, that prosecution activities could fall under an exception 
for certain law enforcement activities. Nonetheless, in her view, disclosure 
processes should comply with measures intended to protect the fundamen-
                                                   
157 The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has a system of internal document management for 
contact with witnesses. The author had experience of a system developed for that purpose 
at the ICTY, namely, in which all contacts with witnesses were supposed to be recorded. 
Unfortunately, however, only some officials actually used it. 
158 Interview with Lindsay Freeman, Senior Legal Researcher at the UC Berkeley Human 
Rights Center, and former prosecution lawyer in San Francisco, 25 October 2019. 
159 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation). Article 23(1)(d) permits 
member states to exempt (that is, restrict its application) “when such a restriction respects 
the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate 
measure in a democratic society to safeguard” for “the prevention, investigation, detection 
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the 
safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security”. 
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tal right to privacy. The lawyer suggests that this issue could be addressed 
by clear and transparent policies around digital data access, retention and 
deletion. 
14.7. Conclusion 
To conclude, disclosure is a swamp, like a mire of quicksand that can rap-
idly swallow the unsuspecting. The methodology, rather than the underly-
ing legal principles, must be rethought. This requires joint and collabora-
tive action between prosecution, defence and chambers. 
The first and most obvious point is to identify the flaws and block-
ages in the current systems and to ascertain where they are not working 
well or even failing. The collection of digital evidence presents new chal-
lenges but in practice and in theory it should be easier to resolve these 
than it is with vast paper collections that need digitalisation before they 
can be searched. An EDS, it is stressed, is no panacea and will not miracu-
lously solve the disclosure issue; but it is a model that can work if proper-
ly employed. 
To summarise, the following reforms are proposed: 
• As a starting point the prosecution retains, as it must, sole ‘owner-
ship’ of its own witness-generated materials and in particular, evi-
dence and information of a sensitive nature. ‘Sensitive’ here in-
cludes information provided with conditions, including of non-
disclosure without the provider’s permission; such as that it could 
be provided solely for generating investigating leads. 
• Open-source and public documents, namely, government and other 
public records, provided to prosecutors’ offices should be copied 
and provided to the court registry and maintained in an electronic 
disclosure suite similar in form and function to that of the ICTY and 
then IRMCT. 
• Prosecutors’ offices must ensure that their staff properly record 
metadata sufficient to allow any interested party to search their col-
lections with relative ease. 
• If possible, information collected by prosecution officials in the 
field should be scrutinised then and there for potential relevance, 
and when feasible, immediately entered into the system. 
• Prosecutors’ offices should ensure that all potentially disclosable in-
formation such as draft reports and statements of in-house witnesses 
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and experts, and relevant communications with witnesses, are cen-
trally stored and managed and have proper metadata. 
• Prosecution internal work product should be strictly isolated from 
non-internal work product that is potentially disclosable. 
• The primary responsibility for searching the EDS collections for in-
formation that is material to defence preparations for trial should 
prima facie shift to the defence. 
• The defence should notify the prosecution of the search terms that 
could produce this material in searching the prosecution’s non-EDS 
collections. 
• Chambers must properly familiarise themselves with prosecution 
evidence and information-keeping practices and the parties’ search 
methodology. 
• Chambers should not micro-manage inter-party disclosure. 
• Chambers should exercise great care before deciding to examine the 
inter-parties disclosure to which they have access but which is not 
part of the evidentiary record on which guilt or otherwise is deter-
mined. Best practice would be to avoid examining this material un-
less cogent reasons exist to do so. 
• Chambers should consult extensively with the prosecution, defence, 
registry and victims’ representatives before setting policies such as 
those in the ICC’s Chambers Practice Manuals. 
• The defence should be required to provide better details of conten-
tions with the prosecution case after the chambers are satisfied that 
the essential disclosure is complete. This should be done as early as 
possible in a case. 
• Each accused person must have adequate resources – staffing and 
facilities – to properly prepare their case for trial, which includes 
searching disclosed prosecution material. 
But problem-fixing normally only occurs in stages, and only after 
acceptance that one exists. After acknowledgment comes the real chal-
lenge of taking the problem-solving leap. The suggestions above could 
work, but this would require all ‘actors’ collaboratively putting their heads 
together and examining them as neutrally as possible. The consultative 
process employed by the ICTY in 2008 in preparing its ICTY Manual on 
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15.Investigation Plans 
in International Criminal Investigations: 




Investigation plans are a recognised best practice for international crimi-
nal investigations.1 At the same time, they are not yet a universal practice, 
as many national jurisdictions investigating core international crimes do 
not use investigation plans.2 This chapter supports the argumentation that 
investigation plans should be used as one instrument of quality control in 
international criminal investigations, as they support mitigating some of 
the bottlenecks that are identified in the concept paper of the CILRAP 
Quality Control Project.3 They make sure that a criminal investigation, 
                                                   
* Markus Eikel is Senior Investigator, International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), Office of the 
Prosecutor (‘OTP’); previously working at the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) (2002–04) and at the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Section, Department of Justice, Canada (1997–2002); Ph.D. (University of Hamburg), 
M.A. (University of Hamburg), LL.M. (Leiden University). The views expressed in this 
chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the OTP. At the same 
time, the chapter has greatly benefited from ideas developed within the OTP Investigation 
Division, in particular by Michel De Smedt (Director Investigation Division) and Cristina 
Ribeiro (Inves-tigation Coordinator). 
1 Robert Petit, David Akerson and Maria Warren (eds.), Prosecuting Mass Atrocities: Les-
sons from the International Tribunals: A Compendium of Lessons Learned and Suggested 
Practices from the Offices of the Prosecutors, 2012, p. 51, Practice 58: “For each case or 
situation under investigation, the prosecution office should draw an investigation plan that 
seeks to achieve the strategic aims of the office”. 
2 See Morten Bergsmo, “Rethinking Instruments of Quality Control in the Investigation and 
Preparation of Core International Crimes Cases”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 
2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-bergsmo/). 
3 The CILRAP concept paper has identified draft indictments, indictments, and pre-trial 
briefs as other instruments of quality control. See Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), 
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like any other professional inquiry, benefits from an organised and sys-
tematic approach, addressing the relevant legal issues in a prioritised 
manner.4 
The chapter is divided into four parts. Firstly, it will define the dif-
ferent functions that an investigation plan should fulfil within the frame-
work of an international criminal investigation. The chapter will argue 
that, the more the investigation plan is in line with those functions, the 
better this tool achieves its quality-control role (Section 15.2.). Subse-
quently, the chapter will describe what role an investigation plan fulfils 
within the investigation cycle and how the plan helps to define the inves-
tigation strategy (Section 15.3.). Thirdly, the chapter will cover the past 
and current practice of drafting and reviewing investigation plans at the 
International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor (‘ICC-OTP’) (Sec-
tion 15.4.). At the end, the chapter provides some conclusions on how 
investigation plans can be best utilised in international criminal investiga-
tions to assure quality control and to mitigate some of the bottlenecks that 
are described in the CILRAP concept paper (Section 15.5.). 
15.2. Functions of an Investigation Plan 
While other contributions in this volume will cover national practices in 
relation to investigation plans,5 this chapter focuses on the use of investi-
gation plans in international investigations and prosecutions. On this level, 
the ICC-OTP is just one of the prosecution offices that make use of these 
plans. Looking at international investigating offices more generally, one 
can find publicly available reference points, amongst others, at the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s (‘ICTY’) Best 
                                                                                                                        
Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2019, p. 4 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/
94-bergsmo/). From the current ICC practice, one may add the Arrest Warrant (‘AW’), the 
Arrest Warrant Application (‘AWA’), and the Document Containing the Charges (‘DCC’) 
prior to the Confirmation Hearing as further instruments or variations. 
4 Dermot Groome, “Evidence in Cases of Mass Criminality”, in Ilias Bantekas and Em-
manouela Mylonaki (eds.), Criminological Approaches to International Criminal Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 120; Petit, Akerson and Warren, 2012, p. 
52, see above note 1. 
5 See for India, Usha Tandon and Shreeywah Uday Lalit, “Use of Investigation Plans in 
Indian Criminal Justice: The Crime of Human Trafficking”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 
February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190223-tandon-lalit/); for Norway, Alf Bu-
tenschøn Skre, “Investigation Plans as Management Tools in Norway”, CILRAP Film, 
New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190223-skre/). 
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Practice Manual (2009),6 the Best Practice Project jointly conducted by 
all Ad Hoc Tribunals (2012), 7  the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda’s (‘ICTR’) Best Practice Guidelines on Investigating sexual and 
gender-based crimes (‘SGBC’) (2014),8 and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe’s (‘OSCE’) Investigation Manual for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.9 All of these reference documents have sections on in-
vestigation plans, including templates. Some of these documents dedicate 
significant attention to different types of evidence: witnesses (both crime-
base and linkage); documents; open source; and forensics. But beyond 
just listing possible options for evidence collection, grouped according to 
different categories of evidence, all documents agree that an investigation 
plan has four major components. 
15.2.1. Case Assessment 
As a key starting point, investigation plans all have an introductory sec-
tion covering a legal case assessment for the case under investigation. The 
ICTY Manual calls this section “fundamental questions that the investiga-
tion will hopefully be able to answer through the collection of credible 
and reliable evidence”.10 In the words of the Manual, without such guid-
ance, there is a strong likelihood “that efforts will lack the focus necessary 
to effectively and efficiently identify and collect the evidence neces-
sary”.11 The template provided in the ICTY Manual also foresees a sec-
tion on the relevant legal framework, which includes theories of legal 
responsibility and possible crimes that were committed and their legal 
elements. 
                                                   
6 See ICTY and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
(‘UNICRI’), ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, UNICRI Publisher, Turin, 2009 (‘ 
ICTY Manual’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0cc55d/). 
7 See Petit, Akerson and Warren, 2012, see above note 1. 
8 ICTR, Prosecution of Sexual Violence: Best Practices Manual for the Investigations and 
Prosecutions of Sexual-Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from 
the Office of the Prosecutor from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, January 
2014 (‘ICTR Manual’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ea03f8/). 
9 OSCE, Investigation Manual for War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 2013 (‘OSCE Investigation Manual’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/md6eab/). 
10 ICTY Manual, p. 30, see above note 6. 
11 Ibid. 
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The Best Practices Manual explains that the main focus of any in-
vestigation plan “should be to identify what elements of the crime or 
criminal responsibility are not sufficiently proven”, based on the identifi-
cation of “specific gaps or weaknesses in the evidence required proving 
the elements of the crimes or modes of liability”.12 The ICTR Manual 
identifies any ‘potential charges’ as an initial reference point for the inves-
tigation plan;13 while the OSCE document refers at the outset of an inves-
tigation plan to the allegations; the person to be investigated; potential 
offences; and elements that need to be proven.14 
At the ICC-OTP, the legal case assessment is ordinarily drafted by 
prosecution lawyers and describes what the case hypothesis or the case 
theory is at the time of writing the respective investigation plan. This case 
assessment should indicate what the assessed legal strengths and weak-
nesses of a case are in order to allow for a more targeted and properly 
prioritised collection effort, mitigating the CILRAP concept paper bottle-
neck ‘too much evidence’. It is important that the case assessment also 
includes references to potential exculpatory points or lines of defence.15 
15.2.2. Planning 
The first of three important functions of the investigation plan is the plan-
ning ahead of the investigation. The Best Practices Manual specifies that, 
after the more specific objectives of a case are set out, “the next step is to 
create a plan detailing how these objectives are to be achieved”.16 The 
ICTY Manual dedicates a specific section to planning, noting that it is 
important to give thought to the implementation of the plan, so that all 
major tasks are completed according to a schedule.17 The OSCE docu-
ment identifies different phases for investigative planning and includes an 
Evidence/Information Collection Plan as well as the planning of specific 
tasks.18 
                                                   
12 Petit, Akerson and Warren, 2012, p. 60, see above note 1. 
13 ICTR Manual, p. 2, see above note 8. 
14 OSCE Investigation Manual, pp. 194–95, see above note 9. 
15 ICTR Manual, p. 4, see above note 8. 
16 Petit, Akerson and Warren, 2012, p. 52, see above note 1. 
17 ICTY Manual, p. 32, see above note 6. 
18 OSCE Investigation Manual, pp. 195–96, see above note 9. 
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In planning its way forward, the case team will address all areas of 
the case where additional evidence is still required. That process leads to 
the identification of investigative objectives, which are generally defined 
around certain areas of the case or legal elements requiring further evi-
dence (for example, the overall structure of an organisation, the chain of 
command, specific incidents, or specific crimes). 
The focus of the investigation is determined by an assessment of the 
case, the investigative options available, and potential arrest opportunities. 
A combination of these parameters leads to an investigative strategy, cor-
relating investigative objectives with existing critical internal and external 
factors, including co-operation with external partners, security, protection, 
available resources, available investigative tools, and others. 
Strategic decisions captured in the investigation plan might include 
giving priority to linkage evidence vis-à-vis crime base; collecting or not 
collecting certain types of evidence; suspending the investigation in cer-
tain geographical areas; or accelerating the investigation in relation to 
certain suspects for which arrest opportunities may arise. In the investiga-
tion plan, the case team will justify its decisions with regards to these 
issues and the underlying reasoning for management approval. 
As a result of the investigation strategy, the investigation plan will 
identify concrete investigative and analytical priorities. The case team 
needs to prioritise those for which concrete results within the period rele-
vant to the specific investigation plan are feasible. For each of the identi-
fied priorities, the plan will provide specific information on the concrete 
investigative activities the team intends to undertake, including the types 
of evidence to collect (such as interviews of certain witnesses or the col-
lection of certain documents). 
In order to illustrate the correlation between investigative objectives 
and critical factors affecting the planning, the following example is pro-
vided. A common feature from most investigations of core international 
crimes is the requirement to obtain additional linkage evidence, effective-
ly connecting the suspect with the crimes that took place on the ground. 
Some of the investigations at the ICC-OTP are conducted without the co-
operation of the situation country, that is, the country where the crimes 
occurred. Investigators therefore have no (or only very limited) access to 
the country under investigation and thereby to a pool of potential insiders 
often residing in country who may be able to provide the required linkage 
evidence. In addition, there may be only limited capacity to protect any 
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potential insider witness who is located within the structures under inves-
tigation.19 One way of mitigation in this case is to focus as much as possi-
ble on non-testimonial evidence, including open sources, imagery and 
documents. 
While mitigation strategies need to be in place at the outset, the case 
team has to constantly re-adjust the planning, based on external factors 
that may change the framework of the investigation and are outside of the 
control of the investigation. Examples for such external factors may in-
clude: a sudden and unexpected political regime change in one of the 
countries that the investigation is operating in; a declining security situa-
tion in certain areas of operation; or an unexpected surrender, like the one 
of Dominic Ongwen in 2015 to the ICC. It is therefore important to up-
date the planning in regular intervals and, when required, even earlier than 
that.20 
15.2.3. Reporting 
Reporting is a second important function of the investigation plan. The 
reporting takes place on two levels: 1) Has the case team done what it 
intended to do; and 2) in doing so, what knowledge has the case team 
acquired in relation to the case hypothesis or case theory? In answering 
these questions, the case team reports to its supervisors on the actual pro-
gress made. Robust compliance mechanisms evaluating the performance 
of the team from the outside will support such an assessment. The pro-
gress reporting within the plan can be undertaken in the form of a narra-
tive. Alternatively, it could also be provided in form of a log-frame (logi-
cal framework) matrix. This format, designed in project management 
practice, defines objectives, results and activities based on a summary 
narrative combined with previously defined indicators.21 
                                                   
19 For the limitations of the witness protection capacity at the ICC, see Markus Eikel, “Exter-
nal Support and Internal Coordination – The ICC and the Protection of Witnesses”, in Car-
sten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 1105–32. 
20 For the relevance of uncertainty in business planning, see Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland 
and Patrick Viguerie, “Strategy Under Uncertainty”, Harvard Business Review, 1997, No-
vember–December issue, pp. 1–32. 
21 For example, see OSCE, Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and 
Project Managers, Vienna, 2010, pp. 39–47 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6jbcgx/). 
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The relevance of regular reporting is emphasised in the various ref-
erence manuals mentioned above.22 For instance, the ICTY Manual rec-
ommends that the investigation “should be reviewed on a quarterly basis 
to assess progress towards its objectives and to evaluate how the collec-
tive knowledge of a particular event has evolved”.23 The reporting assists 
senior management to assess the pace of the investigation. Such an as-
sessment puts the speed of the investigation into context, which implies 
also looking at the framework in which the investigation is conducted. 
Therefore, an investigation plan may include a table indicating the time-
line of the investigation to date and the impact of main factors, such as co-
operation, security and resources over time. Justifiable reasons for a delay 
in reaching investigative objectives may include: unforeseeable security 
developments; unforeseen resource shortcomings, caused by develop-
ments in other cases; or a lack of co-operation of witnesses. 
The reporting function also includes an explanation as to why cer-
tain investigative activities or lines of inquiry were not pursued. For ex-
ample, the case team may decide not to conduct exhumations and autop-
sies as it considers these investigative activities desirable, but not strictly 
necessary for proving the case at hand. In this scenario, the case team logs 
its decision and its reasoning in the investigation plan. By doing so, the 
case team mitigates the CILRAP policy paper bottleneck ‘overview of 
information’, here in relation to capture certain investigative decisions 
taken. More generally, the investigation plan serves the purpose of creat-
ing a historical record of the investigation. 
15.2.4. Management 
Investigation plans also fulfil a management function. One important as-
pect in this regard is to define the resource requirements for the team. 
What are the projected needs in terms of investigators and their required 
competencies, for example to conduct online or financial investigations, 
as well as other staff, including a certain language profile. Resources at 
international courts and tribunals are generally scarce; and it is therefore 
necessary to justify towards senior management the assignment of current 
                                                   
22 Petit, Akerson and Warren, 2012, p. 52, see above note 1; ICTY Manual, p. 32, see above 
note 6; ICTR Manual, p. 4, see above note 8; OSCE Investigation Manual, p. 195, see 
above note 9. 
23 ICTY Manual, p. 32, see above note 6. 
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and additional staff for the specific course of the investigation. All refer-
ence documents include specific sections on resource requirements.24 The 
ICTY Manual explains how necessary resources should be identified once 
a task-list has been generated.25 
A second relevant management aspect is to identify the support that 
is required from other entities within the prosecution’s office where co-
ordinating aspects become relevant. The example of language support can 
illustrate the latter aspect. Most international criminal investigations re-
quire interpretation and translation from local languages into the official 
languages of an international court or tribunal, most commonly English 
and French. The case team needs to make sure that it defines, at the earli-
est possible junction, the language support required to conduct its investi-
gative activities in order to make sure that sufficient interpretation staff 
can support the field missions; and that the language staff has received 
proper security clearance and training prior to field deployment. Planning 
these aspects of the case ahead may be crucial to ensure an effective im-
plementation of investigative priorities and activities. 
As a third important management function, the process of drafting 
an investigation plan offers an opportunity for the whole case team to take 
stock and develop a common understanding of where the investigation 
stands and what the required next steps are. Once a common understand-
ing within the team has been reached, it becomes easier for team members 
to identify relevant investigative activities and inform team management 
of initiatives they may want to take. 
15.2.5. Template Investigation Plan 
Based on the reference documents mentioned in Section 15.2. above and 
ICC-OTP practice at the time of writing, the general template of an inves-
tigation plan could look like the one illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                                   
24 Ibid.; Petit, Akerson and Warren, 2012, p. 52, see above note 1; ICTR Manual, p. 3, see 
above note 8; OSCE Investigation Manual, p. 195, see above note 9. 
25 ICTY Manual, p. 32, see above note 6. 
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Figure 1. General template of an investigation plan. 
Investigation Plan Structure 
Case Assessment 
1 Status of the Investigation 
1.1 Case Timeline 
1.2 Case Hypothesis 
  
1.3 Investigative Steps Taken 
1.3.1 Investigative Priorities (1, 2, 3, and so on) 
1.3.2 Analytical Priorities (1, 2, 3, and so on) 
  
2 Planned Investigation Activities 
2.1 Investigative Strategy and Focus 
2.2 Investigative Priorities (1, 2, 3, and so on) 
2.3 Analytical Priorities (1, 2, 3, and so on) 
  
3 Operational Matters 
3.1 Co-operation 
3.2 Communication 




1 Collective Evidence 
1.1 Witnesses and Other External Sources 
1.2 Documentary Evidence 
1.3 Electronic Evidence 
1.4 Forensic Evidence 
1.5 Physical Evidence 
2 Intermediaries 
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15.3. Investigation Cycle 
Building a case in international criminal investigations is a multi-staged 
process, from an initially very broad to a gradually narrower focus.26 In an 
initial phase, the investigation looks at the totality of a situation, which 
includes all sides of a conflict, including all potential crimes and all po-
tential criminal incidents. Gradually, and depending on the results of col-
lection and analysis, the investigation will narrow its focus and develop 
one or more case hypotheses. Eventually, when facts are believed to be 
sufficiently established to avoid other hypotheses, the case team will de-
velop a case theory, defining the criminal responsibility of specific indi-
viduals for specific crimes under a defined mode of liability. 
An investigation plan needs to be placed within the circular ap-
proach of a criminal investigation. An identified case is broken down into 
different sub-components; for some of those, prosecution lawyers will 
assess the available evidence as strong; for others, the evidentiary basis 
may be weaker. Based on this legal assessment, the investigation plan 
outlines investigative strategy, investigative objectives and activities, as 
described in Section 15.2.2. above. Strategy and activities are implement-
ed and then evaluated in a subsequent plan. This evaluation may come to 
the conclusion that certain objectives were achieved; and thereby certain 
weaknesses of the case as previously identified in the case assessment are 
now mitigated. The evaluation may also come to the conclusion that the 
weaknesses are not mitigated, which in turn leads to the question a) if 
there are other investigative methods and approaches that need to be ap-
plied in order to find the required evidence; or b) if the case theory or at 
least certain parts of it may need to be adjusted, as the evidence collected 
does not support the legal theory. The course of the investigation is best 
described in the form of the cycle seen in Figure 2. 
                                                   
26 Groome, 2012, pp. 119–22, see above note 4. 
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Figure 2. The course of an investigation. 
Applying the investigation cycle in itself is a quality-control mech-
anism as it provides for an opportunity to correct or adjust the focus of the 
investigation. 
15.4. Past and Current ICC-OTP Practice 
15.4.1. Draft Regulations and Regulations Ad Interim 2003 
Investigation plans were considered as an investigation management tool 
for the OTP since the early days of the ICC. The Draft Regulations of the 
OTP, formulated in the first half of 2003,27 determined that the two fore-
seen Deputy Prosecutors (for Investigation and Prosecution) were to des-
ignate a senior prosecutor to supervise the drafting of a ‘draft investiga-
tion plan’ towards the end of the Preliminary Examination (‘PE’) of a case. 
Draft Regulation 6.5. set out the various parameters relevant for the 
draft investigation plan.28 The parameters covered an assessment of the 
anticipated focus of the investigation; an early formulation of criminal 
responsibility; an assessment of the available evidence and its amount; 
and a tentative indication of possible charges, modes of liability and po-
                                                   
27 Morten Bergsmo, “Institutional History, Behaviour and Development”, in Morten Bergsmo, 
Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal 
Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 5–6 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/09c8b8/); Carlos Vasconcelos, “Draft Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor”, in ibid., pp. 802–04. 
28 Carlos Vasconcelos, “Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor”, in ibid., pp. 859–
62. 
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tential defences. Antonio Angotti has provided an analysis of these criteria 
and how they relate to the bottlenecks identified in the CILRAP concept 
paper,29 in Chapter 16 below. The final investigation plan, as defined in 
Draft Regulation 20, was one of the three essential investigation manage-
ment tools (next to a Draft Charges Document and a Proof Chart); it “de-
scribes the different steps of the investigation which are necessary to 
achieve the aim of the investigation, the anticipated outcome of each in-
vestigative step and alternative strategies”.30 The draft investigation plan 
was to converge into an investigation plan, which in turn provided the 
grounds for the draft charges document.31 
The Regulations ad interim, signed by the first ICC Prosecutor in 
early September 2003, were an abridged version of the Draft Regulations 
and contained no reference to a draft investigation plan or an investigation 
plan.32 As a consequence, there was no binding regulatory framework for 
investigation plans at the ICC-OTP until the adoption of the Regulations 
in 2009. In the years prior, different investigative models were tested. As 
the OTP explained in the OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015, the first such 
document issued under the term in office of Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, 
the option of adopting investigative standards from the beginning was 
rejected because the OTP did not consider it mandatory to adopt specific 
standards before some practical experience had been gained; and because 
the OTP wanted to test the approaches coming from different systems.33 
                                                   
29 See also Antonio Angotti, “Investigation Plans in the Draft Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: An Italian Perspective”, CILRAP Film, 
New Delhi, 23 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190223-angotti/). 
30 Vasconcelos, 2017, p. 869 (Draft Regulation 20.2), see above note 28. 
31 See Angotti, 2019, see above note 29. 
32 ICC-OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 
2003, p. 7 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f53870/); Bergsmo, 2017, p. 22, see above note 
27; Vasconcelos, 2017, pp. 894–911, see above note 28. The OTP issued the Regulations 
ad interim as it 
considers that in the elaboration of the final Regulations, it will be indispensable to al-
so take into account the views of the staff members that will be recruited and the expe-
rience gained by the Office in its first months of operations. The Office envisages 
adopting these Regulations during the first semester of 2004. 
33 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, para. 42 (‘OTP Strategic Plan 
June 2012-2015’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954beb/). 
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15.4.2. OTP Regulations 2009 
In the 2009 OTP Regulations, there is no specific reference to what the 
Draft Regulations referred to as ‘draft investigation plan’. Once an inves-
tigation was initiated, a ‘joint team’, consisting of representatives of the 
three ICC-OTP divisions (Investigation Division (ID), Prosecution Divi-
sion (PD), Jurisdiction Cooperation and Complementarity Division 
(JCCD)), reviewed the information and evidence collected and drafted a 
provisional ‘case hypothesis’ or different ‘case hypotheses’.34 The provi-
sional case hypothesis identified incidents to be investigated as well as the 
person or persons who appeared to be the most responsible. It also includ-
ed a tentative indication of possible charges, forms of individual criminal 
responsibility, and potentially exonerating circumstances. In each provi-
sional case hypothesis, the team was supposed to select incidents reflec-
tive of the most serious crimes and the main types of victimisation.35 As 
to the ‘planning of investigative activities’, the case team was supposed to 
“develop an evidence collection plan and a cooperation plan”.36 No fur-
ther parameters were provided to define the evidence collection plan; in 
particular there was no reference to the main categories or the anticipated 
amount of evidence. 
15.4.3. OTP Operations Manual 2010 and After 
In 2010, the OTP released the first version of its Operations Manual 
(‘OM’).37 This document and subsequent OM versions are internal OTP 
products and can therefore only be referred to in generic terms. The OM 
maintains a distinction between a Case Hypothesis document and an In-
vestigation Plan in separate documents. 
As for the planning of investigative activities, the OM institutional-
ised the practice of drafting an investigation plan. The investigation plan 
as viewed in the OM proposed a strategy for investigative operations and 
                                                   
34 ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09, Regu-
lation 34(1) (‘Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/a97226/). 
35 Ibid., Regulation 34(2). 
36 Ibid., Regulation 35. 
37 Jens Meierhenrich, “The Evolution of the Office of the Prosecutor at the International 
Criminal Court: Insights from Institutional Theory”, in Martha Minow, C. Cora True-Frost 
and Alex Whiting (eds.), The First Global Prosecutor: Promise and Constraints, Universi-
ty of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2015, pp. 117–24. 
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took into consideration timelines and the allocation of resources within 
the team. The investigation plan described the investigative focus as de-
termined in the Case Hypothesis, addressed evidentiary gaps, and includ-
ed sections on the selection of different types of evidence. The case team 
was supposed to regularly review the investigation plan in light of the 
possible elements of the crimes investigated; the quality and quantity of 
the evidence collected; and exonerating information and likely defence 
theories. 
Since the OM was issued, the OTP has further updated its practices 
on the management of investigations and the investigation plan. These 
practices are in the process of being integrated into the OTP’s regulatory 
framework. 
The OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015 changed the overall directions 
of OTP investigations to the principle of in-depth, open-ended investiga-
tions.38 This new approach to investigations also included a change in 
investigative strategy and planning; and the development of a new inves-
tigation plan template. 
15.4.4. Current Practice 
The ICC-OTP initially does not focus its activities on a certain structure 
or even a certain individual, but rather on a specific situation. During the 
PE phase, the ICC-OTP determines if the Court indeed has jurisdiction 
over certain crimes; assesses if these crimes are of sufficient gravity; 
makes sure that no national proceedings are undertaken covering the same 
crimes; and determines if the investigation would not serve the ‘interests 
of justice’.39 At the end of this process, as outlined in the Regulations, a 
preliminary case hypothesis or multiple preliminary case hypotheses are 
formulated, providing a potential starting point for any subsequent inves-
tigation. 40  Morten Bergsmo has argued that a draft investigation plan 
should be formulated towards the end of the PE; and that the formulation 
of this investigation plan should actually be one of the major outcomes of 
the PE. He suggests that the investigation plan should be a dynamic tool, 
preferably in the form of a digitised knowledge-base, rather than a static, 
                                                   
38 OTP Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, para. 4, see above note 33. 
39 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, pp. 34–70 (‘OTP 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
40 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 34, see above note 34. 
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frozen document.41 During the PE, the investigative powers of the OTP 
are rather limited. As the 2013 Policy Paper on PE points out, 
the Office does not enjoy investigative powers, other than for 
the purpose of receiving testimony at the seat of the Court, 
and cannot invoke the forms of cooperation specified in Part 
9 of the Statute from States. As article 15 sets out, the Office 
may receive information on alleged crimes and may seek ad-
ditional information from States, organs of the United Na-
tions, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisa-
tions and other reliable sources that are deemed appropriate. 
Accordingly, the Office can send requests for information to 
such sources for the purpose of analysing the seriousness of 
the information received. For this purpose, the Office may 
also undertake field missions to the territory concerned in 
order to consult with the competent national authorities, the 
affected communities and other relevant stakeholders, such 
as civil society organisations.42 
Once officially opened, an investigation at the ICC-OTP will devel-
op from investigating a potential case or potential cases within a situation 
to investigating a defined case or cases.43 The so-called Basic Size docu-
ment, drafted by the OTP in 2015 to provide estimates for its required 
resource capacities, projected for the time from the opening of the investi-
gation until the presentation of a defined case at Confirmation Hearing a 
period of around three years.44 This time-estimate presupposes that the 
investigation progresses in an overall favourable framework, which im-
plies a positive impact of all relevant external factors, in particular co-
operation, security and resources. 
It is important for investigation plans to refer to the case hypothesis 
or, at the later stages of the investigation, to the case theory, in particular 
to identify the areas of the case where the evidence is assessed as weak, 
and the areas where potentially exonerating material exists. Such gap 
analysis can be conducted in form of a written narrative, but is also possi-
                                                   
41 See Bergsmo, 22 February 2019, see above note 2. 
42 OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 85, see above note 39. 
43 Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 347. 
44 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, 17 September 2015, ICC-ASP/14/21, p. 34 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
b27d2a/). 
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ble in an evaluation matrix or evaluation table, breaking down the case 
into various required legal elements (that is, contextual elements for war 
crimes or crimes against humanity; Count 1 murder in location A; Count 2 
rape in location B, and so on) and assessing the evidence collected for the 
different legal elements based on pre-defined criteria. This analysis should 
lead to a conclusion as to what legal elements would require the collection 
of additional evidence as a priority and therefore further deserve investi-
gative and analytical attention. 
The current practice at the OTP is to have an investigation plan 
written, reviewed and approved for every active investigation case. The 
completion of an investigation plan is one of the quality performance in-
dicators of OTP investigations. More generally, the ICC-OTP is in the 
process of developing a quality assurance system at various stages of the 
proceedings. According to its most recent Strategic Plan, the ICC-OTP 
“will strengthen and refine its quality control mechanisms to ensure that 
all critical decisions and activities are consistently taken and properly 
conducted”.45 This includes a regular review of standards and practices; 
employing the right resources in terms of quality and quantity; and by 
reinforcing mechanisms to ensure that the actual collection and analysis of 
evidence is done thoroughly, including through the review of investigation 
plans.46 
At present time, the case team drafts an investigation plan once a 
year; with an interim update after six months. The plan is written in a nar-
rative form, and its structure roughly follows the template as outlined in 
Section 15.2.5. above. In this concept, regularly drafted investigation 
plans are written like different chapters of a book, providing the complete 
history of an investigation. An alternative way could be to conceptualise 
the investigation plan in a knowledge-base format, which, as one single 
inter-linked document, has a continuous existence and is designed as a 
living and growing instrument that follows the entire investigation and 
case preparation stage.47 
While defining the investigation strategy, a case team at the ICC-
OTP will give consideration to the following issues: 
                                                   
45 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2019-2021, 17 July 2019, para. 14 (‘OTP Strategic Plan 2019-
2021’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ncqt3/). 
46 Ibid., para. 17. 
47 See Bergsmo, 22 February 2019, see above note 2. 
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• The requirement of an open-ended investigation;48 
• A building-up target strategy that may consider charging mid-level 
perpetrators first before reaching those at the highest level of re-
sponsibility;49 
• The OTP policy papers on SGBC and children and how the investi-
gation strategy proactively reflects them;50 
• Financial investigations – both for obtaining evidence on crimes 
and in relation to asset tracing of identified suspects; 
• An investigation feasibility assessment conducted in the transition 
from the PE to the investigation phase and mapping out the follow-
ing: general evidence collection opportunities and obstacles; co-
operation issues; and a concept of operations, including the possi-
bility of a permanent field presence of investigators. 
In the office-internal process, the plan is reviewed in various steps, 
which ensures another quality-control layer: a) first by the case team in-
ternally; b) then peer-reviewed at Investigation Division management 
level in order to benefit from ideas that have worked in other cases and to 
ensure compliance with the investigative standards, policies and rules as 
developed by the Office; and c) finally discussed with and approved by 
senior management. This process is in line with the ICTY Manual rec-
ommendation that there should be “a careful and comprehensive review of 
the plan”, both at the peer level and at senior management level.51 
In the practice of the ICC-OTP, investigation plans are drafted in 
co-ordination with other internal plans relevant to the investigation, such 
as the co-operation plan and the relevant security and operational risk 
assessments. In a best-case scenario, the investigation plan identifies the 
relevant requirements; and the corresponding plans explain how these 
requirements can be met. 
                                                   
48 OTP Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, para. 4, see above note 33. 
49 Ibid.; OTP Strategic Plan 2019-2021, para. 24, see above note 45. 
50 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 20 June 2014 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7ede6c/); ICC-OTP, Policy on Children, 15 November 2016 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/c2652b/). 
51 ICTY Manual, p. 32, see above note 6. At the ICTY, senior management approval was 
deemed especially important, as many investigations overlapped, which might result in 
conflicting priorities between different investigation teams. As cases are more separate 
from one another, this inherent conflict is less pronounced at the ICC-OTP. 
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More recently, the ICC-OTP has focused on a further integration 
between the PE and the investigation phase of a case. In 2015, the ICC-
OTP emphasised that “it will look for ways to further integrate its prelim-
inary examinations work into its pre-investigative planning”, 52  for in-
stance by ensuring the preservation of evidence as a ‘critical challenge’.53 
The most recent OTP Strategic Plan pledged to further “explore synergies 
between preliminary examinations and investigations”54 and to continue 
to dedicate efforts to the issue: 
Work is already underway to see how to increase the speed 
of the investigations through a better integration between the 
phase of preliminary examination and investigations with re-
gard to (1) preservation of evidence; (2) earlier start of the 
planning (including, inter alia, identification of staff profiles 
requirements, specific language support, security and logis-
tics needs), and (3) better integration of the work products 
and resources from the preliminary examination into the in-
vestigation.55 
In this respect, the Prosecutor follows recommendations as provided 
by Pre-Trial Chamber III to broaden OTP activities prior to the official 
authorisation of an investigation, as the Office may take 
meaningful steps to protect victims and (potential) witnesses, 
[…] may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the 
Court at this stage and may even, under rule 47 of the Rules, 
request the Pre-Trial Chamber to take measures as may be 
necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the pro-
ceedings.56 
While the investigation plan fulfils an important role within the in-
vestigation cycle, it does not stand in isolation, as it also serves as the 
overarching umbrella to reason individual investigative activities initiated 
                                                   
52 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 16 November 2015, para. 55 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/2dbc2d/). 
53 Ibid., para. 104. 
54 OTP Strategic Plan 2019-2021, para. 2, see above note 45. 
55 Ibid., para. 26. 
56 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Pre-Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of 
“Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investiga-
tion into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 
2017, 9 November 2017, ICC-01/17-9-Red, para. 15 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
8f2373/). 
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to comply with the overall investigative strategy and objectives. These 
activities are captured in an Investigation Management System (‘IMS’). 
The IMS breaks down activities in individual tasks; assigns resources and 
timelines to the task; documents individual investigative steps taken; and 
reports back on the completion of the task. The inputting into the IMS 
needs to follow a coherent protocol and is therefore (as data-entry into 
databases in general) an aspect that needs attention in terms of quality 
control. If the inputting is done with the requisite level of detail, accurate-
ness and consistency, compliance rates in the system will provide a more 
tactical view on the progress of the investigation. The system, however, 
presupposes that the original tasking is done in line with the appropriate 
strategic directions to advance the case. 
15.5. Conclusions 
As a summary of this chapter, the following conclusions can be drawn, 
both in terms of the use of investigation plans in international criminal 
investigations as in relation to the regulatory framework, and the past and 
current practice at the ICC-OTP: 
1. Based on an analysis of different manuals and templates for interna-
tional criminal investigations, an investigation plan is structured in-
to common main components and fulfils at least three main func-
tions (planning – reporting – management). The plan best complies 
with its role as a quality-control tool if all functions are adequately 
taken care of. 
2. Investigation plans are one important tool in the process of the in-
vestigation cycle. They are complemented by a legal case assess-
ment, an investigation management system, and a Fact Analysis Da-
tabase (FAD). 
3. Investigation plans are most effective when aligned with the legal 
case assessment, in order to make sure that investigative strategy, 
objectives and activities directly respond to identified legal re-
quirements and in order to allow for targeted and properly priori-
tised collection. 
4. Investigation plans are an important contribution to maintain an 
overview of information – primarily in terms of capturing investiga-
tive strategies and decisions; and in creating an historical record for 
the investigation. 
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5. The investigation management system provides an overview of the 
progress of the investigation on a more tactical level and, with that 
caveat, is able to serve as a quality-control tool for assessing pace 
and task-compliance within the established investigative framework. 
6. The regulatory framework at the ICC-OTP officially established in-
vestigation plans in 2009, with further upgrades and amendments 
implemented since. The ICC-OTP currently focuses on a stronger 
integration between the PE and the investigation/prosecution phase 
of a case. 
7. Investigation plans at the ICC-OTP are written for every active in-
vestigation in a narrative form once a year with an update every six 
months. They are peer reviewed as well as reviewed by senior man-
agement. 
This chapter has examined the role of investigation plans as an in-
vestigation management tool and as a quality-control tool in international 
criminal investigations. It has come to the conclusion that such plans, if 
properly applied, can contribute to overcoming some of the bottlenecks 
identified in the CILRAP concept paper, in particular ‘overview of infor-
mation’, ‘evidence review’ and ‘too much evidence’. 
16 
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16.Investigation Plans in the Draft Regulations of 
the ICC Office of the Prosecutor: 




Investigation plans should serve as instruments of quality control, particu-
larly when designed to enhance oversight capacity, monitoring and strate-
gy. International criminal jurisdictions share some needs with domestic 
jurisdictions dealing with fact-rich criminal cases such as core interna-
tional crimes cases. This chapter provides an analysis of the first example 
of investigation plans in the framework of the International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’), and compares that with related initiatives within the Italian 
legal system. The resulting considerations should shed new light on the 
needs addressed by investigation plans, when compared with alternative 
tools, with special attention being paid to policy concerns that shape the 
content of both. 
16.2. The Draft Regulations 
16.2.1. The Making of the Draft Regulations 
The process to establish the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’ or ‘Of-
fice’) benefitted from contributions by more than 100 experts through 
several expert consultation processes. In March 2003, in the spirit of Rule 
9 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence,1 a group of legal experts 
joined forces with the preparatory team for the OTP to draft a set of regu-
lations aimed at tackling several issues that the Office would likely face 
                                                   
* Antonio Angotti is an Attorney in Florence, Italy, and a Fellow at the Centre for Interna-
tional Law Research and Policy (CILRAP). He holds a law degree from the University of 
Florence and an LL.M. from Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson School of Law. 
1 International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 September 2002 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/e1b3f5/). 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 822 
from its initial phase. The co-ordinator of the group was Morten Bergsmo, 
co-editor of this volume, who initiated the expert consultations and de-
signed the mandate of each. The work of the group of experts on the Draft 
Regulations addressed several carefully selected topics,2 including a Code 
of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor;3 it elaborated internal proce-
dural guidelines for the management of preliminary examinations and 
investigations, in particular the critical decision-making process to open 
an investigation; the rational management of evidence; and the training of 
involved personnel. While the reception of the Draft Regulations was 
exceptionally positive, 4 the first ICC Prosecutor only adopted parts of 
them ad interim. As described in Chapter 15 above, the practice of the 
OTP under the first and the second Prosecutors has evolved and come to 
deviate in some respects from the original Draft Regulations.5 Regardless, 
this tentative chapter is written under the premise that the Draft Regula-
tions contain procedural and substantial insights that should be fully har-
nessed, also for the benefit of domestic war crimes investigation and pros-
ecution programmes. 
The Draft Regulations were drawn up by a group of five legal ex-
perts: Tor-Aksel Busch (Norway), Michael Grotz (Germany), Nobuo 
Hayashi (Japan), Peter Lewis (United Kingdom), and Carlos Vasconcelos 
(Brazil). Tor-Aksel Busch was Norway’s Director-General of Public Pros-
ecutions and the country’s most highly-respected prosecutor. He had pro-
fessional experience as a prosecutor and judge, and extensive expertise on 
prosecutions. 6 Michael Grotz was one of Germany’s most experienced 
                                                   
2 The text of the ICC-OTP Draft Regulations is annexed to Carlos Vasconcelos, “Draft 
Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and 
SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, Tor-
kel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 834–93 (‘Draft Regulations’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/09c8b8/). The references in this chapter pertain to Book 3 
of the Draft Regulations, the Operations Manual. Vasconcelos’ chapter is the leading pub-
lication on the Draft Regulations. 
3 Salim A. Nakhjavani, “The Origins and Development of the Code of Conduct”, in ibid., pp. 
964–77. 
4 Vasconcelos, 2017, p. 804, see above note 2. 
5 Benjamin N. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, pp. 110–15. Chapter 15 by Markus Eikel provides an overview of ICC-OTP 
practices, with specific regards to investigation plans as management tools. 
6 Government of Norway, “Tor-Aksel Busch ny Riksadvokat”, 22 August 1997 (available on 
the Government of Norway’s web site). 
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prosecutors, who had served in the Federal Ministry of Justice in various 
sections, and had experience in negotiations and international organisa-
tions.7 At the time of the Draft Regulations, he was the Chairperson of the 
European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe.8 No-
buo Hayashi was a Legal Officer of the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), 
where he was a leading expert on international humanitarian law and war 
crimes.9 Peter Lewis was one of the leaders of the Crown Prosecution 
Service of England and Wales, who had been a prominent United King-
dom delegate to the Preparatory Commission for the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the ICC.10 He currently serves as the ICC Registrar. Car-
los Vasconcelos had served as General Prosecutor in Brazil and Senior 
Judicial Affairs Officer at the United Nations (‘UN’) Transitional Admin-
istration in East Timor where he had experience with core international 
crimes cases. He went on to become Associate Federal Prosecutor-
General in Brazil.11 
Appropriately, prosecutorial professionalism and practical experi-
ence appear to have been prioritised in the composition of the group. As a 
result, the Draft Regulations adopted a strategic approach to facilitate 
oversight and quality control in complex prosecutorial bodies. 
16.2.2. Investigative Guidelines in the Draft Regulations 
The guidelines for investigations designed by the Draft Regulations re-
volve around three main “essential management tools to ensure focused 
and professional investigations”, 12 namely a draft charges document, a 
proof chart, and an investigation plan.13 Due to the open-ended nature of 
                                                   
7 Curricula Vitae of Candidates Nominated by States Members of the United Nations and by 
Non-member States Maintaining Permanent Observer Missions at United Nations Head-
quarters, UN Doc. A/55/919, 27 April 2001, pp. 54–55. 
8 Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems: Abridged Report of the 48th 
Meeting (Strasbourg, 7-11 June 1999), 2 August 1999, CM(99)118, para. 2. 
9 See Nobuo Hayashi’s Curriculum Vitae (available on the International Law and Policy 
Institute’s web site). 
10 See Peter Lewis’ Curriculum Vitae (available on the ICC’s web site). 
11 See Carlos Vasconcelos’ Curriculum Vitae (available at the time of writing on LinkedIn’s 
web site). 
12 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 19, p. 869, see above note 2. 
13 Ibid., Regulations 20–22, pp. 869–71. 
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criminal inquiries, each tool is updated to reflect the progress of the inves-
tigation and to plan ahead, anticipating a number of assessments (Draft 
Regulation (‘DR’) 19). None of the tools were seen as static or frozen in 
time. 
In the Draft Regulations model, the draft investigation plan is situ-
ated at the crossroads between the preliminary examination phase and the 
investigation:14 in fact, the decision on whether to open an investigation 
cannot be taken without due consideration having been given to the draft 
investigation plan.15 Moving to open an ICC investigation has such signif-
icant economic and other consequences that such a decision should only 
be made after careful reflection involving the entire OTP senior manage-
ment. If an investigation is initiated, the draft plan converges into a dy-
namic investigation plan, and later provides the grounds for the draft 
charges document (DR 20.1.). 
The draft charges document draws on the results of the preliminary 
examination, the investigation plan, and the on-going investigation. The 
proof chart gives an overview of the evidence collected that proves the 
elements of the suspected crimes and their modes of liability, informing 
the draft charges document (DR 22.2.). The proof chart organises the 
available evidence; however, its structure should also receive guidance 
from the dynamic investigation plan. It is important to emphasise that the 
investigation plan, as the other two documents, was not designed to be 
static; the Draft Regulations provide for its continuous update as the in-
vestigation progresses. Rather than steering the investigation, the plan is 
meant to adapt to the results of the steps that have already been completed. 
The Draft Regulations modelled two separate paths for proprio mo-
tu investigations and referrals from the United Nations Security Council 
(‘UNSC’) or States Parties. The Deputy Prosecutor in charge of investiga-
tions is ultimately responsible for preliminary examinations (DR 4.1.). In 
proprio motu proceedings, once the preliminary examinations team in 
charge of a specific situation has completed the assessments required by 
Draft Regulation 4.5.,16 it will forward a final report to the Deputy Prose-
cutors in charge of investigations and prosecutions along with a reasoned 
recommendation on further action (DR 6.1.). Following these steps, the 
                                                   
14 Ibid., Regulation 12.1., p. 865. 
15 Ibid., Regulations 6.3., 12.1, pp. 859, 865. 
16 Ibid., Regulation 4.5., p. 859. 
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two Deputy Prosecutors must consider whether the situation merits an 
investigation (DR 6.4.). In case of disagreement, the decision to move 
forward is left to the chief Prosecutor. If the Deputy Prosecutors agree that 
a situation does merit an investigation, then a draft investigation plan is 
set up under the supervision of the Deputy Prosecutor in charge of prose-
cutions (DR 6.3.). 
The Draft Regulations provided a separate path for determining 
whether the OTP should open an investigation in case of referrals by 
States Parties or the UNSC (DR 7.-11.). The draft investigation plan, 
however, is always balancing between preliminary examinations and the 
investigation phase. After receiving a referral, the Prosecutor mandates an 
evaluation team whose composition represents investigations, prosecu-
tions, analysis, and legal advisory and policy.17 The report of the evalua-
tion team partially mirrors the work of the preliminary examinations team 
described above: accordingly, the report will assess whether the situation 
merits an investigation (DR 11.1.-11.4.). In such case, a senior prosecutor 
will likewise oversee the draft investigation plan. Initially, the draft inves-
tigation plan is grounded in the information gathered during the evalua-
tion of the situation. 
In both proprio motu and referred situations, the draft investigation 
plan and the report by the preliminary examination/evaluation team are 
submitted to the Prosecutor along with a reasoned recommendation.18 If 
an investigation is initiated, the draft evolves into the investigation plan 
proper, a strategic management tool to plan and prepare for the foreseea-
ble steps of the investigation. 
It should be noted that the team in charge of preparing the investi-
gation plan is composed by the team that oversaw the draft, including 
members of the Investigation and Prosecution Divisions and one Legal 
Advisor; a senior prosecutor supervises the drafting.19 The same team will 
recommend whether the Prosecutor should start an investigation, and is 
mandated by Draft Regulation 6.7. to pay “specific attention to the inter-
ests of justice as specified by Article 53(1) and Rule 48”.20 This seeks to 
promote broad involvement of the Office in the evaluation, providing the 
                                                   
17 Ibid., Regulation 9.1., p. 863. 
18 Ibid., Regulation 6.7., p. 862. 
19 Ibid., Regulation 6.3., p. 859. 
20 Ibid., Regulation 6.7., p. 862. 
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Prosecutor with requisite insights and counsel on a delicate policy ques-
tion. 
The current practice of the ICC-OTP includes many of the assess-
ments underlying the Draft Regulations, as explained by Markus Eikel in 
Chapter 15 above, and is gradually being developed in light of the Of-
fice’s growing experience. Still, the model designed by the Draft Regula-
tions stands out for the inclusive involvement of high-level OTP staff 
from different areas in the preparation of the draft investigation plan, the 
centrality of such tool, and its early adoption: “no decision [to start or not 
to start an investigation] is to be taken without prior establishment of a 
draft investigation plan” (DR 12.1.). 
16.2.3. The Content of the Investigation Plan 
The substance of the investigation plan as foreseen by the Draft Regula-
tions is a list of assessments that, if duly anticipated and considered, aims 
to avoid several bottlenecks that affect past and present investigations of 
core international crimes.21 The content of the draft investigation plan is 
listed in Draft Regulation 6.5. of Book 3.22 The same provision is referred 
to for the content of the investigation plan proper, given that it will be a 
continuation of the draft (DR 20.1.). 
Firstly, the Draft Regulations require an early evaluation of “wheth-
er there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court has been or is being committed”,23 together with the back-
ground and the context of the situation.24 The investigation plan further 
requires the Office to identify “the crime base incidents to be investigated 
and a description of likely suspects, together with the overall aim of the 
                                                   
21 The terminology used in this chapter explicitly refers to Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a 
Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 
(2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2019 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-
pdf/94-bergsmo). The Quality Control in Criminal Investigations Project defined seven 
particularly problematic bottlenecks: overview of information, factual analysis, evidence 
review, formulation of responsibility, cumulative charging, too much evidence, and disclo-
sure. See also Morten Bergsmo, “Rethinking Instruments of Quality Control in the Investi-
gation and Preparation of Core International Crimes Cases”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 23 
February 2019 (http://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-bergsmo/). 
22 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5., p. 861, see above note 2. 
23 Ibid., Regulation 6.5.(a). 
24 Ibid., Regulation 6.5.(b). 
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investigation”.25 Such provisions are aimed to outline the scope of the 
investigation and facilitate the overview of information, providing an es-
tablished framework for factual analysis that is shared by the Office. In-
terestingly, the OTP is required to assess “the overall aim of the investiga-
tion” before its inception, fostering co-ordination among all the teams that 
will work on the case (DR 6.5.(d)). 
Likewise, “the role and place of [the] likely suspects in the relevant 
chains of authority” must be explained from the outset.26 Investigators 
and prosecutors draw, from the beginning of the investigation, a tentative 
and continuously updated structure for criminal responsibility. Requiring 
such evaluation this early expresses the relevance of such structure, aimed 
to prevent oversights in the formulation of responsibility, as the main con-
nections of responsibility that need to be proven are clarified. The makers 
of the Draft Regulations realised that proving chains of responsibility is 
difficult, and therefore decided to facilitate leadership analysis. An inci-
sive, evidence-based understanding of the power structure in a situation is 
indispensable in order to outline the chain of command that allegedly led 
to the crimes, and it depends on the proper direction of analysis exper-
tise.27 
A crucial provision of the Draft Regulations investigation plan re-
quires the “preliminary indication of the main categories of and the 
amount of evidence that is likely to be required to prove the possible 
charges”.28 Given that the possible charges are grounded in alleged facts, 
requiring an early assessment of how such charges can be proven may 
instil the investigation with a sense of realism to steer clear of unsubstan-
tiated charges. Insufficient evidence review can lead to evidence that is 
duly submitted but left disconnected from the charges.29 Arguably, linking 
                                                   
25 Ibid., Regulation 6.5.(d). 
26 Ibid., Regulation 6.5.(f). 
27 A tentative structure of the relevant chains of authority would likely constitute proper 
direction for the work of leadership analysts. See Christian A. Nielsen, “Leadership Analy-
sis in International Criminal Justice”, in Adejoké Babington-Ashaye, Aimée Comrie and 
Akingbolahan Adeniran (eds.), International Criminal Investigations Law and Practice, 
Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2018, p. 211. See also Christian Axboe Niel-
sen, “Analysis of Organisational Structures and Quality Control of Case Development”, 
CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-nielsen/). 
28 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(j), p. 861, see above note 2. 
29 See ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
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investigative activities to the on-going assessment of evidence contributes 
to a more effective factual analysis and enables a constant evidence re-
view, preventing possible issues in the trial phase, including the abun-
dance of evidence which results in lengthier and costlier proceedings.30 
The case history of the ICC provides some insight on how relevant rigor-
ous evidence review is. Inadequate review of available evidence has trou-
bled the work of the OTP since the Kenyatta case, as Judge van den 
Wyngaert noted in her concurring opinion,31 while conceding that it was 
far from being the only influencing factor.32 The Trial Chamber itself not-
ed “the failure on the part of the Prosecution to take appropriate steps to 
verify the credibility and reliability of evidence on which it intended to 
rely at trial”33 as one of the many reasons for the outcome of the case. The 
lack of clear correspondence between factual findings and actual evidence 
was arguably among the issues34 in the Bemba Conviction Decision that 
was overturned by the Appeals Chamber.35 With regards to the Gbagbo 
case, reviewing the investigative results for each charge could have con-
tributed to avoiding the overuse of hearsay or NGO reports among the 
evidence relied upon by the Prosecutor,36 deemed “exceptionally weak” 
                                                                                                                        
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor, Decision, 15 June 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/07965c/). 
30 Rupert Skillbeck, “Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials”, in Human Rights 
Brief, 2008, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 1. 
31 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, 26 April 2013, ICC-
01/09-02/11-728-Anx2, para. 4 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/917ec7/). 
32 Ibid., para. 6. 
33 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber, Decision on Prosecution’s Application for a Further Adjournment, 3 December 
2014, ICC-01/09-02/11-981, para. 52 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/731d89/). 
34 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Appeals Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert and Judge 
Howard Morrison, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2, paras. 10, 12, 50, 64 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c13ef4/). 
35 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial 
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-
01/08-3636-Red (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/40d35b/). 
36 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirma-
tion of charges pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3 June 2013, ICC-
02/11-01/11-432, para. 35 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/). 
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by the Trial Chamber.37 It may certainly be said, as it has,38 that some of 
the acquittals express more complex issues; however, it is also clear that 
inadequate evidence review has been a crucial factor in more than one 
instance. Furthermore, knowing in advance which kind of evidence is 
needed can greatly facilitate meeting evidentiary thresholds, and fosters 
co-ordination among investigators and prosecutors – a recurring theme in 
the model foreseen by the Draft Regulations. 
Policy concerns find their place in the investigation plan, as the 
drafters required the prosecution to provide “an explanation of how the 
investigation and prosecution of the alleged crimes or perpetrators is ex-
pected to fit in with the broader context of cases pursued by the Office”,39 
and the reasons “why the alleged offences warrant a full investigation 
against the backdrop of other alleged offences where such a step might 
not be recommendable”.40 The view of the makers of the Draft Regula-
tions was that a clear prosecutorial policy would be beneficial for the 
work of the Office. Accordingly, they required the investigation plan to 
provide the rationale for case selection and prioritisation. The latest OTP 
policy paper on the issue was published in 2016:41 interestingly, it man-
dated the adoption of a Case Selection Document based on the conclu-
sions of the preliminary examination phase,42 similarly to what the draft 
investigation plan foreseen by the expert group in 2003 required. The 
benefits of formulating an advance assessment on case selection and pri-
oritisation are beyond discussion, and are partially covered elsewhere in 
this anthology.43 
                                                   
37 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Transcript, 16 January 2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-T-234-
ENG, p. 4 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/496176/). 
38 William H. Wiley, “Incisive Hypotheses on Criminal Responsibility in Team Environ-
ments”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-
wiley/). 
39 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(l), p. 861, see above note 2. 
40 Ibid., Regulation 6.5.(c). 
41 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/182205/). 
42 Ibid., p. 5. 
43 See Devasheesh Bais, “Prioritisation of Suspected Conduct and Cases: From Idea to Prac-
tice”, CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-
bais/), and his Chapter 9 above. 
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Draft Regulation 6.5. requires the OTP to formulate “a tentative in-
dication of possible charges, modes of liability and potential defences”.44 
The assessment will be updated as the investigation progresses, and en-
sures that investigative activities remain directed towards the trial phase. 
Both aspects are crucial to avoid target-driven investigations: investiga-
tive results and accusatory hypotheses should be allowed to inform each 
other, if the aim of the system is to do justice rather than meeting a tar-
get.45 Such indication requires investigators to ensure that the results of 
their work speak to the charges that will later be discussed in Court, and 
to perform evidence review for each allegation from an initial stage. Fi-
nally, the provision implies an early thinking-process about possible 
charges which, as it matures, may guide – and simultaneously be shaped 
by – the sharpness of the focus of the investigation. The process of articu-
lating and discussing possible charges guides fact-finders and -reviewers 
towards constantly asking questions that are relevant to formulating tenta-
tive charging hypotheses, by that aiding clarity about the emerging theory 
of responsibility, thus reducing the reliance on broad indictments as a veil 
concealing lack of clarity of analysis.46 This is also in the interest of the 
defence. Thinking about possible charges while the investigation is on-
going and upholding the requirement of an updated formulation within the 
investigation plan may limit the use of cumulative charging, avoiding 
undue burdening of the defence and the trial process.47 
The Draft Regulations mandated several assessments that are more 
focused on the practical aspects of investigations and prosecutions. For 
instance, the likelihood of arresting the suspects is tentatively evaluated 
                                                   
44 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(e), p. 861, see above note 2. 
45 On the issues related to target-driven investigations, see Morten Bergsmo and William H. 
Wiley, “Human Rights Professionals and the Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of 
Core International Crimes”, in Siri Skåre, Ingvild Burkey and Hege Mørk (eds.), Manual 
on Human Rights Monitoring: An Introduction for Human Rights Field Officers, Norwe-
gian Centre for Human Rights, Oslo, 2008, p. 8 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8362d5/). 
46 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, para. 99 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
96c3c2/). 
47 See ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Ar-
rest, 10 June 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG, para. 25 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
fb80c6/). 
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before the decision on whether to open an investigation is taken.48 Given 
the relevancy of this issue, among the most visible in the context of inter-
national justice and the ICC specifically,49 it deserves consideration from 
the early stages of the process. 
Other required evaluations include issues of “State co-operation and 
security”,50 and the “assessment of the admissibility of a possible case 
under Article 17 of the Statute”:51 complementarity, including the evalua-
tion of the genuineness of the will and ability to prosecute through nation-
al proceedings, ne bis in idem, and the ‘sufficient gravity’ threshold. The 
three provisions project the investigation to the next phase, and potentially 
reduce resource-intensive efforts with little value. If issues of State co-
operation or suspect apprehension are foreseeable, the Office should con-
sider this in the planning. Article 17 assessments, if timely, may likewise 
prevent unfruitful action. 
Importantly, the fourth provision on practical matters requires the 
Office to estimate the foreseeable costs in term of resources and staff.52 
The budget of the Court is finite, and does not allow for limitless investi-
gations; a mismanaged resource-intensive investigation might prejudice 
the results of another. In order to prevent this scenario, the drafters of the 
Draft Regulations required the Office to plan its involvement ahead, with 
a view to reducing overall expenditure and promoting efficiency. In this 
regard, and notwithstanding any controversy, is it appropriate to mention 
the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC on the Afghanistan situa-
tion, according to which the foreseeable scarcity of resources plays a rele-
vant role in the evaluation of the interests of justice.53 Accordingly, the 
                                                   
48 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(g): “The whereabouts, if known, of the possi-
ble suspects and the likelihood to arrest them”, p. 861, see above note 2. 
49 David Scheffer, “Proposal for an International Criminal Court Arrest Procedures Protocol”, 
in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 2014, vol. 12, no. 3, p. 229. 
50 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(k), p. 861, see above note 2. 
51 Ibid., Regulation 6.5.(h): “An assessment of the admissibility of a possible case under 
Article 17 of the Statute”. 
52 Ibid., Regulation 6.5.(i): “A preliminary indication of resources, time and staff likely to be 
required to complete the investigation”. 
53 ICC, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursu-
ant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation, 12 April 
2019, ICC-02/17-33, para. 95 (‘Afghanistan Pre-Trial Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/2fb1f4/). 
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current practice at the OTP outlined in Chapter 15 pays specific regards to 
resource management. 
The investigation plan model of the Draft Regulations further in-
cludes a specific evaluation of “potential dangers to the integrity of the 
investigation or the life or well-being of victims and witnesses that could 
arise once the victims are informed of the intention of the Chief Prosecu-
tor to seek authorisation”54 to initiate an investigation pursuant to Article 
15(3) of the Rome Statute. Witness interference is unfortunately common 
within ICC cases,55 and has been crucial to the outcome of some proceed-
ings.56 A dedicated assessment might facilitate upholding Article 68(1) of 
the Rome Statute on the protection of witness and victims. 
Finally, the draft investigation plan allows the inclusion of relevant 
information that does not fit in the categories discussed above, namely 
“any other matter that may be of relevance for a decision to start an inves-
tigation in the light of the specific situation”.57 The provision is meant for 
the draft investigation plan only, since the document is relevant for the 
decision to open an investigation. It is noteworthy that the Draft Regula-
tions encourage the investigation and prosecution teams to express their 
concerns or policy-related advice with the inclusion of a dedicated entry 
in the investigation plan. By doing so, one could argue, the decision to 
start an investigation would involve key actors of the Office of the Prose-
cutor to a significant degree. 
16.2.4. An Overall Assessment of the Draft Regulations’ Approach to 
Investigation Plans 
It is beyond argument that investigation plans are significantly beneficial 
for investigations of core international crimes and fact-rich criminal cases. 
As mentioned in Chapter 15 above, the ICC institutionalised the use of 
such plans in 2010. The Draft Regulations chose to anticipate many inves-
                                                   
54 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(m): “Potential dangers to the integrity of the 
investigation or the life or well-being of victims and witnesses that could arise once the 
victims are informed of the intention of the Chief Prosecutor to seek authorisation, in ac-
cordance with Rule 50(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, p. 861, see above note 
2. 
55 Open Society Justice Initiative, “Witness Interference in Cases before the International 
Criminal Court” (available on the Open Society’s web site). 
56 See Afghanistan Pre-Trial Decision, para. 95, see above note 53. 
57 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(n), p. 862, see above note 2. 
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tigative assessments, requiring them to be formulated before a decision to 
open an investigation is finally taken. They gather from past experiences 
of international criminal justice. In doing so, the Draft Regulations chose 
to involve some of the highest ranked professionals in the OTP. 
By way of example, the six-year younger ICTY Manual on Devel-
oped Practices (‘ICTY Manual’) from 2009 includes a model investiga-
tion plan which should likewise be adopted “prior to commencing any 
significant investigative activity”, 58 and has several points in common 
with Draft Regulation 6.5. The ICTY Manual investigation plan is explic-
itly aimed to link the lines of enquiry with the foreseeable evidentiary 
results, promoting constant evidence review; the plan requires an estimate 
of the resources and time that will likely be employed, and specifically 
includes assessments of the background of the crimes and the alleged of-
fenders; the “charging theory and the characterization of the crimes”, the 
position and the authority of the alleged perpetrators.59 The ICTY Manual 
provides the requirement of an on-going review of the results of the inves-
tigations and a series of evidence-specific assessments with regards to the 
required categorisation of the foreseeable “avenues of investigation”.60 
The investigation plan provided by the ICC-OTP Draft Regulations 
follows a different approach and considers a number of aspects which add 
to the wisdom distilled in light of the practice at the ICTY. For instance, 
the ICTY Manual investigation plan does not require policy assessments 
and statements – which is likely due to the inherent differences among the 
mandates of the ICTY and the ICC – but both investigation plans include 
the explanation of the aim of an investigation. The Draft Regulations in-
vestigation plan, however, brings the formulation of a ‘charging theory’ a 
step forward, requiring a tentative draft indictment. Likewise, assessing 
the position and the authority of the individual alleged perpetrators, as 
was the ICTY practice, is conceptually different from the Draft Regula-
tions’ requirement of formulating “the role and place of these likely sus-
pects in the relevant chains of authority”61 and, as such, the latter arguably 
                                                   
58 ICTY and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (‘UNICRI’), 
ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, UNICRI Publisher, Turin, 2009, p. 30 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/0cc55d). 
59 Ibid., p. 14. 
60 Ibid., p. 30. 
61 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 6.5.(f), p. 861, see above note 2. 
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enables leadership-analysis to a greater extent. Regarding evidence, the 
ICTY Manual is remarkably hands-on and practically useful, since it re-
quires assessments of the foreseeable categories of evidence (in terms of 
potential witnesses, physical evidence, and documentary evidence) for 
each investigative avenue. 62 The Draft Regulations further add the re-
quired assessment of the likely amount of evidence that is directly linked 
to proving the possible charges. Finally, it can be argued that the inclusion 
of mandatory evaluations of the potential dangers to victims, witnesses, 
and to the integrity of the investigation would benefit the ICTY Manual 
investigation plan; the same could be said for the pre-emptive assessment 
of foreseeable issues of State co-operation as well. Chapter 15 outlines 
how the ICC is learning from the practice of the past tribunals, as similar 
assessments are conducted albeit with other tools that are distinct from 
investigation plans. 
The Draft Regulations were composed in 2003. Subsequent devel-
opments in the field of international justice may suggest the inclusion of 
additional assessments or strategic choices. For instance, a planning tool 
for tackling the issue of disclosure could certainly find its place within the 
provisions of Draft Regulation 6.5. (see Chapter 14 above by David Re). 
Nevertheless, the content foreseen by the expert group in 2003 still has 
high relevancy in light of the lessons learned during the first 17 years of 
the ICC. Arguably, the guidelines on the timing of the formulation of the 
draft investigation plan, the involvement of operational lawyers and inves-
tigators as well as senior management in that exercise, and the early think-
ing about possible legal classifications are directly relevant to the serious 
problems the ICC-OTP has encountered in several of its cases to date. 
16.3. An Italian Perspective 
16.3.1. An Introduction to Criminal Investigations in the Italian 
Legal System 
With regards to criminal procedure, one of the most visible differences 
between the ICC and the Italian national legal system is the absence of the 
preliminary examination stage in the latter. This difference is, of course, 
due to the principle of mandatory prosecutions, applied by Article 112 of 
                                                   
62 ICTY and UNICRI, 2009, p. 30, see above note 58. 
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the Italian Constitution.63 Consequently, the decision to open an investiga-
tion is taken automatically, as soon as the notice of a prosecutable crime is 
brought to the attention of the authorities.64 Generally, the duty to investi-
gate rests with the offices of the prosecutor of the district court with terri-
torial jurisdiction on the alleged crimes.65 It must be noted, however, that 
Italian legal scholarship has consistently interpreted the principle of man-
datory prosecutions to implicitly exclude criminal pursuits without a rea-
sonable prospect of securing a conviction.66 
Italian prosecutors (“pubblici ministeri”) have the same selection 
procedure, requirements and appointment as judges; in fact, they are mag-
istrates. The prosecutor in charge of a case leads the investigation, and co-
ordinates the work of tasked officers and other staff. Police authorities are 
directed by the prosecutors appointed to their offices, 67 similar to the 
Norwegian model described in Chapter 18 below by Alf Butenschøn Skre. 
Italy has adopted a hybrid procedural model, which is predominantly ac-
cusatory.68 Hence, prosecutors qualify as parties to the proceedings, but 
they have an obligation to seek the truth and must search for evidence that 
is favourable to the accused person.69 Nonetheless, it is their responsibil-
ity to strategically pursue successful prosecutions.70 In the words of the 
renowned jurist Piero Calamandrei, Italian prosecutors are “lawyers with-
out passion, judges without impartiality”.71 
                                                   
63 Italy, Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [The Constitution of the Italian Republic], 1 
January 1948 (‘Constitution of Italy’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8e3867/). 
64 Italy, Codice di Procedura Penale (Code of Criminal Procedure), 22 September 1988, 
Article 335 (‘CPP’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aee4e8/). 
65 Ibid., Article 51.1(a). 
66 Francesca Ruggieri, “Nota Introduttiva”, in Claudio Botti, Domenico Manzione and Enrico 
Marzaduri (eds.), “Il principio di Obbligatorietà dell’Azione Penale Oggi: Confini e 
Prospettive”, in Criminalia 2010: Annuario di scienze penalistiche, Edizioni ETS, Pise, 
2011, p. 301. 
67 CPP, Article 58, see above note 64. 
68 Court of Cassation of Italy, Judgment, 14 December 1996, no. 6599. 
69 CPP, Article 358, see above note 64; Court of Cassation of Italy, Judgment, 23 February 
1998, no. 1125. 
70 Court of Cassation of Italy, Judgment, 20 December 2005, no. 6743. 
71 Piero Calamandrei, Elogio dei Giudici Scritto da un Avvocato, Ponte alle Grazie, Milan, 
1989, p. 56. 
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Starting from the opening of an investigation, the proceedings are 
subject to judicial oversight,72 more so when the rights of the accused are 
significantly impacted. Such is the case, for instance, of wiretaps,73 arrests 
“in flagrante delicto”,74 or the compulsory extraction of biological materi-
al.75 The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge overseeing 
the investigation phase must either authorise said measures or evaluate the 
prosecutor’s decisions ex post in case of urgency which did not allow the 
prosecutor to seek an authorisation beforehand. Investigations are directed 
by prosecutors while being subjected to selective scrutiny by a pre-trial 
judge. Investigative choices are the domain of the offices of the prosecutor, 
fulfilling their functions in an organic procedure which involves the judi-
ciary from the outset. 
With a notable exception – the possibility of a pre-trial judge order-
ing additional investigation of select matters in a small number of instanc-
es specified by law – prosecutors are exclusively charged with choosing 
and implementing strategic approaches. In order for a prosecutor to 
properly discharge this function, the Italian legal system offers a series of 
guarantees of independence from external influence, albeit not as marked 
as the ones provided for the judges. Prosecutors are particularly independ-
ent during hearings, as the law grants them “full autonomy”.76 However, 
the hierarchical structure of the offices of the prosecutors implies a limita-
tion of the independence of individual prosecutors from legitimate inter-
nal influence,77 which is important to understand before dealing with the 
issue of strategic co-ordination of investigative activities. 
The consequences of the Italian prosecutorial hierarchy have wider 
effects during pre-trial phases, including investigations,78 due to the prior-
ity granted to the promotion of uniform approaches. The chief prosecutors 
at the district-court level determine their offices’ organisational and stra-
                                                   
72 CPP, Article 328, see above note 64. 
73 Ibid., Article 267. 
74 Ibid., Article 391. 
75 Ibid., Article 359bis. 
76 Ibid., Article 53. 
77 Marco Bignami, “L’Indipendenza Interna del Pubblico Ministero”, in Questione Giustizia, 
2018, no. 1, p. 80. 
78 Jessica De Vivo, L’indipendenza del Pubblico Ministero: Profili Costituzionali e 
Ordinamentali, doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2018, p. 47. 
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tegic aspects,79 and thus have the necessary autonomy to co-ordinate with 
other offices at the same level. Accordingly, the instruments of strategic 
planning examined in this chapter are either co-ordinating agreements 
among offices of the prosecutors of different courts, or guidelines adopted 
within a specific office. Both encompass best practices in light of juris-
prudential and normative developments. 
16.3.2. Strategic Tools to Direct Criminal Investigations 
The first Italian strategic tool for investigations examined in this chapter 
is an organisational agreement at the court of appeals’ level, encompass-
ing several court districts and entered into by the prosecutors themselves. 
It is a protocol to co-ordinate the offices of the prosecutor of different 
Sicilian district courts, in order to identify a working method to address 
“the vagueness of certain legal provisions and the obvious lack of consol-
idated jurisprudence” with regards to a 2006 legislative reform on envi-
ronmental crimes.80 
The protocol is explicitly aimed to “provide operational directions, 
uniform for the whole District”81 within the normative gaps left by prima-
ry and secondary sources of law, similar to the Draft Regulations or the 
current Regulations of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.82 In light of the 
identified issues, the protocol provides several tools to enhance the effec-
tiveness of the investigations of specific environmental crimes. The doc-
ument identifies a range of minor offences, dubbed ‘spy-crimes’, which 
strongly suggest the commission of more serious environmental crimes. 
As such, the protocol provides for investigative direction, and establishes 
a shared IT monitoring tool. One of the main issues was the need to short-
en the duration of investigations to counter the effects of the statute of 
limitations. Hence, the protocol sets out an obligation for each office to 
forward any notice of certain alleged crimes to a number of prosecutorial 
                                                   
79 Bignami, 2018, p. 83, see above note 77. 
80 Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals of Caltanissetta, Protocollo Or-
ganizzativo in Materia di Reati Ambientali ex Legge n. 68/2015 [Organisational Protocol 
on Environmental Crimes Pursuant to Law No. 68/2015], 22 March 2016, no. 955/2016 
(‘Organisational Protocol on Environmental Crimes’). 
81 Ibid., p. 2. 
82 ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09, Regu-
lation 1.2 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). 
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offices.83 A significant portion of the document covers the interpretation 
of key legal provisions, indicating an appropriate course of action for is-
sues ranging from jurisdiction to elements of the crimes: in other words, 
investigative and prosecutorial direction within the framework of a com-
mon statement of policy. While much different from an investigation plan, 
the document represents an effort to further a strategic approach to inves-
tigations, largely consisting in tools and directions for advance planning. 
To some extent, it provides for investigative planning, as the protocol 
mandates assessment and procedures for each investigation of relevant 
crimes. However, the lack of an individual planning approach renders the 
document more related to a very detailed policy paper on a select crime 
area. 
Other offices of the prosecutor have pursued similar goals, albeit in 
different guises: circulars (“circolari”), internal dispatches containing 
guidelines with administrative binding effects on hierarchically subordi-
nated offices. Such is the case of the Office of the Prosecutor of the dis-
trict court of Bari in Puglia, another region of southern Italy.84 As a rele-
vant contextual factor it is fair to state that southern Italy has suffered the 
direct consequences of constant organised criminal activities which noto-
riously allow and profit from illegal practices within their controlled terri-
tories.85 Therefore, environmental crimes are a matter of particular con-
cern to certain Italian regions. Against this background, the Chief Prose-
cutor of Bari issued a series of relevant circulars,86 of which the latest is 
                                                   
83 The targeted crimes are environmental pollution, environmental disaster, trafficking and 
abandoning highly radioactive material, organised activities aimed at the trafficking of 
waste. See Organisational Protocol on Environmental Crimes, p. 2, see above note 80. 
84 Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the District Court of Bari, Nuova Circolare Relativa ai 
Reati Contravvenzionali in Materia Ambientale di cui al Testo Unico Ambiente – D. Lgs. 
N. 152/2006, come Modificato dalla L. n. 68/2015 [New Circular on Environmental Crim-
inal Misdemeanours Pursuant to the Consolidated Law on the Environment – Legislative 
Decree No. 152/2006, as Amended by Law No. 68/2018], 21 December 2017 (‘New Cir-
cular on Environmental Criminal Misdemeanours’). 
85 Antonio Pergolizzi, “L’Economia Avvelenata del Crimine Ambientale”, in Moneta e 
Credito, 2018, vol. 71, no. 284, p. 341. It is important to note that – regardless of visible 
action on the ground – such activities burden Italy as a whole, along with other, if not all, 
States, more so in case of environmental crimes. 
86 Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the District Court of Bari, Circolare prot. 936/2016 [Cir-
cular Protocol No. 936/2016], 8 February 2016; Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the Dis-
trict Court of Bari, Circolare prot. 5648/2018 [Circular Protocol No. 5648/2018], 19 July 
2016. 
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mainly aimed to discipline the application of the statute of limitations to 
minor offences.87 The document expresses the office’s policy on the con-
cerned norms in terms of scope and procedural aspects, indicating manda-
tory steps and a statement of best practices. The circular reads as the de-
tailed account of the tasks that must be performed by the office. Com-
pared to investigation plans, and to the ICC-OTP Draft Regulations in 
particular, the circular lacks the element of advance planning for individu-
al circumstances, and disproportionally covers practical matters and pro-
cedural guidelines. 
A third example from Italian prosecution offices focuses on ensur-
ing a uniform procedure or method to deal with specific crimes, which has 
been a priority for the Office of the Prosecutor of the district court of 
Macerata particularly for the crimes of stalking88 and abuse or mistreat-
ment within the family.89 The office has drafted two crime-specific direc-
tives90 which are very similar in content: both documents discuss the ele-
ments of the crimes in light of consolidated jurisprudence, and outline a 
step-by-step procedure starting from the acquisition of the notice that an 
alleged crime has been committed. The directives focus on obtaining evi-
dence, with special regards to the weight of foreseeable means of proof, 
such as the interview of the victim vis-à-vis potential witnesses. Further-
more, the document provides a variety of guidelines on the steps to be 
followed during the investigation, including recommended courses of 
action and criteria for the prioritisation of investigative activities. The 
latter portion of the directives is particularly detailed, and provides an 
overview of the whole investigation phase which may contribute towards 
advanced planning. Such in-depth indication of tasks to be undertaken 
functions as a check-list of sorts, enabling better oversight. Interestingly, 
                                                   
87 New Circular on Environmental Criminal Misdemeanours, p. 2, see above note 84. 
88 Italy, Codice Penale (Penal Code), 19 October 1930, Article 612bis (‘CP’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/46945d/). 
89 Ibid., Article 572. 
90 Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the District Court of Macerata, Direttive per le Indagini in 
Materia di Reato ex art. 572 c.p. [Directives for Investigations of the Crime Pursuant to 
Article 572 of the Penal Code], 15 January 2014; Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the Dis-
trict Court of Macerata, Direttive per le Indagini in Materia di Reato ex art. 612 bis c.p. 
[Directives for Investigations of the Crime as Provided by Article 612bis of the Penal 
Code], 15 January 2014. 
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attached to both documents are forms that outline how the interview of the 
victims should be conducted in light of the guidelines. 
The main characteristic that these tools have in common with the 
content and the purpose of the investigation plan as provided by the ICC-
OTP Draft Regulations is that they are adopted in advance, to direct the 
steps and the progress of an investigation prospectively. Italian prosecu-
tion authorities do recognise that organised planning leads to more effec-
tive investigations. However, the equivalent of an investigation plan is not 
currently provided for by the Italian legal system, and neither protocols 
nor circulars or directives can replace the functions that investigation 
plans tend to perform. For instance, the body of each of the documents is 
largely composed of interpretation of norms. While certainly useful, if 
translated into the ICC framework, they resemble thematic policy papers, 
which do not adequately cater to the strategic needs of individual investi-
gations. This function is performed by the two directives of the Macerata 
district court’s Office of the Prosecutor, albeit only partially. The instruc-
tions contained in the documents, if applied to an individual case, can 
answer many of the questions raised by an investigation plan. However, 
the Italian directives are static, since they pertain to every case of a partic-
ular crime, and do not translate into or require the actual planning of indi-
vidual casework. Nevertheless, not unlike the ICC-OTP Draft Regulations 
investigation plan, the above-mentioned tools can foster an organised ap-
proach and greatly facilitate the sharing of knowledge and best practices 
among and within offices. Co-ordinating investigative practices likely 
results, ultimately, in the consolidation of a common method and better 
oversight. 
16.3.2.1. An Assessment of Current Developments in the Uniformity 
of Criminal Pursuits 
Recent developments have shown the increasing priority afforded to the 
planning of criminal investigations by the Italian judiciary. In September 
2017, the Superior Council of Magistrates 91 included the drafting and 
                                                   
91 The Superior Council of Magistrates is the overseeing body for career judges and prosecu-
tors, mandated by the Italian Constitution and performing a quasi-normative function on its 
area of influence, namely judicial activities left out from existing primary and secondary 
sources of law. Albeit debated in Italian academia with regards to issues of legitimacy, 
there is unanimous consensus that the Council exercises a de facto normative power. See 
the Constitution of Italy, Articles 104–07, see above note 63; Giuseppe Volpe, “Le Origini 
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adoption of investigative planning tools within the suggested, non-
mandatory content of the organisational plan that all offices of the prose-
cutor are bound to implement periodically.92 The term that is employed is 
“investigative protocols” aimed to discipline “homogeneous categories of 
proceedings”.93 The aim of such protocols is, according to the Office of 
the Prosecutor of Tivoli in the central Lazio region, to render more effec-
tive the use of existing resources while enabling the prosecutor to make 
more uniform and hastier assessments. Adopting directives containing 
investigative protocols enhances “the overall saving of resources and op-
erational results, for the sake of the victims as well”.94 
A paradigmatic example is, in fact, a directive pertaining to gender-
based crimes, implemented by the same Office of the Prosecutor in Tivo-
li.95 The reasons for employing a more strategic approach are similar to 
the advantages of investigation plans: the directive mentions the effec-
tiveness of criminal pursuits, resource-effective management, and the 
explicit aim to enhance monitoring.96 Such provisions enable swifter in-
vestigations and limit superfluous activities, with the effect of “offering an 
actual perception of protection and care to the victims”.97 The directive 
provides guidelines on substantial matters and procedural steps, and is not 
designed to constitute a proper plan for investigations. Hence, it cannot be 
adapted to the developments of individual proceedings. Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                        
dell’Organizzazione Corporativa della Magistratura”, in Alessandro Pace, Sergio Bartole, 
and Roberto Romboli (eds.), Problemi Attuali della Giustizia in Italia, Jovene, Naples, 
2009, p. 82; Alessandro Pace, “I Poteri Normativi del CSM”, in Rassegna Parlamentare, 
2010, no. 2, pp. 3–6. 
92 Italy, Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, Circolare sulla Organizzazione degli Uffici 
di Procura [Circular on the Organisation of the Offices of the Prosecutor], 16 November 
2017. 
93 Ibid., Article 7.5(o). 
94 Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the District Court of Tivoli, Direttiva alla Polizia Giu-
diziaria n. 1/2019, in materia di truffe commesse a mezzo internet [Directive to the Police 
No. 1/2019 Regarding Frauds Committed Through the Internet], 8 April 2019, n. prot. 
562/2019, p. 3. 
95 Italy, Office of the Prosecutor of the District Court of Tivoli, Direttiva n. 2/2019: Protocolli 
Investigativi e Buone Prassi per la Polizia Giudiziaria in Materia di Reati di Violenze di 
Genere [Directive No. 2/2019: Investigative Protocols and Best Practices for the Police 
with Regards to Gender-Based Violent Crimes], 3 May 2019, n. prot. 686/2019 [‘Directive 
No. 2/2019’]. 
96 Ibid., p. 3. 
97 Ibid., p. 4. 
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updating and amending the directive according to future developments is 
an important priority of the document, which provides several means to 
that end: firstly, it encourages follow-up meetings and consultations aimed 
to facilitate the work of police personnel; secondly, the directive is ex-
pressly subject to on-going monitoring; and thirdly, it enables police bu-
reaus to directly request clarifications and amendments (specific issues 
are dealt with in thematic circulars).98 While neither the directive nor the 
circulars are updated to reflect the developments within individual cases, 
possible modifications are foreseen and facilitated in their implementation. 
The consultation process leading to the adoption of similar documents is 
an expression of a co-operative approach. As such, the directives are 
adopted with the participation of all the prosecutors of the office, and its 
administrative staff when relevant. If appropriate, the adoption of investi-
gative directives follows a series of meetings and contacts with the police 
bureaus involved in the work affected by the document, “in order to pre-
emptively deal with the issues affecting the police bureaus” involved in 
the consultations. 99  Furthermore, the directive on gender-based crimes 
followed a meeting among the directors of several police authorities, and 
the gathering of the opinions of a relevant NGO in the field and the unit of 
the prosecutor’s office specialised in victims’ care. The reasons for the 
inclusive policy are stated in the document: 
judicial experience has proven that an effective and prompt 
response to such crimes is only possible through the in-
volvement and the accountability of every individual who, in 
any way, takes part in the prevention and the repression of 
the offences […] such synergy is required in order to fully 
protect and care for the victims.100 
This comprehensive framework is complemented by the provision 
of continuous co-ordination and training initiatives for involved police 
personnel. The aims of such directives resonate with the strategic nature 
of investigation plans. Their formulation shares and gathers information 
and best practices widely within the office and other relevant authorities. 
The directives are updated to reflect possible developments via either 
newer directives with abrogative effect or specifically-themed circulars.101 
                                                   
98 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 
99 Ibid., p. 3 
100 Ibid., p. 8. 
101 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 
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Finally, the directive itself is a statement of a policy that is, to some extent, 
shared with all the members of the office thanks to the consultation pro-
cess that ultimately led to its adoption. This is similar to the ICC-OTP 
Draft Regulation investigation plan, although the most significant differ-
ences with the Italian directives rest in the content which, for the latter, 
must necessarily be tailored to address a set of crimes rather than individ-
ual investigations. 
Addressing a category of crimes, the directive contains statements 
on case prioritisation for the set of crimes defined by its scope. A number 
of offences have high priority, indicating that proceedings for the crimes 
of stalking, mistreatment and sexual violence should reach the trial phase 
as soon as possible.102 The directive mandates very detailed procedures 
for the foreseeable police and prosecutorial activities, considering differ-
ent practical scenarios and suggesting adequate responses. Much space is 
given to the description of desirable investigative activities and on the 
overall treatment of victims throughout the proceedings. The statement of 
the tasks to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis provides implicit crite-
ria for the prioritisation of evidence. For instance, in the wake of sexual 
violence allegations, police officers are required to gather biological evi-
dence and call in specialised personnel among the first mandatory 
steps.103 Investigations of alleged domestic violence cases should priori-
tise the search for evidence aimed to assess the immediate dangers for the 
victims. 104  The directive contains more detailed guidelines on how to 
gather evidence, the kind of evidence required in connection with the al-
leged offences, while also focusing on the assessments and measures 
deemed necessary to preserve the well-being of victims and the integrity 
of the investigation. 
Unless otherwise specified, the indications contained in the di-
rective must be regarded as mandatory for the individuals under the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor’s authority. The directive of the Office of the Prose-
cutor of the Tivoli district court, in fact, states that such documents “must 
be regarded as strictly mandatory in order for their goals to be accom-
plished, with the consequence that any significant instance of incorrect 
                                                   
102 Ibid., p. 6. 
103 Ibid., p. 13. 
104 Ibid., p. 14. 
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compliance [with the directive’s provisions] must be reported to the police 
bureaus”.105 
The initiatives undertaken by the Italian offices of the prosecutor to 
ensure a uniform, strategic and effective approach to criminal pursuits 
may be adopted in the form of directives, circulars or protocols. As such, 
they can be considered, at best, close to the bottom of the hierarchy of the 
sources of law. The force of law is reserved to few sources in the Italian 
legal system, while regulations, with one exception,106 are the recognised 
source of binding secondary norms. This leaves directives, circulars and 
similar documents with a limited administrative force through which a 
body invested with adequate power can self-regulate.107 Hence, they are 
binding only in an administrative, and perhaps disciplinary, manner. Far 
from being provided by the law, the uniformity of criminal pursuits is 
currently being developed at the local level, under the administrative au-
thority of individual offices of the prosecutor. 
While steps are certainly being taken,108 the diffusion of the power 
to make strategic and managerial investigative choices likely results in a 
fragmentation of practice, inherently contradicting the aims such initia-
tives are directed towards. In practical terms, unless considerable effort is 
employed in co-ordination, the locally-sourced and -developed practices 
result in a myriad of best practices which differ on the basis of where the 
offence has been allegedly committed. While this is an issue that dispro-
portionately concerns domestic jurisdictions, it is fair to argue that the 
adoption of detailed directives by the higher-ups within the prosecutorial 
hierarchy might share and balance the benefits already provided by such 
efforts. 
                                                   
105 Ibid., p. 3. 
106 The exception consists in the statutes of local governments, such as townships. 
107 Floriana Lisena, Manuale di Diritto Costituzionale, Nel Diritto, Rome, 2016, p. 110. 
108 Offices of the Prosecutor can enter into the protocols explained above. Furthermore, the 
directives adopted by one office likely influence others, see Directive No. 2/2019, see 
above note 95. Albeit belonging to the same normative rank as directives, the resolutions 
of the Superior Council of Magistrates have by definition nationwide impact, and relevant 
guidelines and best practices have been adopted, see Italy, Consiglio Superiore della Mag-
istratura, Risoluzione sulle linee guida in tema di organizzazione e buone prassi per la trat-
tazione dei procedimenti relativi a reati di violenza di genere e domestica [Resolution on 
the Guidelines on the Organisation and Best Practices in Dealing with Proceedings Re-
garding Gender-Based and Domestic Violent Crimes], 9 May 2018. 
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16.3.3. Reasons for the Absence of Investigation Plans in Italy 
The Italian offices of the prosecutors have been tackling issues similar to 
the ones that the expert group tasked with the ICC-OTP Draft Regulations 
aimed to address with the provision of a mandatory investigation plan 
from the earliest stages of the process. However functional directives, 
circulars and protocols may be to strategy, planning, and policy, they are 
not suited or intended to monitor, manage and oversee individual investi-
gations. The Italian initiatives do result in a somewhat increased oversight 
capacity, as the uniformity of expected practices inherently facilitates 
scrutiny and the predictability of management. At the same time, they are 
markedly different from the “management tools to ensure focused and 
professional investigations” envisioned by the ICC-OTP Draft Regula-
tions. 109 Hence, there is no widely adopted instrument to strategically 
manage and monitor individual investigations in Italy, that resembles an 
investigation plan. My argument is that this absence is far from being 
solely determined by the lack of will or capacity by part of the competent 
authorities. Indeed, there are other, perhaps more practical reasons. 
First and foremost, Italian prosecutors are largely educated in their 
legal system from the beginning of their studies. The public selection pro-
cedure is strict, and every applicant has studied the same norms. The ma-
jority of police investigators, likewise, grew up, studied and worked in the 
same legal and cultural framework. The fact that the working language is 
the mother tongue of most involved personnel is an additional considera-
tion. The uniformity of the backgrounds of the individuals involved in an 
investigation likely increases the predictability of their work, perhaps 
reducing the need for planning a common approach. 
Secondly, the scope and timing of criminal investigations must be 
taken into consideration, as most national investigations in fact-rich cases 
operate in an on-going, ever-evolving and functioning criminal reality. 
Often, these investigations are, or become related to, crimes that are still 
being committed: such is arguably the case for organised crime, serious 
fraud, transnational human trafficking, and smuggling. By way of exam-
ple, an investigation might begin with an alleged tax fraud through coin-
operated gambling devices in bars. A wiretap could expose the fraud as a 
part of a money-laundering scheme of a local organised crime syndicate. 
                                                   
109 Draft Regulations, Book 3, Regulation 19, p. 869, see above note 2. 
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Organised crime investigations may start as a branch but evolve into a tree. 
In such cases, the suspected individuals are operating in functioning crim-
inal frameworks until their apprehension. Normally, such investigations 
are gradually built on the results of on-going surveillance. Defining the 
objectives and the intended direction of an investigation beforehand is 
arguably more difficult. 
Another relevant factor is the level of detail of the working norma-
tive framework, as procedural norms provide guidance and requirements 
for prosecutorial activities: every additional legal requirement and defini-
tion shapes the work of the prosecution. The Italian Code of Criminal 
Procedure sets out how evidence should be collected and used in great 
detail. Furthermore, the said provisions are constantly discussed and in-
terpreted by the Italian Court of Cassation, whose Criminal Section has 
issued 32,496 fully reasoned judgments in 2018,110 with only 8,535 with 
simplified reasons for the judgment, and an overall total of 57,177 judg-
ments.111 This wealth of jurisprudential interpretations arguably results in 
more detailed guidance for the prosecution. It has been said that there is 
an inherent uncertainty in international law, 112  which warrants better 
planning. 
Together with extensive legal interpretation, an Italian office of the 
prosecutor can count on the best practices developed over decades of in-
vestigative activities in the same territory, and sometimes regarding the 
same actors. For example, the Italian authorities have been investigating 
and prosecuting Sicilian mafia-type organisations at least since 1885, if 
not earlier.113 The need for planning ahead is arguably reduced if there are 
                                                   
110 Court of Cassation of Italy, La Cassazione Penale – Annuario Statistico 2018, 9 January 
2019, p. 12 (available on the Court of Cassation of Italy’s web site). 
111 Court of Cassation of Italy, Relazione sull’Amministrazione della Giustizia nell’Anno 2018, 
25 January 2019, p. 123 (available on the Court of Cassation of Italy’s web site). 
112 Jörg Kammerhofer, “Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of Its Problems”, in European Journal of International Law, 
2004, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 551. 
113 The prosecutions first emerged in the second half of 1800, with the ‘Stuppagghieri’ trial of 
1878 in Palermo. The more widely known ‘Fratellanza di Favara’ trials took place in Agri-
gento in 1885. The first official document that mentions the “mafia” as a criminal organi-
sation was a report authored by the Prefect of Palermo, a representative of the Ministry of 
the Interior, on the 25 April 1865, see John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: Storia della Mafia Sicili-
ana, Laterza, Rome, 2015. 
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established practices to follow, especially if the geographical, social, and 
political backgrounds do not vary much between cases. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the Italian Constitution applies the 
principle of mandatory prosecutions. Accordingly, there are no budgetary 
limits to criminal investigations. A prosecutor must be able to employ 
every tool provided by the law in order to fulfil his mandate to prosecute 
every reported crime. On the contrary, the ICC-OTP is constrained by its 
annually-adopted budget, and must necessarily plan its work more exten-
sively. 
16.3.4. Lessons to be Learned 
Different solutions cater to different needs. My view is that the reasons for 
the absence of investigation plans in Italy mitigate for their adoption in 
international jurisdictions and hybrid tribunals. The Italian authorities in 
charge of investigations are largely composed of individuals with uniform 
backgrounds and common cultural roots. Their work is perhaps more pre-
dictable than in a multicultural team working in a recently created juris-
diction, on cases that usually involve a new country to study and under-
stand. The offices of the Italian prosecutors operate without budget con-
straints, and do not ordinarily plan the costs of investigative activities. 
Investigations evolve according to the movements of a criminal reality 
which is still operational, and rely on a wealth of established practices, 
norms, and jurisprudence that provide detailed guidance. 
In my view, Italy would benefit from the adoption of investigation 
plans for fact-rich criminal cases, especially if mandated by a primary 
source of law and disciplined by nationwide regulations which would 
equally bind all relevant prosecution offices. However, the need to strate-
gically plan and manage investigations from the outset is arguably more 
urgent in jurisdictions bound by yearly budgets, composed by heterogene-
ous teams of individuals representing a rich variety of legal systems,114 
and which usually operate in unfamiliar settings. 
                                                   
114 As of July, 2017, the professional staff of the ICC represented 90 nationalities, see ICC 
Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Equitable Geographical Representa-
tion and Gender Balance in the Recruitment of Staff of the International Criminal Court, 
22 November 2017, ICC-ASP/16/35, p. 3 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f9b58/). 
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16.4. The Relevancy to Current International Criminal Law 
Discourse 
We often remember the “gift of hope to future generations”115 that the 
International Criminal Court represented in the words of former UN Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan. And we learned – more so during the last try-
ing years – that, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy concluded in 
his address at the end of the UN Diplomatic Conference in Rome: 
the project to institute an International Criminal Court is one 
of those that belong to the highest reaches of international 
political achievements. We can expect no indulgence if we 
fail in our endeavour.116 
Accordingly, every perceived failure and shortcoming of the ICC is 
met by varying degree of dismay. Our scrutiny, I argue, should be aimed 
towards finding out which aspects of the international criminal justice 
process can and need to be improved. Less energy should be dedicated to 
disillusionment and disappointment. 
The Quality Control Project reminds us of how the process is seg-
mented and subject to the same challenges affecting other jurisdictions, 
including Italy, in addition to a set of difficulties that are inherent to inter-
national criminal justice. There are a number of overarching issues that 
seem to affect the whole process, such as individual integrity, undue State 
encroachment, and appointments of and performance by high officials. 
Nevertheless, the existence of seemingly less tangible problems does not 
exempt us from addressing what should and could be fixed. 
This book focuses on challenges faced during criminal investiga-
tions, and on bottlenecks that they cause. This chapter concentrates on 
investigative strategy and management, paying special attention to the 
investigation plan, an instrument used by both national and international 
jurisdictions, for similar reasons. Criminal investigations led pursuant to a 
measure of advance planning, such as the model foreseen by the ICC-OTP 
Draft Regulations, lend themselves to systematic oversight. The results of 
                                                   
115 Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the Ceremony Held at 
Campidoglio Celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
18 July 1998 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8b0ab6/). 
116 Address of H.E. Mr. Lamberto Dini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy to the UN Diplo-
matic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 17 June 1998 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/680833/). 
16. Investigation Plans in the Draft Regulations of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor: 
An Italian Perspective 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 849 
questioning the implementation of a formulated plan are necessarily more 
precise than scrutiny of whether opportunity has been duly employed. In 
this regard, we can also draw from the Italian experience of not having a 
properly defined investigation plan. The needs of criminal investigations 
are currently been addressed with crime-specific guidelines, rather than 
strategic management of individual proceedings. Nevertheless, as one of 
the directives clearly states, any significant lack of compliance with the 
directive’s provisions must be reported to the competent police bureaus, 
presumably to ensure uniformity of approach. Similar to investigation 
plans, Italian directives, protocols, and circulars tend to promote oversight, 
and thus quality control. Yet, investigation plans are essential tools for the 
complex investigations of core international crimes, as the current ICC 
model, described in Chapter 15 above, shows. Notwithstanding the on-
going evolution of ICC-OTP practice, the Draft Regulations still have 
lessons to teach. The centrality of investigations plans, their early adop-
tion, and the high-level composition of the drafting team all suggest that 
we should make an even better use of such management and planning 
tools. 
I wish to conclude this chapter with an invitation, which in my view 
is inherent to the entire Quality Control Project. We should take notice of 
the overarching, less tangible issues, and think of solutions. But, in the 
meantime, we should roll up our figurative sleeves and work on the 
‘plumbing’117 of international criminal law. If better results – results of 
higher quality, in other words – are being demanded, then it is appropriate 
that the discourse turns to quality control mechanisms. 
                                                   
117 This expression draws from the eloquent closing speech by Gregory S. Gordon, on the 
occasion of the ‘Quality Control in Criminal Investigation’ conference in New Delhi. In his 
words, referencing Roger Clark, legal scholars can be divided in two categories: philoso-
phers and plumbers, with the latter being more dedicated to the underlying mechanisms of 
the law, see Gregory S. Gordon, “Synthesis of Conference Papers and Deliberations”, 
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17.Use of Investigation Plans 
in Indian Criminal Justice: 
The Crime of Human Trafficking 
Usha Tandon and Shreeyash Uday Lalit* 
 
17.1. Introduction 
The prosecutorial systems in India and international jurisdictions have a 
sea of difference on account of factors such as the judges, investigative 
agencies, nature and source of funding, subject matter of the substantive 
law, as well as the authorisation under which the prosecutorial system has 
power to conduct an investigation. These factors influence how the prose-
cutorial system will function and who will exercise the checks and bal-
ances. Notwithstanding the fact that the investigation by the International 
Criminal Court’s (‘ICC’) Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) is conducted 
only for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of 
aggression, there is much in common between the two jurisdictions as 
regards the need for investigation plans. The ICC-OTP conducts investi-
gations in fact-rich and complex crimes, necessitating a high degree of 
assessment, planning, co-operation, reporting and management. This is 
similar to the hurdles faced by the Indian investigative agencies in fact-
rich and complex cases such as human trafficking. 
It can hardly be contradicted that real-time case assessment, plan-
ning, reporting and management is rarely undertaken by the Indian inves-
tigating officers in investigations that are not fact-intensive. However, in 
so far as the crime of human trafficking is concerned, there has been a 
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growing need to use investigation plans on account of the complicated 
web of transactions, the co-ordination required between different branches 
of police in order to freeze the proceeds of crime, the sensitivity required 
in order to address and de-brief the victims of human trafficking, as well 
as a fast-paced response team that may be able to deal with the exigencies 
of an emergent situation. 
This chapter first offers some thoughts on the ICC-OTP (Section 
17.2.), before delving into Indian criminal justice in order to assess the 
difficulties faced by Indian investigative agencies (Section 17.3.). There-
after, we proceed to consider points of divergence between the Indian 
investigative system and the ICC-OTP investigations (Section 17.4.). Next, 
we discuss the provisions of Indian law dealing with the offence of human 
trafficking (Section 17.5.). The Chapter then undertakes an analysis of the 
checklists and soft-law compliance through which the Indian procedural 
law regulates an investigation (Section 17.6.). Lastly, it considers whether 
the Indian model is the most appropriate for our domestic jurisdiction and 
whether any suggestions could be taken from investigations conducted by 
the ICC-OTP (Section 17.7.). 
17.2. Draft Regulations of the ICC-OTP 
On 5 September 2013, the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecu-
tor (‘OTP Code’) adopted by the ICC-OTP entered into force,1 a little 
over a year after the commencement of the term of the second ICC Prose-
cutor, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda.2 Though the Code fills an important void in 
the regulation of OTP ethical conduct, its provenance and content mean 
that much depend on the manner in which it is applied in the future. Prior 
to the OTP Code’s entry into force in 2013, no document specifically reg-
ulated the conduct of members of the ICC-OTP in contrast with the judges 
and non-OTP counsel practicing before the Court.3 Some viewed this dif-
ference as unjustified and undesirable.4 The preparatory team of the ICC-
                                                   
1 International Criminal Court, Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, 2013 
(‘OTP Code’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3e11eb/). 
2 International Criminal Court, “Ms Fatou Bensouda” (available on its web site). 
3 International Criminal Court, Code of Professional Conduct for counsel, 2 December 2005 
(‘ICC Code’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f9ed33/); International Criminal Court, 
Code of Judicial Ethics, 9 March 2005 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/383f8f/). 
4 Arman Sarvarian, Professional Ethics at the International Bar, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013, p. 203. 
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OTP carefully prepared a draft Code of Conduct in 2003, in consultation 
with various experts, including from the International Association of 
Prosecutors and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, but the 
controversial first Prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo simply refused to 
accept such a Code, however well-drafted it was.5 This contrasted with 
other international criminal courts and tribunals. For example, the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) adopted ethical codes 
for members of the prosecution in the Tribunals’ early days,6 whereas a 
code applicable to all counsel appearing before the Special Court for Sier-
ra Leone (‘SCSL’) was adopted in 2005,7 and a code applicable to all 
counsel appearing before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’) was 
adopted in 2011.8 
The 2003 draft Code of Conduct was prepared through a broadly-
based expert-consultation process designed by the leader of the preparato-
ry team of the ICC-OTP. Among the outcomes of this work were the Draft 
Regulations of the OTP presented to the first Prosecutor in September 
2003, and then adopted in an abridged version ad interim. They are dis-
cussed in further detail by Antonio Angotti in Chapter 16 above. The 
Draft Regulations are significant. In particular, in Book 3: Operations 
Manual of the Draft Regulations, there is an extremely pertinent Part 2 
relating to the management of preliminary examinations, Article 53(1) 
evaluation, and the start of investigation. Regulation 6 provides for a ‘Pre-
                                                   
5 See Salim A. Nakhjavani, “The Origins and Development of the Code of Conduct”, in 
Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of Inter-
national Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 
951-1006 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). The preparatory team 
was led by Morten Bergsmo, co-editor of this volume. 
6 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Standards of Professional Con-
duct for Prosecution Counsel, 14 September 1999 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
nz7gv4/); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecutor’s Regulation No. 2, 14 
September 1999 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cf3184/). 
7 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel with the Right 
of Audience before the SCSL, 14 May 2005 (‘SCSL Code’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/a3420b/). 
8 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Be-
fore the Tribunal, 28 February 2011 (‘STL Code’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
240aa0/). 
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liminary Examination Report’ and a ‘Draft Investigation Plan’ to be pre-
pared by the OTP.9 
The Draft Investigation Plan as envisaged in Regulation 6 offers a 
significant check in terms of quality control in investigations, by provid-
ing for a plan or a roadmap to be used by investigators from the start of 
the investigation. This is an extremely useful construct in the Indian con-
text. Cases of mass riot, lynching, corruption, and rackets in trafficking 
                                                   
9 Regulation 6.5. provides that the OTP shall prepare a draft investigation plan along the 
following lines: 
(a) an assessment of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime with-
in the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed (article 53(1)(a) of 
the Statute); 
(b) the relevant background of the situation, placing the alleged offences in a broad-
er geographical, social and cultural context; 
(c) an explanation why the alleged offences warrant a full investigation against the 
backdrop of other alleged offences where such a step might not be recommenda-
ble; 
(d) an identification of the crime base incidents to be investigated and a description 
of likely suspects, together with the overall aim of the investigation; 
(e) a tentative indication of possible charges, modes of liability and potential de-
fences, if any, as provided for in article 31 of the Statute; 
(f) an explanation of the role and place of these likely suspects in the relevant chains 
of authority; 
(g) the whereabouts, if known, of the possible suspects and the likelihood to arrest 
them; 
(h) an assessment of the admissibility of a possible case under article 17 of the Stat-
ute; 
(i) a preliminary indication of resources, time and staff likely to be required to com-
plete the investigation; 
(j) a preliminary indication of the main categories of evidence and the amount of 
evidence that is likely to be required to prove the possible charges; 
(k) matters of State co-operation and security; 
(l) an explanation of how the investigation and prosecution of the alleged crimes or 
perpetrators is expected to fit in with the broader context of cases pursued by the 
Office; 
(m) potential dangers to the integrity of the investigation or the life or well-being of 
victims and witnesses that could arise once the victims are informed of the inten-
tion of the Chief Prosecutor to seek authorization, in accordance with rule 50(1) 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
(n) any other matter that may be of relevance for a decision to start an investigation 
in the light of the specific situation. 
For more information on the Draft Regulations, see Chapter 16 above and Carlos Vascon-
celos, “Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus 
Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: 
Volume 5, op. cit., pp. 861–62. 
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pose extremely onerous problems on account of the sheer volume of data 
that requires to be processed, the complexity of the case, and the time 
element that is lost in the whole process due to inefficiency – which leads 
to a reduced quality of criminal investigation on account of degraded wit-
ness testimony and insufficient evidential backing. 
As described by Markus Eikel in Chapter 15 above, the ICC-OTP 
has nevertheless developed a practice that draws on key elements of the 
Draft Regulations, including the use of investigation plans. Eikel clearly 
explains the complex normative environment in which the ICC-OTP un-
dertakes investigations holistically. Four key components of investigation 
plans used by international criminal tribunals may be identified as i) link 
to legal case-assessment, ii) planning, iii) reporting and iv) management.10 
At the outset, it would be pertinent to note that ICC investigations 
benefit from robust preliminary examination which assists the formulation 
of an investigation plan with greater depth of analysis. In contrast to the 
same, it would be relevant to visit the Indian criminal justice system to 
determine how the investigation proceeds, and assess how the investigato-
ry guidelines in India help elevate the standard of investigative quality in 
criminal prosecutions. 
17.3. An Overview of the Indian Criminal Justice System 
The Indian Criminal Justice system is largely premised on three statutes, 
the premise of which were largely enacted in the Victorian era. These 
statutes are the Indian Penal Code (1860), Indian Evidence Act (1872), 
and the Criminal Procedure Code (1973) (‘CrPC’). The CrPC contains the 
procedural law for the investigation, prosecution and trial of offences. 
17.3.1. Investigation v. Inquiry 
Under the Indian CrPC, investigation, defined under Section 2(h), “in-
cludes all the proceedings under this code for the collection of evidence 
                                                   
10 See Chapter 14 as well as various documents such as ICTY and United Nations Interre-
gional Crime and Justice Research Institute (‘UNICRI’), ICTY Manual on Developed 
Practices, UNICRI Publisher, Turin, 2009 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0cc55d/); 
ICTR, Prosecution of Sexual Violence: Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the 
Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, January 2014 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ea03f8/); ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 
23 April 2009 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). 
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conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a magistrate) 
who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf”.11 Thus, investigation 
under the CrPC has been defined in contradistinction to inquiry under 
Section 2(g) of the CrPC, where the latter amounts to a judicial proceed-
ing under Section 2(i) of the CrPC but the former does not. 
Inquiry under Section 2(g) of the CrPC is defined so as to mean 
every inquiry other than a trial conducted under the Code by a Magistrate 
or Court.12 The term inquiry has been used in a wider sense. It includes all 
such proceedings which do not require an adjudication upon a guilt or 
determination of an offence. It would also include proceedings which 
precede the stage of trial.13 
The meaning of the word ‘inquiry’ in the CrPC was interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in V.C. Shukla v. State Through C.B.I.14 The judgment 
sets out the history of the definitions in the successive Codes of Criminal 
Procedure since 1872 of the words ‘inquiry’ and ‘trial’. Thus, ‘inquiry’ is 
“a judicial act and not [akin] to the steps taken by the Police which are 
either investigation after the stage of Section 154 CrPC or termed as ‘Pre-
liminary Inquiry’”, which is “prior to the registration of the FIR, even 
though, no entry in the General Diary or the Station Diary or the Daily 
Diary has been made”.15 
17.3.2. Initiation of a Criminal Process 
In India, the criminal investigation process and prosecution can be initiat-
ed in several ways, which are elaborated as under: 
                                                   
11 India, High Court of Karnatakan, State of Mysore v. Laxmi Trading Co. and Others, Judg-
ment, 6 July 1962, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 269; Supreme Court of India, Union of India v. Prakash 
P. Hinduja and Another, Judgment, 7 July 2003, (2003) 6 SCC 195. 
12 India, High Court of Gujarat, Kanbi Bechar Lala and Others v. State and Another, Judg-
ment, 12 March 1962, 1963 LLR 57; India, High Court of Kerala, State of Kerala v. Ra-
manatha Iyer, Judgment, 26 February 1965, 1965 Ker LT 978; India, High Court of Patna, 
Tuneshwar Prasad Singh and Another v. State of Bihar, Judgment, 20 January 1978, 1978 
Cr LJ 1080. 
13 India, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Arun Debe v. State of M.P., Judgment, 18 August 
1990, 1991 Cr LJ 840. 
14 Supreme Court of India, V.C. Shukla v. State Through C.B.I., Judgment, 7 December 1979, 
AIR 1980 SC 962. 
15 Supreme Court of India, Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. and Others, Judgment, 12 
November 2013, 2014 Cr LJ 470: AIR 2014 SC 187: (2014) 2 SCC 1. 
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i) An informant can report the commission of a cognisable offence16 
to the police officer, or the police officer can himself take cogni-
sance of the commission of a cognisable offence having been com-
mitted in his presence. In such a situation, any police officer, even 
without the orders of a Magistrate, whether on the basis of a com-
plaint or report or knowledge of the commission of a cognisable of-
fence, can investigate the cognisable case under Section 156(1) of 
the CrPC. 
ii) If the complainant feels that a police officer has failed to investigate 
a cognisable offence, the complainant can approach the Magistrate 
with a criminal complaint under Section 190 of the CrPC, to take 
cognisance of such offence. Upon the filing of such complaint, the 
Magistrate can take cognisance of the case and either conduct the 
inquiry, or in the alternative, order the Police to register a First In-
formation Report (‘FIR’) and investigate the offence under Section 
156(3) of the CrPC. 
iii) In the case of a non-cognisable offence,17 the police is not bound to 
investigate, and the judicial process can be set in motion only by us-
ing the mechanism provided under Section 190 of the CrPC, by fil-
ing a criminal complaint before the competent court. 
Since we are considering only warrants cases in this chapter, the 
same are usually initiated only upon the filing of an FIR by an informant 
under Section 154 of the CrPC, or upon information received by the po-
lice station under Section 157(1) of the CrPC, in pursuance of which the 
police ought to investigate the cognisable offence as under Section 156(1) 
of the CrPC. If there is a failure to investigate the same, upon the presen-
tation of a complaint to the Magistrate under Section 190 of the CrPC, the 
Magistrate may either take cognisance and conduct an inquiry, or order 
                                                   
16 In the Indian Criminal Justice System, offences under the CrPC are classified as cognisable 
and non-cognisable. Generally, serious offences such as rape, murder, and so on are con-
sidered cognisable; whereas less serious offences such as nuisance, mischief, and so on are 
classified as non-cognisable offences. In cognisable offences, the police can arrest a person 
without warrant and may start investigation without the order from the court. 
17 In non-cognisable offences, the police cannot arrest a person without warrant and investi-
gation cannot be initiated without the order from the court. 
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the registration of a FIR under Section 156(3) of the CrPC and order the 
commencement of the investigation.18 
                                                   
18 The various stages involved in the process of investigation in the Indian criminal justice 
system are as follows: 
i) Stage of Evidence: Once a FIR has been registered by the police, the evidence is 
mainly divided into three parts: Recording of Statements under Section 161 of the 
CrPC; Collecting of Evidence in form of documents and others; Recording of con-
fessions or statements under Section 164 of the CrPC before the Magistrate. 
ii) Recording of 164 Statement: It is not compulsory for the Magistrate to record 
statement under Section 164 of the CrPC. However, in cases where the offence has 
been committed under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376(1), 376(2), 
376A, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376E, or 509 of IPC, the Magistrate has to record the 
statement of the victim of such offence. 
iii) Stage of Section 173 (Final Report): Once the three stages of evidence are com-
pleted, the police has to submit a final report to the magistrate empowered to take 
cognisance of such report which includes all the evidence collected by the Investi-
gating Agency and on which prosecution proposes to rely upon. When upon inves-
tigation, there is insufficient evidence to send the accused to the magistrate, the po-
lice authority must file a report under Section 169 of the CrPC and release the ac-
cused on furnishing a bond and to appear before the Magistrate empowered to take 
cognisance, if and when so required. Thus, the final report can only be of two 
kinds: Closure Report, or Charge Sheet or Final Report. 
iv) Commitment of the Case under Section 209: Once the Charge Sheet is filed by the 
investigation agency before the Magistrate, irrespective of whether it is sessions 
triable case or not, the Magistrate will take cognisance of the case under Section 
190(1)(b) of the CrPC and issue warrant under Section 204 of the CrPC to the ac-
cused to secure his presence before him, and further can direct the investigation 
agency to hand over the Charge Sheet to the accused under Section 207 of the 
CrPC. If the offences are sessions triable, then the Magistrate will commit the case 
and send all the papers and proceedings of the case to the District and Session 
court for the trial to begin. 
v) Opening of the case: The Prosecutor appointed will have to open the case by ex-
plaining to the Court about the charges slapped on the accused in the Charge Sheet. 
The provision of discharge of the accused is provided in Section 227 of the CrPC 
whereas framing of charges is provided in Section 228 of the CrPC. Before fram-
ing of charges, the accused may file an application before the court, and, if on pe-
rusing the record of the case along with the documents presented and hearing the 
prosecution and the accused, the Court finds that there is not sufficient cause to 
continue the proceedings, the Court shall discharge the accused under Section 227 
of the CrPC. In any event if the Court rejects the application filed under Section 
227 of the CrPC, it may proceed to frame charges under Section 228 of the CrPC. 
The Court at this stage can even add or delete any charge if the material available 
on record does not support the said charge. The Court shall read out the charges to 
the accused and ask if he agrees with the said charges and pleads guilty for the 
same. 
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17.3.3. Preliminary Enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code 
The courts have held in a line of cases that registration of FIR is compul-
sory on receipt of any information or complaint that discloses a cognisa-
ble offence under Section 154 of the CrPC and no preliminary enquiry is 
permissible therein. However, there are cases where such an offence is not 
prima facie made out and the police may need to carry out investigation in 
order to ascertain the correct position. 
In Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P.,19 the Supreme Court of In-
dia observed that although a preliminary enquiry may be conducted before 
registration of FIR, the purpose of the same shall be limited to determin-
ing if a cognisable offence is disclosed or not. Hence the scope of prelim-
inary enquiry, before the registration of FIR, is to ascertain whether the 
information received reveals commission of any cognisable offence, and 
does not extend to verification of the veracity of such information.20 Such 
verification is to be done only after the registration of FIR.21 
The Madras High Court similarly held in CHANGEIndia v. Com-
missioner of Police and Others22 – where the court was dealing with a 
petition filed under Section 482 of the CrPC to direct the Inspector of 
Police, Crime Branch, Crime Investigation Department, Anti Human Traf-
ficking Cell (Anti Vice Squad) – to register FIR on the complaint sent by 
the petitioner against owners or management of the unregistered, illegal 
Balagurukulam Orphanage for Children, and to conduct an effective in-
vestigation into the allegation of child trafficking. The court reiterated the 
ratio laid down in the Lalita Kumari judgment and ordered the respondent 
to comply with the same. 
Under Chapter XV of the CrPC, which covers the position before 
actual commencement in a court or before a Magistrate, and particularly 
under Sections 200 and 202 of the CrPC, the scope of preliminary enquiry 
in case of complaints to the Magistrate is very limited. Section 200 states, 
                                                                                                                        
See generally K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai, R.V. Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure, Eastern 
Book Company, Lucknow, 2017. 
19 See above note 15. 
20 Ibid. 
21 India, High Court of Karnataka, Mareppa v. The State of Karnataka and Others, Judgment, 
5 June 2017, (2017) 4 AIR Kant R 465. 
22 India, High Court of Judicature at Madras, CHANGEIndia v. Commissioner of Police and 
Others, 20 September 2017, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 26925. 
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“the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall exam-
ine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses, if any”. The mandate of 
Section 202 does not require the Magistrate to issue process in all situa-
tions. It empowers him to ascertain, either by himself or police officer or 
any other person, whether adequate grounds are present to proceed fur-
ther.23 The aim is to ascertain, from the perusal of complaint and state-
ments recorded, if there is prima facie evidence to support the allegations 
and proceed against the accused,24 who according to the complainant has 
committed an offence. Therefore, at this stage, the Magistrate is not re-
quired to meticulously appreciate the evidence as if he were the trial 
court.25 Under Section 203, the Magistrate can dismiss the complaint if 
there is insufficient ground to proceed based on the statement of the com-
plainant, the witnesses and the inquiry or investigation carried out under 
Section 202. However, Section 204 provides for issue of process subject 
to the satisfaction of the Magistrate that sufficient ground exists for doing 
so. The expression “sufficient ground” used in Sections 203 and 204 is 
only to indicate that prima facie case is made out against the accused and 
not that sufficient grounds exist to convict him.26 
17.4. Points of Divergence From ICC-OTP Investigation 
In moving forward, it would be pertinent to consider the points of differ-
ence or divergence in investigation conducted by the Indian investigative 
agencies from the investigation conducted by the ICC-OTP. Notwith-
standing the obvious issue that the OTP has to extensively rely upon third 
party sources at the preliminary examination stage, there are various other 
theoretical and statutory differences. 
17.4.1. Robust Preliminary Examination v. Mandatory Investigation 
The OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations reveals that “in ac-
cordance with the Rome Statute, the OTP is responsible for determining 
                                                   
23 Supreme Court of India, S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International 
Ltd. and Others, Judgment, 25 January 2008, (2008) 2 SCC 492. 
24 India, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Durga Prasad and Others v. State of U.P. 
and Another, Judgment, 6 December 2012, 2012 SCC OnLine All 4067. 
25 Supreme Court of India, Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan, Judgment, 1 August 1980, 1980 
Supp SCC 499. 
26 Supreme Court of India, Shivjee Singh v. Nagendra Tiwary and Others, Judgment, 6 July 
2010, AIR 2010 SC 2261. 
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whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into a 
situation pursuant to the criteria established by the Rome Statute, subject 
to judicial authorisation as appropriate”.27 This in effect entails an exami-
nation on three different counts: (i) jurisdiction (temporal, material, terri-
torial and personal); (ii) admissibility (complementarity and gravity); and 
(iii) interests of justice. 
The aforementioned three factors are visible through a reading of 
Article 53(1) and Article 15(3) of the ICC Statute, where the standard of 
proof has been set as a “reasonable basis to proceed”. Given the fact that 
the ICC jurisdiction is complementary to the domestic jurisdiction insofar 
as criminal offences are concerned, the standard of proof becomes higher 
than usual, since the OTP not only has to assess complementarity through 
an examination of the existence of relevant national proceedings in rela-
tion to potential cases being considered for investigation, but it also has to 
assess the scale, nature and manner of commission of the crimes, and their 
impact, bearing in mind the potential cases that would be likely to arise 
from an investigation of the situation.28 
As a result, the ICC-OTP prefers to consider as much additional in-
formation as possible under Article 15(2), from other sources such as 
States, organs of the United Nations (‘UN’), inter-governmental or non-
governmental organisations, or other reliable sources that the OTP deems 
appropriate, and may also consider and receive written or oral testimony 
at the seat of the Court.29 This, in effect, necessitates a highly reliable and 
expansive preliminary examination in order to assess the aforesaid factors. 
In light of the Indian regime, the same can be easily contrasted, on 
account of the mandatory investigations that need to be conducted by the 
police upon the commission of cognisable offences. As stated above, the 
Supreme Court of India in Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P.30 has held 
that if the information discloses the commission of a cognisable offence, 
then no preliminary inquiry is permissible and the registration of a FIR 
under Section 154 of the CrPC is mandatory. However, “if the information 
                                                   
27 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Hanna Kuczyńska, The Accusation Model Before the International Criminal Court: Study 
of Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems, Springer, 2015. 
30 See above note 15. 
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received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity 
for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain 
whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not”.31 Furthermore, upon such 
preliminary inquiry, if it is clear that the case discloses the commission of 
a cognisable offence, the FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC must be reg-
istered. “In cases where preliminary inquiry ends up in closing the com-
plaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first 
informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons 
in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.”32 
Thus, the Supreme Court of India held that “the scope of prelimi-
nary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information 
received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cog-
nizable offence”.33 It gave examples of cases in which preliminary inquiry 
may be made, such as matrimonial disputes, family disputes, commercial 
offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases, “cases where there 
is abnormal delay or laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, 
over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explain-
ing the reasons for delay”.34 
Furthermore, the requirement of a preliminary inquiry, especially in 
cases of cognisable offences, has been made time bound wherein the pre-
liminary inquiry is required to be completed within seven days. The fact 
of such delay and the cause of it also has to be reflected in the General 
Diary entry. 
17.4.2. Admissibility of Statements Before Investigative Agency 
Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, the procedure 
with regards to the collection of evidence during investigation has been 
delineated in Section III of Chapter V. Rule 111 allows a record of ques-
tioning to be taken, wherein the formal statements made by any person 
who is questioned in connection with an investigation or proceedings, 
shall be recorded and signed by the interviewee or his or her counsel. The 
record would also note the time, date and place of and all persons present 
during the questioning. It is important to note that when someone does not 
                                                   
31 Ibid., para. 111(ii). 
32 Ibid., para. 111(iii). 
33 Ibid., para. 111(v). 
34 Ibid., para. 111(vi)(e). 
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sign the record, then the reasons for the same also have to be noted in 
accordance with Rule 111. 
This is in complete opposition to the requirement under the Indian 
CrPC wherein statements made before the police are inadmissible as evi-
dence, let alone recorded. Under Section 161(1) of the CrPC, a police 
officer making an investigation can orally examine any person acquainted 
with the facts and circumstances of the case, including the accused him-
self. Under Section 161(2) of the CrPC, the person being examined would 
be bound to answer the questions, other than those which would expose 
him to criminal liability. Moreover, the statement would be reduced into 
writing by the police under Section 161(3) of the CrPC. 
It is important to note the bar imposed on Section 161 by Section 
162 of the CrPC, wherein the latter mandates that no statement made by 
any person to a police officer in the course of investigation shall be signed 
by the said person (if it is reduced into writing). The only purpose of 
statements under Section 161 of the CrPC is to seek contradiction when 
these statements are compared to the admissible statements. Thus, under 
the Indian Evidence Act, former statements made by a witness can be 
used to contradict him,35 to impeach his credit,36 to corroborate him,37 or 
to refresh his memory.38 But “Section 162 CrPC imposes an absolute bar 
to the use of statements covered by it for any purpose save for the purpos-
es provided, however garbed the use may be”.39 
17.4.3. Separation of Investigation from Prosecution 
Though the Prosecutors in India are considered as an important part in the 
state machinery and are charged with a statutory duty to be fair and im-
                                                   
35 Indian Evidence Act, 15 March 1872, Section 145 (‘Indian Evidence Act’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/675509/). See Supreme Court of India, Hazari Lal v. Delhi Administra-
tion, Judgment, 15 February 1980, AIR 1980 SC 873: (1980) 2 SCC 390. 
36 Indian Evidence Act, Section 155, see above note 35. 
37 Ibid., Section 157. See India, High Court of Kerala, Peethambaran Prasad v. State of 
Kerala, Judgment, 27 February 1998, 1998 Cr LJ 2122. 
38 Indian Evidence Act, Section 159, see above note 35. 
39 India, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Munshi v. State, Judgment, 11 October 1966, 
1967 All LJ 695. 
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partial, they are not part of the investigating agency or the forwarding 
agency.40 
The issue was studied by the Law Commission of India as early as 
in 1958.41 It was of the considered view that looking to the nature of du-
ties that police forces “have to discharge in bringing a case in court, it is 
not possible for them to exhibit that degree of detachment which is neces-
sary in a prosecutor”.42 Therefore the Law Commission suggested that 
public prosecutors should be completely separated from the Police De-
partment. It recommended the following: 
In every district a separate Prosecution Department may be 
constituted and placed in charge of an official who may be 
called a “Director of Public Prosecutions”. The entire prose-
cution machinery in the District should be under his control. 
The departments of the machinery of criminal justice, name-
ly, the Investigation Department and the Prosecuting De-
partment should thus be completely separated from each oth-
er.43 
In 1995, in S.B. Shahane v. State of Maharashtra44 the Supreme 
Court of India held: 
When Assistant Public Prosecutors are appointed under […] 
the Code for conducting prosecutions in courts of Magis-
trates in a district fairly and impartially, separating them 
from the police officers of the Police Department and freeing 
them from the administrative or disciplinary control of offic-
ers of the Police Department, are the inevitable consequen-
tial actions required to be taken by the State Government 
which appoints such Public Prosecutors, inasmuch as, taking 
of such actions are statutory obligations impliedly imposed 
upon it under sub-section (3) of section 25 CrPC. 
                                                   
40 India, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Jai Pal Singh Naresh and Others v. State of 
U.P. and Others, Judgment, 6 August 1975, 1976 Cri LJ 32 (All); Supreme Court of India, 
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, Judgment, 12 July 1994, (1994) 4 SCC 
602. 
41 Law Commission of India, “Prosecuting Agency – Director of Public Prosecutions”, in 
14th Report: Reform on Judicial Administration: Vol. II, 1958, p. 770. 
42 Ibid., para. 12. 
43 Ibid., para. 15. 
44 Supreme Court of India, S.B. Shahane and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another, 
Judgment, 21 April 1995, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 37. 
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Thus, there is a clear and perceptible difference in the functioning 
of prosecutors under the Indian CrPC and at the ICC-OTP: the latter func-
tionaries routinely conduct investigations and also prosecute the accused 
persons concerned. Even if there is a separation brought about in the OTP 
by ensuring that the persons investigating are not the same who are prose-
cuting, yet the very fact that the officers performing the two functions are 
working under the aegis of the OTP is enough to demonstrate a clearly 
distinct way of functioning vis-à-vis prosecutors under the Indian CrPC. 
17.4.4. Collection of Evidence at the Request of the Defence 
Under the Indian CrPC, investigation extends until the stage of charge – 
that is, until formal charges are framed in the case. As we have noted pre-
viously, the accused, at any time before framing of charges against him, 
can file an application under Section 227 of the CrPC to discharge him 
from the charges in the charge sheet. 
However, the material that is supplied to the Court at the stage of 
framing of charges is only the prosecution material.45 Therefore, at the 
stage of framing of charges, the only material that is available to the Court 
is the Final Police Report under Section 173 of the CrPC which contains 
all documents and witness statements which the Prosecution proposes to 
rely upon and examine. There is no requirement on the part of Investigat-
ing Officer to submit the material favourable to defence as part of the 
Final Report. For that purpose, the accused can, at any stage, request 
summons for production of all documents under Section 91 of the CrPC, 
which the police is believed to be in possession or power of, requiring 
them to “attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stat-
ed in the summons or order”. When interpreted harmoniously with the 
provisions relevant to framing of charges, it becomes clear that: 
while ordinarily the Court has to proceed on the basis of ma-
terial produced with the charge-sheet for dealing with the is-
                                                   
45 Please see CrPC, Section 173: 
(5) When such report is in respect of a case to which section 170 applies, the police 
officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report – 
(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution pro-
poses to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investi-
gation; 
(b) the statements-recorded under section 161 of all the persons whom the 
prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. 
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sue of charge but if the court is satisfied that there is material 
of sterling quality which has been withheld by the investiga-
tor/prosecutor, the court is not debarred from summoning or 
relying upon the same even if such document is not a part of 
the charge-sheet.46 
This position of the Indian CrPC is in contradistinction to the posi-
tion in the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence which permits the Pre-
Trial Chamber, under Rule 116, Section III, Chapter V to issue an order or 
seek co-operation under Article 57(3)(b) of the ICC Statute for collection 
of evidence at the request of the defence, if “such order would facilitate 
the collection of evidence that may be material to the proper determina-
tion of the issues being adjudicated, or to the proper preparation of the 
person’s defence”. 
17.5. Human Trafficking in India: A Fact-Rich Crime 
Trafficking of persons is a complex crime with incalculable elements. The 
multi-dimensional nature of the problem, involvement of international 
organised mafia, deficient legislation, laxity in law enforcement, official 
complicity and the trauma of the victims make it a challenging crime for 
investigation and prosecution. Millions of women and girls are victims of 
sex trafficking in India, trapped in false promises of employment or sham 
marriages. Many trafficked persons are subjected to forced labour. 
In January 2019, the UN’s fourth Global Report on Trafficking in 
Persons (2018) released by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(‘UNODC’) again recorded high numbers of cases of human trafficking, 
mainly targeting women and girls.47 Though Article 23(1) of the Constitu-
tion of India prohibits trafficking in human beings and forced labour, un-
fortunately, India is a source, transit and destination country for human 
trafficking. While noting that “[t]rafficking in women and children is the 
gravest form of abuse and exploitation of human beings”, the High Court 
of Delhi in Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India observed: 
Thousands of Indians are trafficked every day to some desti-
nation or the other and are forced to lead lives of slavery. 
                                                   
46 Supreme Court of India, Nitya Dharmananda v. Gopal Sheelum Reddy, Judgment, 7 De-
cember 2017, (2018) 2 SCC 93. 
47 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, p. 10. This report is based on 
information collected from 142 countries, encompassing more than 94 per cent of the 
world’s population. 
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They are forced to survive in brothels, factories, guesthouses, 
dance bars, farms and even in the homes of well-off Indians, 
with no control over their bodies and lives.48 
“Trafficking in women and children has become an increasingly lu-
crative business especially since the risk of being prosecuted is very 
low”.49 As noted by the Supreme Court of India in one of the cases:50 
It is highly deplorable and heart-rending to note that many 
poverty-stricken children and girls in the prime of youth are 
taken to ‘flesh market’ and forcibly pushed into the ‘flesh 
trade’ which is being carried on in utter violation of all can-
nons of morality, decency and dignity of humankind. There 
cannot be two opinions – indeed there is none – that this ob-
noxious and abominable crime committed with all kinds of 
unthinkable vulgarity should be eradicated at all levels by 
drastic steps. 
Since 2011, the US State Department, in its annual report on traf-
ficking in persons, has been placing India in ‘Tier Two’, as “the Govern-
ment of India does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimina-
tion of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so”.51 
The crime of human trafficking involves, inter alia, the issues of prosecu-
tion of traffickers and rehabilitation of rescued victims. 
This chapter is mainly concerned with the investigation of the crime 
of human trafficking in India, so the discussion that follows focuses on 
the provisions of law involving prosecution. 
17.5.1. Indian Penal Code (1860) 
Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code provides for the definition as well as 
the punishment for the offence of trafficking. Following the recommenda-
                                                   
48 India, High Court of Delhi, Bachpan Bachao Andolan and Others v. Union of India and 
Others, Judgment, December 24 2010, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 82/2009. 
49 Supreme Court of India, Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, Judgment, 18 April 
2011, (2011) 5 SCC 1. 
50 Supreme Court of India, Vishal Jeet v. Union of India, Judgment, 2 May 1990, (1990) 3 
SCC 318. 
51 US Department of State, “India”, in Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2018 (available on 
its web site). 
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tions of Justice J.S. Verma Committee Report, 52  the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act (2013) has amended the entire section “so as to enlarge 
the scope of the offence,53 and include within its purview not just slavery, 
but trafficking in general – of minors as well as adults, and also forced or 
bonded labour, prostitution, organ transplantation etc”. 54  While sub-
section (1)55 of Section 370 provides for the ingredients of the offence, 
sub-section (2) to (7)56 provide for the punishment in varying situations. 
                                                   
52 J.S. Verma, Leila Seth and Gopal Subramaniam, Report of the Committee on Amendments 
to Criminal Law, 23 January 2013 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8712ed/, for the 2013 
Act, see https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8f62ce/). 
53 Ibid. Chapter 6 of Justice J.S. Verma Committee’s Report is on Trafficking of Woman and 
Children, wherein the entire issue of trafficking has been discussed at length. 
54 India, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, Vinod v. State of Gujarat and Another, Judg-
ment, 5 May 2017, (2017) 4 GLR 2804. 
55 Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 370(1): 
Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation, (a) recruits, (b) transports, (c) harbours, (d) 
transfers, or (e) receives, a person or persons, by – 
First. – using threats, or 
Secondly. – using force, or any other form of coercion, or 
Thirdly. – by abduction, or 
Fourthly. – by practising fraud, or deception, or 
Fifthly. – by abuse of power, or 
Sixthly. – by inducement, including the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits, in order to achieve the consent of any person having control over the 
person recruited, transported, harboured, transferred or received, commits the 
offence of trafficking. 
Explanation 1. – The expression “exploitation” shall include any act of physi-
cal exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of organs. 
Explanation 2. – The consent of the victim is immaterial in determination of 
the offence of trafficking. 
56 Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 370: 
(2) Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with rigorous im-
prisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may 
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
(3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one person, it shall be 
punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 
ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable 
to fine. 
(4) Where the offence involves the trafficking of a minor, it shall be punishable with 
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but 
which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
(5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one minor, it shall be 
punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 
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The penalty under normal circumstance of trafficking range from seven 
years to ten years rigorous imprisonment and fine. 
The consent of the victim is immaterial in determining the offence 
of human trafficking. Trafficking of a minor attracts the rigorous impris-
onment from ten years to life imprisonment and fine. If more than one 
child is trafficked, then the offender gets more stringent punishment that 
may not be less than 14 years, but may extend to life imprisonment and 
fine. Repeat offenders are awarded imprisonment for life (which means 
imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life), as well as 
fine. Another important provision relates to the complicit official who gets 
the same punishment as prescribed for repeat offenders. 
17.5.2. Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (1956) 
Enacted in pursuance to the 1949 UN International Convention for the 
Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of Prostitution 
of Others, the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (1956) (‘ITPA’)57 is pro-
jected as the main legislative tool for preventing and combating traffick-
ing in human beings in India.58 The ITPA provides for the offence of traf-
ficking where commercial sexual exploitation is being undertaken. Traf-
ficking and prostitution are not synonymous under the ITPA. However, if 
the displacement of a person has been undertaken with a view to under-
take commercial sexual exploitation and commodification of the said per-
son through prostitution, then, the same can be punishable under the ITPA. 
                                                                                                                        
fourteen years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be 
liable to fine. 
(6) If a person is convicted of the offence of trafficking of minor on more than one 
occasion, then such person shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which 
shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall 
also be liable to fine. 
(7) When a public servant or a police officer is involved in the trafficking of any 
person then, such public servant or police officer shall be punished with impris-
onment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that per-
son’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
57 Initially known as the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (1956) 
(SITA). 
58 National Human Rights Commission (‘NHRC’), Integrated Plan of Action to Prevent and 
Combat Human Trafficking with Special Focus on Children and Women; Sankar Sen and 
P.M. Nair, A Report on Trafficking of Women and Children in India 2002-2003 (available 
on NHRC’s web site). 
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The biggest criticism of ITPA is that it failed to define ‘trafficking’ and as 
a matter of fact deals mainly with prostitution.59 
ITPA criminalises keeping a brothel, 60  living on the earnings of 
prostitution,61 inducing a person for the sake of prostitution,62 detaining a 
person for prostitution.63 Complicit officials are dealt with stringent pun-
ishment for seven years to life imprisonment and fine, in cases involving 
seduction for prostitution of a person in custody.64 Punishment in ITPA 
ranges from one year to life imprisonment depending on the severity of 
offence. 
17.5.2.1. Procedural Law under ITPA 
Any offence punishable under ITPA is a cognisable offence under Section 
14, in which the police can arrest the alleged accused without warrant. 
There are, however, several procedural compliances required under the 
ITPA. The investigating agency has to appoint a Special Police Officer 
under Section 13 who is obligated to conduct a raid or search. He is also 
required to conduct a search only in the presence of two or more respecta-
ble inhabitants of the area. Thus, an ITPA prosecution would necessarily 
run afoul of due procedure if these mandatory compliances are not met. A 
checklist would then become necessary in order to ensure compliance. 
Some of the procedural requirements provided in the ITPA have 
been dealt with by the Madras High Court. Section 15 ITPA provides for 
search without warrant, however the same is subject to certain caveats as 
given in sub-section (1). Whether the non-compliance with the same 
would render the search void was considered by the Madras High Court in 
the case of Masti Health and Beauty Private Limited v. Commissioner of 
Police,65 wherein it held the following: 
28. A careful look at the provisions of Section 15 would 
show that a Special Police Officer or a Trafficking Police Of-
                                                   
59 Verma, Seth and Subramaniam, 2013, see above note 52. 
60 India, Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 30 December 1956, Section 3. 
61 Ibid., Section 4. 
62 Ibid., Section 5. 
63 Ibid., Section 6. 
64 Ibid., Section 9. 
65 India, High Court of Judicature at Madras, Masti Health and Beauty Private Limited v. 
Commissioner of Police, Judgment, 9 December 2014, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 11927 
(‘Masti Health Case’). 
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ficer can enter upon any premises and cause a search without 
warrant, only after satisfying the following: 
(i) he should have reasonable grounds for believing that 
an offence punishable under this Act has been or is 
being committed; 
(ii) he must believe that such an offence is committed in 
respect of a person living in the premises; 
(iii) he should believe that the search of the premises with 
warrant cannot be made without undue delay; and 
(iv) he must record the grounds of his belief before enter-
ing the premises. 
Thus, the Madras High Court in Masti Health observed that the 
Special Police Officer must record the grounds of his belief before search-
ing without warrant, wherein such belief must record that an offence was 
committed under ITPA for a person living in the premises where the 
search is conducted, and that the search cannot be delayed until such war-
rant is procured. These steps have to be scrupulously followed, as ob-
served by the Madras High Court in paragraph 67 of Masti Health, failing 
which the search without warrant would be vitiated. 
Another judgment on the procedural law to be complied with under 
ITPA was given by the Delhi High Court in Kumari Sangeeta v. State.66 It 
made an observation with regards to the statutory requirement of conduct-
ing a search without warrant under Section 15(6A) only in the presence of 
two women police officers. It stated that the requirement under Section 
15(6A), although worded as “shall” has to be read in conjunction with 
Section 13(3) ITPA, which provides that the presence of two women po-
lice officers shall be mandatory only when such officers are available. If 
they are not available, then it has to be left to the discretion of the Special 
Police Officer conducting the search without warrant, and the same can-
not be a ground to vitiate the search in toto. Paragraph 35 of the Kumari 
Sangeeta throws light on that aspect: 
35. A careful perusal of Sub-section (6A) of Section 15 of 
the Act reveals that the Special Police Officer would be ac-
companied by at least two women Police Officers. However, 
again it has been left to the discretion of the Special Police 
                                                   
66 India, High Court of Delhi, Kumari Sangeeta and Another v. State and Others, Judgment, 1 
May 1995, 1995 SCC OnLine Del 337. 
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Officer to include two [women] Police Officers at the time of 
the search and at the time of the interrogation. This intention 
of the legislature is crystal from the subsequent last lines of 
Sub-section (6A) inasmuch as it provides that if no woman 
Police Officer is available in that eventuality interrogation 
shall be done only in the presence of a lady member of a 
recognised welfare institution or organisation. 
With regards to the “shall” requirement under Section 15(2) ITPA, 
the Karnataka High Court has given a resounding judgment in Shivaraj v. 
State of Karnataka.67 Section 15(2) ITPA provides that in a search without 
warrant under ITPA, the Special Police Officer shall call upon two re-
spectable inhabitants of the place, one of whom shall be a woman. How-
ever, in a situation where the Special Police Officer was only able to call 
upon only two male inhabitants (none of them were women), the Karna-
taka High Court was called in to opine on the validity of such a search. 
The High Court held the following in paragraph 8 of Shivaraj: 
8. From a plain reading of sub-section 2 of the above Section 
15 it is evident that the raid could be conducted only in the 
presence of two or more witnesses of the locality. The inter-
pretation by the learned Government Pleader that the proviso 
does not require a woman to be present at the raid as a wit-
ness is incorrect. It is mandatory. What the proviso indicates 
is that two persons who should be present to witness the raid 
should be respectable people from the locality, and one 
should be a woman, and if no woman could be found in the 
locality, a woman could be brought from some other locality 
to witness the raid. Therefore, in the present case on hand 
there is no dispute that the witnesses who accompanied the 
police at the raid were two men and there was no woman 
present. In which event, the search would be illegal and can-
not be cited in support of the prosecution case. Therefore, the 
entire exercise of a trial and further prosecution is futile. The 
petition is therefore allowed. The proceedings before the 
court below are quashed. 
As can be seen from the aforementioned judgments, the procedural 
requirements shift as depending upon the interpretation of the High 
Courts in different cases. A certain provision which reads as ‘may’ can be 
                                                   
67 India, High Court of Karnataka, Shivaraj v. State of Karnataka, Judgment, 12 July 2016, 
2016 SCC OnLine Kar 5077. 
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read as ‘shall’, thereby making it mandatory. For example, the Supreme 
Court in Shri A.C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Mst. 
Ram Kali, etc.68 observed that although Section 190(1)(b) of the CrPC 
states that the Magistrate “may take cognizance”, however the Magistrate 
is bound to take cognisance of any cognisable offence brought to his no-
tice and he has no discretion in the matter.69 On the other hand, there are 
also judgments given by several high courts where ‘shall’ has been read as 
‘may’, that is, a provision has been read to be discretionary although a 
literal interpretation of the same would suggest that it is mandatory, viz. 
Kumari Sangeeta as pronounced by the Delhi High Court. Each provision 
is thus subject to judicial rules of statutory interpretation, which may not 
necessarily be comprehensible to a police officer lacking formal legal 
education. This necessitates the need for an investigation plan that is up-
dated with new pronouncement of judgments that have interpreted a pro-
vision differently as compared to its literal interpretation. 
17.5.3. The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and 
Rehabilitation) Bill (2018) 
The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) 
Bill (2018) introduced in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in December 
2018, seeks to create a law for investigation of all types of trafficking of 
persons, and protection and rehabilitation of rescued victims. The Bill 
categorises and criminalises 11 purposes of trafficking as aggravated 
forms of trafficking, such as forced labour, begging, administering narcot-
ic drugs, pretext of marriage, bearing children, and inducing early sexual 
maturity by administering chemical substances or hormones.70 The pun-
ishment for aggravated trafficking is higher than for simple trafficking 
ranging from ten years to life imprisonment and fine.71 The intent behind 
the Bill is to set up various authorities at the district, state and national 
levels for rescue of trafficked persons and investigation of offences, such 
                                                   
68 Supreme Court of India, Shri A.C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Delhi and Anoth-
er v. Mst. Ram Kali, etc., Judgment, 16 August 1967, AIR 1968 SC 1. 
69 India, High Court of Delhi, Nagarwala v. State, Judgment, 24 November 1971, 1972 RLR 
73. 
70 India, The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill (2018), 
26 July 2018, Section 31 (‘The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabil-
itation) Bill’). 
71 Ibid., Section 32 
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as anti-trafficking police officers, Anti Trafficking Units and National 
Anti-Trafficking Bureau.72 It provides for Special Public Prosecutors and 
the setting up of designated courts in each district, to complete trials of 
trafficking cases within a year.73 All offences under the Bill are cognisable 
and non-bailable.74 The Bill provides for the attachment of property used 
for the apprehension of commission of trafficking.75 And in case of con-
viction, such properties shall be forfeited to the government, which may 
sell the properties and remit the sale proceeds to the Rehabilitation 
Fund.76 
17.5.4. Other Laws 
Indian law criminalises trafficking for the purpose of sex, various forms 
of forced labour, and begging under various legislations. For instance, 
trafficking of children for sexual purposes is liable to punishment under 
the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (2012) providing 
stringent punishment up to life imprisonment. Whereas, the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989) pun-
ishes the accused of bonded labour up to five years imprisonment, the 
Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act (1976) punishes him up to three 
years imprisonment. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Chil-
dren) Act (2015) criminalises employment of children for begging,77 sale 
                                                   
72 Ibid., Sections 15–19. Ministry of Home Affairs of India has sanctioned a Comprehensive 
Scheme “Strengthening law enforcement response in India against Trafficking in Persons 
through Training and Capacity Building”, wherein it is proposed to establish 330 Anti 
Human Trafficking Units (AHTUs) throughout the country and impart training to 10,000 
police officers through Training of Trainers. Ministry of Home Affairs of India, “Anti Traf-
ficking Cell” (available on its web site). AHTUs continued to serve as the primary investi-
gative force for human trafficking crimes. US Department of State, 2018, see above note 
51. 
73 The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill, Sections 46–
48, see above note 70. 
74 Ibid., Section 52. 
75 Ibid., Section 29. 
76 Ibid., Section 30. 
77 India, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act (2015), 31 December 2015, 
Section 76 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d2f03/). 
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and procurement of children for any purpose,78 and use of children by 
militant groups.79 
17.6. Locating Investigation Plans to Combat Human Trafficking 
Having perused the Indian procedural law, substantive law and the points 
of divergence of the Indian criminal investigation from that of the ICC-
OTP, let us consider the investigation plans, or lack thereof, employed by 
the Indian criminal justice agencies. It would not be wrong to suggest that 
the ICC-OTP investigation plans embark upon a significantly robust anal-
ysis, having secured material through preceding preliminary examination 
which may serve as an edifice. 
Over the past few years, the Indian Government has realised the 
need for a checklist that guides investigators in understanding whether the 
prosecution is covering all bases or not. This checklist works in the form 
of an investigation plan, as it helps the investigator navigate the difficult 
terrain of case assessment, planning and management. These checklists 
are referred to as Standard Operating Procedures (‘SOP’) that encapsulate 
mandatory and discretionary requirements with which investigators need 
to comply. 
17.6.1. Standard Operating Procedure of UNODC and the 
Government of India 
The SOP prepared by the UNODC in conjunction with the Government of 
India80 offers a detailed breakdown of these compliances. It lists the dif-
ferent kinds of material objects that can be collected, and who and where 
to collect them. Material objects include the following: 
• Diaries, notebooks, account books, registers, and so on in the 
brothel: 
The purpose of this is to prove the existence of brothel, name of 
victims (already trafficked, likely to be trafficked), number of vic-
tims, details of payments, earnings, names of ‘customers’, accom-
plices, conspirators, abettors, traffickers and others. 
                                                   
78 Ibid., Section 81. 
79 Ibid., Section 83. 
80 UNODC and the Government of India, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on Investi-
gating Crimes of Trafficking for Commercial Sexual Exploitation, New Delhi, 2007 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/376b95/). 
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• Travel documents like bus or train tickets of the accused persons: 
This can be used to prove the movement of persons during traffick-
ing to link source-transit-destination areas and to link the offenders 
in the process of the crime. 
• Rent agreements, rent receipts, house tax receipts: 
Ownership or lease or rent agreements can help pin the location of 
the accused persons. This helps prove the existence and address of 
the brothel, the people who are managing it and their income and 
their earnings. 
• Receipts and registers reflecting expenditure on medicines, contra-
ceptives, and so on: 
Medical history can help prove the sexual exploitation of the vic-
tims. 
• Photographs, albums, video cassettes, DVDs: 
This can prove the sexual exploitation of victims and the existence 
of an organised network of criminals. 
• Vehicles used for transporting victims: 
The transportation of victims from one place to another, linking up 
places of exploitation and thereby the exploiter’s networks, is cru-
cial for these investigations. 
• Documents, including personal belongings, relating to the income, 
expenditures or assets of inmates of the place: 
To establish aspects of illegal detention, level of exploitation of the 
victims, the debt bondage of the victims and also to assess the ille-
gal assets acquired by the exploiters. 
After the collection of material objects, the SOP then lists the step-
wise compliance required of the investigator, including the following: 
a. Interrogation of the suspects or accused: 
This includes uncovering the entire organised network of human 
trafficking, including the source, transit and destination of the vic-
tims; the demand and supply patterns; the push and pull factors. In-
terrogation ought to also help the investigator in unearthing the con-
tacts, sources and witnesses in this source-transit-destination co-
nundrum. 
b. Interrogation strategies for the suspects or accused: 
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This includes associating other agencies for investigation, including 
the income tax department, financial institutions where huge assets 
may likely get disclosed, immigration department if the accused 
persons are foreigners, different police agencies if the crimes are 
committed over different jurisdictions. 
c. Arrest of accused persons: 
If the brothel is run by a woman, the investigator has to bear in 
mind that the compliance with Section 46(4) CrPC is a must, 
providing that no woman can be arrested after sunset and before 
sunrise, except in exceptional circumstances with prior permission 
from a Magistrate. 
d. Eviction of offenders and closure of brothels: 
Under Section 18(1) ITPA, the Magistrate has the power to order 
eviction from places of commercial sexual exploitation. On receipt 
of information from the police, the process can be initiated by the 
Magistrate. The most crucial aspect is that eviction can be ordered 
under ITPA even before conviction and even without a FIR. 
e. Organised crime approach: 
Since human trafficking is a ‘basket of crimes’,81 the investigator 
has to take care to note the linkage of source-transit-destination dur-
ing investigation, to explore the angle of conspiracy since there are 
always multiple offenders involved in human trafficking, to share 
criminal intelligence with police agencies, to confiscate assets under 
Section 105A CrPC, to collect intelligence on income, expenditure 
and assets and link those assets with proceeds of crime so that the 
same may be frozen through action initiated under the Prevention of 
Money Laundering Act (2002) through a Provisional Attachment 
Order. 
f. Recording of statements under Section 161 CrPC: 
When a rescued girl or woman is to be interviewed, the same is “to 
be done only by a woman police official. If the woman police offi-
cial is not available, then the same is to be done only in the presence 
                                                   
81 P.M. Nair, Trafficking Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation: Handbook for Law 
Enforcement Agencies in India: Revised Edition 2007, United Nations Development Fund 
for Women (UNIFEM) and UNODC, New Delhi, 2007 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
de8afd/). 
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of a female member of an NGO. This is a mandatory compliance 
required under Section 15(6A) ITPA”. Furthermore, a statement can 
only be taken in a place where the girl or woman is comfortable, as 
required under Section 160 CrPC. 
g. Recording of statements under Section 164 CrPC: 
This is usually a preferred option undertaken by investigators. The 
reason for the same is that victims are likely to be repatriated or sent 
back to their place of residence, which would make them unavaila-
ble for questioning. Another reason is that they may be reluctant to 
record evidence in order not to relive the trauma of the offence, or 
that they may be suffering from some medical ailment, on account 
of which travelling to meet the investigator may be unfeasible. 
h. Production of rescued person before the Magistrate or Child Wel-
fare Committee: 
An adult person rescued under Section 15 or 16 ITPA has to be pro-
duced before a Magistrate as required under Section 15(5) or Sec-
tion 16(2) ITPA respectively. A child on the other hand has to be 
produced before the Child Welfare Committee in accordance with 
the requirements of the Juvenile Justice Act. 
i. Age assessment of the victims: 
This is extremely important to be undertaken as the investigator 
needs to exercise caution against deceptions. Some victims may get 
pressurised or coerced into declaring themselves as adults so that 
the offenders may not retaliate against them or their family. Thus, it 
is crucial for the investigator to conduct a preliminary age assess-
ment on the spot, in order to preclude all such deceptions. 
17.6.2. NHRC Standard Operating Procedure 
Another checklist for a general investigation plan is provided in the 
NHRC SOP for Combating Trafficking of Persons in India.82 This is the 
latest SOP from the governmental institutions. It delineates a step-wise 
questionnaire for the investigator involved, in order to assess whether all 
steps are completed as provided in the checklist. Some of these advisories 
are as follows: 
                                                   
82 National Human Rights Commission India, Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for 
Combating Trafficking of Persons in India, New Delhi, 2017. 
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• Whether a bone ossification test is required, and if yes, then wheth-
er it has been conducted? 
• Whether the statement of the victim has been recorded by the mag-
istrate under Section 164 CrPC? 
• Whether there is a chain of evidence linking previous cases, train 
tickets, phone records, internet search or communication prints, 
money trail? 
• Whether the investigating officer has checked for missing persons 
or child cases or other related cases registered? 
• What is the best evidence available and whether it has been checked? 
• Whether the assistance of various forms of media, such as radio, TV, 
newspapers as well as alternate sources such as NGOs and Legal 
Services Authorities have been utilized? 
• Whether a financial investigation has been carried out and the fea-
sibility of provision attachment of proceeds of crime has been eval-
uated? 
These requirements are crisper and more cogent as compared to the 
SOP of UNODC. They demonstrate the requirements that are more prox-
imate and necessary in order to achieve a higher quality investigation. 
None of the requirements as mentioned in the checklist are mandatory 
guidelines. However, non-compliance with each such guideline can gen-
erate enough doubt in the mind of a judge to distrust the prosecution story. 
That is an evaluation that has to be made on a case-to-case basis. However, 
what is important is that the SOP assists the investigator in achieving an 
investigation that cannot be called into question at the time of trial. This 
significantly guides the investigator in determining the weak links of his 
case, which can be used by him as a feedback loop to plan and manage the 
investigation in a manner that makes the case more robust. 
17.6.3. General Investigation Plans 
As can be seen from the above, there are various compliances in the form 
of a checklist that are necessary; while some are advisable but not neces-
sary. For example, taking a statement under Section 164 of the CrPC be-
fore a Magistrate is advisable but not necessary; 83  therefore, its non-
                                                   
83 See Supreme Court of India, Jogendra Nahak and Others v. State of Orissa and Others, 
Judgment, 4 August 1999, AIR 1999 SC 2565. The Supreme Court notes at paragraph 24: 
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compliance will not render a prosecution null and void. On the other hand, 
non-compliance of Section 15(6A) ITPA which requires a woman police 
officer to be present at the time of arrest, would bring the arrest mecha-
nism into suspicion and may vitiate the whole prosecution story. If there 
are suspicious circumstances that make the prosecution story dubious, 
then the same will get negated and the burden of proof will not be dis-
charged. If the compliances are met, then a Prosecutor is also satisfied that 
there is enough evidence in the case to secure a conviction. However, if 
there are several non-compliances with the checklist, the burden on the 
prosecutor increases as there are gaping holes in the prosecution story 
which cannot be filled post facto. Thus, investigators get to perceive a 
direct consequence of their non-compliances with the checklist. 
A prime example is that of stand-alone evidence of a prosecutrix. 
The test of a sterling witness84 is that the evidence should be of a very 
high quality and calibre whose version should not be assailable. The rele-
vant test of such a witness testimony is that that the statement should be 
truthful and free from contradictions. “It should be natural and consistent 
with the case of the prosecution qua the accused.”85 In a situation where 
the investigator discovers a prosecutrix, he may be inclined to only take 
the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 161 of the CrPC and not 
corroborate the same with any independent witnesses. This strategy may 
be a folly as it is possible that at the stage of trial, the court may not find 
the witness testimony to be wholly reliable. In such a situation, the court 
may need corroboration from independent and impartial witnesses. As 
stated in Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand,86 the Supreme Court faced 
                                                                                                                        
On the other hand, if door is opened to such persons to get in and if the Magistrates are 
put under the obligation to record their statements, then too many persons sponsored 
by culprits might throng before the portals of the Magistrate courts for the purpose of 
creating record in advance for the purpose of helping the culprits. In the present case, 
one of the arguments advanced by accused for grant of bail to them was based on the 
statements of the four Appellants recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of the 
Code. It is not part of the investigation to open up such a vista nor can such step be 
deemed necessary for the administration of justice. 
84 See Supreme Court of India, Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), Judgment, 7 August 
2012, (2012) 8 SCC 21 (‘Sandeep Case Judgment’); Supreme Court of India, Tameezuddin 
v. State (NCT of Delhi), Judgment, 26 August 2009, (2009) 15 SCC 566; Supreme Court of 
India, Lallu Manjhi and Another v. State of Jharkhand, Judgment, 7 January 2003, (2003) 
2 SCC 401 (‘Manjhi Case Judgment’). 
85 Sandeep Case Judgment, see above note 84. 
86 Manjhi Case Judgment, see above note 84. 
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with a testimony may classify the same into one of three categories: (i) 
wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; or (iii) neither wholly reliable or 
wholly unreliable. Thus, the strategy of the investigator to only obtain the 
statement of the prosecutrix may end up being fallacious, as it is possible 
that the prosecutrix may display material contradictions at the stage of 
cross-examination vis-à-vis her Section 164 statement or her Section 161 
statements. In such a situation, if the court finds the testimony to be not 
wholly reliable thereby requiring corroboration, the same may put the 
investigator in a fix as he may not have taken any statement from an inde-
pendent witness under Section 161 of the CrPC. Any new statement taken 
under Section 161 of the CrPC would also make the case hypothesis du-
bious, since it would be assailable on account of there being a doubt that 
the same is an after-thought, embellishment or a product of tutoring by the 
investigator. This example confirms why general investigation plans are 
necessary, as they may guide the investigator to cover all the possible 
lacuna that exist in the case. 
Another example is that of best evidence. The Supreme Court of 
India notes in Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P.87 at paragraph 42: 
The courts below have ignored the importance of best evi-
dence i.e. CCTV camera in the instant case and also have not 
noticed the absence of symptoms of strangulation in the 
medical reports. Upon consideration of the facts and circum-
stances of the case, we are of the view that the circumstances 
and the evidence adduced by the prosecution do not form a 
complete chain pointing to the guilt of the accused and the 
benefit of doubt is to be given to the accused and the convic-
tion of the appellants is liable to be set aside. 
Thus, at any point in time, the investigator needs to be cognisant of 
the best evidence available in order to increase the quality control of in-
vestigation. The SOPs thus guide the investigator in assessing the availa-
bility and feasibility of extracting the best evidence in a case theory; as 
non-production of such evidence can create an adverse inference against 
the prosecution under Section 114(g) Indian Evidence Act (1872). 
In contradistinction to general investigation plans, the ICC-OTP 
undertakes a fact-specific investigation plan wherein it links the facts of 
                                                   
87 Supreme Court of India, Tomaso Bruno and Another v. State of U.P., Judgment, 20 January 
2015, Criminal Appeal No. 142/2015. 
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the matter to a case hypothesis or theory, in order to decipher the underly-
ing elements of the prosecution story, which includes the witnesses, evi-
dence, persons involved, and ways and means to secure new evidence. 
Thereafter, the ICC-OTP enters into the planning phase, where a plan of 
action is chalked out, which includes the broad investigative objectives, 
how these objectives can be achieved in light of existing critical factors 
and identified risks, what the mitigation strategies and alternative plan-
ning scenarios are, and how they can be executed. This leads into the re-
porting phase where the ICC-OTP reports back with regard to the on-
going investigation and provides a feedback loop so that the case hypoth-
esis or theory can be constantly improved in order to update itself with 
any new events. This includes an assessment of what the investigation 
was able to achieve in terms of the objectives that it had set out, and what 
were the reasons for failure or delay. Thus, an historic record is created 
through the use of the reporting phase. Finally, the last element is that of 
management where the ICC-OTP undertakes to manage the investigation, 
wherein it conducts a value assessment of what is required in the foresee-
able future, and what support can be sought from other units or agencies, 
whether domestic or international. 
Thus, a crucial difference needs to be observed. As can be seen 
from the SOP, these are various soft compliances that are required of the 
investigator in the Indian criminal justice system. These soft compliances, 
or checklists, provide a detailed plan for the investigating officer to under-
take. These plans are not fact-specific investigation plans, but general 
investigation plans, for they provide for general guidelines on what the 
investigating officer ought to undertake and pursue, irrespective of what 
the facts of the case are. Some of these compliances are not in the form of 
hard law, as they do not entail hard consequences on account of non-
compliance. Such compliances only exist in the form of advisories, that is, 
it is advisable for the investigating officer to undertake the compliance in 
order to create a complete case theory; however, non-compliance will not 
necessarily vitiate the prosecution hypothesis. 
The SOP guides the investigating officer how to best collect the ma-
terial objects, which can be crucial for proving the existence and address 
of a brothel, the movement of persons during trafficking, the sexual ex-
ploitation of a victim, the existence of an organised crime network, and 
the aspects of illegal detention. As stated earlier, an investigating officer 
has the discretion to deviate from the checklists as provided in the SOP, as 
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the same would not render the case hypothesis nugatory. However, he is 
advised to complete the checklists as the same would strengthen the pros-
ecution story and remove the loopholes in the case. 
17.7. Conclusion: What Can We Learn and Unlearn From the ICC-
OTP? 
It is most alarming that far from being isolated incidents, the trafficking in 
persons has become a booming industry: a well-engineered and organised 
racket. 88 Though, India has “demonstrated increasing efforts by nearly 
tripling the number of victims identified”. But the “investigation, prosecu-
tion and conviction are disproportionately low relative to the scale of hu-
man trafficking”.89 
Quality control in investigation and prosecution of the cases of hu-
man trafficking requires the use of sound investigation plans. The investi-
gation plans devised by the ICC-OTP are made in real time, since the case 
theory is being assessed, planned, reported, and then managed depending 
on the facts of the prosecution case and how the investigation is panning 
out. One of the important reasons why the same is done is due to the fact-
intensive nature of inquiry, thereby necessitating a holistic appreciation 
and revision of the case assessment, coupled with a good planning, report-
ing and management routine in real time. 
In that light, the Indian investigative agencies would greatly benefit 
from similar case assessment, planning, reporting and management phases 
where the focus of the investigation can be realigned towards the prosecu-
tion objectives. The fluid and interpretative style of functioning of the 
Indian judicial system makes it even more necessary for the investigative 
and prosecutorial systems to work in tandem with the strategy to be de-
ployed at the trial stage. As we have seen previously through the evolving 
law on ITPA as pronounced by the high courts in Masti Health, Kumari 
Sangeeta and Shivaraj, 90  the interpretation of procedural requirements 
ought to be clear to the investigative agencies, so that they can comply 
                                                   
88 Mohan Parasaran, “Foreword”, in Usha Tandon and Sidharth Luthra, Human Rights: Traf-
ficking of Women and Children: Legal and Policy Framework, Central Law Publications, 
New Delhi, 2016. 
89 US Department of State, 2018, see above note 51. The conviction rate of cases of sex 
trafficking across the country was only 22 per cent in 2012. Pranav Garimella, “Human 
Trafficking Cases Jump in India; Convictions Decline!”, IndiaSpend, 27 September 2013. 
90 Masti Health Case, see above note 65. 
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well in advance and not at a belated stage. When a criminal case reaches 
the high courts under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing of the charge 
sheet or FIR, there is not enough flexibility for the investigating officer to 
realign the investigation and comply with the interpretation of procedural 
requirements by the high courts. This completely defeats the purpose of 
an error-free investigation as the same is constantly subject to judicial 
review of procedural legislation. 
Another reason for importing the fact-specific investigation plans to 
India is that the investigating officers are often divorced from an eviden-
tial and juristic appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, thereby 
leading to a lesser quality of investigation, as they may not necessarily be 
aware as to how the prosecution may pan out at the trial stage. Thus, a 
higher degree of planning and reporting may help the investigating officer 
refocus the investigation objectives, plan the investigative strategy, keep-
ing in mind the risks involved and the mitigation strategies, and then at-
tempt to assess the reasons for the failure or delay, so that the investigator 
may re-plan his investigation to focus on what may help strengthen the 
prosecution. One example of this is the case of Tomaso Bruno91 as dis-
cussed earlier, which went on to invalidate the prosecution story on the 
reason that the best evidence, that is, the CCTV footage, was not present-
ed, resulting in an adverse inference to be drawn against the prosecution 
because the investigator did not procure the CCTV footage. This example 
indicates that a stronger appreciation of evidence and higher quality con-
trol at the investigation stage would significantly improve the outcome of 
prosecutions. Although the Indian investigators do not benefit from a sim-
ilarly robust preliminary examination as conducted by the ICC-OTP, that 
does not preclude them from conducting an exhaustive investigation that 
may subsume a similar amount of evidence and interaction with witnesses. 
However, the pros cannot be seen without analysing the cons. Im-
plementing a real-time fact-specific investigation plan may burden the 
Indian investigative agencies with procedural necessities, in an already 
overburdened workforce. The Indian investigative and prosecutorial divi-
sions suffer from various external and internal issues, some of them being 
deficiency of formal education, lack of adequate budgeting and manpower, 
lack of technological assistance in the investigative processes which again 
squares back to the reason of lack of funding, constant fluctuations and 
                                                   
91 See above note 87. 
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changes in the law either though judicial pronouncements or legislative 
amendments, and a dearth of investigators qualified with formal legal 
education in order to holistically appreciate the outcome of compliance or 
non-compliance of procedural requirements. Thus, importing a fact-
specific investigation plan similar to that used by the ICC-OTP may be 
too onerous for the Indian investigative agencies to implement. 
The question then crops up, as to how the pros and cons can be 
harmonised in order to produce the best possible result, to tackle the crime 
of human trafficking, in light of the constrains faced by the Indian inves-
tigative agencies. The solution is in the nature of general investigation 
plans, as devised through the Standard Operating Procedures devised by 
the UNODC and Government of India, as well as the National Human 
Rights Commission of India. These general investigation plans, as dis-
cussed earlier, guide the investigators in ensuring that they do not miss out 
on complying with a requirement, failure of which may be fatal at the 
stage of trial. Secondly, with a significantly less-qualified workforce op-
erating as investigators, such general investigation plans can function as 
constant updates for the officers, so that they may be abreast with the 
evolving set of changes in the procedural and substantive law. Thirdly, a 
general investigation plan acts as a feed-back loop for an investigator, so 
that he or she is constantly aware of what the non-compliance with a pro-
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18.Investigation Plans as a Tool for Managing 
Investigations in Norway 
Alf Butenschøn Skre* 
 
18.1. Introduction 
There appears to be a need for more empirical research on which policies 
and practices of criminal investigations may help maximise efficiency and 
reliability. The reason for lack of scientific empirical knowledge in this 
domain could be that the possibilities for scientific research are limited 
due to rules of confidentiality and non-disclosure in law enforcement au-
thorities,1 as well as a possible lack of interest amongst some communi-
ties of practitioners in criminal investigations to engage with the scientific 
community 2  and vice versa. In addition, differences between areas of 
criminal law, and differences of criminal procedure and legal traditions, 
pose challenges for anyone with an ambition to make universal recom-
mendations for policies and procedures in criminal investigations. 
The policy and practice of investigation plans in Norway is one 
domestic experience that may warrant attention from decision-makers 
responsible for criminal investigations in fact-rich cases. One example of 
a fact-rich case processed in the criminal justice system of Norway is the 
trial of the perpetrator of the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks, which included 
                                                   
* Alf Butenschøn Skre is a Public Prosecutor at the office of the Director of Public Prose-
cutions in Norway. He has previously practiced in a law firm in Oslo and served as a Sen-
ior Adviser at the Norwegian National Human Rights Institution. He holds a master’s de-
gree in law and a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Oslo. The 
views expressed in this chapter are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the 
views of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
1 As suggested in Ivar A. Fahsing, The Making of an Expert Detective: Thinking and Decid-
ing in Criminal Investigations, doctoral thesis, University of Gothenburg, 2016, p. 6. 
2 As suggested in Richard Reyes, “Tactical Criminal Investigations: Understanding the 
Dynamics to Obtain the Best Results without Compromising the Investigation”, in Journal 
of Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation, 2017, vol. 2, no. 2. 
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charges of intentionally killing 77 individual persons and seriously injur-
ing 22 persons.3 The final judgement in that case was issued only 13 
months after the attack took place. 
A cornerstone of managing fact-rich investigations in Norway is the 
use of investigation plans. The term ‘investigation plan’ is understood to 
denote a written outline of factual hypotheses and legal bases of criminal 
responsibility or innocence, and a schedule that assigns responsibility 
within the investigation team for investigative steps that must be taken in 
order to bring the investigation to a conclusion.4 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the domestic context 
(Section 18.2.), outlines the use of investigation plans in Norway (Section 
18.3.), and offers brief concluding remarks on the possible relevance of 
the Norwegian experience with investigation plans for other jurisdictions 
(Section 18.4.). 
18.2. A Brief Overview of the Norwegian Context 
Criminal justice policies that have been put in place in Norway should not 
necessarily be assumed to be appropriate in other national or international 
jurisdictions. Norway is a relatively small country in Northern Europe, 
with a population of some 5.3 million5 and one of the highest gross do-
mestic products per capita in the world.6 
Moreover, there are important differences in criminal procedure be-
tween national and international jurisdictions. Two basic features of the 
Norwegian criminal justice system should be pointed out in this regard. 
First, the legal framework for criminal procedure in Norway does 
not include a formal stage of preliminary investigations or pre-
investigation in the same way as the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). 
Criminal investigations are opened if there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to 
investigate whether any criminal act that requires prosecution has taken 
                                                   
3 Oslo District Court, Judgement, 24 August 2012, TOSLO-2011-188627-24 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/8ej2w6/). 
4 See National Police Directorate of Norway, Guidelines for investigation plans version 1.0, 
2017. 
5 As per the fourth quarter of 2019. See Statistics Norway, “Population”, 27 February 2020 
(available on its web site). 
6 In 2018, Norway had the sixth highest GDP per capita according to the International Mon-
etary Fund. See International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database”, April 
2019 (available on its web site) 
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place.7 Although some specialised law enforcement agencies have devel-
oped routines for the examination of whether there are ‘reasonable 
grounds’ to open an investigation (or, alternatively decline to open an 
investigation or refer the matter to another law enforcement agency), the 
vast majority of criminal matters in Norway are investigated without any 
preceding preliminary investigation stage.8 This stands in contrast to ju-
risdictions with a legal framework for the conduct of preliminary exami-
nations, as is the case, for example, in the Statute and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the ICC.9 
Second, the evidentiary threshold under Norwegian law for issuing 
an indictment is ‘proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’,10 and the 
prosecutor in charge of the matter must be certain that the necessary evi-
dence will be available for presentation at trial. In other words, there is a 
higher evidentiary threshold for submitting charges from the prosecution 
service to the courts for trial than, for example, to confirm charges and 
commit the person to a Trial Chamber for trial at the ICC, cf. Article 61(7) 
of the ICC Statute. 
Third, the lowest tier of the public prosecution service in Norway is 
integrated in the police organisation.11 This stands in contrast to many 
                                                   
7 Norway, Lov om rettergangsmåten i straffesaker (Straffeprosessloven) [Criminal Proce-
dure Act], 22 May 1981, Section 224 (‘CPA’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/76cf36/). 
See also Norway, Forskrift om ordningen av påtalemyndigheten (Påtaleinstruksen) [Regu-
lation on Prosecutions], 28 June 1985, Sections 7-5 to 7-6 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/ya13nv/). 
8 See Runar Torgersen, “The Concern for Quality Control and Norwegian Preliminary Ex-
amination Practice”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Pre-
liminary Examination: Volume 1, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4762c4). 
9 See, for example, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 
15(2) (‘ICC Statute’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9) and ICC, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, 9 September 2002, Rule 104 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f). 
See also Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Exam-
ination: Volumes 1 and 2, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018 (http://www.
toaep.org/ps-pdf/32-bergsmo-stahn and http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/33-bergsmo-stahn). 
10 Director of Public Prosecutions, “Kvalitetskrav til straffesaksbehandlingen i politiet og ved 
statsadvokatembetene mv. (Kvalitetsrundskrivet)” [Requirements for the quality of han-
dling criminal matters by police and public prosecutors], 8 November 2018, Circular no. 
3/2018, p. 15 (‘Circular no. 3/2018’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9jp1eq/). 
11 The prosecution service in Norway is organised in three hierarchical tiers: 1) The Director 
of Public Prosecutions (Riksadvokaten), 2) Public Prosecutors (Statsadvokatene) with lim-
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jurisdictions where there is organisational separation between the police 
and the prosecution service. Although there is a clear distinction in the 
line of command between police officers and prosecutors, the integration 
of part of the prosecution service into the police districts is meant to fa-
cilitate close collaboration with investigators and the prosecutors’ over-
sight throughout the investigation. 
The development and use of investigation plans should be seen in 
light of the following indicators of quality in criminal investigations, for-
mulated by the Director of Public Prosecutions in Norway, the country’s 
chief prosecutor:12 
• Fulfilling the duty to investigate and prosecute. As mentioned above, 
the threshold for opening investigations is met if there are reasona-
ble grounds to do so (Section 224 of the CPA). However, even if 
this threshold is met, the prosecution service in Norway has discre-
tion to decide whether to open an investigation. The most important 
factors that guide such discretionary decisions are a) the likelihood 
that a crime has been committed, b) the gravity of the crime, and c) 
the extent of resources deemed necessary to conduct an investiga-
tion of the matter.13 Once a year, the chief prosecutor issues a yearly 
circular in which goals and rules of prioritisation are set for the 
prosecution service. In recent years circulars have mostly pointed 
out the following categories of crimes for prioritisation: murder, 
other serious violent crime that endangers life or health (including 
arson), violence against children, domestic abuse, and hate crime. 
Serious forms of the following crimes should also be given priority: 
sexual crimes, international and organised crime, economic crimes, 
environmental crimes, computer related crimes, and serious traffic 
offences.14 
• Appropriate scope of investigation and appropriate use of resources. 
The purpose of investigations under Norwegian law is to gather the 
information necessary to a) decide whether to issue an indictment, b) 
adjudicate the question of guilt in a court of law, and c) execute an 
                                                                                                                        
ited regional or thematic jurisdiction who report to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
3) Prosecutors integrated in the police organisation. 
12 Circular no. 3/2018, Section 4, see above note 10. 
13 Ibid., p. 7. 
14 Ibid., p. 6. 
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adjudicated punishment (Section 226 of the CPA). The Director of 
Public Prosecutions has stated that the scope of an investigation 
must be guided by its purpose, and so that the information gathered 
is of relevance to those purposes. In this regard, the Director of 
prosecutions has stressed that the prosecutor in charge of the matter 
has an overarching responsibility to ensure that the investigation is 
purpose-driven and conducted with the necessary expeditiousness 
and efficiency.15 As described in more detail below, investigation 
plans – which are considered conducive to a higher level of effi-
ciency and quality – are mandatory in some category of cases, and 
recommended in all serious cases.16 It is also stressed by the Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions that all investigations, and any trying of a 
case before the courts, must be proportional to the seriousness and 
complexity of the case. Prosecutors in charge of complex matters 
are encouraged to make active use of a provision in the CPA that 
enables the prosecutor to waive prosecution for charges that – if the 
person is found guilty – will not result in any material punishment 
for the charged person, given the other charges that are brought.17 
• High rate of solved cases. While procedural safeguards and the 
rights of the accused are to be respected at all times, and the eviden-
tiary threshold must be met in all cases, a high rate of solved cases 
is a self-evident ambition of the prosecution service.18 
• Adequate penal reaction. In the Norwegian criminal system, sen-
tencing is based largely on analysis of relevant precedents in case 
law, rather than detailed quantitative sentencing guidelines. Prose-
cutors have a particular responsibility to ensure that the develop-
ment of penal reactions are in line with the priorities set by the Di-
rector of Public Prosecutions. Unnecessary delays in the handling of 
a criminal matter by the police or prosecution service can lead to a 
discretionary reduction of the sentence when the matter is adjudi-
                                                   
15 Ibid., p. 10. 
16 Ibid., p. 11. 
17 See CPA, Section 70: “Prosecution may be waived when, as a result of the rules on sen-
tencing in cases of more than one committed offence, no or only an immaterial punishment 
would be applicable to the offender” (author’s translation), see above note 7. 
18 Circular no. 3/2018, p. 15, see above note 10. 
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cated. A lack of efficiency thereby harms the goal of achieving ade-
quate penal reactions.19 
• Compliance with applicable rules of procedure and code of crimi-
nal procedure.20 
• Swift handling of cases. Under Section 226 of the CPA, investiga-
tions are to be carried out as swiftly as possible.21 Norwegian pros-
ecutors are also under an obligation to ensure that cases are brought 
within a reasonable time under Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. The need for expeditiousness relates to the 
obvious need of the accused and of victims to obtain a decision 
within reasonable time. However, the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions has also stressed that swift handling of cases is conducive of a 
higher rate of solved cases. This is in part because many types of 
evidence are ‘perishable’ and may deteriorate over time. Swift han-
dling of cases is also conducive to more efficient resource manage-
ment – recommencing an investigation after an hiatus can cause 
personnel to spend more time recalling and revisiting details of the 
case that would otherwise be at the forefront of their attention. 
• Objectivity. Evaluations of cases where a miscarriage of justice has 
taken place often point to a lack of objectivity on the part of the po-
lice and the prosecution service. The criterion of objectivity is de-
scribed as a non-derogable safeguard in all criminal matters. In ad-
dition to protecting the accused against a miscarriage of justice, the 
criterion of objectivity helps ensure a higher quality of evidence. 
Prosecutors must assess whether a particular case at hand require 
the use of measures that reduce the risk of errors as a result of a lack 
of objectivity. Such measures include increasing the number of key 
personnel, requesting assistance from the National Criminal Inves-
tigation Service or another police district, or a meeting with the dis-
trict attorney.22 
                                                   
19 Ibid., p. 16. 
20 Ibid., p. 18. 
21 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/8267cb). 
22 Circular no. 3/2018, p. 22–23, see above note 10. 
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• Appropriate care for victims and next of kin. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions has stressed the role of victims of crime and their next 
of kin in modern criminal proceedings. Police and the prosecution 
service are required to treat such persons with care and respect, and 
to respond expeditiously to enquiries et cetera. Victims and next of 
kin will have a right to a designated contact person within the police, 
and in many cases also an attorney that will safeguards their 
rights.23 
• Promoting the general public’s trust in criminal prosecutions. The 
Director of Public Prosecutions has pointed out that the level of 
trust enjoyed in the general public depends not only on whether 
cases are solved, but also how handling of cases is communicated to 
the public, and how investigations are portrayed by the media. In 
this regard, the Director has encouraged an open and accommodat-
ing attitude to media enquiries, while maintaining the duty of pro-
fessional secrecy and the presumption of innocence.24 
• Appropriate co-operation with the courts and relevant parties and 
others involved in the case. The Director of prosecutions has high-
lighted the need for professional and appropriate co-operation dur-
ing investigations and during trial. There is an expectation that 
prosecutors – in order to enable other involved parties and the court 
to manage the case effectively – provide comprehensive documents 
describing evidence for trial, as well as informative documents con-
taining the charges and clear introductory statements.25 
• Appropriate editing and storage of case files and handling of evi-
dence.26 
• Contribute to development of case law. The prosecution service has 
an ambition to contribute to unity and clarity of the law, as well as 
appropriate legal developments, by requesting leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court in appropriate cases that raise legal questions with 
implications for other cases.27 
                                                   
23 Ibid., p. 23–24. 
24 Ibid., p. 24. 
25 Ibid., p. 26. 
26 Ibid., p. 28–29. 
27 Ibid., p. 29. 
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Investigation plans are just one of several management tools used to 
pursue the concept of quality described above. Other tools include: 
• document containing the reasons to initiate an investigation, in cer-
tain cases of proprio motu investigations; 
• document containing draft charges that are refined continuously in 
the course of the investigation; 
• evidence memoranda that are used to develop and analyse the evi-
dence base; and 
• review conferences and peer review mechanisms that allow for 
quality control by colleagues in the prosecution service who are not 
otherwise assigned to the case. 
18.3. Investigation Plans in Norway 
18.3.1. Function and Areas of Application 
In a circular of 2018, the Director of Public Prosecutions stated that inves-
tigation plans promote “more structured investigative work, progress and 
quality, as well as providing notoriety and an overview of the case to sup-
port decisions during the investigation”.28 A working group appointed by 
the Director of Public Prosecutions in 2018 to give recommendations on 
how the prosecution service can conduct trial hearings in large criminal 
matters more efficiently pointed to the importance of undertaking collec-
tion of evidence aimed at confirming or falsifying hypotheses defined in 
the investigation plan and draft indictment, in order to avoid overload of 
evidence.29 This entails that the investigation should as far as possible be 
a closed-ended project. In fact-rich cases, a well-written investigation plan 
is paramount to achieving correct investigative processes and outcomes, 
as well as an appropriate allocation of resources. 
The investigation plan should be prepared immediately after the re-
port of an alleged crime, and be developed as a ‘living document’ 
throughout the investigation, in response to results of the investigative 
steps taken. Responsibility for the investigation plan rests with the prose-
                                                   
28 Ibid., p. 11. Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
29 The author was the legal secretary of the working group. The working group’s report is 
published as Director of Public Prosecutions, Effektivisering av domstolsbehandlingen av 
større straffesaker [Increasing efficiency in the court-processing of larger criminal cases], 
2018, Paper Series no. 1/2018 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/911e3e/). 
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cutor in charge of the matter, although the plan is frequently drafted by the 
main investigator in consultation with the prosecutor. 
The investigation plan is often created by use of a digital project-
management platform available on the Norwegian police computer net-
work. In other words, it is not necessarily a physical, printed document or 
a digital document file as such. The plan could be the sum of input that 
has been entered into a specific module in a project management system, 
and as such could be described as a knowledge-base. The system used by 
the Norwegian police for this purpose is located on the servers of the po-
lice force and can be accessed by authorised personnel if they are able to 
establish a secure internet connection, thus facilitating the flow of infor-
mation within the team. The availability of the investigation plan in ‘real-
time’ allows team members to plan and conduct investigation steps on the 
basis of the latest available data and analysis. This can allow for more 
open and continuous flow of information within the team than would be 
achieved by using an investigation plan in the form of a static or frozen 
document. Using the investigation plan as a living document does, how-
ever, create the need for a reliable mechanism to log changes made to the 
investigation plan. This is particularly important with a view to being able 
to reconstruct decisions made during an investigation, for example as part 
of an evaluation that goes back to the start of the process. 
The Director of Public Prosecutions has recommended the use of 
investigation plans in investigations of serious crime. 30  Moreover, the 
Director has instructed the use of investigation plans in four categories of 
investigations where there has arguably been a perceived need to enhance 
the quality and efficiency of investigations. The first of these categories 
were cases concerning rape, where the use of investigation plans was 
made mandatory in 2013. The decision had a backdrop of publicly voiced 
concerns regarding the speed and quality of rape investigations. These 
issues could make the criminal case more burdensome than necessary for 
the victim and the accused, and public perceptions of problems in rape 
investigations could potentially cause victims not to report instances of 
rape.31 Investigation plans had already been used to a certain extent in 
                                                   
30 Letter from the Director of Public Prosecutions to the Prosecution Service, 30 March 2015. 
31 See, for example, Letter from the Director of Public Prosecutions to the Prosecution Ser-
vice, 8 November 2013. The Parliament of Norway had also expressed that the quality and 
speed of processing rape cases needed to be improved, see Prop. 1 S (2012–2013). 
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such cases. For example, the National Crime Investigation Service, which 
is a national investigation agency for organised and serious crime, did use 
investigation plans in all cases handled by them, and many police districts 
used investigation plans in cases that were seen as complex or particularly 
serious. There was a clear experience from the operational level of the 
prosecution service that structured investigation planning, when used, 
enhanced both quality and efficiency of investigations. 
In 2015, instructions were given to use investigation plans in cases 
concerning sexual assault on children and cases concerning abuse in close 
relationships.32 Another two years later, such instructions were given also 
for cases where there was a suspicion of murder.33 
Investigation plans may be omitted in these four types of investiga-
tions if the case is so simple (both on the facts and the legal aspects) that 
an investigation plan is clearly unnecessary. 
18.3.2. Eight Mandatory Elements of Investigation Plans in Norway 
There is no authoritative template for investigation plans in Norway, but 
the contents of investigation plans have been gradually more standardised 
through guidelines on the minimum requirements of investigation plans.34 
Investigation plans must contain eight elements, which are described be-
low. 
I. Factual hypotheses 
The investigation plan must contain factual hypotheses that are co-
herent with the available facts collected thus far, and that appear 
relevant to the investigation. The identified hypotheses create a van-
tage point for developing an offence-driven and closed-ended inves-
tigation. Identifying all reasonable hypotheses is inducive to explor-
ing avenues for finding potentially exculpatory evidence. 
Example 1: 
                                                   
32 Letter from the Director of Public Prosecutions to the Prosecution Service, 30 March 2015. 
33 Director of Public Prosecutions, “Mål og prioriteringer for straffesaksbehandlingen i 
2017 – politiet og statsadvokatene” [Goals and priorities for the processing of criminal 
cases in 2017 – the police and the prosecutors], 28 February 2017, Circular no. 1/2017. 
34 See Letter from the Director of Public Prosecutions to the Prosecution Service, 8 Novem-
ber 2013 and National Police Directorate of Norway, Guidelines for investigation plans 
version 1.0, 2017. 
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Alleged purchase of sexual services from a young girl 
who was in psychiatric treatment. Hypotheses that 
were entered in the investigation plan were as follows: 
H1: The accused had sexual intercourse with the 
victim. 
H1.1: The accused had sexual intercourse with 
the victim. 
H1.2: The accused paid to have sexual inter-
course with the victim. 
H1.3: The accused obtained sexual intercourse 
by exploiting the victim’s vulnerability 
and then paid the victim. 
H2: The accused did not have sexual intercourse 
with the victim. 
H2.1: The victim has given an untrue state-
ment caused by her mental illness. 
H2.2: The victim has given an untrue state-
ment as a result of influence in the form 
of leading questions posed by family 
members and/or her therapist. 
H3: The victim was forced to have sexual inter-
course with the accused for payment. 
H4: The accused has had sexual intercourse with 
several minors. He contacts them through [web 
site] and then meets them at [location]. 
Example 2: 
The suspect was observed by several eyewitnesses as 
he exerted brutal violence over some time until the 
victim died. The suspect admitted the actus reus ele-
ments, but gave a confused statement regarding the 
circumstances. 
H1 (Murder – premeditated): 
There is a known pre-existing connection between the 
suspect and victim, and the suspect killed the victim 
after premeditation over time. 
H2 (Murder – wilful): 
Regardless of whether there is a pre-existing connec-
tion between the victim and suspect, the murder was 
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committed because of circumstances occurring at the 
time, resulting in the death of the victim. 
H3 (Murder – insanity): 
There was no pre-existing connection between the 
suspect and victim and no particular events that led to 
the violence. The crime was committed without pre-
meditation or explicable causes. 
H4 (Self-defence): 
Regardless of any pre-existing connection between 
the suspect and victim, a situation occurred in which 
the suspect felt he had to defend himself against the 
victim. The situation resulted in death for the victim. 
Because the use of investigation plans is not regulated in de-
tail, there is room for variation in how hypotheses are formulated in 
practice, and there is room for debate as to what constitutes best 
practice. In a publication from the Norwegian Police Academy, Pro-
fessor Eivind Kolflaath35 proposes the following principles to guide 
the creation of hypotheses in investigation plans, which the present 
author endorses as a vantage point for further discussion:36 
Principles of content 
Contents in each individual hypothesis: 
(1) The hypothesis must be a possible expla-
nation to information in the case. Id est, 
the hypothesis must relate to the facts of 
the case, not the legal requirements. 
(2) The hypothesis must be testable, that is, 
there must exist investigative steps that 
could strengthen or weaken the hypothesis 
(either directly or indirectly through test-
ing of another hypothesis). 
Contents in the set of hypotheses: 
                                                   
35 Faculty of Law of the University of Bergen. Professor Kolflaath has published extensively 
on theories of evidence and probability in law. 
36 The present author’s translation from Norwegian to English, from Eivind Kolflaath, “Hy-
poteser i etterforskningsplaner” [Hypotheses in Investigation Plans], in Egil H. Olsvik and 
Patrick Risan (eds.), Etterforskning under lupen [Investigations Examined], Politihøg-
skolen, Oslo, 2019, pp. 97–98. 
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(3) Every hypothesis in the set must be differ-
ent from the others. 
(4) The set of hypotheses must cover all re-
maining realistic possibilities. 
Principles of formulation 
(1) Formulations of hypotheses must be complete 
sentences (although cross-references to such 
formulations may be done by way of abridged 
phrases for sake of convenience). 
(2) Formulations of hypotheses must be unambig-
uous, unless ambiguity may be eliminated us-
ing principles of interpretation (see below). 
Principles of interpretation 
(1) Formulations of hypotheses shall be interpreted 
literally. No assumptions should be made about 
factual or legal aspects that are not explicitly 
stated in the hypothesis. 
(2) Formulations of hypotheses shall be interpreted 
as hypotheses on the facts of the case, that is, 
not as a hypothesis about any particular legal 
classification. 
II. Legal classifications 
The plan must contain reference to sections of the Criminal Code – 
or any other statute containing relevant penal sanctions – that would 
appear relevant to one or more of the factual hypotheses in the case. 
In practice, the sections of the penal code are often noted in con-
junction with the relevant alternative factual hypotheses. The choice 
of legal classifications is a way of selecting parts of the totality of 
possible crime committed for investigation and prosecution, that is, 
determining the focus and scope of the investigation. In selecting 
which legal classifications to include in the investigation plan, it is 
of course very important to make a critical assessment as to what 
should be included. Several contributions in this volume37 – and a 
policy brief by Morten Bergsmo in 2019 that broached the issue of 
                                                   
37 Devasheesh Bais, “Prioritisation of Suspected Conduct and Cases: From Idea to Practice”, 
Chapter 9 above; Cale Davis, “Challenges in Charge Selection: Considerations Informing 
the Number of Charges and Cumulative Charging Practices”, Chapter 13 above. 
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quality control in criminal investigations of core international 
crimes38 – have pointed to the importance of exercising prosecuto-
rial discretion in order to ‘frame’ the case in an appropriate way. 
A working group appointed by the Director of Public Prose-
cutions to make recommendations on how the prosecution service 
could handle complex and large cases more efficiently at the trial 
stage emphasised the need to take a clear position on the purpose 
and objectives of the case.39 In other words, it should be clearly 
stated what it is that justifies the use of resources to investigate and 
prosecute this alleged instance of crime, when there are other cases 
waiting in a backlog. When that justification is clearly stated from 
the outset, it will become clear that some acts possibly committed 
by the suspect constitute the very essence of the case, while other 
acts (although possibly criminal acts) and other possible modes of 
liability, hold less demand of our attention – in fact they may inad-
vertently distract and unnecessarily complicate the investigation. It 
was a clear recommendation from the working group to weed out 
acts falling in the second category, in other words removing in-
stances within the case that do not justify prioritisation. 
Without such a guiding principle, and without a strong will to 
eliminate less serious instances from the investigation, the working 
group found that there is a clear risk that the investigator will find 
himself in an open-ended, evidence-driven investigation with a sig-
nificant potential to swell far out of proportion. At the same time, 
the working group acknowledged the need to balance this perspec-
tive against the perspective of victims of the crimes that could be 
ejected from the case and their need for reparations. 
III. Based on the facts and on the legal elements of the statutes identi-
fied in item II, the prosecutor in charge of the matter formulates 
factual questions that the investigation should aim to answer. This 
can be done in many ways, and there is no detailed manual on best 
practice for how to formulate this in an investigation plan. The pin-
pointing of the factual topics of inquiry and investigative steps will 
                                                   
38 Morten Bergsmo, “Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations”, 
FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 94 (2019), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 
2019 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/94-bergsmo/). See in particular Sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
39 Director of Public Prosecutions, 2018, see above note 29. 
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of course be useful to ensure that involved team members fully un-
derstand how to carry out their work in a way that is most useful to 
the investigation, that is, that they give appropriate attention to what 
is seen by the prosecutor as the most salient issues. An example of 
such formulation is given in Example 3 below, which concerns the 
investigation of a murder case. Due to evidence gathered at the 
crime scene, the police had a strong suspicion against the suspect, 
but it was unclear whether the motive was purely profit-based, or if 
other mental factors had influenced the suspect. 
Example 3: 
The main aim of gathering of information in [location] 
is to establish the suspect’s movements in [location] 
before and after the time of the murder. It is most im-
portant to document his movements between […] and 
[…], but also movements before this period will be of 
significant interest to the case. […] In questioning 
friends and acquaintances, it will be important to clar-
ify whether the suspect has a history of drug use, men-
tal health and other circumstances that could be of 
importance to the question of criminal liabil-
ity/defence of insanity. 
In addition to items I to III described above, investigation plans 
should include the following five elements: 
IV. Based on the factual questions formulated pursuant to item III 
above, relevant investigative steps should be identified. The inves-
tigative steps should be ranked according to priority and tactical 
considerations. 
V. The plan must assign responsibility within the investigation team 
for outstanding actions, and a deadline for completion of each step. 
The plan should show when deadlines have not been met, and any 
consequences expected as a consequence of the fact that the dead-
line was missed. 
VI. The need for documentation from external sources (such as reports 
from technical analysts, expert opinions, and medical journals) and 
actions required to obtain such documents. 
VII. A deadline for completing the investigation, and assignment of re-
sponsibility for the necessary final steps in closing the investigation. 
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VIII. The plan should include contingency planning in case the lead pros-
ecutor, lead investigator or main investigator should become una-
vailable to continue working on the case. 
In addition to these eight elements, investigation plans will in prac-
tice often include a description of resources required in order to complete 
the investigation. 
18.4. Relevance for Other Jurisdictions? 
On the whole, public prosecutors in Norway view investigation plans as a 
useful tool in clarifying the scope of the investigation, organising tasks in 
an efficient manner and to provide a record of decision points in the 
course of the investigation.40 A key function of investigation plans in large 
investigations is to provide a common platform for the investigation team 
and the prosecutor in charge to facilitate thought-processes as described 
above in this chapter. In this way investigation plans help by providing 
guidance to investigators, thus avoiding unnecessarily lengthy investiga-
tions resulting in voluminous and unfocused gathering of evidence. 
The Quality Control in Criminal Investigation Project of the Centre 
for International Law Research and Policy (CILRAP) has identified seven 
bottlenecks for the prosecution’s investigation and case-preparation in 
matters of core international crimes.41 For reasons described above, the 
proper use of investigation plans as a tool to ensure that the investigation 
meets strict evidentiary requirements before an indictment is issued, may 
help address in part the following of the bottlenecks identified in the pro-
ject: 
• overview of information; 
• evidence-review; 
• formulation of responsibility; 
• cumulative charging; and 
• too much evidence. 
                                                   
40 Responses provided by all public prosecutors to the Director of Public Prosecutions re-
garding the utility of investigation plans were described in a letter from the Director of 
Public Prosecutions to the Prosecution Service on 30 March 2015. 
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19.Quality Control in Case Preparation 
and the Role of the Judiciary of the 
International Criminal Court 
Gilbert Bitti* 
 
When starting a discussion on quality control in ‘case preparation’, it is 
necessary to first agree on what is a good quality case and what is a well-
prepared case. 
With regard to the quality of the case, there is a need to first deter-
mine what the scope of a ‘good’ case is. More specifically, does a good 
quality case need to be representative of the victimisation in a situation? 
In other words, could a case be qualified as good even if the harm suf-
fered by the victims is not fully represented by that case due to its very 
limited scope? Second, it is also necessary to agree on the goal of building 
a case. Is a ‘good’ case, a case that is construed in a way that maximises 
the chances for the Prosecutor to win it, even if the price to pay is to avoid 
some aspects difficult to prove but important for the victims, or is a ‘good’ 
case a case that centres on establishing the truth? 
With regard to case preparation, several aspects should be consid-
ered: (i) the need to respect the rights of the defence, which requires, inter 
alia,1 avoiding an over-collection of evidence (especially with regard to 
crime base evidence) and to properly define the case (especially with re-
gard to its factual scope and the modes of liability), thereby preventing the 
defence from being flooded with tons of evidentiary material to analyse 
and from facing a case which is too vague and contains ‘many possible 
                                                   
* Gilbert Bitti is Senior Legal Adviser, Pre-Trial Division, International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’). The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and do not re-
flect the views of the ICC. 
1 Other aspects are important with regard to the rights of the defence, such as the duty for 
the Prosecutor to investigate equally exonerating and incriminating circumstances, and the 
need to prepare as soon as possible to comply with the requirements concerning disclosure 
and translation of evidence collected. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 906 
options’; (ii) the need to protect the rights of victims (for example, the 
need to conduct as early as possible financial investigations for the pur-
poses of reparations); and (iii) the need to protect witnesses and to plan 
such a protection sufficiently in advance to avoid delays in the proceed-
ings. The role of the judiciary is to ensure respect and protection of the 
rights of all those participating in the procedure. 
With regard to the role of the judiciary at the ICC in the quality con-
trol of case preparation, two issues are of great importance: the timing of 
case preparation (Section 19.1.) and the framing of the charges when pre-
paring a case (Section 19.2.). 
19.1. The Timing of Case Preparation 
With regard to the timing of case preparation, the role of the judiciary has 
been up until now to insist on the need for the case to be prepared as soon 
as possible. The need for early case preparation will first be analysed with 
regard to the conduct of the preliminary examination (Section 19.1.1.) and 
thereafter with regard to the conduct of the investigation (Section 19.1.2.). 
19.1.1. Case Preparation and Conduct of the Preliminary 
Examination 
The problems related to the conduct of preliminary examinations by the 
Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’), will first be analysed (Section 19.1.1.1.), 
and then the necessity to adequately prepare for the investigation already 
at the stage of the preliminary examination (Section 19.1.1.2.). 
19.1.1.1. The Problems Related to the Conduct of Preliminary 
Examinations 
It is important for case preparation to start already before the formal in-
vestigation is initiated. 
In Part 2 of the OTP Draft Regulations,2 which dealt with the man-
agement of preliminary examinations, Regulation 3.1. provided that the 
Deputy Prosecutor (Investigations) was to be responsible for the prelimi-
nary examination of all information received under Article 15 of the 
                                                   
2 ICC-OTP, Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 3 June 2003 (‘Draft Regula-
tions’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/siibwo/). 
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,3 and would report to 
the Prosecutor on the state of the preliminary examinations (Regulation 
3.5.). The Deputy Prosecutor was to establish standing Article 15 prelimi-
nary examination teams, composed of persons from the investigation and 
analysis sections within the Investigation Division, a lawyer from the 
Prosecution Division, and a legal adviser from the Legal Advisory Section 
(Regulation 4.1.). The preliminary examination teams were envisaged to 
first make an assessment of the credibility and reliability of the sources of 
information and, to the extent possible, preliminarily characterise the na-
ture of alleged crimes, identify those involved, recommend targets of a 
possible investigation, and assess the likelihood of a successful comple-
tion of such an investigation (Regulation 4.5.). Obviously, the logic of 
those teams was to prepare an investigation and future cases, while taking 
into consideration issues related to complementarity (see the same Regu-
lation 4.5.). Those Draft Regulations were not approved by the first ICC 
Prosecutor. 
In this regard, the creation of a Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division (‘JCCD’) in the first years of the Court, which inte-
grates a section on preliminary examinations, was motivated by the will-
ingness to push for a positive approach to complementarity,4 although this 
was, according to some,5 too often in vein. In this regard, waiting for a 
State reaction to crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, may have 
been at the detriment of the preservation of crucial evidence. It is im-
portant to envisage the preservation of evidence in a strategic and system-
atic way, including the necessary protection of witnesses, and to plan very 
early on for an investigation. The JCCD rather focuses on the analysis of 
the criteria provided for in Article 53(1) of the Statute, and diplomatic 
exchanges with States especially with regard to the application of the 
principle of complementarity. While the Statute requires such an analysis 
and stresses the importance of the principle of complementarity between 
the Court and States, this cannot be at the expense of the fight against 
                                                   
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (‘Statute’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
4 See ICC-OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September 2006, pp. 4–5 (https://www. 
legal-tools.org/doc/6e3bf4/). 
5 See Human Rights Watch, Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice: Lessons 
from Colombia, Georgia, Guinea and the United Kingdom, 3 May 2018 (https://www. 
legal-tools.org/doc/442f1c/). 
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impunity which requires a prompt response from the OTP with regard to 
the collection of evidence. In the current structure adopted by the OTP, the 
JCCD is given priority with regard to the initiation of OTP activities in a 
situation, allowing the JCCD to retain control according to a recent report 
presented by an independent panel of experts6 and therefore delaying the 
preparation for the investigation, with the unfortunate consequence that 
evidence could be lost. 
It is important to understand that, as soon as the OTP becomes 
aware of crimes committed which could be under the jurisdiction of the 
Court, the immediate reaction of national jurisdictions towards those 
crimes needs to be monitored. As is well-known, there is a duty for na-
tional jurisdictions to react quickly and thoroughly in order to preserve 
evidence, especially regarding the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The jurisprudence of both the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (‘IACtHR’) and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) 
is clear on this topic. The ECtHR insists especially on the requirement of 
promptness with regard to the start of the investigation,7 as a prompt re-
sponse by the national authorities in charge of the investigation is “re-
garded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to 
the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or toler-
ance of unlawful acts”.8 Promptness goes hand in hand with effectiveness 
and national authorities in charge of the investigation must take all rea-
sonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, 
including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence.9 Fur-
thermore, the investigation must be independent from the executive and 
the victims must be able to participate effectively in the investigation.10 
                                                   
6 See ICC-OTP, “Annex 1: ICC OTP Kenya Cases: Review and Recommendations: Execu-
tive Summary of the Report of the External Independent Experts”, in “Full Statement of 
the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on external expert review and lessons drawn from the 
Kenya situation”, 26 November 2019, paras. E.10 and E.14 (‘Kenya Cases: Review and 
Recommendations: Executive Summary of the Report of the External Independent Ex-
perts’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/32p2hy/). 
7 See ECtHR, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Grand Chamber, 
Judgment, 13 December 2012, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:1213JUD003963009, para. 183 (‘El-
Masri Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3f5063/). 
8 See ECtHR, McKerr v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 4 May 2001, ECLI:CE:ECHR:
2001:0504JUD002888395, para. 114 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fa3ca4/). 
9 Ibid., para. 113. 
10 See El-Masri Judgment, paras. 184–85, see above note 7. 
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The IACtHR has found that the obligation to employ due diligence 
is “particularly stringent and important” in the face of serious human 
rights violations – including forced disappearances, extra judicial execu-
tions, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – and re-
quires the investigating body to “use all available means to carry out such 
steps and inquiries as are necessary to achieve the goal pursued within a 
reasonable time”.11 Efforts to investigate promptly should be increased in 
these cases 
because the passage of time has a directly proportionate rela-
tionship to the limitations to – and, in some cases, the impos-
sibility of – obtaining evidence and/or testimony, making it 
difficult and even rendering ineffective or invalid, the proba-
tive measures taken in order to elucidate the facts investigat-
ed, identify the possible authors and participants, and deter-
mine possible criminal responsibilities.12 
Moreover, the IACtHR has established that “it is necessary to act 
with special promptness when, owing to the design of the domestic laws, 
the possibility of filing a civil action for damages depends on the criminal 
proceeding”.13 This is precisely the case at the ICC where the right of 
victims to claim compensation is entirely dependent on the existence of an 
investigation and prosecutions; as stated by Pre-Trial Chamber I: 
any delay in the start of the investigation is a delay for the 
victims to be in a position to claim reparations for the harm 
suffered as a result of the commission of the crimes within 
the jurisdiction of this Court.14 
                                                   
11 IACtHR, Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 11 May 2007, para. 156 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/0c7f35/). See also IACtHR, Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, 
Judgment, 1 March 2005, para. 166 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5ae34f/); IACtHR, 
Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 31 January 2006, paras. 151–52, 184–88 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cb12ef/); IACtHR, Ticona Estrada et al. v. Bolivia, 
Judgment, 27 November 2008, paras. 79–82 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2cikyj/). 
12 IACtHR, Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, Judgment, 31 August 2011, para. 145 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/owwoho/). See also IACtHR, Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, 
Judgment, 12 August 2008, para. 150 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4c42c7/). 
13 IACtHR, Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, Judgment, 1 September 2015, para. 312 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/08ca92/). See also IACtHR, Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Judgment, 
21 May 2013, para. 102 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ikrdxc/). 
14 ICC, Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of 
the Statute”, 6 September 2018, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, para. 88 (‘Pre-Trial Decision on 
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It is against those standards that the OTP should assess the reaction 
of prosecutorial and judicial national authorities, especially with regard to 
the promptness of their response. Impunity for grave violations of human 
rights is “caused or facilitated notably by the lack of diligent reaction of 
institutions or state agents”.15 What matters here for the OTP is to analyse 
the concrete and prompt investigative steps taken by the national authori-
ties, not any kind of political response or general commitment to act. 
In case those national jurisdictions do not react, either because they 
do not have the capacity or because of mostly political unwillingness to 
do so, the OTP should react and start preserving evidence, even if the 
means at the disposal of the OTP are limited at that stage.16 This presup-
poses that investigators and analysts are involved very quickly and have 
the capacity to react when they receive information from victims, non-
governmental organisations (‘NGOs’), the United Nations (‘UN’) or for-
eign Governments. Otherwise, crucial evidence may be lost and this af-
fects the entirety of the proceedings before the Court. 
In its decision on the authorisation of an investigation in the situa-
tion in Burundi, Pre-Trial Chamber III17 stressed two important issues in 
relation to what the Court can do at the preliminary examination stage: (1) 
there is a possibility to involve the judiciary in the preservation of evi-
dence already at the stage of the preliminary examination in accordance 
with Rule 47 of the Rules, as the Pre-Trial Chamber may either appoint a 
counsel or a judge to be present during the taking of the testimony at the 
seat of the Court; and (2) there is also a possibility for the OTP, in co-
ordination with the Victims and Witnesses Unit, to already start taking 
                                                                                                                        
the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/ 
doc/73aeb4/). 
15 See Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Council of Europe, “Guide-
lines adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 March 2011 at the 1110th meeting of 
the Ministers’ Deputies”, in Eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations: 
Guidelines and reference texts, Strasbourg, 2011, p. 7; see also Guiding principles for the 
search for disappeared persons, UN Doc. CED/C/7, 8 May 2019, Principle 6, requiring that 
investigative activities start immediately and that evidence be preserved. 
16 See Article 15(2) of the Statute, see above note 3 and Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, 9 September 2002 (‘Rules’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f/). 
17 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Pre-Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of 
“Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investiga-
tion into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, 9 November 2017, ICC-01/17-9-Red, 
para. 15 (‘Burundi Article 15 Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8f2373/). 
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measures for the protection of witnesses at the stage of the preliminary 
examination. Indeed, although States are not obliged to co-operate at that 
stage, nothing prevents the OTP from asking their voluntary co-operation 
for the protection of victims and witnesses. The same is true for the volun-
tary co-operation which could be offered by NGOs or by inter-
governmental organisations, including the UN. Therefore, the preliminary 
examination could be a much more operational stage than it is now, 
geared towards investigation and case preparation. 
Furthermore, the ICC judiciary has been underlining for years that 
preliminary examinations are too long and should be concluded within a 
reasonable time.18 This has been recently reiterated, taking into considera-
tion the rights of the victims to have access to justice.19 Again, the quality 
of the investigation and the preparation of the case have implications for 
all those involved in the situation under preliminary examination or under 
investigation, especially the victims, whose rights to truth, justice and 
reparations are at stake. 
For example, complementarity considerations are cited by the Pros-
ecutor for explaining an 11-year long preliminary examination in the situ-
ation in Afghanistan (from 2006 until 2017), although the Prosecutor 
notes in her request under Article 15 of the Statute that, due to an amnesty 
law passed in 2007, near “total impunity has been the rule not the excep-
tion”.20 This is also true for other situations. In her request to be author-
ised to start an investigation in the situation in Georgia from 2015, the 
Prosecutor noted that “the timing of this Application has been determined 
largely by issues of admissibility as they relate to the progress of national 
                                                   
18 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Requesting 
Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central 
African Republic, 30 November 2006, ICC-01/05-6 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
76e607/). 
19 ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Repub-
lic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Application for 
Judicial Review by the Government of the Union of the Comoros”, 15 November 2018, 
ICC-01/13-68, paras. 119–20 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a268c5/); see also Pre-Trial 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction, paras. 84–88, see 
above note 14. 
20 ICC, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, OTP, Public redacted version of 
“Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, 20 November 2017, 
ICC-02/17-7-Red, para. 5 (‘Situation in Afghanistan OTP Request for Authorisation of an 
Investigation’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/db23eb/). 
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proceedings”.21 This statement should be compared with the following 
conclusion by Judge Peter Kovacs, in his separate opinion to the decision 
authorising the investigation in the situation in Georgia: 
The report presented suggests that at least during the period 
between December 2011 and 30 October 2014, the Georgian 
authorities were not investigating the serious incidents which 
are of concern to the ICC Prosecutor. Nor does this report 
reveal whether those low-level perpetrators referred to be-
long to those most responsible for the commission of the 
crimes in the course of the 2008 conflict. As such, said in-
vestigations do not fulfil the required admissibility test be-
fore the Court. Moreover, notably at this stage of the Geor-
gian investigation, no charge had been presented against any 
perpetrator, be it a low or high ranking one. In this regard, a 
six-year investigation without any charge being presented 
against a single perpetrator raises serious doubts as to the se-
riousness of such an investigation. To meet the admissibility 
test, a national investigation should not be confined to simp-
ly “collect evidence” but should aim at prosecutions. There-
fore, the Prosecutor could have reached the conclusion that 
the admissibility test was not met way before October 
2015.22 
If one compares the first report on preliminary examinations issued 
by the OTP in 201123 and the last one issued in 201924, it is striking to 
note that the situations in Colombia and Guinea were at what is referred to 
by the OTP as ‘Phase 3’ of the preliminary examination stage (that is, the 
stage concerning analysis of complementarity) in 2011 and were still at 
that stage in 2019. 
The length of preliminary examinations seems also to be the result 
of a sequential approach on the part of the OTP, namely by first assessing 
                                                   
21 ICC, Situation in Georgia, OTP, Corrected Version of “Request for authorisation of an 
investigation pursuant to article 15”, 16 October 2015, ICC-01/15-4-Corr, para. 13 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/75ab1e/). 
22 ICC, Situation in Georgia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, 27 
January 2016, ICC-01/15-12-Anx-Corr, para. 47 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/28b159/). 
23 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities, 13 December 2011, pp. 14 (Co-
lombia) and 21 (Guinea) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4aad1d/). 
24 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities, 5 December 2019, pp. 24 (Co-
lombia) and 37 (Guinea) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/lq7j94/). 
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jurisdiction and then assessing complementarity which delays even further 
the preliminary examination of a situation.25 Such a sequential approach 
is not required by the Statute. 
Respect for complementarity when national prosecutorial and judi-
cial authorities do not react promptly could simply end up in impunity 
both at the national and international levels. In this regard, it must be un-
derlined that the respect for complementarity and the fight against impuni-
ty must go hand in hand; this is the logic of the Statute which provides, 
even when there is an actual litigation on complementarity, for preserva-
tion of evidence, with the involvement of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber.26 
The principle of complementarity should not be a reason to delay 
early investigative steps or to unduly prolong preliminary examinations in 
the hope that, one day, national authorities will start an investigation, 
which in fact they are under the obligation to start immediately. Comple-
mentarity may be respected also after those investigative steps are taken 
or after the investigation is initiated by the ICC-OTP in case it appears 
that national authorities are willing and able to genuinely investigate and 
prosecute. 
The Appeals Chamber has determined that the factual situation on 
the basis of which the admissibility of a case is to be established is “am-
bulatory”.27 Therefore, the Prosecutor can revisit the issue of admissibility, 
with regard to its complementarity component, after the investigation has 
been initiated, by keeping under review the progress, if any, made by na-
tional authorities. In this regard, the Prosecutor may at any time decide 
not to prosecute in accordance with Article 53(2)(b) of the Statute, in case 
                                                   
25 Situation in Afghanistan OTP Request for Authorisation of an Investigation, para. 25, 
where it is stated that by 
the end of 2013, [the OTP] had obtained sufficiently credible and detailed information 
on approximately 200 incidents prioritised for analysis to enable a determination that 
there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes 
had been committed. […] Since then, the Prosecution has focused on analysing the 
admissibility of potential cases […]. 
Emphasis added, see above note 20. 
26 See Articles 18(6) and 19(8) of the Statute, see above note 3. 
27 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the 
Admissibility of the Case, 25 September 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, para. 56 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/ba82b5/). 
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national authorities become active, willing and able to genuinely investi-
gate the cases identified by the Prosecutor. In such a case, the result of the 
early investigate steps taken by the OTP could be provided to national 
authorities in accordance with Article 93(10) of the Statute, provided that 
the conditions of its application are respected, especially the protection of 
witnesses. Such steps could therefore be useful in assisting genuine na-
tional investigations and prosecutions, thus reinforcing the global fight 
against impunity. 
Furthermore, the Statute provides ample opportunities for States to 
make the Court respect the primacy of their national jurisdictions after the 
initiation of an investigation. Article 18(2) of the Statute allows a State, 
whether Party or not to the Statute, to request the Prosecutor to defer the 
investigation with regard to its nationals or others within its jurisdiction. 
The Prosecutor shall defer to the State’s investigation, unless she applies 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a decision to authorise the investigation. In 
such a case, the State in question has procedural standing before the Pre-
Trial Chamber and may appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling on admis-
sibility in accordance with Article 18(4) of the Statute. Furthermore, any 
State may also challenge the admissibility of a particular case in accord-
ance with Article 19 of the Statute. 
In case the Prosecutor decides to defer to the State’s investigation in 
accordance with Article 18(2) of the Statute, she will be in a much better 
position to properly assess the national investigations and prosecutions 
than at the stage of the preliminary examination. Indeed, after the initia-
tion of an investigation, States Parties are under an obligation to respond 
without undue delay to any request of the Prosecutor concerning the pro-
gress of their national investigations and prosecutions, in accordance with 
Article 18(5) of the Statute, an obligation which they do not have at the 
preliminary examination stage.28 As a matter of fact, in the situation in 
Afghanistan, as noted by the Prosecutor with regard to crimes allegedly 
committed by members of the Afghan authorities, the Government of Af-
ghanistan did not provide “any information on national proceedings to the 
Office, despite multiple requests for such information from the Office 
since 2008”.29 Moreover, the Prosecutor’s deferral to the State’s investiga-
                                                   
28 Burundi Article 15 Decision, para. 15, see above note 17. 
29 See ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 14 November 2016, para. 
217 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f30a53/); see also Situation in Afghanistan OTP Re-
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tion is open for review after six months or at any time when there has 
been a significant change of circumstances, in accordance with Article 
18(3) of the Statute. This could prove to be a more powerful incentive for 
national investigations and prosecutions than the Prosecutor waiting for 
an indefinite period of time at the preliminary examination stage for hypo-
thetical national proceedings. 
19.1.1.2. The Necessity to Adequately Prepare for the Investigation 
Recently, Pre-Trial Chamber III has emphasised the need for the Prosecu-
tor to have very early on a clear strategy with regard to the preservation of 
evidence, including by involving in this regard the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
accordance with Article 56 of the Statute: 
As a final remark, the Chamber considers that, considering 
the complexity of the situation, the specific circumstances of 
the victims, and the difficulties for the Trial Chambers to 
evaluate testimonial evidence when witnesses testify a long 
time after the events, it is advisable for the Prosecutor to use 
the dispositions of article 56 of the Statute to preserve evi-
dence which may not be available for the purposes of a po-
tential future trial or whose reliability may be undermined by 
lapse of time.30 
In this regard, it would be better for the OTP to have an investiga-
tion plan at the time it is presenting its request under Article 15(3) of the 
Statute for an authorisation to start an investigation. That investigation 
plan should involve investigators and analysts and envisage all the neces-
sary measures which should be taken with regard to the preservation of 
evidence, including the protection of potential witnesses, taking into con-
sideration the possible challenges with regard to the upcoming investiga-
tion, especially with regard to the access to evidence, both exculpatory 
                                                                                                                        
quest for Authorisation of an Investigation, paras. 23 and 27, where it appears that after 
more than 11 years of preliminary examination at the time of the Prosecutor requested au-
thorisation to investigate in Afghanistan, almost half – 14 out of 29 formal requests for in-
formation – of the OTP requests for additional information remained unanswered, see 
above note 20. 
30 ICC, Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisa-
tion of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic 
of the Union of Myanmar, 14 November 2019, ICC-01/19-27, para. 134 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/kbo3hy/). 
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and inculpatory, and the co-operation States are likely to offer. This was 
foreseen in Regulation 6 of the Draft Regulations in 2003, but it is not 
provided for in the Regulations of the OTP finally adopted in 2009.31 It is 
suggested, as a step further, that such an investigation plan should be 
submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber together with the request under Arti-
cle 15(3) of the Statute, in order to ensure that the judiciary is informed of 
how the investigation should unfold if authorised and that there is a fol-
low-up by a judicial body on this issue. 
For the moment, what the OTP is presenting to the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber together with its request under Article 15 of the Statute and the mate-
rial supporting it, is described in Regulation 49 of the Regulations of the 
Court (the ‘Regulations’). This information solely relates to: (1) the place 
and time of the alleged commission of the crimes; (2) the persons in-
volved, if identified, or a description of the persons or groups of persons 
involved; and (3) an appendix with the chronology of the relevant events, 
maps showing relevant information, including the location of the alleged 
crimes and an explanatory glossary of relevant names of persons, loca-
tions and institutions. 
The jurisprudence of Pre-Trial Chambers since the very first request 
presented by the OTP for an authorisation to start an investigation in the 
situation in Kenya, requires the OTP to present – and this is done usually 
in a confidential way32 – the following information: (1) the incidents that 
                                                   
31 ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). See especially Regulation 29 which only refers 
to an internal report, Regulation 35 only refers to an “evidence collection plan” and a “co-
operation plan”. Those OTP Regulations do not provide any detail and leave total liberty to 
the Prosecutor. 
32 See for the Situation in the Republic of Afghanistan, OTP, Annex 1: Public Redacted Ver-
sion: List of Annexes, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Anx1-Red (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/11af23/), referring to confidential annexes: 
• ANNEX 2A - CONF EXP: Indicative list of most serious incidents attributed to 
members of the Taliban and other anti-government armed groups; 
• ANNEX 2B - CONF-EXP: Indicative list of alleged most serious incidents at-
tributed to the Afghan National Security Forces; 
• ANNEX 2C - CONF EXP: Indicative list of most serious incidents attributed to 
members of United States Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency; 
• ANNEX 3A - CONF EXP: Preliminary list of persons or groups that appear to be 
the most responsible for the most serious crimes: Taliban and affiliated armed 
groups; 
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are likely to be the focus of an investigation; and (2) the groups of persons 
involved that are likely to be the target of an investigation for the purpose 
of identifying the potential cases under consideration.33 To a certain extent, 
it obliges the OTP to identify, but mostly for admissibility purposes under 
Articles 53(1)(b) and 17 of the Statute, who and what it plans to investi-
gate. 
This, however, falls short of a proper investigation plan34 which, 
according to the Draft Regulations should also include, inter alia: (1) a 
tentative indication of possible charges, modes of liability and potential 
defences, if any, as provided for in Article 31 of the Statute; (2) an expla-
nation of the role and place of the likely suspects in the relevant chains of 
authority; (3) the whereabouts, if known, of the possible suspects and the 
likelihood to arrest them; (4) a preliminary indication of resources, time 
and staff likely to be required to complete the investigation – in order to 
prepare a request to the Assembly of States Parties to get appropriate 
funding; (5) a preliminary indication of the main categories of evidence 
and the amount of evidence that is likely to be required to prove the pos-
sible charges, and of the evidence which is likely to be available to the 
OTP, both exculpatory and incriminatory; (6) matters relevant to State co-
operation and security; and (7) issues relevant to the protection of victims 
and witnesses. To this list, it would be useful to add, taking into consid-
eration the ICC mandate with regard to victims, issues relevant to the 
freezing of assets and property of the potential suspects and of the instru-
                                                                                                                        
• ANNEX 3B - CONF EXP: Preliminary list of persons or groups that appear to be 
the most responsible for the most serious crimes: Afghan National Security Forc-
es; and 
• ANNEX 3C - CONF EXP: Preliminary list of persons or groups that appear to be 
the most responsible for the most serious crimes: United States Armed Forces 
and the Central Intelligence Agency; 
See also: 
• ANNEX 4A - CONF EXP: Map of alleged incidents referred to in confidential ex 
parte Annex 2A; 
• ANNEX 4B - CONF EXP: Map of locations of Afghan detention facilities re-
ferred to in confidential ex parte Annex 2B; and 
• ANNEX 4C - CONF EXP: Map of alleged United States detention sites in Af-
ghanistan referred to in confidential ex parte Annex 2C. 
33 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Requesting Clarifi-
cation and Additional Information, 18 February 2010, ICC-01/09-15, para. 14 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/df9549/). 
34 See Draft Regulations, Book 3, Part II, Regulation 6.5., see above note 2. 
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mentalities and proceeds of crimes for the ultimate benefit of victims. 
While some of the requirements mentioned in the Draft Regulations may 
be difficult to provide as such an early stage – that is, the indication of 
modes of liability and potential defences – an investigation plan would 
certainly be a useful tool provided that, first, its development does not 
delay the request for authorisation to investigate under Article 15 of the 
Statute and, second, there is sufficient flexibility in order to adapt to the 
results of the collection of evidence. Such an investigation plan should be 
established irrespective of the trigger mechanism used to activate the 
Court’s jurisdiction. 
A Pre-Trial chamber could require the OTP to present such an in-
vestigation plan together with the request for the authorisation of an in-
vestigation submitted in accordance with Article 15(3) of the Statute. This 
should be possible without changing the applicable law before the ICC. In 
this regard, Rule 50(4) of the Rules already provides that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in deciding on the procedure to be followed, may request addi-
tional information from the Prosecutor. Other provisions in the Statute and 
the Rules could justify the Pre-Trial Chamber asking for such an investi-
gation plan, such as Article 68 of the Statute on the protection of victims 
and witnesses, Article 57(3)(e) of the Statute and Rule 99 of the Rules 
giving power to the Pre-Trial Chamber to request, proprio motu, the freez-
ing of assets and property belonging to the suspect or instrumentalities 
and proceeds of crimes, and Articles 56 and 57(3)(c) of the Statute giving 
proprio motu power to the Pre-Trial Chamber to preserve evidence, to 
provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses and the 
protection of national security information. Given the multiple powers the 
Pre-Trial Chamber enjoys during the investigation, both to ensure the 
rights of those involved in the proceedings and to ensure judicial supervi-
sion of the Prosecutor in the course of the investigation, it would be justi-
fied for the Pre-Trial Chamber to be informed in advance of the Prosecu-
tor’s investigation plan in order to ensure a proper judicial supervision 
during the entire investigation, especially with regard to the preservation 
of evidence in accordance with Article 56 of the Statute, as recently un-
derlined by Pre-Trial Chamber III. It is to be underlined, however, that 
judicial supervision does not mean that the Pre-Trial Chamber would re-
place the OTP in its investigation. 
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19.1.2. Case Preparation and Conduct of the Investigation 
The need to have an external review on the conduct of the investigation 
by the OTP will first be analysed (Section 19.1.2.1.) and thereafter the 
need to complete the investigation already at the pre-trial stage of the case 
(Section 19.1.2.2.). 
19.1.2.1. The Need for an External Review on the Conduct of the 
Investigation 
After the formal start of an investigation, there would certainly be an ad-
vantage to have an external review of the proper implementation of the 
investigation plan. This could be entrusted to the judiciary, through re-
ports from the OTP to the Pre-Trial Chamber, at regular intervals, 
throughout the investigation, containing explanations of the eventual de-
viations from the investigation plan. To a certain extent, such a periodical 
review of the investigation – but not the plan which was never given to a 
Pre-Trial Chamber – was started by Pre-Trial Chamber I during the first 
years of the ICC, in the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Con-
go35 and in the situation in Darfur, Sudan.36 Those attempts were fiercely 
opposed by the OTP37 and were not continued. 
At the ICC, it would certainly be useful to have a periodical review 
of the investigation plan by a judge in the Pre-Trial Chamber assigned 
with the situation, but also more generally a review of the cases the Prose-
cutor plans to bring to Chambers in order for that judge to identify even-
tually flaws in those cases for prosecution purposes and issue recommen-
dations to the OTP on what evidence is missing or what should be envis-
aged in a different way with regard to the theory of the case. Furthermore, 
that judge would be in charge of ensuring the OTP conducts its investiga-
tion in accordance with Article 54(1)(a) of the Statute, that is, investigat-
                                                   
35 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision to 
Convene a Status Conference, 17 February 2005, ICC-01/04-9 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/236413/). 
36 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Inviting Observations in 
Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 24 July 2006, ICC-
02/05-10 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/657682/). 
37 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, OTP, Submission of the Redacted 
Version of the Prosecutor’s Position on Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 17 February 2005 Decision 
to Convene a Status Conference, 11 March 2005, ICC-01/04-12 and ICC-01/04-12-Anx 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5475b7/ and https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/764580/). 
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ing equally exonerating and incriminating circumstances. It could also be 
interesting to involve the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence38 or an 
ad hoc counsel representing the interests of the defence, in order to ensure 
that early preservation of exonerating evidence is thoroughly pursued. 
Such recommendations would not be binding on the Prosecutor but would 
allow the opening of new lines of investigation or a change in the theory 
of the case taking into consideration the evidence collected so far. They 
would also contribute to avoiding more litigation. However, those rec-
ommendations would be filed in the record and would be accessible to the 
judges at the pre-trial, trial and appeals stages. 
It is worth noting that the Statute already provides for the judges to 
issue recommendations with regard to the preservation of evidence and to 
appoint a counsel to represent the interests of the defence during the in-
vestigation (see Article 56(2) of the Statute). This would be another way 
for the judges to get involved very early on in the process and to have an 
early judicial review in order to avoid problems later on in the proceed-
ings. It would be easier for the Prosecutor to take those recommendations 
into consideration at a very early stage of the process, where the cases are 
still in the making and nobody is arrested. To try to correct those mistakes 
at the confirmation of charges stage is often too late or far more difficult. 
Furthermore, this would allow an early intervention in a very confidential 
way. 
19.1.2.2. The Need to Complete the Investigation at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case 
With regard to the conduct of the investigation as a whole, Pre-Trial 
Chambers have very early underlined in their jurisprudence that it was 
crucial for the investigation to be completed before the confirmation of 
charges hearing.39 Unfortunately, this attempt was not supported by the 
Appeals Chamber,40 in order to give maximum flexibility to the OTP. This 
                                                   
38 See Regulation 77 of the Regulations of the Court, 26 May 2004 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/2988d1/). 
39 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Establishing General Principles Governing 
Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, 19 May 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-108-Corr, para. 39 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/6ddc24/). 
40 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the deci-
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was probably a mistake unfortunately committed by the Appeals Chamber 
in its early years, a mistake which the Appeals Chamber finally realised 
(too late maybe?) and tried to correct in 2012 by stating that the investiga-
tion should largely be completed at the stage of the confirmation of charg-
es hearing.41 It is worth mentioning that the OTP itself realised the neces-
sity to be trial-ready at the stage of the confirmation of the charges. This 
change in policy unfortunately only intervened in the 2012-2015 Strategic 
Plan where the OTP declared: 
Thirdly, the Office will aim at presenting cases at confirma-
tion hearing that are as trial ready as possible. If meeting 
such a threshold would not be possible at the moment of ap-
plying for an arrest warrant or summons to appear (e.g. arrest 
opportunity, witnesses only willing to cooperate after an ar-
rest), the Office intends to only proceed with the application 
if there are sufficient prospects to further collect evidence to 
be trial-ready within a reasonable timeframe.42 
Therefore, the practice followed during the early years of the ICC 
produced unfortunate results especially in the situation in the Republic of 
Kenya. It is interesting here to quote the dissenting opinion of the dearly-
missed Judge Hans-Peter Kaul on the decisions concerning the confirma-
tion of the two cases first emanating from that situation: 
Another example of such unsatisfactory investigation would 
be an approach which de facto is aiming, in a first phase, 
(only) at gathering enough evidence to reach the “sufficiency 
standard” within the meaning of article 61(7) of the Statute, 
maybe in the expectation or hope that in a further phase after 
                                                                                                                        
sion of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles Governing 
Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence”, 13 October 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, paras. 52–54 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7813d4/). 
41 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the deci-
sion of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirmation 
of charges”, 30 May 2012, ICC-01/04-01/10-514, para. 44 (‘Mbarushimana Appeals 
Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6ead30/). 
42 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, p. 14 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/954beb/). It is interesting to note that in the same strategic plan the OTP an-
nounced that there would be an increase in the number of investigators and analysts (para. 
45, p. 22). 
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the confirmation proceedings, additional and more convinc-
ing evidence may be assembled to attain the ‘beyond reason-
able doubt’ threshold, as required by article 66(3) of the 
Statute. I believe that such an approach, as tempting as it 
might be for the Prosecutor, would be risky, if not irrespon-
sible: if after the confirmation of the charges it turns out as 
impossible to gather further evidence to attain the decisive 
threshold of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, the case in question 
may become very difficult or may eventually collapse at trial, 
then with many serious consequences, including for the en-
tire Court and the victims who have placed great hopes in 
this institution.43 
Both cases in the situation in Kenya then collapsed at the trial 
stage.44 It is to be recalled in this respect that, during the pre-trial stage, 
two cases, each against three persons, were presented by the OTP.45 The 
OTP requested and obtained three summonses to appear against Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Mohammed Hussein Ali, Wil-
liam Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang.46 
                                                   
43 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opin-
ion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, in Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, 
para. 52 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4972c0/); see also ICC, Situation in the Republic 
of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua 
Arap Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, in Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 
23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, para. 47 (‘Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Pre-Trial Dis-
senting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/96c3c2/). 
44 See also in this regard, Kenya Cases: Review and Recommendations: Executive Summary 
of the Report of the External Independent Experts, E.17, see above note 6. 
45 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, OTP, Prosecutor’s Application Pur-
suant to Article 58 as to Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Moham-
med Hussein Ali, 15 December 2010, ICC-01/09-02/11-35-Red2 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/fd1a68/); see also ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Wil-
liam Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, OTP, Prosecutor’s Ap-
plication Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang, 15 December 2010, ICC-01/09-01/11-26-Red2 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/c6cf4c/). 
46 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohamed Hussein Ali, 8 March 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-1 (https://
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At the confirmation of charges stage, the charges against two of 
them (Mohammed Hussein Ali and Henry Kiprono Kosgey) were dis-
missed in their entirety. For the four others, charges were confirmed par-
tially. It is often forgotten that between 2006 and 2012, 29% of the cases 
at the ICC did not even go to trial. In this regard, the above-mentioned 
change in policy adopted by the OTP in its 2012-2015 Strategic Plan was 
certainly a positive development which must be kept for the future as 
good practice. All cases where the confirmation of charges procedure 
started thereafter were confirmed, albeit sometimes only partially. 
Out of the four persons sent to trial in the two cases in the situation 
in Kenya, none were convicted. With regard to Francis Kirimi Muthaura 
and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, the trial did not even start. The Prosecutor 
decided, in March 2013, to withdraw all charges against Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura as she considered that she had no reasonable prospect of con-
viction.47 With regard to Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, the Prosecutor decided 
to withdraw the charges in December 2014.48 
With regard to the case against William Samoei Ruto and Joshua 
Arap Sang, the proceedings were stopped in 2016, after the Prosecutor’s 
case ended, as the Trial Chamber concluded that “the evidence does not 
support the Network or existence of an organisational policy in the sense 
of Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute”.49 Back in 2012, this was already the 
conclusion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul at the stage of the confirmation of 
charges: 
                                                                                                                        
www.legal-tools.org/doc/df8391/); see also ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for Wil-
liam Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 8 March 2011, ICC-
01/09-01/11-1 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6c9fb0/). 
47 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, Prosecution notification of withdrawal of the charges 
against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 11 March 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-687 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/9d2c58/). 
48 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, 
Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 2014, 
ICC-01/09-02/11-983 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b57a97/). 
49 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber, Reasons of Judge Fremr, in Public redacted version of 
Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, 5 April 2016, ICC-01/09-
01/11-2027-Red-Corr, para. 131 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6baecd/). 
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as to the alleged existence of the various components of the 
‘Network’ […], according to my reading of the evidence, 
[they] did either not exist in that form or are reflective of the 
tribal component of the ‘Network’. My conclusion therefore 
was that the violence during the 2007/2008 violence was in 
essence ethnically driven.50 
It is interesting to compare this sequence of events with the se-
quence of events in the Laurent Gbagbo case. In 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I adjourned the confirmation of charges hearing, by majority, underlining 
that it was “difficult for the Chamber to determine whether the perpetra-
tors acted pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy to attack a civilian 
population as required by article 7(2)(a) of the Statute”.51 It therefore re-
quested the Prosecutor to conduct a further investigation especially with 
regard to “the incidents allegedly constituting the attack against the ‘pro-
Ouattara civilian population’ and whether the alleged physical perpetra-
tors were acting pursuant to or in furtherance of the alleged policy”.52 
Six years later, Trial Chamber I reached the following conclusion: 
the Prosecutor has failed to demonstrate (1) the existence of the alleged 
policy to attack the civilian population on the basis of the alleged pattern 
of violence and other circumstantial evidence cited in support; and (2) that 
the crimes as alleged in the charges were committed pursuant to or in fur-
therance of a State or organisational policy to attack the civilian popula-
tion.53 
One could draw several conclusions from those cases: (1) a warning 
at the pre-trial stage means a problem at trial and a serious risk that the 
trial may collapse; (2) the problems in a particular case do not change 
                                                   
50 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Pre-Trial Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, para. 12, 
see above note 43. 
51 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to 
article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3 June 2013, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, para. 36 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/). 
52 Ibid., para. 44. 
53 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Reasons for oral decision of 15 January 2019 on the 
Requête de la Défense de Laurent Gbagbo afin qu’un jugement d’acquittement portant sur 
toutes les charges soit prononcé en faveur de Laurent Gbagbo et que sa mise en liberté 
immédiate soit ordonnée, and on the Blé Goudé Defence no case to answer motion, 16 July 
2019, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263, para. 28 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/440017/). 
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between pre-trial and trial: the warning in both cases was on the contextu-
al elements of crimes against humanity and the cases collapsed at trial on 
those same contextual elements; (3) the fact that, as common law lawyers 
at the ICC tend to repeat too often, witnesses do not appear at the pre-trial 
stage and therefore it is not possible to foresee what they will say at trial, 
does not mean that weaknesses and contradictions in their written state-
ments will disappear at the trial stage. What is absolutely clear is that a 
bad witness statement at pre-trial does not become good evidence at trial. 
There is no magic for the Prosecutor at trial so that suddenly all problems 
would be solved and the witnesses would start to say exactly what the 
Prosecutor needs to demonstrate. 
The involvement of the judiciary early on in the proceedings cer-
tainly provides a useful check on the Prosecutor’s case and the quality of 
its evidence and preparation, although the OTP has not seen it in that way, 
unfortunately. The pre-trial stage should be an opportunity for the Prose-
cutor to revise her cases, to strengthen the evidence, and reformulate the 
theory of the case when the evidence does not correspond to it. 
Other aspects of the investigation should also be dealt with as soon 
as possible by the OTP during the investigation, in particular the protec-
tion of witnesses and the freezing of assets, proceeds and instrumentalities 
of crimes. Very often the protection of witnesses only starts after the arrest 
of the suspect, which could be a cause of delay in pre-confirmation pro-
ceedings as witnesses have to be relocated before disclosure or, alterna-
tively, numerous requests for anonymous summaries have to be made by 
the OTP at the pre-trial stage, which is a source of delay in the proceed-
ings. Furthermore, those anonymous summaries cannot be used at trial 
which is again a source of delay between the end of the pre-trial proceed-
ings and the beginning of the trial. 
With regard to the freezing of assets and properties belonging to the 
suspect and proceeds and instrumentalities of crimes, this should be done 
as a priority during the investigation and not after the arrest, as it simply 
means that nothing will be frozen because the suspect will seek to hide his 
assets and the proceeds of crimes. All relevant information shall be pre-
sented to the Pre-Trial Chamber, or the competent judge at the national 
level, at the time the Prosecutor requests the issuance of a warrant of ar-
rest so that the orders for freezing are issued at the same time the warrant 
of arrest is issued. Very often those judicial orders are essential to allow 
co-operation from other States with regard to the freezing of assets. 
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There are other important ways in which the judiciary may assist in 
the preparation of the case to ensure its quality. Especially for core inter-
national crimes, it is necessary to collect evidence very early on in order 
to eventually be in a position to use it much later. It is extremely difficult 
to proceed successfully with a case when people are still in power and this 
is true both at the national and the international levels. The actual prose-
cution may therefore take place years or decades after the facts. There is a 
need to organise accordingly the preservation of the evidence in order to 
be in a position to use it in court many years later. The involvement of the 
judiciary in the early preservation of that evidence in order to successfully 
use it later should also be envisaged. Such an involvement may increase 
the probative value of the evidence collected with the intervention of a 
judge or of a counsel, representing the interests of ‘future’ accused, ap-
pointed by a judge. This is true at the ICC through Article 56 of the Stat-
ute, but this should also be explored at the national level. 
The involvement of the judiciary is also crucial in the framing of 
the charges, as will be discussed next. 
19.2. The Framing of the Charges 
When framing the charges, the degree of specificity which must be 
reached with regard to the facts has been the subject of intense debate at 
the ICC. This debate is intrinsically linked to the ICC’s specific procedur-
al framework which departs from the one applicable at the ad hoc Tribu-
nals,54 where there was no Pre-Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor could 
amend the indictment at will, including during the course of the trial. The 
procedural compromises made in Rome are still difficult for the Judges to 
digest in order to finally reach an agreement on how to apply the unique 
ICC procedural framework. More than 17 years after the entry into force 
of the Statute, there are still sharp disagreements among the ICC Judges 
on fundamental issues regarding key aspects of the proceedings before the 
ICC. 
Terminology is, as usual, of the essence in this debate, and the ini-
tial question is simply: what is a charge? With regard to the definition of 
                                                   
54 Reference is made here to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda which are no longer operational. 
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the charges, a combined reading of Article 7455 of the Statute and Regula-
tion 52 of the Regulations indicates that a ‘charge’ is comprised of the 
factual allegations together with their legal characterisation. This can be 
deduced from the wording of Regulation 52 of the Regulations, which 
makes reference to “a statement of facts, including the time and place of 
the alleged crimes” (Regulation 52(b) of the Regulations) and “a legal 
characterisation of the facts” (Regulation 52(c) of the Regulations). This 
understanding has been reflected in the jurisprudence: 
[A] ‘charge’ must be understood further to a combined read-
ing of article 74(2) of the Statute and regulation 52 of the 
Regulations of the Court as: a statement of the facts and cir-
cumstances including the time and place of the alleged 
crimes; and a legal characterisation of the fact to accord both 
with the crimes under articles 6, 7, or 8 of the Statute and the 
precise form of participation under articles 25 and 28 of the 
Statute.56 
In that same decision, Trial Chamber II stated that “under no cir-
cumstances can a charge be a mere statement of the legal characterisa-
tion”. 57  Although the question seems to revolve around the degree of 
specificity of the facts mentioned in the charges, it is linked also to the 
moment when that specificity must be reached and to the respective roles 
of the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers in this respect. 
This issue arose quite dramatically in the Appeals Chamber Judgement in 
the case against Jean-Pierre Bemba.58 
                                                   
55 Article 74(2), second sentence, of the Statute provides that the “decision shall not exceed 
the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges”, 
see above note 3. 
56 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Filing of a Summary of 
the Charges by the Prosecutor, 21 October 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1547-tENG, para. 10 
(‘Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Filing of a Summary of the Charges by 
the Prosecutor’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7e906f/). 
57 Ibid. 
58 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 June 2018, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red (‘Bemba Appeals Judgement’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/40d35b/); see also Bemba Appeals Judgement, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji 
Mmasenomo Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-
Anx1-Red (‘Bemba Dissenting Opinion’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc2518/); 
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To try to understand the different approaches in this debate, the ICC 
practice before the Bemba Appeals Judgement will be analysed first (Sec-
tion 19.2.1.), then the different views expressed by the (very divided) Ap-
peals Chamber in the Bemba Appeals Judgement (Section 19.2.2.), and, 
finally, the (emerging) jurisprudence after the Bemba Appeals Judgement 
(Section 19.2.3.). 
19.2.1. The ICC Practice Before the Bemba Appeals Judgement 
Back in 2009, the Prosecutor tried to make a distinction between the ‘facts 
of the case’ and the ‘facts constituting the charges’ in the Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui case, which would have allowed the Prosecutor to intro-
duce more and/or different criminal acts at trial, provided that those crim-
inal acts generally fell within the crimes confirmed by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber (that is, ‘rape’ or ‘murder’ for example). The Prosecutor’s at-
tempt to modify the factual basis of the charges at trial was rejected by 
Trial Chamber II: 
Irrespective even of this requirement for precision, the 
Chamber is unable to accept the distinction made by the 
Prosecutor between the facts constituting the charges and the 
facts of the case. The core legal texts make no distinction of 
this sort, but only between the “facts and circumstances” and 
the “legal characterisations” on the one hand - both of which 
constitute the charges - and the evidence on the other. Even 
if the Prosecutor intends to define in the instant case, the 
“facts of the case” as mere “[TRANSLATION] concise 
summaries of the evidence”, in practice, the distinction he 
advocates and the resulting use of the term “fact” may con-
stitute a source of ambiguity, confusion and contention at tri-
al. It is appropriate to prevent the Chamber from having to 
consider new facts, which have not expressly been accepted 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber as this would run contrary to the 
provisions of the Statute. To grant the Trial Chamber the 
power to not only modify the legal characterisation of the 
facts, as permitted by regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court, but also to modify the facts of which it is seized or to 
                                                                                                                        
Bemba Appeals Judgement, Separate opinion Judge Christine van den Wyngaert and Judge 
Howard Morrison, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2 (‘Bemba Separate Opinion’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c13ef4/); and Bemba Appeals Judgement, Concurring 
Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx3 (‘Bem-
ba Concurring Opinion’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b31f6b/). 
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deal with new facts, would confer upon it power not be-
stowed by the core legal texts.59 
However, with regard to what has to be understood by ‘facts’, the 
discussion within the ICC did not stop there. A (new) distinction was in-
troduced in the jurisprudence of the Court in 2011, between ‘material’ 
facts and ‘subsidiary’ facts: 
It is important to bear in mind the distinction between, on the 
one hand, the facts and circumstances underlying the charges 
(that is, “the facts and circumstances described in the charg-
es” within the meaning of article 74(2) of the Statute and 
regulation 55(1) of the Regulations) and, on the other hand, 
other facts which are not mentioned in the charge but which 
are subsidiary or otherwise related to them, in particular 
since proof of the material facts may be inferred from them. 
Furthermore, these subsidiary facts are also relevant to the 
extent that they provide background information.60 
The purpose of such a distinction, as with the distinction between 
the ‘facts of the case’ and the ‘facts constituting the charges’, was to allow 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm charges not defined in an exhaustive 
manner: some examples of rapes or murders would justify the confirma-
tion of the charge of rape or murder in a certain place and at a certain 
moment (both being eventually broadly defined), without further preci-
sion and therefore not precluding the addition of other criminal acts at 
trial. Subsequent jurisprudence was nevertheless inconsistent with regard 
to the distinction between material and subsidiary facts. While that dis-
tinction was made in the decision on the confirmation of the charges in 
the case against Callixte Mbarushimana,61 no such distinction was made 
                                                   
59 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Filing of a Summary of the Charges by 
the Prosecutor, para. 19, see above note 56. 
60 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and 
Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Pre-Trial Chamber, Corrigendum of the “Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges”, 7 March 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, para. 36 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5ac9eb/). 
61 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 16 December 
2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, paras. 81–82 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/63028f/). 
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in the decisions on the confirmation of the charges in the cases arising 
from the situation in Kenya.62 
This distinction was endorsed by Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Laurent 
Gbagbo case,63 but rejected by the Appeals Chamber in the very same 
case, stating that the applicable law before the Court did not make a dis-
tinction between ‘material’ and ‘subsidiary’ facts, but simply referred to 
‘facts’.64 
However, the distinction appeared again in the Pre-Trial Practice 
Manual (the ‘Practice Manual’) which was signed in September 2015, by 
the then President of the Pre-Trial Division. On this issue, the Practice 
Manual states the following: 
The charges on which the Prosecutor intends to bring the 
person to trial to be presented prior to the confirmation hear-
ing (cf. article 61(3)(a) of the Statute) shall be spelt out in a 
clear, exhaustive and self-contained way and shall include all, 
and not more than, the “material facts and circumstances” 
(i.e. the facts and circumstances that must be described in the 
charges (cf. article 74(2) of the Statute) and which are the 
only facts subject to judicial determination to the applicable 
standard of proof at confirmation and trial stages, respective-
ly) and their legal characterisation. There shall be no confu-
sion between the material facts described in the charges and 
the “subsidiary facts” (i.e. those facts that are relied upon by 
the Prosecutor as part of his/her argumentation in support of 
                                                   
62 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 Jan-
uary 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, see above note 43; and ICC, Situation in the Repub-
lic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua 
Arap Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Arti-
cle 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, see 
above note 43. 
63 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision on the date of the confirmation of charges hearing and proceed-
ings leading thereto, 14 December 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-325, para. 27 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c5cddf/). 
64 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Ap-
peals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of 3 June 2013 entitled “Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of 
charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute”, 16 December 2013, ICC-
02/11-01/11-572, para. 37 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1bffda/). 
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the charges and, as such, are functionally “evidence”). In-
deed, the Prosecutor may present submissions by which 
he/she proposes a narrative of the relevant events and an 
analysis of facts and evidence in order to persuade the Pre-
Trial Chamber to confirm the charges. However, these sub-
missions in support of the charges should not be confused 
with the charges. These submissions/argumentation can be 
included either in the same document containing the charges 
or in a separate filing (a sort of a “[pre-]confirmation brief”). 
If the Prosecutor chooses to include submissions in the doc-
ument containing the charges rather than in a separate filing, 
the two sections – “charges” and “submissions” – must be 
kept clearly separate, and no footnotes containing cross-
references or reference to evidence must be included in the 
charges.65 
With regard to the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the process of 
the confirmation of the charges, the Practice Manual added: 
Findings on the substantial grounds to believe standard are 
made exclusively with respect to the material facts described 
in the charges, and there is no requirement that each item of 
evidence or each subsidiary fact relied upon by either party 
be addressed or referred to in the confirmation decision – nor 
would this be realistic or otherwise providing any benefit.66 
Thereafter, the distinction between material and subsidiary facts 
was made in the decision on the confirmation of charges in the Dominic 
Ongwen case.67 
With regard to the respective roles of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
Prosecutor and the Trial Chamber with regard to the framing of the charg-
es, Trial Chamber II in the Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
case underlined that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on the confirmation 
                                                   
65 Practice Manual, 4 September 2015, pp. 11–12 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dd93f1/). 
66 Ibid., p. 16. 
67 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 23 March 2016, ICC-02/04-
01/15-422-Red, see the part of the decision on the “charges confirmed” (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/74fc6e/). 
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of the charges crystallised the charges.68 Trial Chamber VII, by majority, 
came to the following conclusion: 
It follows from the above that the Statute foresees a shift of 
authority to define the factual scope of the case: while at the 
stage of submitting the DCC [Document containing the 
Charges] this authority rests squarely with the prosecution, at 
the confirmation stage, such authority passes over to the Pre-
Trial Chamber. In other words, at the confirmation stage the 
Pre-Trial Chamber has the sole authority to define the pa-
rameters of the case for the purpose of ensuing trial proceed-
ings; the confirmation of charges decision rendered under 
Article 61(7)(a) of the Statute sets out the charges, which, as 
such, also binds the Trial Chamber.69 
19.2.2. The Bemba Appeals Judgement: A Divided Chamber with 
Multiple Views 
The issue of the framing of the charges arose again in the Bemba Appeals 
Judgement, more precisely with regard to Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s 
second ground of appeal which was upheld by the majority of the Appeals 
Chamber. In that case, the defence challenged the overly broad definition 
of the charges which were defined, with regard to the facts, according to 
geographic and temporal parameters, that is, the territory of the Central 
African Republic (‘CAR’) and from October 2002 until March 2003. 
Moreover, the defence criticised the fact that Mr. Bemba was convicted 
for individual acts of murder, rape and pillaging committed against partic-
ular victims at specific times and places that had not been confirmed by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.70 
During the confirmation process, in the Amended Document Con-
taining the Charges, the Prosecutor listed a number of alleged criminal 
acts of murder, rape and pillaging, but, through the use of expressions 
such as ‘include’ or ‘include but are not limited to’, indicated that this list 
                                                   
68 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Filing of a Summary of the Charges by 
the Prosecutor, para. 31, see above note 56. 
69 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu 
and Narcisse Arido, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Submission of Auxiliary Documents, 
10 June 2015, ICC-01/05-01/13-992, para. 12 (‘Bemba Trial Decision on the Submission 
of Auxiliary Documents’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6a4ba2/). 
70 Bemba Appeals Judgement, para. 99, see above note 58. 
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was not complete or exhaustive.71 The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed in 
broad terms charges of murder as a war crime and as a crime against hu-
manity, rape as a war crime and as a crime against humanity, and pillaging 
as a war crime, finding substantial grounds to believe that these crimes 
had been perpetrated against civilians by the Mouvement de Libération du 
Congo (‘MLC’) soldiers in the CAR from 26 October 2002 until 15 
March 2003, without limiting its findings to a specific number of acts of 
murder, rape or pillaging.72 
Analysing the scope of the conviction decision, the Appeals Cham-
ber rejected, once more, the distinction between ‘material’ and ‘subsidi-
ary’ facts: 
The Appeals Chamber therefore rejects, by majority, Judge 
Monageng and Judge Hofmański dissenting, the Prosecutor’s 
submission, at the appeal hearing, that Mr Bemba was 
charged with, and convicted of, generally crimes of murder, 
rape and pillaging committed by MLC soldiers on the territo-
ry of the CAR from 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, 
which constituted the [sic] “the facts and circumstances” in 
the present case, and that the criminal acts were merely 
“subsidiary facts” or “evidence”, “used in this case to estab-
lish the material fact”.73 
Turning thereafter to the question of the necessary precision in the 
description of the factual basis of the charges, the Appeals Chamber criti-
cised both the Trial Chamber and the Pre-Trial Chamber stating: 
The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Confirmation Decision 
in its operative part was equally broad as the disposition of 
the Conviction Decision: the charges against Mr Bemba 
were “confirmed” in relation to categories of crimes, without 
any further qualification. Clearly this broad formulation 
would have been an insufficient basis to bring Mr Bemba to 
trial and cannot be said to amount to a description of “facts 
and circumstances” in terms of article 74 (2) of the Statute.74 
The Appeals Chamber added: 
                                                   
71 Ibid., para. 75. 
72 Ibid., para. 76. 
73 Ibid., para. 104. 
74 Ibid., para. 107. 
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Simply listing the categories of crimes with which a person 
is to be charged or stating, in broad general terms, the tem-
poral and geographical parameters of the charge is not suffi-
cient to comply with the requirements of regulation 52 (b) of 
the Regulations of the Court and does not allow for a mean-
ingful application of article 74 (2) of the Statute.75 
The Appeals Chamber then considered that the criminal acts that the 
Prosecutor added after the decision on the confirmation of the charges 
was issued could not be said to have been part of the “facts and circum-
stances described in the charges” in terms of Article 74(2) of the Statute. 
In order to add those additional criminal acts of murder, rape and pillage, 
an amendment to the charges would have been required.76 
The Appeals Chamber does not develop on which Chamber, Pre-
Trial or Trial, should have been in charge of deciding on the amendment 
of the charges, for the simple reason that the majority itself was divided 
on this issue. Whereas the Bemba Separate Opinion77 insists on the role of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm the charges including all alleged crimi-
nal acts, the Bemba Concurring Opinion underlines that the Trial Cham-
ber should not be precluded from giving leave to the amendment of the 
charges after the trial has begun.78 
It is interesting to analyse the strong disagreement expressed in the 
Bemba Dissenting Opinion with regard to this issue of the framing of the 
charges. The arguments put forward mainly relate to the dissenting Judg-
es’ understanding of the respective roles of the Prosecutor and the Pre-
Trial Chamber and are informed by what they call the ‘Prosecutor’s dis-
cretion’ to formulate the charges: 
We consider that it is for the Prosecutor to define the factual 
scope of a case and that the identification of the broad pa-
rameters of a case may suffice to serve article 74 (2)’s pur-
pose of delineating the jurisdiction of the trial chamber.79 
[…] In our view, the pre-trial chamber is tasked with 
determining whether there is a case to be tried – “whether 
                                                   
75 Ibid., para. 110. 
76 Ibid., para. 115. 
77 Bemba Separate Opinion, para. 25, see above note 58. 
78 Bemba Concurring Opinion, paras. 122 and 140, see above note 58. 
79 Bemba Dissenting Opinion, para. 20, see above note 58. 
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there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed each of the crimes 
charged” – and not with confirming or crystallising the to-
tality of the factual allegations underpinning these charges 
for the purposes of the trial. Again for this purpose, we con-
sider that the pre-trial chamber may confirm the crimes 
charged in a broad manner depending on the nature of the 
charges brought by the Prosecutor.80 
[…] 
In this regard, we note that articles 58 and 61 of the 
Statute vest the Prosecutor with exclusive authority to frame 
the charges, with the role of the pre-trial chamber being re-
stricted, under article 61 (7) of the Statute, to confirming the 
charges, declining to confirm the charges or adjourning the 
hearing and requesting the Prosecutor to consider amending 
a charge or providing further evidence or conducting further 
investigation with respect to a particular charge. Read to-
gether, we consider these provisions to reflect adherence to 
the accusatorial principle. They are aimed at ensuring that 
responsibility for framing the charges and determining the 
scope of the criminal trial remains with the Prosecutor 
throughout the proceedings, subject to the confirmation or 
non-confirmation of the charges by the pre-trial chamber.81 
We further consider that the Prosecutor has discretion to 
formulate the charges in a manner appropriate to the type of 
case she wishes to bring. From the perspective of article 74 
(2) of the Statute, it is important that the charges are de-
scribed in a way that enables the chamber, as well as the par-
ties and participants, to determine with certainty which sets 
of historical events, in the course of which crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court are alleged to have been committed, 
form part of the charges, and which do not. This delineation 
can be made based on specific criminal acts; however, de-
pending on the case, the delineation may also be made based 
on broader parameters, for instance, by specifying a period 
of time and a geographical area over which criminal acts 
                                                   
80 Ibid., para. 21; compare with Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Trial Decision on the Filing of a 
Summary of the Charges by the Prosecutor, para. 31, see above note 56. 
81 Bemba Dissenting Opinion, para. 26, see above note 58; compare with Bemba Trial Deci-
sion on the Submission of Auxiliary Documents, para. 12, see above note 69. 
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were allegedly committed by an identifiable group of perpe-
trators against an identifiable group of victims.82 
It is this understanding of the ICC procedural framework which led 
the dissenting Judges to conclude that the Prosecutor could rely at trial on 
criminal acts not relied upon during the confirmation process, subject to 
appropriate notification to the accused.83 Such an understanding begs the 
question, as raised in the Bemba Separate Opinion,84 of what is the pur-
pose of the confirmation process: if the Pre-Trial Chamber is only here to 
confirm an ‘historical set of events’ and whether there is a case to be tried, 
leaving the Prosecutor freedom to modify the case at trial, there seems to 
be no real difference with the (very light) process of the indictment con-
firmation which existed before the ad hoc tribunals and the (much more 
substantial) process of the charges confirmation at the ICC. No reference 
is made in the Bemba Dissenting Opinion to the fact that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is supposed to commit the person to a Trial Chamber for a trial 
on the charges as confirmed (Article 61(7)(a) of the Statute). The differ-
ence between the confirmation process before the ad hoc tribunals and 
before the ICC has already been underlined by the Appeals Chamber.85 
More than 20 years after the adoption of the Statute, nostalgia for 
the system followed by the ad hoc Tribunals seems to have developed, 
which was obviously rejected during the negotiations on the Statute. Oth-
erwise, it would have been extremely easy to simply copy and paste into 
the Statute the system followed by the ad hoc Tribunals, which was al-
ready in place at the time of the negotiations on the Statute. More specifi-
cally, the disappearance of the indictment in the Statute and the fact that 
the basis for the trial is a judicial decision taken by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
seem to have been for some a trauma. 
There is a temptation to reduce the scope of intervention and even 
the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber, probably with a view to proving that 
this ICC novelty is largely useless – as those who oppose it anyway will 
try to make it useless – hoping that one day maybe the Statute will be 
changed to go back to the (beloved) ad hoc Tribunals procedural scheme. 
                                                   
82 Bemba Dissenting Opinion, para. 27, see above note 58. 
83 Ibid., para. 36. 
84 Bemba Separate Opinion, para. 28. 
85 Mbarushimana Appeals Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, para. 43, see above note 41. 
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The OTP has certainly contributed to that debate with a view to keeping a 
maximum of freedom, meaning a minimal intervention by the judiciary at 
the pre-trial stage. 
The intervention of the Pre-Trial Chamber was precisely meant to 
avoid having a Prosecutor who is not ready before trial,86 changing the 
case at will during trial, thereby making the case a moving target at the 
expense of the defence and delaying the proceedings. There is an absolute 
need to understand that the solution is not to give more freedom during 
the proceedings to the Prosecutor, but to make sure that (s)he is ready as 
soon as possible and to have judicial checks on the investigation and on 
the preparation of the case as early as possible. In this regard, those judi-
cial checks must be reinforced and not abolished. It is crucial to have ear-
ly judicial checks, provided of course that those checks are made by judg-
es having the appropriate knowledge and experience. Judicial intervention 
is meant to reinforce the investigation and the case preparation for the 
benefit of the fight against impunity. 
19.2.3. The ICC Jurisprudence After the Bemba Appeals Judgement 
After the Bemba Appeals Judgement, Pre-Trial Chamber I, which was at 
the time of the issuance of the Bemba Appeals Judgement the only pre-
trial chamber seized with a case, was put in the awkward position of being 
confronted with a jurisprudence by the Appeals Chamber which, first, 
rejected the crucial distinction made by the Practice Manual in the con-
firmation of charges process between ‘subsidiary’ and ‘material’ facts and, 
second, requested more precision in the factual description of the charges. 
In the Al Hassan case, Pre-Trial Chamber I therefore tried to build 
on the Bemba Appeals Judgement by requiring the Prosecutor to be suffi-
ciently precise and exhaustive in its presentation and description of the 
criminal acts contained in the charges, by means of a distinction with re-
gard to this requirement depending on the nature of the crime: 
As a result the Chamber emphasizes the need for the Prose-
cution to be as precise and exhaustive as possible in respect 
of those facts in its DCC [Document Containing the Charg-
es]. Nonetheless, the Chamber is of the view that the degree 
of precision to be expected from the Prosecutor in its de-
scription of the facts depends on the nature of the crimes in 
                                                   
86 See Bemba Separate Opinion, para. 28, see above note 58. 
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question and the circumstances of the Prosecutor’s case be-
fore it. Where crimes such as torture or rape are concerned, 
the Prosecutor must describe the criminal acts in issue, stat-
ing the date and place of the acts, along with the number of 
victims, or at the very least a precise estimate of that number, 
and their identities as far as possible. However, where the 
nature of the crimes is such that they are directed against a 
group or collectivity of people, as in the case of the crime of 
persecution, a like degree of precision cannot be expected of 
the Prosecutor in its description of the facts; nonetheless, the 
Prosecutor must endeavour to give the most precise possible 
statements of place, time and approximate number of victims, 
along with the necessary particulars to make out the ele-
ments of the crimes.87 
This rather new approach pushed the Prosecutor to be more precise 
in its presentation of facts in the DCC, which is the longest in the ICC 
history (457 pages long).88 The DCC, despite the existence of at least two 
Appeals Chamber decisions – including the Bemba Appeals Judgement – 
rejecting such a concept, still refers to ‘material’ facts,89 and when giving 
a list of alleged victims, still uses expressions such as ‘for example’ or ‘at 
least’,90 indicating that the list may not be exhaustive. 
The decision on the confirmation of the charges issued by Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, which is 467 pages long, is equally by far the longest confir-
                                                   
87 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Request concerning 
the Time Limit for the Prosecutor to File the Document Containing a Detailed Description 
of the Charges, 5 October 2018, ICC-01/12-01/18-143-tENG, para. 30 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/dd8f47/); see also ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. 
Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
Admissibility Challenge raised by the Defence for Insufficient Gravity of the Case, 27 
September 2019, ICC-01/12-01/18-459-tENG, paras. 55–56 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/z1jsl3/). 
88 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, OTP, Version publique expurgée de la «Version amendée et corri-
gée du Document contenant les charges contre M. Al HASSAN Ag ABDOUL AZIZ Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud», ICC-01/12-01/18-335-Conf-Corr, 11 mai 2019, 2 July 2019, 
ICC-01/12-01/18-335-Corr-Red (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1e4aac/). 
89 Ibid., see Part 9 of the DCC, pp. 428, 439, 444, 446 and 453. 
90 Ibid., see paras. 1046, 1056, 1058, 1085 and 1087. 
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mation of charges decision in the history of the ICC.91 For most of the 
crimes, the decision identifies precisely the alleged victims – and does not 
use expressions such as ‘for example’ or ‘included but not limited to’ 
therefore indicating that the list is exhaustive – with the exception of the 
alleged victims of the crime of persecution.92 Further, there is no refer-
ence to a distinction between ‘subsidiary’ and ‘material’ facts. 
This is a first attempt by a pre-trial chamber to try to adapt to the 
requirements established in the Bemba Appeals Judgement with regard to 
the precision of the charges. The Trial Chamber VI Judgement in the 
Bosco Ntaganda93 case seems to go in the same direction by trying to 
distinguish between different categories of crimes: whereas certain charg-
es can be properly framed only at the level of individual criminal acts, 
others, such as deportation, may only be properly framed more broadly. 
However, the Chamber also indicates: 
Further, the Chamber may consider whether a specific type 
of criminal act (e.g. murder as a crime against humanity) is 
committed in narrowly confined temporal and geographical 
space and/or other parameters. These charges can be framed 
by these parameters and need not be framed at the level of 
individual criminal acts, as long as they fall within the spe-
cific parameters of the charge as confirmed by the pre-trial 
chamber.94 
This is a clear indication that the Trial Chamber wanted to avoid 
setting a too rigid rule with regard to the required level of precision in the 
charges. It is precisely this aspect that the defence is now challenging 
                                                   
91 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, Rectificatif à la Décision relative à la confir-
mation des charges portées contre Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, 
13 November 2019, ICC-01/12-01/18-461-Corr-Red (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
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92 Ibid., see especially pp. 452–65. 
93 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 8 July 2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, paras. 39–40 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/80578a/). 
94 Ibid., para. 41. 
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before the Appeals Chamber, arguing that such a ruling is in contradiction 
with the Bemba Appeals Judgement.95 
The Bemba Appeals Judgement is therefore not the end but just the 
beginning of a long judicial discussion to come on this subject with a 
view to finding a balance between the necessity to spell out the facts in 
the charges in a clear and exhaustive a way as possible, avoiding to have a 
confirmation of charges or a conviction on the basis of ‘samples’,96 while 
at the same time taking into consideration the diversity of forms of mass 
criminality that the Court may face. 
19.3. Conclusion 
The involvement of the judiciary in case preparation at the ICC has cer-
tainly been useful in assisting to correct early mistakes. OTP policies have 
changed or are changing in several ways and it is worth highlighting some 
positive developments. 
With regard to the need to be trial-ready at the pre-trial stage of a 
case, the OTP has recently underlined that it “considers this approach to 
be more important than ever and will build upon and further strengthen 
this strategy in 2019-2021”.97 
The OTP is also indicating a willingness to reduce the length of pre-
liminary examinations and to increase the preparation for an effective 
investigation during those preliminary examinations. The OTP is indicat-
ing in this regard that “it will continue its efforts to expedite the conduct 
of preliminary examinations”98 and that JCCD “has developed methods to 
ensure the work done at the preliminary examination stage can be fully 
exploited by investigative teams and evidence is preserved during prelim-
inary examinations”. 99 Furthermore, the OTP is working “to effect an 
even closer integration of the work of SAS [the Situation Analysis Section 
                                                   
95 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntagan-
da, Defence Team of Mr. Bosco Ntaganda, Defence Appeal Brief – Part I, 11 November 
2019, ICC-01/04-02/06-2443, para. 21 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dstrmv/). 
96 See Bemba Separate Opinion, para. 23, see above note 58. 
97 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2019-2021, 17 July 2019, para. 14 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/7ncqt3/). 
98 Ibid., para. 21. 
99 Ibid., para. 18. 
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within JCCD] with that of ID [Investigation Division] and PD [Prosecu-
tion Division]”.100 To that effect, the OTP is 
now beginning to assign ID and PD staff to situations under 
preliminary examination, to collaborate with SAS staff in 
preparing for any eventual investigation, and to assist in tak-
ing any necessary steps to preserve evidence.101 
There is also a notable evolution with regard to the balance the OTP 
tries to achieve between the respect for the complementarity principle and 
the fight against impunity. One may compare in this regard the OTP’s 
response to the reports concerning the serious acts of violence in the 
Democratic Republic in the Congo (‘DRC’), particularly in the Kasaï 
provinces, with its response to the upsurge of violence in the Republic of 
Mali, more precisely in the Mopti region. 
On 31 March 2017, in reaction to the events in the Kasaï provinces, 
the Prosecutor urged the competent authorities in the DRC, in accordance 
with the principle of complementarity, to “take all necessary measures to 
conduct genuine investigations so as to shed light on the alleged abuses 
and bring to justice all perpetrators involved”.102 The focus was on the 
primary responsibility of States Parties to act and no mention was made of 
any direct action to be taken by the OTP. The OTP visit to the DRC took 
place more than a year later, in May 2018. 
By contrast, on 25 March 2019, in reaction to the events in the 
Mopti region, the Prosecutor stated that in 
complementarity with the national criminal justice system in 
Mali, my Office will take all necessary steps to ensure the 
investigation and prosecution of those who participated in or 
otherwise contributed to what appears to be egregious crimes 
which may fall under the jurisdiction of the [ICC]. As an 
immediate step, a delegation from my Office will, no later 
                                                   
100 See in the regard, “Full Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on external expert 
review and lessons drawn from the Kenya situation”, 26 November 2019, p. 11, see above 
note 6. 
101 Ibid., p. 13. 
102 See ICC-OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou 
Bensouda, regarding the situation in the Kasaï provinces, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo”, 31 March 2017; see also ICC-OTP, “Statement by the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Ben-
souda, at the conclusion of her visit to the DRC: “The fight against impunity and the criti-
cal prevention of crimes under the Rome Statute are essential to social stability””, 4 May 
2018. 
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than this week, meet with the relevant authorities on these 
matters.103 
The OTP willingness to get involved just after the commission of 
crimes is to be welcomed and contrasts with the more passive approach 
taken in the DRC with respect to the alleged crimes committed in the 
Kasaï provinces. In such instances, the OTP should have recourse to Arti-
cle 56 of the Statute and involve the judiciary for the immediate preserva-
tion of evidence, in case it appears that the national authorities do not take 
urgently such measures. 
It is finally worth mentioning that not everything depends on the 
evolution of OTP’s policies. The type and extent of judiciary involvement 
in the quality control of case preparation is still a bone of contention 
among the judges and leads to conflicting jurisprudence. In this regard the 
judiciary will have to find a way to reach an agreement on the way the 
compromises made in Rome shall work in practice, for the benefit of the 
entire institution and more generally for the fight against impunity. 
                                                   
103 See ICC-OTP, “Statement of the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on reported upsurge of 
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20.The Judiciary and Enhancement of the 
Classification of Alleged Conduct 
Eleni Chaitidou* 
 
When contemplating possible improvements to the quality of investiga-
tions, attention is usually on the work-processes of investigators, as par-
tially reflected by Part II of this anthology. An aspect less obvious is 
whether and to what extent judicial intervention at the investigation and 
pre-trial phase can impact and improve the quality of investigations. 
Unless equipped with investigative powers, judges do not engage in 
fact-finding work, do not select the targets of the investigation, do not 
decide who and what should be prosecuted, and do not advise on the suf-
ficiency and quality of evidence collected. That remains the responsibility 
of investigators and prosecutors. Judges are on the receiving end. They 
verify that the evidence presented supports the factual allegations attribut-
ed to the accused, and that the legal characterisation of the factual allega-
tions (or, in other words, the classification of alleged conduct), as pro-
posed by the prosecuting authorities, is accurate. 
Why would judges address the classification of alleged conduct or 
seek to enhance such classification at all? To begin with, judges are not 
passive observers in criminal proceedings who are bound by the submis-
sions advanced by the Prosecutor or the Defence, but they are a neutral 
authority and the ultimate decision-makers as regards the determination of 
the facts, their attribution to the accused, and the interpretation and appli-
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cation of the law in question. The truth-finding mandate compels the 
judges to search for the ‘judicial truth’, as it transpires from the evidence, 
and to attribute responsibility to the accused that reflects what has actually 
happened. The mandate includes the accurate legal classification of the 
accused’s conduct that best reflects his or her culpability. The accurate 
legal classification provides the accused with clarity about the accusations 
levied against him or her. It also allows the victims to accept and embrace 
the judicial process and its outcome. Lastly, the classification assists in 
articulating in abstract the behaviour considered to be unacceptable, thus 
fostering social cohesion. 
At the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’ or ‘Court’), the interfer-
ence of the Judiciary in first instance regarding the classification of al-
leged conduct can occur at different stages of the proceedings. It can oc-
cur, for example, at the stage when the Prosecutor1 requests the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to authorise the commencement of the investigation (Article 15 
of the Rome Statute),2 when the Pre-Trial Chamber reviews the Prosecu-
tor’s decision not to initiate an investigation into a situation (Article 
53(3)), when the Pre-Trial Chamber issues a warrant of arrest or summons 
to appear (Article 58), when the Pre-Trial Chamber decides whether to 
confirm or decline to confirm the charges or to adjourn the hearing (Arti-
cle 61(7)), when the Trial Chamber decides to re-characterise the facts of 
the case (Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court) or, ultimately, 
decides on the innocence or guilt of the accused at trial (Article 74). 
Mindful of the subject-matter of the research project of which this 
anthology forms part, the chapter examines judicial intervention of ICC 
judges in proceedings at the situation level, during which the investigation 
takes place, and the pre-trial stage of a case, and describes how Pre-Trial 
Chambers addressed the Prosecutor’s classification of conduct. The topic 
invites the reader to reflect on past practice of ICC Chambers and to as-
sess whether certain ideas and approaches may be borrowed from the ICC 
and applied by investigating and prosecuting authorities in other jurisdic-
tions. 
                                                   
1 The ICC Prosecutor at the time of writing was Fatou Bensouda, from Gambia (2012–2021). 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (‘ICC Statute’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). All articles mentioned in this chapter without reference 
to the legal instrument, are those of the ICC Statute. 
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20.1. Judicial Intervention at the ICC 
In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals (that is, the international criminal tribu-
nals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) or other internationalised 
criminal tribunals (for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia), the ICC is not estab-
lished to enquire into the criminal responsibility of potential perpetrators 
in one pre-defined situation. Rather, the ICC Prosecutor decides, inde-
pendently of the political will of States and the Security Council, to inter-
vene in situations where there are grounds to believe that crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court have been committed. This reality sets the ICC 
apart from any other international(ised) criminal tribunal and mirrors its 
permanent nature and universal orientation. 
20.1.1. Preliminary Examinations 
The Court does not intervene automatically when there is suspicion that 
crimes within its jurisdiction have been committed. For the ICC to be-
come active, the powers of the Court must be triggered. This occurs in 
three ways: a situation3 has been referred to the Court by a State Party 
(Articles 13(a), 14) or the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations (‘UN’) Charter (Article 13(b)), or the Prosecutor, hav-
ing analysed the seriousness of information gathered and received,4 has 
decided to open an investigation proprio motu (Articles 13(c), 15).5 The 
                                                   
3 As indicated by the word ‘situation’, the State Party or Security Council may not refer a 
particular case, that is, an accusation against a particular individual for a specific conduct, 
but only a situation. Referrals containing information about certain potential perpetrators 
may be indicative for the Prosecutor, but do not instruct her to prosecute those individuals. 
Rather, the Prosecutor is free to enquire into the criminal responsibility of any person in-
volved in the commission of crimes within the given situation, subject to the jurisdictional 
parameters set forth in Article 12, see above note 2. 
4 The Prosecutor may receive information (referred to as ‘communications’) from a variety 
of sources, such as governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisa-
tions or individuals, see Article 15(1) and 15(2), see above note 2 and Rule 104 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 September 2002 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
e1b3f5/). All Rules mentioned in this chapter without reference to the legal instrument are 
those of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
5 The Court may also receive a declaration under Article 12(3) by a non-State Party which 
accepts the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to the crimes in question. Nevertheless, the 
exercise of jurisdiction must be triggered according to three mechanisms set forth in Arti-
cle 13, see above note 2. 
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term ‘situation’ is understood to denote a conflict scenario that is delineat-
ed by temporal, geographical or personal parameters.6 
The receipt of a referral or the receipt of information about crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court does not mark the opening of an ICC 
investigation. Rather, it compels the Prosecutor to start a preliminary ex-
amination.7 During the preliminary examination, the Prosecutor is duty-
bound to analyse – within a reasonable time8 – the seriousness of the in-
formation received or made available against the cumulative criteria under 
Article 53(1)9 with a view to deciding whether to open an investigation at 
the ICC or not. The assessment of the information under Article 53(1) is 
conducted against the lowest evidentiary threshold in the Statute (“rea-
sonable basis to proceed”), requiring that there exists merely a sensible or 
reasonable justification for a belief that a crime falling within the jurisdic-
                                                   
6 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on 
the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 
4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 17 January 2006, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para. 65 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/2fe2fc/); ICC, Situation in Uganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on 
victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 
a/0104/06, and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, 10 August 2007, ICC-02/04-101, paras. 88–103 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8f9181/). For a comprehensive analysis of the jurisdic-
tional confines of a situation, see Rod Rastan, “Situation and Case: Defining the Parame-
ters”, in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal 
Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 
2011, p. 421. 
7 See the use of the mandatory ‘shall’ in Article 15(2), first sentence, see above note 2, and 
Rule 104(1), see above note 4. 
8 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Requesting 
Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central 
African Republic, 30 November 2006, ICC-01/05-6, p. 4 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
76e607/); ICC, Situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
“Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”, 6 
September 2018, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, para. 84 (‘Rohingya Preliminary Ruling’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/73aeb4/); ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the “Application for Judicial Review by the Government of the Un-
ion of the Comoros”, 15 November 2018, ICC-01/13-68, para. 119 (‘Comoros Second Re-
view Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a268c5/). 
9 Rules 48 and 104, see above note 4. ICC, Situation in Egypt, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
on the “Request for review of the Prosecutor’s decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a Pre-
liminary Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014”, 12 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-
3, para. 6 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bfbb8f/); Rohingya Preliminary Ruling, para. 
82, see above note 8. 
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tion of the Court has been committed.10 The Article 53(1) criteria, which 
are applicable irrespective of the trigger mechanism,11 involve an assess-
ment as to whether 
(i) the crime(s), as alleged, fall(s) within the jurisdiction of the Court 
(Article 53(1)(a));12 this assessment involves the classification of al-
leged conduct, including contextual circumstances, that underlies 
the referral or constitutes the focus of the Article 15(1) information; 
(ii) the potential case(s) within the context of the situation would be 
admissible before the Court (Article 53(1)(b));13 and 
                                                   
10 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, paras. 27–35 (‘Kenya Authorisa-
tion Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0caaf/); ICC, Situation in Georgia, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation, 
27 January 2016, ICC-01/15-12, para. 25 (‘Georgia Authorisation Decision’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/a3d07e/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Public Redacted Version of “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-
01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, 9 November 2017, ICC-01/17-9-Red, para. 30 (‘Bu-
rundi Authorisation Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8f2373/). 
11 Kenya Authorisation Decision, paras. 23–24, see above note 10. See also ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor (‘OTP’), Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, paras. 
34–35 (‘2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/acb906/). 
12 The jurisdiction of the Court is ascertained on the basis of four different parameters, of 
which the last two are in the alternative: material (jurisdiction ratione materiae – Article 5), 
temporal (jurisdiction ratione temporis – Article 11), territorial (jurisdiction ratione loci – 
Article 12(2)(a) or 12(3)) or personal (jurisdiction ratione personae – Article 12(2)(b), 
12(3), 26), see above note 2; ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction 
of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 
2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, paras. 21–22 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1505f7/); Ken-
ya Authorisation Decision, paras. 38–39, see above note 10. 
13 Admissibility concerns the question of whether the Court should exercise its recognised 
jurisdiction over a particular situation or case. The admissibility of the potential cases 
(consisting of the group of persons likely to be the focus of an investigation and crimes 
committed during incidents that are likely to be the focus of the investigation) is analysed 
on the basis of the two criteria set forth in Article 17 (complementarity and gravity). Com-
plementarity (Article 17(1)(a)–(c)) in the present context involves the enquiry whether 
domestic proceedings are, or have been, conducted in relation to groups of persons and the 
crimes allegedly committed during those incidents which together would likely form the 
object of the ICC investigation. Gravity (Article 17(1)(d)) in the present context enquires 
whether the likely set of potential cases is serious enough to justify further action by the 
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(iii) “taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice” (Article 
53(1)(c)). 
The nature of preliminary examinations informs the manner in 
which the aforementioned criteria are analysed. Article 53(1)(a) and (b) 
entail the application of exacting legal requirements, while Article 53(1)(c) 
contains an element of discretion.14 Considering the lack of investigative 
powers of the Prosecutor at this phase, the information available must not 
be “comprehensive”, “conclusive”, “clear, univocal or not contradicto-
ry”.15 Rather, “if the information available to the Prosecutor at the pre-
investigative stage allows for reasonable inferences that at least one crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed and that the case 
would be admissible, the Prosecutor shall open an investigation”.16 If the 
information basis is not adequate, the Prosecutor may revert to States or 
other reliable sources, such as the UN or non-governmental organisations, 
in order to receive further additional information, or receive written or 
oral testimonies at the seat of the Court.17 The Prosecutor regularly con-
firms that the analysis, even though provisional, is thorough at this 
stage.18 
                                                                                                                        
Court. The assessment covers: (i) the group of persons that are likely to form the object of 
the investigation and which bear the greatest responsibility; and (ii) the crimes committed 
within the incidents that are likely to be focus of the investigation; in making the assess-
ment, gravity is examined following a quantitative and qualitative approach, see above 
note 2. See for a comprehensive discussion Kenya Authorisation Decision, paras. 40–62, 
see above note 10. 
14 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and 
the Kingdom of Cambodia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, 16 July 2015, 
ICC-01/13-34, para. 14 (‘Comoros First Review Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/2f876c/). 
15 Kenya Authorisation Decision, para. 27, see above note 10; Comoros First Review Deci-
sion, para. 13, see above note 14; Georgia Authorisation Decision, para. 25, see above note 
10. 
16 Comoros First Review Decision, para. 13, see above note 14. 
17 Article 15(2), see above note 2 and Rule 47, see above note 4. 
18 See, for example, 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 81: 
Phase 2 analysis entails a thorough factual and legal assessment of the crimes allegedly 
committed in the situation at hand with a view to identifying the potential cases falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Office will pay particular consideration to 
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Preliminary examinations are the exclusive domain of the ICC 
Prosecutor. Judges do not intervene in this phase. It is incumbent upon the 
Prosecutor to give consideration to the Article 53(1) criteria, including the 
classification of alleged conduct at issue and thus establish the Court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Recently, however, the Prosecutor approached 
the Pre-Trial Chambers under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the 
Court19 or Article 19(3)20 requesting a ruling on discrete legal questions. 
For example, in April 2018 the Prosecutor requested that a Pre-Trial 
Chamber rule on whether the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the 
alleged deportation of Rohingya people from the Republic of Myanmar to 
the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.21 On 22 January 2020, the Prosecu-
tor requested Pre-Trial Chamber I22 to rule on the scope of the Court’s 
                                                                                                                        
crimes committed on a large scale, as part of a plan or pursuant to a policy. The Office 
may further gather information on relevant national proceedings if such information is 
available at this stage. Phase 2 leads to the submission of an ‘Article 5 report’ to the 
Prosecutor, in reference to the material jurisdiction of the Court as defined in article 5 
of the Statute 
See above note 11; ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 De-
cember 2019, para. 10: “All information gathered is subjected to a fully independent, im-
partial and thorough analysis”; and para. 13: “The Office takes no longer than is necessary 
to complete a thorough assessment of the statutory criteria to arrive at an informed deci-
sion” (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/lq7j94/). 
19 Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, 26 May 2004 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/2988d1/) reads: 
Any matter, request or information not arising out of a situation assigned to a Pre-Trial 
Chamber in accordance with sub-regulation 2, shall be directed by the President of the 
Pre-Trial Division to a Pre-Trial Chamber according to a roster established by the Pres-
ident of that Division. 
20 Article 19(3) reads: 
The Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of jurisdiction 
or admissibility. In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility, those who 
have referred the situation under article 13, as well as victims, may also submit obser-
vations to the Court. 
See above note 2. 
21 ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19, 9 April 
2018, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, para. 1 (‘Rohingya Request’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/4af756/). Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed that the Court would have territorial jurisdic-
tion over the crime of deportation but also over the crimes of other inhumane acts (Article 
7(1)(k)) and persecution (Article 7(1)(h)), see Rohingya Preliminary Ruling, paras. 50–78, 
see above note 8. 
22 Following Palestine’s referral, the situation in Palestine was assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, pursuant to Regulation 45(1) (“The Prosecutor shall inform the Presidency in writing as 
soon as a situation has been referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party under article 14 or 
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territorial jurisdiction in the situation of Palestine and to ‘confirm’ the 
boundaries of the territory over which the ICC may exercise jurisdic-
tion. 23  Thus, notwithstanding the Prosecutor’s exclusive authority, she 
twice engaged the judges at this early stage arguing, inter alia, that a judi-
cial resolution of the matters “would assist in her further deliberations”,24 
ensure that a possible investigation is placed on the “soundest legal foun-
dation” before she embarks on a course of action and would “facilitate the 
practical conduct of [the] investigation”.25 It is not excluded that, for the 
same reasons, preliminary rulings may be requested in the future in rela-
tion to the classification of alleged conduct underpinning a referral or the 
Article 15(1) information. In particular, pronouncements on the interpreta-
tion of the crimes under the ICC jurisdiction could be useful for the Pros-
ecutor’s further course of action. That said, whereas such preliminary 
judicial rulings assist the Prosecutor in taking the next steps, they are 
without prejudice to subsequent determinations on the same matter in 
light of the facts and the evidence presented at a later stage. 
Upon conclusion of the preliminary examination, the Prosecutor de-
cides either that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investiga-
tion or that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable ba-
sis to commence an investigation.26 Her decision is summarised in a re-
port, which includes her preliminary findings regarding the legal charac-
terisation of the alleged conduct. 
                                                                                                                        
by the Security Council under article 13, sub-paragraph (b); […]”) and Regulation 46 (2) 
(“The Presidency shall assign a situation to a Pre-Trial Chamber as soon as the Prosecutor 
has informed the Presidency in accordance with regulation 45, paragraph 1. […]”) of the 
Regulations of the Court, see above note 19. 
23 ICC-OTP, Situation in the State of Palestine, Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) 
for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine, 22 January 2020, ICC-01/18-
12 (‘Palestine Request’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/clur6w/). At the time of writing, 
the request is still pending before Pre-Trial Chamber I. 
24 Rohingya Request, para. 3, see above note 21. 
25 Palestine Request, paras. 5–6, see above note 23. 
26 In the past, the Prosecutor’s conclusions not to proceed with an investigation were summa-
rised in a report and made public, see, for example, on 23 June 2014 regarding the situa-
tion in the Republic of Korea: ICC-OTP, Situation in the Republic of Korea: Article 5 Re-
port, 23 June 2014 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ef1f7f/); on 21 September 2018 re-
garding the situation in the Gabonese Republic: ICC-OTP, Situation in the Gabonese Re-
public: Article 5 Report, 21 September 2018 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9aad5c/). 
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20.1.2. Authorisation to Commence the Investigation 
If the Prosecutor decides in the affirmative, that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation, the trigger mechanisms determine the 
subsequent course of action: in case of a referral, the Prosecutor is free to 
commence the investigation into the situation, within the boundaries of 
the referral.27 In this case, the judges do not intervene and will have the 
first opportunity to espouse their views on the classification of alleged 
conduct when the Prosecutor requests the issuance of a warrant of arrest 
or a summons to appear for a suspect. In case of the Prosecutor’s proprio 
motu initiative, she must first submit a request to a Pre-Trial Chamber 
seeking its authorisation to commence the investigation.28 Upon such ju-
dicial authorisation, 29 the Prosecutor may commence the investigation, 
within the boundaries of the authorisation. 
In the context of Article 15 authorisation proceedings the legal 
characterisation of the alleged conduct is reviewed by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber as a consequence of its statutory responsibility to analyse 
whether indeed, as proposed by the Prosecutor, there is a reasonable basis 
to believe that one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
have been or are being committed.30 To this end, the judges review the 
                                                   
27 If the referral involves the crime of aggression, the special procedure under Articles 15bis 
and 15ter applies, see above note 2. 
28 Article 15(3), see above note 2. 
29 Article 15(4), see above note 2. 
30 Article 15(4) in conjunction with Article 53(1), see above note 2 and Rule 48, see above 
note 4. When reviewing the Prosecutor’s request for authorisation to commence an inves-
tigation under Article 15(3), all Pre-Trial Chambers have consistently held that the Article 
53(1) criteria must be examined by the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 15(4), see the first 
and seminal Kenya Authorisation Decision, paras. 17–25, see above note 10. The Appeals 
Chamber recently narrowed down significantly the review powers of the Pre-Trial Cham-
bers and opined that the Pre-Trial Chambers are only mandated to determine under Article 
15(4) whether there is “a reasonable factual basis for the Prosecutor to proceed with an in-
vestigation, in the sense of whether crimes have been committed, and that potential case(s) 
arising from such investigation appear to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction”, see ICC, Sit-
uation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal 
against the decision on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, 5 March 2020, ICC-02/17-138, para. 1 (‘Afghanistan Appeals 
Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/x7kl12/). In a separate opinion, Judge Ibañez 
Carranza pointed out that these findings were rendered in passing and are ultra petita, con-
stituting at best obiter dicta, see ICC, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
Appeals Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Luz del Carmen Ibañez Carranza to the 
Judgment on the appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II on the authorization 
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Prosecutor’s request together with the supporting material.31 In addition, 
the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber receive representations of victims, 
who present their views as to whether an investigation should be 
opened.32 In so doing, the victims also describe the conduct of known 
perpetrators or groups of perpetrators and the harm suffered. Such de-
scription may overlap with the Prosecutor’s submissions, but may also be 
an addition to the Prosecutor’s factual narrative of the situation. At the 
end of the review exercise, the Chamber sets the scope of the authorised 
investigation in terms of its geographical and temporal reach as well as its 
subject-matter. 
Authorisation proceedings under Article 15 have taken place in sev-
eral situations, namely in relation to the situations in Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Georgia, Burundi, Myanmar/Bangladesh and Afghanistan. The practice 
hitherto shows that the judges follow largely the classification of conduct 
as identified by the Prosecutor.33 Only occasionally did the judges go be-
yond the Prosecutor’s classification when they added a legal characterisa-
                                                                                                                        
of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, 
ICC-02/17-138-Anx-Corr (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bfdi78/). Irrespective of how 
the test under Article 15(4) will be shaped in the future by the Pre-Trial Chambers, the is-
sue of legal classification of the conduct remains an integral part of the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber’s analysis under Article 15(4). See also Kenya Authorisation Decision, paras. 37–39, 
see above note 10. 
31 Article 15(4) stipulates that the Pre-Trial Chamber render its decision “upon examination 
of the request and the supporting material”, see above note 2. 
32 Article 15(3), second sentence, see above note 2, and Rule 50, see above note 4. 
33 For example, in the authorisation request regarding the commencement of an investigation 
into the situation in Kenya, the Prosecutor at the time had determined that murder, rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, deportation or forcible transfer of population and other in-
humane acts as crimes against humanity had allegedly been committed, see ICC, Situation 
in the Republic of Kenya, OTP, Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to 
Article 15, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3, para. 48 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c63dcc/). The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the Prosecutor’s classification in its entirety, 
see Kenya Authorisation Decision, paras. 139–71, see above note 10. In relation to the sit-
uation in Burundi, the Prosecutor had determined that murder, imprisonment or severe 
deprivation of liberty, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, enforced disappear-
ance and persecution as crimes against humanity had occurred, see ICC, Situation in Bu-
rundi, OTP, Public version of “Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to ar-
ticle 15”, 6 September 2017, ICC-01/17-5-US-Exp, 15 November 2017, ICC-01/17-5-Red, 
paras. 80–139 (‘Burundi Authorisation Request’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
e47402/). Pre-Trial Chamber III largely confirmed the Prosecutor’s classification and add-
ed attempted murders, but did not mention other forms of sexual violence in its analysis, 
see Burundi Authorisation Decision, see above note 10. 
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tion of alleged conduct as described in the request and/or the supporting 
material and/or the victims’ representations. Importantly, these additions 
remained within the geographical and temporal parameters of the situation 
as delineated by the Prosecutor. 
Two examples, in which the Pre-Trial Chambers amended the Pros-
ecutor’s classification regarding selected examples of conduct, illustrate 
the Pre-Trial Chambers’ approach. 
• Burundi Situation: The Prosecutor requested authorisation to 
commence an investigation into allegations of crimes against hu-
manity committed by members of the Burundian Government, mili-
tary, intelligence service, police and a youth movement associated 
with the ruling party, against the civilian population believed to be 
actual or perceived opponents to the President and the ruling party. 
The Prosecutor submitted that, on evidence at the time, there was no 
reasonable basis to believe that the situation could be characterised 
as a non-international armed conflict as (i) the violence had not 
reached the degree of intensity, and (ii) the level of organisation of 
the anti-government entities was insufficient in order to characterise 
the situation as such. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor confirmed that 
she would keep these allegations under review, if authorisation was 
given.34 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, upon analysis of the supporting mate-
rial, determined that the Prosecutor had acted “too restrictively” and 
had imposed requirements on the supporting material that cannot 
reasonably be met in the absence of an investigation. It encouraged 
the Prosecutor to draw reasonable conclusions at this stage, “pro-
vided those conclusions do not appear manifestly unreasonable”.35 
As a result, it authorised the Prosecutor to extend her investigation 
into all crimes under the Statute, including war crimes, as long as 
they remained within the parameters of the authorised investiga-
tion.36 
• Côte d’Ivoire Situation: The Prosecutor requested authorisation to 
commence an investigation into allegations of crimes against hu-
                                                   
34 Burundi Authorisation Request, paras. 6, 35, see above note 33. 
35 Burundi Authorisation Decision, paras. 138, 141, see above note 10. 
36 Ibid., para. 193. 
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manity and war crimes committed in the context of post-election 
violence in 2010–11 between security forces loyal to outgoing Pres-
ident Laurent Gbagbo, associated groups and militias (‘pro-Gbagbo 
forces’), on the one hand, and supporters and armed groups loyal to 
incoming President Ouattara (‘pro-Ouattara forces’), on the other 
hand.37 The Prosecutor argued that both sides had committed crimes 
to varying degrees. However, in relation to the pro-Ouattara forces 
in particular the Prosecutor submitted that, on evidence at the time, 
there was no reasonable basis to believe that they had committed 
crimes against humanity.38 Nevertheless, the Prosecutor confirmed 
that the determinations were made without prejudice to other possi-
ble crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, including whether pro-
Ouattara forces had committed crimes against humanity.39 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, upon analysis of the supporting mate-
rial, determined that there was a reasonable basis to believe that 
pro-Ouattara forces had committed alleged crimes against humanity 
against the civilian population, as well as other crimes not presented 
by the Prosecutor, such as pillaging, cruel treatment and torture.40 It 
also added further crimes purportedly committed by the pro-
Gbagbo forces not presented by the Prosecutor, such as torture and 
other inhumane acts.41 
Why do judges review and, as the case may be, amend the Prosecu-
tor’s classification of alleged conduct at the stage of the authorisation of 
the investigation? In the first place, the drafters of the Statute purposefully 
subjected the Prosecutor’s conclusions to the independent review of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, before the commencement of an investigation.42 In-
                                                   
37 ICC, Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, OTP, Request for authorization of an investigation pursu-
ant to article 15, 23 June 2011, ICC-02/11-3, para. 39 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
1b1939/). 
38 Ibid., para. 75. 
39 Ibid., paras. 39, 75. 
40 ICC, Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber, Corrigendum to “Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire”, 15 November 2011, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, paras. 92–105, 
162–69 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e0c0eb/). 
41 Ibid., paras. 83–86. 
42 Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Kenya situation clarified that the purpose of the Article 15(4) 
supervision is “to prevent the Court from proceeding with unwarranted, frivolous, or polit-
ically motivated investigations that could have a negative effect on its credibility”, see 
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deed, the Article 15 procedure compensates the absence of a referral and 
constitutes an impartial check on the powers of the independent Prosecu-
tor.43 Thus, the supervisory role of the Pre-Trial Chamber entails that it is 
not bound by the Prosecutor’s conclusions, including the classification of 
alleged conduct, but is at liberty to view them differently. This approach 
ensures objectivity, meaning that the review exercise is free of any ap-
pearance of bias. In the second place, divergence in the classification of 
conduct is a natural consequence of the fact that the information basis of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber is broader than that of the Prosecutor. As men-
tioned earlier, during the authorisation proceedings, victims are entitled to 
make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber. They may provide new 
information on facts that may move the Chamber, in turn, to classify the 
conduct differently. 
If the Pre-Trial Chamber does not agree with the classification of 
the reported factual allegations and declines to authorise the commence-
ment of the investigation, for example for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, the Prosecutor has no authority to proceed. Unless subjected to ap-
pellate review, the matter is closed. If, however, the investigation is au-
thorised, it is upon the Prosecutor to investigate within the parameters of 
the authorised investigation and to frame the charges against individu-
als.44 Hence, what matters is that the Prosecutor describes in the authori-
sation request the factual allegations with sufficient specificity so that the 
material parameters of the future investigation are clear to the judges. Pre-
Trial Chambers reassured the Prosecutor on several occasions that the 
Prosecutor’s Office is not bound by the incidents described in the applica-
tion or the authorisation decision.45 As a corollary, any of the legal classi-
                                                                                                                        
Kenya Authorisation Decision, para. 32, see above note 10. The same reasoning has been 
echoed by other Pre-Trial Chambers. 
43 Comoros First Review Decision, para. 9, see above note 14. 
44 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
victim participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings in the appeal of the 
OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the appeals 
of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 Decem-
ber 2007, 19 December 2008, ICC-01/04-556, para. 52 (‘Appeals Judgment on Victims 
Participation During Investigation’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dca981/); ICC, Situa-
tion in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the con-
firmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 23 March 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, 
para. 106 (‘Ongwen Confirmation Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/74fc6e/). 
45 Kenya Authorisation Decision, para. 75, see above note 10; Georgia Authorisation Deci-
sion, para. 63, see above note 10; Burundi Authorisation Decision, para. 193: 
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fications of alleged conduct undertaken by the Pre-Trial Chamber is pre-
liminary in nature and not restricting the Prosecutor’s investigation. In-
deed, it would be illogical to bind the Prosecutor to a classification that is 
based on a limited information basis formed during the pre-investigative 
phase.46 What the judges achieve by amending the classification is to in-
vite the Prosecutor to explore the classification of the reported conduct 
not envisaged before with a view to gaining clarity and overcoming any 
doubts. Further, as the example Burundi shows, the Prosecutor is encour-
aged to look into all possible crimes committed, in line with her duty to 
“establish the truth [and] extend the investigation to cover all facts and 
evidence”.47 Moreover, as the example Côte d’Ivoire shows, the Prosecu-
tor is encouraged to look equally into crimes committed by all actors in-
volved, in line with her (and the Court’s) duty of independence and impar-
tiality. In this respect, the Pre-Trial Chamber can enhance the investiga-
tion of the Prosecutor. 
20.1.3. Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Commence an 
Investigation 
If after the preliminary examination the Prosecutor decides not to open an 
investigation, the Prosecutor must notify the referring entity 48  and/or 
                                                                                                                        
[T]he Prosecutor is not restricted to the incidents and crimes set out in the present de-
cision but may, on the basis of the evidence, extend her investigation to other crimes 
against humanity or other article 5 crimes, i.e. war crimes and genocide, as long as 
they remain within the parameters of the authorized investigation. 
See above note 10; ICC, Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
“Prosecution’s provision of further information regarding potentially relevant crimes 
committed between 2002 and 2010”, 22 February 2012, ICC-02/11-36, paras. 14–15 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/de6177/); ICC, Situation in the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 14 November 
2019, ICC-01/19-27, paras. 126–30 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/kbo3hy/); see also 
Afghanistan Appeals Judgment, paras. 2, 61, see above note 30. 
46 Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Kenya situation had authorised the investigation only in re-
spect to crimes against humanity. It held that allowing the Prosecutor to investigate acts 
constituting other crimes would not be consistent with the purpose of the Article 15 author-
isation proceedings, see Kenya Authorisation Decision, paras. 208–09, see above note 10. 
This approach was not followed by Pre-Trial Chambers in any of the subsequent authorisa-
tion decisions. 
47 Article 54(1)(a), see above note 2. 
48 Rule 105(1), see above note 4. 
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those who provided the information,49 including the reasons for the con-
clusion reached.50 The Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed is reviewable 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber, either upon request of the referring entity (Arti-
cle 53(3)(a))51 or, if the Prosecutor’s decision is based solely on the crite-
rion of Article 53(1)(c), proprio motu by the Pre-Trial Chamber (Article 
53(3)(b)).52 In the context of the Article 53(3)(a) review, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber does not undertake the assessment of the Article 53(1) criteria ex 
novo, but reviews only those issues that are raised by the challenging enti-
ty.53 In so doing, the Pre-Trial Chamber examines whether the “validity of 
the decision is materially affected by an error, whether it is an error of 
procedure, an error of law, or an error of fact”.54 The classification of al-
leged conduct may be part of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s review exercise in 
relation to any of the Article 53(1) criteria, but in particular the ascertain-
ment of the Court’s jurisdiction.55 If errors are found that have a bearing 
on the Prosecutor’s conclusion not to investigate, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may request the Prosecutor to reconsider, in whole or in part, her previous 
decision not to proceed.56 Upon such reconsideration, the Prosecutor takes 
a “final decision” on the matter.57 In case the Pre-Trial Chamber does not 
                                                   
49 Article 15(6), first sentence, see above note 2, and Rules 49, 105(2), see above note 4. 
50 Rules 49(1) and 105(3), see above note 4. In case the Prosecutor decides not to proceed 
based on the criterion of Article 53(1)(c), that is, that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice, the Prosecutor must inform, in addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber prompt-
ly after making that decision, see Rule 105(4). 
51 Rule 107, see above note 4. 
52 Rule 109, see above note 4. 
53 Comoros First Review Decision, para. 10, see above note 14. 
54 Ibid., para. 12. As will be explained below, the Appeals Chamber provided further clarifi-
cations as to the review of factual errors. 
55 Article 53(1)(a), see above note 2. 
56 Article 53(3)(a), see above note 2, Rule 108(2), see above note 4. 
57 Rule 108(3), see above note 4. See also ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union 
of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals Chamber, 
Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the re-
quest of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an in-
vestigation”, ICC-01/13-51, 6 November 2015, para. 56 (‘Comoros Appeals Decision’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a43856/). Once the Prosecutor has taken a final decision, 
he or she shall notify the Pre-Trial Chamber and others who participated in the review, see 
Rule 108(3). 
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confirm the Prosecutor’s decision taken solely under Article 53(1)(c), then 
the Prosecutor shall proceed with the investigation.58 
Review proceedings under Article 53(3)(a) have taken place in the 
situation regarding the vessels registered in the Union of the Comoros 
(‘Mavi Marmara’), the Hellenic Republic (‘Eleftheri Mesogios/Sofia’), 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia (‘Rachel Corrie’). The Union of the Com-
oros, for which the Statute entered into force on 1 November 2006, re-
ferred the situation to the ICC Prosecutor with a letter dated 14 May 
2013. 59 The acts to be investigated in the referral can be summarised 
briefly as follows. 
Sixty-four miles from the coast of the Gaza Strip, the Israeli De-
fence Forces purportedly intercepted between 31 May 2010 and at least 5 
June 2010 three vessels registered in the Union of the Comoros, the Hel-
lenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia. On board of those vessels 
were about 700 persons who purportedly attempted to break the Israeli 
blockade claiming to deliver humanitarian goods to the Gaza population. 
The interception operation allegedly resulted in the death of 10 passengers, 
the bodily harm of 50–55 passengers as well as other harm suffered by a 
significant number of passengers. 
Upon receipt of the referral, the Prosecutor conducted the prelimi-
nary examination of the information received against the Article 53(1) 
criteria, at the end of which she decided not to initiate an investigation. 
Whereas the Prosecutor accepted the existence of an international 
armed conflict, or alternatively, a non-international armed conflict, and 
the commission of certain war crimes, she declined to qualify the conduct 
as crimes against humanity arguing that there was no widespread or sys-
tematic attack directed against the civilian population. In addition, the 
Prosecutor concluded that the potential cases emanating from the situation 
would not satisfy the gravity threshold as stipulated in Article 17(1)(d) 
considering, inter alia, the limited scope of the situation, the small num-
                                                   
58 Rule 110(2), see above note 4. 
59 ICC-OTP, Letter attached to the notification of the Prosecutor to the President of the Court, 
14 May 2013, ICC-01/13-1-Anx1, p. 2 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5e455/), which is 
appended to ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of Comoros, the Hellenic 
Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Presidency, Decision assigning the Situation on 
Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom 
of Cambodia to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2013, ICC-01/13-1 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/8e4e80/). 
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ber of victims, the nature of the crimes, the manner of the commission of 
the crimes and the impact of the crimes. Hence, since potential cases 
would be inadmissible, pursuant to Articles 53(1)(b) and 17(1)(d), further 
action by the Court was, in her view, unjustified.60 
Subsequently, the Union of the Comoros requested Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I to review the Prosecutor’s negative decision.61 The referring State 
based its review request essentially on two grounds: the Prosecutor’s pur-
ported (i) failure to take into account alleged crimes that fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court (that is, beyond the vessels) when assessing grav-
ity, and (ii) errors in assessing the gravity factors. 
On 16 July 2015, Pre-Trial Chamber I determined, by majority, that 
the Prosecutor had made a series of errors when assessing, inter alia, the 
gravity of the potential cases.62 In this context, the Prosecutor’s classifica-
tion of alleged conduct became highly relevant, in particular when as-
sessing the gravity of the crimes committed within the incidents that 
would likely form the object of the Court’s investigation. 
The Majority Judges took issue, for example, with the Prosecutor’s 
conclusion regarding the nature of the crimes, challenging the Prosecu-
tor’s determination that the documented mistreatment and harassment of 
the passengers did not amount to the war crimes of torture and inhuman 
treatment under Article 8(2)(a)(ii). Thus, in the view of the Majority, the 
Prosecutor failed to take into account those crimes in addition to other 
crimes as part of the gravity test.63 Further, the Majority found several 
errors in the Prosecutor’s factual assessment regarding the manner of the 
commission of the crimes. In the opinion of the Majority, these errors 
rendered unsustainable the Prosecutor’s conclusion with respect to the 
                                                   
60 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and 
the Kingdom of Cambodia, OTP, Article 53(1) Report, 6 November 2014, ICC-01/13-6-
AnxA (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6b833a/). 
61 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and 
the Kingdom of Cambodia, Union of the Comoros, Application for Review pursuant to Ar-
ticle 53(3) (a) of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 November 2014 not to initiate an investi-
gation in the Situation, 29 January 2015, ICC-01/13-3-Red (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/b60981/). 
62 Comoros First Review Decision, see above note 14. The dissenting opinion of Judge Péter 
Kovács is appended to the decision, 16 July 2015, ICC-01/13-34-Anx-Corr (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/0fceb2/). 
63 Comoros First Review Decision, paras. 27–30, see above note 14. 
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question whether the crimes “were systematic or resulted from a deliber-
ate plan or policy to attack, kill or injure civilians”.64 The latter determi-
nation is aimed at the Prosecutor’s assessment that the conduct described 
in the information available did not amount to crimes against humanity. 
The Prosecutor was requested to reconsider her decision not to ini-
tiate an investigation into the situation referred to by the Union of the 
Comoros and to notify the Pre-Trial Chamber of her final decision.65 
What are the consequences of the Chamber’s classification of al-
leged conduct and how does this impact the investigation, if initiated after 
review? The purpose of the Article 53(3)(a) review proceedings is “to 
give referring entities the opportunity to challenge, and have the Chamber 
                                                   
64 Ibid., paras. 31–45. 
65 The Prosecutor sought to appeal this decision without leave from the Pre-Trial Chamber 
under Article 82(1)(a). Following the dismissal of the Prosecutor’s direct appeal against 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision (Comoros Appeals Decision, see above note 57), the 
Prosecutor notified the Pre-Trial Chamber of her reconsideration decision (ICC, Situation 
on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the King-
dom of Cambodia, OTP, Final Decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) 
Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, 29 November 2017, ICC-01/13-
57-Anx1 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/298503/)). This reconsideration decision was 
challenged for a second time by the Union of the Comoros and the Pre-Trial Chamber, in a 
second review decision, concluded that the Prosecutor had not, in fact, complied with its 
earlier pronouncements. Hence, the reconsideration decision was not ‘final’ within the 
meaning of Rule 108(3). The Prosecutor’s appeal of the second review decision was un-
successful and she was instructed to reconsider her decision not to initiate an investigation 
by taking into account the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber by 2 December 2019 (ICC, 
Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and 
the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s ‘Decision on the “Application for Judicial Review by the 
Government of the Union of the Comoros”’, 2 September 2019, ICC-01/13-98 (‘Comoros 
Appeals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/802549/)). The Prosecutor filed her 
‘final’ decision within the deadline proscribed (ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the 
Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, OTP, Final 
decision of the Prosecutor concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), 
dated 6 November 2014, as revised and refiled in accordance with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
request of 15 November 2018 and the Appeals Chamber’s judgment of 2 September 2019, 
2 December 2019, ICC-01/13-99-Anx1 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/jrysaj/)). The Un-
ion of the Comoros challenged the Prosecutor’s reconsideration decision for a third time 
(ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Union of the Comoros, Application for Judicial Review by 
the Government of the Comoros, 2 March 2020, ICC-01/13-100 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/bj2tbv/)). At the time of writing, a decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I is pending. 
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test, the validity of the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate”.66 In con-
trast to the authorisation proceedings developed above, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s duty under Article 53(3)(a) is fundamentally different. It is 
triggered only upon request and is restricted to the points of disagreement 
between the Prosecutor and the referring entity.67 If the Pre-Trial Chamber 
finds that the Prosecutor’s conclusion suffered from errors, then it may 
request the Prosecutor to reconsider her previous decision not to initiate 
an investigation. Such request for reconsideration, despite the discretion-
ary wording in Article 53(3)(a) (‘request’), obliges the Prosecutor (i) to 
reconsider her previous decision, and (ii) to do so in light of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s review decision.68 As to the binding effect of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s pronouncements in its request for reconsideration, the Appeals 
Chamber differentiated between errors of law and fact: given the Cham-
ber’s authority to interpret the Court’s applicable law, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may give directions to the Prosecutor on questions of substan-
tive or procedural law;69 however, it cannot give directions as to how the 
Prosecutor is to assess the facts and which results she should reach.70 
Lastly, the final decision on whether to open an investigation is for the 
Prosecutor to take.71 
Any classification of alleged conduct that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
undertakes at this stage is for the purpose of exercising judicial oversight 
over the Prosecutor’s conclusion not to initiate an investigation. If the 
Prosecutor committed an error, she is duty-bound to comply with the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s findings of law, in particular the interpretation of crimes, 
when reconsidering the facts anew.72 However, the final result is for the 
Prosecutor to take: once she has corrected the legal error, she may change 
                                                   
66 Comoros First Review Decision, para. 9, see above note 14. 
67 Ibid.; Comoros Appeals Judgment, para. 76, see above note 65. 
68 Comoros Second Review Decision, paras. 95–100, 110, 113, see above note 8; Comoros 
Appeals Judgment, para. 77, see above note 65. 
69 Ibid., para. 78. 
70 Ibid., paras. 76, 80, 82. That said, the Appeals Chamber conceded that the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber may direct the Prosecutor to take into account available information, ibid., para. 80. 
71 Comoros Second Review Decision, para. 109, see above note 8; Comoros Appeals Deci-
sion, paras. 56, 59, see above note 57; Comoros Appeals Judgment, para. 76, see above 
note 65. 
72 Ibid., para. 78: “[…] where questions of law arise, the only authoritative interpretation of 
the relevant law is that espoused by the Chambers of this Court and not the Prosecutor”. 
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her view and initiate an investigation. Relevant legal findings of the Pre-
Trial Chamber regarding the classification of alleged conduct may prove 
useful during the investigation. The Prosecutor’s adherence thereto en-
sures consistency in the application of the law and equal treatment across 
situations. However, it is also conceivable that, even though the Prosecu-
tor corrected the legal error in accordance with the directions of the Pre-
Trial Chamber, she may reach the same conclusion as before and still not 
initiate an investigation, depending on the particular circumstances of the 
situation. 
Matters are different when it comes to the Article 53(3)(b) review of 
the Prosecutor’s conclusion not to open an investigation solely on consid-
erations regarding the interests of justice. The Prosecutor’s decision not to 
initiate an investigation will be “effective only if confirmed by the Pre-
Trial Chamber”. If the Prosecutor’s decision is not confirmed, the Prose-
cutor “shall proceed with the investigation”.73 The Prosecutor has hitherto 
not invoked considerations of interests of justice in order to take a deci-
sion not to initiate an investigation. In any event, classification of alleged 
conduct may play only a tangential role (at best, in the context of the con-
siderations regarding the ‘gravity of the crime’) which is only one of 
many factors to be considered, as suggested in Article 53(1)(c). 
20.1.4. Investigation 
Investigating international crimes is complex and time-consuming. The 
ICC is seated in The Hague74 while the crime scenes are located thou-
sands of kilometres away. At the early phase of an investigation, the Pros-
ecutor must develop quickly an overall understanding of the situation. 
Understandably, the limited analysis during the preliminary examination 
may not be sufficient to proceed to the next phase and enable her to re-
quest, for example, a warrant of arrest. In-house investigators travel regu-
larly into the field, oftentimes to dangerous and/or challenging regions 
and at personal risk to their health and safety. They interview witnesses 
and collect evidence on incidents and resulting victimisation as well as 
groups and potential perpetrators and their involvement in the incidents. 
Once back in The Hague, investigators and analysts process the infor-
mation collected, label, register and store it. 
                                                   
73 Rule 110(2), see above note 4. 
74 Article 3(1), see above note 2. 
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During the investigation, it is upon the Prosecutor to identify, 
amidst a plurality of individuals and incidents, specific perpetrators and 
specific conduct with a view to bringing those deemed responsible to jus-
tice.75 Notably, the Statute instructs the Prosecutor, “in order to establish 
the truth, [to] extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence rele-
vant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under 
[the] Statute and, in doing so, to investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally”.76 Judges are not part of this process and remain 
inactive throughout the investigation phase, unless the Prosecutor requests 
certain measures, such as the preservation of evidence in the context of a 
unique investigative opportunity 77 or the protection of victims. 78 Their 
involvement is certainly triggered if and when, any time after the initia-
tion of the investigation, the Prosecutor approaches the Pre-Trial Chamber 
with a request for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or summons to appear. 
20.1.5. Warrant of Arrest or Summons to Appear 
A concrete ‘case’ emerges when the Prosecutor identifies a particular sus-
pect and the conduct for which that person is allegedly responsible. 79 
Hence, ‘case’ proceedings start with the Prosecutor’s request seeking the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear pursuant to Article 
58. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, or a Single Judge acting on its behalf, is-
sues a warrant of arrest, on the application of the Prosecutor, if, having 
examined the Prosecutor’s application and the evidence or other infor-
                                                   
75 Appeals Judgment on Victims Participation During Investigation, para. 45, see above note 
44. 
76 Article 54(1)(a), see above note 2. 
77 Article 56, see above note 2. 
78 Articles 57(3)(c) and 68(1), see above note 2. 
79 See, for example, Kenya Authorisation Decision, para. 44, see above note 10; ICC, Situa-
tion in Libya, Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, 11 Octo-
ber 2013, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, para. 66(i) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/af6104/); 
ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Francis Muthaura et al., Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision on the Application by the Government 
of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the 
Statute”, 30 August 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-274, para. 39 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c21f06/). 
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mation, (a) there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the suspect has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (b) the arrest 
of the suspect appears necessary.80 Alternatively, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may issue upon request a summons to appear, with or without conditions, 
if it is satisfied that the summons is sufficient to ensure the person’s ap-
pearance.81 If the conditions under Article 58 are fulfilled, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is under an obligation to issue the warrant of arrest.82 If the Pre-
Trial Chamber considers that further information or evidence is necessary, 
it may request the Prosecutor to present more evidence.83 Accordingly, the 
Chamber has no discretion to decline the request for reasons other than 
evidentiary or legal.84 
The evidentiary threshold applicable at this stage is commonly un-
derstood to involve the existence of information that satisfies an objective 
observer that the suspect may have committed the crime(s).85 The Pre-
                                                   
80 Article 58(1), see above note 2. The arrest of the suspect appears necessary (i) to ensure his 
or her appearance at trial; (ii) to ensure that the suspect does not obstruct or endanger the 
investigation or the court proceedings; or (iii) where applicable, to prevent the suspect 
from continuing with the commission of the crime or a related crime which is within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances. 
81 Article 58(7), see above note 2. 
82 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58”, 13 July 2006, ICC-01/04-
169, para. 44 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8c20eb/). 
83 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Redacted Version of the Decision concerning Supporting Mate-
rials in Connection with the Prosecution’s Application REDACTED pursuant to article 58, 
9 March 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-27, p. 3 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/021949/); ICC, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision concerning Supporting Materials in Connection with the Prosecu-
tion’s Application for Warrants of Arrest pursuant to article 58, 20 January 2006, ICC-
01/04-02/06-323-Red (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e9a4da/). 
84 Christopher K. Hall and Cedric Ryngaert, “Article 58”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 3rd edition, 
C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2016, mn. 10; William A. Schabas, “Article 58”, in William A. 
Schabas (ed.), The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 705. 
85 See, for example, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Arti-
cle 58, 13 July 2012, ICC-01/04-02/06-36-Red, para. 16 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
18c310/); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Ar-
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Trial Chamber does not have to be certain that the person concerned 
committed the crimes. Rather, the evidence must only establish a reason-
able conclusion, possibly amongst several other reasonable conclusions 
available, and not the only reasonable conclusion.86 
A review of the decisions pertaining to the issuance of warrants of 
arrest (or summonses to appear) reveals that in the vast majority of cases, 
the Pre-Trial Chambers confirmed the Prosecutor’s proposed classifica-
tion of alleged conduct. Only in a few instances, did the Pre-Trial Cham-
bers reject or suggest amendment of the proposed classification of alleged 
conduct. Without claiming to be complete, three scenarios emerge from 
the case-law of the ICC. 
The first scenario concerns the situation where the alleged conduct 
as described in the Article 58 application is proven, but its classification 
does not, in the view of the Judges, fully and accurately reflect the con-
duct, as it transpires from the evidence. Since the legal characterisation of 
the conduct is ‘incomplete’, the Pre-Trial Chamber indicates an additional 
classification. 
• Kenyatta et al. case: In the Article 58 application seeking the issu-
ance of summonses to appear for Messrs Muthaura, Kenyatta and 
Ali, the Prosecutor alleged, inter alia, that the Mungiki – an organi-
sation controlling core societal activities in poor residential areas in 
Nairobi – attacked the civilian population in, amongst other, Nakuru 
and Naivasha during the 2007–08 post-election violence pursuant to 
a policy established to that effect during the 2007–08 post-election 
                                                                                                                        
rest against Jean‐Pierre Bemba Gombo, 10 June 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG, para. 24 
(‘Bemba Warrant of Arrest Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fb80c6/); ICC, Sit-
uation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Appeals Chamber, Judgment in the Appeal of Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui of 27 March 2008 against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Application of 
the Appellant for Interim Release, 9 June 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-572, para. 18 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/69bee9/). 
86 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacu-
mura, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, 13 
July 2012, ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red, para. 19 (‘Mudacumura Article 58 Decision’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/ecfae0/); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, 3 February 2010, ICC-02/05-01/09-73, para. 33 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/9ada8e/). 
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violence. The Prosecutor also mentioned that this was made possi-
ble due to the inactivity of the Kenyan police forces and presented 
evidence in this regard.87 
The Chamber accepted that the attack had been carried out in 
furtherance of an organisational policy within the meaning of Arti-
cle 7(2)(a), but raised the question whether evidence pointed to the 
existence of a ‘State policy’ by abstention. Eventually, it left it to 
the Prosecutor to clarify it at a later stage.88 
The second scenario concerns the situation where the alleged con-
duct as described in the Article 58 application is proven, but it does not, in 
the view of the judges, fulfil the legal requirements of the proposed 
crimes or forms of criminal responsibility. One of the reasons for this is 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber adopts a different interpretation of the applica-
ble law than the Prosecutor. In this instance, the judges do not confirm the 
classification of alleged conduct for legal reasons. 
• Bemba case: In the request for the issuance of a warrant of arrest 
for Mr. Bemba, the Prosecutor alleged that, in the context of a con-
flict in the Central African Republic between October 2002 and 
March 2003, Mr. Bemba was responsible for, inter alia, other forms 
of sexual violence involving the undressing of civilians in public, 
thereby humiliating them.89 
The Pre-Trial Chamber disagreed with the Prosecutor’s clas-
sification of the undressing of persons in public as other forms of 
sexual violence. It found that the facts submitted did not fulfil the 
legal requirements of the crime of sexual violence since the conduct 
was not of comparable gravity to the other crimes listed in Article 
                                                   
87 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura et al., 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 8 March 
2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-1, paras. 22–24 (‘Kenyatta et al. Summons Decision’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/df8391/). 
88 Ibid., para. 24. 
89 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
OTP, Prosecutor’s Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58, 9 May 2008, ICC-
01/05-01/08-26-Red, p. 9 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a57940/); ICC, Situation in the 
Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, OTP, Prosecutor’s 
Submission on Further Information and Materials, 27 May 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-29-Red, 
p. 8 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6eaf15/). 
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7(1)(g).90 The Pre-Trial Chamber did not classify these factual alle-
gations under a different crime and did not include them in the war-
rant of arrest. 
• Kenyatta et al. case: In the Article 58 application seeking the issu-
ance of summonses to appear for Messrs Muthaura, Kenyatta and 
Ali, the Prosecutor alleged that in the context of the 2007–08 post-
election violence in Kenya they were responsible for other forms of 
sexual violence as crimes against humanity (Article 7(1)(g)) in the 
form of forced circumcisions of men.91 The crime of ‘other inhu-
mane acts’ (Article 7(1)(k)) had been pleaded by the Prosecutor as 
well.92 
The Pre-Trial Chamber did not follow the legal characterisa-
tion of the alleged acts of circumcision, as proposed by the Prosecu-
tor, and opined that this conduct was better characterised as ‘other 
inhumane acts’ within the meaning of Article 7(1)(k), paying spe-
cial heed to the serious injury to the body of the victims.93 
The third scenario concerns the situation where the classification is 
rejected since the evidence does not support the alleged conduct, as pre-
sented by the Prosecutor. This may concern crimes or forms of criminal 
responsibility. In this instance, the judges do not confirm the classification 
of the alleged conduct for evidentiary reasons. 
• Kenyatta et al. case: In the Article 58 application seeking the issu-
ance of summonses to appear for Messrs Muthaura, Kenyatta and 
Ali, the Prosecutor alleged that in the context of the 2007–08 post-
election violence in Kenya they were responsible for rapes commit-
ted in, amongst other, Naivasha and Nakuru. 
In the summonses to appear, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not 
include the crime of rape as a crime against humanity allegedly 
committed in Naivasha since the Prosecutor had failed to present 
evidence substantiating his allegation that rapes had been commit-
ted as part of the attack.94 
                                                   
90 Bemba Warrant of Arrest Decision, paras. 39–40, see above note 85. 
91 Kenyatta et al. Summons Decision, para. 27, see above note 87. 
92 Ibid., p. 7. 
93 Ibid., para. 27. 
94 Ibid., para. 26. 
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• Ruto et al. case: in the Article 58 application seeking the issuance 
of summonses to appear for Messrs Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, the 
Prosecutor alleged that Mr. Sang, a radio broadcaster in Kenya, was 
criminally responsible for the commission of crimes against human-
ity, jointly with others, as an indirect co-perpetrator.95 In the alterna-
tive, the Prosecutor alleged that Mr. Sang was an accessory, having 
contributed to a crime committed by a group of persons within the 
meaning of Article 25(3)(d).96 
The Chamber declined to follow the Prosecutor’s assessment 
that Sang was a principal perpetrator. It held that his role as a radio 
broadcaster and his involvement in (only) two preparatory meetings 
did not allow for the conclusion that his actions were essential con-
tributions to the common plan to commit crimes against humanity, 
in that he had the power to frustrate the commission of the crimes 
by not fulfilling his task.97 Accordingly, the Chamber determined 
that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Sang was 
(only) an accessory to the alleged crimes.98 
• Mudacumura case: In the request for the issuance of a warrant of 
arrest for Mr. Mudacumura, the Prosecutor alleged that he was re-
sponsible, inter alia, for the commission of crimes against humanity 
committed between January 2009 and September 2010 in the North 
and South Kivu Provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Con-
go.99 
The Chamber declined to classify the conduct as crimes 
against humanity arguing that the evidence did not support the ex-
istence of an organisational policy to attack a civilian population 
within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) and did not demonstrate that 
the civilian population had been the primary target of such attack.100 
                                                   
95 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al., Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for Wil-
liam Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 8 March 2011, ICC-
01/09-01/11-1, paras. 13, 35–36 (‘Ruto et al. Summons Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/6c9fb0/). 
96 Ibid., para. 50. 
97 Ibid., para. 44. 
98 Ibid., para. 57. 
99 Mudacumura Article 58 Decision, paras. 7, 25, see above note 86. 
100 Ibid., paras. 26–29. 
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As a result, the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected to qualify the conduct as 
crimes against humanity and included in the warrant of arrest only 
war crimes. 
Can the Pre-Trial Chamber’s classification of alleged conduct and 
amendments thereto in the warrant of arrest or summons to appear en-
hance the quality of the Prosecutor’s ongoing investigation? What can be 
discerned from the past practice is that the judges’ review of the Prosecu-
tor’s allegations appears to be comprehensive, meticulous and always 
guided by the supporting material furnished by the Prosecutor. 101  In 
adopting this approach, the judges demonstrate that they act sensibly and 
with circumspection: based on the ICC warrant of arrest, domestic author-
ities are obligated to arrest the suspect and deprive him or her of his or her 
liberty.102 A person sought with an ICC warrant of arrest quickly bears the 
stigma of a ‘war criminal’ in the public eye and will find it difficult to 
dispel the allegations once they are made. As a result, any warrant of ar-
rest or summons to appear must be adequately reasoned and be based on 
solid legal and evidentiary foundations. 
As regards the factual allegations made, it is noteworthy that the 
Pre-Trial Chambers do not add new facts which they may discover in the 
supporting material during the review into the warrant of arrest or sum-
mons to appear. Under the Statute, they are not mandated to establish the 
case and, therefore, lack investigative powers. Their main responsibility 
lies in verifying that the evidence presented by the Prosecutor supports the 
factual allegations. As regards the classification of alleged conduct, on the 
other hand, the Pre-Trial Chamber is not bound by the Prosecutor’s legal 
characterisation of the facts and may advance its own classification in the 
warrant of arrest or summons to appear.103 Despite their prerogative, prac-
                                                   
101 In the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor had argued at the time that the Chamber should “trust 
the Prosecution’s summary”, to which the Chamber responded that it is instructed by the 
Statute to review not only the Article 58 application but also the supporting material, see 
ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, 
Article 58, 10 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red, para. 10 (‘Lubanga Warrant 
of Arrest Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/af6679/). 
102 Ibid., para. 11. 
103 For example, Bemba Warrant of Arrest Decision, para. 25: “It is for the Chamber to char-
acterize the facts put forward by the Prosecutor”, see above note 85; Lubanga Warrant of 
Arrest Decision, para. 16: “However, the Chamber considers that it is not bound by the 
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tice shows that Pre-Trial Chambers follow largely the classification of 
conduct proposed by the Prosecutor. If they do not follow the Prosecutor’s 
legal characterisation of facts, it is in the first place for evidentiary rea-
sons and only in the second place for legal reasons. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s detailed and thorough review of the evi-
dence regarding the alleged conduct and the determination of the corre-
sponding classification can also be beneficial for the Prosecutor in her 
preparation of the next procedural steps. She can consider the Chamber’s 
analysis as a ‘test’ of her case theory, albeit admittedly against a low(er) 
evidentiary threshold. It is, as it were, a first external review of the 
strength of the evidence and classification of alleged conduct. Especially 
when the Pre-Trial Chamber does not confirm the classification proposed, 
either for legal or evidentiary reasons, the Prosecutor may take it as a 
stimulus, a suggestion, to reconsider certain aspects of the case or intensi-
fy the investigation on the ‘problematic’ aspects of the case. Weaknesses 
in the evidence (which may translate in re-classification of alleged con-
duct, should they have been identified by the Pre-Trial Chamber) should 
be addressed as a matter of priority during the ongoing investigation. 
At the same time, the Prosecutor is in a rather comfortable position: 
at the stage of the warrant of arrest, the person is not charged yet. The 
Prosecutor presents the charges in the document containing the charges 
(‘DCC’), which is notified to the suspect at a later stage. In the DCC the 
Prosecutor is at liberty to add or withdraw factual allegations, without 
judicial permission, to the factual allegations set forth in the warrant of 
arrest or summons to appear, and is only limited by the rule of speciality 
under Article 101.104 If facts are added or withdrawn in the DCC, this may 
affect the classification of conduct. Importantly, the Prosecutor is also not 
required to follow the Pre-Trial Chamber’s legal characterisation con-
                                                                                                                        
Prosecution’s legal characterisation of the conduct referred to in the Prosecution’s Applica-
tion”, see above note 101. 
104 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
Postponing the Date of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, 6 March 2015, ICC-02/04-
01/15-206, para. 32 (‘Ongwen Postponement Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
5a0ab1/); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 16 December 
2011, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, para. 88 (‘Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/63028f/). 
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tained in the warrant of arrest or summons to appear.105 In the DCC she 
may include other crimes or forms of criminal responsibility without judi-
cial permission. However, if she insists on a classification previously re-
jected by the Pre-Trial Chamber at the Article 58 stage without furnishing 
further evidence or explanations, she risks that the Pre-Trial Chamber will 
take the same decision at the next procedural stage, which will be ad-
dressed in the following section. 
20.1.6. Confirmation of Charges 
After the suspect is arrested and surrendered to the Court, he or she ap-
pears before the Pre-Trial Chamber which sets the date of the confirma-
tion of charges hearing.106 In that hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber hears the 
arguments of both parties and of participating victims with a view to as-
sessing whether the case should proceed to trial. 
Thirty days prior to the hearing, the Prosecutor submits the DCC 
together with the list of evidence on which she intends to rely at the hear-
ing.107 The DCC is the Prosecutor’s assertion to bring the person to trial 
for the factual allegations the person is believed to be responsible, includ-
ing the time and place of the alleged crimes. In addition, the Prosecutor 
attaches a legal characterisation to such factual allegations that corre-
sponds to the crimes and the precise forms of criminal responsibility set 
out in the Statute. 108 Together, the facts and the legal characterisation 
make the ‘charge’109 which must be specified with clarity and in detail in 
                                                   
105 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applica-
tions to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence”, 13 October 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, para. 53 (‘Lubanga Redactions Ap-
peals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7813d4/). 
106 Article 60(1), see above note 2 and Rule 121(1), third sentence, see above note 4. 
107 Article 61(3), see above note 2 and Rule 121(3), see above note 4. 
108 Regulation 52 of the Regulations of the Court, see above note 19. 
109 Article 74(2), see above note 2 and Regulations 52(b) and (c) of the Regulations of the 
Court, see above note 19. See also, for example, ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, 
Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the Defence Request concerning the Time Limit for the Prosecutor to File the 
Document Containing a Detailed Description of the Charges, 5 October 2018, ICC-01/12-
01/18-143-tENG, para. 30 (‘Al Hassan DCC Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
dd8f47/); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Filing of a Sum-
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the DCC.110 Only a specific DCC will put the suspect formally on notice 
about the nature and cause of the charges and allow him or her to prepare 
an adequate defence.111 
At the confirmation hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber is tasked to de-
cide whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds 
to believe that the suspect committed each of the crimes charged by the 
Prosecutor.112 It is a higher threshold than that applied in other tribunals 
when confirming indictments.113 The threshold of ‘substantial grounds to 
                                                                                                                        
mary of the Charges by the Prosecutor, 21 October 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1547-tENG, 
para. 10 (‘Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on Summary of Charges’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7e906f/). 
110 Al Hassan DCC Decision, para. 30, see above note 109; ICC, Situation in the Central 
African Republic II, Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request to Postpone the Confirmation 
Hearing and All Related Disclosure Deadlines”, 15 May 2019, ICC-01/14-01/18-199, pa-
ras. 41–42 (‘Yekatom/Ngaïssona Postponement Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/a751e6/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Date of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing 
and Proceedings Leading Thereto, 14 December 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-325, para. 25 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c5cddf/); Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on Summary of 
Charges, para. 19, see above note 109. See also European Court of Human Rights (‘EC-
tHR’), Pélissier and Sassi v. France, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 25 March 1999, ECLI:
CE:ECHR:1999:0325JUD002544494, para. 51 (‘Pélissier and Sassi v. France Judgment’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e092c3/); ECtHR, Mattoccia v. Italy, Judgment, 25 July 
2000, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0725JUD002396994, para. 59 (‘Mattoccia v. Italy Judgment’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5e07d3/); ECtHR, Penev v. Bulgaria, Judgment, 7 Janu-
ary 2010, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0107JUD002049404, paras. 33, 42 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/989a14/). 
111 See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 23 October 
2001, IT-95-16-A, para. 88 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a5d1/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Ntagerura et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 7 July 2006, ICTR-99-46-A, para. 22 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/816b44/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva, Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion Raising Objections on Defects in the Form of 
the Indictment and to Personal Jurisdiction on the Amended Indictment, 12 May 2000, 
ICTR-96-12-I, p. 2, para. 1 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0f23f1/). Similarly, Pélissier 
and Sassi v. France Judgment, para. 54, see above note 110; Mattoccia v. Italy Judgment, 
para. 60, see above note 110. 
112 Article 61(7), first sentence, see above note 2. 
113 At other international(ised) tribunals, the Pre-Trial Judge, being satisfied that a prima facie 
case has been established by the Prosecutor, confirms the indictment, see ICTR Statute, 8 
November 1994, Article 18 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8732d6/); ICTY Statute, 25 
May 1993, Article 19 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b4f63b/); SCSL, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, 16 January 2002, Rule 47(E) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4c2a6b/); 
STL, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 20 March 2009, Rule 68(F) (https://www.legal-
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believe’ is fulfilled if, after an exacting scrutiny of the evidence, the 
charges are “sufficiently compelling going beyond mere theory or suspi-
cion”.114 On the basis of the confirmation hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may either confirm the charges in relation to which there is sufficient evi-
dence or decline to confirm the charges because of insufficiency of the 
evidence.115 If the charges are confirmed, the person is committed to a 
Trial Chamber for the charges as confirmed. Declining to confirm the 
charges does not mean the person is acquitted. Rather, it means that there 
was not sufficient evidence to proceed to trial. The Prosecutor is, however, 
free to revert to the Pre-Trial Chamber and to request confirmation of the 
charges based on additional evidence.116 If the Pre-Trial Chamber cannot 
take a final decision, it may adjourn the hearing117 and request the Prose-
                                                                                                                        
tools.org/doc/lc66t7/). The prima facie case has been understood to be a “credible case 
which would (if not contradicted by the Defence) be a sufficient basis to convict the ac-
cused on the charge”, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on 
the Review of the Indictment, 10 November 1995, IT-95-14-I, p. 3 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/0c369d/); STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Appeals Chamber, Interlocutory Deci-
sion on the Applicable Law: Criminal Association and Review of the Indictment, 18 Octo-
ber 2017, STL-17-07/I/AC/R176bis/F0021/20171018/R000800-R000844/EN/dm, para. 
110 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/829cbe/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Trial Chamber, 
Confirmation of the Indictment, 5 July 2001, ICTR-2001-72-1, para. 5 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/a5e4c7/). At the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, the evidentiary threshold ap-
plicable at the stage of the confirmation of the indictment is “well-grounded suspicion”, 
Article 39(2) of the Law on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, 3 
August 2015, Law No. 05/L-053 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8b71c3/). According to 
Article 19.1.12. of the 2012 Kosovo Criminal Procedure Code, 28 December 2012, “well-
grounded suspicion” means that the evidence “would satisfy an objective observer that a 
criminal offence has occurred and the defendant has committed the offence”. 
114 See, for example, ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Prosecutor v. Alfred 
Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirma-
tion of charges against Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, 11 December 2019, 
ICC-01/14-01/18-403-Red, para. 14 (‘Yekatom/Ngaïssona Confirmation Decision’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0s9c6/); Ongwen Confirmation Decision, para. 14, see 
above note 44; Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, para. 41, see above note 104; ICC, 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber, De-
cision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, para. 
41 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cb3614/). 
115 Article 61(7)(a) and (b), see above note 2. 
116 Article 61(8), see above note 2. 
117 Article 61(7)(c), see above note 2. See also ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Adjourning the 
Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 3 March 2009, ICC-01/05-
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 974 
cutor to consider (i) providing further evidence or conducting further in-
vestigation with respect to a particular charge; 118  or (ii) amending a 
charge because the evidence submitted appears to establish a different 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.119 Before addressing the ques-
tion of classification of alleged conduct by the judges at the confirmation 
stage, a few preliminary remarks on three important aspects are necessary: 
(i) the completion of the investigation, (ii) the communication of evidence 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber, and (iii) the analysis of the evidence. 
20.1.6.1. Preliminary Remarks 
First, before undertaking the classification of the factual allegations, it is 
crucial to investigate comprehensively and to determine with specificity, 
at the latest when charging the person, what is the conduct for which the 
person is brought to trial. If there is uncertainty as to the exact contours of 
the alleged conduct, it is difficult to give it the proper classification. Ad-
mittedly, the nature of international crimes is different from ordinary 
crimes as they often concern a plurality of incidents occurring over a pro-
longed period of time, across large swathes of the territory, and involve 
high numbers of perpetrators and victims. Nevertheless, despite the com-
plexity of the relevant conduct, it is necessary to frame the charges in such 
a manner that will inform the suspect in a meaningful way. Recently, Pre-
Trial Chamber I summarised its expectations as to the factual specificity 
of the DCC as follows: 
the Chamber is of the view that the degree of specificity ex-
pected from the Prosecutor in her description of the facts de-
pends on the nature of the crimes in question and the circum-
stances of the case brought by the Prosecutor before the 
Chamber. Where crimes such as torture or rape are con-
cerned, the Prosecutor must describe the criminal acts in is-
sue, stating the date and place of the acts, along with the 
number of victims, or at the very least a clear estimate of that 
                                                                                                                        
01/08-388, para. 14 (‘Bemba Adjournment Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
81d7a9/). 
118 Pre-Trial Chamber I adjourned the hearing in the Laurent Gbagbo case and requested the 
Prosecutor to consider conducting further investigation in relation to the contextual ele-
ments and certain incidents. 
119 Pre-Trial Chamber III adjourned the hearing in the Bemba case and requested the Prosecu-
tor to consider adding his criminal responsibility as a commander to the responsibility as a 
principal perpetrator. 
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number, and their identities as far as at all possible. However, 
where by their nature the crimes are directed against a group 
or collectivity of people, as in the case of the crime of perse-
cution, a like degree of specificity cannot be expected of the 
Prosecutor’s description of the facts; nonetheless, the Prose-
cutor must endeavour to pinpoint as much as possible places, 
times and approximate numbers of victims and to provide 
the necessary particulars to make out the elements of the 
crimes.120 
Setting the contours of the case will also facilitate the gathering of 
evidence during the investigation. Chambers have been acutely aware of 
the challenges and complexities of the Prosecutor’s investigations. How-
ever, they also must ensure that proceedings unfold expeditiously with 
due regard for the rights of the Defence. On a number of occasions the 
ICC judges insisted that the Prosecutor (who controls the timing when 
proceedings are triggered before the Court) largely complete the investi-
gation at the stage of the confirmation of charges so that the case is trial-
ready and further delays in the proceedings are avoided.121 The ambition 
                                                   
120 Al Hassan DCC Decision, para. 30, see above note 109; this approach was followed there-
after in the Yekatom/Ngaïssona Postponement Decision, paras. 41–42, see above note 110. 
121 Lubanga Redactions Appeals Judgment, para. 54, see above note 105; ICC, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Appeals Cham-
ber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirmation of charges”, 30 May 2012, 
ICC-01/04-01/10-514, para. 44 (‘Mbarushimana Appeals Judgment’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/6ead30/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William 
Samoei Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, in 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, paras. 42–52 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/96c3c2/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, in De-
cision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, paras. 47–57 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/4972c0/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta, Pre-Trial Chamber, Corrigendum to “Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Re-
quest to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(9) of the Statute’”, 21 March 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-700-Corr, paras. 35–36 (‘Kenyat-
ta Amendment Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d70f13/); ICC, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the “Prosecution’s Urgent Request to Postpone the Date of the Confirmation 
Hearing” and Setting a New Calendar for the Disclosure of Evidence Between the Parties, 
17 June 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-73, para. 31 (‘Ntaganda Postponement Decision’) (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/f65c8a/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prose-
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of the Prosecutor and the Chambers must be that soon after the confirma-
tion of the charges, the trial commences on the charges as confirmed. 
Second, an evidentiary record largely completed in time enables the 
Prosecutor to analyse whether the factual allegations are supported by the 
evidence collected as a whole. The analysis should not only concentrate 
on how many pieces of evidence support a particular factual allegation but, 
more importantly, whether the proven factual allegation fulfils the legal 
requirements of the crime or form of criminal responsibility that the Pros-
ecutor advances in the DCC. This point will be further elaborated below 
when addressing the analysis of evidence. 
For the judges to take an informed decision and to agree or disagree 
with the classification of alleged conduct proposed by the Prosecutor, it is 
necessary that they have full access to the evidence. At the ICC, two ap-
proaches were followed in the pre-trial phase of the cases. In some cases it 
was argued that the Pre-Trial Chamber should only receive the evidence 
on which the parties rely.122 Evidence which the Prosecutor discloses to 
                                                                                                                        
cutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision adjourning the hearing on the con-
firmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3 June 2013, ICC-
02/11-01/11-432, para. 25 (‘Gbagbo Adjournment Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/2682d8/); Ongwen Postponement Decision, para. 32, see above note 104; ICC, Situa-
tion in the Central African Republic II, Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard 
Ngaïssona, Pre-Trial Chamber, Second Decision on Disclosure and Related Matters, 4 
April 2019, ICC-01/14-01/18-163, para. 28 (‘Yekatom and Ngaïssona Second Disclosure 
Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/35f5b8/). 
122 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establish-
ment of a Timetable, 15 May 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, paras. 41–43 (‘Lubanga Disclo-
sure Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/052848/); ICC, Situation in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber, Tran-
script of Hearing, 14 December 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-12-ENG, p. 4, lines 14–22 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/03aafc/); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. 
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Second Decision on issues relating to Disclo-
sure, 15 July 2009, ICC-02/05-02/09-35, paras. 6–12 (‘Abu Garda Second Disclosure De-
cision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b57860/); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Pros-
ecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohamed Jerbo Jamus, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on issues relating to disclosure, 29 June 2010, ICC-02/05-03/09-49, 
paras. 5–6 (‘Banda and Jerbo Disclosure Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
2a3bac/); ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on issues relating to disclosure, 30 May 2011, 
ICC-01/04-01/10-87, paras. 9–10 (‘Mbarushimana Disclosure Decision’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/aee80d/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. 
Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision establishing a disclosure system and a cal-
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the Defence but on which it does not rely, such as potentially exculpatory 
evidence or evidence that is material to the preparation of the defence, so-
called Rule 77 material, need not be communicated to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber as such communication would alter the nature of the confirma-
tion hearing and infringe the right of the Defence to decide whether to 
rely on disclosed evidentiary material.123 In other cases it was required 
that all evidence disclosed between the parties, be it incriminating or ex-
culpatory, be communicated in their entirety to the Chamber.124 This ap-
                                                                                                                        
endar for disclosure, 24 January 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-30, paras. 15, 19–20 (‘Gbagbo 
Disclosure Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3637f7/); ICC, Situation in the Re-
public of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision es-
tablishing a system of disclosure of evidence, 14 April 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-57, para. 6 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/226a9a/). 
123 For example, Lubanga Disclosure Decision, paras. 50–58, see above note 122. 
124 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable 
for Disclosure between the Parties, 31 July 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-55, para. 19 (‘Bemba 
Disclosure Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/15c802/); ICC, Situation in the Re-
public of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, 6 April 2011, ICC-
01/09-01/11-44, paras. 4–6 (‘Ruto et al. Disclosure Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/351827/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure 
and Other Related Matters, 6 April 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-48, paras. 5–7 (‘Muthaura et al. 
Disclosure Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/12b91f/); ICC, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, 12 April 
2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-47, paras. 8–12 (‘Ntaganda Disclosure Decision’) (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/4b9b48/); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Transcript of Hearing, 4 December 
2013, ICC-01/05-01/13-T-2-Red-ENG, p. 31, line 25 to p. 32, line 3 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/d06553/); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Transcript of Hearing, 5 December 2013, 
ICC-01/05-01/13-T-3-Red2-ENG, p. 12, lines 22–25 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
93e80f/); ICC, Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, 27 Feb-
ruary 2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-203, paras. 9–13 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/43ce00/); 
ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on issues related to disclosure and exceptions thereto, 30 September 
2015, ICC-01/12-01/15-9, para. 2 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eff9b5/); ICC, Situation 
in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure Protocol and Other Related Matters, 16 
May 2018, ICC-01/12-01/18-31-tENG-Corr, paras. 12–16 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/89d69e/); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Prosecutor v. Alfred Yeka-
tom, Pre-Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of Decision Disclosure and Related Mat-
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proach was justified with the wording of Rule 121(2)(c),125 the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s duty to contribute to the search for the truth, its filtering func-
tion to allow only those cases to go to trial for which there is sufficient 
evidence, and its duty to delineate the scope of the trial which is binding 
on the Trial Chamber.126 Today, the system of disclosure of evidence at 
the pre-trial phase is harmonised as it is commonly accepted that the Pre-
Trial Chambers have access to the entire evidentiary material disclosed 
between the parties regardless of whether they rely on it.127 This approach 
allows the Pre-Trial Chambers to independently assess the evidence avail-
able, request, if need be, the submission of all evidence necessary for the 
determination of the truth,128 and arrive at its own conclusion.129 
Third, a related topic is the manner in which the evidence is pre-
sented. Evidently, an organised presentation of the pre-trial evidence is 
conducive to the smooth conduct of the proceedings and the better under-
standing of the charges. Pre-trial proceedings are characterised by a fast 
pace and processing of a large amount of information within a very short 
period of time. The Prosecutor presents the DCC together with the list of 
incriminating evidence, on which she relies, only 30 days in advance of 
the confirmation hearing. The Defence has thereafter 15 days to present 
evidence in favour of the suspect, if it chooses to do so.130 This tight time 
schedule does not give the Defence much time to analyse evidence, espe-
cially if disclosed only shortly before the confirmation hearing. Unlike at 
trial, the Pre-Trial Chamber only exceptionally hears witnesses and does 
not discuss the evidence with the parties in a series of hearings. Several 
Pre-Trial Chambers explored ways to make the processing of voluminous 
                                                                                                                        
ters, 23 January 2019, ICC-01/14-01/18-64-Red, paras. 11–12 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/30e9b1/); Yekatom and Ngaïssona Second Disclosure Decision, p. 16, para. (a), 
see above note 121. 
125 Rule 121(2)(c) reads: “All evidence disclosed between the Prosecutor and the person for 
the purposes of the confirmation bearing shall be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber”, 
see above note 4. 
126 See Bemba Disclosure Decision, paras. 8–25, see above note 124. 
127 Recent pre-trial proceedings in the cases concerning Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mahmoud, Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona followed this approach. See al-
so ICC, Chambers Practice Manual, 4th edition, 2019, paras. 26–27 (‘Chambers Practice 
Manual’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dh0zyq/). 
128 Article 69(3), see above note 2. 
129 Bemba Disclosure Decision, para. 16, see above note 124. 
130 Article 61(6)(c), see above note 2, Rule 121(6), see above note 4. 
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evidence take place under satisfactory conditions, in particular for the 
Defence. One Pre-Trial Chamber requested that the Prosecutor explain 
only the exculpatory evidence and Rule 77 material by summarising it and 
explaining its relevance.131 Another Pre-Trial Chamber requested that the 
Prosecutor analyse incriminating evidence and organise it in an in-depth-
analysis chart (‘IDAC’) according to the constitutive legal requirements 
of the crimes, including contextual elements, and the forms of criminal 
responsibility. 132  A third Pre-Trial Chamber ordered that incriminating 
evidence be set out in a document termed ‘element-based chart’ according 
to the legal requirements of the crimes and forms of criminal responsibil-
ity. It also ordered the Prosecutor to organise the list of incriminating evi-
dence in such a manner that each factual statement is linked with the spe-
cific element of crime and/or form of criminal responsibility.133 The Ap-
peals Chamber clarified that the Pre-Trial Chambers may not compel the 
parties to produce such analytical documents without seeking prior sub-
missions from them on the utility and practical implications.134 In recent 
cases Pre-Trial Chambers have refrained from ordering analytical docu-
ments highlighting, inter alia, the additional burden placed on the Prose-
                                                   
131 Abu Garda Second Disclosure Decision, paras. 13–16, see above note 122; Banda and 
Jerbo Disclosure Decision, para. 5, see above note 122; Mbarushimana Disclosure Deci-
sion, para. 11, see above note 122. 
132 Bemba Disclosure Decision, paras. 64–73, see above note 124; ICC, Situation in the Cen-
tral African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the Submission of an Updated, Consolidated Version of the In-depth Analysis 
Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, 10 November 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-232 (‘Bemba Up-
dated IDAC Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/842374/); Ruto et al. Disclosure 
Decision, paras. 21–23, see above note 124; Muthaura et al. Disclosure Decision, paras. 
22–24, see above note 124; Ntaganda Disclosure Decision, paras. 29–32, see above note 
124. 
133 Gbagbo Disclosure Decision, para. 40, p. 31, see above note 122; ICC, Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Pre-Trial Chamber, Second 
decision on issues related to disclosure of evidence, 5 May 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-67, pa-
ras. 14–15 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/62fa3c/). In the Blé Goudé case, the same Pre-
Trial Chamber refrained from ordering a particular structure of the list of evidence and left 
it to the Prosecutor to organise the evidence “consecutively in any clear order”, see ibid., 
para. 14. 
134 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II entitled “Deci-
sion Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters”, 17 June 
2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-251 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0052a2/). 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 980 
cutor or the risk for delays in the proceedings, in particular the postpone-
ment of the confirmation hearing.135 
The analytical documents, such as the IDAC or the ‘element-based 
chart’, organise the evidence presentation in a law-driven way, linking the 
relevant evidence to the factual allegation with which the Prosecutor in-
tends to prove the existence of a particular legal requirement of the appli-
cable law.136 It provides an immediate overview of whether the evidence 
is sufficient in support of a particular legal requirement, as alleged by the 
Prosecutor. The list of evidence, or a footnoted DCC do not provide the 
same level of analysis as they are not organised according to the legal 
requirements of the applicable law. The level of analysis also cannot be 
achieved by summarising witness statements or other pieces of evidence, 
as has been proposed by another presenter at the New Delhi expert con-
ference.137 Summaries of evidence do not filter the relevant pieces of in-
formation in relation to specific legal requirements of the applicable law, 
but merely reproduce the gist of information contained in the evidence. 
                                                   
135 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag 
Mahmoud, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the In-Depth Analysis Chart of Disclosed Evi-
dence, 29 June 2018, ICC-01/12-01/18-61-tENG, paras. 22–23 (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/d35cef/); Yekatom and Ngaïssona Second Disclosure Decision, para. 24, see above 
note 121. Contrary, ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William Samoei 
Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application for leave to 
Appeal the ‘Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Mat-
ters’ (ICC-01/09-01/11-44)”, 2 May 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-74, para. 27 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7ea8aa/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Fran-
cis Kirimi Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application 
for leave to Appeal the ‘Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other 
Related Matters’ (ICC-01/09-02/11-48)”, 2 May 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-77, para. 25 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c25cf8/). 
136 Pre-Trial Chamber III, the first Chamber to order an IDAC, established and proposed a 
model which was adopted in all other cases before it, see ICC, Situation in the Central Af-
rican Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Annex, 10 
November 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-232-Anx (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b6b329/), 
appended to Bemba Updated IDAC Decision, see above note 132. The model of the ele-
ment-based chart is to be found, for example, in ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Annex III, 24 January 2012, 
ICC-02/11-01/11-30-AnxIII (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3d7817/), appended to 
Gbagbo Disclosure Decision, see above note 122. 
137 See David Re, “David Re, Rethinking Disclosure in Core International Crimes Cases”, 
CILRAP Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-re/). 
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Auxiliary documents, presented in addition to the documents re-
quired by law, are not foreign to large and complex proceedings as those 
before the ICC.138 It is worth highlighting that at trial the Office of the 
Prosecutor readily prepares and submits other voluminous auxiliary doc-
uments, such as pre-trial briefs, which provide further explanations on the 
evidence with a view to assisting the Defence and the Trial Chamber. Out-
siders observe that analytical documents organise the evidence according 
to the legal elements, assist in navigating through large amounts of evi-
dence, expedite the proceedings, and provide the Defence “maximum 
notice and a clear understanding” of the case.139 A 2014 expert report on 
the effectiveness of the ICC recommended that the IDAC be submitted 
“as early as practical before the commencement of the confirmation of 
charges hearing”.140 
Various Pre-Trial Chambers have stressed in the context of setting 
disclosure deadlines prior to the confirmation hearing: 
the Prosecutor is the triggering force of the proceedings, in 
the sense that the determination as to whether, and when, an 
application for a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear is 
to be filed before the Chamber falls squarely within his pre-
rogatives. The Single Judge thus expects that, before ap-
proaching the Chamber with his application for summonses 
to appear […] the Prosecutor has carefully reviewed the evi-
dence in his possession at that time, both incriminating and 
exculpatory. Furthermore, this material has been in his do-
main for sufficient time for him to be able to disclose to the 
                                                   
138 Michael G. Karnavas, “The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence: More of the Same Hybridity with Added Prosecutorial Transparency”, in Interna-
tional Criminal Law Review, 2020, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 94. 
139 Ibid., p. 94; Morten Bergsmo and Olympia Bekou, “The In-depth Evidence Analysis 
Charts at the International Criminal Court”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Active Complemen-
tarity: Legal Information Transfer, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2011, pp. 
313–47 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/8-bergsmo); Roger S. Clark, “Elements of Crimes in 
Early Confirmation Decisions of Pre-Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Court”, 
in New Zealand Yearbook of International Law, 2008, vol. 6, pp. 209-238; Johan D. van 
der Vyver, “Time is of the essence: The In-depth Analysis Chart in Proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court”, in Criminal Law Bulletin, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 601–16. 
140 Guénaël Mettraux et al., “The Confirmation Process”, in Expert Initiative on Promoting 
Effectiveness at the International Criminal Court, December 2014, para. 31 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/3dae90/). 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 982 
Defence or to request for redactions, if need be, within a 
short period of time.141 
The above reasons which the Pre-Trial Chambers have brought 
forward in the context of disclosure must apply a fortiori for the analysis 
of the evidence. During the investigation, the Prosecutor continuously 
takes possession of incriminating evidence and, undoubtedly and demon-
strably, analyses it with a view to formulating the charges in the DCC. 
The IDAC or element-based chart is nothing else but the outcome of such 
analysis that underlies the DCC. 
The judges of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, who adopted the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence in March 2017, acknowledged the ne-
cessity of such analysis at the pre-trial stage and included in said instru-
ment that the Specialist Prosecutor, when presenting the indictment, sub-
mit not only the evidentiary material but also a “detailed outline demon-
strating the relevance of each item of evidentiary material to each allega-
tion, with particular reference to the conduct of the suspect with respect to 
the alleged crime(s)”.142 
20.1.6.2. Classification of Alleged Conduct at the Confirmation of 
Charges Stage 
By the time of writing, the Pre-Trial Chambers have confirmed charges 
relating to Article 5 crimes and offences against the administration of jus-
tice against 22 suspects,143 and declined to confirm charges against four 
                                                   
141 For example, ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Prosecution’s application requesting 
disclosure after a final resolution of the Government of Kenya’s admissibility challenge” 
and Establishing a Calendar for Disclosure Between the Parties, 20 April 2011, ICC-01/09-
02/11-64, para. 17 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1f9ef0/). This finding was rehearsed 
with approval in Gbagbo Disclosure Decision, para. 38, see above note 122; recently also 
remarked in Yekatom/Ngaïssona Postponement Decision, para. 32, see above note 110. 
142 Rule 86(3)(b) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence before the Kosovo Specialist Cham-
bers, 17 March 2017 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/opmwoy/). 
143 These persons are: Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Bosco Ntaganda, Dominic Ongwen, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, 
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, Narcisse Arido, Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain, Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, William Samoei Ruto, Joshua Arap 
Sang, Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé 
Goudé, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mahmoud, Alfred Yeka-
tom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona. 
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suspects for insufficiency of the evidence.144 When the Pre-Trial Chamber 
confirms the charges, it considers the evidence to be sufficient to establish 
‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the suspect indeed committed the 
crimes, as charged, and adopts the classification of alleged conduct as 
proposed by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor thus can assume that there is a 
strong likelihood the Trial Chamber will enter a conviction on the basis of 
the confirmed classification of alleged conduct, provided the evidence 
satisfies the evidentiary threshold applicable at trial (‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’). If the Pre-Trial Chamber concludes that the evidence presented 
does not support the factual allegations, it declines to confirm the charge(s) 
concerned or those parts of the charge(s) affected by evidentiary deficien-
cies. As is the case with warrants of arrest, the classification of alleged 
conduct is not confirmed for evidentiary reasons. If, however, the judges 
are of the view that, on the basis of the evidence presented, a different 
classification of the alleged conduct should be adopted, they can remedy 
the deficiency detected through the avenue the Statute offers: adjourning 
the hearing and requesting the Prosecutor to reconsider the classification 
of alleged conduct pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii). In other words, judges 
cannot change the legal classification themselves. In case the judges are of 
the view that the evidence is insufficient (and they do not wish to decline 
to confirm the charges outright), they may revert to the Prosecutor and 
request that she consider providing further evidence or conducting further 
investigation with respect to a particular charge pursuant to Article 
61(7)(c)(i). 
Pre-Trial Chambers have adjourned the confirmation hearings in 
two cases, namely in the Bemba case and in the Laurent Gbagbo case. 
• Bemba case: The Chamber requested the Prosecutor to consider 
amending the charges because the evidence submitted appeared to 
establish a different form of criminal responsibility, namely Mr. 
Bemba’s responsibility as a military commander or superior under 
Article 28 instead of his responsibility of an indirect co-perpetrator 
under Article 25(3)(a). 145  After the Prosecutor re-submitted an 
amended DCC (and corresponding IDAC), the Pre-Trial Chamber 
declined to confirm Mr. Bemba’s criminal responsibility as a prin-
                                                   
144 These persons are: Callixte Mbarushimana, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Henry Kiprono 
Kosgey, and Mohammed Hussein Ali. 
145 Bemba Adjournment Decision, paras. 46 and 49, see above note 117. 
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cipal perpetrator and confirmed his responsibility as a military 
commander.146 The fact that the Trial Chamber discussed the evi-
dence on the basis of Article 28 and ultimately convicted Mr. Bem-
ba for his responsibility as a military commander, demonstrates that 
the intervention of the Pre-Trial Chamber as regards the classifica-
tion was, as such, correct. 
• Gbagbo case: The Chamber requested the Prosecutor to consider 
providing further evidence or conducting further investigation with 
respect to the existence of the contextual elements of crimes against 
humanity with which Mr. Gbagbo was charged.147 The Prosecutor 
conducted further investigative activities, re-submitted an amended 
DCC, and the Chamber, by majority, confirmed the charges as pre-
sented by the Prosecutor. 148  The fact that the majority of Trial 
Chamber I acquitted Messrs Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, inter alia, be-
cause of lack of evidence concerning the existence of a State or or-
ganisational policy to commit an attack against the civilian popula-
tion within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a),149 is a further indication 
that the evidentiary problem was correctly identified by the Pre-
Trial Chamber but could not be overcome at trial. 
                                                   
146 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, ICC-
01/05-01/08-424, paras. 344, 501 (‘Bemba Confirmation Decision’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/07965c/). 
147 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, paras. 44–45, see above note 121. 
148 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo, 12 June 2014, 
ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red (‘Gbagbo Confirmation Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/5b41bc/). The dissenting Judge, while agreeing that “several incidents supporting 
the crimes against humanity allegation are now better supported by evidence”, could not 
agree with her colleagues on the confirmation since, in her view, the evidence in the record 
did not suffice to commit Gbagbo to trial for the charges under the forms of criminal re-
sponsibility as pleaded by the Prosecutor, see ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Christine van den Wyngaert, 12 June 2014, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Anx (‘Dissenting Opin-
ion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f715a5/). 
149 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Trial Chamber, Transcript of Hearing, 15 January 2019, ICC-02/11-
01/15-T-232-ENG, p. 3 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4fe93a/). 
 
20. The Judiciary and Enhancement of the Classification of Alleged Conduct 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 985 
Which conclusions for the Prosecutor’s investigation can be drawn 
from the Pre-Trial Chamber’s review of the charges at the confirmation 
stage? To find a response to this question, the purpose of the confirmation 
stage must first be called to mind. All Pre-Trial Chambers are unanimous 
in stipulating that its purpose, inter alia, lies in filtering those cases that 
merit to be discussed at trial.150 What exactly this means has been de-
scribed by Judge Christine van den Wyngaert as follows: the Pre-Trial 
Chamber verifies whether there is sufficient evidence to “sustain a possi-
ble conviction on the assumption that [evidentiary] questions are resolved 
in favour of the Prosecutor at trial”.151 It follows that the confirmation of 
charges is not an end in itself, but serves to ‘weed out’ the weak cases and 
to ‘test’ the sufficiency of evidence for trial. As a consequence, and mind-
ful of the serious consequences of confirmation for the accused, the vic-
tims and the Court as a whole, the scrutiny of the Prosecutor’s evidence is 
thorough and rigorous, undertaken against a relatively high intermediate 
evidentiary threshold. All factual allegations included in the DCC are as-
sessed in light of the evidence presented. The fact that the evidentiary 
threshold at the confirmation stage is not the same as at trial does not 
mean that the Pre-Trial Chamber does not assess all factual allegations in 
detail.152 The requisite evidentiary threshold and the scope of the factual 
                                                   
150 See, for example, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 29 
January 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, para. 37 (‘Lubanga Confirmation Decision’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b7ac4f/); Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, para. 18, see 
above note 121; ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al 
Mahdi, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Fa-
qi Al Mahdi, 24 March 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-84-Red, para. 15 (‘Al Mahdi Confirmation 
Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bc8144/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of 
Mali, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Rectificatif à la Décision relative à la confirmation des charges portées contre Al 
Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, 30 September 2019, ICC-01/12-
01/18-461-Corr-Red, para. 42 (‘Al Hassan Confirmation Decision’) (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/9lml5x/); Mbarushimana Appeals Judgment, para. 39, see above note 121; 
Bemba Confirmation Decision, para. 28, see above note 146; Ongwen Confirmation Deci-
sion, para. 14, see above note 44; Yekatom/Ngaïssona Confirmation Decision, para. 14, see 
above note 114. 
151 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, para. 4, see above note 148. 
152 Contrary, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Bosco 
Ntaganda, Trial Chamber, Decision on Updated DCC, 6 February 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-
450, para. 28: “The Pre-Trial Chamber is not required to consider each factual allegation in 
detail but rather only to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substan-
tial grounds to believe that the crimes charged were committed” (https://www.legal-tools.
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enquiry are distinct notions and should not be conflated. Upon confirma-
tion of the charges, the accused will defend him- or herself only against 
those factual allegations that are contained in the confirmation decision.153 
The Trial Chamber will enter a conviction only on the factual allegations 
as described in the confirmation decision.154 As a result, the factual scope 
of the case is ‘fixed’ at the confirmation stage and the Prosecutor is not 
authorised to introduce new facts into trial that have not been contemplat-
ed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. On the other hand, factual allegations that 
are not proven against the evidentiary threshold of ‘substantial grounds to 
believe’ are not confirmed and, therefore, not retained in the charges. This 
may concern discrete factual allegations underlying a crime or form of 
criminal responsibility, or crimes and forms of criminal responsibility as a 
whole. 
The classification, which is part and parcel of the ‘charge’, is of 
course also reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. If the alleged conduct is 
proven and fulfils the legal requirements of the crime(s) and form(s) of 
criminal responsibility, then the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms the classifi-
cation proposed by the Prosecutor. The confirmed classification of alleged 
conduct informs authoritatively the accused of the legal subject-matter of 
the ensuing trial. The confirmation decision also restricts the Prosecutor’s 
authority as she is no longer at liberty to amend the classification of al-
leged conduct on her own. Notably, while the legal classification given by 
                                                                                                                        
org/doc/7cec26/). See also ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Appeals Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji 
Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-
Anx1-Red, para. 34 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc2518/): 
In such a case, allegations of such criminal acts are primarily vehicles to prove a 
broader allegation and it may therefore not be necessary for the pre-trial chamber to 
assess all criminal acts put forward by the Prosecutor. The pre-trial chamber may then 
[…] rely on all or some of those acts to confirm the crimes charged. 
This particular understanding of the scope of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s factual enquiry of-
fered by Trial Chamber VI and two dissenting appellate judges cannot explain why Pre-
Trial Chambers have significantly reduced the factual scope of specific charges, such as in 
the Situation in the Republic of Kenya cases. 
153 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on the Submission of Auxiliary Documents, 10 June 2015, 
ICC-01/05-01/13-992, paras. 12–13 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6a4ba2/); Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Decision on Summary of Charges, paras. 17, 19, see above note 109. 
154 Cf. Articles 61(7)(a), 64(8)(a), 74(2), see above note 2 and Regulation 55 of the Regula-
tions of the Court, see above note 19. 
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the Pre-Trial Chamber when issuing a warrant of arrest is not binding on 
the Prosecutor at the confirmation stage, the Prosecutor must proceed at 
the trial stage with the prosecution of the accused in relation to the crimes 
and forms of criminal responsibility as confirmed in the Article 61 deci-
sion. Should the Prosecutor be in disagreement with or change her mind 
regarding the classification of alleged conduct after the charges are con-
firmed, she can either (i) request to amend the charges with permission of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber,155 or (ii) request that the Trial Chamber trigger the 
application of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and inform 
the parties that it may give the factual allegations a different classification. 
However, in both instances the ultimate decision whether the classifica-
tion is subject to change lies with the respective Chamber and not the 
Prosecutor.156 It is clear from the foregoing that under the Statute the clas-
sification of alleged conduct, in contrast to the facts, may not remain static 
in the course of the proceedings and be subject to change. As a result, it 
appears that the confirmation of the facts of the case is more important 
than the confirmation of the classification of alleged conduct. 
Should, however, the Pre-Trial Chamber wish to amend the classifi-
cation of alleged conduct at the confirmation stage, it must do so through 
the avenue of Article 61(7)(c)(ii) and provide the Prosecutor with the op-
portunity to amend the charge. It cannot change the classification of al-
leged conduct on its own. This conforms with the division of responsibili-
ties set out in the Statute which vests the responsibility to frame the 
charges in the DCC in the Prosecutor, including the classification of al-
leged conduct. Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court is not appli-
cable at the confirmation stage.157 In this regard, Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 
                                                   
155 Article 61(9), see above note 2. 
156 Kenyatta Amendment Decision, para. 19, see above note 121; ICC, Situation in the Central 
African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Trial Chamber, Decision 
on Prosecution Application to Provide Notice pursuant to Regulation 55, 15 September 
2015, ICC-01/05-01/13-1250, para. 8 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ea422e/); ICC, Sit-
uation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., 
Trial Chamber, Decision on Prosecution’s Re-application for Regulation 55(2) Notice, 15 
January 2016, ICC-01/05-01/13-1553 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8ddec3/); ICC, Sit-
uation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé 
Goudé, Trial Chamber, Decision giving notice pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of the Regula-
tions of the Court, 19 August 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15-185, para. 10 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/984739/). 
157 In the Regulations of the Court, Regulation 55 is placed under Chapter 3 “Proceedings 
before the Court” Section 3 entitled “Trial”, see above note 19. Its wording clearly ad-
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approach in the Lubanga case to reclassify proprio motu the contextual 
elements of war crimes in the confirmation decision158 was criticised for 
not being in conformity with the statutory framework.159 
Lastly a few brief observations on the issue of confirming charges 
for the same facts in the alternative. This issue has provoked much con-
troversy, in particular from the Defence, and concerns mainly the confir-
mation of several forms of criminal responsibility in the alternative (forms 
of principal perpetratorship and accessoryship). While in the first cases, 
the Office of the Prosecutor charged Messrs Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo, 
and Bemba, with only one or two forms of criminal responsibility,160 it 
changed its approach in later cases and adopted a broad charging poli-
cy.161 The same development is mirrored in the jurisprudence of the Pre-
                                                                                                                        
dresses the Trial Chamber. Furthermore, there is no provision in the statutory framework 
that renders this Regulation applicable at the pre-trial stage. Lastly, mindful of the norm 
hierarchy, the Pre-Trial Chamber is duty-bound to apply Article 61(7)(c)(ii) and not a Reg-
ulation that is subject to the Statute (Article 52). 
158 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, paras. 202–04, see above note 150. 
159 Olympia Bekou, “Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo – Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges”, in Human Rights Law Review, 2008, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 354. 
160 In the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor charged Mr. Lubanga as co-perpetrator, see ICC, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
OTP, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3)(a), 28 August 2006, ICC-01/04-
01/06-356-Anx2, paras. 20–24 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e2fa01/), Lubanga Con-
firmation Decision, para. 319, see above note 150. In the Katanga and Ngdujolo case, the 
Prosecutor charged both suspects as co-perpetrators and, in the alternative, as accessories 
for having ordered the commission of the crimes, see ICC, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, OTP, 
Amended Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) of the Statute, 26 
June 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-649-Anx1A, paras. 90–94 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
9cc58b/). In the Bemba case, the Prosecutor charged Mr. Bemba as indirect co-perpetrator. 
After the Pre-Trial Chamber adjourned the hearing and requested the Prosecutor to consid-
er amending the charges by considering Mr. Bemba’s criminal responsibility as a military 
commander or superior, the Prosecutor charged Mr. Bemba alternatively for his responsi-
bility under Article 28, see ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, OTP, Public Redacted Version of the Amended Document 
containing the charges filed on 30 March 2009, 30 March 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-395-
Anx3, paras. 57–59, 86 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d7f72e/). 
161 For example, in the Al Hassan case, the Prosecutor charged Mr. Al Hassan as direct perpe-
trator, co-perpetrator and indirect co-perpetrator. In addition, Mr. Al Hassan was charged 
as accessory for having solicited or induced the commission of the crimes, for having aid-
ed and abetted the commission of the crimes, and for having contributed in any other way 
to the crimes committed by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. The forms 
of criminal responsibility were further specified for each crime charged. See ICC, Situation 
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Trial Chambers. While the Pre-Trial Judges adopted a strict approach in 
the first cases162 they changed their approach in later cases, “taking stock 
of the experience of the Court”, and accepted different forms of criminal 
responsibility for the accused’s conduct in the alternative when the evi-
dence was deemed sufficient to sustain each alternative. 163 The judges 
                                                                                                                        
in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag 
Mahmoud, OTP, Version publique expurgée de la “Version amendée et corrigée du Docu-
ment contenant les charges contre M. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag 
Mahmoud”, ICC-01/12-01/18-335-Conf-Corr, 11 mai 2019, 2 July 2019, ICC-01/12-
01/18-335-Corr-Red, para. 208 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1e4aac/). In the Yekatom 
and Ngaïssona case, the Prosecutor charged Mr. Yekatom as direct perpetrator and co-
perpetrator and as an accessory for having ordered, solicited and/or induced the commis-
sion of the crimes, for having assisted in the commission of the crimes, and for having 
contributed in any other way to the crimes committed by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose. In addition, Mr. Yekatom was charged for his responsibility as military 
commander. Mr. Ngaïssona was charged as co-perpetrator and as an accessory for having 
assisted in the commission of the crimes and for having contributed in any other way to the 
crimes committed by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. The forms of 
criminal responsibility were further set out for each suspect individually and specified for 
each crime charged. See ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Prosecutor v. 
Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, OTP, Public redacted version of “Docu-
ment Containing the Charges”, ICC-01/14-01/18-282-Conf-AnxB1, 19 August 2019, 18 
September 2019, ICC-01/14-01/18-282-AnxB1-Red, paras. 120–26, 185–99 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/9e589d/). 
162 Pre-Trial Chamber I held that if there was sufficient evidence to establish principal perpe-
tratorship, the question of accessorial forms of criminal responsibility or com-
mand/superior responsibility became moot, see Lubanga Confirmation Decision, para. 321, 
see above note 150; ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the con-
firmation of charges, 30 September 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, para. 471 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/67a9ec/). Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Bemba case adopted a similar ap-
proach and considered the assessment of Article 28 only necessary if Mr. Bemba’s respon-
sibility as a principal perpetrator could not be established, see Bemba Confirmation Deci-
sion, para. 342, see above note 146. See also Ruto et al. Summons Decision, para. 36, see 
above note 95. 
163 See Chambers Practice Manual, para. 67, see above note 127; ICC, Situation in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor 
Against Bosco Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, para. 100 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/5686c6/); Gbagbo Confirmation Decision, paras. 227–28, see above 
note 148; ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé, 11 
December 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-186, para. 133 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
0536d5/); Al Mahdi Confirmation Decision, para. 22, see above note 150; Ongwen Con-
firmation Decision, paras. 33, 35, see above note 44; Al Hassan Confirmation Decision, pp. 
452–65, see above note 150; Yekatom/Ngaïssona Confirmation Decision, pp. 100–07, see 
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advanced two reasons in support of this approach: confirming alternative 
forms of responsibility may reduce future delays at trial and provides ear-
ly notice to the accused of the different legal characterisations that may be 
considered by the trial judges.164 Some presenters at the New Delhi expert 
conference expressed a degree of sympathy for this approach.165 While it 
is possible to confirm charges in the alternative against a lower eviden-
tiary threshold with a view to discussing them at trial, conducting a trial 
on the basis of numerous forms of criminal responsibility evidently places 
a higher burden on the Defence. The accused is presented with a cata-
logue of forms of criminal responsibility for either all or selected crimes – 
that is, as such, neither meaningful nor informative.166 Since the Defence 
cannot foresee which form of criminal responsibility the Trial Chamber 
will ultimately choose in its final judgment, it must extend its investiga-
tion to cover all legal elements of the alternatives. This is also a matter of 
time and costs for the Defence teams (as it is equally for the Prosecutor). 
In the courtroom, evidence must be elicited from witnesses that could 
potentially be relevant for a number of forms of criminal responsibility, 
thus prolonging the duration of the trial. Moreover, Defence counsel are 
compelled to build various strands of defence strategies in relation to each 
and every alternative. There is no hard rule according to which the Pre-
Trial Chamber ought to proceed. If the evidence clearly evinces the prin-
cipal perpetratorship of the accused, it is at least debatable whether there 
is a need for the Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm, in addition, his or her 
criminal responsibility as an accessory. In any event, should the classifica-
tion of the alleged conduct prove not to be sustainable at trial, there is the 
possibility to apply Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, an in-
                                                                                                                        
above note 114. The policy change was also informed by the developments at trial, in par-
ticular the acquittal of Mr. Ngudjolo and the conviction of Mr. Katanga after the Majority 
of Trial Chamber II re-characterised his conduct pursuant to Regulation 55 of the Regula-
tions of the Court. 
164 For example, Gbagbo Confirmation Decision, para. 228, see above note 148; Ongwen 
Confirmation Decision, para. 35, see above note 44. 
165 See Cale J. Davis, “Cumulative Charging and Challenges in Charge Selection”, CILRAP 
Film, New Delhi, 22 February 2019 (www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/190222-davis/). 
166 Karnavas, 2020, p. 94, see above note 138: “Pleading all modes of liability in the alterna-
tive is hardly specific, even if it technically meets the notice requirement”. 
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strument that was introduced to strengthen the efficiency of trial proceed-
ings and to close “accountability gaps”.167 
20.2. Conclusions 
Have the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers, when assessing the classification of 
alleged conduct, contributed to the improvement of the Prosecutor’s in-
vestigation or the preparation of the cases? I leave this answer to the in-
formed observer of the Court’s proceedings. Importantly, the impact of the 
Pre-Trial Chambers’ classification of alleged conduct must be evaluated in 
light of the stage of the proceedings, in which such classification is under-
taken, and the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber. At the situation stage, during 
which the Prosecutor decides whether to open an investigation and, if in 
the affirmative, conducts the investigation, the pronouncements of Pre-
Trial Chambers on the legal characterisation of alleged conduct are main-
ly indicative.168 Pronouncements on the interpretation of the law, on the 
other hand, contribute to the establishment of settled jurisprudence. These 
findings should be taken into account already at the early stages of the 
investigation. This approach ensures a neat and thorough analysis of the 
evidence collected in light of the applicable law, as established by the 
Court. With the appearance of a suspect, the Statute foresees a shift of 
authority and the Prosecutor’s authority is subjected to increasing judicial 
control. Yet, it appears that of paramount importance throughout the pre-
trial phase is not so much the classification of alleged conduct, but the 
delineation of the factual scope of the case. This is so because under the 
statutory regime, and throughout the criminal process, the Chambers re-
tain flexibility to react to changes in the factual basis of the case and to 
choose the most appropriate classification. Conversely, this flexibility 
                                                   
167 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecu-
tor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled “Decision giving no-
tice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject 
to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”, 8 Decem-
ber 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, para. 77 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/40d015/). See 
also Hans-Peter Kaul, “Developments at the International Criminal Court/Construction 
Site for More Justice: The International Criminal Court after Two Years”, in American 
Journal of International Law, 2005, vol. 99, no. 2, pp. 370–84. 
168 This does not apply, of course, if the Pre-Trial Chamber were to reject a request for author-
isation to commence an investigation because the alleged conduct does not appear to fulfil 
the legal requirements of any of the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. 
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does not exist in relation to the ‘facts and circumstances’ of the case once 
the charges have been confirmed. That said, the classification of alleged 
conduct undertaken by the Pre-Trial Chambers is far from futile. In par-
ticular when confirming the classification proposed by the Prosecutor, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber gives notice to the accused on which basis the trial will 
unfold and signals that the classification is likely to pass the test at trial, 
provided the requisite evidentiary threshold at trial is satisfied. 
What can investigators and prosecutors learn from the ICC experi-
ence? Four points seem to be important: 
• Investigation. Conduct a comprehensive investigation from the out-
set and identify the exact factual contours of the case. Collect rele-
vant evidence of sufficient probative value during the investigation 
with a view to providing a solid basis for a future judicial assess-
ment against the highest evidentiary threshold. A potentially longer 
investigation phase should be accepted in the interest of proper case 
preparation. 
• Law-driven analysis of evidence. Already at the investigation stage, 
commence to build up the analysis of the evidence on a continuous 
basis applying exacting standards. Prefer the use of law-driven 
analysis tools over fact-driven analysis tools. Of essence is not 
whether a particular factual allegation has been proven by a high 
number of pieces of evidence but whether the particular factual al-
legation, as proven by the evidence, fulfils the legal elements of the 
crime or form of criminal responsibility. Findings of the Chambers 
on the law should be taken into account when conducting such 
analysis. 
• Labelling. Critically review the classification of alleged conduct 
and pursue the classification of crimes or forms of criminal respon-
sibility that are squarely supported by the evidence. 
• Quality beats quantity. Criminal proceedings involving the prose-
cution of international crimes generate voluminous evidence which 
is difficult to handle. Ways to reduce the amount of evidence should 
be explored. Sometimes, less is more. 
21 
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21.The Role of the Judiciary in the Enhancement of 
Quality in the National Investigation and 
Preparation of Core International Crimes 
Leïla Bourguiba* 
 
21.1. Introductory Remarks 
When frustration is rising over inefficiency of international criminal tri-
bunals, voices praising national criminal proceedings’ idyllic efficiency 
can often be heard. These voices are sometimes those of persons with 
long-standing experience from domestic practice. It is natural that investi-
gators, prosecutors, judges and lawyers draw on their strong past experi-
ence and their habitual practice in their national jurisdiction. This experi-
ence is obviously precious as seasoned professionals have usually learned 
from their past mistakes and are therefore more likely to anticipate practi-
cal, factual and legal difficulties and offer solutions to solving them. 
Nonetheless, having both worked at the International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’) as well as within a national specialised unit in charge of 
investigating and prosecuting core international crimes, I believe it is rel-
evant to compare the work of international tribunals to such a national 
unit, especially when it is exercising universal jurisdiction. There are syn-
ergies between them and challenges that are common, such as reasonable 
time, costs, challenging fact-finding in fact-rich criminal cases, complexi-
ty of the cases, and diversity of contexts, including cultural differences 
and geographical distance. 
                                                   
* Leïla Bourguiba is Associated-judge, representing the United Nations High Commission-
er, before the French National Appeals Court for Asylum, and Board member of the Re-
search Institute on Mediterranean and Middle East countries (ReMMO). She has served as 
an Associate Legal Officer at the Pre-trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court 
(2006–12) and as a Legal Advisor at the French War crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
Unit within the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris (2012–18). The chapter is submitted 
in her personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the views of any of the institutions 
she has or is working for. 
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The project conference in New Delhi in February 2019 and this an-
thology brought about stimulating exchanges. Sharing experiences is a 
key tool for improvement. The Specialised French Unit for the investiga-
tion and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
(‘Specialised Unit’) remains a relatively young unit created in 2012, yet it 
is part of an old judicial institution with long traditions and deep-rooted 
practices. Unlike the situation where some professionals bring their long-
standing national experience to the work of international tribunals, within 
the Unit the situation was inverse. Its creation and blended composition 
brought national investigators, prosecutors and judges together with pro-
fessionals whose experience was primarily gained in international tribu-
nals. This sometimes increased the sensitivity to protect national law and 
practises. This was particularly the case – and understandably so – when 
the practises and procedures followed in international tribunals were ques-
tioned and perceived as the main reason for their lack of efficiency. 
The quality of the national prosecutors and investigative judges at 
the time of creation of the Specialised Unit, and their genuine dedication 
in making the Specialised Unit efficient, helped to overcome these ten-
sions. Quickly indeed, the particularities of the cases before the Unit led 
the professionals to constantly challenge their routine ways of operating, 
and to be open to new tools and approaches while respecting the coher-
ence of French national criminal law and procedure. 
The expectations of CLIRAP’s Quality Control in Criminal Investi-
gation Project are high. But they need to be demanding to foster reflection 
and blend in some new ideas to enhance the quality of the investigation 
and prosecution of core international crimes. This chapter-contribution to 
the reflection process attempts to shed light on how the judiciary can help 
to enhance the quality of the investigation and preparation of core interna-
tional crimes cases. 
Without delving into the specifics of the French criminal justice 
system, it is, however, necessary to understand the practical experience of 
the investigative judges of the Specialised Unit in order to gain a clear 
comprehension of its fundamental characteristics (Section 21.2.) and its 
jurisdictional nature (Section 21.3.). To overcome the challenges arising 
from such complex cases in a newly established Unit, investigative judges 
have developed tools and practices to reduce the geographical and cultural 
gaps (Section 21.4.), track the fragilities and procedural difficulties (Sec-
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tion 21.5.), and efficiently frame the legal and factual scope of the cases 
ahead of the trial (Section 21.6.). 
21.2. Introduction to the French Specialised Unit 
The French Specialised Unit was essentially created to speed up the inves-
tigation and prosecution of a number of pending cases related to the geno-
cide of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 (Section 21.2.1.), expanding from that 
starting point to include other cases. It is a dedicated Unit, yet with lim-
ited staffing and other resources compared to the challenges induced by 
the exponential increase in cases (Section 21.2.2.). 
21.2.1. Efficiency of the Proceedings as an Essential Raison d’être 
The creation of the Unit is in itself a step towards efficiency. On 8 May 
2003, the Council of the European Union (‘EU’) adopted the Council 
Decision on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. Already in 2003, thus only a year after the en-
tering into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the EU Council under-
lined the “need to set up or designate specialist units within the competent 
law enforcement authorities with particular responsibility for investigating 
and, as appropriate, prosecuting” genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.1 At that time, different French judges were already seized 
with complaints related to the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda in 19942 and 
the proceedings were not advancing satisfactorily. 
In 2004, a year after the EU Decision, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (‘ECtHR’) in the case Mutimura v. France, found that France 
had violated Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The case related to a civil party criminal complaint lodged in France 
against a Rwandan clergyman for his alleged participation in acts of gen-
ocide against Tutsis in his parish in Rwanda in 1994, which resulted in a 
judicial investigation for genocide and torture. At the time of the com-
plaint in 1995, the clergyman was residing in France and serving as a cu-
rate.3 
                                                   
1 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the 
investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Arti-
cle 4 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e41495). 
2 See Section 21.3. below on the triggering jurisdiction mechanism. 
3 On 2 October 2015, the investigative judges of the Specialist Unit issued an order dismiss-
ing the proceedings for lack of sufficient evidence. 
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Before the ECtHR, the plaintiff submitted that the case was pending 
for almost four years before the investigative judge, hence the criminal 
complaint as well as the civil party application (“constitution de partie 
civile”) had not been examined within a reasonable time. The French gov-
ernment, on the other hand, submitted that the case was legally and factu-
ally complex. In particular, it underlined that the facts were grave and of 
extreme scale as the person was suspected of acts of genocide committed 
in a foreign country. It added that the investigation of crimes committed 
abroad by a foreigner against foreigners, in a country such as Rwanda 
with which France had no agreement of mutual legal assistance, was by 
nature complex, in particular as regards gathering evidence, all the more 
since the suspect denied the imputed conduct. Furthermore, this was the 
first case linked to the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that the French 
courts had to deal with. Altogether, the French government submitted that 
this explained and justified the length of the proceedings. On 8 June 2004, 
having examined the circumstances of each imputed cause of delay, the 
ECtHR found that indeed the length of the proceedings did not satisfy the 
reasonable time requirement of Article 6(1) of the Convention and thus 
held unanimously that there was a violation. 
Despite the EU Decision and the ECtHR’s ruling, it took nonethe-
less some time for France to decide to set up the Specialised Unit. In fact, 
its creation was essentially prompted by the increasing number of cases 
related to the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994 brought before French 
courts. 
It was only in 2011 that Law No. 2011-1862 of 13 December 2011 
(which entered into force on 1 January 2012) offered a window opportuni-
ty to include a provision leading to the creation of the Specialised Unit. 
According to the parliamentary debates, it became necessary to better 
concentrate the investigative resources, as (i) such investigations require 
deep knowledge of the specific historical and cultural contexts in which 
the crimes were committed, and (ii) the crimes were mostly committed 
abroad so they require complex and lengthy investigation steps. 
As a result, the Parliament found ‘indispensable’ that a team of 
magistrates in this new Specialised Unit be exclusively dedicated to such 
cases, as well as that investigators exclusively assigned to war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide investigations be at the disposal of 
21. The Role of the Judiciary in the Enhancement of Quality in the  
National Investigation and Preparation of Core International Crimes 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 997 
these magistrates.4 So the Specialised Unit was intended to provide a bet-
ter balance between efficiency and compliance with important procedural 
principles. 
21.2.2. Composition and Activities of the Specialised Unit 
The Specialised Unit is part of the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris 
(first instance). Article 628-1 of the Criminal Code of Procedure states 
that, for the prosecution, investigation and judgement of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, the Specialised Unit does not exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction but concurrent jurisdiction with other tribunals in 
France. 
Unlike the ICC, as soon as the Specialised Unit was created, and 
even before its staff and all judges were recruited, it already inherited 
dozens of cases,5 mainly related to the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. In 
fact, case files were already opened, in some cases since a decade, and 
were spread all over the country at different prosecutors and judges’ offic-
es. Thus, it turned vital to define work-processes and priorities as quickly 
as possible, and to draw on each other’s background. 
As of October 2018, the Specialised Unit (prosecutors and investi-
gative judges) was dealing with situations involving 15 different geo-
graphical areas, including crimes allegedly committed in Syria, Iraq, Lib-
ya, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Afghanistan, 
Rwanda or Chechenia.6 This represents in total more than 105 files in-
cluding 43 preliminary investigations. Most cases related to Syria, Central 
African Republic and Rwanda. In fact, in less than three years, the Spe-
                                                   
4 M. Yves Détraigne, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de 
législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale sur le projet 
de loi relatif à la répartition des contentieux et à l’allègement de certaines procédures ju-
ridictionnelles, March 2011, Senate report no. 394, p. 27. See also, M. Marcel Bonnot, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de 
l’administration générale de la république sur le projet de loi (n° 3373), adopté par le Sé-
nat après engagement de la procédure accélérée, relatif à la répartition des contentieux et 
à l’allègement de certaines procédures juridictionnelles, June 2011, National Assembly 
report no. 3604, pp. 30, 108–14. 
5 Already, before the creation of the Unit, the Directorate for Criminal Matters and Pardons 
invited the local public prosecutors to ask the Cour de cassation (Supreme Court), for the 
proper administration of justice, to transfer their cases related to the genocide in Rwanda to 
the Tribunal de Grande instance of Paris (First Instance Tribunal). 
6 See Interview with Prosecutor Aurélia Devos, Ministère de la Justice, “Crimes contre 
l’humanité : bilan du pôle du TGI de Paris”, 17 October 2018 (available on its web site). 
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cialised Unit experienced a 400 per cent growth in the number of ongoing 
investigations (including preliminary investigations as well as “infor-
mations judiciaires”)7. 
In light of these figures, it was vital to keep a regular rhythm in the 
advancement of the investigations and not to overlook any case. The first 
investigative judges created a ‘dashboard’, regularly updated, allowing 
easy checks of workflow status. They held regular meetings with the in-
vestigators during which challenges and issues could be raised and priori-
ties set or revised if need be. Moreover, to avoid anticipated further delays, 
the investigative judges identified as early as possible the main interlocu-
tors to address requests for co-operation as their execution is not guaran-
teed in a timely manner. 
Undoubtedly, the creation of the Specialised Unit and its visibility 
among NGOs led to a further increase in the number of complaints filed 
and investigations opened. An additional explanation to the rapid expo-
nential growth is a 2015 asylum law reform.8 According to the new law, 
the Director of the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons shall transmit to the Public Prosecutor all relevant information 
linked to a decision motivated by an exclusion clause,9 as defined in Arti-
cle 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention.10 
The figures mentioned above and the variety of situations under 
scrutiny by the Specialised Unit are, again, a clear indication of the need 
to create specialised units within the judiciary in order to centralise the 
information and specialise the investigative efforts. 
                                                   
7 French criminal law provides for two phases of a criminal investigation: preliminary inves-
tigations (“enquêtes préliminaires”) led by prosecutors and judicial investigations (“infor-
mations judiciaires”) handled by investigative judges. 
8 France, LOI n° 2015-925 du 29 juillet 2015 relative à la réforme du droit d’asile [Law No. 
2015-925 of 29 July 2015 on the asylum law reform], 29 July 2015. 
9 Ibid., Article 10. 
10 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/9b8e7a). The exclusion clause allows for the rejection of an asylum or stateless protec-
tion request when there are ‘serious reasons’ for considering that the applicant: (a) has 
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in 
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) has 
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admis-
sion to that country as a refugee; or (c) has been found guilty of acts contrary to the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations. 
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The Specialised Unit is not the only unit of its kind in France. In-
deed, to address complex cases like health scandals, organised crime or 
financial crime, France has opted to create special task forces of magis-
trates and specialised assistants. As a result, in these units, prosecutors 
and investigative judges are assisted by doctors, veterinarians, accountants 
or customs-officers. The War Crimes Unit responds to the same scheme 
and includes specialised assistants as well. According to Article 628-9 of 
the French Criminal Code of Procedure, the specialised assistants partici-
pate in the proceedings under the supervision of the Unit’s magistrates 
and may submit to the judges analytical and summary documents which 
can be filed into the record of the case. 
According to Decree No. 2012-682 of 7 May 2012, the assistants 
must be specialised in criminal law and criminal procedure, public inter-
national law, international humanitarian law, history or ethnology. 
To complete this scheme, at the time of the creation of the Special-
ised Unit, a team of a dozen gendarmes-investigators carried out the in-
vestigations under the supervision of prosecutors and the investigative 
judges. As the number of cases grew and the gendarmes were sometimes 
involved in contributing to the investigation of domestic criminal cases, it 
was necessary to also create a dedicated investigation team. On 5 Novem-
ber 2013, by decree, the government established a new centralised inves-
tigative unit, the Central office for combatting Crimes against humanity, 
genocides and war crimes.11 It became operational in early 2014 and in-
cludes both gendarmes and police officers. Depending of the needs, it 
may also rely on external consultants. 
                                                   
11 The Central Office’s mandate includes core international crimes as well as hate crimes. It 
thus also implies investigating into domestic cases which do not have an international di-
mension. 
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Figure 1: Actual scheme. 
21.3. The Triggering of Jurisdiction: A Self-Imposed Filter for 
Selection of Cases 
Bearing in mind the figures, it is obviously important to rightly calibrate 
the scope of the case. However, unlike the ICC where a case is selected 
out of a situation under investigation, the jurisdiction triggering mecha-
nism in France serves as a filter in the selection of cases (Section 21.3.1.), 
which has an impact on investigation techniques (Section 21.3.2.). 
21.3.1. À la Carte Triggering Mechanism of Universal Jurisdiction 
France has recognised crimes against humanity and genocide as crimes in 
the Criminal Code in 1994 and war crimes in 2010. French tribunals can 
thus exercise territorial jurisdiction over these crimes, and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in cases of: 
• active personality jurisdiction (French nationality of the suspect); 
• passive personality jurisdiction (French nationality of the victim); 
• France’s national interests, harm to the forum State’s own national 
interests; and 
• universal jurisdiction, for acts that are not linked to the French na-
tionality of the suspect or of the victim or to harm to France’s na-
tional interests. 
Central office for combatting Crimes against humanity, 
genocides and war crimes (OCLCH) 
headed by a Colonel 
composed of policemen and gendarmes 
19 members (to increase to 23) including 15 investigators 
3 Prosecutors 
assisted by 1 legal clerk and 
3 legal officers 
3 Investigative Judges 
assisted by 3 legal clerks and 
3 legal officers 
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The material scope of universal jurisdiction is restrictively enumer-
ated in Articles 689-1 to 689-13 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, which 
limits it to offenses included in treaties ratified by France. More specifi-
cally, in relation to the prosecution and investigation of core international 
crimes, France has deliberately widened its jurisdiction. 
Chronologically, it first provided for universal jurisdiction for tor-
ture under the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 10 December 1984.12 A 
presence-link is required to trigger the exercise of universal jurisdiction, 
which must be demonstrated13 at the initiation of the proceedings (com-
plaint or the prosecutor’s initial indictment, the so-called “réquisitoire 
introductive”)14. 
Next, following the conflicts in Rwanda and in the former Yugosla-
via, France adapted its legislation to fulfil its obligations of full co-
operation, as set forth in Resolutions 827 and 955 by the United Nations 
Security Council establishing respectively the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda.15 While in these resolutions, as in many international treaties, 
                                                   
12 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, 10 December 1984 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/713f11). The same mechanism 
is provided for in relation to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 20 December 2006 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
0d0674) (Article 689-13 of the French Code de procédure pénale (‘Criminal Code of Pro-
cedure’), 23 December 1958 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/388101)). 
13 Besides hypothesis of clear effective presence of the suspect on French territory (residence, 
arrest in France), indicia suggesting the presence of the suspect on French territory can al-
so be sufficient to initiate criminal proceedings (presumed presence), such as driving li-
cence issued in France, paying regular visits to a relative healing at the hospital (France, 
Cour de cassation, Criminal Chamber, 10 January 2007, 04-87.245). 
14 It does not matter if the suspect has thereafter left French territory. See France, Cour de 
cassation, Criminal Chamber, 23 October 2002, 02-85.379. 
15 See, France, Loi n° 95-1 du 2 janvier 1995 portant adaptation de la législation française 
aux dispositions de la résolution 827 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies instituant un 
tribunal international en vue de juger les personnes présumées responsables de violations 
graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie 
depuis 1991 [Law No. 95-1 of 2 January 1995 adapting French legislation to Resolution 
827 of the United Nations Security Council establishing the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia], 2 January 1995, and France, Loi n° 96-432 du 22 mai 1996 
portant adaptation de la législation française aux dispositions de la résolution 955 du Con-
seil de sécurité des Nations unies instituant un tribunal international en vue de juger les 
personnes présumées responsables d’actes de génocide ou d’autres violations graves du 
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universal jurisdiction is not required as such, what is imposed is the obli-
gation to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare). France decided 
that it may also exercise criminal jurisdiction when the suspect of crimes 
provided for in these resolutions and treaties is found (“se trouve”) on 
French territory at the initiation of the proceedings. 
On 9 August 2010, Law No. 2010-930 adapted the French Criminal 
Code to the Statute of the ICC.16 It inserted Article 689-11 in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure allowing for the exercise of universal jurisdiction for 
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC. It should be noted that 
the legislator was, however, ever-careful and subjected the exercise of this 
universal jurisdiction to four locks:17 
i) Residency: the legislator opted for a more restrictive nexus than 
mere presence of the suspect on the territory; 
ii) Subsidiarity: the public prosecutor can only proceed with a prosecu-
tion if no international or national tribunal has requested the surren-
der or extradition of the suspect;18 
iii) Double criminality: with the exception of genocide, in relation to 
crimes against humanity and war crimes and offenses, the acts must 
also be punishable under the legislation of the State where they 
have been committed or that State or the State of nationality of the 
suspect is a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC; 
iv) Prosecutor’s discretion: proceedings can only be initiated at the re-
quest of the public prosecutor. 
                                                                                                                        
droit international humanitaire commis en 1994 sur le territoire du Rwanda et, s’agissant 
des citoyens rwandais, sur le territoire d’Etats voisins [Law No. 96-432 of 22 May 1996 
adapting French legislation to Resolution 955 of the United Nations Security Council esta-
blishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda], 22 May 1996. 
16 France, LOI n° 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de 
la Cour pénale internationale, 9 August 2010. This law notably criminalises direct and pub-
lic incitement to commit genocide; amends the definition of crimes against humanity to 
conform to the definition of Article 7 of the Rome Statute; inserts Title IVbis in the Crimi-
nal Code wherein, for the first time in the Criminal Code, acts that may constitute war 
crimes or offenses are listed. 
17 As modified by LOI n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018-2022 et de 
réforme pour la justice, 23 March 2019. 
18 Article 689-11 of the Criminal Code of Procedure specifies that the public prosecutor has 
to ensure that there are no proceedings initiated by the ICC; that no other international tri-
bunal, competent to prosecute the person, has asked for his/her surrender; and that no State 
has requested his or her extradition, see above note 12. 
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By introducing this last requirement, the French legislator explicitly 
restricted the civil party complaint mechanism to trigger the prosecution 
of core international crimes pursuant to universal jurisdiction. This how-
ever, has a practical drawback, because victims are thus encouraged to file 
a civil party complaint for an alleged crime of torture within the meaning 
of the Convention against Torture, whilst the act might amount as well to 
a crime against humanity, in order to avoid the cumulative demanding 
four locks discussed above. 
It follows that the presence or residence of the person suspected of 
having committed core international crimes is the key element in trigger-
ing the exercise of universal jurisdiction. This has important consequences 
for the manner investigations and prosecutions are led, and for the role of 
the judiciary in the pre-trial process. 
21.3.2. In Personam Investigations: A Self-Imposed Calibration 
It should be recalled that the ICC’s case law distinguishes between ‘situa-
tions’, which are generally defined by temporal, territorial and personal 
parameters, and ‘cases’ comprising specific incidents arising from a given 
situation. 19  A case starts when the Prosecutor identifies one or more 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that might have been commit-
ted, and one or more suspects allegedly responsible for their commission. 
This triggers challenges in the defining criterion for the selection of cases 
and in delineating their scope. In this regard, the situation experienced by 
the French Specialised Unit is different. 
Triggered by the presence or residence of the suspect on French ter-
ritory, the jurisdiction of the Specialised Unit is determined by the person 
(in personam) rather than the facts denounced (in rem), as it is the case for 
the prosecution of most crimes. 
This extraordinary in personam triggering of jurisdiction acts as a 
first filter. The public prosecutor is thus not called upon to make choices 
on the selection of areas, regions, incidents, groups of persons, militia or 
individuals to be the subject of his or her investigation and prosecution. 
The investigation does not start from a crime scene to undercover the per-
                                                   
19 See, for instance, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on the applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS 1, 
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 17 January 2006, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para. 
65 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2fe2fc). 
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sons or chain of command allegedly responsible for its commission, the 
case is in fact ab initio delineated by the identity of the alleged suspect, 
because of his presence or residence on French territory. This has several 
procedural consequences. First, the prosecutor’s initial indictment must be 
filed against a named suspect. As a result, only an additional indictment 
(“réquisitoire supplétif”) can authorise the extension of the case to other 
potential suspects. Requesting it to extend to other individuals may impact 
on the length of the investigations. 
It further creates an uncomfortable situation where investigative 
steps are undertaken to establish whether the alleged perpetrator is present 
or residing on French territory before addressing the facts; then the facts 
are being characterised before establishing the jurisdiction of the Unit. 
Under this scheme, one can wonder how confirmation bias can be miti-
gated during the investigations? Accordingly, it is the role of investigative 
judges to ensure that investigations not only gather incriminating evidence 
but also exculpatory material or elements that can mitigate the suspect’s 
guilt, contributing to the quality of investigations. In addition, the fact that 
pre-trial investigations are increasingly incorporating adversarial mecha-
nisms, allowing an early involvement of the Defence, contributes to miti-
gating the risks of potential confirmation bias. To that end as well, the 
judges have developed new working methods. 
21.4. Reducing the Gap from Geographical Distance to Factual 
Proximity 
The cases inherited by the Unit had already been under investigation for 
several years, if not a decade. By shortage of available time, the previous 
investigative judges 20  sometimes lacked focus in the case-delineation. 
This resulted in wasteful over-collection of potential evidence, including a 
number of books and reports. Facing such fact-rich cases, the Specialised 
Unit’s investigative judges were aware of the importance of first under-
standing the context (Section 21.4.2.) as well as their own limits in this 
respect (21.4.1.). 
                                                   
20 Before the creation of the Specialised Unit, the cases related to core international crimes 
were dealt by prosecutors and investigative judges who simultaneously had to deal with 
tens of ordinary crimes cases, often involving detained persons. 
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21.4.1. Acceptance of the Limitations of Lawyers 
Prior to the creation of the Specialised Unit, France was not ignorant of 
mass crimes. It had already experienced within its own judicial system the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
having held important and highly publicised trials related to World War II 
and issuing landmark decisions.21 This experience is still very vivid in 
French memory and often used as historic and legal reference. 
However, previous experiences may be reassuring but misleading as 
well. As a matter of fact, a perfect analogy between the experience of the 
World War II trials and the Specialised Unit’s current activities is not pos-
sible. Following World War II, France tried French citizens whose acts 
had been committed on French soil and constituted acts of complicity in 
crimes against humanity. In this scenario, judges knew the context in 
which the crimes had been committed, shared historical and sociological 
background with the victims, witnesses and suspects, and were often con-
temporary to the facts under judicial scrutiny. Today, on the other hand, 
the Specialised Unit is mostly investigating and prosecuting crimes under 
universal jurisdiction for acts committed abroad, by and against non-
French nationals. 
While international criminal law has developed legal concepts 
aimed at capturing the particularities of mass crimes, one should accept 
that these legal concepts may not be adequate to efficiently fulfil the mis-
sion to punish the most serious conduct and efficiently prevent recurrence. 
Significantly, in some cases it may even be that exclusively relying on 
such concepts could lead to miscarriage of justice. 
From experience, judges and international lawyers assisting them in 
adjudicating the facts, are aware of and the first to be frustrated by short-
age of access to background and contextual information, which are essen-
tial to better understand and capture the facts and acts committed in a 
country, culture and social setting that is foreign and unknown to them. 
Judgements issued by different international(ised) tribunals, such as 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’) as well as the ICC, have been criticised for focus-
                                                   
21 For the prosecution of a French national for involvement in the deportation of Jews, see, 
for example, France, Cour de cassation, Klaus Barbie, Cass crim, 3 June 1998; and France, 
Cour de cassation, Maurice Papon, Cass crim, 23 January 1997. 
 
Quality Control in Criminal Investigation 
Publication Series No. 38 (2020) – page 1006 
ing too much on legal discussions, but missing to understand and deal 
with the facts in accordance with the cultural settings of the affected 
communities, on behalf of which they have assumed the responsibility of 
doing justice.22 
For instance, the social scientist Tim Kelsall, presenting his experi-
ence as an expert at the SCSL, deplored the lack of contextual familiarity 
of the SCSL, which prevented an accurate understanding of the chain of 
command. He criticised the SCSL for relying on its own understanding of 
a hierarchical organisation, including the concept of command responsi-
bility, instead of understanding the specific context of the creation of these 
groups in that situation, which developed as a militarisation of a social 
network.23 
At the same time, difficulties at the ICC – where the judges have 
deplored the lack of evidence or issues of witness credibility – may well 
be seen as a consequence of a factual misrepresentation, which has weak-
ened cases presented by the Prosecutor. It is submitted, without entertain-
ing or entering into the long-discussed controversy between ‘judicial’ and 
‘historic’ truth, that the dedication of most legal staff both at the ICC and 
the Specialised Unit is towards the accomplishment of the purpose of the-
se institutions, which is not to develop legal theory or focus on the impact 
that their work may have on the historical account of the events. Rather, 
most of the staff work towards fulfilling their mandate as set out in the 
preamble of the ICC Statute: contribute to putting an end to impunity for 
the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to their prevention. 
Julien Seroussi, a social scientist who both worked at the ICC and at 
the Specialised Unit, calls for an acknowledgment of the “inevitable limi-
tations to knowledge” and highlights the importance of “folk sociological 
                                                   
22 See, for instance, Tim Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, 2009, and Nancy 
Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of Interna-
tional Criminal Convictions, Cambridge University Press, 2010. See also Christian De Vos, 
Sara Kendall and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court Interventions, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
23 Kelsall, 2009, see above note 22. 
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theories” (‘FSTs’), also called the “sociological consciousness” of interna-
tional lawyers in the establishment of facts.24 
He submits that FSTs “developed within the space that separates the 
legal from the historical truth”, and are aimed at ensuring “the advance-
ment of the law while respecting the facts to the maximum extent possi-
ble”.25 Building on his own experience at the ICC, Julien Seroussi empha-
ses that FSTs help “international lawyers […] to overcome their igno-
rance”. While his analysis focused on the work of international criminal 
tribunals, it seems also applicable to cases when judges adjudicate facts 
based on universal jurisdiction, as the challenges largely echo those of 
international criminal tribunals. 
Stating that FST’s “may give plausible, cheap and useful explana-
tions to international judges who face empirical limitations to fact-
finding”, the author nonetheless calls for extreme caution as 
the discrepancy between what may appear plausible to inter-
national judges before the beginning of a trial and what they 
discover after an examination of complex factual elements in 
war-torn societies can have debilitating effects on their initial 
theories – as well as immediate effects on the legal proce-
dure and validity of their original reasoning.26 
As a result, better and stronger FSTs should be used when adjudi-
cating facts before international criminal tribunals as well as national tri-
bunals, as weak FSTs may indeed have devastating consequences in the 
long-term. In this regard, the judges of the Specialised Unit have devel-
oped factual toolkits. 
21.4.2. Developing Tools for the Work on Facts 
Geographical distance is common to the work of the ICC and that of the 
Specialised Unit. This geographical distance notably leads to evidence 
gathering difficulties, but one should not be misled or hide behind it, 
blindly accepting one of its insidious consequences: ‘factual distance’. 
                                                   
24 Julien Seroussi, “How Do International Lawyers Handle Facts? The Role of Folk Socio-
logical Theories at the International Criminal Court”, in The British Journal of Sociology, 
2018, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 962–83. 
25 Ibid., p. 966. 
26 Ibid., p. 967. 
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This challenge is being addressed at the ICC by the Prosecutor’s 
Office. It comprises an Investigative Analysis Section (‘IAS’) within the 
Investigations Division (‘ID’) wherein analysts are expected to produce: 
accurate and source analytical products in response to the re-
quirements of the Integrated Teams, including reports of dif-
ferent kinds (on incidents, crime pattern, profiles, groups and 
networks etc.), relational charts, timelines and GIS (Geo-
graphic Information Systems), in compliance with IAS 
standards, and taking into account the social context of the 
crimes and background of the alleged perpetrators.27 
The link between the quality of the products of the IAS and suc-
cessful investigations and prosecutions is obvious. Unfortunately, though, 
their analysis is not shared with the ICC Pre-trial Chambers and remains 
undisclosed, as investigation notes and internal memoranda fall within the 
scope of Rule 81(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, not subject 
to disclosure. Instead of deep analytical information, in several cases 
Chambers received only a few pages, usually at the beginning of the Pros-
ecutor’s Document Containing the Charges (‘DCC’), providing succinct 
contextual background (geographical features, main historical events, and 
so on). In the recent DCC in the Uganda situation, such sections seem to 
have disappeared.28 
Arguably, judges are not to be blamed for their lack of knowledge 
and misconceptions about the situation and the underlying facts if they are 
not given the tools to address them. This is of particular importance as, in 
fine, it is they who decide whether to commit a person to trial or on his or 
her guilt. Therefore, the development of tools to better capture the essence 
of the context where the alleged crimes have been committed has to be 
encouraged at the earliest stages, and as soon as the judiciary gets in-
volved. Such tools should be accessible to everyone, allowing the parties 
to contribute to the judiciary’s role in establishing the truth within the 
contradictory setting of judicial proceedings. 
This idea was implemented at the Specialised Unit as soon as it en-
tered into motion. In that setting, prosecutors, and pre-trial and trial judges 
                                                   
27 Excerpt of a job description published on the ICC web site. 
28 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Document Containing the 
Charges, 22 December 2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-375-AnxA-Red (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/1fd4ed). 
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decided to be pro-active and not wait for the story-telling, if any, to be 
submitted by any of the parties. They were of the view that, to adjudicate 
the facts independently and impartially, they also needed to have an inde-
pendent understanding of the context in which such facts occurred at the 
earliest stage possible. Of course, such knowledge was not only of benefit 
to judges and prosecutors, as it was shared with the parties and partici-
pants to the proceedings. 
To that end, the investigative judges in charge of maintaining the 
case record quickly decided to create the so-called “Cote Context”. It con-
sists in a separate folder within the electronic case file, which is available 
to the parties, and wherein information related to the ‘context’ is filed. For 
the purposes of this tool, the context is understood in its plain and ordi-
nary meaning, that is, the “situation within which something exists or 
happens, and that can help explain it”.29 Accordingly, it includes relevant 
books, international reports or decisions, as well as NGOs reports. The 
tool serves two objectives: (1) to physically isolate information not direct-
ly related to the crimes and the individual criminal liability of a person, in 
order not to overload, blur or distract the analysis of the heart of the case; 
and (2) to give key elements of understanding of the facts under examina-
tion. 
Furthermore, the first investigative judges also decided to include in 
their team a social scientist as one of their specialist assistants, who be-
came an essential member of the team. As a member of the Unit, he was 
subjected to professional secrecy and the duty to keep the investigations 
confidential. His access to the files puts him in a better position to identify, 
in co-ordination with the judges, the relevant elements that need to be 
contextualised. As a result, the social scientist helped identifying other 
relevant social and political scientists, ethnologists and anthropologists 
who were heard by the investigative judges, helping to build bridges be-
tween legal and social issues. Their testimonies were thereafter filed in the 
record of the case, as part of the “Cote Context”. For instance, considering 
that the Specialised Unit has several cases related to the genocide of Tut-
sis in Rwanda, the investigations collected a series of documents, indict-
ments, testimonies and decisions emanating from the Gacaca courts. In 
order to grasp fully the functioning of these popular tribunals, an historian 
who thoroughly worked on that subject was heard during the pre-trial 
                                                   
29 Cambridge Dictionary. 
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stage of the investigations and later called to testify before the trial cham-
ber. 
These types of interviews have proven precious. They have helped 
to ensure that the judge assesses the evidence and the involvement of a 
person in the commission of alleged crimes with a better understanding of 
the context in which the facts occurred, be it political, sociological or an-
thropological. This mitigates the risk of misrepresentations of the facts 
that can turn critical at trial, as experienced during the Katanga and 
Ngudjolo trial at the ICC. It also proved important in efficiently approach-
ing and hearing witnesses and victims. 
Of course, as much as the ICC has been criticised for focusing on 
legal issues more than on the facts, the Specialised Unit should be careful 
not to overwhelm itself by focusing too much on the facts to the detriment 
of the law. This is a constant concern that the investigative judges of the 
Unit have to keep in mind, regularly tracking factual and legal fragilities 
of the cases and addressing procedural and substantive issues as they arise. 
21.5. Fragility Trackers and Solvers of Procedural Issues 
During the pre-trial investigation, the judges proceed with a regular inter-
im assessment of the public prosecutor’s charging choices (Section 21.5.1.) 
and shall ensure that any procedural issue be addressed as soon as possi-
ble (Section 21.5.2.). 
21.5.1. Regular Interim Assessments 
As mentioned above, following the 2010 Law, the French Public Prosecu-
tor enjoys autonomy in presenting charges throughout the pre-trial stage 
of the proceedings. Nonetheless, the investigative judges of the Special-
ised Unit shall exercise scrutiny over the Public Prosecutor’s choices. 
Such judicial oversight is exercised at different stages of the pre-trial in-
vestigations, with positive effects on the quality of the prosecution and the 
efficient preparation of a focused trial. 
When the initial indictment (“réquisitoire introductive”) as well as 
any additional indictments (“réquisitoire supplétif”) are filed, the pre-trial 
judge can assess the legal characterisation of the facts as decided by the 
public prosecutor. Such intermediate assessment proceeds first when hear-
ing the suspect at the first appearance (“interrogatoire de première compa-
rution”), at the end of which the pre-trial judge may place him under judi-
cial examination (“mis en examen”). As provided by Article 80-1 of the 
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Code of Criminal Procedure, under penalty of nullity, the investigating 
judge may place under judicial examination only those persons against 
whom there are strong and concordant indicia making it probable that 
they may have participated in the commission of the offences investigated 
as a perpetrator or an accomplice. This assessment is made after an adver-
sarial debate, where the pre-trial judge shall hear or give the opportunity 
to be heard to the person concerned, before placing him or her under judi-
cial examination. 30  Throughout the pre-trial investigations, the person 
concerned may request, every six months, the end of his judicial examina-
tion. The pre-trial judge can only decide upon such request after hearing 
the observations of the public prosecutor. If the pre-trial judge decides to 
maintain the judicial examination of the person concerned, he or she shall 
issue a reasoned decision detailing the strong and concordant indicia 
against the person.31 Accordingly, at each of these stages, the investigative 
judges exercise judicial control over the evidence so far gathered and the 
legal characterisation presented by the public prosecutor.32 
In order to facilitate this regular interim assessment and to keep an 
overview of the content of these factually rich cases, the investigative 
judges’ team has intuitively organised its evolving cases in a chart. Yet, it 
has not adopted the In-depth-Analysis Chart as used in some cases at the 
ICC whereby pieces of evidence are linked to constitutive elements of the 
crimes.33 
                                                   
30 Article 80-1 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, see above note 12. 
31 Ibid., Article 80-1-1. 
32 For the sake of clarity, it is underlined that according to French criminal procedure, the 
person suspected can, at this stage of the procedure, appeal the investigative judge order. 
His appeal is examined by the Investigative Chamber of the Court of Appeal which will 
decide whether or not the person shall be placed under the status of person under judicial 
examination or, if there exist indicia making plausible that he participated in the crime, un-
der the status of assisted witness (Article 113-2 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, see 
above note 12). The difference between the two statuses is thus the evidentiary threshold. 
33 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Setting 
the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other related matters, 6 April 2011, ICC-01/09-
02/11-48, para. 22 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/12b91f): 
this analysis should be presented in the form of a summary table which shows the rele-
vance of the evidence presented in relation to the constituent elements of the crimes 
with which the person is charged. It should enable the Chamber to verify that for each 
constituent element of any crime with which the person is charged, including their con-
textual elements, as well as for each constituent element of the mode of participation in 
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The investigative judges’ team of the Specialised Unit customised 
the chart to the Unit’s specific needs, organising it per items of facts, link-
ing them with the available evidence, and identifying issues of credibility 
and possible contradictions. The chart also indicates whether the evidence 
collected in relation to a fact is considered incriminating or potentially 
exculpatory and, for each item of fact, a short analysis is made, assessing 
the evidence so far gathered, including the alleged involvement of the 
suspect. 
The chart and intermediate analysis are live and constantly updated 
throughout the investigation. This dynamic document helps the coherence 
of the investigations and acts as a guide to keep the investigations focused. 
The chart is an internal working document, which is only accessible 
to the investigative judges and their team on a shared platform.34 This 
enables immediate and constant dissemination of the information and its 
update. The chart is not shared with the Trial Chamber either. 
21.5.2. Procedural Issues 
Over the years, it has become apparent that once the indictments are filed 
by the public prosecutor, the investigative judges must promptly identify 
any potential issues or hesitations in relation to their jurisdiction. This is 
essential because pre-trial investigations can last for several years. In fact, 
even investigations that are conducted with a regular rhythm, taking ad-
vantage of the different field missions in the year and the smooth co-
operation of the authorities, may last up to five years. It thus engages lim-
ited staff and financial resources for a long period of time. Accordingly, 
any doubt as to the jurisdiction of the Specialised Unit must be raised as 
early as possible, even proprio motu by the investigative judges as al-
lowed by law, for such investment not to go to waste. They need to shoul-
                                                                                                                        
the offence with which he or she is charged, there are one or more corresponding piec-
es of evidence, either incriminating or exculpatory, which the Chamber must assess in 
light of the criteria set under Article 61(7) of the Statute. 
See also, ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a 
Timetable for Disclosure between the Parties, 31 July 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-55, paras. 
66–70 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/15c802). For more information, see Chapter 20 
above by Eleni Chaitidou. 
34 As mentioned earlier, according to Article 628-9 of the French Criminal Code of Procedure 
the specialist assistant (legal officer or analyst) may submit to the judges analytical and 
summary documents which may remain internal working documents, see above note 12. 
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der their duty to solve key legal issues, such as possible ne bis in idem, 
lack of jurisdiction or statute of limitation challenges, in order to ensure 
that investigations and prosecutions are on the right track. They should 
not wait for the issue to be raised by the parties as this may occur once the 
proceedings are well advanced, sometimes at the closure of the investiga-
tions. It should be noted that under Article 181 of the French Code of 
Criminal Procedure, when the indictment becomes final, all procedural 
errors, if any, are solved. In other words, when the file is communicated to 
the trial chamber, prosecutors and lawyers are not allowed to raise the 
nullity of any investigation steps. They are thus encouraged to raise them 
before the investigative judge, but it is sometimes if not often raised late 
during the pre-trial investigations.35 
This is a typical situation where, overwhelmed by the facts of a spe-
cific case as well as the number of other pending cases, critical legal is-
sues may remain unidentified for a moment. 
21.6. Interface between Pre-Trial Investigations and the Trial: The 
Judiciary’s Role in Defining the Parameters of the Trial 
To enhance case preparation for trial, a thorough pre-trial brief is prepared 
by the investigative judges (Section 21.6.1.) and serve as a tool for the 
presiding judge of the trial together with the complete case record of the 
investigation (Section 21.6.2.). 
21.6.1. Pre-Trial Brief in the Form of a Judicial Indictment Order 
As developed above, in the exercise of its extraordinary universal jurisdic-
tion, the scope of the investigative judge’s jurisdiction has been largely 
vested on the public prosecutor’s shoulders. This is a departure from the 
French Civil Law tradition, explained by the peculiarity of this extra-
territorial exercise of jurisdiction. 
However, despite this shift, the judiciary remains vested with the 
power and duty to write the pre-trial brief known in France as the “ordon-
                                                   
35 Only the investigative chambers can rescind an act of investigation during the pre-trial 
phase, such as phone surveillance, requisition, seizure, geolocation, hearing of person sus-
pected or of witnesses, expert assessment, civil party application, DNA or print test, and so 
on. Once the investigation phase concludes, it is assumed that all the investigation acts are 
valid, in the interest of the expeditiousness of the proceedings. 
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nance de mise en accusation” (‘indictment order’).36 This indictment or-
der is of critical importance, as it will form the basis of the trial.37 Its 
drafting process provides checks and balances as in the Specialised Unit 
at least two judges, sometimes three, are co-seized of each case. 
In this judicial process committing a suspect to trial, two documents 
are essential: (1) the public prosecutor’s final request (“réquisitoire dé-
finitif”), and (2) the judge’s indictment order. The first is a document filed 
by the public prosecutor before the pre-trial judge. It has to be motivated, 
and the parties may submit observations. As to the second document, Ar-
ticle 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vests in the per-trial judge the 
task of judicially scrutinising the charges. The judiciary thus examines 
whether there exists sufficient evidence of a crime committed by the per-
son under judicial examination. In the affirmative, the pre-trial judge or-
ders the suspect’s indictment before the Cour d’assises (Criminal Trial 
Chamber). 
The indictment order shall contain, under penalty of nullity, (i) the 
accused’s identity and (ii) a statement of the facts and their legal charac-
terisation. It shall also (iii) state precisely the grounds for whether or not 
there is sufficient evidence against the person; (iv) be rendered in light of 
the public prosecutor’s request and the parties’ observations; and (v) spec-
ify the incriminating and exculpatory pieces of evidence.38 It is therefore, 
like at the ICC, the judicial indictment order that constitutes the reference 
document before the Criminal Trial Chamber containing the charges 
against the suspect and delimitating the factual scope of the trial. 
Moving now from the text to actual practise, when dealing with fac-
tually rich cases there is the important challenge of presenting the con-
firmed charges in a clear and exhaustive manner. To that end, the con-
firmed facts and their legal characterisation shall be clearly identifiable in 
the order to prepare the trial properly. 
                                                   
36 At the end of the pre-trial investigation of the case, the investigative judge may, inter alia, 
issue (i) a discharge order pursuant to Article 177 of the Criminal Code of Procedure (“or-
donnance de non lieu”) or (ii) an indictment order pursuant to Article 181 (“ordonnance de 
mise en accusation”). It can also order, in the course of the investigation, a partial dis-
charge pursuant to Article 182 (“ordonnance de non lieu partiel”). 
37 Article 231 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, see above note 12. 
38 See ibid., Articles 176 and 184. 
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In addition, the indictment order shall cast light on the strong and 
weak aspects of the criminal case, pointing out the incriminating and ex-
culpatory material contained in the case record and forming the basis of 
the investigative judges’ reasoning to dismiss the case or commit the sus-
pect to trial. The indictment order is subjected to checks and balance be-
fore the commencement of the trial, as it may be appealed by the parties 
before the Investigative Chamber. 
A clearly-reasoned decision by the investigative judges allows to 
better manage the trial, avoiding the waste of time litigating uncontested, 
non-controversial or secondary matters. It helps the parties to focus their 
respective presentation of evidence on issues of actual dispute, increasing 
the prospects of a trial focused on the real issues at stake, identifying and 
narrowing down the number of issues to be discussed at trial and, as a 
result, reducing the length of the trial. For instance, before the Specialised 
Unit in the joint case against M. Ngenzi and M. Barahiera, about 200 wit-
nesses were heard during the pre-trial investigations. In light of the impar-
tial judicial assessment of the witnesses as developed in the indictment 
order, 92 witnesses out of 200 were finally called to testify during the first 
instance trial.39 
Judicial involvement during pre-trial investigations does not, how-
ever, prevent the debate on the merits of the case. If the indictment order 
clearly delineates the factual scope of the case, the presiding judge of the 
trial is not prevented from asking the jury to analyse questions that have 
appeared necessary as a result of the trial hearings, even if they do not 
directly result from the indictment order. In such a scenario, the presiding 
judge will read these additional questions before the closing statements of 
the victims’ representative, the public prosecutor, and the defence coun-
sel.40 At the same time, the first genocide trials held in France in relation 
to the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda have demonstrated that the orality of 
the trial proceedings might cast further light on elements, facts or witness-
es than the pre-trial stage allowed. Re-characterisation of facts may there-
fore still happen at trial. 
                                                   
39 These figures include 33 witnesses called to testify by the Defence, 50 by the Prosecution, 
and 1 by a victim. 
40 France, Cour de cassation, Criminal Chamber, 8 February 2017, 16-81.962. 
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21.6.2. The Preparation and Transmission of a Case Record as a Tool 
for a Prepared and Focused Trials 
In the French system, as well within the context of the Specialised Unit’s 
work, the indictment order that establishes the parameters of the trial is 
transferred together with the full case record. 
The record of the case contains the document initiating the proceed-
ings (the prosecutor’s initial request or the civil party complaint) and all 
documents and incriminating and exonerating evidence gathered during 
the pre-trial investigations, including witness statements, documentary 
evidence, requests by parties, and orders by the investigative judges. 
The dynamic constitution of the case record offers the advantage of 
ensuring that incriminating as well as exculpatory material are made 
available to the parties, especially to the Defence of a person under judi-
cial examination, as soon as such material becomes available, well in ad-
vance of the start of the trial. The defence counsel can thus consult the 
case record and request a copy thereof, 41  subject to confidentiality. 42 
Aware of the consequences of potential breaches to confidentiality, and in 
order to maintain the principle of access to the file,43 the witness and vic-
tim protection scheme has been enhanced to adapt the legislation to the 
specificity of such cases.44 
The defence’s access to the case record increases its capacity of 
preparation before the commencement of the trial. This can only be wel-
comed in light of the complexity of the cases and the length of the pro-
ceedings. Actually, compared to ordinary crimes, defence teams in core 
international crimes cases in France often find themselves in a difficult 
situation to prepare efficiently. France has incorporated adversarial ele-
ments into its criminal procedure, notably during the pre-trial investiga-
tions. In light of the different challenges presented by the investigation of 
                                                   
41 Articles 113-3, 114 and 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, see above note 12. 
42 Pre-trial investigations are confidential. 
43 Access to the case record is given to the Defence Counsel of the person under judicial 
examination as well as to the Defence Counsel of the ‘assisted witness’ (“témoin assisté”). 
The assisted witness includes any person mentioned by name in an initial or subsequent 
prosecutor’s submission and who is not under judicial examination. See Articles 113 and 
following of the Criminal Code of Procedure. 
44 France, LOI n° 2016-731 du 3 juin 2016 renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le 
terrorisme et leur financement, et améliorant l’efficacité et les garanties de la procédure 
pénale, 3 June 2016. 
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core crimes pursuant to universal jurisdiction, the early defence involve-
ment can be instrumental in identifying and gathering exculpatory evi-
dence as well as in challenging requests by victims or the prosecutor and 
judicial orders.45 This runs up against the cost and time available to do so. 
Indeed, investigations can last for several years, a trial a few months, and 
the case-record may be voluminous. Without financial means, a dynamic 
involvement of the defence throughout the proceedings can be very chal-
lenging, as only a few lawyers will have the means and resources to focus 
their efforts on one case only, to the detriment of the proper functioning of 
their practice. 
The legal aid scheme does not provide for any additional means for 
core international crimes cases, such as expenses for travel costs for site 
visits. Yet, in most cases, the suspects benefit from the legal aid scheme. It 
is important to reflect on the need to improve this situation. The Bar As-
sociation’s involvement may also be one of the venues to further explore, 
for instance by setting up a contingency fund to assist counsel taking core 
international crimes cases under the legal aid scheme. This might help to 
level the playing field. 
Finally, the case record is chronologically organised and therefore a 
useful tool in understanding the lines of investigation followed. If the pre-
trial stage was conducted efficiently, the case record will provide the trial 
chamber with a complete account, clearly distinguishing between contex-
tual aspects and the heart of the criminal case brought against the accused. 
This will allow even outsiders to understand the line of reasoning in the 
investigation and the subsequent decision committing the person to trial. 
The indictment order will thus serve as an efficient tool for the presiding 
judge of the trial chamber46 to organise the court sessions, the calling of 
evidence, and the questioning of witnesses. Held before a jury, only the 
presiding judge will have access to the case record. Parts of the indictment 
                                                   
45 French Law does not expressly foresee the possibility for the defence to undertake inde-
pendent investigations. While no provision prevents the defence from doing so, it is none-
theless not generally accepted in practise as it is assumed that the defence should rely on 
the prosecutors and investigative judges’ investigations, duty bound to look for incriminat-
ing and exculpatory evidence. 
46 The trial is held before a trial chamber composed of the presiding judge, two assessor-
judges, and a trial jury composed of six jurors when the court of assizes rules at first in-
stance and nine jurors when it rules on appeal (Article 296 of the Criminal Code of Proce-
dure, see above note 12). 
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order will be read at the beginning of the trial and this is how members of 
the jury will get knowledge of its content.47 When presenting, concisely, 
the imputed facts as contained in the indictment order, the presiding judge 
will also indicate the incriminating and exculpatory elements therein men-
tioned, as well as the legal characterisation of the imputed facts.48 
Finally, following feedback from the trial judges who sat on the first 
trial on the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, it will become regular practise to 
call to testify at trial the Director of Investigation of the case. He or she 
will explain how the investigation proceeded, any challenges encountered, 
and how they overcame them. This testimony will be given after the hear-
ings dedicated to context, and will help navigate from the broad context to 
the heart of the case. 
21.7. Conclusion 
With the creation of the Specialised Unit, the French Parliament wanted to 
concentrate better the investigation’s means and to encourage a deeper 
knowledge of the specific historical and cultural contexts of the commis-
sion of alleged crimes. After seven years of existence, it is fair to submit 
that the Specialised Unit is on the right track. The investigative judges’ 
efforts were instrumental in raising and addressing issues such as jurisdic-
tion or ne bis in idem challenges as early as possible during the pre-trial 
investigations. The efforts deployed in ensuring a good knowledge of the 
context in which the crimes were committed enhanced the quality of the 
investigations and turned useful for a good preparation of the trial. At the 
same time, by ensuring the existence of an organised and complete case-
record, accessible to the parties, investigative judges ensured that they 
were trial-ready and that the lines of investigation will be understood, yet 
without preventing the debate at trial. 
However, there is still some room for improvement. In light of the 
increased number of cases under investigation, it appears essential to give 
the staffing and material means to the Specialised Unit so that it can take 
additional cases while not affecting the expeditiousness of the proceed-
ings. In addition, it is equally important to find further support for the 
Defence. 
                                                   
47 In addition to the presiding judge, during the trial, the two assessor-judges as well as 
members of the jury may question the accused or witnesses (ibid., Article 311). 
48 Ibid., Article 327. 
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At the same time, it is fundamental that the Specialised Unit is not 
seen as a unit specialised only on physically storing folders of core inter-
national crimes cases. It should rather develop an expertise over the years, 
which will turn beneficial for the efficiency and expeditiousness of the 
proceedings. Judges should be encouraged to stay within the Specialised 
Unit long enough to complete the investigations without adverse effect on 
their career advancement. Mobility of judges and their teams should be as 
limited as possible in order to preserve institutional memory and expertise. 
This is even more important because the trial judges to date are not spe-
cialised in international criminal law, and trials are held before popular 
juries. 
Finally, one should recall the words of Judge Jorda, former Presi-
dent of the ICTY and presiding judge of Pre-trial Chamber I of the ICC: 
“a trial should never last more than 18 months total”.49 I agree with the 
importance of keeping the trial within a reasonable time-frame. Too 
lengthy trials cease to be understandable or followed by the victims and, 
more broadly, the affected communities. On the other hand, while ac-
knowledging the difficulties in gathering a jury for several months, I be-
lieve that, for certain cases, a trial held in less than two months is neither 
efficient nor effective. In fact, leaving little time to the jury to rest and 
reflect does not afford the jurors the necessary time to grasp the peculiari-
ties of the context in which the crimes were committed and the cultural 
and sociological dimensions of victims and perpetrators. They also need 
to have sufficient time to properly hear the evidence and understand the 
tremendous amount of information contained in the case file. Perhaps, to 
address the challenges of keeping a jury for months, such trials should be 
held before professional judges, without a jury, as is currently done in 
terrorism-related cases. 
                                                   
49 See interview with Judge Claude Jorda: Franck Petit, “A trial should never last more than 
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22.The Importance of Successful Co-operation 
Between Police Investigators and the Prosecution 
Service to Secure Efficient and Fair Court 




The level of co-operation between investigators and the prosecutor during 
investigations varies considerably in different countries and legal systems. 
Even in Norway, where the first level of the prosecution service is an in-
tegrated part of the police, often located in the same building as the inves-
tigators, the co-operation is frequently limited to questions where it is 
mandatory. This chapter presents some reflections on how co-operation 
between investigator and prosecutor during a criminal investigation can 
contribute to improved quality of cases, and thus also more efficient and 
fair court proceedings. The chapter is written from a Norwegian perspec-
tive: a civil law country, with mainly statute legislation. But as the experi-
ences from England and Wales mentioned below indicate, the problems 
discussed here are probably of a universal character, independent of the 
legal system. 
‘Quality’ is defined as “an activity, which is conducted according to 
certain agreed standards”.1 Criminal investigation is in Norway regulated 
                                                   
* Tor-Geir Myhrer is a Professor at the Norwegian Police University College (Oslo). He 
holds Dr. Juris and Cand. Jur. degrees, and has been one of Norway’s most prominent 
prosecutors and served as an expert adviser on criminal law reform since 1988. He has 
published extensively on criminal procedure, police law (in particular use of police force), 
data protection, immigration law and legal ethics.  
1 Tor-Geir Myhrer, Kvalitet i etterforskningen: Særlig om påtaleansvarliges rolle og 
betydning (Quality in the Investigation: The Role and Responsibilities of the Police Prose-
cutor), Politihøgskolen (Norwegian Police University College), Oslo, 2015, p. 9. 
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by the Criminal Procedure Act. The Act in force today is from 1981.2 It 
continued the main features from the previous act which dates back to 
1890. Even though criminal investigation has been carried out under more 
or less the same organisational and procedural regulations for nearly 130 
years, it is only the last ten years that the following question has been 
asked: which are the standards (essential elements) that define the quality 
of an investigation?3 
The number of sub-standards or essential elements may differ, but 
there is no need to discuss all aspects in this chapter. We shall instead 
concentrate on the elements where the co-operation between the investi-
gator and the prosecutor is essential for the efficiency and successful out-
come of the proceedings. But first we should address one pivotal question. 
22.2. What Is the Purpose of an Investigation? 
Why does good co-operation with the prosecutor influence the quality of 
the investigation? Why cannot the investigation simply be the first leg in a 
relay-run independently of the next, and the result of the investigation be 
the baton one delivers to the prosecutor who is running the next leg? The 
reason is that an investigation is not simply a fact-finding mission, but a 
mission with a clearly defined purpose: to obtain the necessary infor-
mation for deciding whether an indictment should be sought; and, if so, to 
serve as a preparation for the trial, both on deciding the question of guilt 
and the sentencing.4 
Accordingly, the questions concerning the facts come first, then de-
ciding whether the facts amount to a criminal offence. In many investiga-
tions the answers to these questions are clear from the start, but this is not 
always the case. When the starting point of the investigation is an accident, 
a fire or simply a dead body found in the woods, these questions are the 
first that need answers. Sometimes it is clear from the start that a crime 
has taken place, but not what kind: is it a homicide, manslaughter or has 
someone with an obligation to care left a sick or injured person to die? 
More often the main question in an investigation is to establish whether 
                                                   
2 See Lov 1981-05-22 nr 25: Lov om rettergangsmåten i straffesaker (https://legal-tools.org/
doc/76cf36). You find an English translation (The Criminal Procedure Act) in the ICC Le-
gal Tools Database under persistent URL https://legal-tools.org/doc/612318. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Norway, The Criminal Procedure Act, 22 May 1981, Section 226, see note 2 above. 
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somebody is responsible for what has happened and who they are. On this 
the prosecutor normally has little to offer. When the suspects have been 
identified, the most difficult part of an investigation may be to find proof 
that they have acted with the requisite guilt. As discussed below, co-
operation between investigator and prosecutor can be useful at this point. 
In fiction and popular literature, this is where the investigation stops. 
In real life, it has to continue, collecting information for purpose of the 
sentencing. Even in cases where the accused do not confess, the evidence 
on the issue of guilt is often so overwhelming that the only, or at least the 
most interesting question, is the extent of the punishment. The evidence 
regarding the facts of the matter, for the suspect’s degree of participation 
in the crime and his or her guilt, will always give important information 
relevant to the sentencing. But it is normally not sufficient. If it is a crime 
with a victim, information about the victim and possible connection with 
the offender is important, as well as how the crime has affected and possi-
bly will affect the victim or persons close to her or him. The prosecutor 
(and the court) also need information about issues such as the accused’s 
personal situation at the time of the crime and at present, and how a sen-
tence will affect family and plans for the future. Information about previ-
ous investigations and convictions might also be important if they show a 
pattern relevant to the present case. 
It follows from this that it is essential for the quality and efficiency 
of the investigation to have good knowledge about what information the 
prosecutor needs for deciding on the indictment, and what is important for 
the presentation and argumentation in court. The best way an investigator 
can obtain this, is to co-operate with the prosecutor during the investiga-
tion. 
I find the views in Chapter 10 of Lord Justice Auld’s Review of the 
Criminal Courts of England and Wales (2002) illustrating. The Crown 
Prosecution Service (‘CPS’) in England and Wales was established 1986. 
Until then, the police had carried out both the investigation and decided 
on the indictment. It is easy to understand that the CPS from the start 
deemed it important to demonstrate that they were an independent au-
thority, separate from the police. But as a consequence, the police could 
run the investigation as an independent and isolated first leg in the law 
enforcement relay, and subsequently hand it over to the CPS. In the book 
Effective Prosecution, the authors summarised the findings of Lord Justice 
Auld in this way: 
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He identified that one of the biggest problems was the large 
number of cases incorrectly often overcharged by the police. 
This were subsequently altered and discontinued at court af-
ter CPS review of the charge at a very late stage. He pointed 
out that this led to late guilty pleas and ineffective trials, with 
consequential disappointment for victims and costs to the 
CJS [Criminal Justice System].5 
As a remedy for this Auld prescribed: 
The prosecutor should take control of cases at the charge or, 
where appropriate, pre-charge, stage, fix on the right charges 
from the start and keep to them, assume a more direct role 
than at present on disclosure and develop a more proactive 
role in shaping the case for trial, communicating appropriate-
ly and promptly with all concerned.6 
The quotation above use the phrase “prosecutor should take control 
of cases”. I think it is more appropriate to talk of a ‘co-operation’. The 
investigators have their skills and competence, and the prosecutors have 
theirs. What is needed is that they co-operate and work together in part-
nership. It is important, however, to emphasise that such co-operation is 
not a universal remedy that will fix all shortcomings in an investigation. 
Moreover, it may not even be needed in all circumstances. Other im-
portant factors are the skills, competence and experience of the investiga-
tors and prosecutors, the complexity of the facts of the case, and the chal-
lenges linked to the criminal law or the criminal procedure law that have 
to be employed. 
Sometimes investigators tend to see co-operation with prosecutors 
as a mark of distrust in their competence, or even as a defeat. From my 
experience as a public prosecutor for more than 20 years, this is hard to 
understand. How can it be a defeat to seek or receive information im-
portant for safeguarding that the investigation fulfils its purpose? 
In the following, I discuss some situations or areas where co-
operation between investigators and prosecutors is particularly important 
in order to secure proper quality of the investigation. 
                                                   
5 Yvonne Moreno OBE and Paul Hughes, Effective Prosecution: Working in Partnership 
with the CPS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 28. 
6 Robin Auld, Review of the criminal courts of England and Wales, Stationery Office, Lon-
don, 2001, p. 399. 
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22.3. What Should be Investigated? 
This question comprises two different situations: the first is a question 
concerning the amount of investigative resources. The number of crimes 
will in most countries and cultures probably always exceed the capacity. 
This brings up the question: on what kind of crimes should the investiga-
tive resources be employed and how ‘minor’ can they be? This is usually 
regulated in general instructions, although not always successfully, and 
will not be discussed her. 
The topic of this chapter is the second situation, namely how com-
prehensive and all-embracing should an investigation be in cases that 
comprise a) many different types of crimes of varied degrees of serious-
ness, or b) a large number of the same crime? I will discuss situation a), 
which is often seen in different forms of economic crimes, but can also 
occur in more organised forms of traditional crimes. This situation may be 
relatively common in war crimes justice. 
The investigation of such cases will normally benefit from some tai-
loring from the start, and this should be done in co-operation with the 
prosecutor. The main reasons for tailoring the case are that pursuing and 
investigating every possible crime is both very time consuming, and may 
also complicate the presentation in court. An essential quality standard is 
that investigations are carried out within reasonable time. And bringing all 
possible crimes to court will often not influence sentencing.7 The extra 
time and resources will accordingly not be proportionate. The main con-
sideration when tailoring the case must be that the resources are used on 
the most serious crimes. The maximum sentence for the crime is an indi-
cation of its seriousness, but how the court will in fact rule is also im-
portant. Normally, court experience will place the prosecutor in a better 
position to decide which crime(s) can be left out without having a nega-
tive impact on the final sentencing in the case as a whole. 
The relative seriousness of the crime is, however, not the only con-
sideration. Offences that are rather minor compared with other conduct in 
the case, could be important because they show a certain motivation or a 
general attitude. Even if they do not influence the sentencing, they might 
                                                   
7 If the legal system in question measures a penalty for each crime and then accumulates all 
in one final sentence, this may not be correct. However, whether the defendant’s total is 
reduced from, for example, 80 to 75 years of imprisonment is normally of limited im-
portance. 
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be important for the prosecutor to have them investigated and included in 
the indictment. They can be used to argue for guilt for the main crimes. If 
the accused in a trial for economic crimes in his or her defence puts that 
the missing report, application or approval is an oversight or omission 
caused by work pressure, it might be difficult to be believed if the same 
form of behaviour is shown under other circumstances (such as not filling 
out a missing tax declaration when returning from holiday where valuable 
goods have been purchased abroad). 
22.4. What Are the Crucial Elements of the Crime? 
Basically, the prosecutor must prove that a certain event or a certain state 
of affairs, which is forbidden by the criminal law, has been caused by the 
accused person’s conduct, and that this conduct was accompanied by a 
prescribed state of mind or mental state.8 
How straightforward or complicated this is, depends on how com-
plex the facts of the case are, and the character and number of the ele-
ments that have to be proven under the relevant criminal law. It follows 
from this that the need for co-operation between investigator and prosecu-
tor will vary considerably with the competence and experience of the in-
vestigators, and with how complicated the facts and the law related to the 
case are. In this chapter I will limit myself to pointing out some areas 
where the quality of the investigation and the ambition to have efficient 
and fair court proceedings will benefit from an early co-operation between 
investigator and prosecutor. 
Clearly, the more complex the legal and factual variables are, the 
greater is the need and benefits of a co-operation between investigators 
and prosecutor. Although both are crimes against property, there is a big 
difference between investigating a simple theft and a complicated suspi-
cion of money laundering. Under Norwegian criminal law the latter is 
defined as: 
by converting or transferring assets or by other means con-
ceals or obscures where the proceeds of a criminal act he/she 
has personally committed are located or originate from, who 
                                                   
8 David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, chap. 4. 
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controls them, their movements or rights associated with 
them.9 
It is frequently not the elements in the definition of the crime in 
themselves that create the problem. Rather, do all – or, if not, which – of 
the elements need to be covered by the accused’s guilty mind (mens rea)? 
When this has been clarified, the question of how to prove the guilty mind 
arises. Unless the accused gives a full confession covering the mental 
element, the guilty mind needs to be proven by elements from the physical 
world. This is an area where a close co-operation between prosecutor and 
investigator is especially important. In a fruitful co-operation the prosecu-
tor will clearly indicate what information is required, and the investigator 
present what is possible to retrieve with the resources and investigative 
methods available. 
Another area where proving criminal liability can be challenging, 
and where co-operation may be beneficial for the quality of the investiga-
tion, is when other forms of participation than commission need to be 
considered. Attempt and participation as an accomplice are the most 
common examples. It can be particularly complicated when the two are 
combined. Such complications can occur even if the investigation against 
the person who is responsible for the commission of the crime, is fairly 
straightforward. Let me use an example based on a real incident. 
In a city there are two competing gangs. In an enclosed gateway to 
the building where gang A has their residence, a member of gang B is 
caught on CCTV as he leaves a stolen car loaded with explosives. He im-
mediately runs from the gateway, and the car explodes within seconds and 
destroys the building, causing a fire, and two members of gang A are 
killed. 
Since it can be proven that the chauffeur of the car knew that the 
two members of gang A slept in the building, he is charged with murder. 
But what about the peripheral member of gang B who stole the car the 
previous night? What line of inquiry must be carried out and evidence 
gathered to decide and eventually prove her guilt for murder, manslaugh-
ter, criminal damage or simply just car theft? When it is clear what kind of 
evidence is needed, the investigator must indicate what is possible to ob-
tain with the resources and investigative methods available. Depending on 
                                                   
9 Norway, Lov 2005-05-20 nr. 28: Lov om straff (Straffeloven) (The Penal Code), 20 May 
2005, Section 337 (https://legal-tools.org/doc/aa2cee). 
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the answer to these questions, the investigator and the prosecutor might 
have to return to the question discussed above: how broad should the in-
vestigation be? How important is it for evidential or tactical reasons to 
clarify whether the car thief can also be charged with murder? Co-
operation at this point will prevent that time and manpower are spent on a 
line of investigation with slim chances of success, or that the investigation 
is prolonged in a disproportionate way. 
If the driver is stopped and apprehended by the police in the imme-
diate vicinity because of failure to stop at a red light, and subsequently is 
discovered to be carrying explosives, the situation gets even more com-
plex. Can he be charged with attempted murder? And what about the car 
thief? If her intent to murder cannot be proven, ‘attempted manslaughter’ 
is no alternative. 
This example demonstrates another area where co-operation be-
tween investigator and prosecutor is beneficial for efficient court proceed-
ings. Most prosecutors have experienced that even indictments based on 
the most thorough investigation fall apart during court hearings. The rea-
son is often that witnesses change their statements, do not any more re-
member, do not show up, or use their right. For example, a close relative 
selects not to give a statement in court in front of the defendant. 
If consulted during an investigation an experienced prosecutor will 
often ask: what if ‘this or that’ happens in court? By this question the 
prosecutor may bring the investigators to consider whether the same of-
fence can also be viewed as a different crime, with other or fewer ele-
ments to satisfy. When the offence is also investigated from this point of 
view, the prosecutor may be in a position to change the indictment  (if 
allowed)10 to this alternative crime during the court hearing, if the evi-
dence for the principal crimes does not hold up. 
Co-operation with the prosecutor could also make the criminal ac-
tivity be investigated as another offence. When a person is found in pos-
session of large quantities of stolen goods, it is sometimes difficult to 
prove that he or she has stolen the goods and thus guilty of aggravated 
theft. To avoid this fragile point in the chain of evidence, it is often useful 
                                                   
10 As long as it is the same offence, the prosecutor will in many countries be allowed to make 
such amendments in the indictment, see, for example, the Norwegian Criminal Procedure 
Act, Section 38, in note 2 above. 
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with a subsidiary line of investigation, and subsequently a subsidiary 
charge for receiving proceeds from crime. 
22.5. Argumentation for the Sentencing 
The degree of co-operation needed between investigator and prosecutor 
related to sentencing depends on the roles of the police investigator and 
the prosecutor in the criminal system in question. It is obviously more 
challenging to argue for a penalty if the system – like in Norway or at the 
International Criminal Court – requires that the police investigators and 
the prosecutor conduct their function objectively.11 The investigation shall 
clarify both the evidence against the suspect and that in his or her favour. 
If, on the other hand, the identification and presentation of mitigating cir-
cumstances is primarily a task for the defence, then the prosecutor’s ar-
gumentation for the sentencing is easier. However, it is often wise to in-
vestigate possible mitigating facts. 
The most decisive circumstances and facts will normally be pre-
sented to the court as part of the evidence for the accused’s guilt. This will 
be the situation for aggravating circumstances such as: 
• the crime was committed by means or methods which were particu-
larly dangerous, in a particularly reckless manner, or with a consid-
erable potential for harm; 
• a more serious outcome could easily have been the consequence; 
• committed by multiple persons acting together, or as a planned or 
organised enterprise; or 
• was committed in the course of public service or was perpetrated by 
violating a special trust. 
Other aggravating circumstances are not linked to the elements of 
the crime. Such facts will often need special attention during the investi-
gation if the prosecutor shall be able to present sufficient evidence as a 
basis for the sentencing argumentation. This will normally be necessary 
for an argument that the offence was perpetrated by exploiting or misguid-
ing young persons, persons in a very difficult life situation, who are men-
tally disabled or in a dependent relationship with the offender. This will 
also be the case for evidence showing that the offence has affected per-
sons who are defenceless or particularly vulnerable. The same applies if 
                                                   
11 Ibid., Sections 55 and 226. 
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the crime was motivated by the victims’ religion or life stance, skin colour, 
national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, disability or other circum-
stances relating to groups with a particular need for protection. 
Co-operation between investigator and prosecutor on these topics 
should normally provide quality control on two points: first, and most 
importantly, the relevant topic is actually investigated; secondly, clarifica-
tion of the level of proof needed. Elements decisive for ascertaining guilt 
need to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. For aggravating circumstanc-
es, the requirements are less, but it can often be unclear what the demands 
are. 
If it is required that the investigation and prosecution are carried out 
objectively, an insufficient investigation of mitigating circumstances will 
create an impression of a biased inquiry. That could damage the convinc-
ing effect of the evidence of guilt. Many mitigating circumstances are, as 
the aggravating, closely linked to the elements of the crime or evidence of 
a guilty mind. However, such circumstances may in relation to the argu-
mentation on sentencing still need special attention during the investiga-
tion. This applies to circumstances such as: 
• the offender has prevented, reversed or limited the harm or loss of 
welfare caused by the offence, or sought to do so; 
• the offence was to a significant degree occasioned by the circum-
stances of the aggrieved party; or 
• the offender had, at the time of the act, reduced capacity to realisti-
cally assess his or her relationship to the outside world due to men-
tal illness, mental disability, impairment of consciousness 12  or a 
state of severe mental agitation. 
Other mitigating circumstances need a more dedicated line of in-
quiry during the investigation. Let me mention two. First, the ultimate 
purpose of criminal law is to prevent new crimes. It is therefore important 
for the sentencing if there is valid proof that the defendant has changed 
her or his lifestyle in a manner that improves the prospect of rehabilitation. 
A sentence, which do not ruin this prospect, is often preferable. 
The second circumstance is when the offender himself/herself has 
been severely affected by the offence, or the criminal sanction will impose 
                                                   
12 Not caused by self-induced intoxication. 
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a heavy burden due to advanced age, illness or other circumstances. I will 
illustrate this with an example based on a real incident. 
A man in his early twenties appeared in court charged with reckless 
driving. He had probably fallen asleep at the wheel causing an accident 
that killed his girlfriend who was a passenger in his car. There was no 
question about the defendant’s guilt, nor was it exceptional that he was 
still on crutches some ten months after the accident. What entirely influ-
enced the atmosphere during the trial was the evidence given that when-
ever someone visited the grave of the young woman, they could see marks 
from his crutches in the soft soil or in the snow. This information was not 
in the case file and unknown to the prosecutor, but was known to some of 
the investigators. 
Such mitigating circumstances will often influence the line of ar-
gumentation and possibly also the request for a sentence. For the prosecu-
tor to adjust this during trial could be challenging and also influence the 
efficiency of court proceedings. If the information on how the offence has 
affected the defendant is simply ignored by the prosecutor, it might create 
an impression of a not entirely fair (and objective) criminal prosecution. A 
good co-operation with the investigators, who are normally closer to both 
the defendant and the victims than the prosecutor, could prevent or reduce 
the potential for such occurrence as well as unexpected information dur-
ing trial. 
22.6. Procedural Requirements and Safeguards 
In the previous sections of this chapter, the dominant idea has been that 
co-operation between investigators and prosecutor will improve the quali-
ty of the investigation in its function as preparation for the trial. When it 
comes to procedural requirements and safeguards, the involvement from 
the prosecutor gets a stronger element of control. The reason is that evi-
dence obtained in a way that contradict with procedural requirements, 
may not be allowed as evidence in court. It is equally important that this is 
frequently not just a question of efficiency, in the sense that the trial has to 
be postponed; very often the error cannot be remedied, causing the chain 
of evidence to fall apart. 
There are numerous procedural questions for which guidance from 
and involvement by the prosecutor might be beneficial for the quality of 
the investigation. The discussion in this chapter will be limited to four 
rather broad questions. 
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First, in the countries where there is a legal obligation that the in-
vestigation shall be conducted objectively, this requirement must have the 
prosecutor’s constant attention when co-operating with the investigator. 
Very often this is primarily a question of ensuring that all probable hy-
potheses or explanations of what has happened have been followed up as 
a line of investigation. Even where the principle of objectivity is not a 
legal requirement, such control over the investigation might be advanta-
geous for tactical reasons. If the defence launches an alternative explana-
tion during the trial, it is always better to be able to respond that this hy-
pothesis has already been checked and rejected, than simply to argue that 
the hypothesis is not probable. Experienced investigators will often have 
formed and followed up all probable lines of inquiry. If that is not the case, 
the role of the prosecutor will be to use her or his role to make the investi-
gation as robust as possible. 
The second area for the prosecutor’s guidance or quality control is 
evidence obtained by use of coercive measures like search and seizure, 
covert CCTV, or surveillance of telephones or other (electronic) forms of 
communication. Use of such coercive measures is normally restricted to 
special types of crimes or offences with a high maximum sentencing 
frame. A certain level of suspicion is often required. It differs from coun-
try to country whether such coercive measures can be decided by the in-
vestigators themselves, superior officers, the prosecutor, or by the court. 
Nevertheless, it is important that the prosecutor makes sure that this part 
of the investigation is, or has been, conducted in conformity with the legal 
requirements. But what if it is not? If the flawed evidence cannot be al-
lowed in court, it must be considered whether it may be remedied, or if it 
will in fact taint other evidence and ultimately lead to the case being 
dropped. Illegally obtained CCTV images might be used to identify wit-
nesses who could be interviewed about their observations at the same time 
and place, but illegal search and seizure is more difficult to deal with. 
Ultimately, the result might be that the case has to be dropped. 
A third area for quality control is the privilege against self-
incrimination – the right to silence. Case law from treaty-based human 
rights courts or committees has raised the importance of this in the last 
decades. In many countries the formal interviewing is taped or videoed. 
The challenge is therefore often the questioning of the suspect that takes 
place in the stressful and shocking situation shortly after or during an ar-
rest. A statement given at this early stage might influence which options 
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the suspect feels that he or her will have during the following interroga-
tion secured on tape and video and with a lawyer present. The prosecutor 
has to ascertain personally that the suspect initially was given proper no-
tice of the consequences of being questioned; that this may form a basis 
for criminal prosecution. It is important that this can be proven if contest-
ed by the defence. 
‘Proper notice of the consequences’ is of course impossible if the 
suspect is not even aware that he is dealing with the police. This directs 
me to the fourth area of quality control: provocative and/or undercover 
police investigative work. Books can be (and have been) written about the 
procedural challenges connected with such investigative methods. Here I 
restrict myself to underline what may be the most important checkpoint 
for the prosecutor: where the nature of the offence so warrants, there is 
nothing that precludes that the investigation be based on evidence ob-
tained through an undercover police operation. However, the use of un-
dercover agents must be restricted: the police may act undercover but not 
incite. This is often a question of who has taken the first initiative vis-à-
vis the crime; the undercover agent or the suspect? And, importantly, can 
this be proven? 
22.7. Final Remarks 
When reading this chapter, as well as when I give lectures on the subject, 
I find the observations rather obvious and commonplace, perhaps even 
banal. So why is not such co-operation between prosecutor and investiga-
tors standard routine? Even in Norway – where, as mentioned above, the 
first level of the prosecution service is an integrated part of the police – 
the co-operation during the investigation is often limited to questions 
where it is mandatory, primarily decisions on use of some coercive 
measures. From the prosecutor’s perspective, there are typically three 
conditions for a more extensive co-operation to happen: a) time and op-
portunity, b) competence and will-power, and c) acceptance and demand. 
In Norway, time and opportunity seem to be the most important fac-
tor. The prosecutors are either in court or occupied with preparing a case 
for imminent trial. There is limited time to involve themselves in ongoing 
investigations. Even though the case files are digital and accessible from 
both the investigators’ and prosecutor’s computer, the ‘opportunity’ is still 
very much linked to geographical proximity. To pop into the office or 
have a brief discussion when meeting in the corridor or in the canteen 
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seems easier and more likely to happen than accessing the file on the 
computer, asking a question, or writing a comment. 
Competence and will-power are probably closely inter-linked. If the 
prosecutor perceives that her or his competence is inferior to that of the 
investigators, the will may also be lacking to become involved in the in-
vestigation. More complicated types of crimes are, however, normally 
handled by experienced prosecutors, and the willingness might in these 
circumstances be influenced by the third factor: acceptance and demand. 
Whether investigators accept and value involvement of the prosecu-
tor in the investigation varies over time and from country to country. 
When I started as a prosecutor some 40 years ago, co-operation with the 
prosecutor was not accepted as organisational routine, but was more based 
on the personal relation between investigator and prosecutor. Today it is 
different.13 I have no wide or profound knowledge about the climate of 
such co-operation in other countries, but if the attitude presented in fiction 
is of any value, the prosecutor will frequently be seen as an opponent ra-
ther than a partner. One important way to change this is for the prosecutor 
to accentuate the value of the investigators’ competence and experience, 
but at the same time, to demonstrate how their own competence create an 
added value to the quality of the investigation. 
                                                   
13 Myhrer, 2015, pp. 120–23, see above note 1. 
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In February 2019, I had the honour of participating in the ‘Quality Control 
in Criminal Investigation’ conference in New Delhi. The conference of-
fered various observations and insights, from practitioners and academics 
alike, from both domestic and international perspectives. Conference par-
ticipants highlighted the importance of the investigation phase, which, 
when conducted with appropriate scrutiny, while adhering to rigorous 
professional standards, facilitates and improves the overall quality of 
criminal proceedings, in both the international and domestic spheres. 
This chapter focuses on the domestic sphere. The importance of ex-
ploring national investigation systems stems from the fact that the primary 
obligation to investigate violations of international law rests upon States, 
as reflected, inter alia, in the principle of complementarity. 
States may adopt various models to fulfil their obligations to inves-
tigate alleged criminal conduct during armed conflicts, in particular alle-
gations of violations of the law of armed conflict (‘LOAC’), which may 
amount to war crimes. States can generally rely either on a military justice 
system, or on a civilian one, though this is not a strict dichotomy. States 
that rely mainly on a military justice system may nonetheless incorporate 
certain civilian elements into their system of examinations and investiga-
tions, and vice versa: States, the investigative system of which is rooted in 
                                                   
* Dr. Gilad Noam, Senior Director, International Justice Division, Ministry of Justice of the 
State of Israel, adjunct lecturer, Hebrew University Faculty of Law and College of Man-
agement School of Law. The chapter was written in my personal academic capacity, and 
does not necessarily reflect the positions of the State of Israel. 
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the civilian sector, may rely to some extent on investigative steps carried 
out by the military system. 
Each approach has its pros and cons. Understanding the structure 
and the work of national investigation mechanisms can shed some light on, 
and offer a better understanding of, the unique challenges that arise in this 
context and the ways in which such challenges could be addressed, hence 
drawing some lessons for the benefit of the international criminal justice 
system as a whole. 
In this regard, two main observations emerge from an examination 
of the relevant national practice. Firstly, the International Criminal Court’s 
(‘ICC’) complementarity assessment should give due regard to the man-
ner in which national investigation systems are commonly structured. In 
particular, the standards applied by the Court in determining the compe-
tence of national systems and the capability of national proceedings to 
deal with alleged LOAC violations, must take into account the common 
practice in that State, as well as States’ practice more generally as evi-
dence of the contents of the obligation to investigate LOAC violations.1 
Secondly, international investigations can draw on the experience of na-
tional investigation systems, and refine their capabilities for addressing 
the challenges associated with investigations of alleged violations of 
LOAC accordingly. 
This chapter will resort to the work of the Public Commission to 
Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (Turkel Commission), 
which was established by the Government of Israel.2 In addition to exam-
ining the maritime incident itself, the Commission was further requested 
to examine “whether the mechanism for examining and investigating 
                                                   
1 See, Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute with regard to applicable law in the ICC, which 
provides, inter alia, that the Court shall apply, where appropriate “the principles and rules 
of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict”. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 21(1) 
(‘ICC Statute’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
2 Resolution No. 1796 of the 32nd Government of Israel, Appointment of an Independent 
Public Commission, Chaired by Supreme Court Justice (ret.) Jacob Turkel, to Examine the 
Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (14 June 2010). The Commission was headed by retired 
Supreme Court Justice Jacob Turkel, and was composed of Israeli experts in the fields of 
law, diplomacy and security, as well as esteemed foreign observers such as Professor Tim 
McCormack, Brig. Gen, (Ret.) Kenneth Watkin, and Lord David Trimble. The Commis-
sion was also assisted in its work by a number of renowned international legal experts: 
Professor Claus Kreß, Professor Gabriella Blum and Professor Michael Schmitt. 
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complaints and claims raised in relation to violations of the laws of armed 
conflict, as conducted in Israel generally, […] conforms with the obliga-
tions of the State of Israel under the rules of international law”.3 In Febru-
ary 2013 the Commission issued a comprehensive report which examined 
not only the international legal standards on this matter, but also conduct-
ed a comparative analysis of investigation mechanisms in six States, with 
a view to establishing what are considered “best practices” in this field.4 
The comparative analysis demonstrates the diverse practice in terms of the 
manner in which states have designed their investigations systems. The 
Commission’s comparative survey, a unique and ground-breaking effort, 
will serve as the basis for this chapter’s modest presentation of this issue. 
Naturally, this chapter will also base itself on Israeli practice, which was 
the focus of the Commission’s work. The Israeli investigation system has 
also undergone progressive developments in recent years, based, inter alia, 
on the Commission’s recommendations. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 23.2. reviews key 
characteristics of State investigation systems of alleged violations of 
LOAC. Section 23.3. presents the work of the Turkel Commission, and 
some of the changes that took place in Israeli investigation mechanisms in 
recent years. Lastly, Section 23.4. offers some thoughts on the possible 
implications of this survey on international investigations. 
23.2. National Investigation Mechanisms: Structure and Standards 
Law-abiding States employ a wide range of investigative mechanisms in 
order to fulfil their obligation to investigate violations of LOAC. In some 
                                                   
3 Ibid.; Second Report, The Turkel Commission, Public Commission to Examine the Mari-
time Incident of 31 May 2010, Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating 
Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to Interna-
tional Law, February 2013, p. 33 (‘Turkel Commission Report’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/e8437b/). 
4 Ibid., p. 43: 
Admittedly, each country has its own considerations when it chooses the appropriate 
tools and mechanisms for the purpose of fulfilling its obligations under international 
law. Such considerations relate to the circumstances of that country and its inhabitants, 
its government institutions, and its constitutional and legal system. Despite the differ-
ences in national approaches, the survey provides a wide range of mechanisms that 
countries may adopt in order to examine and investigate violations of international 
humanitarian law. It also assists in critically assessing the pros and cons of the differ-
ent systems when considering the legal and operational needs and realities in Israel. 
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States, distinct military justice systems are those that regularly examine 
complaints regarding violations of LOAC. Although these systems dif-
fer – for example, with regard to the role commanders play in the process, 
or with regard to the division between legal advisors and those responsi-
ble for criminal enforcement – the main characteristic they all share is that 
all phases of the criminal process (including the preliminary phases of 
examinations and investigations) are conducted within the military. The 
United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Israel, are all 
examples of States that have such distinct military justice systems.5 In 
contrast, other States, such as Germany and the Netherlands, chose to 
entrust civilian bodies with the task of investigating violations of LOAC 
by the military.6 However, such States may nevertheless choose to employ 
an internal disciplinary system as part of their armed forces, or rely on the 
work of military police in prosecutions held before civilian courts.7 States 
that have chosen to use distinct military justice systems, usually also in-
corporate into their work, to a varying degree, elements of their civilian 
system.8 
The comparative analysis conducted by the Turkel Commission 
demonstrates the diverse practice in terms of the manner in which States 
have designed their investigation mechanisms. As noted, each possible 
model has its pros and cons. Civilian justice systems, for instance, due to 
their remoteness from the military, may be perceived as more objective. In 
contrast, distinct military justice systems may benefit from better legal 
expertise with regard to LOAC, and from greater operational knowledge 
in matters related to application of such laws. Given that the Israeli sys-
tem is based on the military model, I will focus on some characteristics of 
military justice systems. 
23.2.1. Military Investigations: The Applicable Standards 
The Turkel Commission concluded that the existence and utilization of 
military justice systems is not only commonly accepted and in line with 
                                                   
5 Ibid., pp. 177–203. 
6 Ibid., p. 155. 
7 Ibid., p. 178. 
8 See, for example, in Australia, ibid., p. 189. 
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international standards, but also that their use was “expressly envisaged” 
by international law.9 
The Commission identified the standards for conducting effective 
investigations in situations in which LOAC (international humanitarian 
law, as referred to by the Commission), applies. The four general princi-
ples that the Commission identified as applying to such investigations are 
independence, impartiality, effectiveness and thoroughness, and prompt-
ness.10 The Commission found that the principle of transparency, derived 
from international human rights law, is not explicitly recognized in LOAC, 
and that investigators and prosecutors are not obliged to comply with the 
rules of transparency that relate to specific victims’ rights in such situa-
tions. The Commission found, however, that to the extent that the circum-
stances allow, it is desirable to promote aspects of transparency that relate 
to public scrutiny, through means such as the publication of guidelines, 
establishing reporting mechanisms, and making statistics and relevant 
information publicly available.11 
The Commission acknowledged that adjustments must be made 
when applying the aforementioned principles to investigations of opera-
tional activities that take place in the context of an armed conflict. Such 
adjustments are required in view of “the surrounding circumstances as 
well as the underlying principles governing international humanitarian 
                                                   
9 Ibid., pp. 123–24. For example, Article 84 of the Third Geneva Convention refers to the 
military justice system of States Parties as the default system in which both the State’s own 
military personnel as well as prisoners of war should be brought to trial. Convention (III) 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (IV), 12 August 1949, Article 84 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/365095/). 
10 Turkel Commission Report, see above note 3, p. 114. The Commission distinguished 
between two uses of the term ‘effective’. The four principles are meant to ensure an ‘effec-
tive investigation’ in the broad sense, namely, that an investigation will be carried out 
when needed, with the aim of identifying those responsible and committing them to justice. 
In the narrow sense, the principle of “effectiveness and thoroughness” is concerned with 
the means of the investigation in order to discover the truth (ibid., fn. 193); see also Noam 
Lubell, Jelena Pejić and Claire Simmons, Guidelines on Investigating Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law: Law, Policy and Good Practice, 2019, pp. 24–30. 
11 Turkel Commission Report, pp. 145–46, see above note 3; See also Lubell, Pejić and 
Simmons, p. 31, see above note 10. 
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law”, and “the extent to which they apply is determined by the overall 
purpose of achieving an ‘effective investigation’”.12 
As explained by the Turkel Commission, numerous challenges arise 
with respect to the practical ability to conduct an investigation effectively 
and thoroughly while hostilities are still taking place.13 Nevertheless, the 
Commission found that even if during an armed conflict the thoroughness 
and effectiveness of an investigation, “may not translate to the same evi-
dentiary standards as during peacetime, the standards must still be high 
enough to reach conclusive and reliable findings”.14 The evidence that is 
available “must be thoroughly secured and all feasible reporting must be 
completed”.15 Similarly, with respect to the standard of promptness, the 
Commission found that when applied to an armed conflict, “determining 
the reasonableness of a delay must be assessed according to the surround-
ing circumstances and according to the scope and scale of the violence”.16 
To be sure, investigations of operational activities in situations of 
armed conflict may encounter numerous practical challenges, even after 
the end of active hostilities. The conflict might have led to the destruction 
of evidence, witnesses may be difficult to locate, and opposing authorities 
may still be reluctant to co-operate and assist in such investigations. An 
effective inquiry is one which upholds the aforementioned principles, 
subject to the inevitable need for adjustments, which will depend on the 
particular set of circumstances. 
23.2.2. Advantages of Military Justice Systems 
Military justice systems benefit from unique specialization. Military law-
yers are not only best familiar with LOAC on the theoretical level, but 
they also have a good understanding of military conduct and operational 
considerations, and thus of the implementation of LOAC norms in the 
operational theatre. Such understanding is essential for conducting effec-
tive and professional investigations. Military investigations teams are 
composed also of non-lawyers with operational background, whose essen-
                                                   
12 Turkel Commission Report, p. 139, see above note 3; See also Lubell, Pejić and Simmons, 
p. 9, see above note 10. 
13 Turkel Commission Report, p. 141, see above note 3. 
14 Ibid., p. 142. 
15 Ibid., p. 143 (emphasis supplied). 
16 Ibid. 
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tial expertise contributes much to the work of the teams. In many cases, 
understanding individual battlefield incidents requires knowledge of the 
broader operational picture, without which the investigations are at risk of 
reaching inaccurate conclusions. For instance, the understanding of what 
would constitute a military advantage that arises from a particular attack 
as part of the assessment of proportionality, 17 might require a broader 
understanding of operational considerations that pertain to the hostilities 
at hand, and an isolated examination of a particular attack may not pro-
vide the full picture.18 Military justice systems usually enjoy a profound 
and constantly cultivated understanding of operational procedures and 
directives and other relevant information that is crucial for deciphering the 
factual picture and for formulating the evidentiary basis for criminal 
charges in appropriate cases. 
The unique expertise of military justice systems lies also in the ac-
cumulated experience in dealing with investigations of violations of 
LOAC, which are fundamentally different from investigations of criminal 
offenses in the civilian context. When investigating allegations of war 
crimes, the surrounding circumstances are inherently violent and involve 
the use of armed force. The challenge is to differentiate between legiti-
mate and lawful use of military power, and violations of LOAC that im-
plicate individual criminal responsibility.19 Military justice systems have 
experience and knowledge that helps to better identify those instances in 
which members of the armed forces deviate from conduct that is expected 
from law-abiding troops in combat situations, giving due regard to the 
operational circumstances and to challenges which stem from the ‘fog of 
the battle’ in which military forces operate. 
                                                   
17 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Article 51(1)(b) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d9328a/); ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(iv), see above note 
1. 
18 See, John J. Merriam and Michael N. Schmitt, “Israeli Targeting: A Legal Appraisal”, in 
Naval War College Review, 2015, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 15, 18, 28–29, arguing that “[t]o un-
derstand why Israel adopts particular interpretations of the LOAC and how the nation ap-
plies them in practice, one must comprehend the operational and strategic dilemmas it fac-
es”. 
19 There is also need to differentiate between violations of the LOAC in general, and viola-
tions that amount to war crimes, see Turkel Commission Report, pp. 94–99, see above note 
3. 
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All of the above does not detract from the need to review the way in 
which a particular military justice system operates in light of the investi-
gative standards noted above, and to consider improvements through the 
adoption of best practices. The next part illustrates some of the processes 
that the Israeli system has undertaken in recent years, following the Turkel 
Commission’s Report. 
23.3. Israel’s Mechanism for Examining and Investigating 
Complaints and Claims Raised in Relation to Violations of the 
LOAC: The Turkel Commission’s Report and Subsequent 
Developments 
Several States, including States that were included in the Turkel Commis-
sion’s comparative analysis, have in recent decades carried out reforms of 
their mechanisms dedicated to investigating violations of the LOAC. The 
changes have taken place in pursuit of best practice, sometimes influenced 
by the respective States’ membership in international legal institutions, 
particularly the European Court of Human Rights and the ICC, and some-
times as a result of internal review procedures that took place in response 
to concrete instances.20 
The Government of Israel established the Turkel Commission to 
examine various aspects of the maritime incident of 31 May 2010.21 Ex-
tending the Commission’s mandate to also include an examination of 
whether Israel’s mechanism generally conforms with the obligations of 
the State of Israel under international law (that is, not only with regard to 
the maritime incident),22 stemmed from, inter alia, criticisms with regard 
to the manner in which Israel investigates complaints and claims of viola-
tions of LOAC.23 
                                                   
20 Ibid., pp. 157–58. 
21 On the maritime incident and the background for the establishment of the Commission, see 
The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010: The Turkel 
Commission Report Part One, January 2011 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f2aae4/). 
22 Resolution No. 1796 of the 32nd Government of Israel, see above note 2. 
23 Turkel Commission Report, pp. 33–35, see above note 3. In particular, reports of commit-
tees appointed by the UN Human Rights Council in the aftermath of the military opera-
tions in the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009 (‘Operation Cast Lead’) and in 2014 (‘Operation Pro-
tective Edge’) criticized the Israeli system, albeit noticing the progress along the years and 
speaking favourably of the establishment of the Turkel Commission and its work. See 
Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, 
Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc. 
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Following a comprehensive review, the Turkel Commission con-
cluded that the mechanisms in Israel and the methods they employ gener-
ally comply with Israel’s obligations under the rules of international law.24 
The Commission nevertheless made a number of recommendations for the 
adoption of practices and operating methods which would improve the 
system. 25  Since the Turkel Commission published its Report in 2013, 
many of the recommendations have been implemented, and improvements 
and lessons-learned processes to that effect are ongoing.26 Below, I will 
introduce some of the main changes made to Israel’s system in recent 
years. 
The Turkel Commission recommended the establishment of a 
mechanism for carrying out a fact-finding assessment, to assist the Mili-
                                                                                                                        
A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ca9992/); Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Committee of independent experts in international humani-
tarian and human rights laws to monitor and assess any domestic, legal or other proceed-
ings undertaken by both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian side, in the light of 
General Assembly resolution 64/254, including the independence, effectiveness, genuine-
ness of these investigations and their conformity with international standards, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/15/50, 23 September 2010 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/h22u4b/); Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Committee of independent experts in international humani-
tarian and human rights law established pursuant to Council resolution 13/9, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/16/24, 18 March 2011(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3bd812/); Human Rights 
Council, Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry estab-
lished pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 
24 June 2015, paras. 601–67 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a67ee2/). 
24 Turkel Commission Report, p. 49, see above note 3. 
25 Ibid., emphasizing that “where the Commission saw a need for amendments or changes to 
the mechanisms and operating methods, it does not necessarily indicate essential flaws, but 
rather it is a blueprint for optimal improvement”. 
26 Following the publication of the Turkel Commission’s Report, the Israeli Government ap-
pointed a team to review and implement the Turkel Commission’s recommendations. In 
August 2015, the team published a detailed report on the status of implementation of the 
recommendations as of that time. See Team for the Review and Implementation of the Se-
cond Report of the Public Commission for the Examination of the Maritime Incident of 
May 31st 2010 Regarding Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Com-
plaints and Claims of Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict According to International 
Law, August 2015 (‘Implementation Report’). The team submitted its report to the Prime 
Minister, and recommended the establishment of a small monitoring team that will contin-
ue to observe the process of implementation. The Ministerial Committee on National Secu-
rity approved the recommendations of the implementation team. See The Ministerial 
Committee on National Security approves the implementation of the Turkel Commission’s 
Second Report. 
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tary Advocate General (‘MAG’) in making a determination as to whether 
a criminal investigation is warranted in particular instances.27 This mech-
anism does not detract from the MAG’s discretion to decide on the initia-
tion of a criminal investigation based on the facts known to him or her,28 
but it provides an additional tool that may assist the MAG in making such 
a decision by gathering additional information when required.29 The Tur-
kel Commission’s recommendation to establish a professional fact-finding 
assessment mechanism resulted mainly from difficulties that it found with 
the practice of using operational debriefings for such purpose.30 It rec-
ommended that the mechanism be composed of experts on the theatres of 
military operations, international law and investigations. 
Accordingly, the General Staff Mechanism for Fact Finding As-
sessments (‘FFA’) was founded and became functional during operation 
‘Protective Edge’ in Gaza in 2014.31 The FFA is headed by a Major Gen-
eral who, like the other members of the mechanism, was outside the chain 
of command when the incidents that they examine took place. The FFA is 
comprised of investigative teams of officers, who hold operational exper-
tise, legal qualifications, and professional investigative experience. It is 
vested with broad-ranging powers in order to ensure that it can obtain all 
the information required, and members of the Israeli Defense Forces are 
obligated to co-operate with it. The FFA’s role is to conduct prompt and 
thorough examinations of every incident referred to it by the MAG, in 
order to gather sufficient information to determine whether the conduct in 
question is of a criminal nature. The FFA has dealt with numerous inci-
                                                   
27 Turkel Commission Report, p. 382, see above note 3. 
28 See for example, the MAG’s decision to open a criminal investigation as reported in Deci-
sions of the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional Incidents that occurred 
during Operation ‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 1 (Part 2) (10 September 2014): “The 
MAG Corps received an operational incident report indicating a suspicion that an IDF sol-
dier stole money while in the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, the MAG ordered an immediate 
criminal investigation into the incident”. 
29 The implementing team noted in its report (Implementation Report, para. 53, see above 
note 26) that the MAG has additional tools available to him to complete the factual as-
sessment, including obtaining relevant factual information from the command operational 
debrief. 
30 In the Commission’s view, operational debriefings should primarily serve the operational 
needs of the army, rather than focus on questions of criminality as a basis for a decision to 
initiate an investigation. 
31 Implementation Report, para. 49, see above note 26. 
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dents of various types, most notably with exceptional incidents (such as 
attacks resulting in significant civilian casualties), particularly incidents 
related to operation Protective Edge and violent events across the fence 
between Israel and the Gaza Strip.32 In addition to supporting the MAG’s 
decision-making process, the FFA findings also inform the IDF’s ‘lessons-
learned’ process so that steps may be considered to minimize the risk of 
such incidents in the future. 
Examples of other changes in Israel’s military justice system fol-
lowing the Turkel Commission’s recommendations include: the estab-
lishment of a department for operational matters within the Military Po-
lice (Military Police Criminal Investigative Unit for Operational Affairs 
(‘CIUO’)), alongside the MAG Corps for Operational Matters within the 
military prosecution (which was established back in 2007);33 and incorpo-
rating the reporting procedure into the IDF Directives.34 
Several recommendations of the Turkel Commission aimed at 
strengthening the independence of the military justice system, by focusing 
on the MAG, who heads the system.35 According to military orders, while 
the MAG is subordinate to the IDF Chief of Staff in rank, and is part of 
the military’s General Staff, the MAG, and the entire MAG Corps, are 
only subject to the authority of the law, and not to the chain of command, 
in making legal and investigative determinations. In order to support the 
independence of the MAG, the Commission recommended, inter alia, that 
the MAG’s tenure be fixed, and that the MAG shall be given a fixed rank, 
                                                   
32 See The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, Yesh Din et al. v. IDF Chief of 
Staff et al., 24 May 2018, HCJ 3003/18, para. 63 (President E. Hayut’s Verdict). With re-
gard to Operation Protective Edge, as of August 2018, approximately 220 incidents have 
been referred by the MAG for examination by the FFA Mechanism. On the status of the 
examinations and investigations, see Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General Re-
garding Exceptional Incidents that Allegedly Occurred during Operation ‘Protective 
Edge’ – Update 6 (15 August 2018). 
33 Turkel Commission Report, p. 397, see above note 3. See also, “The IDF Military Justice 
System”, Israel Defense Force (available on its web site). 
34 Turkel Commission Report, p. 374, see above note 3; Israel’s State Comptroller Public 
Report on Operation ‘Protective Edge’, IDF Activity from the Perspective of International 
Law, Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination and Oversight of Civilian 
and Military Echelons, 14 March 2018, pp. 94–96, and recommendations for further im-
provements in that regard in ibid., pp. 96–98. 
35 Turkel Commission Report, pp. 389–96, see above note 3. 
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such that the promotion of the MAG from Brigadier-General to Major-
General is not subject to the discretion of the Chief of the General Staff.36 
These recommendations were implemented. In April 2015, a new Di-
rective was published by the Attorney General, clarifying the relationship 
between the military justice system and the general legal system headed 
by the Attorney General. The Directive also clarifies the independent legal 
status of the MAG and the framework for professional guidance provided 
to the MAG by the Attorney General. The Directive further refers to the 
established guidelines regarding the Attorney General’s involvement in 
the MAG’s decisions.37 
Finally, it should be noted that the Turkel Commission’s work also 
contributed to improvements in the civilian system, primarily by strength-
ening the oversight capabilities of the civilian system vis-à-vis the military 
justice system. The authority of the Attorney General to review appeals on 
the MAG’s decisions regarding investigations and prosecutions of serious 
violations of international law has been regularized and formalized in the 
form of an official Attorney General guideline.38 In addition, following 
the Commission’s recommendation,39 a unit within the office of the Depu-
ty Attorney General (International Law) which deals with matters pertain-
ing to LOAC, has been established. This unit adds a civilian echelon deal-
ing with these matters, in addition to the work of the MAG’s Corps. These 
changes further strengthen the ability of Israel’s legal system to deal ef-
fectively with claims regarding violations of LOAC. 
23.4. Implications for International Investigations 
What implications does national practice have for investigations by inter-
national institutions, including the ICC? The starting point in answering 
this question is that international proceedings are complementary to do-
mestic proceedings. As a rule, international proceedings can hardly be 
justified in situations in which domestic systems function according to the 
                                                   
36 Ibid., pp. 391–92. 
37 Implementation Report, paras. 74–76, see above note 26. 
38 Turkel Commission Report, pp. 407–408, see above note 3; Attorney General Guideline 
4.5003 (5775): “The review of decisions of the Military Advocate General regarding inci-
dents involving the death of an individual in the course of Israel Defense Forces operation-
al activity, when serious violations of customary international law are alleged”; ibid., paras. 
114–16. 
39 Turkel Commission Report, p. 403, see above note 3. 
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aforementioned international principles.40 The complementary nature of 
international criminal proceedings goes beyond the perception of com-
plementarity as an issue of admissibility before the ICC.41 The awareness 
of those spearheading international proceedings of the challenges that 
arise at the domestic level in relation to examinations and investigations 
of alleged violations of LOAC, as well as the way in which States deal 
with these challenges, is in other words of critical importance. Realizing 
that such challenges may be inherent to the complex investigative effort in 
the context of an armed conflict can prevent wrong conclusions as to 
whether domestic systems function properly. The standard, including that 
demanded by the principle of complementarity, is essentially one of pro-
cess rather than of result. 
International investigations are complementary to national investi-
gations in another, less noticed, aspect, which relates to the substance of 
the process. Investigations of violations of the LOAC must consider in-
                                                   
40 See, for example, William Schabas, “Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimen-
tary Thoughts”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2008, vol. 19, no. 1; Charles Chernor Jalloh, 
“Kenya vs. The ICC Prosecutor”, in Harvard International Law Journal, 2012, vol. 53; 
Anna Bishop, “Failure of Complementarity: The Future of the International Criminal Court 
Following the Libyan Admissibility Challenge”, in Minnesota Journal of International 
Law, 2013, vol. 22; Sarah M.H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Cata-
lysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013. 
41 The complementary nature of the ICC as an institution is reflected, inter alia, in the pre-
amble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, see above 
note 1 (“shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”). This notion of com-
plementarity goes beyond its function as an admissibility device (reflected in Articles 17, 
18 and 19 of the ICC Statue). See, generally, Carsten Stahn, “Revitalizing Complementari-
ty a Decade after the Stocktaking Exercise”, Policy Brief Series No. 115 (2020), Torkel 
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2020, p. 1: “Complementarity has several dimen-
sions. In its most narrow form it is an admissibility device […] it is also a means to organ-
ize the interaction between international and domestic jurisdictions in a more holistic sense. 
This may be called the ‘systemic function of complementarity’” (https://www.toaep.org/
pbs-pdf/115-stahn/); Justin Tillier, “The ICC Prosecutor and Positive Complementarity: 
Strengthening the Rule of Law”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2013, vol. 13, no. 
3, pp. 507–08: “The Preamble of the Rome Statue […] sets an ambitious goal – ending im-
punity, but the Preamble also provides a strict limitation on the implementation of this 
goal – the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. This means that 
national judiciaries have the primary responsibility for preventing and punishing atrocities 
in their own territories, and the ICC remains a Court of last resort”; see also David Hughes, 
“Investigation as Legitimisation: The Development, Use and Misuse of Informal Comple-
mentarity”, in Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2018, vol. 19, no. 1. 
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formation and evidence at the disposal of the military. For example, in 
order to establish criminal intent for a specific conduct or analyse target-
ing decisions, it is vital to build on information that the attacker had at the 
time of the relevant conduct. Information relating to the processes used in 
order to determine the lawfulness of potential targets is also crucial. Many 
investigations, both in the national and international spheres, commence 
following allegations brought by victims of hostilities, based on their ef-
fects and outcomes. The perspective offered by victims is very important 
for conducting a thorough factual assessment. Sometimes victims possess 
crucial information that is not known to the military. 
International investigators should be cognizant of the relative ad-
vantages of domestic systems, in particular in cases involving alleged 
violation of LOAC in which capable domestic military justice systems are 
available. As described above, this relative advantage stems from the legal 
and operational expertise of such domestic systems, as well as their prox-
imity to the scene and the exclusive information they may possess. In 
many cases, international investigations rely heavily on materials and 
evidence from victims or those who represent them, while State investiga-
tions have critical access to exclusive information, which is normally sen-
sitive and classified in situations with ongoing or recurring conflict. Inter-
national prosecutors should seek to “expend greater effort in ensuring that 
cases brought to trial are fully investigated and supported by sufficient 
evidence”.42 While there is no doubt that international judicial bodies are 
accountable to victims and communities affected by international crimes, 
who have understandable interests in the initiation of international pro-
ceedings, such expectations from international bodies cannot come at the 
expense of quality control or professionalism when conducting criminal 
processes. 
Considering the unique expertise gained in state investigative bod-
ies in the context of international investigations, international bodies 
should consider not merely deference to law-abiding states, but also refer-
ring victims and the information that they provided to the relevant nation-
al mechanisms. Some commentators have defined such a policy as “posi-
                                                   
42 Richard J. Goldstone, “Acquittals by the International Criminal Court”, EJIL: Talk!, 18 
January 2019 (available on its web site). 
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tive complementarity”.43 The inherent potential of national justice systems 
of States that are committed to the rule of law, reinforces the conclusion 
that this policy is a worthy one. 
That is not to say that national military justice systems are flawless. 
Examinations and investigations in situations that inherently involve vio-
lence and national sentiments, are never easy, and States do not always 
prioritize such endeavours. The role of jurists committed to international 
law is to support such systems and strive to improve them.44  
Professional international review of domestic investigation systems 
is sometimes necessary. However, considering also the challenges faced 
by international judicial institutions, and the difficulty of investigating 
“from a distance”, it is fundamentally important to invest resources in 
                                                   
43 ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, 1 February 2010, paras. 16–17 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/6ed914/): “The positive approach to complementarity means that the 
Office will encourage genuine national proceedings where possible […]”; Tillier, see 
above note 42; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, “A Positive Approach to Complementarity: The Im-
pact of the Office of the Prosecutor”, in Mohamed M. El Zeidy and Carsten Stahn (eds.), 
The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2011, pp. 21–32; William W. Burke-White, “Reframing Positive 
Complementarity: Reflections on the First Decade and Insights from the US Federal Crim-
inal Justice System”, in El Zeidy and Stahn (eds.), The International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 341-60; Katharine A. Marshall, 
“Prevention and Complementarity in the International Criminal Court: A Positive Ap-
proach”, in Human Rights Brief, 2010, vol. 17, no. 2; Rod Rastan, “Complementarity: 
Contest or Collaboration”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Complementarity and the Exercise of 
Universal Jurisdiction for Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublish-
er, 2010, pp. 112–13: 
Drawing on these lessons learned, the ICC Prosecutor’s Office stated early on that it 
would adopt a policy to encourage and assist national investigations and prosecutions. 
The stated objective was not to compete for case allocation with national courts, but to 
ensure that the most serious crimes did not go unpunished through adoption of a policy 
of coordinated action between the ICC and national authorities. This approach, labelled 
“positive complementarity”, has been described by the Prosecutor’s Office as meaning 
that it “encourages genuine national proceedings where possible; relies on national and 
international networks; and participates in a system of international cooperation”. 
44 See SONG Tianying, “Positive Complementarity and the Receiving End of Justice: The 
Case of Myanmar”, Policy Brief Series No. 104 (2020), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPub-
lisher, Brussels, 2020 (https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/104-song/).  
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strengthening the role of the domestic component within the international 
criminal justice system.45 International proceedings are a last resort. 
                                                   
45 Phil Clark, Distant Justice: The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African 
Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2018, chap. 5. 
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